oversight

DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs

Published by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General on 2021-01-25.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

DHS Has Not
Effectively
Implemented the
Prompt Asylum Pilot
Programs




                January 25, 2021
                      OIG-21-16
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                      Department of Homeland Security
                       Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

                               January 2, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR:         Troy Miller
                        Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
                        Commissioner
                        U.S. Customs and Border Protection

                        Tracy Renaud
                        Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director
                        U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

FROM:                   Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.                Digitally signed by JOSEPH V
                                                 JOSEPH V
                        Inspector General                       CUFFARI
                                                                Date: 2021.01.21 16:33:47
                                                      CUFFARI   -05'00'


SUBJECT:                DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt
                        Asylum Pilot Programs

Attached for your information is our final report, DHS Has Not Effectively
Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs. We incorporated the formal
comments from DHS in the final report.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will
provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and
appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We
will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Thomas Kait,
Assistant Inspector General for Special Reviews and Evaluations, at
(202) 981-6000.


Attachment
                                      DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
                        DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the
                            Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs


 January 25, 2021                          What We Found
                                           DHS has not effectively implemented the PACR and HARP
 Why We Did                                programs. Within the Department, U.S. Customs and
 This Review                               Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and
                                           Immigration Services (USCIS) share responsibility for
                                           managing PACR and HARP. Because of rapid
 In recent years, the United
                                           implementation and expansion of the programs, DHS
 States has experienced a
                                           components did not adequately consider several factors
 surge in migrants crossing
                                           necessary to support their operations. Specifically, our
 the southern border to seek
                                           initial review and visit to the El Paso sector disclosed:
 asylum. In October 2019,
 DHS began pilots of the                       x few metrics were implemented to measure the
 Prompt Asylum Claim                             programs’ effectiveness in meeting goals;
 Review (PACR) and                             x a program goal of 7 to 10-day maximum detention
 Humanitarian Asylum                             is inconsistent with CBP detention standards and
 Review Process (HARP)                           was routinely exceeded;
 programs to quickly process                   x due to facility limitations, multiple families were co-
 migrants with claims of                         located, with limited assurance of privacy and
 credible fear. We conducted                     separation of juveniles from unrelated adults;
 this review to evaluate DHS’
                                               x consultation areas and legal amenities were not
 effectiveness to date in
                                                 conducive to allowing aliens to prepare for credible-
 implementing the programs.
                                                 fear screening interviews;
 This interim report is based
                                               x staff resources were inadequate to manage the
 on observations from our
                                                 programs; and
 visit to the El Paso, TX
                                               x data systems were not interoperable, necessitating
 border sector.
                                                 labor-intensive and error-prone manual efforts to
                                                 track and share information across components.
 What We                                   As of April 15, 2020, DHS had deployed the pilot
 Recommend                                 programs to most sectors on the southern border. Going
                                           forward, DHS should consider and take actions to address
 We made six                               the issues we identified, to better ensure effectiveness in
 recommendations to                        fulfilling mission goals.
 improve PACR and HARP
 program implementation.                   DHS Response
 For Further Information:                  DHS officials did not concur with five recommendations
 Contact our Office of Public Affairs at   and concurred with one. We consider these five
 (202) 981-6000, or email us at
 DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov   recommendations unresolved and open and one
                                           recommendation resolved and open.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                                          OIG-21-16
                          OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                                Department of Homeland Security

Table of Contents

Background .................................................................................................... 3

Results of Review ............................................................................................ 8

        Few Metrics Were Implemented to Measure Pilot Programs’
        Effectiveness.......................................................................................... 8

        Program Goal of 7 to 10-Day Maximum Detention Is Inconsistent with
        CBP Detention Standards and Was Routinely Exceeded ....................... 11

        Assurance of Privacy and Separation of Juveniles from Unrelated Adults
        Is Limited at El Paso Facility ................................................................ 13

        Consultation Areas and Legal Amenities Are Not Conducive to Allowing
        Aliens to Prepare for Credible-Fear Screening Interviews ...................... 16

        Staff Resources Were Inadequate to Effectively Manage the Programs .. 20

        Data System Limitations Entailed Labor-Intensive and Error-Prone
        Manual Efforts to Track and Share Information ................................... 23

Conclusion.................................................................................................... 24

Recommendations......................................................................................... 25

Appendixes

        Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 32
        Appendix B: DHS Comments to the Draft Report ................................. 34
        Appendix C: PACR and HARP Processes Compared to Standard
                    Expedited Removal/Credible Fear Process ........................ 41
        Appendix D: PACR and HARP Process Flowchart.................................. 42
        Appendix E: Special Reviews and Evaluations Major Contributors to
                    This Report ...................................................................... 43
        Appendix F: Report Distribution .......................................................... 44

Abbreviations

        CBP               U.S. Customs and Border Protection
        C.F.R.            Code of Federal Regulations
        CPC               Centralized Processing Center

www.oig.dhs.gov                                                                                     OIG-21-16
                  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                     Department of Homeland Security

      CRCL        Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
      EOIR        Executive Office for Immigration Review
      FRC         Family Residential Center
      GAO         Government Accountability Office
      HARP        Humanitarian Asylum Review Process
      ICE         U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
      INA         Immigration and Nationality Act
      OFO         Office of Field Operations
      PACR        Prompt Asylum Claim Review
      POE         Port of Entry
      TEDS        National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and
                  Search
      UAC         Unaccompanied Alien Children
      U.S.C.      United States Code
      USCIS       U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services




www.oig.dhs.gov                                                      OIG-21-16
                      OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                            Department of Homeland Security

                                        Background

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO)
manages U.S. ports of entry where officers perform immigration and customs
functions, admitting admissible individuals who have valid documents for legal
entry, such as visas or legal permanent resident cards. Between ports of entry,
CBP’s Border Patrol detects and interdicts individuals suspected of illegally
entering into the United States. Together, OFO and Border Patrol are
responsible for providing short-term detention for inadmissible aliens1 arriving
in the United States without valid travel documents, in compliance with the
National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS),2 which
governs CBP’s interaction with detained individuals. The Department of
Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, which works with
CBP to design and implement policies, procedures, and guidance to protect the
civil and human rights of detainees in DHS custody, actively participated in the
development of the TEDS standards.3

Upon encountering inadmissible aliens at or between ports of entry, CBP’s OFO
officers and Border Patrol agents generally determine whether to (1) place
inadmissible adults and family units4 into expedited removal proceedings,5 or
(2) refer them for full removal proceedings before the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR).6 CBP transfers aliens placed into expedited
removal proceedings to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for
detention. ICE refers aliens who express a fear of persecution, torture, or a
fear of return, or otherwise indicate an intention to apply for asylum to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), whose asylum officers conduct a
credible-fear screening interview.7 Aliens receiving a positive credible fear

1 Inadmissible aliens are aliens who are ineligible for visas or admission to the United States,

including aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and aliens not
in possession of a valid visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid
entry document. 8 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), (7)(A)(i)(I).
2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and

Search, October 2015.
3 Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Fiscal Year 2015

Annual Report to Congress, June 10, 2016.
4 Unaccompanied alien children are transferred to the custody of the Department of Health and

Human Services and are not subject to expedited removal proceedings.
5 Expedited removal generally enables immigration officers to order removal of aliens

determined inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act without further review or
hearing before an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
6 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). A full removal proceeding, often referred to as a 240

proceeding, is conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
7 USCIS conducts credible-fear screening interviews to determine whether aliens have a

credible fear of torture, or of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, if returned to their country.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                 3                                      OIG-21-16
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                           Department of Homeland Security

determination from USCIS are referred to EOIR for a hearing on their asylum
claim;8 those receiving a negative determination may request a review of that
determination before an immigration judge.

In late spring and early summer of 2019, CBP experienced unprecedented
numbers of inadmissible aliens trying to enter the United States. Many of
these aliens claimed they feared returning to their country of origin and
intended to claim asylum. In May 2019, CBP officials testified before Congress
that they were experiencing an unprecedented border security and
humanitarian crisis along the Southwest Border.9 According to CBP data, the
number of aliens apprehended between ports of entry, or found inadmissible at
ports of entry, along the Southwest Border increased 135 percent from fiscal
year 2017 to FY 2019, as shown in Table 1. This surge in migrants led to
overcrowding and prolonged detention of individuals in some Border Patrol
facilities, and prolonged detention in some ports of entry.10

Table 1. Southwest Border Apprehensions and Inadmissible Aliens
                           FY 2017        FY 2018         FY 2019
 Unaccompanied Alien
                            48,681         58,660           80,634
 Children (UAC)
 Family Units              104,997        161,113          527,112
 Single Adults             261,513        301,317          368,812
                Total      415,191        521,090         976,558
Source: CBP Southwest Border migration data

On July 17, 2019, a bipartisan group of nine Senators requested that President
Trump implement a pilot program, provisionally titled “Operation Safe Return”:

       … to rapidly, accurately, and fairly determine those families who have
       crossed the southern border that clearly do not have a valid legal claim
       and safely return them to their home countries.[…] The process would use



8 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens are issued a notice to appear which provides the EOIR
hearing date, time, and venue.
9 At the Breaking Point: the Humanitarian and Security Crisis at our Southern Border, Hearing

before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Border Security and
Immigration, May 8, 2019 (joint statement of Todd Owen, Exec. Assist. Comm., CBP, Carla L.
Provost, Chief, USBP, Manuel Padilla, Director, Joint Task Force-West, DHS).
10 Management Alert – DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at

El Paso Del Norte Processing Center, OIG-19-46, May 2019; Management Alert – DHS Needs to
Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio
Grande Valley, OIG-19-51, July 2019; Capping Report: CBP Struggled to Provide Adequate
Detention Conditions During 2019 Migrant Surge, OIG-20-38, June 2020.

www.oig.dhs.gov                               4                                     OIG-21-16
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       existing authorities, but surge necessary resources to a limited, particular
       location on the southern border.11

In early October 2019, DHS began implementing the Prompt Asylum Claim
Review (PACR) pilot program in the El Paso sector, with the intention to more
quickly process12 and remove non-Mexican single adults and family units13
apprehended by Border Patrol without a valid asylum claim. Border Patrol
agents complete initial assessments of those aliens subject to the pilot,14 and
then transfer them to a temporary, modular Central Processing Center (CPC)15
for USCIS to conduct credible fear screenings. In late October 2019, DHS also
implemented the Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (HARP) pilot program
to take a similar approach to Mexican single adults and family units, primarily
at ports of entry, beginning with the Paso del Norte port of entry in El Paso,
Texas.16 Under HARP, OFO handles the initial processing of those subject to
the pilot program17 at the port of entry, and then transfers them to Border
Patrol’s CPC facility to continue the asylum claim process. The goal of both
pilot programs is to complete the credible fear screening process in 7 to 10
days, while applicants remain in CBP custody.


11 Letter from Senators Ron Johnson, Kyrsten Sinema, et al. to President Donald J. Trump,
July 17, 2019.
12 CBP’s admissibility processing includes verifying the alien’s identity, checking databases for

outstanding warrants or criminal history, searching the alien for drugs or contraband, and
taking statements from the alien. CBP may refer aliens to USCIS to conduct credible fear
screenings and to ICE for detention or release.
13 UAC are not subject to PACR and HARP pilot programs and are normally transferred to the

Department of Health and Human Services.
14 The PACR program was launched as a pilot to effectively process aliens subject to the Third

Country Transit rule. CBP may only enroll in the PACR program non-Mexican single adults or
family units who have been placed in expedited removal proceedings and who have expressed a
fear of persecution or torture, or a fear of return, or indicated an intention to apply for asylum.
The Third-Country Transit rule bars eligibility for asylum for an alien who enters or attempts to
enter the United States across the southern border, but who did not apply for protection from
persecution or torture where it was available in at least one third country outside the alien’s
country of citizenship, nationality, or last lawful habitual residence, through which he or she
transited en route to the United States. 84 FR 33829, July 16, 2019.
15 Prior to the opening of the CPC in March 2020, Border Patrol held aliens in the PACR

program in soft-sided tents at El Paso Border Patrol Station One.
16 OFO does not process aliens for the PACR program. PACR is a Border Patrol program, and

OFO officers have discretion to place non-Mexican nationals arriving at ports of entry (POE)
into other programs, such as the Migrant Protection Protocols (also referred to as “Remain in
Mexico”). After introducing HARP at the Paso del Norte POE, HARP also became available to
Border Patrol. During the period of our review, Border Patrol placed approximately 350
Mexicans in HARP.
17 CBP may only enroll in the HARP program Mexican single adults or family units who have

been placed in expedited removal proceedings and who have expressed a fear of persecution or
torture, or a fear of return, or indicated an intention to apply for asylum.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                 5                                       OIG-21-16
                      OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                           Department of Homeland Security

CBP facilitates USCIS credible fear processing and EOIR hearings while aliens
in PACR and HARP programs remain in CBP custody. USCIS’ credible fear
processing of aliens in the pilot programs is generally the same as its
processing of those not in the programs. However, USCIS conducts interviews
with aliens in the pilot programs while they are detained in Border Patrol
facilities, while those not in the pilot programs are interviewed while in ICE
custody. Differences and similarities between the pilot programs and the
standard expedited removal/credible fear process are shown in Appendix C.
Similar to other individuals placed in expedited removal proceedings, during
the time of our site visit to El Paso, USCIS afforded aliens in PACR and HARP a
48-hour consultation period18 prior to the credible-fear screening interview.
This provides aliens an opportunity to contact a relative, representative,
attorney, or any other person whom the alien may want to act as their
consultant during the interview. USCIS’ goal is then to process PACR and
HARP credible fear interviews within 4 days of receiving the referral from CBP,
whereas for other individuals in expedited removal proceedings, the goal to
process credible-fear screening interviews is 10 days. In addition, requests for
review of a negative credible fear determination by an EOIR immigration judge
occurs while the single adult or family unit is still in CBP custody rather than
in ICE detention. Appendix D provides a general flowchart of the PACR and
HARP processes.

Although deemed pilots, DHS has implemented PACR and HARP in all but one
of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the Southwest Border.19 The rollout of
the programs occurred as follows:

     x   October 2019 - El Paso, TX (PACR)
     x   December 2019 - Rio Grande Valley, TX (PACR)
     x   January 2020 - Yuma, AZ (PACR); El Centro, CA (PACR); Big Bend, TX
         (PACR); San Diego, CA (PACR); El Paso, TX (HARP)
     x   February 2020 - Laredo, TX (PACR); Del Rio, TX (PACR);Yuma, AZ
         (HARP); Rio Grande Valley, TX (HARP); Laredo, TX (HARP); Del Rio, TX
         (HARP)

OFO at ports of entry and Border Patrol between the ports in these areas

18 In July 2019, the then acting USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli reduced the time for
consultation from 48–72 hours to 24 hours for all aliens in the credible fear process. However,
the consultation time reverted to 48–72 hours in March 2020, after a Federal district court
judge ruled that Mr. Cuccinelli had not been lawfully appointed as acting USCIS Director in
2019, and therefore, the “reduced-time-to-consult” policy had to be set aside. L.M.-M. v.
Cuccinelli, 442 F.Supp.3d 1 (D. D.C. March 1, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5141, 2020 WL
5358686 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 25, 2020).
19 Tucson, AZ, is the only Southwest Border sector that has not yet implemented the programs.


www.oig.dhs.gov                                6                                    OIG-21-16
                     OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                          Department of Homeland Security

identify aliens who meet the criteria for inclusion in the programs and then
transport those aliens to one of three designated Border Patrol facilities along
the Southwest Border for credible fear processing. Aliens encountered in El
Paso and Big Bend are transferred to the CPC in El Paso; those encountered in
the Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio are transferred to the Donna 1 soft-
sided tent facility in the Rio Grande Valley; and those encountered in Yuma, El
Centro, and San Diego are transferred to the Temporary Processing Center soft-
sided tent facility in Yuma, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Southwest Border Map Showing Approximate Coverage of PACR
and HARP Central Processing Centers




Source: OIG depiction of CBP data

We are conducting this review in response to a July 18, 2019 Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee request to conduct a review of
“Operation Safe Return” concurrent with its implementation. The committee
also requested Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a review of the same program.
In November 2019, we confirmed that CBP’s PACR and HARP programs were
similar to Operation Safe Return, and in February 2020, we initiated our
review. From March 10 to 13, 2020, we conducted our first site visit to the El
Paso, Texas area. At the time of our site visit, the El Paso sector had 164
aliens in the PACR and HARP programs. We had to suspend our additional site
visits upon returning from El Paso due to the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic. CBP is generally no longer detaining inadmissible aliens in its
holding facilities and is immediately returning inadmissible aliens to the




www.oig.dhs.gov                          7                             OIG-21-16
                      OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
                           Department of Homeland Security

country they entered from or to their country of origin.20 As such, CBP has
temporarily halted PACR and HARP. We conducted additional fieldwork,
including telephonic interviews and analysis of documents and data, through
June 2020. We are issuing this interim report to provide our initial
observations of PACR and HARP, primarily limited to the El Paso, Texas area.
Once the COVID-19 pandemic has eased and if the programs resume
operations, we plan to continue our fieldwork and issue another report.

                                   Results of Review

DHS has not effectively implemented the PACR and HARP programs. Within
the Department, CBP and USCIS share responsibility for managing PACR and
HARP. Because of rapid implementation and expansion of the programs, DHS
components did not adequately consider several factors necessary to support
their operations. Specifically, our initial review work and visit to the El Paso
sector disclosed:

     x   few metrics were implemented to measure the programs’ effectiveness in
         meeting goals;
     x   a program goal of 7 to 10-day maximum detention is inconsistent with
         CBP detention standards and was routinely exceeded;
     x   due to facility limitations, multiple families were co-located, with limited
         assurance of privacy and separation of juveniles from unrelated adults;
     x   consultation areas and legal amenities in El Paso were not conducive to
         allowing aliens to prepare for credible-fear screening interviews;
     x   staff resources were inadequate to manage the programs; and,
     x   data systems were not interoperable, necessitating labor-intensive and
         error-prone manual efforts to track and share information across
         components.

Few Metrics Were Implemented to Measure Pilot Programs’
Effectiveness

GAO has issued best practices for an effective pilot phase of a program.
According to GAO, “The pilot phase allows for a check on whether program
operations … occur as expected.”21 In another report, GAO recommended that

20 As a result of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Order Suspending
Introduction of Persons from a country where a communicable disease exists (March 20, 2020),
CBP stopped or significantly limited the processing of inadmissible aliens seeking asylum,
which has raised legal concerns. We did not assess this action or its legal implications as it is
outside the scope of this report.
21 Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, GAO-12-208G, January 2012.



www.oig.dhs.gov                                 8                                     OIG-21-16
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                           Department of Homeland Security

pilot programs should have well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives;
criteria or standards for determining pilot performance; and a plan to track the
pilot’s performance and evaluate the final results.22 Following these best
practices can increase the rigor of the pilots to ensure scalability and long-term
success.

Although deemed pilots by CBP, both PACR and HARP have been implemented
along most of the Southwest Border without a full evaluation of their
effectiveness or the resources required to implement and sustain them for the
long term. At the time of our review, CBP provided only two evaluation metrics
for PACR, and none for HARP. Of the two metrics for PACR, CBP did not
establish a goal against which to measure one of the metrics (i.e., the number
of aliens successfully processed in the program), and did not meet the other
metric (i.e., the prescribed timeline to complete processing). Further, we could
not identify any formal plans for the rollout of the programs beyond a list of
dates and expansion locations. Nor did we find any decision points for the
rollout based on an evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness.

Upon initiating the pilot programs, CBP did not direct the El Paso Sector to
collect or track any metrics and did not provide any clearly defined goals to
evaluate performance. Nor has CBP conveyed to any sector formal or detailed
policy guidance including the use of metrics and goals. Instead, CBP provided
a generic concept of operations outline and left implementation and evaluation
details to sector officials to determine. During our site visit to El Paso, we
observed a method that sector officials implemented to track all aliens enrolled
in the programs in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. A Border Patrol official
stated the spreadsheet was the official system of record from the programs’
implementation in October 2019 until the e3 Portal23 (e3) was modified in
January 2020. The spreadsheet evolved during this period to capture the
aliens’ demographic data, and program milestones such as referral to USCIS,
dates of credible-fear screening interviews, and outcomes to meet headquarters
reporting requirements. However, headquarters program officials could not
demonstrate how they used this data or any other metrics to evaluate the
effectiveness of the pilot programs prior to expanding them to other sectors.

CBP’s metrics to determine the success of the pilot programs were nonexistent
or limited at most, yet CBP expanded the programs to additional locations.
According to Border Patrol, two metrics used to evaluate the success of the

22 Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Strengthen its Approach for Evaluating the SRFMI Data-
Sharing Pilot Program, GAO-09-45, November 2008.
23 The e3 Portal collects and transmits biographic, encounter, and biometric data for

identification and verification of individuals encountered at the border and checkpoints for
CBP’s law enforcement and immigration mission.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                9                                      OIG-21-16
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                           Department of Homeland Security

PACR program are the number of aliens successfully processed and keeping
the entire process within the prescribed timeline. However, CBP never stated
the goal for the number of aliens successfully processed in the program, and
therefore, there is no benchmark to measure against. Further, the number of
aliens successfully processed for the program is relative to the number of
eligible aliens encountered by CBP. That latter number fluctuates depending
on many outside factors influencing migration patterns and the proportion of
asylum seekers among inadmissible aliens, and does not provide a means to
measure whether the program is successful or effective. In addition, the
original pilot proposal24 prescribed a 5 to 7-day timeline. However, a PACR
expansion document listed “a six-step concept of operations for approximately
seven to ten day streamline process.” For purposes of this report, we refer to
the 7 to 10-day timeline as CBP’s goal for both PACR and HARP programs,
given that it is the most generous and also the most recent timeline
documented. For the HARP program, an OFO official stated, 3 months after
the pilot was implemented, that insufficient time had passed and OFO had
insufficient data to make any determination regarding the effectiveness of the
program. Yet, CBP had already expanded HARP to other locations. Further,
information provided to OIG regarding the expansion of the programs did not
include any formal plans or decision points based on an evaluation of the
program’s effectiveness, but rather included only an expansion timeline and
future locations for PACR and HARP.

Although we have yet to receive full and reliable data regarding the numbers of
aliens in the programs, CBP does not have benchmarks or goals against which
we would be able to evaluate such numbers. In addition, initial reporting
shows many instances when the entire process goes beyond the 7 to 10-day
timeline prescribed in the PACR expansion document, and in some cases
significantly beyond it. Table 2 shows the number and percent of aliens in the
HARP and PACR programs who were detained in CBP custody for 10 days or
less, and more than 10 days, respectively. Figure 2 shows total days in CBP
custody for aliens in HARP and PACR, from apprehension to removal, release,
or transfer to ICE detention.




24 Joint memorandum from CBP Acting Commissioner, ICE Deputy Director, and USCIS Acting

Director to Kevin K. McAleenan, DHS Acting Secretary, Prioritization of Removal Pathways,
undated: Attachment D, Streamlined Processing Procedures and Third Country Pilot Guidelines.
Attachment D describes the general characteristics of the PACR pilot program, to include the 5
to 7-day timeline, and served as the main guidance for implementing the pilot. The PACR pilot
was not listed as a removal pathway in the original memo, and the undated Attachment D
appears to have been added later.

www.oig.dhs.gov                               10                                    OIG-21-16
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Table 2. Days in Custody for Detained Aliens in HARP and PACR
Programs, October 1, 2019 to March 31, 202025
               10 Days     Percent    More than    Percent                                    Grand
  Program
                or Less                10 Days                                                Total
 HARP            1,482       73%          552        27%                                      2,034
 PACR             876        29%         2,121       71%                                      2,997
 Grand Total     2,358       47%         2,673       53%                                      5,031
Source: OIG analysis of CBP Data

Figure 2. Total Days in Custody for Detained Aliens in HARP and PACR
Programs, October 1, 2019 to March 31, 202026
                 350


                 300


                 250
     Detainees




                 200


                 150


                 100


                 50


                  0
                       1   3   5    7   9    11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45

                                   HARP Days In CBP Custody        PACR Days In CBP Custody

Source: OIG analysis of CBP Data

Program Goal of 7 to 10-Day Maximum Detention Is
Inconsistent with CBP Detention Standards and Was Routinely
Exceeded

CBP must comply with TEDS, which governs CBP’s interactions with
individuals detained in CBP facilities. TEDS generally limits detention in CBP



25 The table is derived from manual spreadsheets CBP used to track HARP and PACR cases.
The table excludes outliers and cases with incomplete data.
26 The figure is derived from manual spreadsheets CBP used to track HARP and PACR cases.

The figure excludes outliers and cases with incomplete data.

www.oig.dhs.gov                                               11                              OIG-21-16
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facilities to 72 hours27 with the expectation that CBP will transfer UAC to the
Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement,28 and families and
single adults to ICE’s long-term detention facilities.29 While TEDS policy
governs all CBP detention facilities, it is primarily intended for CBP temporary
hold rooms normally found in Border Patrol stations and OFO ports of entry.
TEDS was published before the implementation of the PACR and HARP
programs and construction of CBP facilities intended to hold aliens longer than
72 hours, like the El Paso CPC.

On its face, the 7 to 10-day timeline developed for the PACR and HARP pilots is
inconsistent with TEDS on detention duration. At the time of our visit, 65 of
the 164 (nearly 40 percent) aliens in the PACR and HARP programs detained by
Border Patrol in the El Paso sector — including 27 children in family units —
had been in CBP custody longer than 72 hours, but less than 1 week;30 46 of
the 164 (28 percent) aliens in the programs — including 19 children in family
units — had been in custody longer than 1 week.31 Only about 32 percent of
aliens in the programs were held within TEDS’ 72-hour limit. Table 3 provides
the time in custody of all aliens held in Border Patrol’s custody in the El Paso
sector on March 10, 2020.




27 TEDS 4.1 Duration of Detention. Detainees should generally not be held for longer than 72
hours in CBP hold rooms or holding facilities. Every effort must be made to hold detainees for
the least amount of time required for their processing, transfer, release, or repatriation as
appropriate and as operationally feasible.
28 Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible for custody of UAC. 6 U.S.C. § 279(a).
29 See 6 U.S.C. § 211(c)(8)(B) and DHS Delegation No. 7030.2, Delegation of Authority to the

Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Nov. 13, 2004.
30 The 164 aliens are listed in the Grand Total column of Table 3, including 73 children in

family units, 64 adults in family units, and 27 single adults. The 65 aliens held longer than 72
hours but less than 1 week are listed in the 72 Hours to 1 Week column, including 27 children
in family units, 25 adults in family units, and 13 single adults.
31 The 46 aliens held longer than 1 week are listed in the More than 1 Week column of Table 3,

including 19 children in family units, 18 adults in family units, and 9 single adults.

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Table 3. Time in Custody for Aliens Detained in El Paso Sector on
March 10, 2020
                        Under 72     72 Hours    More than
     Demographics                                             Grand Total
                          Hours      to 1 Week     1 Week
 UAC                        14            0           0            14
   PACR/HARP*                0            0            0            0
   Other Programs           14            0            0           14
 Family Unit – Children     40           39          26           105
   PACR/HARP                27           27           19           73
   Other Programs           13           12            7           32
 Family Unit – Adults       36           36          25            97
   PACR/HARP                21           25           18           64
   Other Programs           15           11            7           33
 Single Adults             104           45           9           158
   PACR/HARP                 5           13            9           27
   Other Programs           99           32            0          131
            Grand Total    194          120          60           374
*UAC do not meet the inclusion criteria for PACR or HARP; as such, there were no UAC held in
Border Patrol’s custody under these programs at the time of our visit.
Source: OIG analysis of CBP Data

TEDS does not contain provisions regarding items such as health, hygiene,
clothing and bedding for detainees held longer than 72 hours. For example,
TEDS does not require CBP to provide clean clothing or undergarments at
regular intervals and only requires the issuance of clean bedding upon detainee
request and when available. These standards are in stark contrast to the ICE
Family Residential Standards, which require a daily change of socks and
undergarments, a twice-weekly exchange of outer garments, and a weekly
exchange of bedding items. We observed an ample supply of clothing and
undergarments at the El Paso CPC. However, there are no written policies
stating when or how often agents will issue or exchange clothing for aliens held
by CBP for longer than 72 hours.

Assurance of Privacy and Separation of Juveniles from
Unrelated Adults Is Limited at El Paso Facility

TEDS requires that detainees younger than 18 years of age in CBP custody are
not held with adult detainees, unless the adult is an immediate relative or legal
guardian and no other adult detainees are present in the area.32 TEDS also
requires CBP to afford detainees a reasonable amount of privacy from detainees


32   TEDS 4.3 General Detention Procedures: Juvenile/Adult Segregation.

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of the opposite gender.33 Despite these requirements, we found that CBP held
many families together in large open pods in the El Paso CPC with no
assurance of privacy or separation of juveniles from unrelated adults.

Given the capacity limitations of most of CBP’s short-term holding facilities,
most aliens in the PACR and HARP pilots within the El Paso sector were
generally held at a newly-built CPC on the grounds of El Paso Station.34 The
large pods at the CPC made it difficult for CBP to balance both TEDS standards
for family unity with those affording women and children separation from
unrelated men and those for privacy in restroom facilities, as shown in Figure
3. For example, at the CPC, there were two “dual head of household” pods in
which children were held with both their parents and unrelated families.
Specifically, one pod held 10 unrelated families, and the other held 11. As a
result, women and girls in these pods were being held with unrelated men and
boys. In one pod, a 15-year-old girl was being held with a 17-year-old boy and
10 unrelated men. In another, two 14-year-old girls were held with 9 unrelated
men, and one of those girls was also held with a 15-year-old boy, a sibling of
the other 14-year-old girl. Toilet stalls in the living area with waist-high
partitions offered little privacy.35 In addition, although the detained population
at the CPC included mothers with infants and toddlers, there was no private
space for nursing.36




33 TEDS 4.3 General Detention Procedures: Gender Segregation. TEDS 4.15 Restroom Facilities:
Privacy.
34 Detainees held in quarantine for communicable illnesses such as the flu were held inside El

Paso Station, which had smaller cells that enabled separating detainees with different medical
conditions from each other.
35 TEDS 4.15 Restroom Facilities: Restroom Facilities. Restroom accommodations will be

available to all detainees and a reasonable amount of privacy will be ensured.
36 TEDS 4.15 Restroom Facilities: Privacy. Officers/Agents must make a reasonable effort to

afford privacy to all detainees of the opposite gender consistent with the prohibition on
voyeurism.

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 Figure 3. Example of a detention pod observed by DHS OIG at Border Patrol’s CPC on
 March 10, 2020.
 Source: OIG

CBP had taken some measures to prevent safety and security incidents related
to holding unrelated families together. For example, each pod had an unarmed
security guard in attendance to supervise the detainees, and video coverage.
Detainees wore the same clothing during the day and at night; changes of
clothing were given in the shower rooms, which were separated by gender, so
detainees did not change clothes in front of unrelated adults of the opposite
gender. A CBP official said there had been no reported incidents at the CPC,
and, as of the close of our fieldwork, DHS OIG had not received any complaints
from detained families at the CPC. Nevertheless, based on officer discretion,
the decision was made to require 17-year-old boys to sleep in a separate area
in the holding pod. Despite these precautions, conditions at the CPC were not
comparable to those in the ICE Family Residential Centers (FRC) DHS OIG
visited in July 2016,37 where detained families slept in designated sleeping
quarters. Because sleeping quarters in the FRCs were divided into smaller
rooms, family unity could be maintained with greater separation into gender-
and age-appropriate groupings.

During our site visit, we observed that CBP made an effort to accommodate the
needs of families with children at the CPC, but the facility was not designed to
offer conditions of detention comparable to the ICE FRCs. For example,
families at the FRCs received physical exams, immunizations, and preventive
care. They had access to a variety of food options, including fresh fruit and
vegetables, at each meal. At the FRCs, families shared sleeping quarters with
only a few other families. Families at the FRCs had beds and cloth bedding,


37Results of Office of Inspector General FY 2016 Spot Inspections of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Family Detention Facilities, OIG-17-65, June 2, 2017.

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and could keep personal possessions, including up to 10 changes of clothing,
in their sleeping quarters. Toilets were separate from bedrooms and afforded
some privacy. In contrast, the detention cells or “pods” at the CPC were large
and did not offer much privacy; most were designed to hold 90 detainees with
sufficient room for sleeping mats. The toilets in the pods consisted of stalls
with waist-high partitions fixed to one wall of the open living space. Seating for
adults and older children consisted of rows of metal benches. Detainees were
issued their own mats and Mylar blankets, but did not have other personal
possessions with them.38

In addition, while CBP personnel at CPC made an effort to offer a less
restrictive setting for children, as required by TEDS,39 options were limited.
CBP had created a play area in each cell, with colorful mats and toys. CBP
officials said they had padded concrete posts within the detention cells to
protect children who were running around, and allowed families some outdoor
time. In contrast, at the FRCs, families had access to a gym with exercise
equipment and outdoor recreation throughout the day. Children at the FRCs
were offered structured exercise such as sports and dance. More broadly,
children at the FRCs had access to services comparable to those available to
non-detained children, such as education, religious services, and in-person
counseling from chaplains and social workers.40

Consultation Areas and Legal Amenities Are Not Conducive to
Allowing Aliens to Prepare for Credible-Fear Screening
Interviews

According to the pilot program guidelines, USCIS telephonic credible fear
interviews must be conducted in a location where the interviewee is separate,
apart from other individuals in CBP custody, and that allows the alien privacy
and the ability to be free from being overheard. USCIS’ credible fear

38 Comparisons between conditions OIG observed at ICE FRCs in 2016 and those OIG observed
at CBP facilities in 2020 have limitations; conditions of detention at the ICE FRCs may have
changed in the intervening years. However, standards described in this report reflect the
current ICE FRC standards, which are comparable to those in force in 2016.
39 TEDS 5.6 Detention: Least Restrictive Setting. Officers/Agents will place each at-risk

detainee (i.e., juveniles, UAC, pregnant individuals, etc.) in the least restrictive setting
appropriate to their age and special needs, provided that such setting is consistent with the
need to ensure the safety and security of the detainee and that of others.
40 ICE applies the Family Residential Standards for condition of detention for families without

regard to anticipated length of detention; children have immediate access to education, medical
care, religious services, and other amenities. However, the standards allow several days to
complete educational and medical testing. For example, students must complete an initial
educational assessment within 3 business days of arrival. The facilities must provide full
physical exams within 48 hours of arrival for children, but within 14 days of arrival for adults.

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procedures dictate a consultation period prior to the interview, to allow the
alien an opportunity to contact a relative, representative, attorney, or any other
person of the alien’s choosing whom the alien may want to act as their
consultant during the credible-fear screening interview. Additionally, EOIR
provides a legal orientation program and self-help legal centers at ICE
detention facilities, to help aliens prepare for immigration interviews and
proceedings. During our site visit to El Paso, we observed that aliens in the El
Paso CPC face greater challenges preparing for credible-fear screening
interviews than detainees in ICE detention facilities. These aliens may not
receive the same opportunity for consultation as those outside of the programs
and detained in ICE facilities.41 The El Paso CPC does not have many of the
legal amenities found in ICE facilities, such as a law library or private area to
consult with a representative or conduct interviews.

Since implementing the PACR and HARP pilot programs, Border Patrol has
struggled to provide access to phones and private space for aliens to consult
with representatives or participate in telephonic screening interviews and
immigration court proceedings. The pilot program guidelines require that all
interviews be conducted in a location that is separate from other detainees and
allows the alien privacy and the ability to be free from being overheard.
However, Border Patrol facilities typically do not have areas for private
consultations and interviews. Border Patrol officials told us that when PACR
and HARP began in October 2019, agents had only four cordless phones for
aliens to use and sometimes had to escort aliens to the welding shed or guard
shack at El Paso Border Patrol Station One, so the aliens could have a private
conversation. In January 2020, Border Patrol converted the sally port in
Station One to facilitate 20 phone booths as shown in Figure 4, and is in the
process of adding more phone booths in the newly opened CPC. The sally port
is in a separate secure area, approximately 300 yards from the CPC. We
observed agents escorting groups of aliens back and forth between the two
facilities to use phones for scheduled interviews and consultations. Border
Patrol officials told us that attorneys can submit requests to set up calls with
aliens.




41 On December 5, 2019, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Federal lawsuit on behalf of

Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center and several asylum seekers, challenging the PACR
and HARP programs for, among other things, allegedly denying asylum seekers a meaningful
opportunity to access and confer with counsel and third parties while preparing for USCIS
credible fear interviews and immigration judges’ reviews. Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy
Center v. Wolf, No. 19-3640 (D. D.C. Dec. 5, 2019). DHS OIG did not evaluate the claims in the
lawsuit; we are reporting our findings based on our own observations and analysis.

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 Figure 4. Phone booths observed by DHS OIG at El Paso Station on March 10, 2020.
 Source: OIG

The addition of the sally port phone booths is an improvement, though aliens
still experience challenges conducting private consultations and interviews.
Border Patrol officials told us they recently modified the booths, adding
padding to the walls and Plexiglas to close in the ceiling, to provide additional
soundproofing. However, issues still remain. For instance, the phones inside
the booths do not have handsets or headphones for security reasons, so aliens
must use the speakerphone function. During our site visit, we observed that
conversations were partially discernable from outside the booths. Additionally,
while listening to a telephonic credible-fear screening interview from a separate
office, OIG team members could hear a constant muffled background noise
emanating from the other phone booths. This created a distraction during the
interview and, at times, either the asylum officer or interpreter had to repeat
questions or answers.

CBP officials told us that the consultation period begins once agents serve the
alien USCIS Form M-444, which describes the credible-fear interview process
and informs the alien of his or her rights.42 CBP agents also provide each alien
in the programs an EOIR list of free or pro bono legal contacts and play a
credible fear orientation video43 before the alien signs Form M-444
acknowledging the notice concerning the credible-fear screening interview. The
alien is then scheduled for a credible fear interview at least 48-hours after
signing Form M-444 or arrival at the facility (whichever is later). During this
48-hour consultation period44, the alien is afforded the opportunity to contact a
relative, representative, attorney, or any other person of the alien’s choosing

42 The USCIS Form M-444 has been translated into many languages.
43 The video is played in either Spanish or Portuguese.
44 During the time of our site visit to El Paso, TX, the consultation period was 48 hours. USCIS

provided a 24-hour consultation period from July 2019 to March 1, 2020.

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whom the alien may want to act as their consultant during the credible fear
interview.

A USCIS official told us many of the detainees do not understand what legal
representation means and that it would help to have a legal orientation
program in the CPC for aliens in HARP and PACR programs. ICE detention
standards for single adults and families include procedures for aliens to have
access to a legal orientation program in which representatives from nonprofit
organizations provide comprehensive explanations about immigration court
procedures along with other basic legal information to large groups of detained
individuals. ICE detention standards also provide access to a law library, with
up-to-date legal material and the ability to print or photocopy documents and
keep them in their living quarters. During our site visit we observed that CBP
did not offer any legal orientation programs in the CPC other than the credible
fear orientation video. We also observed that aliens in the CPC did not have
access to pens or paper, the ability to conduct legal research, or the
opportunity to keep any documents with them. Providing access to legal
orientation programs and other legal amenities generally found in ICE
detention facilities could help to increase the aliens understanding of the
credible fear process.

At the time of this report, we could not make any conclusions regarding what
impact the lack of legal orientation programs and amenities in the CPC had on
the credible fear determinations or outcomes of those aliens in PACR and
HARP, as compared to USCIS’ general credible fear caseload.45 Table 4
provides the number of aliens in the PACR and HARP programs interviewed by
USCIS and the outcomes of those credible-fear screening interviews for all
participating sectors, as of March 31, 2020.46




45 The credible fear determination standards for aliens vary based on their countries of origin
and transiting paths to the United States. Thus, in order to make a proper comparison
between the credible fear determinations for aliens in standard expedited removal proceedings
and aliens in PACR and HARP programs, one must first evaluate which standard applies to
each alien, based on an in-depth analysis of that alien’s case.
46 The number of USCIS’ credible fear interviews of applicants is generally used to calculate the

number of USCIS’ credible fear determinations for aliens in the PACR and HARP programs.
However, the former is generally less than the latter, since USCIS may not interview every
single member of the same family as a separate applicant, and thus the number of applicants
interviewed tends to be smaller than the total number of aliens in the programs, which include
all family members.

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Table 4. PACR and HARP Program Outcomes as of March 31, 202047
             PACR Outcome                       PACR Total            Percent
 Positive Determination48                          542                 19.91%
 Negative Determination49                         1,964                72.15%
 Dissolved50                                       123                  4.52%
 Ineligible/Other51                                 93                  3.42%
                          Grand Total             2,722               100.00%
             HARP Outcome                       HARP Total            Percent
 Positive Determination                            586                 29.23%
 Negative Determination                           1,246                62.14%
 Dissolved                                         134                  6.68%
 Ineligible/Other                                   39                  1.95%
                          Grand Total             2,005               100.00%
Source: OIG analysis of USCIS Data

Staff Resources Were Inadequate to Effectively Manage the
Programs

The DHS Workforce Planning Guide specifies that it is the responsibility of every
DHS component to ensure that effective workforce plans are prepared,
implemented with action plans, monitored, and evaluated to help the
Department meet its mission and organizational goals. CBP and USCIS did not
conduct adequate workforce planning for the pilot programs, which resulted in
staffing problems for both components. Implementation of the pilot programs
reduced the time USCIS is permitted to evaluate asylum claims, while it
increased the amount of time CBP keeps aliens in custody. These changes
resulted in an increased strain on both USCIS and CBP staffing resources and




47 The total numbers in Table 4 only reflect USCIS outcomes, and do not include those cases
overturned by EOIR.
48 In a positive determination, an asylum officer has determined the alien has a credible fear of

persecution or torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), 8 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) §
208.30(e).
49 In a negative determination, an asylum officer has determined that the alien does not have a

credible fear of persecution or torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B), 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e).
50 In a dissolved case, the alien has expressed a desire to be removed from the United States

and no longer pursue a credible fear claim.
51 Ineligible and other cases include detainees placed in other programs as well as those whose

cases were administratively closed or for whom an interpreter could not be located due to rare
language issues.

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required reassignment of staff from regular responsibilities, to meet the
demands of the pilot programs.

The USCIS Arlington (Virginia) Asylum Office performs telephonic credible fear
screening of aliens in the PACR and HARP pilot programs in El Paso.52 USCIS
officials told us that, prior to implementation of the pilot programs, they
completed credible fear screenings in an average of about 10 days. They
reduced this timeframe to an average of about 4 days, to help meet the pilot
programs’ goal of 7 to 10-day case completion. To achieve this reduction goal,
the USCIS Arlington Asylum Office prioritized pilot program cases and
increased the amount of overtime and weekends worked by asylum officers.

Officials told us that prioritizing pilot program cases has led to increased
processing times for cases outside of the pilot programs. The Arlington Asylum
Office received funding authorization to increase overtime to keep up with the
demands of the pilot programs. This included conducting credible-fear
screening interviews 7 days per week during the period of our fieldwork.
USCIS also reassigned asylum officers from other operational or administrative
functions to perform pre-screening work and credible-fear screening interviews
for the pilot programs. USCIS conducted a hiring surge in FY 2020 to fill
existing vacant positions. In addition, USCIS and CBP have continued a joint
program which started before the pilot programs were established, wherein
CBP officers are trained and assigned to USCIS field offices to perform credible-
fear screening interviews.53

The additional overtime and weekend staffing appears to have negatively
impacted the morale of asylum officers. One USCIS official told us that the
pilot programs, in combination with other new DHS initiatives like Migrant
Protection Protocols54 and Asylum Cooperative Agreements,55 have put

52 At the time of our fieldwork, the Arlington Asylum Office had jurisdiction over credible
fear/reasonable fear cases from Southern California, Arizona, West Texas, and the mid-Atlantic
to Southeast region and was responsible for all affirmative asylum applications filed by
individuals in the mid-Atlantic and Southeast regions of the United States, with the exception
of Florida.
53 On August 29, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted seven

asylum applicants’ motion for a preliminary injunction, among other things, preliminarily
enjoining CBP agents from conducting asylum interviews or making credible fear
determinations, pending a ruling on the merits of the case. A.B.-B. v. Morgan, No. 20-cv-846
RJL, 2020 WL 5107548 (D. D.C. Aug. 29 2020).
54 The Migrant Protection Protocols are a U.S. Government action whereby citizens and

nationals of countries other than Mexico arriving in the United States by land from Mexico may
be returned to Mexico pursuant to Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) while their U.S. removal proceedings are pending under Section 240 of the INA.
55 Asylum Cooperative Agreements are authorized by section 208(a)(2)(A) of the INA. Under the

Asylum Cooperative Agreements, aliens with an expressed fear of returning to their home

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additional demands on asylum officers and “increased expectations that they
work extended hours or work weekends.” The same official explained that
asylum officers “are burned out” and “USCIS staff has been tired for years.”
USCIS officials admitted they are hearing complaints from asylum officers and
union officials about the overtime and weekend hours the new programs
require and have experienced employee retention issues that may be related to
the increased workloads. In an effort to improve employee morale, USCIS has
recently increased workplace flexibilities, such as allowing telework, and is
evaluating whether shift work would be attractive to staff.

Like USCIS, CBP has experienced staffing strains in connection with
supporting the PACR and HARP programs. Border Patrol officials told us the
temporary, modular CPC in El Paso was set up to accommodate the pilot
programs, but the El Paso Border Patrol Sector did not receive any additional
employees to operate the CPC. As a result, Border Patrol agents from other
stations within the sector had to be reassigned or detailed to the CPC to
operate the facility and process aliens enrolled in the pilot programs.
Furthermore, additional agents are needed at the CPC to escort aliens to and
from the phone booths for their telephonic credible-fear screening interviews
with asylum officers. Providing staffing support to facilitate the credible-fear
screening interviews is a new responsibility for Border Patrol under the pilot
programs, as these interviews used to take place while the alien was in ICE
custody. The El Paso Sector management suggested that 40 to 50 additional
employees were needed to properly staff the CPC, but they had no expectation
of receiving additional staffing at the time of our site visit. An El Paso Border
Patrol supervisor told us that each shift is “scrounging for staff.”

The pilot programs also resulted in additional transport demands in the El
Paso Sector, as the apprehending station now has to transport aliens subject to
the pilot programs to the CPC for further processing. Because the El Paso
Sector has not contracted for transportation services for alien transports, staff
are pulled off their regularly assigned duties to perform these transports. CBP
officials explained that the reassignment of staff to operate the CPC, transport
aliens, and perform other duties related to the pilot programs reduces the
number of staff available to perform CBP’s core mission, which is to safeguard
the border. The lack of staff available in the field can also place patrolling
agents at risk. For example, Border Patrol officials told us they had recently
seen a significant increase in failures to yield56 when encountering aliens near

country are removed to a third country that is a party to the Agreement where the alien would
have access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent
temporary protection.
56 CBP uses the phrase failure to yield to describe an event when a driver disregards a law

enforcement officer’s order to stop the vehicle, often at a Border Patrol checkpoint, and flees.

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the border, but they said they do not have enough agents to adequately
address the issue.

Data System Limitations Entailed Labor-Intensive and Error-
Prone Manual Efforts to Track and Share Information

DHS Departmental guidance requires effective planning to ensure the success
of information technology development efforts. Despite previous OIG reports
highlighting the lack of interface among the DHS components’ major data
systems,57 the Department has yet to upgrade these systems, but instead relies
on time-consuming and error-prone processes to relay information between the
systems. In addition, CBP did not have its data management systems built out
to track HARP and PACR data at the time the pilot programs were implemented
in El Paso. Also, the four distinct data management systems used by OFO,
Border Patrol, USCIS, and EOIR — the four entities with respective roles in
executing different aspects of the programs — do not interface with each other
to permit data sharing.

When the PACR pilot was initially implemented in the El Paso Sector in October
2019, Border Patrol had yet to build out its data management system (e3) to
track pilot program data. Similarly, El Paso OFO had not completed the build
out of its data management system (Unified Secondary) to track pilot program
data at the time of HARP implementation.58 Instead, Border Patrol used a
spreadsheet to manually track PACR and HARP data necessary to process
aliens in the pilot programs. Manually tracking the data was a labor-intensive
process that required reassignment of staff from their regular responsibilities.
El Paso Border Patrol maintained one master spreadsheet, and trained and
assigned specific agents to perform data entry in order to tightly control and
protect the spreadsheet data. In addition, OFO assigned two officers per shift
to the Border Patrol station, in order to facilitate data exchange between
Unified Secondary and Border Patrol’s tracking spreadsheets and e3.

When Border Patrol officials completed the build-out and went live with e3 to
track pilot program data in January 2020, they concurrently tracked data
using the spreadsheets in order to validate proper data tracking in e3. CBP

57 DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families, OIG-

20-06, November 25, 2019; Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward
Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals, OIG-17-101, August 14, 2017.
58 At the time of our site visit to El Paso, TX, OFO had recently completed the build-out of

Unified Secondary to document initial processing of aliens encountered at ports of entry,
including documenting whether the aliens are subject to enrollment in HARP. However, Border
Patrol’s e3 Portal is the official system of record for HARP data, because Border Patrol tracks
alien data from custody of the alien from OFO through completion of the HARP process.

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headquarters tasked El Paso Border Patrol Sector with entering all of the
historical PACR and HARP program data from the spreadsheets into e3. This,
too, was a labor-intensive process that pulled staff away from their regular
duties. CBP headquarters is independently validating the historical data being
entered into e3 and working with El Paso Border Patrol Sector to achieve 100-
percent data validation prior to discontinuing the use of the tracking
spreadsheet.

CBP officials told us that email is the primary way pilot program data is shared
between CBP, USCIS, and EOIR because the e3 and Unified Secondary systems
do not interface with each other or with the USCIS and EOIR systems, used to
capture data in other steps in the programs’ process. Sharing data among
agencies by email is inefficient and can result in errors.59 For example, both
CBP and USCIS officials told us they experienced challenges with reconciling
the number of aliens requesting credible-fear screening interviews. According
to these officials, Border Patrol agents frequently inquired about the status of
an interview request they had emailed to USCIS, but USCIS staff would reply
that they had not received the request. To remedy this issue, USCIS detailed
an employee to the El Paso Border Patrol Sector to reconcile these interview
requests on an ongoing basis.

                                      Conclusion

This report offers DHS OIG’s initial observations on the PACR and HARP
programs based on our March 2020 visit to the El Paso Sector. El Paso was
the first location to implement the pilot programs; accordingly, the programs
have operated the longest in that sector. These observations are intended to
inform DHS and Congress of challenges with the programs and recommend
corrective actions before the suspension on the programs is lifted and the
programs are potentially expanded further along the Southwest Border. CBP
did not have specific program policy guidance or measurable objectives, yet
rapidly implemented the pilot programs and expanded them without a full
evaluation of the pilots’ effectiveness. Although the pilot programs’ credible
fear process is generally the same as that process under the standard
expedited removal proceedings, CBP temporary holding conditions and
detainees’ access to counsel and representation vary greatly from those

59 In DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families,
OIG-20-06, November 25, 2019, DHS OIG found that CBP adopted various ad hoc methods
(including spreadsheets and email communications) to record and track family separations,
but these methods led to widespread errors. We recommended the DHS Chief Information
Officer work with ICE and CBP to ensure system interoperability to improve cross-component
information sharing and coordination on border security operations.


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afforded to detainees in ICE detention. In addition, CBP and USCIS have had
to adjust staffing and reprioritize work in order to perform additional
responsibilities and meet the shorter timelines for processing aliens in PACR
and HARP. Without interface among Border Patrol, OFO, USCIS, and EOIR
systems, the tracking and maintenance of program information is manual,
making it labor-intensive and vulnerable to errors.

                            Recommendations

This report describes our initial observations of the PACR and HARP programs
based on our site visit to the El Paso, Texas area and analysis of data provided
by the Department. We may make additional recommendations following the
completion of our review once the program suspension is lifted.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the CBP Commissioner, in coordination
with the USCIS Director, develop and implement a plan to evaluate the
performance of the PACR and HARP programs that includes well-defined and
measurable objectives and standards.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the CBP Commissioner, in coordination
with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), establish
appropriate standards for managing prolonged detention, or in coordination
with ICE, establish a plan for transferring aliens remaining in detention for
longer than 72 hours.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the El Paso Chief Patrol Agent develop
and implement policies to afford detainees a more reasonable amount of
privacy and physical separation from unrelated individuals of the opposite
gender in the El Paso CPC.

Recommendation 4: We recommend the El Paso Chief Patrol Agent develop
and implement policies to ensure aliens in the PACR and HARP programs have
access to private consultation areas and legal amenities in the El Paso CPC.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the CBP Commissioner and the USCIS
Director identify appropriate staffing requirements and implement a workforce
plan for processing aliens in the PACR and HARP programs.

Recommendation 6: We recommend the DHS Chief Information Officer
coordinate with CBP and USCIS to establish a process for reliable interchange
of information between data systems used to process and track aliens in the
PACR and HARP programs.


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              Management Comments and OIG Analysis

We have included a copy of DHS’ Management Response in its entirety in
Appendix B. We also received technical comments from DHS and incorporated
them into the report where appropriate. DHS did not concur with
Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, but concurred with Recommendation 6.
We consider Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 unresolved and open.
Recommendation 6 is resolved and open. A summary of DHS’ responses and
our analysis follows.

DHS did not concur with Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, stating that the
PACR and HARP programs have been inactive since March 2020 due to the
March 20, 2020, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “Order
Suspending Introduction Of Persons From a Country Where A Communicable
Disease Exists,” as amended and extended. DHS officials said, in addition, due
to the D.C. District Court’s decision in Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition
et al. (CAIR) v. Trump, No. 19-2117 (D. D.C. June 30, 2020), PACR may not
restart in its current form. DHS officials said the future of PACR and HARP is
dependent on both litigation and the resumption of pre-pandemic operations.
Therefore, DHS requested that OIG consider these five recommendations
resolved and closed.

We consider Recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 unresolved and open.
Although both programs have been inactive since March 2020, DHS has not
officially terminated the programs and could restart them upon return to post-
pandemic operations. It is also not clear to us that PACR became an inactive
program as a result of the District Court decision, since the government has
appealed that decision. Moreover, HARP is not affected by the District Court
decision. Should DHS issue a formal policy memorandum terminating both
programs, we would consider Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 5 resolved and
closed. Recommendation 3 involves conditions of detention that are not solely
related to the PACR and HARP programs, and remains unresolved and open.

In its response to our report, DHS expressed concern that the report
inaccurately describes the credible fear process after a negative determination.
Specifically, DHS stated, for PACR and HARP, review by an immigration judge
occurs while the detainee is in CBP custody, rather than in ICE custody. In
addition, DHS stated that immigration judge review occurs at the request of the
detainee, and is not considered an appeal under the regulations. In the
background section of our report, we first describe the standard process that
existed prior to PACR and HARP, and then how these programs compare to the
process. The report accurately reflects that in PACR and HARP, immigration
judge review occurs while the detainee is in CBP custody. Appendix C details

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our comparison of the standard process and the process for PACR and HARP.
In response to DHS technical comments, we more uniformly use the term
“review” in our report, to avoid any confusion.

DHS stated that PACR and HARP were implemented to expeditiously process
credible fear claims consistent with existing legal protections, and that
detainees who receive a positive determination are transferred to ICE custody
to be placed in removal proceedings under Section 240 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. DHS stated that PACR and HARP “were effective in reducing
participants’ overall time” in the credible fear process, whether detainees
received a positive or negative credible fear determination. Appendix C of our
report details differences in case processing timeliness goals for detainees in
the credible fear process in CBP and ICE custody. As we noted in the report,
we did not compare credible fear determination outcomes or timelines for
aliens in PACR and HARP programs with those in the standard expedited
removal processing. We did compare PACR and HARP timeline results with
program goals and found PACR and HARP did not consistently meet those
goals.

Additionally, DHS expressed concern that the sentence in the report noting
that “USCIS and CBP have continued a joint program … wherein CBP officers
are trained and assigned to USCIS field offices to perform credible-fear
screening interviews,” is no longer accurate, as the agreement between USCIS
and CBP expired on July 28, 2020. DHS further noted that by July 31, 2020,
Border Patrol had implemented modifications to its short-term holding facility
in El Paso, Texas, to increase physical separation among detainees and ensure
added privacy for telephonic consultations. As explained in Appendix A, we
completed our fieldwork for this review in June 2020, before these changes
occurred. We thank DHS for providing these updates, and have noted the
changes in our report.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the CBP Commissioner, in coordination
with the USCIS Director, develop and implement a plan to evaluate the
performance of the PACR and HARP programs that includes well-defined and
measurable objectives and standards.

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with the recommendation. DHS stated
PACR and HARP are currently inactive and their future is dependent on
litigation and resumption of pre-pandemic operations. DHS requested that
OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. The
pause in these programs due to the pandemic represents a unique opportunity

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for DHS to develop well-defined and measurable objectives and standards for
PACR and HARP. It is not clear to us that PACR became an inactive program
as a result of the District Court decision in CAIR v. Trump, since the
government has appealed the District Court decision. Moreover, HARP is not
affected by the District Court decision. The recommendation will remain
unresolved and open until DHS develops well-defined and measurable
objectives and standards for PACR and HARP, or issues a formal policy
memorandum terminating both programs.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the CBP Commissioner, in coordination
with DHS CRCL, establish appropriate standards for managing prolonged
detention, or in coordination with ICE, establish a plan for transferring aliens
remaining in detention for longer than 72 hours.

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with the recommendation. DHS stated
PACR and HARP are currently inactive and their future is dependent on
litigation and resumption of pre-pandemic operations. CBP would collaborate
with partners from the Department of Health and Human Services, ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations, and USCIS when facilitating the
transfer of detainees and monitoring detainees’ time in custody. While CRCL is
not an operational component with the capability to reduce time in custody
before transfer, CRCL is involved in oversight and worked closely with CBP to
draft TEDS, which is CBP’s guiding policy document related to CBP’s short-
term holding of detainees. DHS requested that OIG consider this
recommendation resolved and closed.

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. In our
review of DHS technical comments, we recognized that the original wording of
this recommendation could be misinterpreted, and we informed DHS that we
had revised the wording. This recommendation requires CBP to either work
with CRCL to establish appropriate standards for managing prolonged
detention, or work with ICE to avoid prolonged detention. TEDS only sets
standards for short-term holding of detainees. As we note in Appendix C of our
report, timeliness goals for PACR and HARP envisage prolonged detention,
which is inconsistent with TEDS standards. The recommendation will remain
unresolved and open until DHS establishes standards for managing prolonged
CBP detention, or establishes plans to avoid prolonged detention when
operationally feasible. Alternatively, a formal policy memorandum terminating
PACR and HARP would close this recommendation.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the El Paso Chief Patrol Agent develop
and implement policies to afford detainees a more reasonable amount of


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privacy and physical separation from unrelated individuals of the opposite
gender in the El Paso CPC.

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with the recommendation. DHS stated
PACR and HARP are currently inactive and their future is dependent on
litigation and resumption of pre-pandemic operations. Additionally, DHS
indicated the El Paso CPC was not fully operational at the time of the OIG site
visit, and constraints and limitations OIG described no longer apply.
Specifically, aliens are placed in cells based on gender and age. The only time
aliens are placed in the same cells with unrelated opposite gender is when
multiple dual heads of household family units are held in the same cells with
sufficient space to hold multiple family units. In addition, the cells are
supervised by personnel and monitored by cameras. CBP provided copies of
relevant supporting documentation to OIG on December 4, 2020. DHS
requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed.

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. The
documentation we received on December 4, 2020, is relevant to
Recommendation 3, but does not resolve this recommendation. We remain
concerned about CBP’s practice of holding multiple dual heads of household
units in the same cells, absent additional measures to afford privacy and
physical separation. The recommendation will remain unresolved and open
until we receive additional documentation on the measures CBP has taken to
afford detainees more privacy and physical separation in the El Paso CPC.

Recommendation 4: We recommend the El Paso Chief Patrol Agent develop
and implement policies to ensure aliens in the PACR and HARP programs have
access to private consultation areas and legal amenities in the El Paso CPC.

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with the recommendation. DHS stated
PACR and HARP are currently inactive and their future is dependent on
litigation and resumption of pre-pandemic operations. Additionally, DHS
provided copies of relevant supporting documentation to OIG on December 4,
2020 showing that as of July 10, 2020, CBP constructed and installed sound
insulating phone booths, including walls and ceilings for privacy, at the El Paso
CPC. DHS requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and
closed.

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. The
photographs we received on December 4, 2020, sufficiently demonstrate CBP
has taken appropriate measures to ensure aliens in the El Paso CPC have
access to private consultation areas. However, we did not receive
documentation on policies ensuring aliens in the PACR and HAPR programs

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have access to legal amenities at the El Paso CPC. Documents confirming such
access exists would be sufficient to close this recommendation. Alternatively, a
formal policy memorandum terminating PACR and HARP would close this
recommendation.

Recommendation 5: We recommend the CBP Commissioner and the USCIS
Director identify appropriate staffing requirements and implement a workforce
plan for processing aliens in the PACR and HARP programs.

DHS Response: DHS did not concur with the recommendation. DHS stated
PACR and HARP are currently inactive and their future is dependent on
litigation and resumption of pre-pandemic operations. Additionally, DHS
officials said staffing at the El Paso CPC was sufficient to support existing
processing and holding responsibilities. Further, existing USCIS staffing
vacancies had been filled before the pandemic and budgetary constraints had
frozen hiring and overtime. USCIS received appropriate funding authorization
to meet high priority screening programs, including PACR and HARP. As a
result, there is no need to identify appropriate staffing requirements and
staffing plans, and requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved
and closed.

OIG Analysis: We consider this recommendation unresolved and open. The
pause in these programs due to the pandemic represents a unique opportunity
to identify appropriate staffing requirements and a workforce plan, should
processing aliens in the PACR and HARP programs resume. In light of the
government’s appeal of the District Court decision, the decision’s inapplicability
to HARP, and the absence of a formal policy memo terminating the programs,
the recommendation will remain unresolved and open until DHS develops
appropriate staffing requirements and implements a workforce plan for PACR
and HARP, or issues a formal policy memorandum terminating both programs.

Recommendation 6: We recommend the DHS Chief Information Officer
coordinate with CBP and USCIS to establish a process for reliable interchange
of information between data systems used to process and track aliens in the
PACR and HARP programs.

DHS Response: DHS concurred with the recommendation. DHS stated the
DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer will coordinate with CBP, USCIS,
and the Immigration Data Interchange Initiative Executive Steering Council, to
identify consistent data exchange formats and interfaces that would support a
set of services to automate the data interchange. DHS estimated that these
changes would be completed by July 30, 2022. DHS requested that OIG
consider this recommendation resolved and open.

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OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of the
recommendation, which is resolved and open. We will close this
recommendation when we receive documentation showing that the planned
milestones to improve the interchange of information between data systems
have been met.




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Appendix A
Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.

The Office of Inspector General conducts data-driven, risk-based audits,
inspections, and investigations. We initiated this review in response to a
congressional request from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and eight additional Senators.
We determined that this review was appropriate and useful to our mission, as
the PACR and HARP programs relate to our work on prolonged detention and
children in CBP custody. Our objective was to determine how DHS,
particularly CBP and USCIS, implemented the PACR and HARP pilot programs.

This special report describes our observations during our site visits to CBP
facilities in the El Paso, Texas area from March 10 to 13, 2020. Due to travel
restrictions and the suspension of the programs at U.S. borders during the
COVID-19 pandemic, we suspended additional site visits to evaluate the
entirety of DHS’ implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs. We
anticipate resuming site visits and issuing a report detailing DHS’ full
implementation of the PACR and HARP pilot programs after COVID-19
restrictions ease and the pilot programs resume.

We visited the following Border Patrol and OFO facilities in the El Paso, Texas
area from March 10 to March 13, 2020:

      Border Patrol Facilities
      El Paso Station One
      Santa Teresa Station
      El Paso CPC

      OFO Facilities
      Paso Del Norte port of entry
      Santa Teresa port of entry

During our site visits, we spoke with CBP and USCIS employees, including line
officers, agents, analysts, and senior management officials. We observed the
processing and detention of aliens enrolled in the PACR and HARP programs,
toured CBP facilities, and listened to a telephonic credible-fear screening
interview conducted by USCIS. Additionally, both prior to and following our
site visit, we interviewed USCIS, Border Patrol, and OFO headquarters

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personnel responsible for the PACR and HARP programs within their respective
agencies. We also reviewed relevant background information, including
directives, guidance, policies, and written communications related to PACR and
HARP pilot programs and TEDS standards. We conducted fieldwork for this
report between February and June 2020.

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of
1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspection and
Evaluation issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.




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Appendix B
DHS Comments to the Draft Report




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Appendix C
PACR and HARP Processes Compared to Standard Expedited
Removal/Credible Fear Process

             PACR & HARP                                 Standard Process
   Border Patrol or OFO encounters inadmissible alien subject to expedited removal
            and claiming fear of return, begins expedited removal processing.
 Border Patrol or OFO transfers alien to      Border Patrol or OFO temporarily holds
 one of three Border Patrol facilities        alien until placement with ICE (goal is
 (approximately 1 day).                       less than 72 hours, but may be weeks).
  Alien receives Form M-444, arrives at facility, begins 48-hour consultation period.60
                          USCIS credible-fear screening interview
 USCIS Asylum Officer prepares, and           USCIS Asylum Officer prepares, and
 Supervisory Asylum Officer reviews,          Supervisory Asylum Officer reviews,
 determination documents (goal is 4           determination documents (goal is 10
 days).                                       days).
 Positive Determination – CBP serves          Positive Determination – ICE or USCIS
 Notice to Appear,61 and requests ICE         serves Notice to Appear. ICE may either
 placement. ICE may either detain or          detain or release under Alternatives to
 release under Alternatives to Detention62. Detention.
 Negative Determination – alien afforded      Negative Determination – alien afforded
 Immigration Judge review; then CBP           Immigration Judge review; then ICE
 refers alien to ICE for repatriation.        repatriates alien.
 Negative Determination – Alien declines      Negative Determination – Alien declines
 Immigration Judge review; CBP turns          Immigration Judge Review; ICE
 alien over to ICE for repatriation.          repatriates alien.
 Negative Determination – Immigration         Negative Determination – Immigration
 Judge review requested; hearing held         Judge review requested; hearing held
 (goal for Immigration Judge review is 48     (goal for Immigration Judge review is no
 hours).                                      later than 7 Days).
 Immigration Judge Review – Judge             Immigration Judge Review – Judge
 affirms negative determination; asylum       affirms negative determination; asylum
 officer’s order of removal stands. CBP       officer’s order of removal stands. ICE
 turns alien over to ICE for repatriation.    repatriates alien.
 Immigration Judge Review – Judge             Immigration Judge Review – Judge
 vacates negative determination. CBP          vacates negative determination. ICE
 serves Notice to Appear, requests ICE        serves Notice to Appear; ICE may either
 placement. ICE may either detain or          detain or release under Alternatives to
 release under Alternatives to Detention.     Detention.
Source: OIG depiction of CBP and USCIS information

60 USCIS provided a 24-hour consultation period from July 2019 to March 1, 2020.
61 A Notice to Appear is a formal document placing an alien in removal proceedings before
EOIR.
62 ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations provides alternatives to detention through the use

of technology, typically electronic monitoring via a GPS-enabled ankle bracelet.

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Appendix D
PACR and HARP Process Flowchart




Source: OIG depiction of CBP and USCIS information


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Appendix E
Special Reviews and Evaluations Major Contributors to This
Report

Amy Burns, Chief Inspector
Lorraine Eide, Lead Inspector
Carie Mellies, Lead Inspector
Steve Farrell, Senior Inspector
Jason Wahl, Senior Inspector
John Miller, Inspector
Erika Algeo, Independent Referencer




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Appendix F
Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
CBP Liaison
USCIS Liaison

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees
Senator Kyrsten Sinema
Senator Rob Portman
Senator Joe Manchin III
Senator James Lankford
Senator John Barrasso
Senator John Cornyn




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