COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHIN3TON. D.C. 20540 k ' 7B-1667 .MAR 19 1 ' ir. F. C. Fenton Autborized Certifying Officer W Isr1oUna1 Revenue Service V. S. Treasury Department jmrket yo treet San ?ulc iictClfloia 94102 Desar . Fenton: 'We refer to your letter of December 23, 1970 (your reference AdFFV), vith an enclosed voucher for $50 in favor of Mr. Robert Y. Solwan, w - covering an expense incurred by his incident to maintaining his status as s attmnay in good standing of the State Ba? of California. You request aadvance decision as to the prpriety of certifying the voucher for $a pertinent facts are stated in your letter as follows: | 1. IRobert M. Solom n, Estate Tax Attorney, is a menber of the State Bar of California, as required by law. The State Bar imposes an annual fee for membership on all of its members. lMr. Solomon was admitted in January, .' 19 a his fee for the-year 1970 in $50.00. and 8r2* As explained in Mr. Solomon's meorandum dated Novem- ber 5, 1970 (Enclosure 3)L an Estate Tax Attorney (08-905-13) is required to be a member in good standing of the bar of one of the states or the District of s> Columbia. If that enmloyee. la not a member in good standing of a state bar, he vil3 be separated from his employment. *3 lThe State of California requires that each member pay the annual membership fee or be dropped from the rolls of attorneys in the state. This would result in . Mr. Solomon beinj separated from his employment with the Internal Revenue Service." CAUklification requirements for various positions in the Federal ,"Fe Z ae established pursuant to the authority provided in 5 U.S.C. - lnd 5112. 2zder_.this basic authority it has been determined that /~~~~~~/6 .4~ }_ '~ ~QQ9~~9r ,. *,B 173667 ' q6ualify as estate tax attorneys persons must be unmbers in good *tandiflg5 of the bar of one of tbe States or of the District of Columbia. Oere is no requirement or preference as to which State bar the employee selects for admission. W. Solomon chose to seek admission to the CalifornIa bar, which is an integrated bar jurisdiction. AU practicing __ attorneg-ln--thst-State-are-required-to-be-members of the State bar and nr subject to the rules of the bar including a provisioa for the payment o an awnnal fee to administer the purposes of *che integrated bar. See 7, A. Jur. 2d, Attorneys att Lw 7. As a member of such bar Wr. Solomon Mgt pay annual dues to remain in an "activ&e status. Insofar as his e:ployment with the Internal Revenue Service is concerned he Mt main- tain mebership before this bar, or the bar of any other State or the iDstrict of Columbia, and to lose that status would result in dis- qulification for his Government employment as an estate tax attorney. W. Solom's original request was nistratively deni the baues of our decisions 22 Co!. Cen. M6O19T2) and 47 id. 31 1967). arguos that his situation is distin sablfrc thoe decisions for thb reason tbat he is required to pay dues annually.In both decisions 'w considered a Government attorney's entitlement to reimburseawnt for : nominal fees necessarily expended to represent his particular agency * before a United States Court of Appeals, and it was held "that admission g to practice before a Federal court was a matter of personal qualification for the attorney concerned," end that the relevant appropriations "were , not available to reimburse attorneys for a nominal fee required by the i court as a condition of admisslon to practice." Although a one-time fee Was there involved, the principle that an expense of qualification is personal Is the same. In addltion to the foregoing It has been repeatedly held that where w ftedera eVpoMee must secure permits or licenses to perform the duties Of his position it in a matter of person qualification and the fees inwident to procuring same 'would be an xpense necessary to quality hbW7 for the duties required of reimbursement therefor wouldK r/ 40t be authorized." 3 Camp. Gen. 663, 665 (1924). Se o 6 id. 432 . (1926) And 31 id. 8l51); ~ compare wt 46 id. 7 Th* e expense iCurred by W. Solodn is an expense of per nl qulification and as Such not reimbursable. ¶here is also for consideration 5 U.S.C. 5946which provides in part that:3 *"!xcept as authorized by a specific appropriation, LorJ * - by Cxpress terms in a general appropriation *** appropriated f'Ads may not be used for payment of- -2- ^.~~ --- -2 - -. J 173j6 6 7 F. ,. S .- . '. "(1) membership fees or dues of an employee * * * in a society or association * * *' does not reveal lan- An examination of the relevant appropriation acts funds for the of appropriated guage that would authorize the expenditure we conclude -px aosecontexplated by M Solomon's voucher. Accordingly# thatthe conditions prescribed in 5 U.S.C. 594&arelt-atisfied. a reinubs- For the foregoing reasons the voucher does not represent for paymnt. As requested able expense and therefore may not. be certifiedis returned. the original voucher with supporting documents -- ' Sincerely youX8,, - - e* .' *lU ELL- Coxtroler General of the United States Enclosure .;. Ii1 -'-<C9 -i' ?.. !"'... ~ 'qjl .*' ':~I *':** . .. S. -3-
IRS Employee's Claim for State Bar Association Fee
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-03-02.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)