oversight

Need for Long-Range Planning for Avionics Development Programs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-12-28.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

Need For Long-Range
Avionics Development
                           8.174248



Department   of the Army




BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNlTED STATES
                        COMPTROLLER     GENERAL     OF      THE      UNITED   STATES
                                      WASHINGTON.    D.C.         20548




     B - 174248




     To the President   of the Senate and the
q    Speaker  of the House   of Representatives
 /
                 This    is our report        on the need for long-range                      planning
     for     avionics      development         programs   of the Department                       of the
     Army.

                Our     review   was made pursuant    to the Budget                          and Ac-
     counting         Act,   1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting                            and
     Auditing         Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C.   67).

                Copies   of this report    are being    sent to the                      Director,
     Office      of Management      and Budget;     the Secretary                        of De-
     fense;      and the Secretary      of the Army.




                                                         Comptroller               General
                                                         of the United             States




                                50TH ANNIVERSARY 1921.1971
         ;   C'OMPTROLLER
                        GENERAL'S                                   NEED FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR                    AVIONICS
         '   REPORTTO THE CONGRESS                                  DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
                                                                  I Department of the Army  B-174248                       LQ
                                                              /
         I
         I   DIGEST
             __----


     '       WHYTHE REVIEW WASMADE
                     In prior    reviews     of Army aircraft         system developments,          the General       Ac-
                     counting    Office     (GAO) found%at          significant       aircraft     modifications        were
                     necessary     due to the need to redesign               armament     and avionics       subsystems       to
                     correct    development      deficiencies.         Because the standard           lightweight       avi-
                     onics equipment        (SLAE) package,       which was committed           for use in several
                     new Army aircraft        systems,      was experiencing         development      problems      impact-
                     ing on airframe       programs,       GAO reviewed        the SLAE program       to determine        the
                     underlying     causes for such program            shortcomings.

     I
     '       FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

                     Although         the military        characteristics           established        in May 1960 for the
                     light      observation        helicopter        limited      the weight        of the avionics          equip-
                     ment to 100 pounds3               in  October       1960   Army    officials        decided     to  use     exist-
                     ing equipment           which was about 55 percent                 heavier.         The Army did not con-
                     tract     for the development              of lightweight          avionics       until     1966, about
                     4 years        after    contracting        for the helicopter              development.         This delay
                     forced       a compression          of the development            cycle of SLAE and, in GAO's
                     opinion,        was the primary           cause of development               and production        problems.
                     GAO believes          that    this     inadequate       planning        occurred      because the Army did
                     not have a system for long-range                       avionics       planning      to provide       timely
                     identification           of the avionics            subsystems        needed for its aircraft.
                      (See p. 12.)

                     As a result         of the delay in starting               the development         of SLAE, the Army
                     found it necessary             to push the avionics            package     into    production     9 months
                     before     preliminary         design     testing       was completed to meet aircraft              delivery
                     schedules.          Because SLAE was not available, older,                      larger,     and heavier
                     avionics      equipment        ultimately        was installed       in all 1,071 helicopters             ini-
                     tially     contracted        for.      An older       type UHF-AM transceiver            was installed
                     also in 942 helicopters                bought      on follow=-on     contracts.         Use of the sub-
                     stitute      equipment       reduced      the effectiveness          of all 2,013 helicopters.
                      (See p. 19.)          The schedule         slippages      and design      changes      to overcome      de-
                     ficiencies        in the avionics           equipment      produced     additional        costs of about
                     $2.4 million.            {See pp. 20 and 21.)

                     In December1966 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development                    di-
                     rected  the installation    of SLAE in seven additional         Army aircraft      systems
                     and in all Army aircraft      produced   after   fiscal year 1969, even though            SLAE
                     had never been successfully       tested   in the light   observation     helicopter
 I
 I
 I
I
I
I            Tear Sheet
I                                                                           I
     for which it was designed.               A component       of the SLAE package also was
     specified     for installation         in five    aircraft      systems      as a second FM trans-
     ceiver.      These actions      were taken without           determining       whether    the ex-
     pected    benefits      would outweigh      the expected        cost and before        completion   of
     any testing        of SLAE to determine        its suitability          for Army use.        (SLAE
     also was selected         for installation        in an aircraft          system procured       for
     the Air Force,        the Navy, the Marine          Corps,     and the Canadian        Armed Forces.)
     (See p. 23.)

     SLAE was not installed                in two of the aircraft       systems  because       the Army           .               i
     later      determined        that   this   use was not cost effective.         Installation       in                         I
     three      other    aircraft      systems was canceled       because SLAE was not available,                                 I
                                                                                                                                  I
     but modifications              to one of these aircraft       systems    to prepare       for SLAE                           I
     installation          had cost about $185,000.          (See pB 23.)                                                         I
                                                                                                                                  I

     The Army issued     invitations      for bids on a second FM transceiver               for the
     SLAE at an estimated         cost of over $20 million         without    determining       whether                       I
                                                                                                                              I
     the need justified        the cost.     The Army also did not consider              the alterna-                         I
     tive  of using FM transceivers          already    being used in other         Army aircraft.                            I
                                                                                                                              I
     GAO brought    this   to the attention         of Army officials      who promptly       reevalu-                        l
     ated the requirement         and reduced     the planned     procurement      about $7 mil-                              I
     lion.    (See pp. 26 and 27.)                                                                                            I
                                                                                                                              I
                                                                                                                              I
     A decision     was made in August      1969 by the Commanding       General,    Army Mate-
     riel    Command, to transfer     program    and fund control     of the Avionics         Lab-
     oratory    from the Electronics       Command to the Aviation       Systems Command.
     This decision,     however,    has not been implemented.         GAO believes      that,      if                         I
     the Aviation     Systems Command is given program          and fund control,       it should                             ;
     also be given command control          over the Avionics     Laboratory      to avoid the                                I
                                                                                                                              I
     problem    of dual control     of the laboratory.       (See p. 33.)                                                     I


AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

     In commenting         on a draft     of this      report,      the Army agreed        that improved
     long-range       planning    was needed.          The Army did not agree,            however,      with
     our findings         and conclusions       as to the causes of the SLAE developmental
     problems.        The Army contended          that    these problems         had been caused by
     changing      requirements       and unforeseen          technical   difficulties.           GAO be-
     lieves     that    these problems       would have been minimized                or avoided     if the
     Army had initiated         plans for the development               of lightweight         avionics      in
     1960 to meet the military             requirements          then specified.

     The Army also commented        that the GAO recommendations        were sound management                             i
     practices.       The only action     cited   by the Army, however,     was that  a long-                             I
     range avionics      plan was being prepared.        (See p. 40.)      No work has ac-
     tually     begun in preparing     the long-range    avionics plan.

     The Army stated       that suitable    regulations      were in effect      to control      the
     commitment      of untested   subsystems     to additional     systems.       The regulation                     I
                                                                                                                      I
     referred     to in the Army reply      controls    type classification         of materiel;                      I
     however,     it does not preclude      the commitment       of incompletely      tested     sub-                 I
     systems    to additional    systems.                                                                             I
                                                                                                                      I


                                                        2
     .
         In the reply the Army stated        that cost-effectiveness          determinations       and
         economic  analyses    were required     and that     the appropriate       degree    of cost
         analyses  had been conducted.         GAO found that these determinations              and
         analyses  had not been prepared        and that    additional     controls      were needed
         to ensure   their  preparation.       (See p. 30.)

         The Army stated          also that the regulation          requiring      economic      analyses     was
         sufficiently       clear     regarding      which activity      prepared      these analyses,        in
         this     case the Army Materiel          Command.      The Army Materiel           Command's     im-
         plementing      regulation,        however,     does not clearly       indicate      which of its
         subordinate       commands should        prepare    the analyses       when more than one sub-
         ordinate     command is involved.              (See pp. 30 and 31.)

         The Office        of the Secretary          of Defense         (OSD) disagreed           with a GAO proposal
         that engineering             development      not be approved             unless   all critical         subsys-
         tems were under development                 with sufficient             lead time to ensure           proper
         interface.          OSD contended        that SLAE was not committed                    to additional        sys-
         tems prior        to testing         and that    therefore        the proposal         was not appropriate.
         GAO disagrees.             The plan to install           SLAE in additional               aircraft    was in-
         cluded     in the Five Year Avionics                Requirements           Plan used as the basis for
         procuring       avionics        and for modifying          aircraft        to accept        new avionics.
         Based on this           plan,     one project     manager       initiated        modification        actions      to
         enable     installation           of SLAE.      These were subsequently                 terminated      because
         of nonavailability              of the SLAE.

         OSD similarly       disagreed     with a GAO proposal    that congressional     committees
         be advised    when engineering         development  of a weapon system is authorized,
         although    a critical       subsystem    is still under development     for another    sys-
         tem.


RECOiVMEIDATI9X5'OR XiGGESTIONS

         The Secretary            of   the   Army should:

             --Place     additional       emphasis    on the timely    reparation                  of   a long-range
                avionics      requirements      plan.     (See p. 18.p

             --Prepare       a regulation    which prohibits      commitment                of incompletely
                tested      subsystems    to additional    systems   except                under extraordinary
                conditions.         (See p. 31.)

             --Establish       additional       controls     to ensure  that cost-effectiveness          de-
                terminations        and an analysis        of economic    alternatives      are prepared
                prior     to program      approval,      as required   by Army regulations.          (See
                p. 31.)

             --Initiate         actions   that will   clarify     responsibility         within   the Army
                 Materiel       Command for preparing         an economic      analysis     when more than
                 one of      its subordinate    commands are directly             involved.      (See p. 31.)

         In addition,            the Secretary      of Defense,    before          approving   engineering             de-
         velopment          of   an aircraft,      should  require    that         all subsystems.needed               to

Tear Sheet
                                                              3
    fulfill   critical    requirements of an aircraft  be under development and
    have sufficient      lead time to ensure proper interface.   (See p. 18.)

    The Secretary of Defense also should establish procedures whereby his au-
    thorization  is required prior to commitment of a critical    developmental
    subsystem to additional    systems before it is proven acceptable by suit-    1


    able tests.    (See p. 31.)                                                   ,


MATTERSFOR CONSIDERATIONBY THE CONGRESS                                           I




    GAObelieves that the Congress may wish to be informed by the Secretary
    of Defense when critical   subsystems still in development are committed
    to additional  systems, since such commitments can have adverse effects
    on the performance of all involved systems and on the combat effective-
    ness of the U.S. Armed Forces.




                                         4
                        Contents
                                                              Page

DIGEST                                                          1

CHAPTER

  1       INTRODUCTION                                          5
              Description  of SLAE package                      5
              Management structure  for aircraft and
                avionics programs                               6
              Army studies of avionics management               9

  2       PROPERINTERFACEOF SLAE AND HELICOPTERS
          HAMPEREDBY LACK OF LONG-RANGEPLANNING                12
             Need for long-range planning                      15
             Proposed Army avionics plan                       17
             Conclusions, proposals, and agency com-
               ments                                           17
             Recormnendations                                  18

  3       ADVERSEEFFECTSOF INADEQUATEAVIONICS
          PLANNING                                             19
              Production authorized before testing             19
              Capability     of helicopter   degraded          20
              Schedule slippages                               28
              Aircraft    modifications    to overcome SLAE
                 deficiencies                                  21

   4      COMMITTALOF UNTESTEDSLAE COMPONENTS    TO
          OTHERAIRCRAFT SYSTEMS                                23
             Cost effectiveness  not determined                26
                 Second FM transceiver   needs ques-
                   tioned                                      26
                 Use of other FM transceivers   not
                    studied                                    28
             Proposals and agency comments                     29
             Recommendations                                   31

   5      PROGRAM AND FUND CONTROLOF AVIONICS RESEARCH
          AND DEVELOPMENT                                32
              Army efforts   to realign avionics manage-
                ment structure                           33
              Conclusions                                35
              Agency comments                            35
CHAPTER                                                          Page
       6   SCOPEOF REVIEW                                         37

APPENDIX
       I   Chronology     of events                               39

  II       Letter of June 11, 1971, from the Acting As-
              sistant Secretary of the Army (Research
              and Development                                    40

III        Principal   officials of the Department of De-
              fense and the Department of the Army re-
              sponsible for administration  of activities
              discussed in this report                            47

                              ABBREVIATIONS
GAO        General Accounting         Office

OSD        Office     of the Secretary         of Defense

SLAE       standard     lightweight     avionics     equipment

RFP        request     for proposal
  COMlXl'ROLLER
              GENEPJL'S                              NEED FOR LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR AVIONICS
. RE??ORTTO THE CONGRESS                             DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
                                                     Department of the Army  B-174248


 DIGEST
 _---     --


 WHYTHE REVIEW WASMADE

      In prior reviews of Army aircraft                  system developments,          the General       Ac-
      counting    Office     (GAO) found         that significant        aircraft     modifications        were
      necessary     due to the need to redesign                armament      and avionics       subsystems      to
      correct    development       deficiencies.          Because the standard           lightweight       avi-
      onics equipment        (SLAE) package,          which was committed          for use in several
      new Army aircraft         systems,      was experiencing          development      problems      impact-
      ing on airframe        programs,       GAO reviewed        the SLAE program        to determine       the
      underlying      causes for such program             shortcomings.


 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

      Although         the military         characteristics           established        in May 1960 for the
      light      observation        helicopter         limited      the weight         of the avionics          equip-
      ment to 100 pounds,               in   October       1960   Army    officials        decided     to   use     exist-
      ing equipment           which was about 55 percent                  heavier.         The Army did not con-
      tract     for the development               of lightweight          avionics       until     1966, about
      4 years        after    contracting         for the helicopter              development.         This delay
      forced       a compression          of the development             cycle of SLAE and, in GAO's
      opinion,        was the primary            cause of development               and production         problems.
      GAO believes          that    this      inadequate       planning        occurred      because     the Army did
      not have a system for long-range                        avionics       planning      to provide        timely
      identification           of the avionics             subsystems        needed for its aircraft.
       (See p. 12.)

      As a result         of the delay in starting               the development         of SLAE, the Army
      found it necessary             to push the avionics            package      into production        9 months
      before     preliminary         design     testing       was completed       to meet aircraft         delivery
      schedules.          Because SLAE was not available,                  older,     larger,     and heavier
      avionics      equipment        ultimately        was installed       in all 1,071 helicopters              ini-
      tially     contracted        for.      An older       type UHF-AM transceiver             was installed
      also in 942 helicopters                bought     on follow-on       contracts.         Use of the sub-
      stitute      equipment       reduced      the effectiveness          of all 2,013 helicopters.
       (See p. 19.)          The schedule         slippages      and design       changes     to overcome       de-
      ficiencies        in the avionics           equipment      produced     additional        costs   of about
      $2.4 million.            (See pp. 20 and 21.)

      In December 1966 the Assistant        Chief     of Staff  for Force Development           di-
      rected  the installation    of SLAE in seven additional             Army aircraft      systems
      and in all Army aircraft     produced     after    fiscal   year 1969, even though            SLAE
      had never been successfully      tested     in the light      observation     helicopter
     for which it was designed.               A component       of the SLAE package         also was              .
     specified     for installation         in five    aircraft      systems      as a second FM trans-
     ceiver.     These actions       were taken without           determining       whether    the ex-
     pected    benefits      would outweigh the expected             cost and before        completion   of
     any testing        of SLAE to determine        its suitability          for Army use.        (SLAE
     also was selected         for installation        in an aircraft          system procured       for
     the Air Force,        the Navy, the Marine Corps,             and the Canadian         Armed Forces.)
      (See p. 23.)

     SLAE was not installed                 in two of the aircraft       systems   because       the Army
     later      determined        that    this   use was not cost effective.          Installation       in
     three      other    aircraft        systems was canceled      because     SLAE was not available,
     but modifications             to    one of these aircraft      systems     to prepare       for SLAE
     installation          had cost       about $185,000.      (See p. 23.)

    The Army issued      invitations      for bids on a second FM transceiver               for the
    SLAE at an estimated          cost of over $20 million         without    determining       whether
    the need justified         the cost.     Jhe Army also did not consider              the alterna-
    tive  of using     FM transceivers       already    being used in other Army aircraft.
    GAO brought    this    to the attention         of Army officials      who promptly       reevalu-
    ated the requirement          and reduced     the planned     procurement      about $7 mil-
    lion.    (See pp. 26 and 27.)

    A decision     was made in August       1969 by the Commanding       General,    Army Mate-
    riel    Command, to transfer      program    and fund control     of the Avionics         Lab-
    oratory    from the Electronics       Command to the Aviation        Systems Command.
    This decision,      however,   has not been implemented.          GAO believes      that,      if
    the Aviation      Systems Command is given program          and fund control,       it should
    also be given      command control      over the Avionics     Laboratory      to avoid the
    problem    of dual control     of the laboratory.        (See p. 33.)


AGENCY
     ACTIONSANDUNRESOLVED
                       ISSUES
     In commenting         on a draft     of this      report,      the Army agreed        that improved
     long-range       planning    was needed.          The Army did not agree,            however,      with
     our findings         and conclusions       as to the causes of the SLAE developmental
     problems.        The Army contended          that    these problems         had been caused by
     changing      requirements       and unforeseen          technical   difficulties.           GAO be-
     lieves     that    these problems       would have been minimized                or avoided     if the
     Army had initiated         plans for the development               of lightweight         avionics      in
   , 1960 to meet the military             requirements          then specified.

    The Army also commented       that the GAO recomendations        were sound management
    practices.     The only action      cited  by the Army, however,     was that a long-
    range avionics     plan was being prepared.       (See p. 40.)     No work has ac-
    tually     begun in preparing    the long-range   avionics plan.

    The Army stated       that  suitable    regulations      were in effect      to control      the
    commitment      of untested    subsystems     to additional     systems.       The regulation
    referred     to in the Army reply       controls    type classification         of materiel;
    however,     it does not preclude       the commitment       of incompletely      tested     sub-
    systems    to additional     systems.

                                                         2
    .
        In the reply the Army stated that cost-effectiveness             determinations       and
        economic  analyses    were required    and that  the appropriate       degree    of cost
        analyses  had been conducted.       GAO found that these determinations            and
        analyses  had not been prepared      and that additional      controls      were needed
        to ensure their    preparation.     (See p. 30.)

    The Army stated also that the regulation                  requiring      economic     analyses  was
    sufficiently       clear    regarding      which activity      prepared     these analyses,     in
    this     case the Army Materiel         Command.      The Army Materiel          Command's im-
    plementing      regulation,       however,     does not clearly       indicate     which of its
    subordinate       commands should       prepare    the analyses       when more than one sub-
    ordinate     command is involved.             (See pp. 30 and 31.)

    The Office        of the Secretary          of Defense         (OSD) disagreed         with a GAO proposal
    that engineering             development      not be approved           unless   all critical         subsys-
    tems were under development                 with sufficient           lead time to ensure proper
    interface.          OSD contended        that    SLAE was not committed               to additional       sys-
    tems prior        to testing         and that    therefore        the proposal       was not appropriate.
    GAO disagrees.             The plan to install           SLAE in additional             aircraft    was in-
    cluded     in the Five Year Avionics                Requirements         Plan used as the basis for
    procuring       avionics        and for modifying          aircraft      to accept        new avionics.
    Based on this           plan,     one project      manager initiated           modification       actions      to
    enable     installation           of SLAE.     These were subsequently                terminated because
    of nonavailability              of the SLAE.

    OSD similarly        disagreed     with a GAOproposal     that  congressional     committees
    be advised     when engineering         development  of a weapon system is authorized,
    although     a critical       subsystem    is still under development      for another    sys-
    tem.


RECO&tMENL?ATIOi?S
               OR SUGGESTIONS

    The Secretary            of   the     Army should:

          --Place     additional       emphasis    on the timely   preparation             of   a long-range
             avionics      requirements      plan.    (See pa 18.)

          --Prepare        a regulation       which prohibits      commitment       of incompletely
             tested      subsystems        to additional    systems   except       under extraordinary
             conditions.          (See     p. 31.)

          --Establish       additional      controls    to ensure   that     cost-effectiveness          de-
             terminations        and an analysis       of economic    alternatives          are prepared
             prior     to program      approval,     as required   by Army regulations.              (See
             p. 31.)

          --Initiate        actions   that will   clarify     responsibility         within   the Army
              Materiel      Command for preparing         an economic      analysis     when more than
              one of     its subordinate     commands are directly            involved.      (See p. 31.)

        In addition,       the Secretary          of Defense,    before     approving   engineering            de-
        velopment    of    an aircraft,         should   require    that    all subsystems     needed          to


                                                          3
    fulfill         critical     requirements of an aircraft       be under   development      and’   .
    have      sufficient       lead time to ensure proper      interface.       (See p. 18.)

    The Secretary     of Defense    also should establish    procedures       whereby    his au-
    thorization    is required    prior   to commitment   of a critical       developmental
    subsystem    to additional    systems   before  it is proven     acceptable      by suit-
    able tests.      (See p. 31.)


MATTERSFOR CONSIDERATIONBY THE CONGRESS

    GAO believes    that    the Congress    may wish to be informed    by the Secretary
    of Defense when critical          subsystems still  in development   are committed
    to additional     systems,     since such commitments    can have adverse   effects
    on the performance        of all involved   systems   and on the combat effective-
    ness of the U.S. Armed Forces.
                                         CHAPTER1

                                      INTRODUCTION

        A review of the development,             production,     and installa-
tion of the standard lightweight               avionics     equipment package
in Army aircraft       has been made by the General Accounting M--
fice to enable an evaluation             of the Army's management of
avionics    programs, including          planning,     development,     and
production.       Avionics equipment is vital             to the accomplish-
ment of aircraft       missions.       Avionics provides the primary
means of communication,          identification,         and navigation      to
aircraft     systems and also represents             a substantial    and in-
creasing percentage of total             aircraft     system costs.

         The objective    of the SLAE program, when originated           in
1964, was to provide a compact, lightweight,              inexpensive
avionics     package for the light      observation    helicopter.
Later the package was committed for use in several other
aircraft     systems.     The SLAE contract    cost, initially      valued
at $16.1 million,        had increased to about $39 million         by
December 1970.         In September 1970 the contractor         submitted
a claim for $44.6 million         more to cover extra costs in-
curred in the development and production            of SLAE. We did
not determine the validity         of the contractor's       claim.

DESCRIPTION OF SLAE PACKAGE

           The SLAE package consists                  of the following                    items.

                         Model des-
      Equipment           ignation                               Major    function
VHF-FM     transceiver   AN/ARC-114   Very-high-frequency              FM radio     used to send       and re-
                                          ceive     messages      from ground       and airborne       units:
VHF-AM     transceiver   AN/ARC-115   Very-high-frequency              AM radio     used to send       and re-
                                          ceive     messages      from the control        tower.
UHF-AM transceiver       AN/ARC-116   Ultra-high-frequency               AM radio    used to send        and         re-
                                          ceive messages          from the control        tower.
Automatic      direc-                 Navigational          aid giving      automatic     or manual           com-
   tion   finder         AN/ARK89         pass bearing         on any radio       signals    within      a
                                          given     frequency       range.
Intercommunication                    Provides        a means for crew selection             of any      of     the
   control    set        C-6533fA.W       transceivers         for voice     transmission        and   for      com-
                                         munications         among crew members,
      The SLAE package is about one third of the size and
weight of the former avionics equipment and uses 800 watts
less power.   See page 11 for photography provided by the
Army comparing SLAE components with current equipment.

MANAGEMENTSTRUCTUREFOR
AIRCRAFT AND AVIONICS PROGRAMS

       Responsibility      for management of Army avionics     for air-
craft   systems is divided among several organizations           de-
scribed briefly       below.

Office of the Assistant      Chief       of Staff
for Force Development

       This Office is responsible   for approving requirements,
coordinating    development programs, determining  priorities,
and designating    equipment to be included in Army budget sub-
missions.

Office of the Assistant      Chief   of Staff
for Communications-Electronics

       Some of the functions      of this Office are to review,
monitor,  and coordinate     tactical      communications requirements,
research and development,       logistics,     personnel and training,
and associated   programs and budgets, to provide integrated
tactical   communications    systems.

U.S. Army Combat Developments            Command

       This command develops,   tests,   and recommends improved
operational   and doctrinal   concepts for the Army and monitors
research and development programs to ensure that new equip-
ment meets Army requirements.        It provides the Army Materiel
Command with guidance and requirements         from equipment users.

U.S. Army Materiel    Command
   .
      The Army aterie      Command provides centralized    direc-
tion of its subordinate     commands which are responsible      for
management of equipment.      Those involved in avionics    in-
clude the Aviation    Systems Command, the Electronics     Command,
and the Test and Evaluation     Command.

                                     6
U.S. Army Aviation      Systems Command

      This command is responsible        for the development,   produc-
tion,  initial   fielding,     and supply and maintenance support
of Army aircraft      systems.    At the time of our review, this
command also prepared (jointly        with the Electronics    Command)
the Five Year Avionics Requirements Plan for Army aircraft.
Prior to fiscal     year 1968, this command only coordinated
and approved plan requirements        after the fact,

        Overall management of aircraft         systems is assigned to
project    managers who are responsible          to the Commanding
General of the Aviation           Systems Command.' During    aircraft
systems development,         the   aircraft project   manager is re-
sponsible for ensuring timely development and testing                and
successful     integration      of subsystems, such as avionics,
being developed by other commodity commands. He also bud-
gets engineering        development funds for avionics      peculiar     to
his aircraft      systems and funds to procure installed-avionics
equipment.       But  these funds are released directly       to the
Electronics      Command by the Army Materiel        Command.

        The SLAE package initially        was developed for use in
the light    observation     helicopter,    and the above-mentioned
aircraft    project     manager assumed overall      responsibility  for
this avionics       program.    In December 1968 this responsibility
was transferred        to the project    manager for Selected Avionics
Equipment for Army Aircraft           at the Electronics    Command.

U.S. Army Electronics       Command

      The Electronics    Command is responsible    for the life-
cycle management of avionics      equipment,  including   research,
development,   procurement,   and supply management.      This com-
mand prepares the Five Year Avionics Requirements Plan for
Army aircraft    jointly  with the Aviation   Systems Command.


1
    Prior to August 1969 project managers were responsible              to
    the Commanding General, U.S. Army Haterie  Command.
       The Avionics   Laboratory of the Electronics  Command
carries   out research and development for avionics     equipment
and provides systems engineering      support for the integra-
tion of avionics    equipment in Army aircraft.

        Centralized    management for the SLAE package is assigned
to the project      manager for Selected Avionics Equipment for
Army Aircraft.        He is responsible   for the coordination   and
control    of the development,     procurement,    distribution, and
logistical      support of SIAE. He reports      to the Commanding
General of the Electronics        Command.

U.S. Army Test and Evaluation       Command

       This command is responsible    for planning,      coordinating,
conducting,     and evaluating engineering   and service tests of
avionics    equipment and the equipment's    integration      with air-
craft systems.
ARMY STUDIES OF AVIONICS MANAGEMENT

       The Army has conducted studies of its avionics pkogram
management, including     the development of SUE,     One of these
studies was made by the Research Analysis Corporation,
McLean, Virginia,    for the Office of the Chief of Research
and Development.     This comprehensive study was authorized
because of concern over the organization,      procedures,  and
rationale   used by the Army for development of avionics     and
because of concern that Army avionics     lagged behind the
state of the art.     A report on this study was issued in
October 1967.     (See p. 15.1

        In April 1969 the Army asked a consultant          to form a
committee to examine the technical          and administrative    evo-
lution     of the SLAE program and to recommend improved proce-
dures for the acquisition        of avionics   systems for future
aircraft..      A report on the findings     and recommendations of
this committee,       known as the Avionics Systems Committee, was
issued in October 1969.        (See p. 16.)

       On July 15, 1971, the Army Audit Agency issued a special
report of audit number NE 72-5, entitled     "Standard Light-
weight Avionic Equipment."     The report contained several
recommendations which would, if implemented,      terminate   all
procurements   of additional  quantities  of SLAE components un-
less reviews being conducted by the Assistant       Chief of Staff
for Force Development and the Army Materiel      Command indi-
cated that SLAE components met Army requirements.         In such
event the Army Audit Agency recommends that sufficient        test-
ing be performed to ensure that reported deficiencies        are
corrected   and that Army requirements   are met before the com-
ponents are deployed.

     The recommendations     in the Army Audit Agency report
were based on unsatisfactory      equipment reports from Vietnam
and on deficiencies   reported by the Army Test and Evaluation
Command.

      A preliminary  draft of this report was furnished     to
OSD for comment. The Acting Assistant       Secretary of the
Army (Research and Development) replied      on June 11, 1971,
on behalf of the Secretary      of Defense.  The comments are
discussed in pertinent    sections of this report and are

                                  9
included as appendix II.   A chronology   of events   is included
as appendix I to this report.




                               10
COMPARISONOF SLAE COMPONENTS
                           WITH CURRENTEQUIPMENT




                                VHF   AM   RADIO   SETS
                               CHAPTER 2

           PROPER INTERFACE OF SUE AND HELICOPTERS

            HAMPEREDBY LACK OF LONG-RANGEPLANNING

      Although the military       characteristics        established  in
May 1960 for the light      observation      helicopters      limited the
weight of helicopter      avionics equipment to 100 pounds,
Army officials     decided in October 1960 to use existing
equipment that was about 55 percent heavier.                 The Army did
not contract    for development of lightweight            equipment until
1966, about 4 years after contracting             for development of
the helicopter.      The results    of this delay are discussed in
chapter 3. (See pe 19.)

        We believe that this inadequate planning occurred be-
cause the Army had no system for long-range       planning (10 to
15 years) to provide for timely identification        of the avi-
onics subsystems needed for aircraft.       Since then the Army
has developed a long-range      plan of its contemplated    air-
craft requirements     through 1985 but has not developed a
plan for avionics     equipment needed for the aircraft.       We
believe that a long-range      avionics plan is necessary to en-
sure the timely development of equipment needed for the
aircraft.

      In its comments on the draft report,      the Army dis-
agreed with our position   that avionics    available     in 1960
exceeded the loo-pound weight limitation      in the military
characteristics  for the light  observation     helicopter.

       The Army reply stated that the characteristics         speci-
fied (1) complete provisions 1 for UHF-AM and VHF-AM trans-
ceivers with only one to be installed        at a time, (2) a
VHF-FM transceiver,    an auxiliary    FM receiver,    and an FM
homing, (3) two intercom stations,        (4) one headset,    (5) com-
plete provisions    for an automatic direction      finder  (instal-
lation   dependent on mission),     and (6) space, weight, and

1All necessary wiring,      brackets,    etc.,   needed for   instal-
 lation and operation.

                                   12
power1 for battlefield    identification   of friend or foe,
The reply stated also that, using standard avionics       avail-
able in the early 1960's, the weight of the required       equip-
ment totaled  100 pounds.     (See p. 41.)

        In its 1967 report       on the Army's management of its
avionics programs, the          Research Analysis Corporation        listed
the individual     weights      of the required     avionics   equipment
specified     in the military      characteristics.        These weights
totaled     155 pounds, or      55 percent over the loo-pound weight
limitation.

       The Army computation         of 100 pounds did not include
either    the automatic direction          finder or the identification
of friend     or foe.    The automatic         direction    finder was speci-
fied in the military         characteristics         as being required    on
some flights,      although the identification             of friend   or foe
was to be included on the aircraft                as soon as it became
available.      Consequently the weight of these items (31
pounds) was an important          factor     in meeting the military
characteristics       specified     in 1960.

       The Army computation    of 100 pounds also did not in-
clude any provision     for the antennas and associated      equip-
ment necessary for the operation      of the avionics    equipment.
When the weight of these items (24 pounds) is considered,
the total weight of the avionics      is 155 pounds.     The impor-
tance of this additional     weight to the effectiveness      of the
helicopter   is explained on page 20.

        The Army reply stated that the loo-pound weight limi-
tation    on the avionics  equipment was not exceeded until
1964, when the mission selectable       avionics    concept was
changed, when the identification       of friend    or foe system
was approved, and when voice security         equipment became nec-
essary.     As shown above the total weight of the required
avionics equipment specified      in the 1960 military      charac-
teristics    was 155 pounds.


1M
 ake   available     space and power for        the equipment    as well
 as provide for      the weight of it.



                                       13
        The reply stated also that a weight reduction         through
the use of solid-state     communication radios appeared to be
possible    in 1964.   The Research Analysis Corporation         report
stated that this equipment was well within        the development
state of the art in 1960. We believe that,          if the Army had
planned for the development and production        of the solid-
state avionics    for use in the light observation       helicopter
on a more timely basis,     the problems  encountered     with this
equipment could have been recognized      earlier     and possibly
could have been resolved before the aircraft          became opera-
tional.




                                  14
NFED FOR LONG-RANGEPLANNING

      In January 1964 the helicopter   project    manager informed
the Electronics  Command that existing    avionics equipment was
too large and too heavy for the helicopter.        This was almost
4 years after approval of the helicopter,      and 2 more years
elapsed before the Electronics    Command contracted    for the
development of SLAE in January 1966.

      The contract provided for deliveries    beginning in Jan-
uary 1968, which would have allowed the installation        of SUE
in the 483d light  observation helicopter.     This allowed only
2 years for development and production     of SLAE, although
5 to 8 years normally are required    for projects    of this kind.

      The Army asked the Research Analysis Corporation to
study Army avionics management.   Its 1967 report1 showed:

     1. That transistorized      circuitry  was well within   the
        development state of the art (1960) and that a
        lightweight    avionics    package could have been for-
        mally recommended coincident       with the light   observa-
        tion airframe     development,

     2,   That the avionics weight limitation      specified in
          military  characteristics  documents    could not be
          satisfied  by hardware then existing.

     3. That the request for proposal (RFP) for the avionics
        was issued almost 5 years after the initial RFP
        (1960) for the airframe,,

     4. That SUE-equipped      aircraft were scheduled for de-
        livery    only 27 months after the avionics   contract
        was awarded.     No other Army equipment of such major
        proportions    or impact had been able to proceed
        through the testing     and acceptance cycle with such
        speed.


1Research Analysis Corporation  report RAC-R-22,       October
 1967, slAvionics Development and Technology.1'



                                 15
These findings were recognized by the Avionics               Systems Com-
mittee in an October 1969 report on SUE.

        In our opinion,     the lack of planning for avionics           pre-
cipitated     a sequence of events which adversely affected              the
light observation       helicopter   program.    The issuance of the
contract    for development of SLAE about 4 years after the
contract    for development of the light observation             helicopter
compressed the ST&E development period to meet aircraft                  de-
livery    schedules,    which resulted    in inadequate development
and production      before some of the technical       difficulties
were known or solved.          These problems led to impaired air-
craft effectiveness       and to costly modifications.

      The Research Analysis Corporation,         in its 1967 report,
recommended a long-range      plan for Army aviation        and a com-
panion long-range   avionics plan.       In 1969 the Army prepared
a plan which projected     its aircraft     systems requirements
from 1970 to 1985.     This   plan   did not  identify    the avionics
equipment needed but did state that the aircraft             systems
would need communications      and navigation      equipment.     We
found that there was no companion long-range            avionics   plan
in support of the aviation       plan.




                                      16
PROPOSEDARMY AVIONICS PLAN

      In July  1970 the Office of the Assistant      Chief of Staff
for Communications-Electronics      prepared a plan for tasks to
be accomplished during a 2-year study to develop an Avionics
Master Plan.    An Army official    told us that the study was
necessary because of the lack of adequate management infor-
mation on avionics and because of failure        in the past to
ensure adequate avionics      for Army aircraft.

      Included in this study plan were tasks designed to
determine avionics needed to support projected        aircraft
missions to meet the estimated      threat.   From such informa-
tion the tasks were to identify      avionics  technology      and sub-
system developments needed to meet these requirements.             The
information   would provide necessary guidance for the avionics
part of the air mobility    research and development program.
But the study plan had not been approved at the time that
we completed our fieldwork     in December 1970.

CONCLUSIONS, PROPOSALS, AND AGENCYCOMMENTS

       In our opinion,     the lack of adequate planning for avi-
onics to meet the needs of the light observation        helicopter
was the primary cause of development problems encountered
later    in the SLAE program.      To ensure the timely development
of avionics     equipment, we believe that the Army should pre-
pare a long-range      avionics plan to support its long-range
aviation    plan.

       In replying       to our draft report,  the Army disagreed
with our conclusion         as to the cause of the development prob-
lems in the SLAE program.           The Army said that the problems
had been caused by changing requirements          and unforeseen
technical    difficulties.       (See pe 40.1
       It is our belief    that,    if planning had been adequate
and if the development of SLAE had started               on a timely basis,
provision   for unforeseen       technical   difficulties       might have
been included in the development time schedules.                 Also time
might have been available        to cope more effectively         with
changing requirements.        These problems might have been solved
before production,      and thus the Army might have avoided
additional    problems and costs and the need to authorize


                                    17
production.    (Our position on this        matter   is given    in
greater detail   in ch. 3, p. 19.)

      We proposed that the Secretary    of the Army have a long-
range avionics   plan prepared to support the long-range    air-
craft requirements   plan,   The Army replied   that such a
plan was needed and was being prepared.       (See pp. 43 and 44 .>

       The plan being prepared is for the aforementioned              Avi-
onics Master Plan which is to include long-range              avionics
requirements.     Planning for this plan was authorized            in
April 1969.     A coordination    draft  of the    tasks   to  be  ac-
complished during a Z-year study leading to an Avionics
Master Plan was distributed       in July 1970. This study plan
was revised and a second coordination         draft was issued in
September 1971. No work has actually         begun on the study
or on the preparation      of the Avionics Master Plan itself.
Considering    the long delays that have occurred already,             we
believe   that the Secretary     of the Army should accelerate
the preparation    of a long-range avionics        requirements     plan.

      We proposed also that the Secretary      of Defense, before
approving engineering    development of an aircraft,     require
that all subsystems needed to fulfill      the critical    require-
ments of the aircraft    be under development and have suffi-
cient lead time to ensure proper interface.         The reply
stated that one of the prime objectives       of a development
program was to ensure that all subsystems were developed
in sufficient   time for proper interface.      However, no spe-
cific   actions related  to our proposal were cited,       (See pp.
44 and 45.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

      We recommend that the Secretary    of the Army take ac-
tions which will place additional     emphasis on the timely
preparation   of a long-range avionics requirements   plan,

      We recommend also that the Secretary       of Defense direct
that procedures be established       to ensure that, before engi-
neering development of an aircraft       is approved, all sub-
systems needed to fulfill   critical     requirements  of the air-
craft  are under development and have sufficient        lead time
to ensure proper interface.

                                     18
                                CHAPTER   3

       ADVERSE   EFFECTS   OF   INADEQUATE    AVIONICS   PI&JNING

       As a result  of the delay in starting     the development
of SLAE, the Army found it necessary to push the avionics
package into production    before testing    was completed.    The
Assistant   Chief of Staff for Force Development authorized
production    of the SLAE package in March 1967 (9 months be-
fore preliminary    design testing    was completed) to enable
its scheduled installation      in aircraft  being produced.

      Because SLAE was not available,           older, larger,    and
heavier avionics    equipment ,ultimately        was installed    in all
1,071 helicopters    initially       contracted    for.   An older type
UHF-AM transceiver    was installed        also in 942 helicopters
bought under follow-on        contracts.      The substitute    equipment
reduced the effectiveness         of all 2,013 helicopters.

       The schedule slippages and design changes to overcome
deficiencies      in the avionics equipment also resulted   in ad-
ditional     costs of about $2.4 million,    This amount includes
$890,000 for schedule slippages and about $1.5 million        for
changes to overcome deficiencies       in the SLAE package,

PRODUCTION AUTHORIZED BEFORE TESTING

       When the Army authorized   production   of SLAE, Electro-
nics Command officials    knew that additional    design effort
would be required    to correct  deficiencies.    They believed
that the design problems would be resolved when production
started and risked the need for redesign during production.
They assumed this risk in an attempt to have the equipment
installed   as soon as possible   in aircraft   being produced.

      Although preliminary     design testing     was not completed
until  9 months later,    early tests had shown design deficien-
cies in the UHF-AH transceiver       and radio-frequency      inter-
ference in all transceivers.        The contractor    had proposed
redesign of the equipment to meet reliability          requirements
imposed by the Army.




                                   19
CAPABILITY OF HELICOPTER DEGRADED

         The payload-to-empty        weight ratio1      is a critical     design
factor     in the light    observation      helicopter.        Adding about
55 pounds to the empty weight of the helicopter                   by substitut-
ing older type avionics          reduced aircraft         speed and maneuver-
ability,     or mission endurance,          Also9 because of greater
space and weight required            for the older type avionics,          the
Army did not install         battlefield     identification       and voice
security     avionics    systems in the initial           1,071 helicopters.

       The older, heavier type UHF-AM transceiver      also was in-
stalled     along with certain    SLAE components in 942 additional
helicopters      bought under follow-on    contracts. Thus the ef-
fectiveness      of these helicopters   also was compromised,

       Another serious problem that had not been corrected               as
of November 1971 was interference             among the automatic    direc-
tion finder,     the identification        transponder,*     and the FM
transceiver,      As a result      these items cannot be used simul-
taneously.     A modification        to the automatic     direction  finder
is expected to eliminate         interference     with the FM transceiver
in SUE packages purchased in the future.                 But the other in-
terference    problems had not been resolved when we completed
our review.

SCHEDULESLIPPAGES

       The contractor  tried   to use the automated-production
method to meet the 24-month delivery       schedule but found that
preliminary    designs were not susceptible      to such production.
Use of slower production     methods resulted      in extensive  slip-
page in the delivery     schedule,   This caused the Army to de-
fer the planned SLAE installation       in helicopters     being


1Payload-to-empty  weight ratio  is the relationship       of the
 flying weight of the aircraft,    including    pilot   and fuel,
 to the empty weight of the aircraft.        Each additional
 pound added to the empty weight reduces the payload.
2Notifies air and ground receivers            of the identity      and lo-
 cation of the aircraft.


                                      20
produced to the 712th aircraft.  If there had been suffi-
cient time to refine preliminary designs, the contractor
might have been able to use the more efficient automated-
production method.

        The installation     schedule later was revised to begin
with the 1,072d helicopter         produced because of the need for
redesign of SLAE to correct         deficiencies     and to meet reli-
ability    requirements.      Design   tests,    completed after produc-
tion began, disclosed        serious deficiencies.        These deficien-
cies required       redesign of the UHF-AM transceiver        after 136
transceivers      were manufactured      and modification    of the VHF-
AM and FM transceivers        after 400 of each were manufactured.

      The aircraft     manufacturer      was directed    to prepare de-
sign changes for the SLAE installation,but             the changes were
abandoned later because the SLAE packages were not available.
The contractor     received $320,000 for these efforts.            SLAE
was designated for installation           in the follow-on    procure-
ments of 2,542 helicopters,         but, because the UHF-AM trans-
ceiver was being redesigned,          the older, heavier transceiver
was s,ubstituted     in 942 aircraft.       The cost of engineering
changes to make this substitution           was $570,000.

AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS
TO CVERCOMF,
           SLAE DEFICIENCIES

        In December 1968 the light         observation       helicopter    manu-
facturer    informed the contracting          officer     that serious dif-
ficulties     were being experienced        in incorporating          SLAE in
the aircraft.      The major problems were radio-frequency                 in-
terference     in each of the transceivers            and interference
among SLAE components which, at times, rendered them inoper-
able.     The contracting     officer    directed      the manufacturer        to
submit engineering-change          proposals to correct           these defi-
ciencies.      The contractor      submitted proposals to correct
some of the problems and, as of December 1970, was preparing
another engineering-change          proposal,       A second aircraft        con-
tractor    had similar    problems.

      The following costs        were incurred      under the aircraft
contracts  for changes.



                                       21
Elimination     of radio-frequency       interfer-
   ence among the transceivers                          $1,244,000
Elimination     of interference      among the
   automatic    direction    finder,   the iden-
   tification    transponder,      and the FM
   transceiver     (not successful,      see p. 20)        108,000
Correction     of other problems                           186,000

     Total                                              $1,538,000

       We believe that many, if not all,     of the reported de-
ficiencies    might have been avoided, along with the necessary
modification     costs to correct the deficiencies,    if develop-
ment of SIAE had not been delayed because of inadequate
planning.




                                    22
                                CHAPTER4

              COMMITTAL OF UNTESTED SLAE COMPONEK!KTS

                     TO OTHER AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

       In December 1966 the Assistant       Chief of Staff for Force
Development directed      the installation    of SLAE in seven ad-
ditional   Army aircraft     systems1 and in all Army aircraft
produced after fiscal       year 1969, even though SLAE had not
been successfully     tested in the light     observation    helicopter.
This decision was made without giving adequate consideration
to the cost effectiveness        of the proposed installations       and
prior to any testing      of SLAE to determine its suitability
for Army use in any of these aircraft         systems.

         SLAE was not installed       in two of the aircraft     systems
 because the Army later determined that this use was not cost
 effective.      Its installation       in three other aircraft     systems
 was canceled because SLAE was not available.             Modifications
 to one of these aircraft         systems to prepare for SLAE instal-
'lation     had cost about $185,000.

      In March 1967 the Assistant         Chief of Staff for Force
Development directed      also the installation        of the AN/ARC-114,
VHF-FM transceiver,      a component of SLAE, in five aircraft
systems as a second FM transceiver.            This decision was made
also without   determining     its cost effectiveness.         In Novem-
ber 1970 the Army issuedinvitatfonsfor             bids expected to
cost $21.5 million     to fill    this requirement.        We called this
lack of cost-effectiveness        determination      to the attention   of
Army officials    who promptly reevaluated         the requirement    and
reduced the planned procurement about $7 million.


1The Air Force selected SLAE for installation       in two air-
 craft  systems, but, due to the unavailability       of SLAE pack-
 ages, it was not installed   in one of the aircraft      systems.
 The abandoned engineering   effort  for that system cost
 $120,000.    SUE also was installed    in an aircraft    system
 purchased for the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Canadian
 Armed Forces.


                                    23
        The Army's Five Year Avionics Requirements Plan, dated
December 1966, scheduled the installation                  of SLAE to begin
with the fiscal        year 1969 production         of seven Army aircraft
systems other than the light observation                 helicopter.       This
plan was approved by the Assistant               Chief of Staff for Force
Development to be used as the basis for procuring                     avionics
equipment for new production           aircraft      and for aircraft        ret-
rofit    programs.       Project  managers     cite   this    plan   as author-
ity for processing         engineering    changes and fbr modifying
aircraft     specifications      to incorporate       the avionics      equip-
ment indicated       in the plan.

        In accordance with the plan, the project       manager for
a utility    aircraft directed     the aircraft manufacturer     in
May 1968 to prepare an engineering-change         proposal for in-
stallation    of SUE.    As late as January 1969, the Electron-
ics Command assured the project        manager that SLAE would be
available,    but in February 1969 the command advised him
that it would not.     In March 1969, the contractorDs        efforts
to install     SW were terminated      but the contractor    was paid
$184,620 for preparatory       costs which had been incurred.

       In the reply to our draft reports         the Army disagreed
with our position     that SLAE had been committed to other air-
craft    systems before testing.       The Army stated that only
planning guidance had been given by the Army for the instal-
lation    of SLAE in additional     aircraft    and that two addi-
tional    steps were required    before implementation       of these
plans.     These steps were:     (1) the item must be type clas-
sified    "standard A" or Department of the Army approval must
be given for limited      procurement and (2) funds must be re-
leased to the procurement agency.            (See p. 42.)    The Army
said that neither     was done before completion        of testing.

     The Adjutant General of the Army, in a letter  of Janu-
ary 23, 1967, made the following statement about the plan.

              "The *** plan lists     approved        Department of
       the Army installation      requirements         for avionics
       **Jc .

           "Standard configurations  listed  in this plan
      will be used as the basis for materiel   management
      computations,  programming and procurement of

                                        24
      avionics  and surveillance       equipments to support
      both new production     aircraft    and aircraft retro-
      fit programs. ***

              I'*** This document [the plan] is to be used
      as a basis for processing        ECP's [Engineering
      Change Proposals]     and modifying      aircraft   detailed
      and model specifications       to incorporate     the con-
      figuration     changes indicated.    ***'I

        Also, as pointed out above, the project        manager for a
utility     aircraft directed    the aircraft   manufacturer   in May
1968 to prepare an engineering-change          proposal for installa-
tion of SLAE. In addition,          SLAE was being procured under a
limited-production      authorization,     and the Electronics   Com-
mand assured the project        manager that SUE would be avail-
able for his aircraft       in 1969.

        In our opinion,   the Adjutant  General's    letter    and the
project    manager's action demonstrate that the Five Year
Avionics Requirements Plan is more than a plan and is, in
effect,    a commitment of equipment to aircraft         systems.    We
recognize that a plan to utilize       developmental      equipment,
when available,      is important  and necessary.      We believe,
however, that such planning should not be set forth in doc-
uments used as the basis for procurement and modification,
such as the Five Year Avionics Requirement Plan.




                                    25
COST   EFFECTIVENESS    NOT    DETERMINED

        Army officials    did not prepare cost-effectiveness
studies when changes in avionics           equipment were specified      in
the 5-year avionics plan.         Although Army regulations       provided
for cost-effectiveness       determinations       before changes in air-
craft    were approved, Army officials         informed us that,   at the
time these changes were specified,           the installation    of SLAE
in these aircraft       was obviously    cost effective.      As shown
below, however, later decisions          to delete the SLAE require-
ment from two aircraft       systems were based on the fact that
installation      costs would be excessive.

       In February 1968 the project          manager for a heavy lift
helicopter    requested Army approval for deleting            the require-
ment for SLAE in that aircraft           because of excessive costs.
The prototype     installation      and retrofit   costs for 54 air-
craft   were estimated       at $6.7 million.     Army officials     agreed
that the costs were excessive and withdrew the requirement.
Later another project         manager (for an attack helicopter)
decided not to install         SLAE because of the excessive        cost of
modifying   the few aircraft        being produced.     These costs were
estimated   at $381,000 for 38 aircraft.

Second FM transceiver         needs questioned

        In January 1967 the Army Combat Developments Command
recommended that a second FM transceiver        be installed   in all
aircraft    that were used in direct    support of combat opera-
tions.     This recommendation was based on the rationale        that
(1) there was often a need to use two FM transceivers          simul-
taneously     and 12) there was a need for a backup FM trans-
ceiver.     In March 1967 the Assistant    Chief of Staff for
Force Development directed     that the AN/ARC-114 transceiver
be installed     in 50 percent of five aircraft    systems and
that all wiring,     brackets, etc.,   needed for installation      be
installed     in the other 50 percent.

       Army officials  said that,    at the time this decision
was made, the change was obviously        cost effective.      The
project    manager for the heavy lift     helicopter,     however, in-
formed the Assistant     Chief of Staff in September 1969 of
the cost (estimated    at $915,000) to modify the aircraft          and
to install    a second FM transceiver.      The project     manager

                                      26
was advised in January 1970 that           the increased     capability
did not justify these costs.

       Project   managers for two of the other aircraft         systems
questioned     the need for a second FM transceiver.        During a
review of the aircraft       modification    program for fiscal     years
1972 through 1976, Army officials         found that costs were more
than could be expected to be approved at higher levels.               As
a result     each project   manager was requested to rank each
modification      and to recommend only essential     programs.

        The utility aircraft  project manager did not recommend
the installation    of a second PM transceiver   in a utility
aircraft    because he felt  that the program was not essential.

        The project   manager for the light      observation   helicopter
ranked the procurement and installation           of a second FM trans-
ceiver 10th in a list         of 11 proposed modifications.       Never-
theless the Army funded this program although it did not
fund programs that the project          manager had ranked higher in
priority,      such as an improved landing gear.        The aircraft
project      managers told us that,     since the second PM trans-
ceiver program had been directed           by the Department of the
Army p    they  had had  no   other choice   than to proceed with the
procurement      and installation    of the transceivers.

     To meet the second FM transceiver     requirement,  on No-
vember 16, 1970, the Electronics    Command issued invitations
for bids for a multiyear    buy of 6,310 transceivers   expected
to cost about $21.5 million.

       In view of the questionable          cost effectiveness       of this
requirement,     we  presented   our   findings     to officials     of   the
Aviation    Systems Command on November 24, 1970, and suggested
that cost-effectiveness        determinations      be made before pro-
ceeding with the procurement.            On November 28, 1970, the
Duputy Commanding General, Aviation             Systems Command, re-
quested that higher headquarters            reevaluate     the requirement
for a second FM transceiver         on a cost-effectiveness          basis.
At a meeting held on December 9, 1970, Army officials                   recon-
sidered the need for a second PM transceiver                 in each air-
craft    on this basis and decided to reduce the quantity                to be
purchased'by     2,060.    This reduced the estimated            cost of the
planned procurement       by about $7 million.

                                     27
Use of other    FM transceivers     not studied

        Prior to our review the Army had not considered the
alternative     use of other FM transceivers       installed    in its
aircraft.     Army regulations    provide for an analysis         to de-
termine the most economical way to accomplish an approved
objective,    but they do not clearly     identify     the organiza-
tion responsible     for preparing    the analysis.        Because of
this lack of clarity,      no such analysis was made. We dis-
cussed this matter with Army officials,           and an analysis      was
prepared.     It showed that the use of the SLAE component
would be more economical than the use of other F'M trans-
ceivers.




                                    28
PROPOSALSAND AGENCYCOMMENTS

      We proposed that the           Secretary of the Army establish
regulations    providing     that,      in general,   development   of a
new subsystem be completed            and the subsystem be proven ac-
ceptable by suitable       tests      for operational     use in its ini-
tial application      before it       is committed to additional      air-
craft or weapons systems,

       The Army position    is that suitable      regulations       are in
effect   and that untested     subsystems   have not been committed
to additional     aircraft  or weapons systems.        (See p0 44.1 An
Army official     told us that the reply was referring            to Army
Regulation    71-6 entitled    "Type Classification/Reclassifica-
tion of Army Materiel,"       effective   January 1, 1970.

        One of the steps necessary before a subsystem can be
installed       in a system and can be issued for use is type
classification.          The subsystem must be classified      either
"limited     production-urgent,"       which means that the subsystem
is approved by the general staff of the Department of the
Army for procurement and distribution             in limited  quantities
to meet an urgent operational           requirement    that no adopted
itern will      satisfy,   or "standard A," which means that the
subsystem has successfully          completed all required tests and
is fully     acceptable     for Army use.       -

       Army Regulation    71-6 controls      this type classification
of subsystems; however, it does not preclude the commitment
of incompletely     tested subsystems to additional            systems.
It merely exerts a degree of control            over one of the steps
in the process of installation.          In view of the potential
adverse effects     evidenced by this report,          we believe that
regulations    should be revised or established            that would
preclude the commitment       of incompletely       tested    subsystems to
additional   systems.

        We proposed also that,    when such committal was consid-
ered necessary even though a crucial          subsystem was still
under development,     the  Secretary    of  Defense   furnish  a certi-
fication    to the appropriate     congressional    committees,   stat-
ing the reasons for such authorization           and the status of
development.      The OSD position    is that this proposal is not


                                        29
  appropriate   for this      report because SLlpE was not committed
  to additional    aircraft      systems prior to testing.  (See
  p. 45.1

        For the reasons stated on pages 24 and 25, it is our
  opinion that SLAE was committed to additional       aircraft     and
  that the proposal was therefore     appropriate,    We   believe
  also that any commitment of an incompletely      tested subsystm
  to additional   systems should require approval by the Secre-
  tary of Defense because of the adverse effects       which can oc-
  cure A requirement     for Secretary of Defense approval would
  serve as a management tool and would help to ensure that a
  thorough evaluation    had been made before a request for com-
  mitment reached him.

          We proposed further    that the Secretary     of the Army es-
  tablish    controls   to ensure that required     cost-effectiveness
  determinations      and an analysis of economic alternatives         are
  made prior to program approval.          In reply the Army stated
  that the cost-effectiveness        determinations   and analysis were
  required    by Army Regulation     37-13 entitled   "Economic Analysis
  of Proposed Army Investments,"         dated June 4, 1969, and that
  the appropriate      degree of cost analysis had been conducted.
  (See p. 44.1

        As shown on page 26, adequate analyses were not made
  when the plan to install    SLAE in additional       aircraft    was
  approved.   Also analyses of the quantities       and alternative
, types of second FM transceivers      were not made until        we
  brought this to the attention     of Army officials.          Therefore
  we believe that additional    controls   are needed.

          Finally  we proposed that the Secretary of the Army
  clarify     the regulation    requiring     the economic analysis     to
  clearly     show the organization       responsible     for its prepara-
  tion.      The Army stated that regulation          37-13 clearly   defined
  responsibility      for cost-effectiveness        preparation.     (See
  p. 44.)

         The cited regulation     does clearly show that the Army
  Materiel   Command is responsible     for the preparation  of anal-
  yses.    The difficulty,    however, arises within   this command.
  Its regulations      do not indicate  which of its subordinate


                                       30
commands should prepare the analyses when more than one of
the subordinate  commands are directly  involved,  as in the
case of SLAE--the Aviation   Systems Command and the Electron-
ics Command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

       We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish
procedures whereby his authorization      is required   prior to
commitment of a critical    developmental   subsysta    to addi-
tional   systems before it is proven acceptable      by suitable
tests.

     We recommend also    that   the Secretary   of the Army:

     --Prepare    a regulation  which prohibits    commitment of
        incompletely    tested subsystems to additional     system
        except under extraordinary     conditions.

     --Establish      additional     controls  to ensure that cost-
        effectiveness       determinations    and an analysis of eco-
        nomic alternatives        are prepared prior to program ap-
        proval,    as required      by Army regulations.

     --Initiate     actions that will clarify    responsibility
        within   the Army Materiel   Command for preparing      an
         economic analysis when more than one of its subordi-
        nate commands are directly     involved.




                                  31
                                  CHAPTER5

                       PROGRAMAND FUND CONTROL

               OF AVIONICS RESEARCHAND DEVELOPP/IENT

        In its 1967 report on avionics management, which in-
cluded a case study on the SLAE development for the light
observation         helicopter,       the Research Analysis Corporation
concluded that (1) the Army's avionics                 problems could be
attributed        directly      to an unwieldy organizational         structure
within     the Army Materiel            Command and (2) a reorganization
and consolidation            of avionics activities      under a single
command structure           was essential      to the solution     of the Army's
avionics      problems.         The report recommended a two-phased ap-
proach:       first,      the   establishment    of a project     manager for
avionics      at the Army Materiel           Command and the consolidation
of avionics materiel             management into one activity         at the
Electronics         Command and second, the ultimate           transfer     of
command responsibility              for this consolidated      avionics     orga-
nization      to the Aviation          Systems Command.

       The Aviation Systems Command has submitted proposals
designed to implement these recommendations,        to improve the
planning for avionics    and aircraft     needs, and to provide
better   management of the entire     air mobility  research and
development program.

        The Avionics Systems Committee, in its report dated
October 1, 1969, stated that SLAE had been started               too late
to meet the light        observation  helicopter     system requirement.
Because of this,       the committee recommended that the Elec-
tronics    Command be permitted      to support advanced development
and to engage in research in avionics            systems not scheduled
for installation       on production   aircraft    prior   to the selec-
tion of specific       avionics equipment for a particular          air-
craft    system.    Both the Aviation     Systems Command and the
Electronics      Command endorsed this recommendation and for-
warded it in September 1970 to the Army Materiel              Command
for further      consideration.




                                       32
ARMY EFFORTS TO REALIGN
AVIONICS MANAGEMENTSTRUCTURE

       In 1970 the Army established     a project   manager orga-
nization 1 within  the Electronics     Command. The responsi-
bility   of the new organization    includes coordination      of the
SLAE program among the Electronics         Command, the Aviation
Systems Command, and aircraft      project    managers,

       In August 1969 the Army Materiel            Command established
an Air Mobility      Research and Development Laboratory             complex
under the Aviation       Systems Command. This complex is to
provide centralized       management of research and development
programs for air mobility,         including      avionics and weapons,
The complex consists       of working agreements for aeronautical
research and development with three National                Aeronautics
and Space Administration        laboratories       and with the Army
Aeronautical      Research Laboratory      at Fort Eustis,       Virginia.
The Army considered consolidating            four other laboratories,
including     the Avionics Laboratory,         into the complex.        It
decided, however, that such a move would be undesirable                    at
that time.       The Commanding General, Army Materiel            Command,
concluded in August 1969 that the efforts                of these labora-
tories    could be managed by the complex by means of program
and fund control      of the air mobility         research and develop-
ment budget.

       At our request the Deputy Commanding General, Aviation
Systems Command, in September 1970 provided us with a status
report on the efforts    by the Aviation  Systems Command to ex-
ercise program and fund control     over research and develop-
ment funds for avionics.     A part of his reply is quoted
below.

      "**Jr The requirement for program and fund control
      of the Avionics Laboratory   by AVSCOM[Aviation
      Systems Command] was recognized   and approved by
      the Commanding General, Army Materiel   Command.
      Current status of this decision   is as follows:


1
 This was an upgrading of an Army Materiel  Command product
 manager organization  established in 1968.


                                      33
             "The FY 71 RDT&E [research,       development,
      test,    and evaluation]    funds designated    for the
      Avionics     Laboratory   were released directly      from
      AMC [Army Materiel       Command] to ECOM [Electronics
      Command]. This was done because the Air Mobility
      R&D Laboratory      (AMRDL) Complex, which was ap-
      proved by DA, 1 Jul 70, was not operational             at
      the time funding guidance was issued by AMC. The
      CG [Commanding General],        AMC concluded it would
      be appropriate      to temporarily   delay program and
      fund control     by AVSCOMuntil     the AMRDL became
      operational.       Funding guidance for the Avionics
      Laboratory     is expected to be issued through AVSCOM
      commencing with FY 72.

              "AVSCOM conducted an RDT&E review of the FY
      71 planned implementations,      based on new FY 72
      guidance,    on 11 and 12 Aug 70.     The Avionics     Lab-
      oratory    was represented  at this meeting and par-
      ticipated    in the program review and planning.
      Program control     will be exercised    by meetings of
      this type and also by the conduct of specific            in-
      process reviews required     by existing    regulations,

              "RDTSrE 6.2 funds [funds for exploratory        devel-
      opment] will be controlled          by the AMRDL and con-
      sistent     with the policy of AVSCOM, 6.3 [funds for
      advanced development]        RDT&E funds [funds for engi-
      neering development]        will. be controlled   by Deputy
      for Research, Engineering          and Data, AVSCOM. The
      Avionics     Laboratory    does not show any 6.1 RDT&E
      funds [funds for basic and applied research]            on
      its Command schedule,        therefore,    all 6.1 funds
      relating     to electronic     developments will   go di-
      rectly    from AMC to ECOM."'

         Electronics    Command officials   told us that they had not
been informed by the Army Materiel          Command of any changes
in program and fund control          over avionics  research and de-
velopment,         They told us also that the meeting at the Avia-
tion Systems Command was merely a briefing           to coordinate
efforts.        The Deputy Commanding General, Aviation      Systems
Command, however, informed us again in December 1970 that
his command had program and fund control           and had furnished


                                   34
the Electronics  Command with     detailed   budget   guidance   for
fiscal  year 1972.
       We contacted Army Materiel Command officials         to inform
them of this apparent confusion concerning        the status of
program and fund control     over avionics research and develop-
ment.    We were told that, although the decision was made
(August 1969) to give the Aviation       Systems Command such
control,   no action had been taken to implement this decision.
These officials    stated that eventually     a policy statement
would have to be issued covering this matter,          but they did
not feel that the matter should be clarified          at that time.

CONCLUSIONS

      We believe that it is necessary for the Army to decide
whether program and fund control     of the Avionics Laboratory
will be under the Aviation   Systems Command or the Electronics
Command so that the confusion    that now exists between the
two commands may be ended.

      We believe also that, if this responsibility       is as-
signed to the Aviation     Systems Command, command control     of
the Avionics Laboratory     should also be assigned to this
command to avoid the problem of dual control       of the labora-
tory.   This   change in  command  authority would  not necessarily
require a relocation     of the laboratory.

AGENCY COMMENTS

       The Army reply made no mention of the findings  or con-
clusions   contained in this chapter.  We subsequently  con-
tacted the Department of the Army and the Army Materiel
Command during July, 1971 and were informed of several actions
which had been taken.

      The Army Materiel   Command has contacted   the Aviation
Systems Command and the Electronics     Command to clear up the
confusion which existed between the subordinate       commands
over the program and fund control     of the Avionics Laboratory.
Both subordinate   commands were informed that the Electronics
Command would retain    control over the Avionics Laboratory
until   a final decision on Avionics Laboratory     control  was
made. If and when a decision      is made to implement the Army

                                  35
Materiel    Command plan to shift control from the Electronics
Command to the Aviation    Systems Command, these commands will
be notified    by the Army Materiel Command.

        We were informed also that there had been a reorgani-
zation within     the Army Materiel    Command Headquarters.  Avi-
onics development management was shifted        from the
Communications-Electronics      Division  to the Air Mobility  Di-
vision.

       We believe that this reorganization     will help to im-
prove avionics     development management at the command head-
quarters   level,   since avionics now is included with all the
other subsystems which make up an aircraft,            Avionics no
longer will have to compete for funds with other electronics
equipment,    such as tactical    radios and satellite       communica-
tions,    Avionics now will compete with the other aircraft
subsystems for funds, and the personnel involved in the
decisionmaking     process should better understand        the importance
of avionics     to aircraft.

      We believe also that communications within            the Army
Materiel    Command concerning avionics       in relation     to aircraft
should be improved, since avionics personnel are now report-
ing to aircraft     personnel instead of to electronics          person-
nel.     In our opinion,    similar  benefits   also could be realized
by transferring     the program and fund control,         as well as the
command control,      of the Avionics Laboratory       to the Aviation
Systems Command.




                                    36
                               CHAPTER6

                           SCOPEOF REVIEW

       Our review of the SLAE program covered the period from
inception     of the program to December 1970. We reviewed
contract     records,  correspondence  files, and pertinent Army
regulations.       We also discussed these matters with appro-
priate Army officials.

       We visited   the following      organizations   to obtain         in-
formation.

      Office of the Assistant  Chief of Staff          for    Force De-
        velopment, Washington, D.C.

      Office of the Assistant    Chief of Staff        for    Communications-
         Electronics, Washington, D.C.

      U.S. Army Combat Developments          Command,Fort     Belvoir,
        Virginia

      U.S. Army Materiel      Command,Washington,      D.C.

      U.S. Army Aviation      Systems Command,St.Louis,         Missouri

      U.S. Axmy Electronics         Command,Fort Monmouth, New Jersey




                                     37
                                                                      APPENDIX I


                         CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS


                              --Event                                    Date

Military    characteristics         of light            observation
   helicopter    approved                                              May    1960

Engineering-development            contract        for     heficop-
  ter awarded                                                          Nov. 1961

SUE need recognized           by project          manager of the
  helicopter                                                           Jan.   1964

Production    contract     for     helicopter            awarded       May    1965

Development-production            contract        for     SLAE
  awarded                                                              Jan.   1966

Preliminary    engineering-design              tests       of SUE:
     Begun                                                             Dec. 1966
     Completed                                                         Dec. 1967

Production of SLAE authorized                 by Department
  of the Army                                                          Mar.   1967

Engineering-design        tests     of SLAE:
     Begun                                                             Aug. 1967
     Completed                                                         Feb. 1969

Engineering   tests      of SUE:
     Begun                                                             July   1968
    Completed                                                          Oct.   1970

Service tests     of SW:
     Begun                                                             Jan. 1969
     Completed                                                         Aug. 1970




                                             39
APPENDIX II

                                       DEPARTMEN-l- OF THE ARMY
                              OFFlCE     OF THE ASSISTAMIP SECRETARY
                                               WASHINGTON.      D.C.   2QSIQ




                                                                                     11 JUN      1971



    Dear     Mr.    Bailey:

    This is in response            to your letter   of 29 March      1971 to the Secretary     of
    Defense   requesting           comments     on your draft    report   titled    “Need for Long-
    Range Planning       for       Avionics  Development      Programs”          (GSD Case #3258).

    The inclosed            statement,        providing     Department       of the Army           position       on
    each finding           and recommendation,agrees                 with the general           thrust      of the
    paper       that improved          long-range       planning     is needed.        The Army           is con-
    stantly       striving      to improve        its planning.       For example,           in June 1970, the
    Chief of Staff directed               the Assistant        Chief of Staff for Communications                      and
    Electronics           to prepare        an Avionics       Master     Plan to assist         the avionics
    management.               However,        the Army       does not agree with your finding                    and
    conclusions           as to the causes of the SLAE developmental                          problems.           These
    problems          were caused by changing                requirements       and unforeseen              technical
    difficulties.           The plan to install         SLAE in additional          aircraft        systems        was
    not a commitment               since both type classification              action     and funding          release
    by DA are required               to implement         the plan.       These additional           actions       were
    not taken until after the completion                     of testing.

    The Army      believes     the recommendations      of the report    are sound manage-
    ment practices        and have been in effect    in the Army     for a period    of years.
    It is suggested      the data in this letter   and the inclosure     be considered     for
    use in preparing        the final GAO report    on this subject.

    This    reply    is made       on behalf      of the Secretary             of Defense.

    1 Zncl                                                             Sincerely,
    Army   Cmts on
    Draft  GAO Rpt




    Mr.    6. M. Bailey
    Director,      Defense    Division
    U.S.     General    Accounting     Office
    Washington,       D. C. 20548




                                                      40
                                                                                               APPENDIX 11


                            DEPARTMENT OF ARMY COI@fENTS
                                         ON
                   GAO DRAFT REPORT, GAO CODE 67033,  DTD 30 MAR 71
                                   OSD CASE 83258

1.    The Military     Characteristics  (MC) for                   the Light   Observation           Airplane,
later    renamed Light     Observation Helicopter                    (LOH) specified     the       following
avionics     that were not to exceed 100 lbs.

      a.     Complete  Provisions              (CP) for      UHF-AM and VHF-AM with             only   one       to
be installed      at a time.

       b.    VHF-FM and auxiliary               FM receiver        and FM Homing.

       C.    2 intercom       stations.

       d.    1 headset.

      e.     CP for     automatic         direction       finder    (ADF)   (installation          dependent
on mission).

     f.   Space Weight     and Power (SWP) for Battlefield     Identification                              Friend
or Foe (BIFF).      (SWP is an acknowledgement    that a new development                                is underway
but not yet sufficiently      identified   to do detailed  engineering        in                        the aircraft.)

Using standard         avionics      available        in the early   1960's   the           weight     of the
required     installed       equipment        totaled     100 lbs.   It was not             envisioned      the
total    quantity      of avionics        listed      above would be installed               at any one time
but would be mission            selectable.           Therefore,   a development             program     was not
required     to meet the 100 lb. criteria.

2.    By 1964 the mission             selectable        avionics     concept    had been determined           un-
acceptable,       the MARK XII IFF system had been approved                         and voice     security      equip-
ment became necessary             for an increase            in weight     of 80 lbs.        This increase        equates
to 202 of the LOH payload.                   It appeared       possible      at that     time to achieve        a
70 lb. weight         reduction       thru the use of solid             state   communications        radios,       as
well    as a quantum        increase       in reliability         and a possible         cost reduction.
Several     reputable       electronic         manufacturers       were willing        to guarantee       production
deliveries      within      2 l/2 years at an attractive                 price    through     the use of a
Total     Package Procurement             Contract      (TPP).

3.    The TPP contract     was awarded       in January    66 with production            deliveries
scheduled    to begin in August          68.   An 80 lb. weight       reduction     was achieved
along with an increase        in reliability         and at a reduction         in cost.       But due                   to
technical    difficulities      suitable     production    deliveries       were delayed         until
January   70.

4.   Under     the provisions       of       the TPP contract         it was necessary  to authorize
production       prior  to military            testing of the        equipment.   It was therefore




                                                             41
  APPENDIX II


necessary       for DA to authorize             a limited       production      (LP) type classification
in 1967 or force             the Government         to default        on the contract.        In March 67
the status        of the avionics           development       was reported.         "AS of this      date,
the LOHAP (Light            Observation        Helicopter       Avionics     Package)    has met nearly
all contractual            specifications.            The components        have undergone      manufacturer-
testing      under the supervision              of the US Army Electronics             representatives.
Weight,      distortion,          power output        and reliability        data significantly         exceed
specifications.             The only serious           shortcoming        is in the output      stages       of
the AN/ARC-116           transceiver.          Prototype      transistors,       which will     bring      the
116 up to specifications,                  have been located           and are expected       to be produced
shortly."         The LP was approved.

5, At this time the LOHAP was under contract                    to be produced         for $6000 per
aircraft    set which      provided    almost     equal capability     of the older            family      of
avionics    that     cost $16,000.       In addition     the contract      provided        for a
reliability      improvement       by a factor     of 10 and a 60% reduction             in weight.
From the above it was obvious              that LOHAP would offer        significant           advantages
to other    aircraft      systems.     In view of the magnitude          of improvement             offered,
additional      cost effectivity       analyses     were not needed.        Since Standard             A
type classification          was scheduled      for 1st quarter      FY69, planning            guidance
was given by DA to plan for the change to LOHAP for all new production
aircraft    beginning      in FY69 procurement.          This planning      guidance         included
the second or auxiliary            FM. The LOHAP was renamed Standard                Lightweight
Avionics    Equipment       (SLAE) at this      time.

6.      Two additional       steps     were required         by DA prior      to   implementation        of   the
above     planning     guidance.        These were:

         a.    The item must         be type classified          Standard     A or DA approval          be
given      for each Limited          Procurement.

         b.   Funds    must   be released        to   the    procurement      agency.

Part of the requirement             for Standard      A type classification            is successful
completion       of testing      by the Army.       By the time the detailed              1969 aircraft
model specifications           were required,       it was apparent        technical       difficulties
would preclude        the use of SLAE.           The planning     guidance      was held in abeyance
until    further    notice.       It can be determined         from the above that DA did not
commit an untested          avionics       system to additional       aircraft.          Adequate       controls
were in effect        to prevent       this.     DA did however make a specific                exception         for
two of the SLAE radios            for 37 OV-1D's based on the merits                 of that       particular
case.      No unusual      problems     were encountered       in the OV-lD- SLAE-interface.




                                                            42
                                                                                          .   /                     A.Ak




                                                                                        APPENDIX II

7. The slippage           of Standard     A type classification        caused the plan to
install     SLAB in other        new production     aircraft      to be held in abeyance.         By
the time Standard           A was achieved,     only a very few new production          aircraft
were still      planned       to be procured.      Under these changed conditions           a re-
evaluation      was necessary.         Based on the low volume of new production
aircraft,      a change to the SLAE radios            for these aircraft      did not appear
economically       attractive.        However, if a large new production          buy was
planned,     the SLAB components          would probably       have been selected    for the
communications         radios.

8.     The second DA decision          necessary      as a result       of the SLAE type classifica-
tion     slippage    was one of retrofit          for the second PM. USACDC recommended                  the
installation        of the second PM for all aircraft                habitually     operating     in the
combat area.          This requirement      totaled     slightly      over 6000 radios        based on FY
72 baseline       force    structure.      The advanced        procurement      plan for that quantity
was approved.

9.     As a result     of the GAO audit     of SLAE, USAAVSCOM requested          revalidation
of the second FM requirement.            The requirement      was revalidated       but the
quantity     was reduced     to 4500 radios     for the initial    procurement.          Experience
gained    from the initial      employment    of the second PM will         be used to validate
the total     requirement.

10.     Although     the total      program    costs     for the second PM were reviewed                by
DA in making the above decision,                 a formal       cost effectivity        analysis      was not
prepared      since    the dollar      value   of increased         capability       is subjective.        No
alternate       PM radio was considered           suitable       by DA for the second PM require-
ment based on considerations                of weight,       volume and reliability.              An economic
analysis      comparing    the AN/ARC-131         vs. the AN/ARC-114             for the second PM for the
OH-58 was prepared         by USAECOM at the suggestion                 of the GAO. Assuming             a $3000
price     for the ARC-114,        it still     proved      the most economically           effective.       Later
a contract       was signed     for ARC-114's        at a cost of less than $1200 each.

11.       Some of the objectives           of both the LOH and its avionics              package were
maximum capability             with minimum size,         weight    and cost.      These objectives
are in opposition             to an electromagnetically           clean aircraft       and avionics
system.       A reasonable          compromise      has been reached      in the LOH between        these
opposing      objectives.           Part of the price        of achieving     this   compromise     was the
more than normal            system integration         work required.       When considering        the LOH
electromagnetic           interference       problem    it should     be remembered       the LOH
probably      has more electronics             within   a smaller     space than any other        operational
aircraft.

12.       Army Position       on GAO Recommendations         or   Suggestion:

          GAO Recommendation.

          (1)        Require the   preparation     of a long range avionics      plan         in
support         of    the Army's   long-range    aircraft   requirements   plan.




                                                      43
      APPENDIXII

        Army Position.

        (1)      A long     range avionics       plan         is      needed      and is       being     prepared
(reference        cover     letter).

        GAO Recommendation.

        (2)      Establish     regulations      providing     that development      of a new
subsystem        generally     must be completed          and the subsystem    proven     acceptable
by suitable         tests   for troop       use in its initial     application     before     it is
committed        to additional       aircraft     or weapon systems.

        Army Position.

        (2)       Suitable  regulations        are       in        effect      and untested      subsystems
have    not     been committed       to additional                 aircraft       systems   (reference      para               6).

        GAO Recommendation.

        (3)    Establish    controls           to assure             that the required               cost effectiveness
determinations         and analysis          of economic               alternatives   are            made prior     to
program     approval.

        Army Position.

       (3)      Cost effectiveness      determinations                       and analysis          are required  by
Army Regulation        37-13.      The appropriate                      degree of cost           analysis  was con-
ducted     (reference     para 5).

         GAO Recommendation.

        (4)      Clarify      the regulation           to clearly             indicate         the   organization
responsible         for    preparation      of   the     economic             analysis.

        Army Position.

          (4)    AR 37-13 para        l-6 clearly         defines             responsibility            for    cost
effectivity        preparation         (Inclosure        1).

13.      The OSD position          on GAO Recommendations                      to the       Secretary         of    Defense:

         GAO Recommendations.

      (1)        Before    approving  engineering                 development              of an aircraft,              require
that all        subsystems     needed to fulfill                the critical               requirements            of the aircraft
be under        development     with sufficient               lead-time       to          ensure proper            interface.




                                                                   44
                                                                              APPENDIX II

      (2)    Provide    a certification   to appropriate     congressional       committees
in those cases where full-scale         development     of an additional       weapon system
is authorized      even though a crucial      subsystem is still      under    development
for another     system.

       OSD Position.

      One of the prime objectives         of a development      program is to ensure
that all subsystems      are developed      in sufficient    time    for proper   interface.
However,   these recommendations       are not appropriate        for this report
since the SLAP was not committed          to additional    aircraft      systems prior
to testing    (reference    para 6 above).




Incl
                                                                                                       .
    APPENDIX       II
Al? 31-13                                                                                        4 June 1969

 creased decision effectiveness.     For cs:tmple,            b. Deputy/Xsaistant      Chiefs of Staff, Head-
 some major p!:rnninx documcn).s (such z..E:the           quarkrs, DA will:
 Armed Forces Develrbpment Plan and the Joint                    (1) EstaMish implementing         instructions,
 Strategic Objecti:ves Plan) contain cost analy-          as necessary, for preparation         and submission
 sis, but ar. econumic analysis of the to&! forces        of economic analyses within their respective
invo!ved would sot bc meaningful       for decision       areas of responsibility,      providing    such addi-
purposes.                                                 tional guidance does not conflict with the prov-
       (2) For proposed acquisitions of princi-           isions of this regulation.
pal or secondary PEXA items, justified 0:) the                   (2) Evaluate the economic analyses with-
basis of an inventory objective in accordance            in their areas of responsibility;         issue imple-
with DA logistic guidance.                               menting instructions as part of the normal pro-           ’
       (3) When DA instructions and regulations          gram budget guidance, as appropriate.
providr for equipment age or condition replace-              c. Commanders of major Army commands
ment criteria, labor and equipment trade-o:?             and all agencies and act;vities reporting di-
standards      and requirements      computations.       rectly to Headquarters,         Department       of the
 (These may be used in lien of the econ%nic              Army will :
analysis called for herein, provided they can be                (1) Prepare and submit economic analyses
 demor.stra:ed to be cof;lpztible with the brkc          of the projects,        programs     or changes for
princip?es of economic analysis contain~~d in            which ana!yscs are required by this regulatior.
this reguktion.)                                                (2) Establish ne:essary controls to insure
    f. Thresholds cstablishcd by existing regula-        eft’ective application     of the procedures and
tions and directives will remain in force.               techniques of economic analysis to proposed
                                                         project or programs competing for limited re-
l-6.     RcsponsibiWes.     CL Comptroller     of the    sources.
Army      will :                                                (3) Determine capability to conduct PO-
        (1) Coordinate and provide policy and de-        phisticated economic analysis and estabIish a
tailed guidance and assistance to the DA Stafi           priority system for determining the projects to
concernin,rr the preparation       and use of econ-      be analyzed within this capability.
omic anaiyFes of proposed .4rmy investments
at Headqcnrtera,        Department     of the Army        l-7. References. a. AR 18-2, Army Information
level.                                                    and Data Systems Responsibilities     and Proce-
       (2) Participate in the evaluation of econ-         dures.
omic analyses supporting        proposed Army in-            b. AR 37-29, Accounting and reporting for
vestment.                                                t’ne cost of military personne! services.
       (3) Process through OASA(FM)           or OA-         c. AR 37-40, Army Production Base Support
SA(J&L), as appropriate,        all investment pro-      Program Report.
posals reqxii-ing economic analysis.                         d. AR 23.5-5, Commercial and Industrial-
       (si) Develop the coordinated staff position       type activities.
on each economic analysis which involves areas               e. DA Pamphlet 37-6, Accounting and Re-
of responsibility     of .mure than one Ikputy,’         porting Procedures Ikknual for Project Prime
Assistant Chief of Staff.                                under Resource Management Systems.



 1-S. General. a.. Investments    are proposed on        veknent      proposal. Following  are investment
a “project” basis. Projects should be SC)dzfkd           proposals to \vhich this regulation applies but
that cl1 resource requirements       (including the      need not be limited to:
use of assets on hand and currently not fcliy                   (7 ) Repair or replace decisions. Specific
emplo::ed but planned for alternative          use in    policy and procedures for the replacement of
some project) and all benefits re!:,ted to tl?e          machine tools and other industrial production
iife cq~19. of the prnject are included in the in-       eqrlip:r?ent are prescribed by AR 37-40.

                                                    46
                                                     APPENDIX III


     PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE

               AND THE DEPARTMENTOF THEARMY

       RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES

                   DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT


                                         Tenure of office
                                         From .          To
                     DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE

SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
   Melvin R. Laird                    Jan.    1969     Present
   Clark M. Clifford                  Mar.    1968     Jan.    1969
   Robert S, McNamara                 Jan.    1961     Feb, 1968
   Thomas S, Gates, Jr.               Dec.    1959     Jan.    1961

DEPUTY SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
   David Packard                      Jan.    1969     Present
    Paul H. Nitze                     July    1967     Jan.    1969
   Cyrus R. Vance                     Jan.    1964     June 1967
   Roswell L. Gilpatric               Jan.    1961     Jan.    1964
   James H. Douglas                   Dec.    1959     Jan.    1961

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSERESl%RCHAND
  ENGINEERING:
    Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.           Oct.    1965     Present
    Dr, Harold Brown                  &Y      1961     Sept. 1965
    Herbert F, York                   Dec.    1958     Apr,    1961

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
  (INSTA~TIONS      AND LOGISTICS):
     Barry J, Shillito                Jan.    1969     Present
     Thomas D. Morris                 Sept.   1967     Dec. 1968
     Paul R. Ignatius                 Dec.    1964     Aug.    1967
     Thomas D. Morris                 Jan.    1961     Dee, 1964
     Perkins McGuire                  Jan.    1957     Jan.    1961




                                47
APPWDIX III


                                   ->Tenure      of office
                                       From               -To
                  DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

SECRETARYOF THE ARMY:
   Robert F. Froehlke              July   1971      Present
   Stanley R. Resor                July   1965      June 1971
   Stephen Ailes                   Jan.   1964      July    1965
   Cyrus R. Vance                  July   1962      Jan.    1964
   Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.             Jan.   1961      June 1962
   Wilbur M, Brucker               July   1955      Jan.    1961

UNDER SECRETARYOF THEARMY:
   Thaddeus R, Beal                Mar.   1969      Present
   David E. McGeffert              July   1965      Mar.    1969
    Stanley R. Resor               Mar.   1965      July    1965
   Vacant                          Dec.   1964      Mar.    1965
    Paul R. Ignatius               Mar.   1964      Dec. 1964
   Vacant                          Jan.   1964      Feb. 1964
    Stephen Ailes                  Feb.   1961      Jan.    1964
   Hugh M. Milton II               Aug.   1958      Jan.    1961

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE ARMY
  (RESEARCHAND DEVELOPMENT):
    Robert L. Johnson              Nov.   1969      Present
    Vacant                         Jan.   1969      Nov. 1969
    Russel D. O'Neal               Oct.   1966      Jan.    1969
    Willis  M, Hawkins             Oct.   1963      Oct.    1966
    Vacant                         Aug.   1963      Sept. 1963
    Finn J. Larson                 Aug.   1961      July    1963
    Richard S. Morse               June   1959      July    1961

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE ARMY
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):
     J. Ronald Fox                 June   1969      Present
    Vincent P. Huggard (acting)    Mar.   1969      June 1969
     Dr. Robert A. Brooks          Ott,   1965      Feb. 1969
     Daniel M. Luevano             July   1964      Oct.    1965
    A, Tyler Port (acting)         Mar.   1964      June 1964
     Paul R. Ignatius              %Y     1961      Feb. 1964
    Vacant                         Jan.   1961      bY      1961
     Courtney Johnson              Apr.   1959      Jan.    1961


                             48
                                                             APPmDIX III


                                                  Tenure of office
                                                  From            To
                             DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY (continued)

COMMANDINGGmEiRAL, UNITED STATES
 ARMYMATERIEL COMMAND:
   Gen. Henry A. Miley, Jr.                    Nov.   1970     Present
   Gen. Ferdinand J. Chesarek                  Mar.   1969     Nov e 1970
   Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr.                   July   1962     Mar. 1969




U.S   GAO,   Wash.,   D.C.               49
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