oversight

Office of Inspector General's Report on Policies and Practices for Covered Systems at the Department of Education - Date Issued: 08/15/2016 PDF (272K)

Published by the Department of Education, Office of Inspector General on 2016-08-15.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                           UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
                                          OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL


                                                                                                    THE INSPECTOR GENERAL


August 15,2016

The Honorable Ron Johnson                                   The Honorable Thomas R. Carper
Chairman, Committee on Homeland                             Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Secmity and Governmental Affairs                            Security and Govenunental Affairs
U.S. Senate                                                 U.S. Senate
328 Hart Senate Office Buil ding                            513 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510                                      Washington, D.C. 205 10

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz                                The Honorable Elij ah Cummings
Chairn1an, Oversight and Govenunent                         Ranking Member, Oversight and Govemment
Refonn Committee                                            Refmm Committee
U.S. House of Representatives                               U.S. House of Representatives
2157 Rayburn House Office Building                          2471 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 205 15                                     Washington, D.C. 20515


Dear Chainnans Jolmson and Chaffetz, and Ranking Members Carper and Cununings:

The Cybersecuiity Act of 2015 established a reporting requirement for Inspectors General of
agencies operating Federal computer systems that provide access to personally identifiable
infonnation. Specifically, we are required to report on the logical access controls, the
infonnation security management practices employed for these systems, and the policies and
procedures that ensure that entities providing services are implementing the same infonnation
security practices. Enclosed with this letter you will find the results of our review.

If you have any questions or if you need any additional infom1at ion, please do not hesitate to
contact me directly at (202) 245-6900, or have a member of your staff contact our Congressional
Liaison, Catherine Grant, at (202) 245-7023.

Sincerely,



(     -(L)-1J.......   S::\. y---
Kathleen S. Tighe
Inspector General

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Jolm King, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education


                                400 MARYLAND AVENUE, S.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20202-1510

                Promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity ofthe Department's programs and operations.
  Office of Inspector General’s Report on Policies and Practices for Covered
                   Systems at the Department of Education
                               August 15, 2016

The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (Act), enacted December 18, 2015, as Division N of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, established a reporting requirement for Inspectors
General whose agencies operate a covered system, defined as a national security system or a
system that provides access to personally identifiable information. Specifically, we are required
to report on the logical access controls, the information security management practices employed
for these systems, and the policies and procedures that ensure that entities providing services are
implementing the same information security practices.

Section 406(b) of the Act requires the Inspector General of each covered agency, not later than
240 days after the date of enactment, to submit to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction in
the Senate and House of Representatives a report of information collected from the agency
describing policies and practices in five specified areas. We list the five specified areas and
provide the requested information below. We relied on information collected in work performed
by Office of Inspector General (OIG) to report the requested information. Except as noted in the
discussion below of the results of specified OIG audits under (A), we did not perform work to
verify or validate the implementation of the described policies and practices, although many of
the policies and procedures will be verified and validated through our Federal Information
Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) work this year.

The policies and practices described below apply to all U.S. Department of Education’s
(Department) systems. This includes covered systems that provide access to personally
identifiable information, as well as other systems. The Department does not operate a national
security system.

Department’s Policies and Practices for Covered Systems

   (A) Description Of The Logical Access Policies And Practices Used By The Covered
       Agency To Access A Covered System, Including Whether Appropriate Standards
       Were Followed

The Department’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) established the Departmental
Handbook OCIO-01, “Information Assurance/Cybersecurity Policy” (OCIO-01), dated August
2014, to provide policy regarding information assurance/cybersecurity for all information
technology (IT) assets and services operated within or, on behalf of the Department.
Specifically, for logical access, OCIO-01 requires proper identification and authentication for all
users of government systems before allowing them access to Departmental systems. Further, it is
the Department’s policy to limit system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of
authorized users, devices (including other systems), and to the types of transactions and
functions that authorized users are permitted to exercise. The responsibility for implementation
and enforcement rests jointly with the Program Offices (PO) that own the systems and data, and
the Personnel Security office of the Office of Management (OM).

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To supplement the OCIO-01 policy, the Department also established “Logical Access Control
Guidance, Version 6.1,” (LACG v6.1), issued in March 2013, to ensure that only authorized
individuals gain access to information systems, are assigned minimum privileges to complete
their tasks, and are individually accountable for their actions. The guidance also states that
access to sensitive system resources will be controlled and limited based on positive
identification and authentication mechanisms.

As part of our FISMA Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, OIG found that the Department
established policies and procedures for managing its identity and access management program
for its employees that is consistent with National Institute of Standards and Technology
standards. Specifically, we found that for the systems we reviewed (which included covered
systems), the Department:

   •   established a mechanism for tracking and monitoring internal users;
   •   maintained and reviewed user activity logs;
   •   established a process tracking and monitoring employee adherence to rules of behavior
       for use of Department systems;
   •   enforced the 90-day password change requirement;
   •   granted user access to its systems and facilities in accordance with Federal guidance;
   •   required users, including contractors and third parties, to use two-factor authentication;
   •   established a process to ensure that employees were granted access based on needs and
       separation of duties principles; and
   •   established a process for the termination and deactivation of user access for employees
       when no longer required.

However, during our FY 2015, 2014, and 2013 FISMA audits, we also identified instances where
appropriate standards were not always being followed. These instances are set forth below.

The U.S. Department of Education’s Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
Report for Fiscal Year 2015, issued on November 13, 2015 (ED-OIG/A11P0001)

OIG found that Federal Student Aid’s (FSA) implementation and management of the technical
security architecture supporting the Department’s mainframe environments needed
improvements to effectively restrict unauthorized access to the Department’s information and
resources. Specifically, for the mainframe environments at the Virtual Data Center (VDC) and
Total System Services, Inc. (the data center that houses the Common Origination and
Disbursement (COD) system), we found accounts for authorized Departmental users with
excessive permissions, unauthorized access to data, weak data resource rules, unclear security
software privileges, account management weaknesses, and inadequate separation of duties. In
addition, we found that FSA did not have reasonable assurance that commercial users of a
subcontractor-operated mainframe supporting the COD system do not have access to Department
data.

For the recommendation to correct vulnerabilities relating to the VDC mainframe environment,
the Department identified in its Audit Accountability and Resolution Tracking System that
corrective action plans were completed in March 2016. We will verify these corrective actions

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during our next mainframe vulnerability assessment testing of the VDC environment. During
our FY 2016 FISMA audit planning, we were informed that FSA is going to migrate its COD
operations that were processed in a mainframe environment to a midrange environment. 1 We are
reviewing this new processing environment as part of our FY 2016 FISMA vulnerability
assessment and penetration testing of the COD system. Since COD will not be using mainframes
for its processing, the findings that were identified in the FY 2015 FISMA report are no longer
applicable.

The U.S. Department of Education’s Compliance with the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 for Fiscal Year 2014, issued on November 12, 2014 (ED-
OIG/A11O0001)

OIG audit work showed that the Department and FSA did not fully comply with the Identity and
Access Management reporting metric. We reported that improvement was needed in (1) the
overall identity and access management process; (2) password authentication; and (3) users’
logical access controls. Specifically, we found that:

    •   OCIO had not fully established policies and procedures to (1) identify all devices that
        were attached to the network; (2) distinguish those devices from users; and
        (3) authenticate devices that were connected to the network.
    •   The Department did not consistently follow and enforce the required Federal and
        Departmental guidelines requiring users to update their network passwords.
    •   FSA did not fully establish effective access controls for a major system to ensure users of
        an application were not able to manipulate their user settings. Specifically, during
        penetration testing of this FSA system, the OIG’s testing team was able to perform
        unauthorized actions by elevating the privileges of a basic user account.

As of September 2015, the Department reported that all corrective actions were completed to
implement the three recommendations identified in the report. However, it should be pointed out
that the first two bullets were repeat findings, originally identified in the FY 2011 and 2013
FISMA audits, where the Department reported they had completed the proposed corrective
actions, and implemented the recommendations. We are validating these corrective actions as
part of our FY 2016 FISMA reporting.

The U.S. Department of Education’s Compliance with the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 for Fiscal Year 2013, issued on November 13, 2013 (ED-
OIG/A11N0001)

OIG audit work showed that the Department did not fully comply with the Identity and Access
Management reporting metric. We reported that improvement was needed in (1) the overall
identity and access management process; (2) password authentication; and (3) the deactivation of
users’ accounts. Specifically, we found that:


1
 A midrange computer system features computers that have more processing power than personal computers, but
are less powerful than mainframe models. These types of systems involve a broad range of memory capacity,
processing power, and applications for business or scientific use.

                                                      3
   •   OCIO had not fully established policies and procedures to identify all devices that were
       attached to the network, distinguish those devices from users, and authenticate devices
       that were connected to the network.
   •   The Department did not consistently follow and enforce the required Federal and
       Departmental guidelines requiring users to update their network passwords. Although
       OCIO officials explained that the Department’s Active Directory is configured to
       automatically notify and prompt users to change their network passwords after 90 days,
       our review showed that (1) about 1,200 of 9,523 users did not change their passwords for
       more than 90 days as required; (2) 165 users did not change their password for more than
       600 days; and (3) 5 users were able to access the network despite expired passwords
       (3) user accounts had been expired for 2 years, and 2 user accounts for a year).
   •   The Department did not consistently and effectively ensure that user accounts inactive for
       90 days were disabled, as required by Federal and Departmental guidelines. Specifically,
       we found that as of May 2013, 824 of the 896 inactive user accounts were not being
       disabled as required.

As of May 2014, the Department reported that all corrective actions were completed to
implement the three recommendations identified in the report.

The aforementioned audit reports can be found in their entirety on our OIG website:
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/areports.html

   (B) Description And List Of The Logical Access Controls And Multi-Factor
       Authentication Used By The Covered Agency To Govern Access To Covered
       Systems By Privileged Users

Logical Access Controls

LACG v6.1 defines position roles and responsibilities to ensure effective implementation and
management of the guidance by establishing an access control structure and assigning security
responsibilities for (1) the CIO; (2) the Chief Information Security Officer; (3) the Assistant
Secretary for Management; (4) OM; (5) the Information System Security Manager;
(6) Information System Security Officers (ISSO); (7) Network Security Officers; (8) Information
System Owners; and (9) Users. LACG v6.1 further identifies logical access control areas, to
include privileged users, described in detail below.

Access Enforcement

Access control policies (e.g., identity based policies, role-based polices, rule-based policies) and
associated access enforcement mechanisms (e.g., access control lists, access control matrices,
cryptography) should be designed to control access between users (or processes acting on behalf
of users) and objects (e.g., devices, files, records, processes, programs, domains) in the
information system. These policies should be configured to distinguish between users and
devices connected to the network. For third party and custom written applications, to the
greatest extent possible, technical security controls are utilized through operating systems or
database management systems. System database administrators are required to configure

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operating systems and databases to implement applicable password management requirements
and enforce the Department’s password standards. Accounts are also required to be configured
to be disabled after 90 days of inactivity. All devices are required to receive Enterprise
Architecture Review Board (EARB) approval before being connected to the Department’s
network. Further, devices must be authenticated consistent with FISMA and applicable
regulations, statutes, and applicable Federal governance. Direct connections from public
networks systems and databases, even to view data, is prohibited.

Information Flow Enforcement

POs are required to ensure that systems categorized in accordance with Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal
Information and Information Systems,” as being a “Moderate” or “High” impact system control
the flow of information within a system, and between interconnected systems. This control is
accomplished by configuring network devices (such as firewalls and routers) to restrict protocols
and ports to certain segments of the network and between specific devices. This control can also
be accomplished through application design by forcing data to flow from designated point and
prevents or minimizes the need for data to be removed from authorized repositories.

Separation of Duties

Each PO is required to establish appropriate divisions of responsibilities and separation of duties
to eliminate conflicts of interest in the responsibilities and duties of individuals. Information
systems shall also enforce separation of duties by limiting access authority.

Least Privilege

Departmental information system configurations are required to enforce the most restrictive set
of rights/privileges or accesses needed by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) and
information systems for the performance of specified tasks. LACG v6.1 specifically prohibits
users from gaining administrator privileges without a validated business reason. Exceptions
must be documented and approved by the ISSO and remain available for audit verification.
Also, access to system utilities is approved by the ISSO, and limited to users and administrators
with an approved need. Information system configurations must employ the concept of least
privilege for specific duties (including specific ports, protocols, and services) in accordance with
risk assessments to adequately mitigate risk to the Department’s IT operations and assets.
LACG v6.1 also recognizes that since user access privileges may change over time, it is
imperative that reviews are conducted more frequently than on an annual basis. These reviews
should ensure that user access privileges are current, and the privileges granted are authorized.
Users should be granted only the most restrictive set of privileges needed to perform authorized
tasks.

Unsuccessful Login Attempts

POs are required to follow OCIO-01 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Special Publication 800-63, “Electronic Authentication Guidance,” to ensure information


                                                 5
systems employ minimum difficulty standards for passwords and personal identification
numbers. POs are also required to configure systems to limit the number of login attempts
before locking user access, triggering an investigation as to the reason for the failed login
attempts.

System User Notification

Upon initiation of a user’s attempt to access a system, the system should provide an indication as
to the nature and usage of the system. These specific requirements are found in the “Warning
Banner” section of OCIO-01. Warning banner formats must be approved by the Department’s
Office of General Counsel.

Concurrent Session Control

POs are required to ensure concurrent user logins are not permitted without written approval
from an ISSO or Authorizing Official.

Session Lock and Termination

LACG v6.1 requires that password protected screen savers be automatically activated on
workstations after a maximum of 30 minutes of inactivity. The password used to unlock the
screensaver is required to comply with Departmental password construction standards. Also, IT
systems are required to be designed and configured to automatically terminate sessions after a
specified period of inactivity.

Supervision and Review of Access Control

Whenever possible, automated tools should be used to identify all devices that are attached to the
Department’s network. Audit records (e.g., user activity logs) for systems categorized as “High”
or “Moderate” impact, in accordance with Federal Information Processing Standards 199, are to
be reviewed every 30 days, and “Low” impact systems every 60 days for inappropriate or
suspicious activities. Users are required to report to the Information System Security Manager
all devices that are found unidentifiable (labeled as “unknown”) and network connectivity shall
be terminated.

Remote Access

Remote access to Departmental information systems is available through virtual private network
connections and multi-factor authentication is required.

Wireless Access Restrictions

Wireless transmission of Departmental information is only allowed by secured means and when
approved through official Departmental channels. For wireless access, the use of Wide Area
Network and Wide Local Area Network technology is permitted if (1) anti-virus software
application code version and definitions are maintained; (2) access points are registered and


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maintained by OCIO; (3) access points maintain record logs on unauthorized access attempts in
accordance with security requirements (recording capabilities must be active at all times while
access points are operational); and (4) Service Set Identified character strings do not reflect the
name of the Department, Agencies, POs, office addresses, or other product information.

Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices

Users can only connect government-issued wireless devices to the Department’s network
infrastructure, with OCIO having approval for the types of wireless devices that are deployed.
Users with personally-owned mobile and wireless devices that want to connect to the network
infrastructure for government business purposes must register the devices with the OCIO
organization. Departmental issued wireless devices should (1) have approved anti-virus software
installed and maintained; (2) have access controls that allow for passwords and personal
identification number complexity in accordance with the Department’s password standard which
defines password configuration settings; (3) have a time-out capability that does not exceed 30
minutes; and (4) encrypt Department-sensitive data on wireless devices.

Multi-Factor Authentication

In January 2016, the Department established the “Mandatory Use of Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) Cards” standard operating procedure that requires the mandatory use of two-
factor authentication in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, “Policy
for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” to ensure proper
identification of all users having access to information and information systems. Specifically,
the standard operating procedures requires that all Federal employees and contractors accessing
the Department’s network and/or information systems are required to use two-factor
authentication. All users must have a PIV-enabled identification card and a personal
identification number in order to access the Department’s network and/or information systems.
PIV cards are issued to employees by OM on the first day of processing, or prior to allowing any
network access. OM also verifies that employees have completed the appropriate security
awareness training, and that a security background investigation was completed prior to issuing
the PIV Card. Contracting Officer’s Representatives/Program Managers ensure the same process
is conducted for all contractors requiring access to the network, prior to the issuance of a PIV
card. The standard operating procedure further points out that allowing users to
access/authenticate network assets and information systems with a single factor,
username/password, or two-factor using something other than approved PIV credentials, is
considered a risk and therefore must be treated as a weakness and documented as such.

Departmental Handbook OCIO-15, “Handbook for Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified
Information”, issued in March 2007, further emphasizes that the Department leverages the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 requirement to enforce the use of two-factor
authentication for remote access to the Department’s information resources.




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   (C) If The Covered Agency Does Not Use Logical Access Controls Or Multi-Factor
       Authentication To Access A Covered System, A Description Of The Reasons For
       Not Using Such Logical Access Controls Or Multi-Factor Authentication

As described above under (B), the Department uses logical access controls and multi-factor
authentication. According to the Department’s “Mandatory Use of Personal Identity Verification
Cards” standard operating procedure, although the use of PIV credentials is required for multi-
factor authentication, OCIO acknowledges circumstances where it may be difficult to implement
the requirement. The standard operating procedure identifies exceptions that are recognized
when the use of a PIV card may be waived. However, the appropriate risk decisions associated
with the PIV card waiver must be documented in a Risk Acceptance Form (RAF) and approved
by the Department’s Chief Information Security Officer prior to the user being granted access.
Exceptions to using a PIV card are identified below.

User Forgot/Locked PIV Card

This exception occurs when an existing account or credential is temporarily unavailable or
inaccessible. When this occurs, a one-time/one day exception is approved. If the user requires a
second day, the user’s immediate supervisor must request approval from the Chief Information
Security Officer. If additional days are required, the user must report the card as lost to the
Department’s Security Operations Center (EDSOC) and OM Security Services. OM Security
Services terminates the card and the EDSOC reports the lost card as a cyber security incident.

Enterprise Failure of PIV Infrastructure

This occurs when an unplanned failure (such as a disaster recovery or emergency situation
occurs) of the IT infrastructure requires immediate access to network assets or information
systems.

Technically Not Feasible

This occurs when PIV or supporting IT infrastructure prohibits a user from technically accessing
network assets or information systems using a PIV card or credentials. The ISSO or system
owner must submit a RAF for approval.

Mobile Devices

Currently, government furnished equipment and bring your own devices mobile devices do not
support the PIV card/credentials. The ISSO or system owner for the Department’s general
support system submits and maintains the enterprise level RAF for the government furnished
equipment and incorporates a RAF requirement as part of the bring your own devices process.

Shared IT Asset

A shared IT asset is one that is shared by two or more individuals. Due to the asset-based PIV
implementation at the Department, an asset designed as PIV exempt applies to all users


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accessing the asset and therefore, the shared asset owner must submit a RAF. The following
shared asset exceptions are approved until January 2017: (1) kiosks; (2) regional training
facilities; (3) video teleconference centers; (4) OM security guard stations; and (5) assets that are
part of the Department’s loaner pool. Any changes or continued exceptions beyond January
2017 require a RAF approved by the Chief Information Security Officer or designee.

   (D) Description Of The Following Information Security Management Practices Used By
       The Covered Agency Regarding Covered Systems:

       (i) The policies and procedures followed to conduct inventories of the software
           present on the covered systems of the covered agency and the licenses associated
           with such software

Departmental Directive OCIO 3-110, “Software Asset Management and Acquisition (SAMA)
Policy” (OCIO 3-110) was issued in March 2015 in response to compliance standards, applicable
laws, and licensing restrictions as outlined by Executive Order 13103, “Computer Software
Piracy.” The Directive applies to all Departmental employees and contractors utilizing
Department-owned IT equipment and software, and all IT equipment that is connected to the
Department’s network. OCIO 3-110 requires that the OCIO IT Program Services (ITPS) and the
IT Principal Office Coordinator (POC) conducts an annual assessment of software management
procedures, practices and an inventory of installed software and related license agreements,
purchase invoices, and other documentation showing evidence of licensed software that is
currently in use. OCIO ITPS and the IT POCs use a software asset management tool to retrieve
reports to assist with enforcing and validating OCIO 3-110 policy.

All EARB approved software is available to Department employees for use (e.g., installation or
re-installation, replacement, and upgrades) with approval from their IT POC or designee
(providing that licenses are available). For software that the Department or employees has
legally obtained licensing and approval, OCIO ITPS maintains a software library for the
Department for original software licenses, certificates of authenticity, purchase invoices,
completed registration cards, original software media (e.g., diskettes or CD-ROMs), user,
administrator, and assessment information. IT POCS are required to enter all applicable
information in the software asset management tool, with OCIO ITPS acting as system
administrator for the tool.

       (ii) What capabilities the covered agency utilizes to monitor and detect exfiltration
            and other threats, including:

           (I)   Data loss prevention capabilities

As part of the Department’s ongoing Cybersecurity initiatives, the OCIO’s Information
Assurance Services is in the process of establishing a Data Loss Prevention (DLP) system
designed to protect personally identifiable information in the Department’s network by providing
technical capabilities to detect, prevent, and report the leakage of personally identifiable
information data (unencrypted sensitive data such as social security numbers (SSNs) and
financial information) in email and web traffic that leaves the Department’s network boundary.


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However, the tool used to monitor DLP does not monitor encrypted emails that remain within the
Department’s network. The Department’s DLP system is also designed to reduce the likelihood
of unintentional or inadvertent actions that leak data and cause security incidents. However, as
of July 2016, due to technical issues, the implementation of the DLP blocking feature has been
postponed. As an additional protection, the Department advised its employees to use the WinZip
program to encrypt personally identifiable information prior to emailing outside the
Department’s network. The transmission of unencrypted personally identifiable information is
considered a security violation that must be reported and handled in accordance with the
Department’s incident handling procedures.

               (II) Forensics and visibility capabilities

Departmental Handbook OCIO-14, “Handbook for Information Security Incident Response and
Reporting Procedures” (OCIO-14), dated March 2011, provides incident response and reporting
procedures to ensure appropriate and expeditious handling of information security incidents that
may affect the Department’s normal business operations. The handbook also contains a chain of
custody form to be used during incident handling.

OCIO’s Information Assurance Services office manages the Department’s Computer Incident
Response Capability (EDCIRC). The EDCIRC Coordinator serves as the primary focal point for
Department-wide incident reporting and escalation activities. EDCIRC coordinates with OIG on
matters that relate to potential criminal violations, or other matters within OIG’s jurisdiction
related to computer incidents. The OIG component responsible for investigating computer
security incidents is the Technology Crimes Division (TCD), which falls under the Assistant
Inspector General for IT Audits, and Computer Crime Investigations. TCD performs cyber-
criminal investigations in response to attacks against, as well as unauthorized access of, the
Department’s information systems networks, databases, and computer communications systems.
It also investigates the criminal misuse of Departmental computers and performs forensic
analysis of computer media in support of criminal investigations. TCD consists of special agents
with a formal technical background and all computer crime investigators have full statutory law
enforcement authority as granted by Congress.

OCIO-14 emphasizes that TCD cannot investigate a computer security incident without
receiving a timely incident report. Thus, failure to provide OIG timely incident reports may
directly impede the criminal investigative activities of the TCD staff. If incidents are not
reported as soon as possible, the Department may lose information that is vital to the securing of
evidence, as well as making important connections to ongoing cases and making decisions about
initiating new cases.

               (III) Digital rights management capabilities

Departmental Directive OCIO 3-110, “Software Asset Management and Acquisition (SAMA)
Policy” (OCIO 3-110) states that the EDSOC is required to monitor the network for unauthorized
software and notify the EARB of any suspected unauthorized software and determine whether
the software is/is not approved. 2 It is the responsibility of the IT POC to verify whether there is
2
    Unauthorized software includes pirated software or copyright infringement in the use of software.

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a license for the software. If there is no license agreement on record, the IT POC, in conjunction
with the ISSO, takes appropriate action to remove any unlicensed software. No employee or
contractor can loan, distribute, or transmit Department software to any third party, unless the
employee or contractor is expressly authorized to do so by OCIO and the applicable license.

OCIO 3-110 explicitly states that no employee or contractor can install, reproduce, distribute,
transmit, download, or otherwise use software for which the Department lacks the appropriate
license, unless such software is properly licensed to the employee or contractor, and is approved
and used in accordance with Departmental policy and the applicable license. It further states that
no employee or contractor can download from the internet or obtain from other sources and
install any software that has not been properly tested in accordance with contractor standards on
Department computers unless otherwise directed to do so by written authorization from the Chief
Information Officer or designated representative.

OCIO 3-110 identifies different levels of responsibilities relating to digital rights management.
For instance, it is the employee and contractor’s responsibility to ensure that no unlicensed
software is installed on the agency computer. EDSOC is responsible for reporting to the PO's
ISSO and the employee’s supervisor the use of unsolicited software and following up with the
EDSOC helpdesk for software blacklisting. Further, EDSOC is responsible for continuously
monitoring the Department’s network for unlicensed, unapproved, or unauthorized software and
providing a weekly report to the EARB on the results. Finally, it is the helpdesk technician’s
responsibility to ensure that they do not install, or assist in the installation of, unlicensed
software on the agency computer.

       (iii)A description of how the covered agency is using the capabilities described in (ii)

Data Loss Prevention Capabilities

According to the Department, the DLP system deployment was initiated in November 2015, with
the actual deployment of data protection software to employee workstations (desktops and
laptops) during December 2015 and January 2016. In January 2016, users were notified that
they may see different DLP related messages when performing various actions such as
transmitting unencrypted SSNs (or numeric strings that appear to be SSNs), as well as
transferring large files or content regardless of the existence of SSNs. As the DLP develops, the
Department plans on transitioning to proactive blocking of emails containing unencrypted SSNs,
preventing the transmission of unencrypted SSNs and protecting users from potential security
violations. The sender of the message receives an automated message from the DLP system
advising them that their message was blocked and delivery prevented. If the message was an
email, the user would receive the automated message in the form of an Automated Notification
(in the form of a pop-up notification box) Response Action. If the blocked message was web
browser traffic, the user would receive notification directly in their web browser.

According to the Department, during the initial deployment of its DLP tool, if a user sent social
security numbers unencrypted, they would be contacted by the EDSOC to validate the data
transmission. The EDSOC investigates all events that result in a security alert to determine if
what caused the alert was an actual security event. If it is not an actual security event, the


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EDSOC has the authority to tune the DLP solution to recognize the event. Otherwise, it initiates
security incident handling procedures.

Forensic and Visibility Capabilities

OCIO-14 identifies specific activities that are required of system users and system support
personnel regarding forensic and visibility capabilities relating to security incidents. These
capabilities are outlined below.

System User Response Activities

OCIO-14 explains that users participate in incident containment efforts because they have
immediate local access to the workstation or other devices that may have been attacked, allowing
them to help limit the damage caused by the attack and preserving valuable evidence. Actions
taken by the user may significantly impact the state of the evidence and therefore, should be
coordinated with TCD and/or the EDCIRC Coordinator. Also, support personnel (i.e., Help
Desk, Computer Security Officer, ISSO, etc.) can direct users to take any of the steps to assist in
containing and preserving evidence.

If the Incident Handler or Incident Coordinator determines that the incident might result in a
future investigation by TCD, the Incident Handler or Incident Coordinator immediately contacts
their Information System Security Manager or Computer Security Officer who would then
contact the EDCIRC Coordinator (or designated backup), who would then contact TCD. It’s
imperative that TCD needs to be involved from the beginning of the incident investigation to
ensure that all potential evidence is preserved. The TCD Duty Agent is available to the EDCIRC
Coordinator 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for consultation on these matters.

If it is determined the affected system is a laptop, users are required to seek forensic guidance
immediately from their ISSO or Computer Security Officer. For instance, improper power
disconnection can drain the backup batteries and cause loss of data, which can cause
admissibility issues should the laptop be considered evidence in a criminal investigation.

During the eradication phase of the incident, a determination is made as to whether or not
evidence needs to be preserved. In the event that evidence needs to be preserved, the EDCIRC
Coordinator coordinates with the OIG for next steps.

System Support Personnel Response Activities

System support personnel also maintains a chain of custody (that demonstrates who did what
when), including clearly demonstrating each transfer of evidence (e.g., date, time, persons
involved). This is especially important in preserving any physical evidence that may be analyzed
by the TCD or law enforcement. Because preservation of evidence is vital to the incident
response process, no changes should be made to any physical evidence. Evidence that is not
preserved may cause the Department to lose valuable data that would assist in the full
remediation of incidents, as well as support law enforcement prosecution.



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In the incident’s identification phase, the Incident Coordinator is responsible for communicating
incident-related information and escalating the incident, as appropriate, to management and the
EDCIRC Coordinator. The EDCIRC Coordinator reports to the appropriate internal and external
parties such as TCD.

In the containment phase of the incident, to prevent any damage to evidence, containment
activities should be coordinated with the EDCIRC Coordinator who consults with the TCD.
System support personnel performs most incident containment activities, such as
(1) documenting all actions performed during the response; (2) keeping all Incident Handlers
informed and advising the appropriate parties (e.g., system owners) of progress; (3) ensuring that
active measures are taken to stop an ongoing incident (e.g., firewall rule set modifications, email
filtering, system disconnection); (4) performing two disk images of a system onto unused media,
verifying the integrity of the images, and safely storing the second image for future use as
evidence; (5) gathering, analysis, and reviewing of network, system, and application logs to
ensure containment efforts were successful and that all systems impacted by the incident have
been identified; and (6) changing passwords on compromised systems and systems that interact
with the compromised systems.

Eradication is the process of identifying the cause of the incident and mitigating that cause, as
well as removing components of an incident. It is important to note that eradication may destroy
evidence of the incident and TCD must be involved. Any steps taken in the eradication process
must be documented. Recovery steps are to be recorded and reported to include the EDCIRC
Coordinator and TCD.

Digital Rights Management Capabilities

OCIO 3-110 states that as part of Information Assurance Services’ continuous monitoring
program, the EDSOC monitors for unapproved/unauthorized software and a weekly report is
generated and sent to the EARB for verification and validation. Any software for which OCIO
or the IT POC does not have a license or is not approved is enforced through the Continuous
Monitoring program and blacklisted by the EDSOC, until approved by the EARB.

According to OCIO 3-110, the Department is required to provide training to both current and
new employees in compliance with the Executive Order 13103, Computer Software Piracy, and
this SAMA Policy. Specifically, the Department is required to (1) provide training during
employee orientation on SAMA Policy regarding the detection and prevention of piracy and the
consequences of violating SAMA Policy and applicable copyright laws; (2) circulate reminders
of this SAMA Policy on a bi-annual basis and reminders are posted on the Department’s intranet
on a quarterly basis; and (3) renew this policy annually as part of the required Department’s
Security Awareness Program.

OCIO 3-110 also requires OCIO ITPS to develop performance measures to monitor the
Department’s compliance with Executive Order 13103, CIO Council, and this SAMA Policy on
a quarterly basis. EDSOC runs a weekly report on blacklisted and whitelisted software and
provide a copy to the EARB for verification and validation. OCIO ITPS runs quarterly reports



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on software applications and provide a copy to the EDSOC and the EARB to ensure the
Department is in compliance with OCIO 3-110.

       (iv) If the covered agency is not utilizing capabilities described in (ii), a description of
            the reasons for not utilizing such capabilities

The Department is utilizing these capabilities described above in (ii).

   (E) Description Of The Policies And Procedures Of The Covered Agency With Respect
       To Ensuring That Entities, Including Contractors, That Provide Services To The
       Covered Agency Are Implementing The Information Security Management
       Practices Described In (D)

OCIO-01 documents and set forth the Department Information Assurance (IA) Cybersecurity
Policy regarding IA/cybersecurity for all IT assets and services operated within or on behalf of
the Department. This policy is based on statutory and executive directive requirements that
include Federal laws and regulations, Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, National
Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publications 800 Series, National Institute of
Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards, Office of Management
and Budget Circulars, and Department of Homeland Security policy. Violation of this Policy
may result in the loss of, or limitations on, use of information resources, as well as disciplinary
and/or legal action, including termination of employment or referral for criminal prosecution in
accordance with Federal law and Departmental policy. OCIO-01 applies to all Departmental
personnel and contractor staff. Additionally, it applies to all Department IT resources; hardware;
software; media; facilities; and data owned, managed, or operated on behalf of the Department.
Compliance with this Policy is mandatory. All personnel and support contractors must be
familiar with, and comply with policy contained in OCIO-01. The IA Cybersecurity Policy is
supported through standards, guidance, directives, and other Information Assurance Services
governance documents and shall be complied in full.

In addition, LACG v6.1 states that as part of Access Enforcement, per Federal Acquisition
Regulation Part 39.101(d), in acquiring IT for access enforcement, agencies shall include the
appropriate IT security policies and requirements, including use of common security
configurations (e.g., U.S. Government Configuration Baseline and beyond) available from the
National Institute of Standards and Technology.




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