oversight

Activities and Status of Civil Defense in the United States

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-10-26.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

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                                                LM095495




   Activities And
   Status Of Civil Defense
   III The United kites       B-133209




   Department   of the Army




   BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
   OF THE UNITED STATES


                                         OCT.26,1971
                   COMPTROLLER     GENERAL     OF      THE   UNITED   STATES
                                 WASHINGTON.    D.C.     20548




      B-133209




      To the President  of the Senate and the
    J Speaker of the House of Representatives
,

              This is our report on the activities  and status of civil
      defense in the United States.    Our study was made pursuant
      to the Budget and Accounting    Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the
      Accounting    and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

              Copies of this report   are being sent to the President      of
      the United States; the Director,    Office of Management       and
      Budget; the Director,    Office of Emergency     Preparedness;     the
      Secretary    of Defense; and the Secretary    of the Army.




                                               Comptroller              General
                                               of the United            States




                          50 TH ANNIVERSARY                  1921- 1971
      .

COMPTROLLERGENERAL'S                              ACTIVITIES AND STATUS OF CIVIL DEFENSE
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS                            IN THE UNITED STATES
                                                  Department of the Army B-133209


DIGEST
-I----


WHY THE STUDY WAS M4DE

          In 1961 the civil         defense program of the United States was revitalized                   and
          was directed        toward providing   protection      for millions    of people against
          radioactive       fallout    in the event?%%-nuclear        attack.      A long-range       program
          was recommended by the President           to identify     existing    fallout     shelters      and
          to provide new ones.
                                                                                                               7" .-'-q-Y
          The Office       of Civil   Defense was created      in the Office     of the Secretary          of/'
          Defense to carry out this function.               In 1964 responsibility       for civil       de-
  '       fense was transferred          to the Department of the Army.          The General Accountings):,;:
          Office       (GAO) made this study to evaluate         the accomplishments       of the civil
          defense program over the past 10 years.                                                        ._
             --..-. ,-

OBSERVATIONSAND CONCLUSIONS

          The Office    of Civil    Defense has developed a substantial            lifesaving       capabil-
          ity;   however, certain      unresolved    issues hamper meeting current            civil   defense
          objectives.      Also  a  number   of   important    events,   such  as  the   acquisition       of a
          nuclear capability       by other nations,        have occurred    in recent years and
          have significantly       affected    civil   defense planning.        (See pp. 5, 16, 33,
          and 34.)

          The principal    goal of the current       civil  defense program--the     development
          of a nationwide    fallout    shelter  system--is     complemented by related     program
          elements,    such as warning and detection.         There are, however, no programs
          (other than research)      aimed at protecting      people against    them i cal or bi-
          ological   weapons or the direct      effects    of nuclear explosions,      such as blast,
          heat, and shock.       (See pp. 15 and 30.)

          According    to the Department of Defense (DOD), present fallout           shelters   would
          save 18 million    to 30 million    lives which would otherwise      be 1 ost in the
          event of a nuclear attack.       Alternative   combinations     of addit i onal fallout
          and blast protection,     ranging in cost from $400 million        to $8 billion     for
          fiscal   years 1970 to 1975, could save additional        millions   of lives.      (See
          p. 31.)

          Although appropriations     for        military   defense as a whole have increased   over
          recent years, appropriations            for civil   defense have decreased.    (See p. 14.)




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     Insufficient      and poorZy     distributed
                                      ---.              shelter   space

     Office   of Civil     Defense data indicate      that,   if current       programs continue           .   I
     at present    levels,     up to one half of the population          still     will    lack stan-
     dard fallout     protection    in 1975.     Furthermore     available      protection      is             i
                                                                                                               I
     dispersed    unevenly.      In major cities     2.5 fallout     shelter      spaces are avail-            I
     able for each person,        compared with less than 0.4 of a space for each                              I
                                                                                                               I
     person in areas outside major cities.              (See pp. 19 to 21.)                                    I
                                                                                                               I
     The Office      of Civil     Defense has not used information           regarding     likely
     targets     of an enemy (targeting        assumptions)    in setting       priorities      for
     developing      fallout    shelters.    The Office     has followed       a policy which
     generally     treats    everyplace    as being equally      vulnerable.         GAO believes
     that,   in the light       of the limited     funding of this program, this is not
     a realistic       approach.      (See pp. 28 and 29.)

     The Office       of Civil   Defense lacks the authority    and funds to finance
     or subsidize        the construction   of shelter spaces.     The Office  can only
     identify,      license,   marks and stock available     spaces.   (See pp. 20 and
     21.)

     Use of best      available     shelters

     The Office   of Civil  Defense has established    a minimum level                of protection            I
                                                                                                               I
     which must be met if the shelter     is to be licensed,    marked,               and stocked              I
     by the Office.     (See pp. 25 to 28.)                                                                    I
                                                                                                               I
                                                                                                               I
     Where shelters  of this level are not available,     however, many lives                    could         I
     be saved and injuries   could be reduced by use of the best protection                       avail-       i
     able even though it is below the standard.       (See pp, 25 to 27.)                                      I
                                                                                                               I

     The Community Shelter  Planning program encourages the use of protected    space                          i
     under the minimum standards,   but these shelters normally are not licensed,                              I
                                                                                                               I
     stocked, or marked by the Office of Civil Defense.    (See pp. 26 and 27.)                                I


                                                                                                               I
RECOMMENDATIONSOR SUGGESTIONS                                                                                  I
                                                                                                               I
/'   In developing additional            fallout   shelter   protection,      the Secretary  of Defense        I
     should set priorities          on the basis of targeting          assumptions   and the best              I
     available     predictions      of risk.      These priorities       would help ensure that the            /
     limited    financial      resources      are applied to areas most likely         to need addi-           I

     tional    protection.        (See p. 29.)

     The Office    of Civil  Defense recognizes        the desirability        of marking and
     stocking   the best available     shelters,     regardless     of protection       rating,      but
     it does not have the financial        resources      to do the job.         GAO believes      that,
     pending an overall     assessment of area priorities           in undertaking        protective
     measures, the Office     of Civil   Defense should stock the best available                   shel-
     ters regardless    of protection    rating.      The question of financial            resources
     obviously   must be determined     within    the overall     availabilities       of funds for
     DOD.



                                                    2

                                                                                                               I
I
I
I
I              .
I
I                  GAO recommends that the Secretary          of Defense (1) provide additional         justi-
I
I                  fication  to the Congress, concerning          the part which civil      defense plays
I                  in the U.S. overall    national     security     posture    and (2) give consideration
I
I
                   to whether higher priority       should be given to marking and stocking            good
I                  shelter  spaces already    identified,       in view of the relatively       low per capita
I                  cost of protection   which these shelters          provide.     (See p. 29.)
I
I
I
I
I
            AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVEDISSUES
I
I                  DOD stated that it was aware of the need to reevaluate   the civil defense
I
I                  program.    Broad policy decisions are expected to be made on the basis of
I                  current   administration studies.  (See ch. 7.)
I
I
I                  The Office  of Civil   Defense hopes to extend its efforts            for seeking the
I
I                  cooperation   of Government departments       involved     in providing    financial
I                  assistance  in construction       programs for facilities,       such as urban renewal
I
I                  and housing agency projects,         which have the potential       of providing     vast
I                  quantities  of fallout    shelter     space.   (See pp. 21 and 22.)
I
I
I                  The Office     of Civil    Defense defended the use of the current   fallout   protec-
I                  tion standard       as a future   planning  objective, but it stated that the best
I
I                  available     concept of shelter      use was being applied in its current   opera-
I                  tional    planning.     {See pp. 27 and 28.)
 I
 I
 I
 I          iUTTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS
 I
 I
 I                 In view of the issues concerning           (1) the imbalance of fallout          protection,
 I
 I
                    (2) the potential      for expanding fallout      protection     by using best available
 I                 space, and (3) the limited         progress   of the civil      defense program in meet-
 I                 ing its objectives,        as dealt with in this report,         and in view of two special
 I
 I                 studies    recently    made by the administration       pertaining      to civil    defense,
 I                 appropriate     committees    of the Congress may wish to review the reports                 on
 I
 I                 these studies       for use in any consideration       of civil     defense requirements.
    I               (See p. 35.)
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                       Contents
                                                         Page
DIGEST                                                    1
CHAPTER

  1       INTRODUCTION                                    4

  2       RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NUCLEARAGE                10
             Nature of the threat                        10
             Deterrence to threat                        12
             Budgetary trends                            13
  3       PROGRAM ACTIVITIES                             15
             Fallout   shelter program                   15
             Other program activities                    17
                  Warning and detection                  17
                  Emergency operations                   17
                  Financial   assistance to the States
                     and local governments               18
                  Research and development               18

  4       IMBALANCEDDISTRIBUTION AND SHORTAGEOF
          EXISTING FALLOUT SHELTERS                      19
              Agency comments                            21
  5       POTENTIAL FOR INCREASINGFALLOUT PROTECTION      24
             Agency comments and our evaluation           27
             Recommendation to the Secretary of
               Defense                                    29
  6       DEFENSESTUDI-ESOF ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF
          CIVILIAN PROTECTION                             30
  7       BROADPOLICY DECISIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE
          NEEDED                                          33
             Agency comments                              35
             Matter for consideration by the Congress     35
  8       SCOPEOF REVIEW                                  36
APPENDIX                                                               Page Y

          I   Effects      of modern weapons                           39
     II       The national      plan for      emergency preparedness   47

 III          Letter dated February 17, 1971, from Direc-
                tor of Office of Emergency Preparedness                49

     IV       Letter dated March 5, 1971, from Principal
                Deputy Assistant    Secretary of Defense
                 (Systems Analysis)   and attachment from
                Office of Civil Defense                                50

                                   ABBREVIATIONS

DOD .         Department      of Defense

GAO           General Accounting          Office

OCD           Office    of Civil       Defense

OEP           Office    of Emergency Preparedness

PF            Protection      factor
' COMPTROLLERGENERAL'S                      ACTIVITIES AND STATUS OF CIVIL DEFENSE
  (?EPORT'TO THE CONGRESS                   IN THE UNITED STATES
                                            Department    of the Army B-133209


 DIGEST
 ------

 WHY THE STUDY WAS l'd4DE

      In 1961 the civil     defense program of the United States was revitalized             and
      was directed    toward providing   protection     for millions of people against
      radioactive   fallout   in the event of a nuclear attack.        A long-range      program
      was recommended by the President       to identify    existing fallout    shelters     and
      to provide   new ones.

      The Office   of Civil  Defense was created   in the Office     of the Secretary     of
      Defense to carry out this function.       In 1964 responsibility     for civil   de-
      fense was transferred    to the Department of the Army.        The General Accounting
      Office   (GAO) made this study to evaluate the accomplishments         of the civil
      defense program over the past 10 years.

 OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

      The Office    of Civil   Defense has developed a substantial           lifesaving       capabil-
      ity;   however, certain     unresolved    issues hamper meeting current           civil   defense
      objectives.      Also a number of important        events,   such as the acquisition           of a
      nuclear capability      by other nations,       have occurred    in recent years and
      have significantly      affected    civil   defense planning.       (See pp. 5, 16, 33,
      and 34.)

      The principal    goal of the current       civil   defense program--the    development
      of a nationwide    fallout    shelter   system--is     complemented by related    program
      elements,    such as warning and detection.          There are, however3 no programs
      (other than research)      aimed at protecting       people against    chemical or bi-
      ological   weapons or the direct      effects     of nuclear explosions,     such as blast,
      heat, and shock.       (See pp* 15 and 30.)

      According    to the Department of Defense (DOD), present fallout           shelters      would
      save 18 million    to 30 million    lives which would otherwise      be lost in the
      event of a nuclear attack.       Alternative   combinations     of additional     fallout
      and blast protection,     ranging in cost from $400 million        to $8 billion       for
      fiscal   years 1970 to 1975, could save additional        millions   of lives.        (See
      p. 31.)

      Although   appropriations      for   military   defense as a whole have increased   over
      recent years ) appropriations         for civil   defense have decreased.    (See p. 14.)
    Insufficient     and poorly     dish4buted       shelter   space

    Office   of Civil    Defense data indicate         that,   if current       programs continue
    at present    levels , up to one half of the population               still     will    lack stan-
    dard fallout     protection     in 1975.      Furthermore     available      protection      is
    dispersed    unevenly.      In major cities       2.5 fallout     shelter      spaces are avail-
    able for each person,         compared with less than 0.4 of a space for each
    person in areas outside         major cities.        (See pp. 19 to 21.)

    The Office      of Civil    Defense has not used information            regarding     likely
    targets     of an enemy (targeting        assumptions)    in setting       priorities      for
    developing      fallout    shelters.    The Office     has followed       a policy    which
    generally     treats    everyplace    as being equally      vulnerable.         GAO believes
    that,   in the light       of the limited     funding of this program, this is not
    a realistic       approach.      (See pp. 28 and 29.)

    The Office     of Civil   Defense lacks the authority    and funds to finance
    or subsidize      the construction   of shelter spaces.     The Office  can only
    identify,    license,   mark, and stock available     spaces.   (See pp. 20 and
    31   \



    Use of best     avaiZabZe     sheZters

    The Office   of Civil  Defense has established    a minimum level                of protection
    which must be met if the shelter     is to be licensed,    marked,               and stocked
    by the Office.     (See pp. 25 to 28.)

    Where shelters  of this level are not available,     however, many lives                    could
    be saved and injuries   could be reduced by use of the best protection                       avail-
    able even though it is below the standard.       (See pp. 25 to 27.)

    The Community Shelter  Planning program encourages the use of protected      space
    under the minimum standards,   but these shelters   normally are not licensed,
    stocked, or marked by the Office   of Civil  Defense.   (See pp. 26 and 27.)


RECOMMENDATIONSOR SUGGESTIONS

    In developing        additional     fallout   shelter   protection,      the Secretary  of Defense
    should set priorities           on the basis of targeting         assumptions   and the best
    available     predictions       of risk.     These priorities       would help ensure that the
    limited    financial       resources     are applied  to areas most likely        to need addi-
    tional    protection.         (See p. 29.)

    The Office    of Civil  Defense recognizes        the desirability        of marking and
    stocking   the best available     shelters,     regardless     of protection      rating,      but
    it does not have the financial        resources      to do the job.         GAO believes     that,
    pending an overall     assessment of area priorities           in undertaking       protective
    measures, the Office     of Civil   Defense should stock the best available                  shel-
    ters regardless    of protection    rating.       The question     of financial       resources
    obviously    must be determined    within    the overall     availabilities       of funds for
    DOD.
.    GAO recommends that the Secretary          of Defense (1) provide additional      justi-
     fication  to the Congress, concerning          the part which civil    defense plays
     in the U.S. overall    national     security     posture and (2) give consideration
     to whether higher priority       should be given to marking and stocking         good
     shelter  spaces already    identified,       in view of the relatively     low per capita
     cost of protection   which these shelters          provide.  (See p. 29.)


AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVEDISSUES

     DOD stated that it was aware of the need to reevaluate   the civil defense
     program.    Broad policy decisions are expected to be made on the basis of
     current   administration studies.  (See ch. 7.)

     The Office  of Civil   Defense hopes to extend its efforts            for seeking the
     cooperation   of Government departments       involved     in providing    financial
     assistance  in construction       programs for facilities,       such as urban renewal
     and housing agency projects,         which have the potential       of providing     vast
     quantities  of fallout    shelter     space.   (See pp. 21 and 22.)

     The Office     of Civil    Defense defended the use of the current      fallout   protec-
     tion standard       as a future   planning objective,   but it stated that the best
     available     concept of shelter      use was being applied   in its current    opera-
     tional    planning.     (See pp. 27 and 28.)

IddTTER FOR CONSI'DERATION BY THE CONGRESS

     In view of the issues         concerning     (1) the imbalance of fallout          protection,
     (2) the potential        for expanding fallout       protection     by using best available
     space, and (3) the limited          progress    of the civil      defense program in meet-
     ing its objectives,         as dealt with in this report,          and in view of two special
     studies    recently     made by the administration        pertaining      to civil    defense,
     appropriate     committees of the Congress may wish to review the reports                      on
     these studies       for use in any consideration         of civil     defense requirements.
     (See p. 35.)




                                                 3
                                CHAPTER1

                              INTRODUCTION

        In 1951 the Congress enacted the Federal Civil Defense
Act (64 Stat, 1245-1257, as amended; 50 U.S.C. App. 2251-
2297) authorizing      a program to minimize the effects           of an
attack on the United States.            The current civil     defense
program--a joint Federal, State, and local effort--is                  based
on this act and is designed primarily             to protect the popula-
tion from the disabling       and lethal effects        of radioactive
fallout    from a nuclear attack through a nationwide             fallout
shelter system of existing          buildings    and new construction.
It provides for supporting          activities,     such as public warn-
ing, radiation     detection    and monitoring,       and development of
emergency operating       capabilities       of State and local govern-
ments for related training          programs.

         The beginning of modern civil   defense in the United
States dates back to World War I when the Secretary of War
was made responsible      for civil defense.     Shortly after 1939
the civil      defense machinery was reestablished     and functioned
until     President Truman abolished it in 1945. It was becom-
ing clear even then, however, that the problems of civil
defense would assume an entirely       new dimension with the pos-
sibility     of atomic warfare.

      A number of studies and reports dealing with a proposed
civil  defense organization      were made. One of these, the
1948 Hopley Report, recommended that an Office of Civil De-
fense be established    directly    under the President or the
Secretary of Defense.      Some objections   were raised within
the Department of Defense, however, and the recommendation
was not adopted.     In 1949 the President assigned the civil
defense function   to the National Security Resources Board
but, in a memorandum to the Board, limited       its activities
to !'peacetime planning and preparation      for civil   defense in
the event of war, rather than operation       of a full-scale
civil  defense program."
      After the first   Soviet Union atomic detonation    in 1949,
the Board proposed that a Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion be established   directly   under the President.    A plan
submitted to the President     in September 1950 included a

                                      4
policy to provide blast shelters  in likely  target areas.
The President immediately requested congressional    action on
the plan.   The Federal Civil Defense Administration   was
created by Executive Order No. 10186 in December 1950,
followed by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 which was
signed into law on January 12, 1951.

       Funds were requested for large-scale         blast shelter    sur-
veys and for modification      of existing    structures    to provide
blast protection.      These measures were proposed at a time
when the fallout    threat was not a matter of general public
knowledge and when the general concept of shelter was pro-
tection   from the immediate effects       of atomic blasts--blast,
heat, and shock.      The funds appropriated      for civil   defense
in the first    3 years were:
                                              Amount
            Fiscal   year               (000,000    omitted)

                 1951                              $32
                 1952                               75
                 1953                               43

       Following the Soviet Union detonation   of a thermonu-
clear device and the recognition     of the enormous destructive
potential    of the downwind fallout  hazard of the newer weapons,
blast shelters and evacuation were deemphasized and fallout
shelters assumed the major role as the most feasible      life-
saving protection    against nuclear attack.

       The steady growth in the destructiveness      of weapons,
improvements in the means of their delivery,        and aggressive
actions of a well-armed and hostile       Communist bloc forced a
reevaluation    of the security  position   of the United States.
America's leaders concluded that civil       defense was an es-
sential    part of the strategic  defense structure    of the
United States.

      During the 10 years after the enactment of the Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950, the rapidity        and magnitude of
changes in the world situation      complicated   attempts to de-
fine the potential    and the limitations     of civil    defense,
the manner in which the program should be conducted, and
the position  of civil   defense in a structure        of national

                                    5
                                                                               .


defense.   In spite of changing views, basic research was                  .
conducted, civil   defense offices were established, and ini-
tial plans were made,
       From 1951 to 1958, under the Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration,   a number of programs were initiated,      including
an attack warning system, stockpiling       of medical and other
civil   defense supplies and equipment, civil     defense exer-
cises, and research programs.       No means was developed by the
agency during these years to protect the population         from
atomic attack,   however, and little    provision  was made for
caring for survivors.

        In 1958 the Federal Civil Defense Administration      and
the Office of Defense Mobilization     were merged to form the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.        From the time of
its establishment,    a major activity  of the agency was pre-
paring The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mo-
bilization    which set forth the basic policies,    responsibili-
ties, and procedures as a foundation     for operational    plans,

      Early in 1961 it became apparent that careful            scrutiny
of the program for civil          defense had to be made. There was
general feeling      that past efforts,       handicapped as they were
by insufficient      political     and financial    support, had not
produced the type of program that could provide security
against thermonuclear          weapons, On May 25, 1961, President
Kennedy delivered       a message to the Congress on urgent na-
tional needs,in which he announced the initiation             of a long-
range program to protect the public from fallout.              The
President    stated:

      "This Administration      has been looking hard at ex-
      actly what civil     defense can and cannot do. It
      cannot be obtained cheaply.       It cannot give an
      assurance of blast protection       that will be proof
      against surprise     attack or guaranteed against
      obsolescence or destruction.       And it cannot deter
      a nuclear attack.

     "We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear at-
     tack only if our retaliatory   power is so strong
     and so invulnerable  that he knows he would be
     destroyed by our response,   If we have that
      strength,   civil  defense is not needed to deter an
      attack.   If   we should  ever lack it, civil defense
      would not be an adequate substitutees'

       The President stated further           that the aforementioned
deterrent   concept assumed rational            calculations and that
there still   remained the possibiZity  of an irrational     attack, a miscaZ-
eulation,   an accidentaL wa.r, or a war of escaZation     which eouZd not be
either foreseen or deterred.      He also said:

       ItIt is on this basis that civil       defense can be
       readily justifiable      - as insurance for the
       civilian   population    in case of an enemy miscal-
       culation.      It is insurance we trust will never
       be needed - but insurance which we could never
       forgive ourselves for foregoing        in the event of
       catastrophe.O'

        The President concluded by recommending a "nationwide
long-range program of identifying     present fallout  shelter
capacity and providing     shelter in new and existing  struc-
tures.l'

       By Executive Order No. 10952, dated July 20, 1961, as
amended, he divided the existing          Office of Civil and De-
fense Mobilization       into two organizations:       the Office of
Emergency Planning 1 which was to function           as part of the Ex-
ecutive Office in advising and assisting           the President      in de-
termining policy for all nonmilitary           emergency preparedness,
including   civil    defense; and the Office of Civil Defense
(OCD) to function      under the Secretary of Defense in oversee-
ing the Nation's      civil   defense program.     The responsibility
for carrying      out the fallout    shelter program was among the
program operations       assigned to the Secretary of Defense.

      OCD originally    was headed by an Assistant   Secretary of
Defense, but in March 1964 its functions      and responsibilities
were transferred     to the Secretary of the Army who established
OCD within his office      at the Pentagon and delegated its func-
tions to a Director     of the Office of Civil Defense., Al-
though OCD is part of DOD, the emphasis, as directed         by
President Kennedy in 1961, is on civilian      management and
1Name subsequently        changed to Office       of Emergency Prepared-
 ness (OEP).
                                          7
control.      OCD functions  through eight regional   offices
strategically     located throughout  the continental    United
States.

        The primary objective     of the civil   defense program is
to plan and implement reasonabZe measures which will maximize
Zifesaving  consistent   with the noma pattern     of American soci-
ety.      DOD studies indicate    that a faZZout shezter system best
meets this objective.        As it has evolved, the civil      defense
program comprises the following         program operations.
      1. Fallout   shelter.

      2. Warning and emergency operations.

      3. Supporting activities  needed to successfully          exe-
         cute program elements.
Some type of financial     assistance  to State and local govern-
ments is available,    either directly   or indirectly,      in sup-
port of practically    every element of the civil       defense pro-
gram.
      To attain  its program objectives,    CCDworks closely
with State and local governments to develop their capability
for taking effective    action in time of emergency.    This im-
plements the joint   responsibility   between the Federal,
State, and local governments, directed     by the Federal Civil
Defense Act of 1950, as amended.
      Also OCD coordinates    its functions    with OEP and with
many other Federal agencies having emergency responsibili-
ties.    The concept of civil    defense is that the normal
forces of Federal, State, and local governments will be or-
ganized so that, with supplementary       forces as required,
they will be able to meet the effects        of a nuclear attack.

      Federal funds appropriated     for civil defense programs
from 1951 through 1970 totaled about $1.7 billion.          There
has been a downward trend in proposed budgets and actual
appropriations    during the past several years.      For example,
$358 million   was requested in fiscal    year 1965 ($105.2 mil-
lion appropriated);     however, only $76.6 million    was re-
quested in fiscal     year 1970 ($70.6 million   appropriated).

                                  8
Budget history  data during                                            fiscal               years            1962 through                 1970
are shown in the following                                             table.

                                              Office      of Civil         Defense       Budget      History

                                                                                                                             Aooronriation
                                                                                                                             Percent       Percent
                  OSD-BOB                                 Recommended            Reconnnended                                    of            of
                  budget           Presidential            in House               in Senate                                  OS&BOB. President's
Year            (note a)               budpet                 u                      u                        Amount          budpet        budget.

                                                         (000   omitted)
1962       $                        $     207,600b          $207,600b               $    207,600b            $207,600b                        100.0
1963             754,400                  756,900             75,000                     215,000              128,000          17.0            17.0
1964             689,400                  346,800             87,800                     135,338              111,569          16.2            31.1
1965             559,000                  358,000             89,200                     154,200              105,200          18.8            29.4
1966             371,850                  193,900             89,190                     124,370              106,870          28.7            55.1
1967             192,029                  133,400.           102,100                     102,100              102,100          53.2            76.5
1968             163,400                  111,000             86,100                      91,100               86,100          52.7            77.5
1969             159,700                   76,800             58,040                      63,640               60,540          37.9            78.8
1970           _ 85,656                    76,608             65.508                      73.808               70.558          82.4            92.1

Total      $2.975.435'              $2.261.108              $860.538                $1,167.156               $978.537

aOSD--Cffice             of the     Secretary  of Defense.
 BOB--Bureau             of the     Budget (now the Office                  of Management            and Budget).
b
    Does not      include         $49.6    million       transferred         from       former      Office        of Civil     and Defense     Mobi-
    lization.

'8 years         only.




                                                                                                              ,




                                                     .
                                                                                 .      .



                  .*                                                   1

                         .
                                    CWTER 2

                   RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NUCI2A.RAGE

       The new dimension of destruction--nuclear        warfare--
which burst upon the world in 1945 has grown more imposing
through the years, but the tremendous power and multiple
effects   of nuclear weapons have not rendered the cause of
survival   hopeless.   Even though a full-scale      nuclear attack
would cause many casualties,     effective   protection     against
some of the effects    of nuclear attack is available.

       Although a number of original     civil-defense-recommended
programs, such as duck and cover, evacuat.ion,           and do-it-
yourself    home shelters, no longer are given much emphasis,
knowledge and experience.gained      from them ha,ve'been used in
evolving the present program-- basically         a nationwide    system
of fallout    shelters.



       The threat of a nuclear attack on the United States
under a condition     of general war is regarded by OEP as less
likely   than periods of limited war, possibly     involving   the
use of U.S. military      forces on foreign soil.   General war
represents    the only contingency   which would significantly
threaten national     survival.

      Measures planned for a yar-related    ,emergency generally
are limited   to protection against ntieiear attack., Civil
defense planning accepts the possibility      of a massive nu-                             *
clear attack on the United States, using ballistic       missiles
as the principal   means of delivery.
        The threatsto       the United States, posed by chemical and
biological     agents, is considered by DOD to be less signifi-
cant than the nuclear threat,             although chemical agents- are
effective     against tactical        targets of limited   areas and al-
though biological         agents could be used against U,S, popula-
tion centers.        tirrent2.y  there me no &vi2 defense programs, other
than research,    to protect   people   from   the effects   of attack   with   chemieaz
or bit, Zogied   weapons.                                          i
       The Nation*s general planning assumptions regarding
the nature of the threat are contained in the "National
Plan for Emergency Preparedness'" published by OEP in 1964.
(See app. II.>     These assumptions include the following
items.
      1. Ballistic   missiles  will     be relied   upon increasingly
         for delivery   of nuclear      weapons.
     2. No nation has the capability   of destroying  all re-
        warding targets  in the United States, althea     q
        target can be destroyed if the enemy expends suffi-
        cient weapons on it.

      3, Military    command and control centers,       centers of
         government, nuclear retaliatory        capability,    and
         concentrations     of industry and populations       would be
         likely   principal   targets,  Initial    priority    would be
         given to nuclear retaliatory      capability,
      4. It is impossible to predict with           assurance   an ene-
         my's specific   attack objectives.
      5. Tactical    warning of an intercontinental     ballistic
         missile attack likely      would not exceed 15 minutes
         for initial    targets.    Also it is unlikely    that
         strategic    warning (indications    of a possible attack
         before it is launched) ever will be so definite          as
         to warrant taking all protective       measures for civil
         defense.
      OEP periodically      provides Federal agencies having civil
defense responsibilities        with updated planning assumptions
based on specific      analyses of strategic    situations, in addi-
tion to the general planning assumptions contained in the
1964 National Plan.
       Civil defense is based, to a large degree, on various
assumptions,     possibilities,      and probabilities,    Civil de-
fense documents indicate         that the nature of the assumed
threat is primarily         from nuclear weapons and the potential
radiation    from these weapons, though the specific           nature
of a nuclear attack on the TJnited States, the weight of
such an attack,      the reliability     of enemy delivery   systems,
and specific     targets are not subject to precise prediction,

                                   11
        Although the direct effects          of nuclear weapons--blast,
 heat, and shock--are        recognized as major elements of the
 threat 9 the &vii! defense program ineludes no specific activity    to mit-
igate them. According to OCD, however, recent research has
 indicated    that some steps-- such as direct-effects         surveys
 of existing     structures,     ventilation    improvement of existing
 below-ground space, and blast protection             in new construc-
 tion--would     be useful,     provided that the necessary funds
were made available.          A discussion     of the effects  of nu-
 clear weapons is given in appendix I,

       The   ability to intercept  a nuclear attack began to
diminish     and thus the nuclear threat increased,   when the
delivery     systems of nations began to become highly devel-
oped and     when the speed of delivery   increased greatly   to
the about     lO,OOO-miles-an-hour  rate of today's ballistic
missiles.

      The destructive    power of modern weapons is phenomenal:
Today's nuclear weapons vary widely in size and yield,       but.
a 20-megaton weapon is 1,000 times as powerful as the Hiro-
shima bomb. The zone of destructiveness        of the larger weap-
ons does not, however, increase in the same ratio as the size
of the weapons.      For example, the estimated zone of complete
destruction   for a l-megaton weapon is 11 square miles but
is only about 50 square miles for a lo-megaton weapon.

-DETERRENCETO THREAT
      To minimize the possibility      of aggression by a hostile
nuclear power, the United States has followed a general
policy of deterrence     intended to make a nuclear attack on
our country unprofitable      to a potential   enemy.

       The size and character        of weapons systems to maintain
this deterrent     strength     is a subject of continuing     debate,
since the threat is changing continually           and since technol-
ogy rapidly    extends frontiers       for both offense and defense.
A more fundamental problem, according to DOD, is the rela-
tive weights which should be given to assured-destruction
and damage-limiting       objectives    of the deterrence   policy in
planning our strategic        forces.



                                     12
      Assured destruction        is the ability    to inflict    at all
times, and under all foreseeable          conditions,    an unaccept-
able degree of damage upon an aggressor--even              after absorb-
ing a surprise    attack.       This is the primary emphasis of the
U.S. military    program.       Damage limiting    is the ability    to
reduce the potential       damage of a nuclear attack on the
United States through the use of both active and positive
measures.     The anti-ballistic-missile         system and civil    de-
fense programs are damage-limiting           measures.

        DOD January 1969 program justifications        conclude that
the U.S. primary deterrent         is the U,S. assured-destruction
capability,      although damage-limiting    measures could con-
tribute     to the deterrent    if they could be made truly effec-
tive by reducing damage to a nominal level even after the
opponent responded by increasing         his offensive   forces,
These justifications       conclude also that:
      I'*** on the basis of our present knowledge of
      military   technology,    we still   see no practical
      way in which to do this [taking damage-limiting
      measures] against the kind of attack the Soviets
      could potentially      mount in the 1970's.      Accord-
      ingly y our best alternative       is to continue to
      base our policy of deterrence        on our Assured De-
      struction   capability."

BUDGETARYTRENDS

       Within DOD, civil   defense competes. for funds with ac-
tive defense and offense weapons systems.          The budget for
civil   defense for fiscal    year 1970 represents    less than one
thousandth of the total DI)D budget.       The trend in the rela-
tionships    for fiscal  years 1962 through 1970 follows.




                                    13
                     Appropriations         approved
                                                  ---
                                                        Column 2 as
       Fiscal           Civil                           percentage
        year           defense              DOD         of column 3

                       (000,000       omitted)

        1962           $   257         $ 46,495            0.55
        1963               128           48,350              .26
        1964               112           48,223              023
        1965               105           47,682              .22
        1966               107           58,858              .18 .
        1967               102          ,70,230              .14
        1968                86           74,152              .12
        1969                61           74,402              .08
        1970                71           72,667              .lO
       'Total          $1,029       $541,059               .19
                                      0
      DOD,in replying   to our draft report-(see          app. IV>, ac-
knowledged the shift in budget emphasis in recent years,
According to the Principal       Deputy Assistant      Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis),       the shift has not resulted       from
a reduction   in civil  defense priority         or emphasis but
rather has been caused by two main factors:              (1) the need,
since the mid-1960's,     for tighter     fiscal    constraints  on all
DOD's non-Southeast    Asia programs and (2) the tendency in
the executive   branch to limit budget requests for civil            de-
fense to progressively      lower levels as a consequence of
continued funding reductions       during the g-year period shown
above.
      Administration   policy consistently     has emphasized the
complementary relationship    between active and passive de-
fense  measures, but, as indicated,      civil  defense appropria-
tions have declined steadily    over the years in both dollars
and the percentage of the total appropriations         for defense.
In practice    civil defense does not seem to be regarded as a
primary element of national    defense.


                                  I




                                       14
                                CHAPTER3

                           PROGRAM
                                 ACTIVITIES

 FALLOUT SHELTERPROGRAM

         The principal      goal of today's civil      defense program
 is the development of a nationwide            fallout     shelter system
 to protect     the total population,       wherever it may be, from
 radioactive      fallout.     Under this program potential          public
 fallout    shelter facilities      are identified       in existing
 buildings    and in special facilities          (mines, caves, tunnels)
 through surveys conducted by the U.S; Army Corps of Engi-
 neers and the Naval Facilities          Engineering       Command. These
 surveys determine the fallout          protection     level, known as
 the protection        factor (PF>,l provided by each facility             and
 the number of persons the facility           can accommodate.

         Facilities    which meet specified   criteria    to a level
 equal to PF 40 or better and which have sufficient             space
 for 50 or more persons are considered as eligible             public
 fallout     shelters    and are licensed by means of a signed
 agreement between the Federal Government, the local govern-
 ment, and the owner of the facility.          These facilities       then
 are marked and stocked as needed with OCD-furnished food,
 water storage containers,         medical and sanitation     supplies,
 and radiation       detection  and measuring equipment.

         The initial      fallout  shelter surveys were concerned
 only with identification          of all shelter spaces which met
 the specified       criteria.     There was no attempt to match pop-
 ulation    with shelters.        Therefore, in 1966, OCD developed
 a Community Shelter Planning program, including            projects   to
 ensure effective         use of the fallout   shelters identified   in
 the survey.


* %he relationship     between the amount of fallout   gamma radi-               '
   ation that would be received by a person inside and pro-
   tected compared with the amount he would receive if he
   were outside and,unprotected,    e.g., persons in a PF 40
   shelter would receive one fortieth     as much radiation  as
   unsheltered   persons.

                                     15
       This program, which is the foundation             of local emer-
gency readiness,       matches population      areas with available
shelter     space and provides for public dissemination              of de-
tailed    instructions      for each person on where to go and what
to do. To avoid overloading             and underloading,     available
shelters     and population     statistics    are identified      on maps
and persons living        and working in particular        areas are al-
lotted    shelter spaces. The program also defines the un-
filled   needs for shelter in a community and identifies                the
best available       shelters.

     Following are OCD statistics  on fallout   shelter sur-
veys and on Community Shelter Planning projects    as of
June 30, 1970,

                                                               Spaces
                                                              (note a>
          Fallout     shelter   surveys                    (000 omitted)

National fallout     shelter     survey:
     Identified                                               194,774
     Licensed                                                 127,812         .
     Marked                                                   107,501
     Stocked                                                  103,414
Smaller structures       survey (note b)                        2,550
Home fallout    protection      survey (note c):
     PF 40 or better                                            1,817
     PF 20 to PF 39                                            28,021
Community Shelter Planning projects:
     Funded projects      started                                   262
     Nonfunded projects       started        I                   1,424

aSpaces allow 10 square feet for each person and, except
 for the last-line item, provide PF 40 or better.
bBuildings,    other than one-, two-, and three-family            houses,
 having   shelter   space for 10 to 49 persons.
CIn 26 'States      and the District      of Columbia.

     As shown by the above survey data, fallout     shelter
space providing   PF 40 or better has *been located for about
195 Gillion   people, but not all of these shelter spaces
have been developed,    Only 66 percent have been licensed;
55 percent have been marked with identifying  signs; and
about 53 percent have been stocked with food, water, and
other survival  items.
OTHERPROGRAM
           ACTIVITIES

      Although the national      fallout     shelter system is the
heart of civil    defense planning in the United States, it
does not stand alone.       Complementary program elements fall
into four categories:       (1) warning and detection,      (2) emer-
gency operations,     (3) financial      assistance  to the States,
and (4) research and development.

Warning and detection
       The main program in this category is the radiological
monitoring     and reporting    program which is designed to pro-
vide accurate and timely data on the intensity           and extent
of radioactivity      following    a nuclear attack,    OCD buys,
distributes,     and maintains the instrumentation       to meet this
objective.      As of June 30, 1970, 71,042 radiological       moni-
toring stations      had been established     and 111,404 shelters
had been equipped with radiological          detection  and monitor-
ing kits.

        Public warning of an attack is initiated      through the
National Warning System.       The  system  sends attack-warning
information    from OCD warning centers located in North Amer-
ican Air Defense Command installations        to over 1,500 sec-
ondary warning points in key Federal locations,          principal
cities,    and State capitals.     From these warning points,
news of possible attack can be relayed via local warning
systems to the public by means of horns, sirens, whistles,
or other locally     devised means.

     The fiscal    year 1971 budget estimate for       the warning
and detection   program was about $3.8 million.

Emergency operations
      There are eight programs under the category of emer-
gency operations,   including training and education,  damage
assessment, and emergency information.    These programs are
designed (1) to inform and train citizens   before a disaster

                                 13
                                                                                                                   .


so that they will know what to do in case of emergency,
(2) to provide capabilities      for assessment of damage--po-
tential    damage before an attack and real damage after an
attack--and    (3) to develop and provLde emergency informa-
tion to meet public needs during an emergency.       For these
programs $10.6 million     was requested for fiscal  year 1971.

Financial  assistance                          to
the States and local                           governments
      For fiscal     year 1971, $26 million       was requested for a
program of providing       financial    assistance    to the States
and local governments.         This program provides funds for
matching expenditures        of the States and local governments
on a dollar-for-dollar        basis for three grant-in-aid       pro-
grams--personnel       and administrative      expenses of State and
local civil     defense activities;       emergency operating    cen-
ters; and survival       supplies,   equipment, and training.

Research and development

       The goal of the program of research and development is
to advance technology of ongoing and potential     future civil
defense programs and operations,    to maximize effectiveness
and reliability   and to reduce costs where possible.      The
fiscal   year 1971 budget estimate for this program was
$3.5 million.

     Selected OCD statistics                                    on the status and accomplish-
ments of the complementary                                   program elements as of June 30,
1970, follow.
                                                                                                      Number

  Emergency operating             centers:
        Funded with Federal              matching        funds                                            1,039
        Nonfunded--loo-percent                 State and local          funds                             2,571
  Warning points:
        National      warning       points                                                                   983
        State and local           extensions         funded with matching            funds                   281
        Backup installations               funded with Federal             funds                             490
  Radiological        monitoring         stations:
        Fixed monitoring            points                                                              71,042
        Shelter     facilities-equipped                                                                111,404
  People trained:
       Under the civil            defense       education       program                              3,203,134
       Under the medical             self-help         program                                      12,554,558
       Under the university                extension        program                                     332,273
        Architect-engineer             fallout       shelter      analysts                               19,843
        Military      installations'            radiological         defense-monitoring      per-
           sonnel                                                                                        18,484




                                                                18
                                CHAPTER4.

                     IMBALANCEDDISTRIBUTION AND

                SHORTAGEOF EXISTING FALLOUT SHELTERS

        The identification of fuZZout sheZters by OCD under its fuZZout
sheZter survey program has, in our opinion, disclosed an imbaZan.ce of ex-
isting protection betueen major cities and other popuZation areas and a
shortage of sheZters in meeting its goa7. of providing protection  for al2
persons.

       CCD statistics      show that on the average 2.5(l)        fallout
shelter spaces are avail ble         for each  person    in major    cities
but that less than 0.4(1       B  of a space is available      for each
person in noncity areas and cities         with populations       under
25,000.     Further, most of the protection        in the major cities
exists in the commercial-industrial         cores (the central busi-
ness districts)       rather than in residential      areas since fall-
out protection      is found mainly in large buildings.           The im-
balance is shown also by the availability            of shelters
stocked with survival        supplies and equipment--shelters          are
stocked for 58 percent of the population           of major cities        but
for only 14 percent of the population          of other areas,

       Considering  the possibility       of enemy targeting,    the
central urban areas containing         the majority   of fallout    shel-
ters may be highly vulnerable        to destruction    from blast,
heat, shock, initial     radiation,      and other primary effects
of a nuclear attack.       The possible attack level could be
many hundreds of times greater than the explosive             power of
the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.            The National Plan for
Emergency Preparedness published          in 1964. by OEP assumes that
large populations     centers likely      will be important enemy tar-
gets.

       The imbalance in distribution      of existing fallout  pro-
tection between major cities       and other areas appears to be are-
suZt of OCD's program of identifying and developing shelter     spaces in
only existing facilities or in TM-Uconstruction  being built    by others.


1These ratios     are based on the 1960 census and 1968 shelter
 data.

                                     19
OCD does not have the authority        to construct   or to pay for              .
the construction     of special-purpose     public fallout    shelters
in any location,     including   areas with a deficit      of shelter
spaces.    The shelter program is geared to the identification,
licensing,   marking, and stocking of shelters         in buildings
and other facilities      over which OCD has no direct construc-
tion control    or influence.      In other wordsg UCD'S pogrm      is
not aimed at adding   significantZy   to the Nation's   shelter   capacity
since it does not provide for constructing,      or financing   the
construction   of, shelter space.  OCD merely identifies      what
becomes available   through normal construction.
        Thus there is no current Federal program to provide di-
rect financial     assistance    to underprotected      suburban and
rural areas to increase their protection            from radioactive
fallout,    even though OCD recognizes that the predominant
danger outside the central core areas of large cities                  will
be from fallout.       Further the existing   fuZZout protection     gap be-
tween major cities  and other areas probubZy will continue     to widen     if
present practices      continue,    since heavy construction         which
provides adequate safety from radiation            will be located pre-
dominantly     in commercial-industrial      core areas of cities.

        OCD has established      certain programs to stimulate       more
shelter construction        in underprotected     areas and to increase
the amount of protection         to the Nation in general.        One of
these is the OCD Shelter Development Program under which
OCD encourages architects         and consulting     engineers to in-
clude shelter areas in their building            designs to increase
the national      shelter   inventory.     Professional    courses in
fallout    shelter analyses are offered to architects            and en-
gineers, and OCD data show that by April 1969 more than
17,500 students had completed these courses and had passed
a qualifying      examination,
        OCD also has initiated     a program (Direct Mail Shelter
Development) whereby new projects          and their architects      are
identified     through construction     reports.     Architects   and
owners then are contacted and asked to incorporate              shelter
spaces in their projects.         Also, a university      advisory ser-
vice is available      to give architects      advice on radiation      pro-
tection    design.



                                       20
       Some measures which OCD has proposed, but has not under-
taken, are Federal construction   of public fallout    shelters,
Federal funding of portable ventilation    kits to increase the
shelter capacity of below-ground areas in existing      buildings,
and Federal subsidies to encourage building      owners to pro-
vide fallout   shelter space in new construction    in underpro-
tected communities.

       The basis for the last proposal is OCD data which indi-
cate that, if current programs continue at present levels,
up to one half of the population      in 1975 still  will lack
standard (PF 4,O or better)   fallout   shelter protection   under
existing   time and distance movement criteria,

      According to OCD this deficit,       or unfilled  requirement
for standard shelters,     is not likely    to be changed appreci-
ably unless new means are instituted        to increase the number
of fallout    shelters incorporated    into new buildings.

       To test how shelter inclusion        can be stimulated      in
areas lacking sufficient      standard shelters,         OCD has proposed
that small Federal payments be made to building              owners who
include shelters      in new construction      projects,     The test
would determine program acceptance and effectiveness               in
terms of spaces added under various payment methods.                 The
proposed payment formulas would provide the building               owner
a subsidy of a specified      percentage of total costs or a
specified     amount for each added shelter space, but the sub-
sidy would not exceed the actual additional              cost of construc-
tion.     For  fiscal  year 1971  OCD   envisioned     payments  of $10
for each added shelter space.
      OCD requested $2.5 million    and $1.5 million    for fiscal
years 1970 and 1971, respectively,     to initiate   the above ex-
perimental    shelter subsidy program, but the funds were not
appropriated.

AGENCYCOMMENTS

       In December 1970 we issued a draft report to DOD on our
observations    on the imbalance of fallout   protection  between
urban and nonurban areas and on the shortage of fallout        pro-
tection   for the Nation.    We suggested that, since it appeared
that a shortage of standard protection      would continue to

                                   21
exist under OCD's current program of developing fallout      shel-          .
ters, early consideration    be given to actions to increase
the number of available    shelter spaces, especially  in areas
currently  underprotected.
      Specifically,   we proposed that the Secretary of Defense
seek, in addition    to the actions already under way or pro-
posed for OCD, the cooperation     of governmental agencies in-
volved in programs which can provide vast quantities        of fall-
out shelter spaces as part of the construction      of facilities,
such as mass transit    (subways), urban renewal, and housing
departments and agencies.
       In its reply to our draft report (see app. IV>, OCD ad-
vised us that it concurred with our proposal to seek the co-
operation    of Federal agencies toincreasethe amount of pro-
tection and stated that it was,in fact, then carrying    it
out l   OCD stated that Executive Order No. 11490 dated Octo-
ber 28, 1969, which assigns emergency preparedness functions
to various Federal agencies had been helpful   in gaining en-
try of OCD employees into Federal agencies to discuss shel-
ter.
        Prior to promulgation     of Executive Order No. 114.90,
there was no Government document requiring           consideration     of
fallout     shelter in Federal financial     assistance    construction
programs.      Since issuance of the Executive order, various
departments including--     the Departments of Health, Education,
and Welfare and Housing and Urban Development--have              encour-
aged incorporation      of shelters   in their financially       aided
projects.      OCD pointed out the significance       of this con-
struction     area because in fiscal    year 1971 it involved about
$7 billion     of Federal grant funds.

      As an example of the results   of increased coordination
during the past year, OCD cited one Government agency which
previously   refused to have anything to do with shelter de-
sign but which now includes fallout    protection    in the de-
sign of many of its new facilities,     OCD also stated that it
hoped that this cooperation    could be extended to other agen-
cies involved in programs to give financial       aid for construc-
tion.

      Concerning our observations        on the imbalance of protec-
tion, however2 OCD acknowledged         the current substantial  lack
                                   22
of shelter spaces but indicated         that, generally,        it had been
unsuccessful      in obtaining    funds and the authority         to take
alternate     actions to increase the number of shelter              spaces.,
It stated that, although the national           fallout     shelter policy
was adopted in 1961, only the first           phase of the policy had
been implemented-- identification         of fallout    shelters      in ex-
isting    structures.     Lack of legislative      authority      for shelter
incentive     payments and restrictive      budgets have not permit-
ted OCD to increase the number of shelters where existing
structures     cannot meet the need. OCD indicated            that funds
had not been approved for ventilation           devices which could
provide a significant        increase in below-ground shelter ca-
pacity.

      Our review indicates that the Nation lacks, and under current pro-
gmms will  continue  to lack, a sufficient number of properly dispersed,
adequately equipped fuZZout she-&em in homes, schools, arul other buitd-
ings and facilities   to aeeoinmodate the population   in the event   of m-
clear attack.




                                      23
                              CHAPTER5

         POTENTIAL FOR INCREASINGFALLOUT PROTECTION

        We believe that, as a potential         means of significantly
increasing      the number and the adequacy of marked and stocked
fallout    shelter    spaces available    to the public--until       such
time as more shelters        meeting Federal minimum standards be-
come available      (see ch. 4)--consideration        should be given
to (1) the desirability         of marking and stocking the best
avaiZabZe     .sheZters in an area and (2) emphasizing the devel-
opment of fallout       shelters   in those geographic areas con-
sidered to be most ZikeZy at risk           from fallout.

       The Federal minimum standard considered necessary for
the protection     of lives has been lowered as a result of con-
tinued research into the required radiation         shielding and
of the limited     funds available    to provide support for a na-
tional   fallout   shelter construction     program for high PFs.
The Federal minimum standard during 1955-57 was PF 5,000 and
subsequently     was lowered to PF 1,000 in 1959, PF 100 in
1960, and PF 40 in 1962.(l)        The current standard of PF 40
resulted    from a Presidential    Science Advisory Committee, an
advisory panel on civil      defense, which reported on July 16,
1962, that:
      'l-k** a lower figure,  say PF 50 [the minimum stan-
      dard at that time was PF 1001, would make a much
      larger number of spaces available      without greatly
      decreasing the lifesaving    potential    under many
      kinds of attack."


1Examples of each PF:

      PF 5,000--undergound       shelters  (3 feet of earth cover or
                  equivalent)     and subbasements of multistory
                  buildings.
      PF l,OOO--basements,       without exposed walls, of multi-
                  story masonry buildings.
      PF loo--central        areas of basements, with partially
                  exposed walls, in multistory         buildings.
      PF     40--basements,      without exposed walls, of small
                  two- and three-story      buildings.
 Since shelter              surveys were reporting    in the PF ranges of
 20 to 39, 40             to 69, etc., PF 40 was chosen as the closest
 approximation              to PF 50 suggested by the advisory panel.
 OCD finances             the development--licensing,     marking, and stock-
 ing- - of public             shelters if the shelters provide PF 40 or
 better.

         An OCD document states that moderate levels of protec-
 tion can provide significant        reductions    in fallout fatali-
 ties, and this statement is supported by data based on ra-
 diation    dose situations    computed for a large hypothetical
 attaclc on military     and urban targets      in the United States.
 The information     indicates   that, of those surviving     the di-
 rect effects     of the attack,    46 percent would survive the
 fallout    hazard without shelters      and 97 percent would sur-
 vive in PF-40 shelters.

             Although   shelters  providing   less than PF 40 normally  me not
 licensed,       marked, or stocked by OCD as part of the national      shelter
inventoq,         OCD data indicates     that these shelters, too, could provide
significant         lifesaving   protection.
                                 For example, the document
which showed that 97 percent of the survivors      of the direct
or initial   effects of a hypothetical   attack would remain
alive in PF-40 shelters   also indicated    that 93 percent would
survive in PF-20 shelters and 90 percent would survive in
PF-15 shelters.
       OCD acknowledges that, where shelters   of PF 40 or bet-
 ter are not available,  many lives can be saved and injuries
 can be reduced by the use of the best protection      available.
 According to ED, the community shelter planning process
 provides for the use, where necessary,    of protected    space
 having less than PF 40. These lesser protected       shelters,
 however, normally are not licensed,   marked, or stocked by
 QCD.

        Although QCDhas stated that the best available            shel-
 ter, regardless     of PF, should be provided for everyone, we
 believe that adherence to the Federal fallout           standard of
 PF 40 for financing     purposes has prevented this concept from
 being applied effectively      in practice.      OCDmakes no dis-
 tinction    as to the best available     shelter   if there is an
 excess of shelter spaces above PF 40. Therefore,             although
 a shelter meets the Federal standard of PF 40, people may
be directed  to go to a less than best available             shelter,
with the attendant   increased risk of radiation            damage.

       The nature of construction   in the urban core areas in-
herently   provides a greater degree of radiation       shielding
than that in residential    areas.   Also the threat appears to
be greater in urban areas, but this apparently        is not con-
sidered in developing    a shelter program.    We  noted    that
targeting   assumptions were relied on in cost-effectiveness
studies leading to the adoption of the current fallout            shel-
ter program but were not used in implementing the program.
Adherence to a fixed minimum PF standard--PF       40--on a na-
tionwide scale gives an all-or-nothing      approach to the fall-
out shelter program.

       Some local community civil     defense officials,       with en-
couragement from OCD, have included unmarked and unstacked
shelters  having less than PF 40 on their community shelter
planning maps distributed     to citizens    of the community,         In
case of a civil   defense emergency, citizens       are supposed to
go to these shelters.     Thus the inconsistent      situation     exists
where OCD limits   Federal   financing      under its shelter   identi-
fication program to sheZters       of PF 40 and above but en-
courages the use, under its Community SheZter           PZanning pro-
gram, of unmarked,   unstacked     sheZters    beZow the FederaZ
standard of PF 40.


       We were unable to find OCD estimates on the overall
number of additional         spaces that could be added to the na-
tional fallout      shelter    inventory   if shelters     rated at vari-
ous PFs lower than PF 40 were included.              One indication,
however, is shown in statistical           data from CCD's survey of
home fallout     protection.       The survey, completed in 26 States
and the District      of Columbia, identified        1.8 million      PF-40
or better shelter spaces in homes and 28 million                  PF-20 to
PF-39 shelter     spaces in homes. (See table on pm 16of this
report.)     Also OCD informed us that subsequent surveys of
small structures      (excluding     one-, two-, or three-family
homes) having a lo- to 50-person capacity              identified     an ad-
ditional    6.6 million     PF-40 or better shelter        spaces,
5.8 million     PF-20 to PF-39 shelter spaces, and about 4 mil-
lion PF-10 to PF-19 shelter spaces.
AGENCYCOMMENTS
             AND OUREVALUATION

       In our draft report to OCD, we suggested           that the Sec-
retary of Defense either consider lowering the              current
standard of PF 40 or permit Federal financing             of the best
available   shelters  in an underprotected area,          regardless  of
the PF.

       In its reply OCD stated that the PF-40 standard is a
civil    defense planning objective     for the future--a    goal for
ultimate     shelter posture to be actively    pursued in identi-
fying existing      shelter and designing shelter into new con-
struction,      OCD believed that the PF-40 standard should be
maintained as the goal but stated that the best available
concept was being applied in current operational          planning
in that local communities were provided data by OCD on
shelters below PF 40 for use in preparing         community shelter
planning programs,

       OCD stated also that, if funds were available    for pro-
curement of shelter supplies,     it might be desirable  to
mark and stock public shelters used in a community shelter
plan even though they were less than PF 40. Because of
insufficient    funds, however, only about half the PF-40 or
better shelters     are currently stocked, and many of these
are not stocked to capacity.

       Although we agree that providing          fallout   protection
of PF 40 or better may be a desirable            goal to be actively
pursued, we believe that limiting           Federal financing      to
public shelters       having such protection       tends to limit the
lifesaving     potential    of the fallout     shelter program.       Many
rural,    suburban, and residential        communities are not likely
to achieve an adequate sheltering           capacity at the PF-40
level or perhaps even the PF-20 level.              OCD cannot predict
the level of protection        that will be required for any given
location,    but it appears that su.bstantktlZy more protection can be
fwnished if facilities  which provide the best avaiZabZe faZZout protec-
tion, even though below the Pi?-40 Zevel., are {dentified, Zicensed,
marked, and stocked.

         We believe also that OCD can accomplish more effec-
tively     its goal of providing     protection   to the total popu-
lation     by directing  its efforts     toward the identification


                                    27
 of the best available      shelter sufficient    to meet the peak
 population   requirements     of each local area within the es-
 tablished  time and distance movement criteria,,         After iden-
 tification   of sufficient     shelter space by best available
 criteria,  OCD could, if funds permitted,       periodically     up-
 grade protection     by substituting   better space in new or
 modified facilities.       As new or improved space becomes
 available,   previously    identified   space having a lower PF
 can be removed from the inventory,        and thus sufficient     best
 available  space to meet the peak population        requirements     of
 the area will be retained.

        OCD stated that additional     funds would be required      to
 move the supplies and equipment to the improved space when
 it became available.       Although this is true, it should be
 recognized    that, during the time the best available       shelters
 were in the program, the fallout        protection provided would
 be increased and that this increased availability          could be
 of inestimable     value in the event of a nuclear attack dur-
 ing that period.       Thus we believe that the potential      value
 of the added protection       may outweigh the additional    moving
 costs.

         In our draft report we also indicated            that, in admin-
 istering     the shelter program, OCD did not appear to recog-
 nize or make any assumptions regarding             the locations      of
 enemy targeting.        Thus every place is treated equally and
 shelter development is not emphasized in areas of highest
 risk.     OCD replied    that, given the decision to limit civil
 defense measures to a fallout          shelter-oriented       program,
 considerations      of risk are not germane. Winds may cause
 fallout    to occur anywhere in the United States after a
 nuclear attack,      according to OCD, and cities           or industrial
 areas cannot be totally        written   off as unsuitable        for fall-
 out shelter,     because no one can predict          exactly which
 cities    or industrial    areas will be targeted,
       We agree that precise predictions     of        enemy targets and
 wind patterns    cannot be made, and we also          believe that pro-
 viding all citizens     with equally adequate         civil  defense
 protection    is a desirable  goal. Because of     the Zimited financia2
  and other resources which, according to OCD, have restricted  the devez-
  opment of the &vi2 defense program, however, we beZieve that priori-
  ties of effort shouZd be set, on the basis of the best avaiZabZe ppe-
-d<ctions   of risk.


                                      28
RECOMMENDATION
             TO THE SECRETARYOF DEFENSE

      We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in carry-
ing out the civil  defense program, establish      priorities     and
stress the development of protection       in those areas consid-
ered by DOD to be most likely     at risk from fallout      after a
nuclear attack.   The use of priorities      would also help to
ensure that the limited   financial    resources are applied to
areas most in need of additional     protection.

        We believe that pending an overall              assessment of area
priorities     in undertaking      protective     measures9 OCD should
stock the best available         shelters     regardless      of protection
rating.     The question of financial          resources obviously must
be determined within the overall             availabilities      of funds
for DOD. We recommend also that the Secretary of Defense
(1) provide additional        justification       to the Congress con-
cerning the part which civil            defense plays in the U.S.
overall national     security      posture and (2) give consider-
ation to whether higher priority             should be given to marking
and stocking good shelter spaces already identified,                    in
view of the relatively        low per capita cost of protection
which these shelters       provide.




                                    29
                                   CHAPTER6

               DEFENSESTUDIES OF ALTERNATIVE TYPES

                         OF CIVILIAN PROTECTION

        The principal     goal of the current civil           defense pro-
gram is the development of a nationwide               fallout      shelter sys-
tem to protect people from the hazards of radioactive                       fall-
out from a nuclear explosion.              Although primary or direct
effects    of nuclear weapons, such as blast, heat, shock, ini-
tial radiation,       and other lethal        or disabling     effects,      are
recognized by OCD as a major element of the threat,                     the
current civil      defense program includes no activities                 to
mitigate    these effects      by protecting      people and property
from them. Any protection            afforded to persons in target
areas against primary weapons' effects would come about by
happenstance rather than by design; that is, incidental                        to
taking    cover indoors and in shelter.             Similarly,      there are
no active civil       defense programs to protect people from ef-
fects of chemical or biological             weapons. Evacuation as a
lifesaving     concept, after warning that attac'k is under way,
is no longer considered by OCD as a feasible                  alternative         or
supplement to fallout         shelters.

       Information  has been developed, however, by OCDand
DOD on the cost and the lifesaving     potential     of various
strategic    defense programs.  Pertinent   portions    of this in-
formation are presented in the following       paragraphs.

       DOD studies showed that, in a nuclear attack against a
projected    U.S. population       of 226 million    in 1975--with    the
attack directed     against military        forces, population     centers,
and large industrial       installations--some       104 million    people,
or about 46 percent of the population,             would die if the
United States had an anti-ballistic-missile              defense and no
civil   defense program.       Of those killed,      about half would
die of fatal doses of fallout           radiation.     The remaining
122 million    people would survive both the direct and fall-
out effects    of the nuclear attack.           The projection   of deaths
from the direct effects        of such a nuclear attack was con-
sidered comparable to the Hiroshima experience.                There, with
people distributed      at random--some out in the open,


                                        30
relatively   unwarned and unprotected--68,000    of the 256,000
population,    or about 27 percent, were killed.    There was no
lethal fallout.
        The studies made by OCD calculated          the lifesaving        ef-
fectiveness      of various amounts and kinds of shelter,               of al-
ternative    warning systems, and of different            days-of-supply
of shelter stocks.          They showed that, with the 160 million
fallout    shelter    spaces existing    as of January 1, 1969,
18 million     to 30 million     of the projected      1975 fatalities
of 104 million       could be saved. Additional          shelters     identi-
fied by continuing        the fallout   shelter survey from 1969 to
1975 could save another 1 to 5 million            lives,     depending on
whether present warning systems were improved.                  Alternative
combinations      of fallout    and blast protection       could save ad-
ditional    millions     of people.
       Projections    of total costs for alternative       civil  de-
fense programs for fiscal       years 1970-75, according to the
OCD studies,     range from $400 million    to $8 billion,       These
totals   include the costs of additional      shelter    spaces, which
range from $55 million       to $7 billion.

        Generally,    the greater the number of lives saved by a
given civil      defense program, the more costly the program
for each life saved. For example, OCD estimated that a
program of fallout       shelters consisting of spaces located by
shelter surveys plus spaces added by use of packaged venti-
lation kits would provide shelter to 68 percent of the pop-
ulation    by 1975; would save some 41 million     people who
otherwise would die; and would cost about $1 billion,         or
about $26 for each life saved.

       Another program studied by OCDwould provide spaces
additional     to the first       program by subsidizing     shelters  in
new buildings.        This would provide shelter for 86 percent
of the 1975 population;           save 49 million   people; and cost
about $2.2 billion,         or about $44 for each life saved.         Add-
ing still    further    spaces to the above programs through spe-
cially    constructed     fallout     shelters  to provide for the en-
tire 1975 population         would save 55 million      people at a cost
of $85 for each life saved.



                                      31
      The following        table   shows pertinent    statistics            on some
of the alternative         programs    studied   by OCD.

                             Percent
                             of pop-                                              cost
                             ulation              Number                            for
                            provided   Number        of              Esti-        each
                              with       of         sur- Lives       mated        life
                             shelter   deaths     vivors --saved     cost        -saved
                                                   (millions)
No shelter                                104       122         -
Shelters located
  to Jan. 1, 1969               40           78     148         26   $     639   $ 25
Surveys of existing
  shelter continued
  to 1975                        54          74     152         30         995     33
Spaces located to
  1975 (3 above)
  plus use of pack-
  aged ventilation
  kits                          68           63     163         41       1,059     26
Same as,4 plus
  spaces added by
  construction      sub-
  sidy payments                 86           55     171         49       2,166     44
Same as 5 plus spe-
  cially    constructed
  fallout    shelters          100           49     177         55       4,686     85
Same as 5 plus con-
  struction    subsidy
  payments for blast
  protection     in 100
  Largest cities                86           48     178         56       5,684    102




                                        32
                                   CHAPTER7

        BROAD POLICY DECISIONS ON CIVIL                 DEFENSE NEEDED

       Over the past several           years,      there have been inquiries
by congressional         and executive         branch    officials      into the
need for redirection         of civil       defense efforts,          but the focus
of the program has not changed materially                       since 1961.     The
lack of change, despite            significant        world and national        de-
velopments     affecting     civil     defense       assumptions      and planning,
indicates    to us that reconsideration                 of civil     defense   re-
quirements     and implementation           may be appropriate.

         During congressional         hearings     on civil      defense    in 1963,
Subcommittee         No. 3 (Hebert     Subcommittee)         of the House Corn-
mittee      on Armed Services       considered       a bill     to provide      for
shelter       in Federal   structures       and to authorize         payment to-
ward the construction            or modification         of approved     public
shelter       space.    The bill    was actively         supported    by the Com-
mittee      and was approved by the House of Representatives.
According         to OCD, however,     the legislation          was deferred
by the Senate Armed Services              Committee        on the premise       that
the need for an expanded fallout                 shelter     program was related       I
to the then-unresolved            need for deployment           of an anti-
ballistic-missile         system.

       Since the last period           of major public     and congressional
concern     for civil    defense,     around   the  time   of the Cuba mis-
sile   crisis     and the Hebert Subcommittee          hearings     in 1962
and 1963, a number of developments               and events have occurred
which have important         implications      for civil     defense   assump-
   .
tlons,     goals,   and planning.        Among these are:

       --The threat    posed by the recently acquired  nuclear
          capability   of Communist China and its impending    de-
          ployment   of a delivery  system.

       --The technological       advances   in weapons and delivery
          capabilities     in recent   years by all nuclear   powers.

       --The ratification         of the nuclear         nonproliferation
          treaty.

       --The    widening     Sino-Soviet        rift.

                                           33
         --The Soviet-American         strategic      arms limitation        talks.        _.

         --The congressional         decision for      implementation        of an
            anti-ballistic-missile          system.

         --The congressional    and public attention      focused on
            the country's   chemical and biological      warfare effort,
            culminating   in the President's    decision    to halt fur-
            ther production   and testing    of such agents.
         --The launching        by Red China of its        space satellite            in
            April 1970.

        In addition,    at least three developments pertaining          to
the structure      and effectiveness     of OCD have occurred re-
cently.     In May 1969 the President directed         OEP to make a
study of the civil        defense program, with particular       emphasis
on the status and effectiveness          of OCD's fallout    shelter
program.      Information     for the study was received from a num-
ber of agencies with emergency preparedness functions               and
from non-Federal       groups concerned with civil      defense,     In
June 1971 a report on the results          of the study was being
prepared for review by the National Security Council,                At
the beginning of our review, we attempted to obtain informa-
tion from OEP on the objective         and scope of the study, but
we were unsuccessful.

       OCD is also the subject of a study group formed when
the President,     in an April 1970 message to the Congress,
recommended liberalization      of some of the laws pertaining
to natural disasters.       The President    stated that disaster
assistance   activities    of State and local governments often
are closely related     to their civil    defense responsibilities
and that the relationship      between Federal Government,disaster
assistance   and civil   defense activities      should be reviewed
carefully,   with special attention      being given to the impact
of any suggested change on national         security.   In June 1971
a report on the study was under review by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.
     1

      Additionally, a Special Subcommittee on Civil Defense
of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings in Octo-
ber 1970 on a general review of civil   defense program de-
velopments since 1963. No report has been issued but

                                         34
additional   hearings     are scheduled  to be held             before      the end
of the current     session   of the Congress.

        A number of issues also have been raised                    in literature
on civil      defense    and in budget hearings            on civil     defense
appropriations.          Among problems        cited    have been (1) the in-
ability     to provide      blast   protection       for those population
areas most likely         to sustain      blast     damage and (2) the lack
of recognition        or assumptions        regarding      enemy targeting
with the result        that everyone        and everyplace        is treated
equally     in civil     defense planning,          which we believe         is not
a realistic       approach     in the light        of limited     funding.

AGENCY COMMENTS

       In our draft  report to DOD, we suggested      that there
was a need for broad policy      decisions  on basic civil    defense
planning.    In response DOD stated that it was acute23 mare of the
necessity    for reevaluation..       OCD agreed that such decisions     on the fu-
ture direction     of civil     defense were needed and, hopefuZZy,      expected     as
a resuZt of the severa          administration  studies being made.

MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY TIPE CONGRESS

        In view of the issues        concerning      (1) the imbalance          of
fallout    protection,     (2) the potential         for expanding       fallout
protection     by using best available           shelter     space, and (3)
the limited      progress    of the civil     defense program in meeting
its objectives        as dealt with in this report,             and in view of
two special       studies  recently    made by the administration
pertaining      to civil   defense policies,          to the shelter       program,
and to the relationship          between natural         disaster    assistance
and civil     defense activities,        appropriate        committees     of the
Congress may wish to review           the reports        on these studies
for use in any consideration            of civil     defense requirements.




                                        35
                             CHAPTER8

                          SCOPEOF REVIEW

        Our study of civil defense activities     was made to de-
termine the extent of protection    available     to the people in
the event of a nuclear attack on the United         States and in-
cluded a review of the history    and current     status of civil
defense programs conducted at the Federal,        State, an
levels.

       Our study of the philosophy,    policy,   and programs of
OCD was conducted at the national      headquarters     in Washington,
D.C., and at the Region No. 8 office,        at Dothell, Washington.
In addition,     we discussed and examined documents on national
planning guidance for emergency preparedness at OEP in Wash-
ington, D.C. We also reviewed civil        defense and natural
disaster   activities    at the State of Washington Department of
Civil Defense and at several county and city civil          defense
offices.

        We interviewed  officials  responsible     for civil  defense
activities     at the Federal, regional,    State, and local levels
and reviewed records and publications        relating   to all aspects
of civil    defense.




                                  36
    APPENDIXES




s




    37
                                                                                      APPENDIX           I


                               EFFECTS     OF MODERN WEAPONS

          Some knowledge          of the effects            of nuclear         weapons   is        an
aid     to understanding            the primary          objectives          of the present
civil      defense    effort.

         A nuclear        explosion        produces         four     principal         kinds     of
life-endangering              forces.        Blast,       heat,      and initial          radia-
tion,     which      occur      almost     instantaneously               at the moment of
explosion,         have an immediate              effect.          In addition,            there    is
a delayed        effect,        residual      radiation          (more commonly              known
as radioactive            fallout),        the severity            of which         depends
largely      upon the height             at which         the explosion             occurs.        An
explosion        at or near ground              level       will     produce       much more
radioactive          debris       than an explosion              at high       altitude.

        The area of severe      destruction        resulting  from an ex-
plosion    may vary   with  the size        of the nuclear    weapon,      with
the height     of the detonation,         and,   to some extent,      with     the
terrain    and atmospheric      conditions.

        The initial        effects     of a nuclear         explosion     are devas-
tating    and little         can be done to avoid            them at close        range.
These effects,          however,     are limited         geographically.          People
a few miles        from    the explosion          would    be endangered       by the
blast    and‘heat,       but most of these            people     would   survkve     these
initial     hazards.         DOD illustrations           of the blast       and heat
effects     of a 5-megaton          and a ‘20-megaton          nuclear    explosion
are shown in the following                 charts.

         The main danger       to the Nation     as a whole       is                  the de-
layed     effect   of radioactive       fallout,    which    could                    blanket
large     areas  of the country       in an all-out       nuclear                     attack.
FuZZout  can be just  as dead29 as the initia2   effects     of                                   the
bomb, but a variety   of measures can be taken to protect
people until  time dissipates   the danger of radioactivity.

Facts      about     fallout

         When a nuclear       weapon explodes             near  the ground,     great
quantities       of pulverized         earth    and other       debris   are sucked
up into     the nuclear       cloud.        There      the radioactive      gases
produced      by the explosion           condense        on and into   this    debris,
producing      radioactive       fallout       particles.         Over a period       of



                                                   39
                                                                                    EFFECTSOF A 5 MT BLAST




                                             .......,
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                                ..::::*
                     .:::--
                              .:::-
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        .::::*
.::::
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:’

                                                                                                                                                                                 G1.5         PSI
                                                                                                                                                                                        100




                                                                                                            3 MILES             5 MILES              7 MILES           9 MILES




                                                                GRdUND
                                                                  ZERO



                                                   If burst   is elevated        to altitude      maximizing       reach   of blast   damage:
                                                                            “Moderate       Damage”       from   blast is extended      from    7 to 11 miles
                                                                            “Ignition     Radius”   (ignites     newspaper)     is extended       from 9 to 10 miles




                                                                                                                                                                                                    .   .
   001
ISd S' I-O   ::   ISdS-S'Z
                                                                                                                                                                                           :i
                                                                                                                                                                                        .::::
                                                                                                                                                                                     ..:::,
                                                                                                                                                                                   .:::!'
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                                                                                                                                                                        ..:::,*
                                                                                                                                                              . . ...::::.
                                                                                                                                                                     .. .
                             . .. .. . .. .. *.. .. . . . . .                                                                                    _.. .. . .. .. .. . .
                                       . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... .. ... ... .. .. . . . .
                                                      . . . . . .. .. .. .. ., .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .
                                                                                   .. . ... .. .
APPENDIX I


time,    these particles     fall  back          to earth--the        larger    ones        .*
first,     the smaller   ones later.

        The early    fallout,    which affords  the major radiation
danger,    descends      in less than 24 hours.     Less dangerous
lighter    particles      will  sift  down for years at a diminishing
rate.

        The fallout      pattern    depends on the type,         size, and det-
onation    of the weapon involved           and on the meteorological
conditions      for the first       day or so after       the blast.     In
areas where the fallout            patterns     from two or more weapons
overlap,     the hazard increases.            In a massive nuclear       attack
on the United       States,      much of the country        could be blanketed
by the ensuing       fallout.       DOD illustrations        of what fallout
patterns     could look like on a spring              day and a fall   day fol-
low.

        Fallout     particles        emit several     types of radiation,           but
the most dangerous            ones are gamma rays.           Gamma rays have
greater      penetration       power than other rays.            They affect         liv-
ing tissue       by damaging the ability             of body cells        to repro-
duce.      Because the human body is continually                   replacing       dam-
aged and worn-out           cells     to maintain     an efficient        level    of
operation,       any hindrance          to this replacement        process      results
in lowering       body resistance           to disease    and organic        malfunc-
tion.      Therefore       survival!     potentia2    is direct29       reZated     to
the amount of radiation               to which a person has been subjected.

        No special    clothing       can protect   people against    gamma
radiation,     and no special          drugs or chemicals   can prevent
large doses of radiation             from causing   damage to the cells
of the body.       Antibiotics         and other medicines,    however,    are
helpful    in treating       infections      that sometimes  follow    exces-
sive exposure      to radiation.

     Almost all the radiation         that people absorb from fall-
out particles     comes from particles       outside      their    own bodies.
Only simple precautions        are necessary      to avoid swallowing
the particles.      Because of their      size (like        grains   of sand),
it is practically      impossible   to inhale       them.

       PeopZe exposed         to fallout      radiation      do not     become radio-
active   and therefore          dangerous     to other      people.      Radiation



                                            42
              SURVIVAL               ACTIONS

 No      shelter         required        under     this    wi
.conditian

Up       to   2 day-s      shelter        occupancy

 2 days       to      1 week         shelter     occupancy

 1 week        to     2 weeks          helter      occupancy
followed            by    decontamination                 in excep-
tional        oreas
.-


            FAR-OUT
                 ~oNolTloNs
                          FRO
            WI[DE
                RAMliE
                    Of TARGETS:                                        UUSTRIAL
                                                                             ANDPOPULATION




                 SURVIVAL         ACVIONS

          No shelter   required      under    this
          condition
                                                                        L
          Up to 2 days shglter        occupancy
     al
          2 days to 1 week        shelter    occupancy            .
                                                                   c
           1 week to 2 weeks shelter          occupancy
          followed   by decontamination           in excep-   .
          tionai areas
                                                                                          APPENDIX           I


"sickness         is    not    contagious   or infectious,                   and    one    person
    cannot     catch     it    from another   person.

           Radiation        exposure        is measured          in units      called      roent-
   gens , after        the German physicist                who discovered           them.        Dur -
   ing the average            lifetime,         every    human being         receives        about
   10 roentgens          of nuclear         radiation        from natural          sources.         Ex-
   posure    to more than 300 roentgens                      over     a period      of a few
   days--a     dose which           unprotected         persons       might    receive       after
   a nuclear       attack--would            cause     sickness,        nausea,      and, pos-
   sibly,    death.         Death would          be certain         if a person         received
   a dose of 1,000           roentgens          over a period          of a few days.

           The      intensity        of the gamma radiation                  emitted     by fallout
   decreases          in time      through       a process       known       as radioactive
   decay.        A significant             decrease     in radioactivity             occurs      dur-
   ing the       first        24 hours       of its    existence.            If the gamma ra-
   diation       level       at a location          is measured        as      1,000   roentgens
   an hour       3-l/2       hours     after     an explosion,         it      will  have been
   reduced       to about         100 roentgens         an hour      24      hours   later.

            Although         the   intensity        of fallout     radiation          decreases
   rapidly,        radiation         levels      at locations      many miles          from     a
   ground       burst      could     be so intense         as to require         l- to 2-weeks
   shelter       occupancy         before      it would      be safe    to leave.            Short
   trips      out of shelter,              however,    to replenish          supplies,        take
   radiation          readings,        and perform       other   essential          functions
   would     be possible           earlier.

            The purpose           of fallout          shelters        is to provide          protec-
   tion     from gamma radiation.                     Since     the rays        have enormous
   penetration           ability,         the most practical               form    of protection
   is placement            of a sufficient              amount      of mass between            fallout
   and the people               to be protected.               This     shielding        may be fur-
   nished      by any type            of material          that     places      mass between           the
   source      of radiation             and the people,             but the more dense the
   material         the better          its    protection.            An earth       barrier
   3 feet       thick      will     reduce       gamma radiation             to l/1000       of the
   outside        intensity.           A concrete          barrier       2 feet      thick     will
   provide        equivalent          protection.

          Analyses     of DOD studies       indicate         that,      in a heavy at-
   tack,    the radiation      hazard    outside       those       areas   nearly     to-
   tally    destroyed     by blast    and heat       effects        would   result      in
   exposure      of the surviving      population          to a radiation          dose of


                                                      4.5
          APPENDIX I


          about    8,000    roentgens       or less.
                                                  A reduction      of this      hazard                  *
          to l/40   of the outside,    or unprotected,        ZeveZ (PF 40) would
          save the lives    of more then 90 percent         of the people        who
          otherwise   would   die from   the effects    of fallout      radiation.
          PF 40 will          provide      adequate protection        against     fallout       radi-
          ation     hazards       of nuclear       attacks    which might occur over the
          next few years,             and studies       of much larger      attacks       indicate
          that PF 40 will             continue-    to be effective      in reducing          poten-
          tial    fatalities.           Therefore       PF 40 has been established              by
          OCD as the minimum standard                   of protection     for all public
          fallout       shelters.




I’,   .




                                                       46
                                                                                 APPENDIX II

. .
                         THE NATIONAL PLAN FOR EMERGENCYPREPAREDNESS

            The National       Plan for Emergency Preparedness,            edited and published
      by OEP in December 1964, sets forth            the basic principles,          policies,   re-
      sponsibilities,       preparations,     and responses of civil          government for meet-
      ing any kind of anticipated           national   defense emergency.          The National
      Plan does not cover the peacetime natural               disaster     program      The plan-
      ning assumptions       contained    in the National      Plan remain val d today,
      broadly speaking,        although   there are additional         up-to-date planning as-
      sumptions,      agreed to on an interagency         basis,    available     to the agencies
      charged with civil        defense policy and planning.

             The primary objective        of emergency preparedness       plann ng, as stated
      in the National
      viva1 and recovery
                           Plan, is nationa
                               would require
                                                  survival!
                                                involvement
                                                              and recovery.      rlr
                                                                                  ational
                                                                of all levels of govern-
                                                                                             sur-

      ment; but the Federal Government, by virtue of its war powers, must ex-
      ercise    pervasive   direction     and control    in the interest     of national     sur-
      vival.     The Federal Government is responsible            for the direction       and co-
      ordination     of the total     national  civil    emergency preparedness        program.

      Responsibilities

              Under the National     Plan, OEP is responsible      for advising      and as-
      sisting    the President    in determining     policy  for planning,     directing,      and
      coordinating     all nonmilitary      emergency preparedness,     including      civil
      defense.      OCD is responsible      for the civil   defense activities       specified
      by the Federal Civil       Defense Act of 1950, as amended, and by Executive
      Order No. 10952, including         the formulation,    development,     execution,     and
      administration      of the national      civil defense program.

            Other Federal agencies have been assigned emergency responsibili-
      ties and functions     related   to their   basic missions    and capabilities.
      For example, Federal food and medical stockpiles           are the responsibility
      of the Secretary    of Agriculture      and the Secretary   of Health,     Education,
      and Welfare,   respectively.       Federal preparedness    and mobilization      func-
      tions for electric     power are centered      in the Secretary   of the Interior.

            Each State is responsible   for the preparedness       and emergency opera-
      tions of the State and its political      subdivisions     and for ensuring   that
      such activities  are compatible   with those of the Federal Government.
      The government of each political     subdivision     is responsible   for its pre-
      paredness and emergency operations     in accordance with Federal and State
      plans and programs.

            The private  sector    is responsible,      in cooperation    with appropriate
      Government agencies,    for planning     and executing      measures designed to
      ensure the continuing     functioning    or rapid restoration       of the essential
      elements of the national       economy.    Individuals     are responsible   for their
      own emergency needs and for participation            in the general survival     and
      recovery  effort.


                                                   47
APPENDIX II


Civil    defense

       The National          Plan includes     a general outline       of planned and or-
ganized actions         in    an emergency to protect       lives and property          and to
maintain     or restore         services    and facilities    essential     to survivial.
These actions        are     classed as (1) preventive--lessening             vulnerability    to
anticipated       attack       effects--and    (2) remedial--providing         the means to
sustain     survivors        and aid their     recovery.

        Five principal      programs --damage assessment,       communication,      trans-
portation,     military     support,   and resource   supply--provide        support to
the preventive        and remedial    civil defense programs.        Certain    adminis-
trative     measures --such as financial       support for emergency operating
centers,     State and local      personnel   and administration,      and OCD-conducted
research     and development      programs-- support   the overall     civil    defense
program.




                                                 48
                                                                                      APPENDIX III
                         EXECUTIVE       OFFICE     OF THE PRESIDENT
                               OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
                                      WASHINGTON,    D.C.    20504

                                                                                           OFFICE   OF THE   DIRECTOR




Xr . Irvine       M. Crawford                                                   17    February         1971
Assistant       Director,      Civil   Division
United     States      General    Accounting                Office
;Vashington,       D. C. 20548
Dear       Mr.     Crawford:

Thank you for              the opportunity          to review           your       draft     report          on
the structure,               activities    and      status    of        civil        defense      in    the
United    States.

&ly comments            follow:

1.     The material            on pages       13, 14 and 23 on assumptions                     regard-
ing the threat             is presumably          drawn     from The National              Plan for
Emergency       Preparedness,             which     was published          in 1964.          It is
suggested        that      this     source     be cited.         Although        the planning
assumptions          referred         to remain,       broadly       speaking,       valid       today,
there     are fully          up-to-date        planning       assumptions,          agreed       on an
interagency         basis,        available       to the agencies            charged       with
civil     defense       policy       and planning.            These planning           assumptions,
however,       are classified              and are not available               to the public.

2.     As        a matter  of information,      the developments      and events
listed           on pages  37-38   have been taken     into   account    in recent
reviews           of the civil    defense  program.

3.     It is suggested        that     the language                   in line    6, page 38 be
modified       to read ” . ..Preparedness            to              make a study     of the
civil     defense    program,      with   particular                    emphasis    on . ..‘I

4.     As regards    the Presidentially          directed       study    of the rela-
tionship     between    disaster     assistance       and civil       defense,
referred     to on page 38, I was not aware                of efforts       by your
office    to obtain     information       on this     study.       However,    it
would    not be appropriate,         in any event,         for    me or members     of
my staff     to comment      on this    study    before      it has been reviewed
by the President.

I note     that         you have     referred       your        draft     report        to the
Department            of Defense       for    review.
Sincerely,


   Y
Gefr A..
Director

                                                    49
  APPENDIX IV



                                         AS§iSTANT      SECRETARY     QF DEFENSE
                                                WASHINGTQH,   D. C.   ‘20301




                                                                                   5 MAR 1971
SYSTEMS   ANALYSIS




               Mr. C. M. Bailey
               Director,   Defense Division
               U.S. General Accounting      Office
               Washington,   D. C. 20548

               Dear Mr. Bailey:

                      The draft   General Accounting          Office Report on the "Study of
               the Structure,     Activities,         and Status of Civil Defense in the United
               States,"    (OSD Case #3213) forwarded by your letter               of December 17,
               1970 has been reviewed.            In general,      we consider the report      a realistic
               analysis   of the current        civil    defense posture,     its capabilities
               and its limitations.           As indicated     in the introductory      comments
               attached,    we appreciate       the objective       approach taken by your office
               and the expenditure        of time to perform this in-depth           review.

                       The report      states that the complementary         relationship      between
               active and passive defenses has been weakened by the reduction                       trend
               in civil     defense budgets compared to increases              in active defenses.
               This shift       in budget emphasis during recent years is acknowledged
               but it is felt        the implication       in the report   that there has been a
               reduction      in priority      and emphasis on civil     defense preparations          is
               incorrect.         The discussion     on pages 16 and 17 should be expanded to
               point.out     that the national        involvement    in military      operations    in
               Southeast Asia in mid and late 1960s created overriding                     requirements
               which forced budget increases             in active forces and necessitated
               tighter    fiscal     constraints     on all non-Southeast       Asia programs of the
               Department.

                      Another factor     which should be taken into consideration           in
               analyzing    the declining     trend in civil     defense appropriations       is the
               reluctance     of Congress to approve appropriations           for civil   defense
               in the amounts requested by the Administration.                This is reflected
               in the table on page 12 of the report.             For the nine year period
               shown, the Congress has been willing            to appropriate     only 43% of the
               funds requested.       This has resulted      in a growing tendency in the
               Executive    Branch to limit      budget requests     to lower levels.



                                                        50
                                                                       APPENDIX IV
*      The report points out "it would seem that the time is appropriate
to reconsider      the needs of civil    defense and the best method of
meeting such requirements."          The Department is acutely aware of the
necessity     for this reevaluation.      As noted in the report,     there are
two Administration      study efforts    underway which bear directly      on this
subject,     one of which is now awaiting      review by the National     Security
Council.      The Congress is also aware and concerned about the need for
reevaluation      of the program.     The House Armed Services Committee
started    hearings on October 13, 1970, for a general review of
program developments       since 1963.

      At the present level of funding,          OCD is limited       to a national
civil   defense program based primarily         on the use of existing        resources.
Under such a program there is no way to compensate for inadequacy
in existing    resources,    such as fallout      shelter.     This type of program
places maximum     stress on the management capability            of State and
local governments.        OCD has attempted     to emphasize this aspect of
civil   defense readiness,      fully recognizing       and exploiting    the fact
that this kind of local and State readiness               is equally applicable
to non-nuclear     emergencies.

       While we believe that the present OCD programs are effective          in
readying State and local governments for all types of emergencies,
we agree that the present gap in fallout     shelter    availability    will
continue to widen if the national    civil  defense program must continue
to rely on resources    which are developed essentially       for other
purposes.

       Attached    are detailed   comments prepared by OCD on specific
sections     of the report.     Following  the introductory    remarks,   these
comments are organized by the major recommendations            or suggestions
set forth     on pages 3 - 5 of the report,      followed   by a general list
of corrections      and suggested clarifying     changes.
                                                                [See GAO note.1
                                                Sincerely,



                                                Philip A. Odeen
                                          Principal    Deputy Assistant
                                             Secretary   of Defense

Attachments

GAO note:        OCD's general list of corrections   and suggested
                 clarifying  changes have been considered and in-
                 corporated  in the body of the report.




                                           51
      APPENDIX IV

                                     INTRODUCTORY REMARKS


    The Department of Defense appreciates       and wishes to thank the General
    Accounting  Office   for the thorough in-depth      objective    study that was made
    in order to develop the Draft Report representing           a study of the structure,
    activities  and status of Civil Defense in the United States.              The review
    was spread over a period of about 18 months with varying             levels of manpower
    assigned and included    reviewing   the history    and current     status of civil
    defense programs conducted at Federal,        State and local levels.

    The GAO staff    took the time to extensively          read and review all the basic
I   program documents relating       to Civil Defense, including          several DOD Damage
    Limiting  studies,   Congressional     hearings and reports,         material    on Civil
    Defense Interagency     Relationships,     Legislative     Reporting    materials,     the
    Federal Civil Defense Guide, the Annual Report,             and the Annual Statistical
    Report.   They also visited      Regional,    State and local Civil Defense offices
    to observe Civil Defense "at work."

    The findings,    conclusions     and recommendations     resulting     from the study again
    demonstrates    what can result     from a detailed     study.     Every agency or committee
    that has studied the vulnerability          of the United States to nuclear attack has
    come to the conclusion       that a strong civil     defense program is vital        to the
    security   of the nation.       Such studies made since World War II are numerous.
    They include the Bull and Hopley studies within             the Military    establishment     in
    1946 and 1948, respectively;        Project   East River in 1952; the Kefauver Committee
    Report in 1955; the Holifield         Subcommittee report in 1956; the Gaither Panel
    report   in 1957; the Hart report       in 1960; the Holifield       Subcommittee report
    in 1962; the Hebert House Armed Services Subcommittee hearings and report                   in
    1963; and the National       Academy of Sciences study in 1963.

    This    GAO report  also implicitly    recognizes    the need for    and value   of the
    civil    defense program.

    The history  of the civil  defense piogram is thus full of detailed   justification
    of need, but as the GAO report illustrates,     this history has been short of
    program funds to accomplish    the recognized requirements.

    The Department of Defense and the Administration      recognize   the need for broad
    policy decisions   on Civil  Defense and such decisions    are expected to be made
    soon after   the two studies  referred to in the report are completed and acted
    upon by the President.




                                                 52
                                                                                APPENDIX IV

. ~ GAO Recommendation     or Suggestion

         "Questions    have been raised concerning    the need for new directions
         of effort    and doubts expressed on the nature of some underlying
         civil   defense assumptions,   concepts and policies;    and it would
         seem that the time is appropriate      to reconsider  the needs of civil
         defense and the best method of meeting such requirements."

    DOD Comments

         Broad policy decisions      on the future   direction    of civil  defense in
         the U.S. are needed.       The OEP civil   defense study and the Nelson
         Committee investigations      should provide these decisions,       hopefully
         in the near future.      In addition,    a special    subcommittee  of the
         House Armed Services Committee started         hearings on the civil
         defense program on October 13, 1970.

         The national      fallout    shelter    policy was adopted in 1961 for the
         reasons provided on pages 9 and 10 of the GAO report.                    In addition,
         cost was an important         consideration.         Successive DOD studies have
         shown that a fallout         shelter    system is the most cost-effective
         (cost per life saved) defensive              system.      Only the first   phase of
         the policy envisioned         in 1961, e.g. the identification           of fallout
         shelter     in existing    structures,      has been implemented.        Lack of
         legislative      authority    for shelter       incentive     payments and restrictive
         budgets have not permitted           progression       to the provision    of additional
         shelter     where the survey of existing            structures    could not meet the
         need.

         The following     comments relate       to the issues     raised    on civil    defense
         at the bottom     of page 36.

         Given the decision       to limit civil   defense measures to a fallout
         shelter   oriented    program, considerations      of risk are not germane.
         Fallout,   depending on the winds, may occur anywhere in the U.S.
         following    a nuclear attack.     Cities    or industrial       areas cannot be
         totally   written   off as unsuitable     for fallout      shelter     because no
         one can predict     exactly which cities      or industrial        areas will be
         targeted.

         In damage limiting    studies,   although enemy weapons must be targeted           as
         rationally  as possible,     many different       sizes and types of attacks    are
         studied.   No one could accurately        predict     which of the anticipated   attacks,
         if any, an enemy might use,        But this is not to say that risk oriented
         programs which would provide blast shelters              in the larger cities  would
         not have advantages.      Hypothetical      alternative     programs have been studied
         and show that blast shelters       would save additional         people at more cost.




                                                     53
APPENDIX IV
                                                                                            ,    ’


   Many fallout       shelter facilities       provide low-level         blast protection
                                                                                                     . .
   and-recent      research reveals that new building               designs can be
   "slanted"     to provide significant          additional      blast and fire pro-
   tection    at incremental     costs of $30 to $60 per space.                This is
   much less expensive than single-purpose                  blast shelters.      The technical
   basis exists       for such a modest blast shelter              program and could be
   included    in an experimental        shelter     program, if the funds were made
   available     by the Congress.

   Another cost-effective       method of obtaining        additional    shelter,
   where needed, is the provision          of portable     ventilation    devices
   (developed by OGD) to increase the capacity              of many below ground
   shelter    areas.    Below ground shelter       provides    some increased
   protection      from the direct   effects   of nuclear weapons.         Funds were
   requested     for the procurement      and distribution       of these devices in
   FYS 1965, 1966 and 1967 but were denied by the Congress.                    Requests
   have been deferred       in recent years because of budgetary           restrictions.
   Damage limiting      studies and the OEP study have taken into considerations
   the developments       on pages 3, 37 and 38 of the GAO report.




                                               54
                                                                            APPENDIX IV
 .
GAO'Recommendation     or Suggestion

     "In this regard,     in view of       the current   substantial lack of shelter
     space it appears that early           consideration   should be given to whether
     actions     should be initiated       to increase the number of available
     shelter     spaces3 especially      in those areas which are currently    under-
     protected."

DOD Comments

     As stated in Chapters 4 and 7 of the GAO report,                  OCD does not have
     the authority      to construct      or pay for the construction        of public
     shelter     to overcome deficits       of shelter.       Requests for authorizing
     legislation     were made to the Congress and $460 million              was included
     in the FY 1963 budget, $175 million              in the FY 1964 budget, and
     $93.3 million      in the FY 1965 budget to make incentive             payments to
     public and non-profit        private     organizations      for the incorporation
     of fallout     shelter   in new and existing         buildings   where shelter     is
     needed such as in areas outside of major cities.                   The authorizing
     legislation     and consequently       the appropriations       were not approved.

     Sums of $10 million     in FY 1967, $2.5 million    in FY 1970 and $1.5
     million    in FY 1971 were included in budget requests       to test shelter
     incentive    payments.    Such tests do not require   authorizing    legislation.
     These amounts were also denied by the Congress.         The FY 71 test
     envisioned    incentive   payments of only $10 per added shelter       space.

     Many below ground shelter            areas in existing      buildings     cannot be used
     to capacity     because of lack of ventilation.              The capacity       of many of
     these shelters        could be increased      dramatically       if portable      ventilation
     kits,    developed by OCD, could be provided.               Funds in the amounts of
     $50 million     in FY 1965, $25 million           in FY 1966 and $6 million           in FY 1967
     were requested        of the Congress for procurement            and distribution         of
     portable    ventilation      kits.      These requests were denied.           When our budgets
     were further      restricted       (beginning   in FY 1968) due to the Vietnam war,
     requests for these devices were deferred.                  Cur latest     estimate      is that
     portable    ventilation      kits can provide additional            below ground shelter
     spaces, where needed, at a cost of about $1.20 per space,

     Less than standard fallout    shelter spaces3 as an interim  measure, for
     use in Community Shelter   Planning are identified   by the National   Fallout
     Shelter Survey and the Home Fallout    Protection  Survey.  Further  informa-
     tion on this point is provided in the comments on page 30.




                                             . 55
  APPENDIX IV
GAO Recommendation      or Suggestion                                                               L         .

     "In addition   to actions     already underway--shelter      identification,                       . .
     warning and'detection      systems, financial     assistance    to states and
     local communities     and research and development--or         proposed for
     action by the Office     of Civil Defense (See Chapter 3), the Secretary
     of Defense should seek the fullest        cooperation     of departments     of the
     Government, which are, or will be, involved           in programs which have
     the potential    of providing     vast quantities   of fallout     shelter   space,
     such as mass transit      and housing."

DOD Comments

     We concur with the recommendation            and, in fact,         are now carrying      it
     out.     On October    28,  1969,  the   President       signed    Executive     Order  11490
     assigning    emergency praparedness         functions,       including     civil   defense,
     to various Federal Agencies.           The general provisions             of this order
     contained    a statement     that all Agencies authorized              to engage in
     building    construction     shall plan, design, and construct                such buildings
     to.protect    the public to the maximum extent feasible.                    Where empowered
     to extend Federal financial          assistance,       they shall encourage recipients
     of such assistance        to use standards       for planning,        design, and construction
     which will maximize protection           for the public.

     The Executive     Order has been extremely        helpful    in getting     OCD personnel
     entry into Federal Agencies to discuss shelter.                 There is a significant
     difference    between Federally     owned and Federally          financed assisted
     projects.    Whereas the Agencies are involved            in construction      of Federally
     owned (non-military)      buildings    having a valuation          of about $2 billion    in
     Fiscal Year 1971, approximately         $7 billion      of Federal grant funds were
     used for financial      assistance   in construction        projects.

     OCD is now working with Agencies that previously                refused to have
     anything     to do with shelter      design and construction.          An example of
     this is the Post Office Department.            As  a result     of  increased  coordination
     during the past year (and the new Executive             Order),     they are including
     fallout     protection    in the design of many of their new post office
     facilities.        This is a major accomplishment       that we hope can be extended
     to other Agencies,        especially   those involved     in programs to give financial
     aid on construction.

     Under 50 USC App. 2287, the Secretary                   of Defense is mandated to design
     construction      authorized      under the annual Military          Construction        Authorizatio
     Acts using OCD protection             techniques.        This has been helpful       in producing
     shelter     on military     installations          which have a significant       civilian
     population.       Further     this shelter         can be made available     to communities
     adjacent     to the military        installations.




                                                 56
                                                                                     APPENDIX IV

PGAO Rec&mendation          or Suggestion

    “GAO   believes      that   the Secretary   of Defense should     also   undertake
    a review of the current           minimum Federal fallout     protection       standard
    to see if it should be revised            downward to provide     for encouraging
    use of the 'best available'            space in an area to meet population
    needs.       However, if a change to the current         standard     is not
    considered       appropriate    then the public    should be made aware of
    those shelters         which do not meet the minimum Federal protection
    standard       and consequently     may not be marked and stocked for
    emergency use."

DOD Comments

    Any technically      based program must have a standard            as the goal
    of the program.        This means that both objective          and capability
    plans are required.         Objective    plans cover what is established
    as a desirable      goal for the future       and capability     plans cover
    the use of whatever is available            now. The Community Shelter
    Plans (CSP) are capabilities          plans.     The Federal guidance for
    developing      such plans states     that people should be matched to
    the best protected        space currently     available    even though less
    than PF 40. Provision          is also made for utilizing        shelter    at less
    than 10 square feet per occupant,            and exceeding movement-time
    standards     as necessary.       None of these exceptions       are deemed
    desirable,      but are practical     measures to be taken in case an
    attack     occurs before the shelter        system can be completed.

    The PF 40 standard   has been adopted as a civil      defense planning
    objective   for the future.   This standard was lowered three times
    (from PF 5000 to PF 40) over the period 1955 to 1962 as more was
    learned about weapons phenomena.         The basis for PF 40 is provided
    in the attached Federal Civil      Defense Guide, Part A, Chapter 1,
    Appendix 1, September 1967.      It must be remembered that this is a
    goal not only for identifying      shelter   but for designing  it into
    new construction.     If every citizen     could have at least this
    shelter near his home and place of work several million     more
    people could be saved in the event of an attack   than if every                                  3

    one had, for example, PF 20 protection.  In addition,    millions                         more
    would      escape   radiation     sickness   and be in better         physical     con-
    dition  to emerge from shelter     and aid in recovery     of the nation.
    Expressed differently,    the fallout    shelter    with a higher PF can
    cope with a greater    number of fallout     contingencies    than one with
    a lower PF. The choice of PF 40 was a compromise between wide
     shelter     coverage     and significant     fallout   protection.




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   In summary, OCD believes    that        the PF 40 standard should be mainkained
   as the goal for the ultimate           national   shelter     posture to be actively.             '
   pursued in shelter   improvement          and shelter     development.    However,'
   this minimum goal should not           be considered      to be absolute when failure
   to meet the goal would result           in no improvement at all.         The "best
   available"   concept can and is         being applied in current        operational
   planning.  .

   With respect to shelter          development      in new construction,       insistence
   on a PF 40 minimum is obviously             not a practical     position     as long as
   OCD must rely on voluntary          participation      of building     owners and
   designers     to develop new shelter         space,    OCD provides      technical     design
   advice and assistance         to maximize the inherent         shelter    potential      in
   building     projects,   but must accept the decisions           made by the architect
   and owner and whatever protection              results   from their    action.      This
   subject is discussed        further    in the general section under comments on
   coordination      between Shelter Development and Community Shelter Planning.

   As will be seen from the following     material we are encouraging    the
   use of best available   protection  in local civil  defense operations    and
   planning  rather  than discouraging   such use.

   Beginning in FY 1965 the survey was expanded to include small structures
   (less than 50 capacity)       and best available         shelter   (less than PF 40) in
   shelter   deficit    areas of jurisdictions         preparing    CSPs. (The National
   Fallout    Shelter   Survey because of fund limitations            has, in recent years,
   been limited      to areas preparing     CSPs.)      Current survey procedures       call
   for looking for PF 20 or better          protection      and recording    protection   down
   to PF 10 in facilities       (other than one, two and three family homes) that
   have a potential       of 10 or more spaces.         In FY 1970 the survey identified
   6.6 million      PF 40f spaces, 5.8 million        PF 20-39 spaces and an estimated
   4 million    PF lo-19 spaces.      These data are provided to local governments
   for use in preparing       CSPs, These surveys looking for the "best available"
   space will be continued       to the maximum extent , subject           to fund availability.

     CSP guidance provides       for the use of PF 4Oi shelter               even though not
     licensed,    marked or stocked.         Protected        space is preeminent.        Even
     though a building       owner refuses       to sign a license agreement during
     peacetime,    in a war emergency he will not likely                 object to the use of
     his building    as a shelter.       Only about half of the structures                identified
 a;- as having PF 40f protection         are stocked and many of these are not stocked
     to capacity.     Many shelter      facilities        have potable water trapped in pipes
    and other receptacles        and,   especially        in larger buildings,         some food
    would normally be available.             Guidance       to  the  public   includes    advising
     them to bring certain       provisions        to public shelter,        and in most areas
     it is expected that radiation           will have decayed after about two days
     to the point that short foraging              excursions      can be made to obtain life
     sustaining    supplies.     Buildings       with a PF of 40 or greater           but less than




                                                58
                                                                           APPENDIX IV

  50 capacity    are not stocked and are used, as needed, in CSPs. With,
  respect to stocking,     it can be seen that facilities        providing  less
  than standard protection     are not treated    differently     than many
  standard shelters.     Local governments     are urged to have an increased
  readiness   plan, to be activated   during a period of strategic         warning,
  for marking with paper signs (provided        by OCD) all unmarked shelter
  facilities   intended  for occupancy (regardless        of PF), as well as
  emergency plans for supplying     shelters.

 Not all PF 40f shelters      should be stocked or stocked to capacity             as
 some are not properly     located in relation       to the population.        However,
 many of the nearly 98,000 facilities        identified        but unstacked should
 be stocked,  but our supply of shelter        supplies      is exhausted and our
 budgets and appropriations       have been reduced to the point we have been
 unable to procure needed shelter       supplies.       Moreover,      several of the
 medical kit items and much of the shelter           rations      should be replaced
 because of deterioration      due to age.

 If funds were available            for procurement   of shelter       supplies     it may be
 desirable    to mark and stock any public shelter               used in a CSP even
 though less than PF 40, but as better              shelter    comes into the inventory
 and substandard       shelter     is phased out, funds would be required                to cover
 the expense of moving the stocks to the better                  shelter.       In addition,
 experience     indicates      that if substandard      shelters     are marked and stocked
 as an interim      measure the pressure mounts to further                lower the shelter
 standard.      Certainly      a reluctance    on the part of local civil             defense
 officials    to move stocks from one shelter             to a better       shelter    could be
 anticipated.

 The point is raised that in areas having an excess of PF 40f shelter
 OCD makes no distinction          as to best available            shelter.       In such a
 situation     local planners will generally               use massive buildings         and
 below ground shelter         space which will provide the best protection
 against nuclear weapons effects,               in preference       to lighter      and smaller
 structures.       This, however, must be weighed against distance,                      as closer
 lesser protected       space may be superior            to better     protection     that is more
 distant     should the fallout       arrive      before people could get to distant
 shelters.       These  factors    enter     into    all CSP allocation         work whether or
 not enough standard shelter           is available.

 OCD does not support a change in current        CSP guidance to require
 advising  the public that fallout    protection     to which they are assigned
 may not meet the recommended Federal standard protection          factor.      If it
 is the best fallout     protection available    at the present time, they are
 being provided    for to the extent possible     with the resources     available.
 If the people know that some shelters        meet OCD standards   and others do not
 then it is possible     that far more people would try to crowd into the
 standard shelters    in an emergency causing them to be unhabitable.




U.S GAO, Wash., D.C.                         59
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