oversight

Cost, Schedule, and Design Aspects of Selected Atomic Energy Commission Construction Projects

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-08-17.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                 a   2                              I-P




2:o   REPORT 'O THE CONGRESS




      Cost, Schedule, And Design Aspects
      Of Selected Atomic Energy Commission
      Construction Projects -_,,,,0,




                                                    BY
                                                    THE
                                                    COMP
                                                     GENE
      BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
      OF THE UNITED STATES


            E COPy- CO       GEN    AuG.1.7,19 71
                         e         o7-q
            COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
                       WASHINGTON, D.C.   20548




B-164105




To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

      This is our report on the cost, schedule, and design as-
pects of selected Atomic Energy Commission construction
projects.

      Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Account-
ing Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing
Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

       Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Of-
fice of Management and Budget, and to the Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commission.




                                          Comptroller General
                                          of the United States




                 50TH ANNIVERSARY 1921-1971
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S             COST, SCHEDULE, AND DESIGN ASPECTS OF
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS            SELECTED ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CONSTRUCTION
                                  PROJECTS B-164105


DIGEST


WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

       The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) provides funds for the construction of
       large facilities used in connection with its research activities and devel-
       opment programs. Because of congressional interest in such construction
       projects, the General Accounting Office (GAO) selected five projects for
       review: the 200-billion-electron-volt (Bev.) accelerator laboratory, the
       Loss of Fluid Test Facility, the Power Burst Facility, the Fast Flux Test
       Facility, and the Hot Fuel Examination Facility.
       The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory was selected for review because of the
       substantial costs to be incurred in its construction, estimated by AEC at
       $250 million. The remaining projects were selected because, during a re-
       view of certain reactor development activities, GAO had seen indications of
       cost increases or schedule slippages and had decided to inquire into the
       causes.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

       Cost estimates

       GAO reviewed AEC's June 1970 cost estimates for the five projects, as
       shown below. As of May 1971 AEC's total cost estimates for these projects
       remained the same.
                                                Cost estimates
                                 Year        At time           At
             Project          authorized   authorized      June 1970     Increase
                                                        (millions)
200-Bev. accelerator
   laboratory                    1967          $250.0     $250.0          $   -
Loss of Fluid Test
   Facility                      1963            17.6       35.0           17.4
Power Burst Facility             1964             8.1       16.1              8.0
Fast Flux Test Facility          1966            87.5      102.8           15.3
Hot Fuel Examination
   Facility                      1968            10.2       10.2              -

       AEC has advised the Congress of the revised cost estimates.     (See pp. 27,
       30, and 35.)



Tear Sheet                                 1
                                                          AUG. 1 7, 1 9 7 1
For the three projects that have experienced increases in estimated con-
struction costs, related estimates of operating funds which are expected
to be expended during the projects' construction periods also have in-
creased substantially over original estimates. (See pp. 28, 33, and
37.)
In June 1970 the organization responsible for construction of the 200-Bev.
accelerator laboratory did not have a current estimate of total project
costs. At GAO's request the laboratory and the architect-engineer pre-
pared estimates of the total costs of various project components as of
June 30, 1970. GAO assembled these estimates which totaled about $240 mil-
lion. (See pp. 11 to 16.)
AEC advised GAO that the $240 million estimate did not appear to be un-
reasonable as a working estimate of the project, which was 24-percent com-
pleted in June 1970. AEC indicated, however, that, because of the com-
plexities and the remaining uncertainties facing the project, costs could
not be predicted with sufficient accuracy to warrant revising the official
estimate of $250 million. AEC expressed the belief that the project would
be completed within the $250 million authorization. (See pp. 14 and 15.)
Construction scheduZe

The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory was expected to be completed on sched-
ule in 1973. Laboratory officials estimated that a 200-Bev. beam would be
achieved by June 1971, about 1 year earlier than originally anticipated.
(See p. 17.) The other projects had experienced slippages in their esti-
mated completion dates.
The estimated completion dates of the Loss of Fluid Test Facility and the
Power Burst Facility have been extended about 6 years and 4 years, respec-
tively. Delays of both projects have resulted from design revisions, pro-
cedures instituted to upgrade engineering, and management direction prob-
lems. Measures were taken by AEC to resolve these problems, (See pp. 23
to 27, and 31 to 33.)
The completion of the Fast Flux Test Facility and the Hot Fuel Examination
Facility has been delayed about 1 year. In a September 23, 1970, report to
the Congress on the "Problems in Developing the Atomic Energy Commission's
Fast Flux Test Facility" (B-164105), GAO noted that the delay of the facil-
ity had been caused by management problems and that action was being taken
to resolve these problems. (See pp. 37, 39, and 43.)
According to AEC the delay of the Hot Fuel Examination Facility was attri-
butable, in large part, to the fact that funds for design work were not
available as early as anticipated. (See p. 43.)




                               2
   Design changes
   Significant changes have been made to each of the construction projects.
   The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory is being constructed to incorporate
   the capability to obtain energy levels as high as 500 Bev. under modi-
   fied operating conditions. Also several minor design changes have been
   made, which are not expected to adversely affect the operating capabil-
   ity of the accelerator. (See pp. 17 to 19.)
   Substantial design changes have been made to the Loss of Fluid Test
   Facility and the Power Burst Facility, which have been accompanied by
   modification and/or expansion of their original test programs. (See
   pp. 21, 22, and 29 to 31.)
   The definitive design for the Fast Flux Test Facility included a plant
   concept similar to that expected to be used in commercial fast breeder
   reactors. The initial estimated cost for the project, which was based
   on a management assessment of many different reactor concepts, has been
   increased by about $15 million. (See pp. 35 to 37.)
   Since authorization of the Hot Fuel Examination Facility, design modi-
   fications--resulting in cost reductions of about $1.2 million--have
   been made to maintain the $10.2 million cost estimate. Also about
   $5 million is to be invested in the upgrading of the Fuel Cycle Facil-
   ity, a nearby test facility, principally to augment the capabilities
   the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. (See pp. 40 to 45.)
    GAO believes that AEC should have informed the Congress that it was con-
    sidering the modification of the Fuel Cycle Facility at the time author-
    ization was requested for the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. AEC stated
    that such advice had been omitted by oversight and that it had been pro-
    vided to the Congress later, during the fiscal year 1971 authorization
    hearings. (See pp. 41 and 42.)
   Reporting system

    Reports were prepared periodically, usually monthly, and were designed
    to communicate information to AEC concerning changes in cost, sched-
    ule, and designed aspects of construction projects. GAO believes that
    these reports provided adequate mechanisms for communicating this in-
    formation. (See pp. 46 to 49.)
    AEC has supplied the Congress with current cost and schedule infor-
    mation regarding the projects included in GAO's review. Also AEC has
    given substantial information to the Congress concerning the design
    aspects of its various construction projects. (See p. 49.)
    With respect to the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory, GAO believes
    that the contractor's practices for developing current working cost
    estimates reported to AEC should be strengthened tp providea better
    basis for analysis and evaluation. (See p. 49.)

Tear Sheet                            3
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

     AEC, together with appropriate contractor officials, should review the
     contractor's cost-estimating practices used for the 200-Bev. accelerator
     laboratory and should make appropriate revisions to ensure that esti-
     mates prepared by the contractor are documented adequately to facili-
     tate effective analysis and evaluation. (See p. 49.)


AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

     AEC pointed out that the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory project was be-
     ing carried out in a highly satisfactory manner and that it was expected
     to be completed within the original time and cost estimates and to ex-
     ceed its performance objectives. AEC agreed, however, that the con-
     tractor's estimating practices should be strengthened and took steps to
     improve these practices. (See pp. 49 and 50.)


MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

     GAO is issuing this report because cost levels, maintenance of sched-
     ules, and design changes of large construction projects of departments
     and agencies of the Federal Government, paid for with public funds,
     are matters of special concern and interest to the Congress.




                                       4
                       Contents
                                                        Page
DIGEST                                                    1

CHAPTER

  1       INTRODUCTION                                    5
              Planning and approval of construction
                projects                                 5
              Status of active construction projects     7

  2       200-BILLION-ELECTRON-VOLT ACCELERATOR LABO-
          RATORY                                        10
              Cost estimate                             11
              Construction schedule                     17
              Design changes                            17

  3       LOSS OF FLUID TEST FACILI'IY                  20
              Design changes                            21
              Construction schedule                     23
                  Design changes and redirection of
                    LOFT program                        23
                  Upgraded engineering                  23
                  Management direction problems         26
              Cost estimate                             27

  4       POWER BURST FACILITY                          29
              Cost estimate and design changes          29
              Construction schedule                     31

  5       FAST FLUX TEST FACILITY                        34
              Cost estimate and design changes           35
              Construction schedule                      37

  6       HOT FUEL EXAMINATION FACILITY                  40
              Planning and authorization of HFEF         40
              Design and construction                    42

  7       REPORTING SYSTEM                               46
              Internal reporting system                  46
                  200-Bev. accelerator laboratory        47
                  Division of Reactor Development and
                    Technology projects                  48
CHAPTER                                                   Page

               External reporting system                   49
               Conclusions                                 49

      8    SCOPE OF REVIEW                                 51

APPENDIX

      I    Principal management officials of the Atomic
             Energy Commission responsible for adminis-
             tration of activities discussed in this
             report                                        55

                         ABBREVIATIONS

AEC        Atomic Energy Commission

FFTF       Fast Flux Test Facility

GAO        General Accounting Office

HFEF       Hot Fuel Examination Facility

LOFT       Loss of Fluid Test Facility

PBF        Power Burst Facility
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S           COST, SCHEDULE, AND DESIGN ASPECTS OF
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS          SELECTED ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CONSTRUCTION
                                PROJECTS B-164105


DIGE ST


WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

     The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) provides funds for the construction of
     large facilities used in connection with its research activities and devel-
     opment programs. Because of congressional interest in such construction
     projects, the General Accounting Office (GAO) selected five projects for
     review: the 200-billion-electron-volt (Bev.) accelerator laboratory, the
     Loss of Fluid Test Facility, the Power Burst Facility, the Fast Flux Test
     Facility, and the Hot Fuel Examination Facility.
     The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory was selected for review because of the
     substantial costs to be incurred in its construction, estimated by AEC at
     $250 million. The remaining projects were selected because, during a re-
     view of certain reactor development activities, GAO had seen indications of
     cost increases or schedule slippages and had decided to inquire into the
     causes.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

     Cost estimates

     GAO reviewed AEC's June 1970 cost estimates for the five projects, as
     shown below. As of May 1971 AEC's total cost estimates for these projects
     remained the same.
                                              Cost estimates
                               Year        At time           At
        Project             authorized   authorized      June 1970     Increase
                                                      (millions)
200-Bev. accelerator
  laboratory                   1967        $250.0       $250.0           $ -
Loss of Fluid Test
  Facility                     1963          17.6         35.0            17.4
Power Burst Facility           1964           8.1         16.1             8.0
Fast Flux Test Facility        1966          87.5        102.8            15.3
Hot Fuel Examination
  Facility                     1968          10.2         10.2
     AEC has advised the Congress of the revised cost estimates.     (See pp. 27,
     30, and 35.)
For the three projects that have experienced increases in estimated con-
struction costs, related estimates of operating funds which are expected
to be expended during the projects' construction periods also have in-
creased substantially over original estimates. (See pp. 28, 33, and
37.)
In June 1970 the organization responsible for construction of the 200-Bev.
accelerator laboratory did not have a current estimate of total project
costs. At GAO's request the laboratory and the architect-engineer pre-
pared estimates of the total costs of various project components as of
June 30, 1970. GAO assembled these estimates which totaled about $240 mil-
lion. (See pp. 11 to 16.)
AEC advised GAO that the $240 million estimate did not appear to be un-
reasonable as a working estimate of the project, which was 24-percent com-
pleted in June 1970. AEC indicated, however, that, because of the com-
plexities-and the remaining uncertainties facing the project, costs could
not be predicted with sufficient accuracy to warrant revising the official
estimate of $250 million. AEC expressed the belief that the project would
be completed within the $250 million authorization., (See pp. 14 and 15.)
Construction 'schedule

The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory was expected to be completed on sched-
ule in 1973. Laboratory officials estimated that a 200-Bev. beam would be
achieved by June 1971, about 1 year earlier than originally anticipated.
(See p. 17.) The other projects had experienced slippages in their esti-
mated completion dates.
The estimated completion dates of the Loss of Fluid Test Facility and the
Power Burst Facility have been extended about 6 years and 4 years, respec-
tively. Delays of both projects have resulted from design revisions, pro-
cedures instituted to upgrade engineering, and management direction prob-
lems. Measures were taken by AEC to resolve these problems. (See pp. 23
to 27, and 31 to 33.)
The completion of the Fast Flux Test Facility and the Hot Fuel Examination
Facility has been delayed about 1 year. In a September 23, 1970, report to
the Congress on the "Problems in Developing the Atomic Energy Commission's
Fast Flux Test Facility" (B-164105), GAO noted that the delay of the facil-
ity had been caused by management problems and that action was being taken
to resolve these problems. (See pp. 37, 39, and 43.)
According to AEC the delay of the Hot Fuel Examination Facility was attri-
butable, in large part, to the fact that funds for design work were not
available as early as anticipated. (See p. 43.)




                               2
Design changes

Significant changes have been made to each of the construction projects.
The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory is being constructed to incorporate
the capability to obtain energy levels as high as 500 Bev. under modi-
fied operating conditions. Also several minor design changes have been
made, which are not expected to adversely affect the operating capabil-
ity of the accelerator. (See pp. 17 to 19.)
Substantial design changes have been made to the Loss of Fluid Test
Facility and the Power Burst Facility, which have been accompanied by
modification and/or expansion of their original test programs. (See
pp. 21, 22, and 29 to 31.)
The definitive design for the Fast Flux Test Facility included a plant
concept similar to that expected to be used in commercial fast breeder
reactors. The initial estimated cost for the project, which was based
on a management assessment of many different reactor concepts, has been
increased by about $15 million. (See pp. 35 to 37.)
Since authorization of the Hot Fuel Examination Facility, design modi-
fications--resulting in cost reductions of about $1.2 million--have
been made to maintain the $10.2 million cost estimate. Also about
$5 million is to be invested in the upgrading of the Fuel Cycle Facil-
ity, a nearby test facility, principally to augment the capabilities
the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. (See pp. 40 to 45.)
GAO believes that AEC should have informed the Congress that it was con-
sidering the modification of the Fuel Cycle Facility at the time author-
ization was requested for the Hot Fuel Examination Facility. AEC stated
that such advice had been omitted by oversight and that it had been pro-
vided to the Congress later, during the fiscal year 1971 authorization
hearings. (See pp. 41 and 42.)
Reporting system

Reports were prepared periodically, usually monthly, and were designed
to communicate information to AEC concerning changes in cost, sched-
ule, and designed aspects of construction projects. GAO believes that
these reports provided adequate mechanisms for communicating this in-
formation. (See pp. 46 to 49.)
AEC has supplied the Congress with current cost and schedule infor-
mation regarding the projects included in GAO's review. Also AEC has
given substantial information to the Congress concerning the design
aspects of its various construction projects. (See p. 49.)
With respect to the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory, GAO believes
that the contractor's practices for developing current working cost
estimates reported to AEC should be strengthened tp providea better
basis for analysis and evaluation. (See p. 49.)

                                  3
RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

     AEC, together with appropriate contractor officials, should review the
     contractor's cost-estimating practices used for the 200-Bev. accelerator
     laboratory and should mnake appropriate revisions to ensure that esti-
     mates prepared by the contractor are documented adequately to facili-
     tate effective analysis and evaluation. (See p. 49.)

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

     AEC pointed out that the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory project was be-
     ing carried out in a highly satisfactory manner and that it was expected
     to be completed within the original time and cost estimates and to ex-
     ceed its performance objectives. AEC agreed, however, that the con-
     tractor's estimating practices should be strengthened and took steps to
     improve these practices. (See pp. 49 and 50.)

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

     GAO is issuing this report because cost levels, maintenance of sched-
     ules, and design changes of large construction projects of departments
     and agencies of the Federal Government, paid for with public funds,
     are matters of special concern and interest to the Congress.




                                       4
                         CHAPTER 1

                       INTRODUCTION

PLANNING AND APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

     AEC's Division of Construction furnishes staff judg-
ment on construction estimates to AEC Headquarters divisions
and offices and reviews construction project data sheets,
requests for architect-engineer work, and other matters re-
lating to construction projects.

     Requests for proposed construction projects at AEC's
multiprogram laboratories generally originate with the lab-
oratories' operating contractors and are submitted to the
cognizant AEC field office for comment. For other contrac-
tors the field office is responsible for preparing sound and
economical budget estimates and supporting justifications.
In preparing such requests, operating funds may be used to
perform conceptual design work and to aid in the development
of budget estimates.

     AEC's instructions provide that conceptual design in-
clude the establishment of the scope and general design pa-
rameters of construction projects and that it is desirable,
in practically all cases, that conceptual design be under-
taken prior to the inclusion of a construction project in
the budget submission.

     Also, since fiscal year 1964, AEC has requested and has
been provided with construction planning and design funds
to obtain architect-engineer services for complex construc-
tion projects which are under consideration for future
years' authorizations and a'ppropriations. Such funding en-
ables AEC to perform the daesign work necessary to develop
reasonably reliable cost estimates on such complex projects.

     AEC's manual instructions provide that prices used in
estimating costs be those of the price level that is current
at the time the estimates are prepared, except when instruc-
tions are issued to the contrary. Also a contingency re-
serve should be included to cover costs that may result from
unforeseen or unpredictable conditions.


                            5
     AEC informed us that, in accordance with informal guid-
ance received from the Office of Management and Budget early
in calendar year 1969, provisions for cost escalation were
included in the contingency reserve for projects having rel-
atively short construction periods. Separate escalation
provisions are included for projects to be constructed over
long periods.

     As part of the budget process, the field offices submit
all construction project proposals to the appropriate Head-
quarters program division for review and include, for each
proposed project, a construction project data sheet. Each
data sheet includes a description, justification, and cost
estimate for the proposed construction project. The data
sheets are reviewed by the Division of Construction for con-
formity with design criteria; soundness of cost estimates;
reasonableness of time schedules; and adequacy, pertinence,
and consistency of project description statements.

     After completion of AEC's budgetary review, the con-
struction project data sheets, as revised during the review,
provide the basic support for those projects for which AEC
will request authorizations and appropriations.

     The Congress authorizes and appropriates separate funds
to AEC for operating expenses and for plant and capital
equipment. Included in the latter category are amounts for
construction, acquisition, or modification of facilities;
construction planning and design; and acquisition of capital
equipment not related to construction. During fiscal years
1965 through 1971, AEC was appropriated, for plant and cap-
ital equipment, approximately $2.5 billion, of which approxi-
mately $1.3 billion was related specifically to construction
activities.

     After a construction project has been authorized and
appropriations have been provided, preliminary design work
is accomplished by an architect-engineer on the basis of
detailed design criteria approved by the field office man-
ager. When projects are considered by AEC to be particularly
urgent, AEC has the authority to initiate this design work
prior to project authorization.

     After approval of the preliminary design by AEC, de-
tailed design work generally is performed by the same

                              6
architect-engineer who performed the preliminary design.
The detailed design work consists of the development of com-
plete construction drawings and related documents and a de-
tailed estimate of the cost of construction.

     At the start of construction, the current estimate of
the total cost of the project, including any costs which may
have been incurred or obligated for architect-engineer ser-
vices, must be within the start-of-project limitation set
forth in the authorizing legislation. The estimated cost
shown in the authorizing legislation, plus a stated percent-
age, either 10 or 25 percent, is referred to as the start-
of-project limitation. Normally the percentage for the more
complex projects, such as accelerators and reactors, is
25 percent of the estimated cost of the project, and normally
the percentage for conventional facilities such as lecture
halls, cafeterias, classroom additions, and office buildings,
is 10 percent of the estimated cost of the project.

     AEC's instructions provide that construction of a proj-
ect not be initiated by a field office unless the program-
matic purpose, scope, location, and operational capacity are
within the description of the project as proposed to the
Congress for authorization. The instructions provide also
that, when these criteria are not met, the matter be referred
to AEC Headquarters for a determination as to whether (1)
the project may be regarded as one which has been authorized,
(2) the project may be regarded as a substitute project, or
(3) the project requires further authorization.

STATUS OF ACTIVE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

     As of December 31, 1970, AEC had 80 active authorized
projects. The following tables show the total amount of
cost overruns and underruns expected to occur, based on De-
cember 31, 1970, cost estimates, and the estimated schedule
slippages at that date of all authorized projects. This in-
formation has been provided in construction projects reports
submitted by AEC annually to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Congress of the United States.




                             7
                     Estimated Cost Overruns or Underruns
                           of Construction Projects

                                        Estimated
                                         cost at               Estimated
                                         time of              cost as of           Estimated
                       Number           authori-             December 31,           overrun
                    of projects          zation                  1970           or underrun(-)

                                                        ,'     - (millions)·

Projects having
  estimated un-
  derruns                  7            $        41.6         $    34.9                $ -6.7
Projects having
  estimated
  overruns                15                    634.9             765.1                 130.2
Projects whose
  current esti-
  mates equal
  amounts autho-
  rized                   58                    533.2             533.2

   Total                  80            $1,209.7              $1,333.2                 $123.5

                             Schedule Slippage of
                  Active Authorized AEC Construction Projects
                           as of December 31, 1970

                                                             Slippage (months)
                                 No
                               slip-                                                        37 or
                  Total         page   1 to 6        7 to 12      13 to 24     25 to 36      more

Projects hav-
  ing esti-
  mated under-
  runs               7                      1            1            2            1             2
Projects hav-
  ing esti-
  mated over-
  runs             15            1          -            2           4            2              6
Projects whose
  current esti-
  mates equal
  amounts au-
  thorized         58           23          8           9            8            7              3

  Total            80           24          9           12          14           10             11




                                                 8
     On February 19, 1968, we issued a report to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on our "Review of Selected Con-
struction Projects" (B-159687). To provide more meaningful
information regarding certain aspects of construction activ-
ities, we suggested that AEC

    -- disclose to the Congress information regarding delays
       encountered in completing authorized projects,

    -- incorporate in its instructions a more specific def-
      inition of what constitutes a change in project
      scope, and

    -- provide information on the related research and de-
       velopment costs associated with projects presented
       for authorizations when such costs are significant
       and critical to the successful and timely completion
       of the projects.

     Since the report was issued, AEC has taken action to
implement our suggestions.




                             9
                         CHAPTER 2

     200-BILLION-ELECTRON-VOLT ACCELERATOR LABORATORY

     The 200-billion-electron-volt (Bev.) accelerator labora-
tory was authorized by the Congress as project 68-4-f under
Public Law 90-56 (81 Stat. 124), approved July 26, 1967.
The laboratory is being constructed at Batavia, Illinois,
under a cost-type contract with Universities Research As-
sociation, Inc., a consortium of 52 major universities.
     The association has established the National Accelera-
tor Laboratory as the operating organization directly re-
sponsible for designing and constructing the accelerator
laboratory and for operating the accelerator and associated
facilities. The accelerator will provide the highest en-
ergy beam of protons of any facility in the world for use
in high-energy physics research. Currently the Soviet Union
has the highest energy accelerator at about 76 Bev.
     The laboratory will be composed primarily of the accel-
erator, experimental areas, and support facilities. The
accelerator itself will be composed of three accelerators:
a linear accelerator, a booster accelerator, and a main ac-
celerator ring which will operate in series and which will
raise the energy of protons to 200 Bev. or greater by ac-
celerating them around a ring about 4 miles in circumference.
     AEC plans initially to provide three experimental areas
external to the main accelerator ring, which can be used
individually or simultaneously. AEC advised us that addi-
tional area for experiments would be added as experience
was gained in using these high-energy beams.
     Many of the support facilities--such as laboratories,
shops, and offices--included in the authorization of the
project will be housed in a single high-rise structure of
approximately 422,000 square feet. In addition, other lab-
oratory facilities are planned near the experimental areas.
     At the time our fieldwork was completed, in September
1970, the construction of the 200-Bev. accelerator labora-
tory was 34-percent completed. AEC estimated that the total
cost of the project would not exceed the $250 million au-
thorized and that the project would be completed on


                            10
schedule. Initial tests of a 200-Bev. beam are expected in
June 1971, to be followed by a period for tuning up and de-
bugging.

      It appea.rs that the progress that has been made thus
far can be attributed, in large part, to certain techniques
used in managing the construction of the accelerator labora-
tory.

     -- The laboratory director holds weekly meetings--
        attended by representatives from his office, the
        technical sections of the laboratory, the prime con-
        struction contractor, and AEC--to discuss all aspects
        of the construction project, including possible de-
        sign changes.

     -- In designing the accelerator, the laboratory has uti-
        lized technology developed at other high-energy
        physics accelerators to the greatest extent possible
        and thereby has minimized research and development
        efforts. Furthermore the laboratory has emphasized
        simplicity and flexibility in design so that future
        design changes can be incorporated more readily.

     -- The laboratory has constructed prototypes for each
        major accelerator component to ensure that the spec-
        ifications will produce an acceptable component.

     -- In requesting proposals from suppliers before procur-
        ing accelerator components, the laboratory has, on
        occasion, received suggestions for the simplification
        and improvement of accelerator components. In such
        cases the laboratory accepted the improved design,
        provided that it did not compromise quality.
COST ESTIMATE

     AEC estimates that the 200-Bevo accelerator laboratory
will cost $250 million. In fiscal year 1968 the Congress
provided partial authorization and appropriation for this
project of $7,333,000 for architect-engineer work. Through
fiscal year 1971 the Congress has authorized the full
$250 million, of which it has appropriated $149,407,000.



                            11
     The March 1969 cost estimate, which accompanied AEC's
request for full authorization of the project, included,
in addition to a provision for contingencies, a separate
provision for cost escalation of about 10 percent of con-
struction and engineering costs.

     Through fiscal year 1971 approximately $23 million has
been provided to AEC in its operating expenses appropria-
tion for construction related research and development in
connection with the project.

     AEC's manual states that:

     "After construction begins, a month-to-month review
     of the estimated cost of the remaining construction
     work is required in order that the resulting re-
     vised estimated total will be a realistic estimate
     of total probable costs. This is particularly
     important in view of the additional problem of
     funding any increases in previous years' proj-
     ects from each new appropriation. The revised
     estimated total costs predicted for the project
     may differ from the official estimate and will
     be the basis for any revision to the official
     estimate and financial plan as required."

     At the time we started our review, a current estimate
of total project costs was not available. The assistant
laboratory director advised us that, because of staffing
problems and the laboratory's concern with maintaining its
construction schedule, priority had not been given to de-
veloping current cost estimates.
     At our request architect-engineer and laboratory of-
ficials prepared estimates of the total costs of various
components of the accelerator laboratory as of June 30,
1970, on the basis of costs incurred to date and of the es-
timated costs to complete the work. The architect-engineer
prepared cost estimates and provisions for contingencies
for the conventional facilities, and laboratory officials
prepared cost estimates and contingency provisions for the
technical components.




                            12
     We assembled this cost information which totaled about
$240 million, about $10 million less than the official es-
timate of $250 million. The following table compares the
cost elements of the $240 million estimate as of June 30,
1970--at which time the project was 24-percent completed--
with the cost elements of the $250 million estimate as of
March 1969.

                                                           Over or
                                                           under(-)
                                    Cost estimates          March
                                    March     June           1969
        Cost element                1969      1970         estimate

                                             -(millions)

Engineering, design, inspec-
  tion, and administration          $ 34.0      $ 53.3      $19.3

Construction costs:
    Land improvements                  6.9          5.8      --1.1
    Buildings                         34.5         42.3        7.8
    Utilities                         17.0         22.0        5.0
    Other structures                  20.7         21.2         .5
    Special facilities                70.5         57.4     -13.1

                                     149.6        148.7       -. 9

Standard equipment                    10.6         10.5       -. 1

Contingency and escalation            55.8         27.1     -28.7

        Total                       $250.0       $239.6    -$10.4

     The favorable cost experience as of June 30, 1970, was
attributed by laboratory officials to revision or elimina-
tion of certain accelerator components, timely completion
of construction contracts, and reduction in estimated con-
struction and procurement costs.

     Explanations of the major differences between the above
two estimates follow.




                               13
        1. The increase in engineering, design, inspection,
           and administration costs reflected the need for mak-
           ing greater than expected engineering and design
           effort, for constructing prototypes of major accel-
           erator components, and for providing temporary fa-
           cilities for laboratory employees at the construc-
           tion site.

        2. Building and utility construction cost increases
           represented escalation resulting from deferral in
           construction of the conventional facilities so that
           priority could be given to the design, procurement,
           and assembly of technical accelerator components.

        3. The decrease in the cost of special facilities was
           associated with (a) a decrease in the energy level
           of the accelerator booster from 10 to 8 Bev., (b)
           elimination of a standby preaccelerator system, and
           (c) decreases in the cost of the main ring and
           booster magnets.

        4. The March 1969 provision for escalation and contin-
           gency amounted to $55.8 million. As of June 30,
           1970, laboratory and architect-engineer officials
           estimated that contingency and escalation provisions
          ·totaling about $27.1 million would be necessary for
           uncompleted contracts.

     The assistant laboratory director informed us that,
from the summer of 1969, the laboratory had been aware that
the accelerator laboratory construction costs might be
lower than the $250 million initially estimated. The
$240 million estimate developed during our review was dis-
cussed with various laboratory and AEC field office of-
ficials and with the laboratory director in September 1970.
The laboratory director stated that the $240 million es-
timate did not appear unreasonable at that time.

        In commenting on the $240 million estimate, AEC stated
that:

        "The AEC agrees that the $240 million estimate
        developed during the GAD review of the 200 BeV


                               14
    project in June 1970 at 24% of project completion
    does not appear unreasonable as a working esti-
    mate for the project at that time. It is noted,
    however, that the 200 BeV facility, which is one
    of the largest and most complex machines ever
    built by man, still had many uncertainties at
    this early stage of completion. The 4% difference
    between the official $250 million estimate and
    the $240 million June 1970 estimate is less than
    the variance among the expert judgments which
    differ because of the remaining uncertainties and
    difficulties facing the project during the early
    stages.

    "The AEC and the Laboratory remain highly opti-
    mistic, especially in view of the excellent pro-
    gress to date, that the project will indeed be
    successfully completed on schedule and within
    the $250 million authorization.

     "The most recent comprehensive review of the cost
     estimate ($250 million), was made in early March
     1971 at 54% of construction completion, using the
     combined team efforts of *** [the architect-
     engineer], *** [laboratory officials,] and the
     local on-site AEC 200 BeV area office representa-
     tives. Each of these three organizations has its
     own special expertise to offer in the review in
     different areas of technology and management,
     etc ."

     The assistant director of the laboratory informed us
that the March 1971 estimate had been developed by obtaining
(1) actual costs incurred plus outstanding commitments as
of December 31, 1970, (2) estimates from laboratory section
leaders and the architect-engineer of commitments to be
made for the 6-month period January through June 1971, and
(3) estimates based on judgment and knowledge for the period
beyond fiscal year 1971. The manager of AEC's 200-Bev.
Accelerator Facility Office advised us that the laboratory's
estimate had appeared reasonable and that he had accepted
it without modification.




                            15
     Our review of the supporting data for the March 1971
cost estimate showed that records had not been developed
at the laboratory to indicate how the above-described sup-
porting data had been used in arriving at the $250 million
estimate. Further, documentation was not available in sup-
port of the estimated commitments to be made beyond fiscal
year 1971 to complete the various systems constituting the
accelerator laboratory. Therefore we were unable to verify
the reliability of the estimate.

     AEC advised us that it considered that, consistent
with the project status, the March 1971 cost estimate had
been prepared from information viewed in sufficient depth
for a reliable evaluation. We believe, however, that the
lack of documentation for the laboratory's March 1971 esti-
mate tends to preclude an effective analysis and evaluation
of the estimate and provides a basis insufficient for de-
termining appropriate revisions to the estimate as changes
occur in the future.




                            16
CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE

     Laboratory officials advised us that the entire project
would be completed by December 1973, as shown in the con-
struction project data sheet. Tests of a 200-Bev. beam from
the accelerator are expected to begin in June 1971, about
a year earlier than originally planned. Laboratory offi-
cials stated that the completion schedule had been based on
their experience in meeting scheduled completion dates.

     A picture provided by AEC showing the accelerator lab-
oratory as of December 1970, at which time the project was
44-percent completed, is shown on page 18.

DESIGN CHANGES

     The following modifications have been made to the 200-
Bev. accelerator laboratory plans shown in the laboratory's
January 1968 design report.

     A standby preaccelerator system, estimated to cost
about $1 million, was deleted from the laboratory's plans,
primarily because of the availability of a preaccelerator
for emergency use at Argonne National Laboratory.

     An official of the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory in-
formed us that reduction in the energy level of the booster
from 10 to 8 Bev. would increase the reliability and effi-
ciency of the booster and that the main accelerator could
compensate for the booster reduction. Other laboratory of-
ficials informed us that the modifications had not affected
the capability of the accelerator to operate at energy lev-
els of 200 Bev. or higher.

     Laboratory officials also advised us that construction
of eight industrial buildings, estimated to cost $3.4 mil-
lion, might be deleted from the current design. The March
1969 construction project data sheet provided for the con-
struction of about 165,000 square feet of industrial space.
The assistant laboratory director told us that the labora-
tory had planned to include this industrial space in 10
buildings; however, after two of the buildings having about
30,000 square feet of space had been completed, further
construction was deferred until the design of the experimen-
tal areas was completed.

                              17
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· · ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
     As of September 1970 the laboratory was planning to
provide approximately 60,000 additional square feet of in-
dustrial space in a multistoried central laboratory build-
ing included in the initial authorization of the project
and in another structure, which would bring the total to
90,000 square feet. Laboratory officials plan to evaluate
the need for additional space as the accelerator design
progresses. The $240 million estimate includes the neces-
sary funds to-provide 165,000 square feet of industrial
space.

     The original design of the accelerator included   the
capability to increase its energy above the 200-Bev.   level
to 400 or 500 Bev. According to AEC, the option for    provid-
ing this additional capability was estimated to cost   about
$25 million and this amount was included in the $250   million
estimate. Exercising the option at a later date was    esti-
mated to cost an additional $30 million.

     AEC stated that the present design would provide the
capability to operate at a 400- to 500-Bev. energy level at
a reduced pulse rate within the $250 million estimate,
largely as a result of technological advances and design
innovations. Also these advances are expected to reduce
the modifications required to achieve the higher energy
range at the normal pulse rate.




                              19
                         CHAPTER 3

                LOSS OF FLUID TEST FACILITY

     The Safety Test Engineering Program was authorized by
the Congress as project 64-e-4 under Public Law 88-72 (77
Stat. 85), approved July 22, 1963. The program would enable
AEC to conduct a series of large-scale safety tests which
would generate comprehensive data to permit informed deci-
sions regarding design and reactor-siting criteria based on
demonstrated and positive engineering information. A total
of $19.4 million was authorized for the program. Of this
amount, $17.6 million was for the construction of the Loss
of Fluid Test Facility (LOFT).

     LOFT would enable the investigation of a loss-of-coolant
accident which generally was regarded as the most serious of
the accidents postulated for water-cooled reactor systems.
Because little information was available regarding the con-
sequences of such an accident, it was believed that conser-
vative policies with respect to design and reactor-siting
criteria were imposing significant economic penalties on the
U.S. power reactor program.

     In June 1964 one contractor was given overall responsi-
bility for the LOFT experimental design and the test program.
In June 1969 this contractor was replaced by a new contrac-
tor. AEC advised us that the change had been made because
of problems that the first contractor had experienced in go-
ing forward with the project successfully. According to AEC
the new contractor's responsibilities were essentially the
same but included overall direction of construction activi-
ties, for which the responsibility had been assigned previ-
ously to AEC's Idaho Operations Office. A similar situation,
with respect to contractor responsibility, occurred with the
Power Burst Facility. (See p. 33.)

     The primary objective of the initial LOFT program was
to provide quantitative engineering information concerning
the sequence of events and phenomena which take place during
a loss-of-coolant accident and concerning the ability of the
containment vessel to mitigate the consequences. The ap-
proach selected in late 1964 to accomplish the above objec-
tive was to perform numerous analytical studies and

                            20
small-scale tests to study individual parts of an accident.
Ultimately these studies and tests were to be climaxed by a
loss-of-coolant accident which would destroy the reactor
core.

DESIGN CHANGES

     After the project had been authorized, a number of
changes occurred in the nuclear industry which necessitated
a reevaluation of the objectives of the LOFT program and re-
examination by AEC of safety information needed concerning
loss-of-coolant accidents. The principal changes were
(1) an increase in demand for nuclear power plants, (2) an
increase in pressure to locate nuclear plants near metropol-
itan areas, and (3) an increase in the average power level
of nuclear plants, particularly during the period 1962
through 1966.

     The initial concept of testing in the LOFT facility in-
volved examination of the resistance of containment barriers
to the conditions potentially associated with major loss-of-
coolant accidents. This containment concept and plant iso-
lation were, at the time, major lines of defense for power
reactor systems in guaranteeing public safety. Since 1966,
however, increasing reliance has been placed on engineered
safety features, particularly emergency core-cooling sys-
tems, to guarantee public safety.

     In May 1967 the Director, Division of Reactor Develop-
ment and Technology, directed that the LOFT program include,
on a high-priority basis, the investigation of emergency
core cooling. He directed also that the planned core-
destructive test be eliminated from further consideration,
since the requirements for engineered safety system tests
probably would fully occupy LOFT resources.

     A number of design changes have been made to various
LOFT systems. Many of these changes were associated di-
rectly with incorporation of a more sophisticated emergency
core-cooling system and with redirection of the program in
1967 to investigate such a system.

     As of May 1971 the program to be performed with LOFT
was to consist of a series of loss-of-coolant tests, during


                            21
which an emergency core-cooling system was to be operated
under various performance conditions. The tests were to
permit an evaluation of the capability of the cooling system
to prevent the release of radioactive products following
loss-of-coolant accidents. The test program also was to in-
clude an investigation of the containment safety systems,
as well as of radioactive product behavior.




                            22
CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE

     LOFT has experienced an estimated schedule slippage of
over 6 years. Originally it was to be completed by March
1966. As of November 1970 the facility was only 59-percent
completed and was expected to be completed in June 1972. A
picture provided by AEC, showing the facility at about the
time that this stage of completion was achieved, is shown
on page 24.

     The reasons for   the 6-year slippage in the construc-
tion of the facility   included design changes, redirection
of the LOFT program,   upgraded engineering requirements, and
management direction   problems associated with the project.

Design changes and redirection of
LOFT program

     Construction of LOFT was to begin by December 1963;
however, the start of construction was delayed about
9 months because of problems encountered in completing the
preliminary design.

     After construction began the discovery of a lava rock
bed directly beneath the containment vessel site necessi-
tated a revision to the design of the bottom part of the
vessel. These revisions made the vessel unique, and, 'as a
consequence, about 18 months were needed to solve the new
design problems.

     The redirection of the LOFT program, as discussed pre-
viously, also had a significant impact on the construction
schedule, since it necessitated almost a complete redesign
of the facilities and test assembly of LOFT.

Upgraded engineering

     After the project was started, methods for upgrading
engineering, including a quality assurance program and sys-
tems design descriptions, were instituted and emphasized by
the Division of Reactor Development and Technology because
of problems being encountered in the construction of other
facilities. According to AEC this action, although needed,



                               23
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24
did contribute to the delay of the project.   In March 1971
AEC advised us that:

     "The importance and obvious value of the AEC's
     program for upgrading engineering has been dis-
     cussed with the Congress since the FY 1966 Hear-
     ings, and in particular detail in the JCAE [Joint
     Committee on Atomic Energy] FY 1968 AEC Autho-
     rizing Legislation Hearings, throughout Part 2.
     In summary, the AEC has accumulated, through
     years of association with its laboratories and
     contractors and the nuclear industry, much expe-
     rience in the planning and execution of R&D [re-
     search and development] programs and in the de-
     sign, construction and operation of test facili-
     ties and reactor plants. Numerous problems have
     also been encountered which have often extended
     appreciably the time, effort and cost required to
     complete a project or program. This experience
     has demonstrated conclusively to the AEC the ur-
     gent need to strengthen significantly the engi-
     neering practices employed on present and future
     programs to provide maximum assurance that these
     programs have the best opportunity to success
     through the timely and predictable construction
     and safe and reliable operation of the associated
     important and expensive facilities. The AEC has
     further concluded that this strengthening can
     only be achieved through a systematic engineering
     approach utilizing exacting engineering standards
     and quality assurance practices. Abundant expe-
     rience acquired in building many nuclear power
     plants demonstrates that this disciplined engi-
     neering approach in the long-term is the lowest
     cost avenue toward meeting these objectives of
     safe, reliable and predictable operation."

     According to AEC another important ingredient in car-
rying out the design and construction of a nuclear project
on a high-quality basis is a design that is methodically
developed with careful attention to detail and with firm,
well-established requirements. This design is best
described for review and evaluation by a systems design



                            25
description document which provides technical working ref-
erences of individual systems of a nuclear power plant.

     AEC advised us that, until June 1969, problems expe-
rienced with the original contractor in developing accep-
table systems designs for LOFT had been one of the princi-
pal causes of the slippage in the construction schedule.
AEC stated that these problems were evidenced by the unac-
ceptable design descriptions that had been submitted for
AEC review and approval. As a result of these problems,
most field construction work was suspended from May 1968
through October 1970.

     At the time of our fieldwork in September 1970, the
operating contractor, in conjunction with AEC's Idaho Oper-
ations Office, had determined which systems designs were
critical in terms of their effects on current estimated
completion dates of the facilities and test assembly of
LOFT. It appeared to us that the documents supporting the
systems designs having the highest priority were being sub-
mitted in sufficient time to avoid any additional slippages
in the estimated completion dates.

Management direction problems

     AEC stated that management direction problems, which
had resulted in too much diffusion of responsibility, had
contributed to the schedule slippage of the project. AEC
informed us that after 1967 measures had been taken to
strengthen project management at AEC Headquarters, particu-
larly with respect to applying a systematic and disciplined
engineering approach embodying engineering standards and
strong quality assurance measures.

     This approach was reflected in steps to increase the
number and capabilities of employees assigned, to provide
needed additional experience in design and construction as-
pects of nuclear power plants. These actions were accom-
panied by measures to strengthen coordination both within
the Headquarters organization and between Headquarters and
the field activities.

     In April 1969 the position of Special Assistant to the
Director, Division of Reactor Development and Technology,


                             26
was established for the LOFT project. The Director stated
that priority would be exerted to bring the project to suc-
cessful completion.

     In May 1969 the LOFT Project Division was established
at the Idaho Operations Office, to focus responsibility for
the project at that level.

COST ESTIMATE

     In September 1962 LOFT was estimated to cost $17.6 mil-
lion. AEC indicated that this estimate, which accompanied
AEC's request for authorization, included a provision for
cost escalation as a percentage of the estimates for mate-
rial and direct labor projected over the anticipated con-
struction period. The following table shows the increases
which have occurred in the estimated construction costs.

                                                   Over or under(-)
                      Cost estimates                September 1962
Cost element    September 1962   June 1970             estimates

                                   (millions)

Construction        $11.20         $24.40               $13.20
Engineering,
  design, and
  inspection          2.50             7.90               5.40
Contingency           3.90             2.70              -1.20

    Total           $17.60          $ 3 5 .0 0 a        $17.40

aThe Congress was advised of this revised cost estimate in
 April 1969, and the necessary funds were made available
 through additional appropriations and underruns on other
 projects.

     AEC attributes the increased costs to

     -- changes to the plant design and schedule to incorpo-
        rate provisions for conducting tests of more impor-
        tance to reactors currently being constructed, par-
        ticularly tests of emergency core-cooling systems;



                              27
     -- increased costs associated with escalation of in-
        direct construction and inspection due to time ex-
        tensions;

     -- increased costs associated with the containment
        shell and containment vessel door; and

     -- provisions for upgraded engineering and quality as-
        surance and revised safety requirements.

     The estimated operating funds to be expended for this
project have increased substantially. Originally about
$19 million was to be expended from May 1964 through Decem-
ber 1969. As of May 1971 about $48 million was expected to
be expended through June 1972, the estimated completion
date for the construction-funded portion of the project.
LOFT is scheduled to begin nuclear operations by December
1973. The redirection of the LOFT program and the schedule
slippages were the principal causes of the significant in-
creases in operating funds.




                           28
                            CHAPTER 4

                    POWER BURST FACILITY

     The Power Burst Facility (PBF) was authorized by the
Congress as project 65-4-b under Public Law 88-332 (78 Stat.
228), approved June 30, 1964. PBF was justified by AEC on
the basis of a need for more definitive information on
safety requirements for reactor facilities. Because of the
need for this information, many complex safety features,
which had not been tested and which may not have been re-
quired, were being incorporated into the designs of all re-
actors.

     The primary purpose of PBF was to study and understand
the phenomena associated with the failure of reactor fuel
assemblies when subjected to deviations from the normal
temperature, pressure, and flow characteristics of an oper-
ating reactor.

      The justification   which accompanied the authorization
request indicated that    PBF was required to support certain
aspects of the nuclear    safety program. The project was to
be started by December    1964 and was to be completed by June
1966.

COST ESTIMATE AND DESIGN CHANGES

     The total estimated cost of the project, as authorized,
was $8.1 million. AEC indicated that this amount included
a provision for cost escalation as a percentage of the esti-
mates for material and direct labor projected over the antic-
ipated construction period.

     At the time physical construction was started in Sep-
tember 1965, the total estimated cost was $9.4 million which
was within the start-of-project limitation of 125 percent of
the amount authorized by the Congress.

     As of June 30, 1970, the total estimated cost was
$16.1 million, of which $8 million represented increased
costs, as shown in the following table.



                               29
                           Cost estimates
                                                           Over or
                                                           under(-)
                       January                           January 1964
    Cost element        1964         June 1970             estimates

Engineering, design,
  and inspection     $1,300,000   $ 3,420,260             $2,120,260
Construction          5,175,000    12,323,412              7,148,412
Contingency           1,625,000       406,328             -1,218,672

    Total            $8,100,000   $1 6 ,1 5 0 ,0 0 0 a    $8,050,000

aThe Congress has been advised of increases in the cost esti-
 mate, and the necessary funds have been made available from
 underruns on other construction projects.

     The $8 million increase in cost was attributed by AEC to

     -- upgraded engineering requirements instituted by AEC,
        which included a quality assurance program and a re-
        quirement for systems design descriptions;

     -- cost escalation associated with schedule slippage;
        and

     -- major design change from a facility which would pro-
        vide limited power bursts to one which could be oper-
        ated at a constant, or steady-state, power level.

     As authorized, PBF was to provide power bursts as short
as 1 millisecond (one thousandth of a second).  In April
1965, about 5 months prior to the start of construction, the
architect-engineer was instructed to incorporate into the
PBF design the operating capability for a constant, or
steady-state, power level. This was considered a major de-
sign change, which necessitated design changes in nearly all
aspects of the project, to enable scientists to broaden the
ability to simulate the types of accidents described in the
original PBF concept and to increase the reliability of the
resulting experimental data. The additional cost was esti-
mated at about $1.3 million.




                            30
     In an April 1967 letter, replying to an inquiry from
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the status
of several construction projects, AEC indicated that:

     "A major design change was made on the PBF when
     it was decided to incorporate a steady state (20
     megawatts) power operating capability in the
     PBF. The original design was limited to the
     performance of short period excursions. This
     design change will permit greater flexibility
     in the type of accidents that can be simulated
     in the PBF."

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE

     PBF has experienced a schedule slippage of over 4 years.
At the time of authorization, PBF was scheduled to be com-
pleted by June 1966; however, construction work was nearly
completed as of September 1970 and the test program was
planned to begin around October 1971. A picture of PBF,
which was provided by AEC, is shown on page 32.

     AEC indicated that the 4-year delay had resulted from
(1) design changes due to the incorporation of a steady-
state power level capability, (2) implementation of quality
assurance requirements, (3) deficiencies in the architect-
engineer's initial design, and (4) management direction
problems similar to those discussed for the LOFT project.
(See p. 26.)

     Physical construction of the project was scheduled to
begin by December 1964. The addition of the steady-state
power level capability to PBF, however, resulted in a rede-
sign of almost all project systems and delayed the start of
construction until September 1965.

     AEC advised us that, after physical construction began,
the major part of the schedule slippage which occurred from
about February 1966 to January 1968 was attributable to the
contractor's implementation of the quality assurance pro-
gram. This program was part of AEC's plans for upgrading
engineering and design revisions required as the result of
disclosed quality assurance deficiencies. The contractor


                             31
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                       32
was required to perform, as part of the quality assurance
program, an in-depth design and construction review of each
system component. AEC Headquarters required such a review
before authorization could be given to procure the compo-
nent.

     AEC informed us that the original contractor had not
effectively implemented the design review and that many de-
ficiencies in the design of PBF had been disclosed subse-
quently and had to be corrected before construction could
proceed. As a result, schedule slippages occurred in pro-
curing the PBF reactor system components. As discussed on
page 25, AEC has placed considerable emphasis on the impor-
tance of strengthening engineering practices in reactor de-
velopment projects.

     AEC informed us also that the construction contractor
had limited experience in the procurement of engineered
components for a reactor plant and that this situation had
resulted in significant delays.

     The management direction problems which existed with
the LOFT project also existed, to a large extent, with the
PBF project. AEC informed us that the actions which had
been taken to solve the problems with LOFT also had been
taken on PBF, except that no specific division for PBF had
been established at the Idaho Operations Office because the
project was nearly completed.

     As a result of schedule slippages, the estimated operat-
ing funds related to the project have increased from about
$4.1 million to be expended from March 1965 to March 1968 to
the current estimate of about $18 million through fiscal
year 1971.




                             33
                         CHAPTER 5

                  FAST FLUX TEST FACILITY

     On May 21, 1966, the Congress authorized the Fast Flux
Test Facility (FFTF) as project 67-3-a under Public Law 89-
428 (77 Stat. 88). The authorization provided $7.5 million
for architect-engineer services needed to design the proj-
ect. In July 1967 the Congress authorized an additional
$80 million for construction, which brought the total to
$87.5 million.

     FFTF was designed to be a 400-megawatt facility for
testing reactor fuel, components, and systems for the devel-
opment of technology primarily for the Liquid Metal Fast
Breeder Reactor program. It is planned that FFTF will in-
clude a reactor having such support facilities as heat-
removal and fuel-handling systems, fuel examination facili-
ties for reactor material and components, and the necessary
maintenance and office facilities.

     The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program is AEC's
highest priority civilian nuclear power program. The objec-
tive of the program is to develop and demonstrate the safe,
reliable, and economical implementation of fast breeder re-
actor power plants so that utility groups can use them by
the mid-1980's. The program involves not only participation
by AEC laboratories but also participation by a significant
number of industrial and utility companies.

     AEC plans to first apply the technology developed with
FFTF to the construction, in conjunction with reactor manu-
facturers, of one or more liquid metal fast breeder demon-
stration plants scheduled for completion in the late 1970's
or in the early 1980's. AEC believes that the technology
ultimately will be used for designing the commercial fast
breeder reactor in the 1,000-megawatt range. An artist's
conception of FFTF, which was provided by AEC, is shown on
page 38.




                            34
COST ESTIMATE AND DESIGN CHANGES

     As of June 30, 1970, AEC estimated that FFTF would
cost $102.8 million. This amount was within the 125-percent
start-of-project limitation but was about $15 million greater
than the September 1966 estimate of $87.5 million which ac-
companied AEC's request for authorization, as shown by the
following table.

                                                        Over or
                                                       under (-)
                                Cost estimates          Septem-
                              Septem-                   ber 1966
       Cost element           ber 1966 June 1970        estimate

                                          (millions)

Engineering, design, and
  inspection                   $11.0       $17.0         $ 6.0
Construction:
    Reactor system                 22.5      29.9         7.4
    Closed test loops               7.7       3.0        -4.7
    Fuel handling and stor-
      age                           3.2       2.2         -1.0
    Buildings, structures,
      cranes, and electri-
      cal and miscellane-
      ous services                 11.3     15.4           4.1
    Interim fuel examina-
      tion facility                 5.2       3.9         -1.3
    Containment                     3.2       8.3          5.1
    Nuclear proof test fa-
      cility                        1.3        -          -1.3
    Maintenance facility            1.8       1.8          -

        Total                      67.2     81.5          14.3

Additions                           -         0.9          0.9
Contingency                        20.3      20.4          0.1

        Total                  $87.5      $1 0 2 .8a     $15.3

aThe Congress has been advised of the increases in the cost
 estimate for FFTF. Through fiscal year 1971, $59.7 million
 was appropriated for the project.
                              35
     AEC advised us that the cost estimate of $87.5 million
had been based on a composite of potential concepts and on
an assessment of costs by management and that the contingency
provision was about 30 percent of all other costs and in-
cluded a factor for cost escalation.

     After preparation of the September 1966 cost estimate
and after the evaluation of many reactor-core concepts, a
definitive design was developed which, in AEC's judgment,
could be built and would meet the objectives of the project.

    An explanation for the increases and decreases follows.

     1. The definition of the plant concept resulted in to-
        tal increased costs of $16.6 million, of which
        $7.4 million was related to the reactor system,
        $4.1 million to buildings and structures, and
        $5.1 million to the containment facilities. The
        original cost estimate for the closed test loops was
        high because of uncertainties related to their cap-
        ability of being incorporated into specific plant
        concepts. The selected plant concept accomplished
        this capability with an estimated $4.7 million re-
        duction in costs.

       The plant concept selected was similar to that ex-
       pected to be used in commercial liquid metal fast
       breeder reactors, and its design would enable the
       removal of certain reactor components without a
       complete removal of the top part of the reactor.
       AEC had determined that this plant concept would
       meet the objectives and scope described in the con-
       struction project data sheet.

    2. The $1 million decrease in fuel handling resulted i
       from the simplification of the fuel-handling systems
       for the selected plant concept. According to AEC
       this simplification was accomplished at the expense
       of an increase in the cost of the reactor and reac-
       tor vessel.

    3. AEC deferred indefinitely the $1.3 million nuclear
       proof test facility due to the budgetary stringencies
       subsequent to authorization of the project. AEC did


                            36
       not consider this facility to be essential for ini-
       tial operation, since the physics experiments that
       it was designed to perform already were being carried
       out in other AEC facilities. During the fiscal year
       1971 authorization hearings before the Joint Commit-
       tee on Atomic Energy, AEC indicated that it still
       would like to construct this facility.

     4. The $1.3 million decrease in the interim fuel exam-
        ination facility resulted from design changes.

     As of June 30, 1970, AEC had expended about $60 million
of operating funds for research and development related to
the FFTF project. At the time that construction was autho-
rized in fiscal year 1968, AEC estimated that about $41 mil-
lion would be necessary for research and development through
fiscal year 1970 and that $31 million more would be needed
through fiscal year 1973.

     As of September 1970 AEC estimated that about $151 mil-
lion of operating funds would be necessary for the
construction-related research and development work and other
expenses associated with the project. AEC attributed this
increase to the (1) need for more research and development
work than that originally anticipated, (2) need to strengthen
the capability of accomplishing the research and development,
(3) increased costs related to the development of hardware
prototypes, and (4) cost escalation. AEC indicated that
there was a need also to devote a greater effort to the de-
velopment of the technological base required to go forward
with the project.

CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE

     The Congress authorized the construction of FFTF in
July 1967, and at that time AEC estimated that construction
would start by June 1968 and would be completed by April
1973. Construction started in July 1970, however, and, as
of May 1971, AEC estimated that the project would be com-
pleted by June 1974, about 1 year later than originally es-
timated.

     In our September 23, 1970, report to the Congress on
the "Problems in Developing the Atomic Energy Commission's

                             37
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                                         38
Fast Flux Test Facility" (B-164105), we noted that the de-
lay of the project had been caused by management problems.
Specifically, the problems related to the fact that AEC's
Pacific Northwest Laboratory had not established an
engineering-oriented organization having sufficient manage-
ment and technical capabilities to develop such a complex
project and to the fact that AEC, with its various levels
and dispersion of management, had not effectively brought
about changes in organization and design approaches that had
been identified and determined to be essential.

     In that report we suggested that AEC review the reactor
development and technology organization and all levels of
contractor and laboratory management involved with the proj-
ect, to streamline the organization, to strengthen the com-
munication and technical review channels, and to provide
some assurance that management and staff would make maximum
contributions to this high-priority project.

     In response to our suggestion, AEC stated that actions
which were intended to establish clear lines of responsibil-
ity and unequivocal authority had been taken or were being
taken. AEC has agreed to keep us apprised of the progress
and status of the project in order that we may evaluate the
effectiveness of the actions taken to improve project manage-
ment.




                             39
                         CHAPTER 6

              HOT FUEL EXAMINATION FACILITY

     The Congress authorized $10.2 million for the Hot Fuel
Examination Facility (IIFEF) as project 69-4-a under Public
Law 90-289 (77 Stat. 88), approved April 19, 1968. HFEF
was designed to contribute to the development of fuel ele-
ments for the fast breeder reactor program by providing a
facility for the examination of reactor fuels and struc-
tural materials which had been irradiated in the Experi-
mental Breeder Reactor II, a principal irradiation test
facility of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program,
at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. HFEF was
planned to be a one-story building having a hot cell exami-
nation complex and associated support facilities.

PLANNING AND AUTHORIZATION OF HFEF

     The need for additional examination capability at the
testing station has been recognized by officials of AEC's
Argonne National Laboratory since 1966, when the role of
the Experimental Breeder Reactor II was changed from that
of a demonstration reactor to a test facility for the Liquid
Metal Fast Breeder Reactor program.

     On February 27, 1967, AEC authorized Argonne to begin
conceptual design work on HFEF. On April 5, 1967, AEC in-
formed Argonne that HFEF should be a complete examination
facility, primarily to support the irradiation work being
conducted at the Experimental Breeder Reactor II. Also AEC
asked Argonne to consider the desirability and reasonable-
ness of modifying the Fuel Cycle Facility, a nearby test
facility, rather than constructing HFEF.

     In an April 28, 1967, letter, Argonne stated that it
considered the modification of the Fuel Cycle Facility to
be impracticable because (1) it would require interrupting
the operation of the only existing fuel production facility
for the Experimental Breeder Reactor II as a result of the
extensive modification needed, (2) work would have to be
diverted to some other facility during modification, which
would be costly, and (3) the facility was being considered
in connection with the processing of future fuels.

                             40
     Conceptual design of HFEF was initiated by Argonne.
In September 1967 Argonne estimated that it would cost
$23.5 million to provide a complete examination facility
incorporating all the capabilities specified by AEC. Be-
cause of the relatively high estimated cost, Argonne offi-
cials reviewed the design and estimate and concluded that
a minimum-sized, fully equipped facility could be con-
structed for about $18 million. Argonne officials indi-
cated that the reduction would be accomplished by reducing
the size of the facility by about one third and by eliminat-
ing selected equipment items.

     The design of the facility was based on the types of
examination capability to be required. According to AEC
reliable estimates of the work load were not available be-
cause the estimates depended heavily on the results of the
work to be performed primarily at the Experimental Breeder
Reactor II and, since this was a research and development
program, the results were unpredictable.

     In September 1967 AEC informed Argonne that the cost
of HFEF should not exceed $10 million. Argonne officials
advised us that this reduced funding level had necessitated
significant changes in the design of HFEF.

     On October 3, 1967, Argonne informed AEC that a fa-
cility having reduced capability could be constructed for
about $9.7 million. Argonne informed AEC also that:

     "Previous work has indicated that it would be un-
     desirable and impractical to use FCF [Fuel Cycle
     Facility] for those overall functions currently
     intended for HFEF. However, it appears possible
     that some space could be made available in the
     FCF for certain types of examination work. This
     approach will be investigated further and will be
     defined at the time of submission of the Feasi-
     bility and Cost Study. It is not intended that
     any of the work associated with FCF modifications
     or equipping will be borne as an HFEF Project ef-
     fort. Conversion of portions of the FCF will come
     only after the current FCF production activities
     have been concluded."



                            41
     In January 1968 AEC requested congressional authoriza-
tion of $10.2 million for the construction of HFEF, which
was to be completed by March 1971. AEC informed us that
the cost estimate which had accompanied the request for
authorization had included a provision for cost escalation
as a percentage of the estimates for material and direct
labor projected over the anticipated construction period.

     The construction project data sheet and the testimony
at the authorization hearings for fiscal year 1969, con-
ducted in February 1968, did not call attention to the fact
that the expected work load for HFEF had not been estimated
or to the fact that Argonne National Laboratory was consid-
ering the modification of the Fuel Cycle Facility to pro-
vide additional capability. The data sheet indicated that
no suitable facility was available for the examination of
irradiation experiments.

     We believe that, when authorization is requested so
that a project can provide a particular capability, AEC
should advise the Congress, either in the construction
project data sheet or during the hearings before the Con-
gress on AEC's budget request, of significant expenditures
that will be required to provide the capability in existing
facilities of augmenting that planned for the new facili-
ties. This would give the Congress more complete informa-
tion on which to base its decision regarding whether the
project should be funded.

     AEC advised us that, consistent with its policy of
keeping the Congress informed of significant developments
in its projects and programs, information regarding the use
of the Fuel Cycle Facility in connection with HFEF opera-
tions should have been provided at the time HFEF was autho-
rized but that the information had been omitted by over-
sight. The information was provided during the fiscal year
1971 authorization hearings.

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

     HFEF, as authorized by the Congress, was to have a
gross area of 43,500 square feet. Subsequent to authoriza-
tion, work-load requirements were studied and revised de-
signs were proposed.

                            42
     In November 1968 Argonne completed another design study
and cost estimate which included significant changes from
previous designs. The shielded equipment storage cell
would be eliminated, all decontamination functions would be
consolidated in one examination cell, and HFEF would be re-
located. The estimated cost of HFEF as redesigned was
about $11.4 million.

     In December 1968 Argonne suggested certain changes
totaling about $1.2 million to reduce the estimated cost to
$10.2 million. The changes which were made are shown in
the following table.

                                                  Estimated
               Suggested change                    saving

   Eliminate clean cell                       $    680,000
   Reduce shielding thickness                       90,000
   Remove shielded repair cell                     108,000
   Reduce size of work station module              157,000
   Modify three work stations                      144,000

       Total                                  $1,179,000

     In April 1969 Argonne submitted to AEC the preliminary
design report for HFEF which provided for a 56,570-square-
foot facility, estimated to cost $10.2 million, to be com-
pleted by June 1972.

     The design report referred to the project as the HFEF-
Fuel Cycle Facility examination complex and indicated that
13 work positions would be available and equipped at the
complex when HFEF was completed.

     Construction of HFEF was started in July 1969. As of
October 1970 it was about 35-percent completed and was ex-
pected to be finished in June 1972, more than a year later
than originally anticipated. According to AEC the delay
was attributable, in large part, to the fact that funds for
design work had not been available as early as anticipated.
A picture provided by AEC, showing the facility as of Octo-
ber 1970, is on page 44.




                                  43
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                                                     44
     In a March 1970 letter, AEC advised us that, as of
January 1970, about $1 million had been expended to up-
grade and equip the Fuel Cycle Facility to meet the then-
current examination requirements. AEC estimated that it
would spend $4 million additional, of which $2 million
would be used for modifications and equipment prior to the
start of HFEF operations in June 1972 and $2 million there-
after.

     As of June 1970 AEC estimated that HFEF could be con-
structed for $10.2 million and stated that the types of
capability to be provided generally agreed with those indi-
cated in the construction project data sheet. Thus the
total estimated expenditures associated with the HFEF-Fuel
Cycle Facility examination complex were about $15.2 million.
AEC informed us that, as of May 1971, no change had been
made to that estimate.




                             45
                            CHAPTER 7

                     REPORTING SYSTEM

INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEM

     AEC requires a Monthly Progress Report for Construc-
tion Jobs for each project costing more than $100,000. The
report includes (1) a description of the work, (2) the date
the work started, (3) the scheduled final completion date,
(4) the scheduled and actual percentage of completion,
(5) the present working estimate, and (6) any significant
comments.

     A special Progress Forecasts report is required on
each project estimated to cost $5 million or more. This
report is required 90 days after construction has started
and subsequently whenever there is a significant change in
the construction activities or a change in the completion
date. The report must include the reasons for the changes
in forecasts and/or scheduled dates, including all contrib-
uting factors such as labor shortages and strikes.

     The AEC manual establishes provisions for a reporting
system whereby more detailed cost reports are used at the
field office level and whereby summary reports are submit-
ted to Headquarters to aid in overall control of project
costs and commitments. Reporting is flexible in format and
in the amount of detail provided and is contingent on cir-
cumstances surrounding a given project, such as whether the
work contracted for is by lump-sum, fixed-price, or cost-
plus-fixed-fee contract.

     The reports used by the field offices provide sources
of information to assist management in controlling costs
and include more detailed information than that provided in
the summary reports for AEC Headquarters use. The reports
provide more detailed information on the phases of con-
struction projects currently active and less detail on the
phases of projects not started or previously completed.

     The summary cost reports and estimates are prepared by
the contractor for the use and information of persons more


                               46
remote from construction activities. The summary reports
are reviewed by AEC field office employees; are signed by
the managers or their delegated representatives, as evi-
dencing the correctness of the costs and agreement with the
estimates contained in the reports; and then are submitted
to AEC Headquarters.

     Within AEC Headquarters, the Division of Construction
is responsible for informing appropriate officials of the
status of construction projects and for promptly reporting
potential problem areas which may affect construction
schedules and cost estimates. This is accomplished, in
part, by reports on visits to facilities-under construction.

     The 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory project is under
the cognizance of AEC's Division of Research.  All other
projects included in this report were under the cognizance
of the Division of Reactor Development and Technology.

200-Bev. accelerator laboratory

     In planning for the organizations required to bring
the laboratory into being, AEC recognized the need for
onsite management control because of the size, complexity,
and schedule of the project. Therefore, in the early
stages of the project, AEC established the 200-Bev. Accel-
erator Facility Office which has a staff of about 20 people
and which is located at the project site.

     Facility office employees maintain a day-.to-day work-
ing relationship with the laboratory administr:ative and
management employees; to ensure that the laboratory's ac-
tions are consistent with the administrative rules and reg-
ulations of AEC and to maintain a detailed working knowl-
edge of the project.

     At the time of our review in September 1970, the labo-
ratory had not developed complete procedures for estimating
and reporting costs in the monthly summary cost: and esti-
mate reports. AEC 200-Bev. Accelerator Facility Office of-
ficials did not require the laboratory to prepaire detailed
monthly cost reports and estimates.  An area oiEfice offi-
cial advised us that the type of information provided in
the detailed cost reports, such as breakdowns of material


                             47
and labor costs, was not considered necessary to keep
abreast of the current status of the project.

     The summary cost reports and estimates prepared by the
laboratory from August 1969 to August 1970, in the early
stages of the project, continued to show the total cost es-
timate of $250 million. When actual costs had been deter-
mined on completed procurement or construction contracts
and were in excess of estimates, the overruns were deducted
from the escalation provision. No summary cost report was
provided to AEC in September 1970, because the laboratory
was revising the cost estimates. Since October 1970 the
laboratory has issued revised cost estimates in which the
individual cost elements have been adjusted to reflect cur-
rent estimates.

     AEC's March 1971 cost estimate showed that the total
project cost still remained at $250 million. As discussed
on page 16, the procedures used in arriving at this esti-
mate were not adequately documented, which precluded an ef-
fective analysis and evaluation of the estimate.

Division of Reactor Development
and Technology proiects

     The management concept utilized by the Division of Re-
actor Development and Technology provides that Headquar-
ters' representatives be resident at each contractor site
deemed necessary by the division director. The role of
these site representatives is to keep the division apprised
of the progress of contractor activities and to emphasize
the technical aspects of such activities. In carrying out
their role, the site representatives prepare periodic re-
ports, usually on a weekly basis, and provide additional
information at the request of the director.

     A number of reports were generated in connection with
the contruction of LOFT, PBF, FFTF, and HFEF, which were
designed to inform AEC of cost and schedule changes, design
revisions, and other events associated with the projects.
Generally the information contained in these reports was
adequate to keep AEC informed of the progress and status of
the projects.



                             48
EXTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEM

     AEC keeps the Congress informed of the status of its
various construction projects, in part, by furnishing a
number of tables in connection with each year's budget re-
quest. The tables show the estimated or, where applicable,
the actual costs and completion dates of projects which are
under construction, are to be started, or are completed.
Also furnished are a number of other tables, such as one
showing the projects under construction for which the esti-
mated costs have exceeded the start-of-project limitation.
The tables are prepared as of December 31 and are published
as part of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy hearings on
AEC's annual authorization requests.

     AEC has supplied the Congress with current cost and
schedule information regarding the projects included in our
review. Also AEC has given substantial information to the
Congress concerning the design aspects of its construction
projects.

CONCLUSIONS

     We believe that the various types of reports being
utilized by AEC and its contractors at the time of our re-
view in September 1970 generally provided adequate mecha-
nisms for communicating information related to the cost,
schedule, and design aspects of construction projects.
With respect to the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory proj-
ect, however, we believe that the procedures used in devel-
oping current working estimates reported to AEC should be
strengthened to provide a better basis for analysis and
evaluation.

     We therefore suggested that AEC, together with appro-
priate contractor officials, review the laboratory's cost-
estimating practices used for the 200-Bev. accelerator and
make appropriate revisions, to ensure that the estimates
prepared will be adequately documented to facilitate effec-
tive analysis and evaluation.

     AEC pointed out that the 200-Bev. accelerator project
was being carried out in a highly satisfactory manner and
that it was expected to be completed within the original


                            49
time and cost estimates and to exceed its performance ob-
jectives. AEC agreed, however, that the contractor's esti-
mating practices should be strengthened and took steps to
improve these practices.




                           50
                         CHAPTER 8

                      SCOPE OF REVIEW

     Our review was made at (1) AEC Headquarters in German-
town, Maryland, (2) AEC's operations offices in Chicago, Il-
linois; Idaho Falls, Idaho; and Richland, Washington, and
(3) AEC-contractor-operated facilities at the National Ac-
celerator Laboratory, Batavia, Illinois, and the National
Reactor Testing Station, Idaho Falls, Idaho.

     Our review was directed primarily toward examining into
the cost, schedule, and design aspects of five ABC construc-
tion projects--the 200-Bev. accelerator laboratory, LOFT,
PBF, FFTF, and HFEF. We also examined into AEC's reporting
system with regard to its adequacy for communicating infor-
mation concerning the progress and status of construction
projects to AEC Headquarters and with regard to whether sig-
nificant developments had been brought to the attention of
the Congress when appropriate.

     As part of our examination, we reviewed pertinent AEC
policies and procedures and obtained the views of AEC and
contractor employees knowledgeable of, and responsible for,
the administration of the projects selected for review. We
did not examine into whether the need for the projects was
adequately justified or whether the costs incurred were rea-
sonable.




                           51
APPENDIX




  53
                                                   APPENDIX I


            PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS OF

               THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

        RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES

                 DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT


                                        Tenu'e of office
                                        From          To

CHAIRMAN:
    Glenn T. Seaborg                 Mar.   1961   Present
    John A. McCone                   July   1958   Jan. 1961

GENERAL MANAGER:
    R. E. Hollingsworth              Aug.   1964   Present
    A. R. Luedecke                   Dec.   1958   July 1964

ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR
  REACTORS:
    George M. Kavanagh               Jan.   1966   Present
    J. A. Swartout                   Dec.   1964   Dec. 1965

ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR
  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
    Spofford G. English              Aug.   1961   Present

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CONSTRUCTION:
    J. A. Derry                     Mar.    1954   Present

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF REACTOR
  DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY:
    Milton Shaw                      Dec.   1964   Present

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF RESEARCH:
    Paul W. McDaniel                 May    1960   Present

FIELD OFFICE MANAGERS:
    Chicago Operations Office:
        Kenneth A. Dunbar            Nov.   1957   Present




                                55
APPENDIX I


                                        Tenure of office
                                        From          To

FIELD OFFICE MANAGERS (continued):
    Idaho Operations Office:
        William L. Ginkel            Nov.   1963   Present
        Hugo N. Eskildson, Jr.       Jan.   1962   Nov. 1963

   Richland Operations Office:
       Donald G. Williams            July   1965   Present
       J. E. Travis                  Aug.   1955   July 1965




                             56