oversight

Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning

Published by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General on 2020-12-21.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

Ineffective Implementation of
Corrective Actions Diminishes
DHS' Oversight of Its
Pandemic Planning




                  December 21, 2020
                         OIG-21-14
                   OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                       Department of Homeland Security
                        Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

                               December 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM FOR:          Ken Cuccinelli
                         Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
                         Deputy Secretary
                         Department of Homeland Security

FROM:                    Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
                         Inspector General
                                                       JOSEPH V   Digitally signed by
                                                                  JOSEPH V CUFFARI

                                                       CUFFARI    Date: 2020.12.18
                                                                  12:45:36 -05'00'

SUBJECT:                 Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions
                         Diminishes DHS’ Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning

For your action is our final report, Ineffective Implementation of Corrective
Actions Diminishes DHS’ Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning. We incorporated
the formal comments provided by your office.

The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving oversight of
personal protective equipment and pandemic planning. Your office concurred
with all three recommendations. Based on information provided in your
response to the draft report, we consider recommendation 3 open and
unresolved. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive
077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report
Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please
provide our office with a written response that includes your (1) agreement or
disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion date for each
recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other
supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of
the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the
recommendation will be considered open and unresolved.

Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we
consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and resolved. Once your office has
fully implemented the recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter
to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations. The
memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-
upon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to
OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.




www.oig.dhs.gov
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                      Department of Homeland Security


Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will
provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We
will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Don Bumgardner,
Deputy Assistant Inspector General, at (202) 981-6000.




Attachment




www.oig.dhs.gov
 
                                  DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
             Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions
           Diminishes DHS’ Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning
                                                         

December 21, 2020                         What We Found
                                          The Department of Homeland Security provided OIG
Why We Did                                with adequate documentation of its initial plans and
This Review                               actions to address our recommendations to improve
                                          the Department’s pandemic planning and response.
                                          However, DHS did not effectively implement corrective
The Office of Inspector                   actions to address three recommendations intended
General (OIG) issued a                    to provide the operational efficiencies and controls
series of three reports                   needed in the current pandemic. Specifically, DHS
between August 2014 and                   did not:
October 2016 examining
DHS’ pandemic activities
                                               ensure the office it designated to manage and
and recommending actions
                                                account for pandemic personal protective
to improve the efficiency
                                                equipment (PPE) provided adequate
and effectiveness of DHS’
                                                management oversight;
planning and response
                                               ensure components’ compliance with the
activities. OIG conducted
                                                Integrated Logistics Support Plan; and
this verification review to
determine the adequacy                         designate an office to ensure continued
and effectiveness of DHS’                       oversight, review, and approval of the
corrective actions.                             Department’s and components’ pandemic plans.

                                          As a result, early in the pandemic, as COVID-19
What We                                   spread throughout the world, DHS did not have
                                          sufficient department-wide oversight of PPE or
Recommend                                 pandemic planning.

We made three                             DHS has already begun to remedy this lack of
recommendations to ensure                 oversight. In March 2020, DHS implemented a
improved oversight of PPE                 centralized process to manage department-wide
and pandemic planning.                    pandemic funding and PPE supplies to ensure greater
                                          oversight and control. Continuing this approach
                                          should help DHS better prepare its components to
                                          protect the workforce and persons in their care and
                                          custody during this and future pandemics.

For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public
                                          DHS Response
Affairs at (202) 981-6000, or
email us at                               DHS concurred with all three recommendations. We
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov   consider recommendations 1 and 2 open and resolved
                                          and recommendation 3 open and unresolved.

       www.oig.dhs.gov                                                                OIG-21-14
        
                   OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                       Department of Homeland Security



                                Background

The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the safety and welfare
of its workforce and must ensure it is adequately prepared to continue critical
operations in the event of a pandemic. The Office of Inspector General (OIG)
issued three reports between August 2014 and October 2016 that examined
DHS’ pandemic activities and recommended actions to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of DHS’ planning and response.

      DHS Has Not Effectively Managed Pandemic Personal Protective
       Equipment and Antiviral Medical Countermeasures, OIG-14-129,
       August 26, 2014
      DHS’ Ebola Response Needs Better Coordination, Training, and Execution,
       OIG-16-18, January 6, 2016
      DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and Execution,
       OIG-17-02, October 12, 2016

Early in the pandemic, as COVID-19 spread throughout the world, DHS
responded to ensure it could continue mission-essential operations. DHS’
Management Directorate (MGMT) sent an email to DHS component heads on
January 31, 2020, recognizing that personal protective equipment (PPE)
supplies might become difficult to obtain based on increased global demand.
The email indicated that the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer
(OCRSO) would coordinate department-wide needs identification. OCRSO also
centralized the PPE procurement process to manage the procurement of PPE
for DHS components. The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO)
began issuing guidance for supervisors, managers, and DHS employees,
identifying guidance to follow during a pandemic. Further, DHS encouraged
telework and adjusted hours and operations to mitigate potential threats to the
workforce. All of these actions were proactive and showed flexibility and
resilience to changing conditions.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, OIG has initiated several pandemic-
related reviews to examine DHS’ response and preparedness. These reviews
relate to various issues such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency
supply chain and U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement’s efforts to prevent COVID-19 in their facilities.
This verification review examines DHS’ preparedness for the pandemic, based
on its implementation of recommendations issued in the three prior OIG
reports listed previously. We judgmentally selected for review 11 of the 28
recommendations on DHS-wide pandemic planning and response activities
included in these reports. Our sample selection focused on DHS-wide

www.oig.dhs.gov                       1                                OIG-21-14
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                      Department of Homeland Security

recommendations to improve oversight of pandemic PPE and pandemic
planning. See Appendix B for a list of the 11 recommendations in our sample.
Our objective was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of DHS’
corrective actions in response to the recommendations for improving DHS’
pandemic planning and response activities. We concluded that the corrective
actions were adequate if DHS submitted documentation to OIG to demonstrate
its corrective action plans addressed the intent of our recommendation at the
time the recommendation was closed. We concluded that the corrective actions
were effective if DHS implemented them in a way that improved pandemic
planning and response after the implementing actions were completed.

                    Results of Verification Review

DHS Adequately Addressed Prior OIG Report Recommendations

For the 11 recommendations in our sample, DHS provided OIG with adequate
documentation of its initial plans and actions to address our recommendations
to improve the Department’s pandemic planning and response. Adequate
documentation consisted of detailed implementation plans, delegation of roles
and responsibilities, and evidence of actions implemented to satisfy the intent
of the recommendations. For example, DHS provided a current copy of the
DHS Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease (PEID) Workforce Protection
Plan (WPP) and implementing memo sent to the components. The PEID WPP
established the requirement for component planning for preparedness, mission
readiness, and the protection of DHS personnel, as well as persons in DHS’
care or custody. A copy of its PPE logistics plan and implementing email
provided us evidence of a DHS strategy for managing PPE inventories. Copies
of component risk assessments demonstrated DHS’ ability to hold appropriate
amounts of PPE based on mission-critical needs. Further, samples of inventory
reports demonstrated that DHS could track PPE on hand.

DHS Did Not Effectively Implement Corrective Actions to
Address Three Recommendations

Despite adequate documentation, DHS’ implementation of corrective actions for
3 of the 11 recommendations in our sample did not provide the operational
efficiencies and controls the recommendations intended. Specifically, the
corrective actions were ineffective and did not provide sustainable
improvements to DHS’ pandemic planning and response activities.




www.oig.dhs.gov                       2                               OIG-21-14
                     OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                          Department of Homeland Security

DHS Did Not Ensure the Office It Designated to Manage and Account for
Pandemic PPE Provided Sufficient Management Oversight  

In our August 2014 report, DHS Has Not Effectively Managed Pandemic
Personal Protective Equipment and Antiviral Medical Countermeasures, we
recommended the Deputy Secretary identify and designate an office responsible
for the management and accountability of pandemic PPE.1 In response, MGMT
designated OCRSO responsible for the management and accountability of
pandemic PPE. To carry out this responsibility, OCRSO developed the PPE
Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP), which was issued in July 2015. This
plan identifies and describes specific logistics guidance, practices, and
methodologies to standardize the general process for all DHS components to
follow when supporting operational and pandemic PPE needs. According to the
ILSP, OCRSO was responsible for PPE management oversight throughout the
Department. However, OCRSO officials stated the office has no dedicated staff
or budget to manage the PPE program.

The PPE ILSP reinforced a decentralized process that empowered the
components to control their individual procurement transactions by using
mandatory DHS PPE contracts and pay for purchases with funds from the
components’ operating budgets. This process was used during the steady-state
conditions2 that existed from the time we closed the related report
recommendation in September 2015 until the COVID-19 pandemic was
declared in March 2020.

OCRSO officials acknowledged that the extent of their office’s oversight of the
PPE inventory was quarterly report reviews, which were spreadsheets providing
only the amounts of PPE the components maintained. The reports contained
no details such as PPE expiration dates, which are needed to ensure that older
inventory is not held past the time it is still considered safe and effective for
use. Two media articles from 2020 reported that DHS components had
significant quantities of expired PPE inventories.3 One article stated U.S.
Customs and Border Protection had an expired inventory of 1.5 million N95
masks. Per the second article, the Transportation Security Administration held
an inventory of more than 115,000 expired N95 masks, which were purchased
in 2009. Neither of these N95 mask inventories were included in a January
2017 inventory report that DHS provided to OIG as support for closing the
recommendation.
                                                       
1 OIG-14-129, Recommendation 1.
2 Steady-state conditions refer to normal operating conditions that present a stable and
unchanging environment, as opposed to a pandemic or quickly changing environment.
3 The Washington Post, “U.S. Government Has 1.5 million Expired N95 Masks Sitting in an

Indiana Warehouse,” March 26, 2020; Government Executive, “As TSA’s Screeners Work
Significantly Reduced Schedules, Agency’s N95 Stockpile Goes Unused,” May 4, 2020.

www.oig.dhs.gov                             3                                     OIG-21-14
                                        OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                  Department of Homeland Security

In March 2020, DHS MGMT received $178.3 million in emergency funding
under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act to procure PPE
and sanitization materials. As a result, MGMT decided to centrally manage
these funds, and OCRSO centralized the procurement process to support this
initiative. This process enabled OCRSO to manage department-wide PPE
purchases and limit inventory quantities to pandemic operational needs. In
addition, OCRSO established bi-weekly meetings to coordinate with the
components and monitor PPE inventories, burn rates, and needs.

In summary, during the steady-state environment, despite being named the
responsible office, OCRSO did not assign responsibilities and establish
processes to oversee the PPE program. OCRSO conducted quarterly reviews of
inventory reports, but we consider this level of oversight to be insufficient to
qualify as an effective internal control over the PPE program. The decentralized
process that DHS implemented during the steady-state environment and that
lasted until March 2020 did not provide the oversight and control intended by
our prior report recommendation. On the other hand, a centralized process,
recently implemented in March 2020 to manage department-wide PPE supplies
during the pandemic, provided greater oversight and control capabilities. DHS
would benefit from continuing this centralized approach moving forward once
the operating environment transitions from crisis mode back to steady-state
operations. Continuing this approach should help DHS better prepare its
components to protect the workforce and persons in their care and custody
during this and future pandemics.

DHS Did Not Ensure Components’ Compliance with the Integrated
Logistics Support Plan

As previously explained, we recommended in our August 2014 report that the
Deputy Secretary identify and designate an office responsible for the
management and accountability of pandemic PPE.4 In response, MGMT
designated OCRSO to be responsible for the management and accountability of
pandemic PPE. To carry out this responsibility, OCRSO developed the PPE
ILSP. According to the ILSP, the components were responsible for the PPE life
cycle, including PPE inventory tracking, management, maintenance and
rotation, and maintenance of inventory records.

However, in our October 2016 report, DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better
Oversight, Training, and Execution, we identified inconsistent DHS component
compliance with the ILSP and recommended the Department establish
oversight to address this issue.5 In response, DHS reiterated that OCRSO had
                                                       
4   OIG-14-129, Recommendation 1.
5   OIG-17-02, Recommendation 4.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                 4                   OIG-21-14
                                        OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                  Department of Homeland Security

direct oversight of department-wide pandemic PPE inventory. Yet, DHS limited
OCRSO’s responsibility to compiling and reviewing quarterly reports comprised
of component input to OCRSO’s asset management system, to monitor
procurement activities. OCRSO used these reports to ensure components used
mandatory strategic sourcing contracts, as required by ILSP.

Although responsible, OCRSO did not have the resources to properly conduct
PPE oversight. OCRSO officials told us the components did not consistently
maintain timely and accurate inventory records, which OCRSO needed for PPE
oversight. The inventory records also did not contain PPE expiration dates.
Furthermore, OCRSO officials said its ILSP was widely considered guidance
and not policy, and could not be enforced. Our October 2016 report discussed
instances when components did not comply with certain ILSP requirements.
For example:

            three components did not determine pandemic PPE requirements;
            three components (which included two components from the first group
             identified above) could not identify pandemic PPE supplies or were
             unaware if local offices had supplies on site; and
            another three components established pandemic re-ordering timelines
             that differed from the ILSP requirements.6


As a result, we concluded that without clear guidance and proper oversight, the
Department could not ensure components had the necessary amounts of PPE
to protect their personnel during the initial stages of a pandemic response.
Our August 2014 report previously recommended an office to be responsible for
management and accountability for pandemic PPE. However, in October 2016
we emphasized the need for such oversight to ensure components followed the
procedures set forward in the ILSP. Despite the two similar recommendations
issued in 2014 and 2016, the Department did not implement corrective actions
to address them.

According to OCRSO officials, in the COVID-19 pandemic environment, DHS
has begun re-evaluating its approach to PPE inventory management, such as
just-in-time7 ordering and delivery included in the ILSP. DHS officials told us
just-in-time inventory management did not work well because the global
demand for PPE had limited available supplies. OCRSO officials stated they
will conduct a lessons learned evaluation of PPE inventory management once
the pandemic ends.

                                                       
6
 OIG-17-02, pages 6 and 7.
7
 Just-in-time refers to a business practice of attempting to cut costs and improve quality by
reducing inventory stockpiles and delivering products as needed.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                 5                    OIG-21-14
                                        OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                                  Department of Homeland Security

DHS Did Not Designate an Office to Ensure Continued Oversight, Review,
and Approval of the Department’s and Components’ Pandemic Plans  

In our October 2016 report, DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight,
Training, and Execution, we further recommended the Deputy Secretary
designate an office responsible for conducting oversight of component
pandemic plans, including review and approval of those plans.8 In response,
DHS stated the DHS Pandemic Workforce Protection Plan (PWPP) was
undergoing significant revisions and would be republished as the “DHS
Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease (PEID) Plan.” The PEID Steering
Committee (PEID-SC), co-chaired by executives from MGMT and the Office of
Health Affairs (OHA), would oversee this effort and revisions every 2 years. The
co-chairs of the PEID-SC would establish a team to review and approve
components’ PEID plans.

The DHS Secretary approved the DHS PEID WPP on January 7, 2017. The
purpose of this plan was to prepare DHS components to protect their workforce
and persons in their care and custody. The plan required DHS components to
develop or update their existing component-level plans within 120 calendar
days of approval of the DHS plan.9 The PEID-SC team completed its review of
the components’ plans in June 2017 and team members returned to their
normal duties. OHA was dissolved in December 2017 and its functions were
reassigned to MGMT and the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction office.
DHS did not reassign OHA’s PEID-SC leadership responsibilities, and MGMT
did not reassign its leadership responsibilities on the Steering Committee. As a
result, DHS and MGMT did not ensure continued oversight of department-wide
pandemic planning, thereby rendering DHS’ corrective action obsolete.

Since the oversight structure DHS created to address our recommendation is
no longer in place, there is continuing confusion over who will lead the revision
of DHS’ and components’ workforce protection plans. MGMT staff told us they
began discussing the requirement to update the WPP in fall 2019. However, at
the conclusion of our fieldwork in July 2020, DHS had not identified an office
or entity responsible for updating the PEID WPP. As such, the Department has
not followed through on corrective actions to implement our related report
recommendation for ensuring DHS-wide oversight of pandemic planning.




                                                       
8 OIG-17-02, Recommendation 1.
9 The DHS PEID Workforce Protection Plan establishes expectations for components’ roles,
responsibilities, and plan development and provides detailed guidance in its annexes.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                 6                   OIG-21-14
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                      Department of Homeland Security

                           Recommendations

We recommend the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Deputy
Secretary:

Recommendation 1: Assign responsibility and delegate authority to an office
or individual for the oversight, management, and accountability of pandemic
PPE, including authority to ensure that components comply with DHS PPE
policies.

Recommendation 2: Assign responsibility and delegate authority to an office
or individual to update and establish a formal policy with procedures,
practices, and methodologies identified in the PPE ILSP, to standardize the
process for all DHS components to follow for their PPE programs.

Recommendation 3: Assign responsibility and delegate authority to an office
or individual for oversight and management of DHS and component pandemic
plans, including review, approval, and updating of those plans.

              Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We received DHS’ formal response to our draft report on December 8, 2020.
DHS stated the COVID-19 pandemic has presented historic challenges to all
levels of government. We agree with this observation and noted in our report
that OCRSO planned to conduct a lessons learned evaluation of its response to
COVID-19. We encourage DHS to use this analysis to improve processes and
procedures to protect the health and safety of the DHS workforce and persons
in its care and custody.

DHS concurred with all three recommendations.

Based on our evaluation of DHS’ response, we consider recommendations 1
and 2 open and resolved and recommendation 3 open and unresolved.
Appendix A contains a copy of the Department’s response in its entirety. We
also received technical comments and incorporated changes to the report
where appropriate. A summary of the Department’s responses to the
recommendations and our analysis follows.

DHS Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. In January 2014, the Office
of the Under Secretary for Management designated OCRSO as being
responsible for the management and accountability of pandemic PPE. This
designation remains in place but will be reviewed and updated, as appropriate,
including upgrading the designation to a formal delegation to clarify OCRSO

www.oig.dhs.gov                       7                                OIG-21-14
                   OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                       Department of Homeland Security

authority, if recommended by the DHS Office of General Counsel. In addition,
OCRSO will expand previous efforts to centrally manage Department-wide
pandemic PPE logistical oversight, funding, and PPE supplies. This will include
developing a plan to revise/create and implement a process(es) to ensure that
components comply with DHS PPE policies. Estimated Completion Date (ECD):
December 31, 2021.

OIG Analysis of DHS Response: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the
recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until
DHS provides documentation showing assignment of responsibility and
delegation of authority to an office or individual for the oversight, management,
and accountability of pandemic PPE, as well as a plan to create and implement
processes to ensure components comply with DHS PPE policies.

DHS Response to Recommendation 2: Concur. Per Office of the Under
Secretary for Management direction in January 2014, OCRSO is responsible for
PPE management oversight throughout the Department. This designation
remains in place, but will be reviewed and updated, as appropriate. OCRSO
will establish a formal policy and revise and update the ILSP, dated July 2015,
to reflect Department’s current procedures, practices, and methodologies for
the oversight of Department-wide PPE programs, as appropriate. ECD:
December 31, 2021.

OIG Analysis of DHS Response: DHS’ proposed actions are responsive to the
recommendation. The recommendation will remain open and resolved until
DHS implements and provides copies of a formal policy describing procedures,
practices, and methodologies for DHS components to follow in managing their
PPE programs.

DHS Response to Recommendation 3: Concur. The Under Secretary for
Management, through the DHS Chief Human Capital Officer, in coordination
with the Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, and
through the Chief Medical Officer, will update the DHS Pandemic and
Emerging Infectious Disease Workforce Pandemic Plan, dated October 7, 2016,
and related component plans, as appropriate. ECD: December 31, 2021.

OIG Analysis of DHS Response: DHS’ proposed actions are not responsive to
the recommendation. DHS has not designated a single office or individual
ultimately responsible for oversight and management of DHS and component
pandemic plans. Additionally, DHS’ response indicated it will update the DHS
Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Disease Workforce Pandemic Plan, but did
not confirm that it will review, approve, and update all DHS component
pandemic plans. Designating a single responsible office or official will provide
DHS with the oversight structure to revise pandemic plans in the near and

www.oig.dhs.gov                        8                                OIG-21-14
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                      Department of Homeland Security

distant future to provide DHS-wide oversight of pandemic planning. The
recommendation will remain open and unresolved until DHS formally
designates an office or individual responsible for oversight and management of
DHS and component pandemic plans.

                  Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by amendment to
the Inspector General Act of 1978.

Our objective was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of DHS’
corrective actions to address three OIG reports (OIG-14-129, OIG-16-18, and
OIG-17-02) containing 28 recommendations for improvement to DHS pandemic
planning and response.

We judgmentally selected 11 of 28 key recommendations on DHS-wide
pandemic planning and response activities for review. We further focused on
recommendations relevant to COVID-19 concerns about DHS planning and
response activities, and management of personal protective equipment.  

To achieve our objective, we reviewed prior reports, documentation in the DHS
OIG Project Tracking System that DHS submitted to close the
recommendations, and new information through media reports. We conducted
interviews with OCHCO, OCRSO, Office of Procurement Operations, and Office
of the Chief Security Officer. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
provided written responses to questions. We requested documentation from
OCHCO, OCRSO, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office, and MGMT.

We conducted this verification review between April 2020 and July 2020
pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to
the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Shelley Howes,
Director; John McPhail, Supervisory Program Analyst; Diane Benton, Program
Analyst; Denis Foley, Program Analyst; Audrey Van, Auditor; Kate Fishler,
Auditor; Deborah Mouton-Miller, Communications Analyst; Rolando Chavez,
Independent Referencer.




www.oig.dhs.gov                       9                               OIG-21-14
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                    Department of Homeland Security

Appendix A
DHS Comments to the Draft Report




                                                               

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                    Department of Homeland Security




www.oig.dhs.gov                  11                   OIG-21-14
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                         Department of Homeland Security

Appendix B
Sample of 11 Recommendations Reviewed
 
The following recommendations identified in bold are those that our review
determined were not effectively implemented by DHS.
       Report and
    Recommendation                         Recommendation
        Number
      OIG-14-129   DHS Has Not Effectively Managed Pandemic Personal Protective
                   Equipment and Antiviral Medical Countermeasures
           1          Identify and designate an office responsible for the
                      management and accountability of pandemic personal
                      protective equipment (PPE).
           2          Develop a strategy for management, storage, and distribution of
                      pandemic PPE.
           3          Implement an inventory system for the current inventory and
                      future inventories of pandemic PPE.
           4          Work with components to establish a methodology for determining
                      sufficient types and quantities of pandemic PPE to align with the
                      department-wide pandemic plan.
           5          Have components implement inventory control procedures for pre-
                      positioned pandemic PPE to monitor stockpiles, track shipments,
                      and ensure compliance with departmental guidance.
       OIG-16-18      DHS’ Ebola Response Needs Better Coordination, Training, and
                      Execution
           10         Ensure components make PPE purchases based on component
                      risks.
       OIG-17-02      DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and
                      Execution
           1          Designate an office responsible for conducting oversight of
                      component pandemic plans, including review and approval of
                      those plans.
           2          Update the Department’s Pandemic Workforce Protection
                      Plan to clarify pandemic readiness training requirements.
           3          Issue implementation guidance, including deadlines, for
                      components to execute the Integrated Logistics Support Plan.
           4          Establish oversight to ensure component compliance with the
                      Integrated Logistics Support Plan.
           5          Establish clear and consistent guidance for timeframes that
                      components should maintain pandemic personal protection
                      equipment.
 




www.oig.dhs.gov                          12                                 OIG-21-14
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                       Department of Homeland Security

Appendix C
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees




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