oversight

Cost and Effectiveness of Electronic Sensor and Surveillance Systems

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-06-10.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

    ?   ,: ”’ ,<-’ _,




/
                        lllllllllllllllllllllllllllIl
                              LM095632
                              COMPTROLLER       GEPJERAL    OF     THE      UNITED      STATES
                                              WASHINGTON.    DC.         20548




    B-163074
L
    Dear     Mr.    Chairman:

               In accordance      with your request,         the General       Accounting      Office
    has looked        into the cost and effectiveness            of electronic      sensor    and
     surveillance         systems    in the Department         of Defense.       The accompany-
    ing report       presents     an unclassified      version     of the significant      informa-
    tion developed.

              Under    separate     cover,   we are sending                          you a copy of a summary
    and compilation          of Federal    and State statutes                          relating  to electronic
    surveillance       published      June 18, 1970, by the                          Legislative    Reference
    Service      of the Library       of Congress.

             We noted      that your        statement         concerning         the electronic      battle-
    field  in the Congressional               Record        of March       23, 1971, cited       a total     cost
    of $3.25 billion.         The costs         cited    in our report          are applicable       only to
    the sensor        and surveillance            systems       and related         munitions    developed
    under     the‘auspiccs        of the Defense            Communications             Planning    Group       for
    use by the military            services        in Southeast        Asia.       The se costs    do not in-
    clude any costs         applicable        to tactical        data systems          currently    under       de-
    velopment        by the military          departments,           such as TACFIRE,            TSQ-73,
    and TOS, or any costs              applicable         to other     intelligence-gathering              de-
    vices,     such as night        observation         device      s developed        or under    develop-
    ment    by the individual          military        departments.

             Our   observations         and conclusions       have not been discussed           with
    officials   of the Department            of Defense.      We plan no further      distribu-
    tion of this report         unless     copies   are specifically    requested,     and then
    we shall distribute          copies     only after   your agreement       ha.s been obtained
    or public    announcement           has been made        by you concerning      the contents
    of the report.
                                                            Sincerely   your 6,




                                                                     Comptroller                 General
                                                                     of the United               States
    The Honorable       William   Proxmire
    Chairman,     Joint  Economic       Comrnittee
    Congress    of the United     States
                                                                  COST A!slD EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTRONIC
                                                                  SENSOR AND SURVEILLATjCE SYSTEHS
                                                                  Department   of Defense  B-163074
                                                                                         /
                                                                                     QJ
--DIGEST
      ----



        At the Chairman's           request,     the General     Accounting       Office   (GAO) has
        looked     into    -the cost and effectiveness           and certain       other   aspects     of
        electronic       sensor    -inh surveillance       systems     in the Departlnent        of Defense
        (DOlbj'; __Sensors      are electronic       devices     which    detect     the presence      and
        m?Z&ent        of vehicles      and personnel      in vicinities         where sensors      are
        located.

        To present            an unclassified         report,    GAO has      omitted     certain    detailed           in-
        formation           such as

             --operating         statistics        on sensor      systems 9
             --capability           of sensors      and readout        devices,
             --location         of monitoring        facilities,
             --available         statistics        on battle       damage assessrent,          and
             --design        objectives      and    characteristics          of future      sensor   systems.

         GAO's      observations         and conclusions         have   not    been     discussed    with       offi-
         cials      of DOD.

         The cost of the sensor       and surveillance        program    for fiscal                  years  1967
         through      1970 was $1.4 billion.       An additional      $219.7   million                  has been
         appropriated      for fiscal   year 1971.     (See pp. 7 and 8.)




         Mcmqement of sensor progwm

         Until    recently,       the development       5 production,       and procurement         of sensor
         devices     was centralized           in the Defense       Communications       Planning      Group
         (renamed      the Defense        Special    Projects      Group as of April         1, 1971).
         This Group was established               by the Secretary        of Defense       in 1966 to
         manage development           and deployment         of an electronic        sensor    system     to
         impede     the flow of men and supplies                from North     Vietnam     to South Vietnam.
         This initial        mission     was expanded        in April    1968 to include         a wide
         range of tactical           applications       of electronic       sensors     within    South
         Vietnam.        (See p. 6.)

         The Planning        Group was authorized        to assign    the tasks    of designing                       and
         developing      the equipment      necessary      to support    its program    to the                    mili-
         tary    departments      and other    agencies.      Funds for these      tasks were

 Tc.tr Slwct
    included        in the budgets            of the          military departments                     but        were        con-
    trolled        by the Planning            Group.           (See p. 6.1

    The Planning     Group was established        hurr iedly  and was given   an ex-
    tensive   program    to accomplish     in a very limited      time.   It appears                                                 that
    the organization       succeeded   in its effor ts with      a minimum of false                                                  starts
    and development      of unworkable     devices.      (See p. 7.)

    Domestic        qx3P~eations

    The sensor        and surveillance         systems      developed        by the Planning     Group
    would have limited            applications         in domestic       law enforcement      because      of
    their     bulk,    size,    and cost.        These devices         were developed      primarily       to
    withstand       the rigors        of a battlefield          environment.        They are used
    primarily       in areas where any personnel                   or vehicle     movement   monitored       is
    considered        evidence      of unfriendly        activity.         Sensors    have been used by
    the U.S. Border          Patrol      to monitor      selected       portions    of the border      be-
    tween the United           States      and Mexico.        (See p. 10.)

    Title      III    of the Omnibus Crime Control                 and Safe                     Streets       Act of 1968
    prohibits         the manufacture,          possession,        sale,      or                 transportation         of de-
    vices      used primarily           for surreptitious          interception                        if distribution
    through        the mails        or some aspect        of interstate                        or foreign        commerce is
    involved.           The act does not prohibit               their     sale                  and distribution          to
    domestic         police      forces    and other      units    of local                     government        engaged    in
    legitimate          activities.         (See p. 10.)

    Uses and effectivensss        of
    sensors in Sowt7zeost -__I_Asia

    Sensors        have    been    used      in      Southeast          Asia      to

       --relieve          troops    from          routine       surveillance             and guard            duty,

       --monitor          the movement     of enemy                troops         and supplies               in       areas     inacces-
          sible      to     ground troops,

       --provide          early    warning           of     impending          attacks         by enemy           troops         on allied
           installations,           and

       --provide       intelligence                information         for use           in      setting          u      ambushes       and
           determining         patterns            of enemy        movements.                 (See p.        17. P

    Officials      of the military        services have stated     that   the sensors   and
    surveillance       devices   used in Southeast        Asia have been effective      combat
    tools.       GAO found it impracticable        to obtain     a complete   picture   of the
    results      of the sensor     surveillance    activity    from a review     of combat
t
    reports.       (See p. 17.)
               To objective'ly        evaluate        these     systems       from    the standpoint    of     effectivc-
               ness,     cost,    and/or     alternative         methods        is,   in GAO's opinion,        not
               feasible.         (See p. 17.) ._
                               -
               It is probable,    however,             that,      through    the use of these      systems,    some
               American    lives have been             saved;       enemy personnel,    vehicles,       and supplies
               have been destroyed;      and           fewer troops        have been required        to accomplish
               combat missions.      What is             not clear-is-,        how many lives     have been saved,
               how much damage has been                inflicted        on the enemy,   and how many fewer
               troops   have been required.                   (See p. 17.)

               R~ZiabiZity        of sensors

               Sensor-aided       surveillance        sys-terns have undergone            a number of opera-
               tional     and technological         changes     in a relatively          short     period    of time.
               A number of these           changes    have improved       sensor      performance         and reliabil-
               ity.     The newer sensors          have been designed         to be more able to withstand
               severe     implant    shock and changes          in climatic        conditions       during     and
               after    implant.       GAO has been informed           that   sensors        are relatively        immune
               to destruction        from artillery          and that    generally        a direct      hit  is re-
               quired     to render      them inoperable.          (See p. 18.)

               From 1968 to 1970 unit         costs     of sensors    in general    have been reduced
               and their     useful    field  lifetimes       have been increased.       The daily  in-the-
               ground    cost of a particular         sensor,     for example,   has be,.n reduced    by
               47 percent.        (See p. 19.)

               Use   2x4   fereigx cow~t~-~~s
                                     -   --
               Sensors   have       been provided           to the Australian      Forcer;    in       South Vietnam.
               The Australian          Government         reimburses    the United     States          Government   for
               the equipment          provided.         (See p. 20.)

               Interest     has been expressed                by several        foreign      governments      in sensor
               equipment.      DOD is currently                 considering        providing       equipment     similar    to
               that     used in Southeast   Asia              to some of        these     foreign     governments.       (See
               p. 20.)

               Necessity for proceed&g tiith future                        procummnt
               md dez)eZopnmt of sensor syst-e%-

               Purchase       of newer sensors       is continuing       in order     for DOD to provide             the
               South Vietnamese          with   a detection      and intelligence         capability.        It is
               impracticable,         in GAO's opinion,        to objectively        evaluate       the effective-
               ness of existing          sensor   systems.       Because     of this    fact,     it appears       to
               be a question        of policy     that    the executive       branch    and the Congress
               should     decide   on the need for newer sensors                or development         of more ad-
               vanced models.           (See p. 21.)


Tear
____ Sheet--




                                                                   3
Officials of the military   departments have stated that no additional
personnel will be required to operate and monitor sensor and surveillance
systems in the future.    Support units_ required to operate these systems
will be provided from within the existing     manpower available to the
services.   (See p. 24.)

Sensors apparently have increased the services'     ability   to monitor the
movement of enemy forces and to make more efficient       use of military
personnel in combat areas.   GAO has, however, found no indications       that
the use of these devices will result  in any reductions in overall mili-
tary manpower requirements.   (See p. 24.)




                                  4
                                                         Cant-ents
                                                                                              Page

                                 DIGEST                                                         1
!
                                 CHAPTER

                                    1      IKTRODUCTION                                         5
                                               Integrated Battlefield    Control  System        5
                                               Sensor and Surveillance    Systems               5

                                    2      MANAGEMENTOF SENSOR PROGRAM                          6
                                              Establishment  of the Defense Communica-
                                                tions Planning Group                            6
                                              Control and Cost of the Sensor Program            7

                                    3      POTENTIAL UTILIZATION OF SFSJSORSBY DOMESTIC
                                           LAW ENFORC~&lT AGENCIES                             10

                                    4      OPE?J~TIONALUSE ,kND EFFECTIVEMZSS OF SFXSORS
                                           IN SOUTHEASTASIA                                    11
                                               Duel Blade                                      11
                                               Igloo White                                     13
                                               Duffel     Bag                                  15
                                               Effectiveness    of Sensor Systems in South-
                                                  east Asia                                    17
                                               Reliability    of Sensors                       18
                                               Utilization    by Foreign Countries             20

                                    5      NEED FOR FUTURE SENSORAND SURVEILLMCE
                                           SYSTEMS                                             21
                                               Necessity    for Proceeding with Future
                                                 Procurement and Development of Sensor
                                                 Systems                                       21
                                                   Use of Sensors by South Vietnamese
                                                       Forces                                  21
                                                    Management and cost of sensors sys-
                                                       tems in the future                      22

                                    6      MANPOWERREQUIREXENT FOR FUTURE SENSOR
                                           SYSTEMS                                             24




    -I   -_-,.   _1   --..   .
EXHIBIT                                                       Page

   A       Estimated Defense Communications    Planning
       .     Group Program Cost from Inception     through
             Fiscal Year 1971                                  29

APPEXDIX

   I       Letter    dated Augast 20, 1970, from Senator
              William Proxmire,    Chairman, Joint Economic
              Committee,   United States Congress to the
              Comptroller   General. of the United States      33

                              .AEiBRWIATIONS

DOD        Department      of Defense

DkSZ       Demilitarized      Zone

GAO        Generr;l   Accounting     Office
         DIGEST
         __----

         GJHY ‘I’HE RFVIiW           f,‘.& /,‘;ll’X
                                     _-__I_

                 At the Chairman's           request,     the General     Accounting        Office   (GAO) has
                 looked     into    the cost and effectiveness            and certain        other   aspects    of
                 electronic       sensor     and surveillance       systems      in the Department         of Defense
                 (DOD).       Sensors     al%-
                                             L electronic     devices    which      detect     the presence      and
                 movement       of vehicles      and personnel      in vicitlities         where sensors     are
                 located.

                 To present            an unclassified               report,   GAO has      omtted     eel*tain   detailed           in-
                 formation           such as

                      --operating          statistics      on sensor       systems,
                      --capability            of sensors     and readout          devices,
                      --location          of monitoriIlg      facilities,
                      --available          statistics      on battle       d;:::;age assessiirznt,          and
                      --design         objectives       2nd characteristics             of future        sensor   systems.

                 GAO's       observations               and conclusions        have   not    been    discussed    with       offi-
                 cials       of DOD.

                 The cost of the sensor       and surveillance        program    for fiscal                       years  19Gi
                 through      1979 was $1.4 billion.       An additional      $219.7   million                       has been
                 appropriated      for fiscal   year 1971.     (See ppo 7 and 6.)




                 P!~lcrc/n~mt:
                 __Jc-                 of ---.ce?k-or     progjl~m

                 Until    recently,       the development,         production,       and procurement         of sensor
                 devices      was centralized          in the Defense        Communications       Flanning      Group
                 (renamed      the DeFense Special           Projects      GI-GUP as of April         1, 1971).
                 This Group was established               by the Secretary         of Defense       in 1966 to
                 manage development           and deployment          of an electronic        sensor    system     to
                 impede     the flcv,i, of men and supplies             from North      Vietnam     to South Vietnam.
                 This initial        mission      was expanded       in April    1968 to include          a wide
                 range of tactical           applications       of electronic        sensors    within     South
                 Vietnam.        (See P. 6.)

                 The Planning       Group was aut!-iorized      to assign    the tasks    of designing                             and
                 developing     the equipment      necessary      to support    its program    to the                          mili-
                 tary   departments      and other    agencies.      Funds for these      tasks were




- .__.     . . . .-      ,
            included        in the budgets            ofthe        military         dcpartmsnts       but        were     con-
            trolled        by the Planning            Group.        (See p.         6.)

            The Planning     Group was established        hurriedly       and was given an ex-
            tensive   program    to accomplish     in a very-limited          time.   it appears                                 that
            the organization       succeeded   in its efforts        with    a minimum of false                                  starts
            and development      of unworkable    devices.        (See p. 7.)



            The sensor        and surveillance         systeals    developed        by the Planning      Group
            would have limited            applications        in domestic       law enforcement       because     of
            their     bulk,    size,    and cost.       These devices         were developed       primarily       to
            withstand       the rigors       of a battlefield          environment.        They are used
            primarily       in areas where any personnel                  or vehicle     movement   monitored        is
            considered        evi dcnce of unfriendly           activity.         Sensors    have been used by
            the U.S. Border          Patrol     to monitor      selected       portions    of the border       be-
            tween the United          States      and Mexico.        (See p, 10.)

            Title      III    of the Omnibus Crime Control                   and Safe           Streets       Act of 1368
            prohibits         the manufacture,          possession,         sale,      or        transportation         of de-            '
            vices      used primarily           for surreptitious            interception              if distribution
            through        the mails        or some aspect        of interstate                or foreign        commerce is
            involved.           The act does not prohibit                their      sale        and distribution          to
            domestic         police      forces    and other      ut,its    of local            government        engaged    in
            legitimate          activities.         (See p. 70.)

            Uses    and eff~ctizmcss                 of
            sensors in Southasi;
                             -cI               Aoin

            Sensors        have    been    used      in    Southeast        Asia      to

               --relieve          troops    from      routine       surveillance             and guard       duty,

               --monitor          the movement     of enemy             troops        and supplies          in    areas     inacces-
                  sible      to     ground troops,

               --provide          early    warning         of   impending          attacks     by enemy          troops     on allied
                   installations,           and

               --provide       intelligence               information       for use in setting              up ambushes             and
                   determining         patterns           of enemy      movements.    (See p.            17.)
    :   -

:
    I
            Officials      of the military       services have stated     that   the sensors   and
            surveillance       devices   used in Southeast       Asia have been effective      combat
1           tools.       GAO found it impracticable       to obtain     a complete   picture   of the
            results      of the sensor     surveillance   activity    from a review     of combat
            reports.       (See p. 17.)
To objectively        evdluate       thesl          system;      from    the standpoint    of effcctive-
ness,     cost,   and/or    alternative              methods       is,   in GAO's opinion,    not
feasible.       (See p0 17.)

It is probable,    however,                 that,      through      the ;sc of these systems,        some
American    lives have be!?n                saved;       enerr.5' personnel,   vehicles,      and supplies
have been destroyed;       and              fcwr       troops      have been required       to accomplish
combat missicns.      C/hat is                not clear         is, how miny lives       have been saved,
how much damage hat been                    inflicted         on the et:emy,   and how many fewer
troops   have been required.                       (See p0 17.)



Sensor-aided       surveillance         systems    have undergone           a number of opera-
tional     and technological          chwges     in a relatively           short     period    of time.
A number of these           chanc,;es Ilave irr:provcd      sensor      performance         and reliabil-
ity.     The ncwet* sensors          have been designed          to be more able to withstand
severe     implant    shock and changes          in climatic         conditions       during     and
after    implant.       Gkr) has been jnformed           that    sensors      arc relatively         immune
to destruction        from artillery          and that     generally        a direct      hit  is re-      ,
quired     to render      them inoperable.           (See p. 18.)

From 19G8 to 1970 unit         ccsts        of sensors     in general       have been reduced
and their     useful   field   liftttitzs         halve ken    incrczc?.        The daily   in-thz-
ground    cost of a particular            sensor,      for example,      has been 13educed by
47 percsrit.       (See p* 19.)

 USt3 3iJ
--._        ~fc3i?7i~~-r(?:I'i1;~-.~~

Sensors   have           been provided          to the Australian      Forces     in      Scuth Vietnam.
The Australian              Governr::ent       reilnbut-scs the United     Statzs         Governme!~t  for
the equipment             provided.          (See p. 20.)

Interest     has been expressed                  by several        foreign      yovernmcnts      in sensor
equi pinent.     DOD is currently                  considering        providing       equipment     similar    to
that     used in Southeast    Asia               to some of        these     foreign     governments.       (See
p. 20.)




Purchase       of newer            sensors    is continuing       in orcier for D3D to provide                 the
South     Vietnamese             with    a detection      and intelligence          capability.         It is
impracticable,         in          GAO's opinion,       to ob.jecti;fely       evaluate       the cffective-
ness of existing                 sensor    systems.       Because     of this     fact,     it appears       to
be a question        of          policy    tha t the executive          branch    and the Congress
should     decide    on          the need for newer sensors               or dcvelo~metlt        of more ad-
vanced models.                  (See p. 21.)




                                                       3
kb2pmcr      -re~uiramcnts      for    fxtLtm    sensor system

Officials       of the military       departmen~ts~have          stated    that    no additional
personnel       will   be required     to operate        and monitor       sellsor   and surveillance
sys tems in the future.            Support     units     required       to operate    these      systems
will      be provided    from within       th e existing       manpo,k/er available        to the
services.         (See p. 24.)

Sensors   apparently       have increased         the     services'     ability      to monitor     the
movement    of enemy forces       and-to      make      more efficient          use of military
personnel     in combat areas.         GAO has,         however,     found no indications           that
the use of these        devices   will     result       in any reductions          in overall      mili-
tary   manpower     requirements.        (See p.        24.)




                                             4
                                                                                .   .   - .   . I   - ,   . _




                                        CHAPTER 1
                                        ----

                                     INTRODTTCTICN
                                     __-- --

            The Chaisxxn b .I uint Economic Co,mmittee, in a letter
    dated August 20, 1970, requested            the General Accounting          Of-
    fice to make an investigation           of the cost,   effectiveness,
    and certai.n     other aspects of- L1-l.eelectronic     battlefield         pro-
    gram.       (See app. I.)     To presmt: an unclassified         report,      we
    have omitted      cc:rta.in detailed    information   such as operating
!   statistics)      capability    ef sensors and readoclt devices,           lo-
    cation      of monitoring   facilitFes,     available  statistics        on
    battle      dnmzgc assesx~f-nt 9 ai~ci design objec:ti.ves     and c'flarac-
    teristics      of flltu-re senscer sys-Leii.5 y Our observations         and
    conclusiorts     have noT been di scussed with officials            of the
    Department      of Defense.

I   INTEGRATED-A.2~d.-p
    ---            T3~'I'YYL":FIIXD   CONXCL
                               _-..------    -. SYSTEH  .I
            The term 'lelectronic         bat tlefield'?      has been used i-n the
    past to de:;cribc      tl;e sensor and surveillance                program in
    Southeast Asia.        It he.5 al.~o been confused with the Army's
    future    plans for the Integrated             battlefield        Control   System
    in which seiisors ar.~cl surveill~.:nce           devices will play a major
    role,     these devices will          provide     the comninlider with current
    intelligence      data which, when combined wirh information                       from
    other intelligence         sources, will         assist     him in making com-
    mand and control       decisions.           The total      Integrated     Dattleficld
    Control     System concept envisions             a future      Army built     around
    an integrated      system that exploits             the advanced technology
    of communications,         sen.sors, fire        direction,       and the required
     automatic    data processing         Lsystems and equipment.


             Sensors are electronic      devices which are used to detect
    the presence and movement of vehicles            and personnel      in the
    vicinities      where sensors are implanted,         A sensor-aided      com-
    bat surveillance      system consists      basically     of (1) the sen-
    sors, (2) a communications         link (usually     radio)    from the
    sensor to a readout device,          (3) the readout device which re-
    ceives sensor transmissions,          and (4) the display        and proc-
    essing equipment which assist           in counting    the sensor acti-
    vations     and in analyzing    the data to determine        the di.rection
    and rate of movement of the detected            objects.
: -
i/_




                           MANAGDEPJTOF SF,Iu'sOR
                                               -----PROGRA?5
                                                        --

      I?sTA.BLISTM34T OF THE DEFENSE
      ?t!%ii?~TIONS    PLANNING GROUP

             Up to the present time, the management of the deve'lop-
      merit, production,     and procurement      of sensor devices has been
      centralized    in the Defense Communi.cations Planning Group
      (redesignated      the Defense Special Projects       Group as of
      April    1, 1971).    This Group was established        by the Secretary
      of Defense in September 1966 to manage the development and
      deploymen t of an anti-infiltration          system for Southeast Asia
      that would impede the flow of men and supplies             from North
      Vietnam to South Vietnam,          This initial    mission was-further
      expanded in April      1968 to include a wide ?_a:,::? of tactical
      applications     of electronic     sensors within    South Vietnam,

               The Director     of the Planning Group was authorized            direct
      contact     with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,           thz milf.tary    depxt-
      merits, and theater        commanders.     He ~:'as instructed      to report
      directly      to the Secretary      of Defense through the Director            of
      Defense Research and Engineering             for broad policy       and fund-
      ing decisions.        He 1572s also gLven the responsibility           and au-
      thority,     within    broad DOD guidance,       to m&e decisions        per-
      taining     to concept formulation,        design,    development,     test,
      requirements       analysis,    procurement,     and distribution      of
      equipment.

              In addition,     the Secretary       of Defense authorized          the
      Director     of the Planning Group to utilize                the resources      of
      the military      departments      and other agencies for the accom-
      plishment     of specific      tasks requiring        facilities     and man-
      power resources       not available       within   the Planning Group-
      These tasks included          engineering     design and development of
      sensors and related         equipment and munitions,             as well as the
      testing,     production     management, shippin:;          and continued      lo-
      gistic    support of these items.            Funds to accomplish         these
      tasks were included         in the budgets of the military              dcpart-
      ments; however, they were controlled               2nd     relcascd   only upon
      authorization      of the Planning Group.
                   ..

CONTROL AND COST OF TJIE SENSOR PROGRAM

       To ensure     system integrity,           the Planning Group retained
management responsibility             for planning,        system engineering,
establishment      of overall       schedules,       evaluation      and analysis
of theater     requirements,        financial       management, and identifi-
cation of specific         tasks to be assigned to the military                    de-
partments     and other agencies.             (This   management      responsibil-
ity of sensor systems for Souiheast Asia wi.11 be terminated
by June 30, 1971.          See p* 22,)         Instructions       issued to those
organizations      assisting       in   the  program      contained     specific
guidance on technicaL          configuration,         quantities      required,
target    schedules,     logistics        support,     funding    designations,
and other instructions           needed to direct          the effort     wj.thi.n
the parameters       of the overall.        program.

      The design,   development,    and production of the required,
equipment had to be expedited       because of the urgency of this
program.   Generally,     time was not spent restudying,   redesign--
ingr or repackaging      an item to determine whether a better
model could he produced,        As soon as an item under develop-
ment demonstr:ited    that it Wx~Id 187011=,it was put into yro-
duction.

       Equipment was designed only to witllstand        cnvironmcntal.
conditions     existing   in Southeast Asia.    These limited      envi-
ronmental    requirements    contributed   to a reduction     in the
development     cycle for the introduction     of new equipment from
about 6 years to between 15 and 21 months for most items.

       Since its inception     the Planning Group has sponsored
the development      of several different        types of sensors,         asso-
ciated ground and airborne        reLays,     other ancillary      equipment,
and the development of related          special     antipersonnel     and
antivehicular     munitions.     The latter      were designed to protect
sensors and to interdict       enemy troops and supplies           infil.trat-
ing on foot and in vehicles.          Illustrations        of several      air-
delivered     sensors used in Southeast Asia are on page 9.

       The Planning Group was established     hurriedly,      ‘and it was
given an extensive    program to accomplish     in a very limited
time.    It appears that,undcr    these circumstances,      the orga-
nization    succeeded in its efforts   with a minimum of false
starts   and development of unworkable     devices.      The cost of

                                            7
the Planning Group's program for fiscal        year 1967 through
1970 was about $1.4 billion.      An additional     $21.9.7 million
has been appropriated   for fiscal-year     1971, for a total       es-
timated  program cost from inception     through fiscal     year 1971
of about $1.6 billion.     A breakdown of these costs by mili-
tary service   and type of appropriation     is shown in cxhi.bit       A.




                                    8
.I.
      ;a ‘+..       ‘L
                ,- : .,A


                  P
                  ..-. ..-. .. ._.. _ --   .-                                        .-




                      .

                                                CHAPTER 3

                              POTENL'IAL UTILI>:ATION OF SENSORS

                          BY DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEKEL~T
                                                     AGFKIFS
                                                        ---
                 The sensor and surveillance      systems developed by the De-
         fense Communications       Planning Group appears to offer only
         limited     opportunities     for use by domestic law enforcement
         agencies because of their bulk, size, and cost.            These de-
         vices were developed primarily         to withstand  the rigors  of a
         battlefield      environment.

                The sensing devices developed by the Planning Group
         have application     primarily    in areas where any personnel      or
         vehicle movement monitored        is considered    evidence of un-
         friendly   activity.     The U.S. Border Patrol has been using
         these devices to monitor selected         portions    of the border be-
         tween Mexico and the United States and has been able to in-
         crease its apprehension        of persons attempting     to enter the
         country illegally,

                 Title    III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
         Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510-2520) prohibits                    the manufacture,
         possession?        sale, or transportation            of any mechanical device
         used primarily          for the purpose of surreptitious           interception
         if their      distribution       involves     the mails or some aspect of
         interstate       or foreign      conLmerce, However, the act restricts
         itself     from applying       to work done by officers,          agents, em-
         ployees,      or persons under contract             with the United States,
         a State, or a political             subdivision       of a State,    Therefore,
         it does not prohibit           distribution       and sale of sensor de-
         vices to domestic police forces and other units of local gov-
         ernment engaged in legitimate               activities     but does preclude
I
         such sale to other groups.
i:   -
                The Legislative        Reference Service of the Library   of
         Congress has prepared a compilation           of the Federal and State
         statutes      relating     to electronic surveillance.   This compila-
         tion,    entitled      "Wire Tapping and Eavesdropping,"    was pub-
         lished on June 18, 1970.




                                                    10
      The original        ,m:lssion of the Defense Communication,5
Plannj-ng Group was to develop an infi.i:-r.;:ti.n:n      and interdic*-
tion cnpaL)ility      to impede the Zlcw of vc,hicles       and personr,el
into South Vietnam.            The program was to include an air.-
supported,    anti-infiltrration        system in Laos    FiTId b&Trier
                                                                  a


system extendixg         along izl;e DeG2 i-carized Zoije (.R]Q) frol!l
the Gulf of Torikin ;;'hroug:~ the road and trail         net-x:ork in
Laos used by the infiltrators,




     TIx Jhel     Bind?,    Igloo   White,   and Duffei      Baz operations
are discussed     below.



        Duel Blade was to E!IlCoJ;!paSS      cleared   areas I.00 to 150
meters tn depth and Zt~~rOXiLKl2t~~iy          27 kilometers    long*     csce
illustration     on p* 12.)     The sides of the cleared           areas were
to be enc!.osed rJi;h barb?<1 ic:ire, rind the space bei:iaf:pn thz
wire obstacl.cs    w35 to be planted with antipersonnel               mines *
A lo-meter    ccnte:: strip   was to cont,>in sensors which wo111.d
be monitored     at the variolis      strorq; points     and forward    op?rat-
ing bases.

      The sensors and other cquipme:lt necessary to support
the Duel Blade operation        were delivered   to the tlleat-er    in
1967.   After  at) area 600 meters wide and 13 kilometers            long
had been clczr&,      construction    xas terminated    in June 1967
because of an adverse tactical        situation.     The fixed-barrier

                                      11
           z
           t-
      i
           u
     j:_   3
           x

           0
           v)




i
i
!

i.
      concept wa.s then abnndoncd in favor            of tactics  which called
      for the use of rnobfl.c, qui-ck-reacting          combat units   to re-
      spond to North Vi.ctna;xse   infiltration          in the area of the
      DPZ.

            Selecteci operatjng      bases of t&e originaL           Duel Blade
      concept are cur;Tently      funci:ior,ing,         and some hand-impLanted
      sensors are being u,~ed in the eastern portion                 of the DHZ.
      In the s;ie;;tern ptirtion,    air--deLiT<Tered s~l’r:s:.)rs   h3ve  bee11

      implanted,    and the GPllSOl?t~i3riSlX~~~!~iOll~;      are being reLa)7cd
      by aircraft    to a  monitoring      faci!.ity       at C?,uangTri.

      IGUN -TJ-EITE
             __-_--_




              The objective        of the antivehicular        subsystem is to de--
      tect and provide          intel.Ligence     information     for use in the
       interdiction       of enemy truck traffic          along specific    road
      networks,       in order to stop or reduce the flow oZ trucks
      carrying      f;roops and suppLies into South Vietllarn.             (See il-
      lustration        on p0 14 for a diagram of the concept of this
      systeme)        Both acoilstic      and seismic sensors are used in the
      antivehicular         subsystem and ar2 im?l.anted primarily            by F--4D
      jet aircraft        assigned to the Igloo White delivery             mission.
      Selected incapacitating             antipersonnel      mines a-re also air
I -
      delivered       by the F-4's to cause casualties              amang personnel
       in truck parks or storage areas and to protect                   sensors from
      retrieval.      by the enemy.

             Sensors are activated      by lrehicles  passing within     the
      detection    range.     The sensor transmissions     are then trans-
      mitted    to the Infiltration     Sur~,7eiLLance Center located      ii-1
      Thailand where they are analyzed by intelligence            specialists.


                                             13
.




    14
r
“ I I
        Targets   identified      by the Center arc reported            to the air
        control   system,     which   controls    the   strike    aircraft,     Nor-
        mally,  the forward       air control     aircraft     are then directed
        to the target      for visual     confirmation-and        for direction      of
        strike  aircraft.

                In addition to identifying       targets   for immediate strikes,
        the Center uses sensor data to establish             patterns    of enemy
        activity.     These patterns    indicate     the location      of truck
        parks and storage areas which are potential              targets    for la-
        ter air strikes,

               To complement the use of sensors in the Igloo White
        System, a specialized       munitions     package was developed.
        After    roads are closed by bombiIlg, mines are dropped along
        approaches to the destroyed         portions    of the roads to detczr
        repair     by heavy equipment and to prevent         bypass. The con-
        centration      of enemy truck traffic       in the area then creates             '
        targets     for air attack.

        DUFFEL --2.-z
               RFC

                III Janu:zr> 1968 the CclXcander of U.S. Forces               in Souttl
        Vietnam directed         that the sensors and related           eq-?ipJ32nt
        earmarked for the Igloo I4hite antipersonnel                  subsyste:n be
        used in the defense of Khe Sanh.               These    sensors were dropped
        from aircraft         among the North Vietnamese troops and alcn;:
        the trails      and routes leading        to Khe Sanh.       The data der.Lved
        from the sensors,          combined with informatio:l        received    from
        other intelligence-gathering            devices,     such as night obser*,rn.-
        tion systems and aerial           photography,      provided    the basis for
        directing      artillery     fire  and air strikes        against   tile enemy.

               The reportedly     successful   use of sensors in the deferlse
        of Khe Sanh indicated       that they could be used in support of
        ground combat operations.          As a result     the Pla:1nin~ Croup
        was directed     by th e Deputy Secretary       of Defense in /Ipri?. I.968
        to support plans to use sensors in a ITide ral?gc of tactical
        operations    against   the enemy within       South Vietnam.

              A sample of the use of sensors              in the ground      tactical
        system is illustrated  on page 16.




                                                15
i
                The acoustic   and seismic sensors initially            used in
.       Duffel    Bag were those designed for delivery             by fixed-wing
        aircraft    in the I&Loo White system.           These sensors proved
        to be too hca\7y, too large,           and too costly    fore use by ground
        forces.     As experience    was acquired,       smaller and lighter
        sensors more suitable      for hand emplacement by ground troops
        were developed.      In addition,        readout equipment for use in
        a ground environment      was dcvcloped        to receive data from the
        sensors.




              Sensors have been used in Sowtl~ast        Asia to (I.1 re-
        lieve troops from routine    surveillance      and gl.~rd (luty , (2)
        monitor   the movement of enemy troops and supplies            in areas
        inaccessible   to ground troops,     (3) proL:idc early Warning of
        impending attacks    by enemy troops on allied       installations,
        and (4) provide intelligence     information     for use in setting
        up ambushes and deter?j;Lning patterns      cjf enern/ movcm:;~ts.

               Officials    of the rnilf.ta:y      scrviccs        hav2 stated that
        the sensors and su~vcillanc:e           dc~viccs -tiscd in SOU~~IF~ 2 i: 1~~j.a
        ha.:?" been effective       combat tools.        Ijot; c;.p2 r 3 to objelc'l-ii'ely
        evaluate      these Sj7StClXS from the standpoirii:             of effectiveness,
        cost and/or alternative           mcth~ds is, in our opinion,               not fca-
        sible,      It is probable      that,   throu&       the use of tIle:;e systems)
        some American lives have been saved; enemy per.c;on~7el, vchi-
        cles 9 and suppliec: have been dcsLrojred;                 and fewer troops
        have been needed to accomplish             combat missions,             What is
        not clear is       how mm>7     lives have been saved, hopi much dam-
        age has been inflicted          on the enemy, and how maily fewer
        troops have been required            as a direct
                                                    '          result      o f the use of
        sensor surveillance         systems.

                In reviewing     combat reports,        we found that it was im-
        practicable     to obtain    a complete picture          of the results          of
        the sensor surveillance        activities,          WI21212a series of sensor
        activations     results    in artillery       fire,   aircraft       strike,
        etc.,     there must    be almost     instantaneous      battle      damage    as-
        sessment if a commander is to have positive                    confirmation       of
        the results     of the action       taken.      Frequently      this is impos-
        sible because weather conditions              are not suitable;           troops




                                                    17
_   - --.   -.-                  ._             .
            .
                      -         .   I.   Y..   “.   .--   _,“.   =   .-.   -,__..   ^   __




        .




-




    .

                 for pez-forming the assessment are l,az.kinZ; or the area is
                 no t SeCil;‘e ) and sending troqs                 -in would e?;pase them to dan-
                 ecr
                 c,    unnece         s sar ily.    Tile L.ei;orts    did indicate 9 however, that
                 so312  p-I.YL r;tive       results    wer~~ being obtained,

                          T'~P estimated      coots fcr sensor and suu'xwi.l.rLailc~ sys-
                 tam ‘and a ssociated          munitions       (sez pe 8) dc not include
                 mi1.I car-y    pessonncl costs.         Offirials       of the Military       Assis-
                 tance Coxxznd and the 7th Air Force estimated                        that about
                 2,_7;25 .merican
                             fi        milj.tary     personnel wzre required             in the ear-
                 ious activities        and organizations            directly    related     to the
                 operations       of the sensor programs in Southzazt Asia as of
                October !.? 1970.           This esiimnte        included     personnel     i.n~~~~lved
                in the n~anagin~;,P maintaining,             implanting,       and monitoring       of
                sel?.sors and the training            of pt-~~-~onnei
                                                                3          in Southeast Asia,         We
                were inforxzd        that no ad<!itfo:lal          troops were provided 'to
                t-122  ti~cater    co~~wnders      in  Vietnam       for implanting       and moni-
                torinj-; L5n,nso;Cs.




                      The newer phase III          see:xors have been designed to be
                more 23lc to withstand          severe implant       shoz'k, temperature,
                IlLliilidity~  and rainfall     durj'.ng :~nd after    implant.     In addi-
                tion,   officials     of the Planning Group and the military              de-
                partments      informw?. us that th? sensors z~re relatively             im-
                nmie to destruction         from artillery     fire.      They stated that
                generally      it rqufxcc      a direct    hit to render tile sensors in-
                qmAd.e.
       Not only have the capabilities        of sensors been improved,
but their      unit costs have been reduced and their        useful
field   lifetimes     have been increased.     By increasing     the use-
ful life,      the requirement   for new sensors decreases and the
operating      cost of sensors in the ground decreases,          For ex-
ample, in 1968 a hand-emplaced         seismic detector    cost $1,1~65
and had a useful       lifetime  of 45 days.    Its cost per sensor-
day in the ground was about $26,           The unit  production     cost
of an improved model of this sensor in 1969-70 was $825,
and it had a life        of GO days.   This resulted    in a cost per
sensor-day       of about $14, or a reduction     of 47 percent.

       The following     table illustrates   the reduction   in unit
operating   co.,~1:s achieved during the period      1965 to 1970.
The two tyljes listed       account for approximately    67 percent
of the sensors in use in Southeast Asia at the time of out
review.
                                                                            ._
                  Hand-Emplaced
                         -          Seismic
                                     .--_I_~_~ Sensors
                                                    Unit costly: _~__ day
                                                                    --_._
                  Sensor                            '1.968
                                                    I__-             1970
                                                                    -. -
Minia turc
       _   Scisiui c Into-us-ion Dctcctor          $25.90         $13.75
Ground Emplaced %ismic        Intrusion
  Detector                                          15.60            7.80

                  Air-Delivered     Seismic
                                         ___-.Sensors
                                                -__-
                                                    Unit cos;:Jer-_- daJ
                                                                      ._._-_.
                  Sensor                            1968            1970
                                                                    -__
Helicopter-Deliverc~~      Seismic Intru-
   sion Detector                                   $70.00         $15.70
Air Delivered      Seismic Intrusion    De-
   tector                                           32.20           16.10
UTILIZAT‘fON BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

       Sensors have been provided  to the Australian     Forces in
South Vietrxm by the Commander, Military     Assistance    Command,
Vietnam.    The Australian  Government rein?burses the United
States Goverrment for the sensors and related       equipment pro-
vided.

        Canada, The United- Kingdom, and 0th:. r: NATO countries
have been briefed        by the PLanning Group on the sensor and
surveillance       equipment developed and their        tacticnl     applica-
tions,      Because of the interest      expressed by severcsl foreign
governn~nts      in this equipnicnt,    DOD i:i currently       considering
selling     equ%pmcnt sinnil.car to that used ii1 Souihea,qt Asia to
some of these governrents e At the time of our inquiry,                    a
policy     had not been established      regaxling    restriciions       on
the use of sensors that night be sold to other countries.
The identification        of tl,: govermc.izts   be-ing considered       and
the intendc.:i use of the devices by these govern3,2i-;zS: are
classified     information,




                                                                                t
                                      20
                                                  -   . .   _   ..    .~,




                                    CHAPTER 5

         NEED -~___
              FOR FUTUR1;:SENSC)KAND SURVEILLANCX SYSTEFlS

NECESSTTY FOR PROCEEDING WITH
--1__-
 FlJTlrRE PROCURl3:IENT
           II__- ---   A6DEVEILX'MENT
OF SEK'SORSYSTEXS    -

        As pointed out previously          (see pO X7), we cannot objec-
tively     evaluate    the effectiveness       of sensor devices.             Be-
cause of this fact,         the need for continued           procurement          of
phase III      sensors and the development of more advanced mod-
els for the future        appears to be a question            of policy       for
the executive       branch and the Congress to decide.                 Cur-
rently     procurement    of newer sen:jors is continuing              in order
for DOD to provide        the South Vietnamese forces \Gth a deteq
tion and intelligence          capability.      In additton         to their       use
in Vietnam, the phase III           sensor systems al-so may have ap-
plications      in other areas of the world.             The    use   of se1nsors
by the Vietnam        ;e and the need for procurencnt               of sensor
systtms in the future          are discussed      below.

Use of    sensor::
              ---_    bv
                       .A

       In March 1969 the Deputy Secretary       of Defense directed
that a plan be developed to train         the South Vietnamese in
the use of sensors as part of the Vietnamization          Program.
Training   of the Vietnamese began in August 1969 and is con-
tinuing.    Special  training    teams are assigned in each divi-
sion, and a central     training    course is corlducted at Vung Tau,
South Vietnam.

       The South Vietnamese have employed sensors to perform
several missions      since the Vietnamization             Program has been
established.       These missions       include      (1) interdiction       of
enemy infiltration       and resupply        routes,    (2) surveillance
over areas otherwise       requiring       reconnaissance        by ground
troops    (economy of force),        (3) surveill.ance        of known enemy
mortar and rocket-firing         sites,      (4) base camp and fire           sup-
port base deFense, and (5) collection                 of intelligence.         At
the time of our reviex2        the South Vietnamese forces had as-
sumed responsibility       for emplacing and monitoring                about 45
percent    of the sensors used in South Vietnam.                  DOD   plans to
continue     to provide sensors to the South Vietnamese under
the Vietnamization       Program.
                                          21
Msnzgernent
-.----. ., --.-     and cost. ----
                                of ,sen.sox- systems
 in the-- future.--
       On AugJst 8, 1968, the Director,           Defense Research and
Engineering D formed a corr~~fttce composed of senior scicn-
tific    aild military personnel       to evaluate    the present and
future    programs of the Planning Group.           During its investi-
,?at ion, this committee recognized         thF& improved sensor sys-
tems could b2 applied      in other areas of the wor1.d and in a
range of battlefield      s;itu.ations    beyond t-hose encountered     in
Soutl1east Asia.

        As a result   of tlw appzr~?~~t: successes achieved in the
use of sensors and survei.llance         devices in Soutlieast        Asia,
the Army, Navy, and Air Force have each established                  organi-
zntioris    to study and manqg,e future      uses of sensor systems.
These staffs      are to be responsible      fur exploi.ting      the 'cxist-
ing sensor technobog;r and for deve:iopincn, ne:i technoloq,
equip!"":'t 9 and operational     cortccpts ~~'flic?~can be used for
v~o~~~~d~~iidecombat survei llc?.?lce a;ld target   accl?lisition     missions
in any type of conflict.

        On September 26, 1970, the Deputy SeCiYCt3T)            of Dcfensc
directed     that full   respoiisibj.liEy    fcr opcr~tional     scnsc'r
systel::s in Southeast      j-sin be trcnsfcrred     to tlit! Army and Air
Force by June 30, 1971.. Currentlyp             the Planning Group is
coordinating      the transfer     of these operational      systems with
the Departments      of the Army and Air Force,

        On December 12, 1970, t!le Deputy Secretary        of Defense
assigned to the Director,       Dcfcnsc Communications      Pl.anning
Group B the mission of coordinating        the future   sensor pro-
grCl:TS  of each of the military     departments.     At the time of
our review,    procedures  for acco::lpIishir:g   this new mission
had not been established.

      During our inqujry   Air Force officials      informed us that
they were proposing    a S-year development program to improve
the Air Force ground sensor surveillance       system,      The total
cost of this program will     be about $20 million       over the S-
year period.   At the time of our review,      the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps were in the process of definitizing           their  10111,-
range development programs.      The specific    a:nounl:s of funds
being proposed for these programs a1.e classified.
       Ve were informed that no estimated             procurement     costs
were available      for future      sensor systems beyorid those in the
proposed budget for fiscal           year 1972.     Procurement     funds
programmc:d for future        sensor systems--during        the next 10 years
will   depend on the re.c;ults of each service’           s research    and
devc~lopmcnt progr'ams and the number and types of systems
selected   to be added to the inventory.              At the time of our
review,   specifi.c    quantitative      requirements     for future    scn-
sor systems had not been developed.




                                      23
            Ke have been infonnsd       by officials     of thi: military      de-
      pEWt~Wl?tS that no additional        parsonno     will   be rcq~sirecl to
      operate and monitor     senc3or and surveillance          system; in the
      future m  Support units     required     to  operate    these   q~~,tcms
      will  be provided from within        the existing      manpower availsble
      to the services.

            Currentfy         the Navy has a "Sensor Application             T;tn:r?' on
      each coast with i~s Az~phibi~~~usForces to provide the expc.r-
      tise for other Navy organizations                l.ess knowledgeable        in sen-
      sor uses.      The Marine Corps has progrnrmcd                rhrce sensor sup-
      port units,     one per division.          These units are scheduled to
      become operational          on Zuly 1, 1971.         Each unit will       consist
      of one officer          and 39 enlisted    T;:':Ix. At tt1c t~mc of our rc-
         .                    and Air Force    had   noi: identified      the type of
      vbev, the Ari??  $‘,J
      support ur;its        that will   li? required      to op::;--ate :ind monitor
      sensor system n

              The use of     sensors has apparently       increased   the ability
      to monitor     the    movement of enemy fort,. us and to make more ef -
      ficient    use of     military    personnel   iri combat areas,    We have,
      however, found        no indicationc     that the use of the::2 devices
      F7i11 result     in   any reductions     in overail    miiiinry  manyo~~er
      requirements,

              Each of the military        services   have addc.d c'.~~ses in the
      concepts of empSoymci!t of sensor systems to the curriculum
      of their    existing     service    schools,     In addition,    the Army has
      added to the curriculum           of its school_ at Fort Huachuca, Ari-
      zona, new courses of instruction             on tile installment     and use
      of specific      sensor systems,        The Narine Corps also sends its
      personr~~l to Fort Huachuca for training               in the use of spe-
 i
 4    cific    sensor systems,         The Air Force conducts its specialized
      training    on the use of sensors at Eglin Air Force Base, Flor-
      ida.     The 1Jav-y trains     its personnc!. in tile use of sensors
 i    for riverinc      and special warfare        applications     at Nare Island,
      Vallcjo,    California.


                                                24
  1
/ !
  i
. :
 f             The Army has established             Project     NASSTER (Mobile Army
-;     Sensor System Test, Evaluation                 and Review) at Fort Hood,
 i     Texas, which is to be the Army's test facility                        for
       intelligence-gathering             systems and devices under development
       and the related        military      doctrines,       organizations,         and tac-
  II   tical    concepts for the Army'           s  future     use  of  these      systems
       and devices.        All. testing       at MASSTER is performed from the
  t    user's     or soldier!s       po.i.nt of view.        The intelligence-
       gathering-type       systems and devides tested at MASSTER include
       devices employing the unattended                  ground sensors discussed            in
       this report,       as well as devices and systdms employing low-
       light-level      television;        radars;     optics;     chemical,       aural,
  I    radioactive,      magnetic,        and biochemical          detection;       thermal
  I                 and   image    intensification.            The  systens      tested
       imagery;
  f    successfully       at Project       IGSSTER will        eventually      become a
       part of the Army' s Integrated               Battlefield      Control      System.         ..
                Currently,    Project     1"iASSTERconducts        three    types    of
  I    tests.

                1, I$teria]- field test--field    tes'ilng of equipI,?.-nt that
                   has been developed or is being developed in which a
                   high level of confidence    exists.

                2. System field   test--fiel.d  testing     of various   organi-
                   zational  concepts involving     battalion     and larger
                   forces.

                3. Material--system      field   test--field  testing     of various
                   arrangements      of equipment and personnel        (organiza-
                   tional    concepts)     at platoon or company echelons to
                   determine     optimuim organizational     structure     and equip-
                   ment requirements,

             This project had 282 personnel assigned to it in Sep-
       tember 1970 and is expected to have more than 500 assigned
 5     during 1971.




                                                 25
.I




                                   27

     _   ;   .-   I   I.   .   ,
                                                                                                                                                                                                       EXHIBIT A




                                                                                                                                        I_ 20.7             --- 30.0        --A21         3       --- 9.2               --- 6.0              -__ 07.7

                                                                                                                                    $      65.4         :     40.6         $ 24.4             $        22.0            $ 17.5’           $           170.3
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        =z.                  z-_       _-

                                                                                                                                        -2735.5               11.6
                                                                                                                                                            . -T;f,          ._-. 1.7             --- 2.2               --L 2 2              --v;3 23.3
                                                                                                                                               3.3              2.G                 -                                                                   5.3
                                                                                                                                                                2.6                 1.7                  5.2                  ;.2                       8.7

                                                                                                                                          43.8                14.3             13.0                    l?.         3       10.7                       95.1
                                                                                                                                        7-c-G               -75s            -ITo                  --          ;z        ---71                --zr-
                                                                                                                                            7.9                                                                                -                        7.0
                                                                                                                                            9.2                 G.7               li.0                 li.2                  10.6                     54.7
                                                                                                                                            9.9                 2.2                  -                                                                12.1

                                                                                                                                        ---1G.G             -- 14.7          _-Lt-97              --2.-h5               -L- 50               -.---_r.e51      9

         AIP     FORCE                                                                                                              $      91.7         $133.6             $213.1             $17/..3                  $117.8            $        682.5
                                                                                                                                            --            -zL--              Z-Y- ----         :z-_-m-:                 icz-                 s-.-=-e
                 Operations           and wintenance                                                                                           3.5             21.6             32.9                47.2                  40.0                  141.2
                        X-121/F-4            hircraft                                                                                   --rs                -ix4              -2ci.8              -232                  --20.5               -851
                        Illfjltration             Svrveillar.ce          Center,          Urployn?lc          hurs-2::~
                              Relay     Tercinal,           Sensor     R~,,::>rti~,;       Post                                                                 4.2               10.6                 11.1                  11.1                     37.0
                        Long-Range           Navigation,           Cti-3     i.el:copt?r,            POT     LID     test    site              -                  .5                  .5                 1.2                   1.1                     3.3
                        Drone5                                                                                                                                                        .4                 2.6                   4.3                     7.3
                        Transporraticli               and other                                                                                    .1           i.l                   .6                 3.1                   3.0                      7.9

                 Procure,rent                                                                                                             51.5                93.5           157.2                 66.6                    63.6                 444.6
                       Ajrcraft        modification                                                                                     -XT                 -m-7             -i-cc                7x5                    -1I;;ci             752T&
                       Spares      and repalr            parts                                                                                                                                                               4.0                  52.6  6.6
                       Classffied           drol,es
                       CcwGrmnicetions              and eleclronics                equi?m*;:lt                                                                                                                               22.0                     88.2
                       Drsgontooth           nines,       Cluster         to-.lj    unit      28/3?                                                             9.3                 -                    -                     -                       9.3
                       Wide area         antiper:onnel              mine,        Cluster        tomb       unit      34/4?                     2.0             17.0               40.6                 30.0                    -                      89.6
                       M-36 Cluster             bomb
                       Other      munitions                                                                                                                     ;,C               12.0
                                                                                                                                                                                    6.1                  -9.2                13.8
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             10.0                     31.2
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      24.9
                       Tactical        Fighter         Dispenser,           Si’O-41      Aircraft            r.lnc    dispenser             i .:                 1.0                -                     -                    -                       2.7
                        SUU-42     Aircraft          sen!,or      dispenser                                                               17.0                 18.1                 -                     -                    -                      35.1

                 Military         construction            program                                                                       d--171              _-~ -            L-                   __- -                 -I                   ..-I- 17         7

                 Research,          developrcnt,            trut,      and     evrluation                                               -2- 90              A 23       5     -L 20        0       -__L-
                                                                                                                                                                                                    12 5                &_14         0       Lo.      79      0

         DEFENSE            CCW~JNICATIOKS          PJAk’i’!IxG      GROUP                                                          $ -..- 7.3          S 22.4     S 16.5                     $     14.5               $ 15.7            $            7f.4
                                                                                                                                                         -..._ - _ _-_                            _._.__                =-:                  -;-             _
                 Operations          and     n.aintel,zncc,          Defense        agencies                                                   1.4              1.6                 1.5                  1.5                  1.7
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               -             --2.       7 9

                 Research,         deVelOpaent,             test,      and     evalu.atiOn,            Defense        agencies          ___ 5.9             ---I20     6     --..15.n               13.0
                                                                                                                                                                                                  ___                   --.-14.0             ----     68.5

         TOTAL      PRWRA’l        COST                                                                                             $370.0              $;ZS.O             c/.11.7            $213.0                   $219.7            $~21,~~i3.4
                                                                                                                                     c.:z                 --._                ___                                                                             =




‘-   .
i




    ‘-.   “.
                                                            August           20,      1970




Mr. Elmer      Stoats
Comptroller        General               of the          United        States
C*neral     Accounting                  Off ice
Washington,        D. C.

Dear      Mr.      Stants:

          Recently          I have        been        raising         qucsLicns              and requesting                   inforoiition
about        a new progrim              knorin        as the electronic                      or integrated                 battlefield.
This      system        is composed              of various             senrors            backed         hy cosputers                 which
are     designed          to prcvidc             field        comxnndern            \ritl:        general         battl.eficld               in-
telligence.               In the course                 of my inquiries                    about        the program,                 a nun>~rr
of questions              have      been       raised         which       deserve            detailed          study          before         the
Congress          proceeds         wit.h       its      further         dcvclopncnt.                    Therefore,               I would
 li.ke     to request          that       you       undertake           an invcsrl              ;ation       of co;t.            and cficc-
tivcnecs          of tile prc;r:si               ce:;tcrcd          ‘9rouiid      the         follow;ng           qljesl       ions:

          1.       To what          cytcnt         ha;ie      the     three           Lrxjr’l:zr    of the ar-cd      forces
                   coordinated              tln:ir       efforts          in        the development        of electronic
                   battlefield              devices           and     what          action,      if any,   has   been      taken
                   to avoid           duplication?
                                                                                 1
          2.       How effective            have           these        devices     been    in combat                    in    Vietnam?
                   Have     they   corltributed                  to     improved     combat      capability                      and hoF:
                   reliable      have       they           proven         in actual      combat?

           3.      Is it necessary,                   in view           of         the Victnzmizntivn                  program,          to
                   proceed   with              the    procurcmunt                    of so-called           phase        III     sensors
                   and with     the            developmznt              of         more   advanced          sensors          for     1972
                   and 19757

           4.      Does      the   Department           of Defense        plan  to make         these       devices       and
                   related       equipment         available         to foreign       countries           under     the
                   Foreign       Military       Sales        Act   or ot!ler    foreign         assistance          programs,
                   and     if so, what        restrictions,             if any,     will      be placed           on their
                    USC?
    Hr, Elmer Steats
    August 20, 1970
    Page So


            5.   What kind of support    units will  be necessery   to operate and
J                monitor
                 devices
                          such devices and to what extent will
                          permft a reduction   in military
                                                                    the use of such
                                                             ~+npower?

            6.   What are the potential         applications of tl‘tse devices      in domrrtic
                 law enforcement?        h’nat restrictions,   if any, could be placed
                 on their   distribution       and sale to domer-tic police    forces   and
                 other groups?

            7.   k’hat long range plans,     if any, does the Department    of Defense
                 have co:,:erning    the devcld;;rent and procurement    of these de-
                 vices durir.5    the next ten years?    What are the project    costs
                 of eny long range programs?

            I do not accept classified      information            and I therefore msk that
    your    repsz I to me be u;:classified.       I would          hope that you could have
    this    report  ccmpleted  by Mrch 31, 1971.

            If you have any questions,         please    do not     I, citatr:   to ~~21 n+eR(.
    ‘Lhmk     YOM for your cooper;tion       in this     nrttcr.




                                                                                             U.S.   GAO   Wash.,   D
                                                    34