? ,: ”’ ,<-’ _, / lllllllllllllllllllllllllllIl LM095632 COMPTROLLER GEPJERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON. DC. 20548 B-163074 L Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with your request, the General Accounting Office has looked into the cost and effectiveness of electronic sensor and surveillance systems in the Department of Defense. The accompany- ing report presents an unclassified version of the significant informa- tion developed. Under separate cover, we are sending you a copy of a summary and compilation of Federal and State statutes relating to electronic surveillance published June 18, 1970, by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. We noted that your statement concerning the electronic battle- field in the Congressional Record of March 23, 1971, cited a total cost of $3.25 billion. The costs cited in our report are applicable only to the sensor and surveillance systems and related munitions developed under the‘auspiccs of the Defense Communications Planning Group for use by the military services in Southeast Asia. The se costs do not in- clude any costs applicable to tactical data systems currently under de- velopment by the military departments, such as TACFIRE, TSQ-73, and TOS, or any costs applicable to other intelligence-gathering de- vices, such as night observation device s developed or under develop- ment by the individual military departments. Our observations and conclusions have not been discussed with officials of the Department of Defense. We plan no further distribu- tion of this report unless copies are specifically requested, and then we shall distribute copies only after your agreement ha.s been obtained or public announcement has been made by you concerning the contents of the report. Sincerely your 6, Comptroller General of the United States The Honorable William Proxmire Chairman, Joint Economic Comrnittee Congress of the United States COST A!slD EFFECTIVENESS OF ELECTRONIC SENSOR AND SURVEILLATjCE SYSTEHS Department of Defense B-163074 / QJ --DIGEST ---- At the Chairman's request, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has looked into -the cost and effectiveness and certain other aspects of electronic sensor -inh surveillance systems in the Departlnent of Defense (DOlbj'; __Sensors are electronic devices which detect the presence and m?Z&ent of vehicles and personnel in vicinities where sensors are located. To present an unclassified report, GAO has omitted certain detailed in- formation such as --operating statistics on sensor systems 9 --capability of sensors and readout devices, --location of monitoring facilities, --available statistics on battle damage assessrent, and --design objectives and characteristics of future sensor systems. GAO's observations and conclusions have not been discussed with offi- cials of DOD. The cost of the sensor and surveillance program for fiscal years 1967 through 1970 was $1.4 billion. An additional $219.7 million has been appropriated for fiscal year 1971. (See pp. 7 and 8.) Mcmqement of sensor progwm Until recently, the development 5 production, and procurement of sensor devices was centralized in the Defense Communications Planning Group (renamed the Defense Special Projects Group as of April 1, 1971). This Group was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1966 to manage development and deployment of an electronic sensor system to impede the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This initial mission was expanded in April 1968 to include a wide range of tactical applications of electronic sensors within South Vietnam. (See p. 6.) The Planning Group was authorized to assign the tasks of designing and developing the equipment necessary to support its program to the mili- tary departments and other agencies. Funds for these tasks were Tc.tr Slwct included in the budgets of the military departments but were con- trolled by the Planning Group. (See p. 6.1 The Planning Group was established hurr iedly and was given an ex- tensive program to accomplish in a very limited time. It appears that the organization succeeded in its effor ts with a minimum of false starts and development of unworkable devices. (See p. 7.) Domestic qx3P~eations The sensor and surveillance systems developed by the Planning Group would have limited applications in domestic law enforcement because of their bulk, size, and cost. These devices were developed primarily to withstand the rigors of a battlefield environment. They are used primarily in areas where any personnel or vehicle movement monitored is considered evidence of unfriendly activity. Sensors have been used by the U.S. Border Patrol to monitor selected portions of the border be- tween the United States and Mexico. (See p. 10.) Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 prohibits the manufacture, possession, sale, or transportation of de- vices used primarily for surreptitious interception if distribution through the mails or some aspect of interstate or foreign commerce is involved. The act does not prohibit their sale and distribution to domestic police forces and other units of local government engaged in legitimate activities. (See p. 10.) Uses and effectivensss of sensors in Sowt7zeost -__I_Asia Sensors have been used in Southeast Asia to --relieve troops from routine surveillance and guard duty, --monitor the movement of enemy troops and supplies in areas inacces- sible to ground troops, --provide early warning of impending attacks by enemy troops on allied installations, and --provide intelligence information for use in setting u ambushes and determining patterns of enemy movements. (See p. 17. P Officials of the military services have stated that the sensors and surveillance devices used in Southeast Asia have been effective combat tools. GAO found it impracticable to obtain a complete picture of the results of the sensor surveillance activity from a review of combat t reports. (See p. 17.) To objective'ly evaluate these systems from the standpoint of effectivc- ness, cost, and/or alternative methods is, in GAO's opinion, not feasible. (See p. 17.) ._ - It is probable, however, that, through the use of these systems, some American lives have been saved; enemy personnel, vehicles, and supplies have been destroyed; and fewer troops have been required to accomplish combat missions. What is not clear-is-, how many lives have been saved, how much damage has been inflicted on the enemy, and how many fewer troops have been required. (See p. 17.) R~ZiabiZity of sensors Sensor-aided surveillance sys-terns have undergone a number of opera- tional and technological changes in a relatively short period of time. A number of these changes have improved sensor performance and reliabil- ity. The newer sensors have been designed to be more able to withstand severe implant shock and changes in climatic conditions during and after implant. GAO has been informed that sensors are relatively immune to destruction from artillery and that generally a direct hit is re- quired to render them inoperable. (See p. 18.) From 1968 to 1970 unit costs of sensors in general have been reduced and their useful field lifetimes have been increased. The daily in-the- ground cost of a particular sensor, for example, has be,.n reduced by 47 percent. (See p. 19.) Use 2x4 fereigx cow~t~-~~s - -- Sensors have been provided to the Australian Forcer; in South Vietnam. The Australian Government reimburses the United States Government for the equipment provided. (See p. 20.) Interest has been expressed by several foreign governments in sensor equipment. DOD is currently considering providing equipment similar to that used in Southeast Asia to some of these foreign governments. (See p. 20.) Necessity for proceed&g tiith future procummnt md dez)eZopnmt of sensor syst-e%- Purchase of newer sensors is continuing in order for DOD to provide the South Vietnamese with a detection and intelligence capability. It is impracticable, in GAO's opinion, to objectively evaluate the effective- ness of existing sensor systems. Because of this fact, it appears to be a question of policy that the executive branch and the Congress should decide on the need for newer sensors or development of more ad- vanced models. (See p. 21.) Tear ____ Sheet-- 3 Officials of the military departments have stated that no additional personnel will be required to operate and monitor sensor and surveillance systems in the future. Support units_ required to operate these systems will be provided from within the existing manpower available to the services. (See p. 24.) Sensors apparently have increased the services' ability to monitor the movement of enemy forces and to make more efficient use of military personnel in combat areas. GAO has, however, found no indications that the use of these devices will result in any reductions in overall mili- tary manpower requirements. (See p. 24.) 4 Cant-ents Page DIGEST 1 ! CHAPTER 1 IKTRODUCTION 5 Integrated Battlefield Control System 5 Sensor and Surveillance Systems 5 2 MANAGEMENTOF SENSOR PROGRAM 6 Establishment of the Defense Communica- tions Planning Group 6 Control and Cost of the Sensor Program 7 3 POTENTIAL UTILIZATION OF SFSJSORSBY DOMESTIC LAW ENFORC~&lT AGENCIES 10 4 OPE?J~TIONALUSE ,kND EFFECTIVEMZSS OF SFXSORS IN SOUTHEASTASIA 11 Duel Blade 11 Igloo White 13 Duffel Bag 15 Effectiveness of Sensor Systems in South- east Asia 17 Reliability of Sensors 18 Utilization by Foreign Countries 20 5 NEED FOR FUTURE SENSORAND SURVEILLMCE SYSTEMS 21 Necessity for Proceeding with Future Procurement and Development of Sensor Systems 21 Use of Sensors by South Vietnamese Forces 21 Management and cost of sensors sys- tems in the future 22 6 MANPOWERREQUIREXENT FOR FUTURE SENSOR SYSTEMS 24 -I -_-,. _1 --.. . EXHIBIT Page A Estimated Defense Communications Planning . Group Program Cost from Inception through Fiscal Year 1971 29 APPEXDIX I Letter dated Augast 20, 1970, from Senator William Proxmire, Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress to the Comptroller General. of the United States 33 .AEiBRWIATIONS DOD Department of Defense DkSZ Demilitarized Zone GAO Generr;l Accounting Office DIGEST __---- GJHY ‘I’HE RFVIiW f,‘.& /,‘;ll’X _-__I_ At the Chairman's request, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has looked into the cost and effectiveness and certain other aspects of electronic sensor and surveillance systems in the Department of Defense (DOD). Sensors al%- L electronic devices which detect the presence and movement of vehicles and personnel in vicitlities where sensors are located. To present an unclassified report, GAO has omtted eel*tain detailed in- formation such as --operating statistics on sensor systems, --capability of sensors and readout devices, --location of monitoriIlg facilities, --available statistics on battle d;:::;age assessiirznt, and --design objectives 2nd characteristics of future sensor systems. GAO's observations and conclusions have not been discussed with offi- cials of DOD. The cost of the sensor and surveillance program for fiscal years 19Gi through 1979 was $1.4 billion. An additional $219.7 million has been appropriated for fiscal year 1971. (See ppo 7 and 6.) P!~lcrc/n~mt: __Jc- of ---.ce?k-or progjl~m Until recently, the development, production, and procurement of sensor devices was centralized in the Defense Communications Flanning Group (renamed the DeFense Special Projects GI-GUP as of April 1, 1971). This Group was established by the Secretary of Defense in 1966 to manage development and deployment of an electronic sensor system to impede the flcv,i, of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This initial mission was expanded in April 1968 to include a wide range of tactical applications of electronic sensors within South Vietnam. (See P. 6.) The Planning Group was aut!-iorized to assign the tasks of designing and developing the equipment necessary to support its program to the mili- tary departments and other agencies. Funds for these tasks were - .__. . . . .- , included in the budgets ofthe military dcpartmsnts but were con- trolled by the Planning Group. (See p. 6.) The Planning Group was established hurriedly and was given an ex- tensive program to accomplish in a very-limited time. it appears that the organization succeeded in its efforts with a minimum of false starts and development of unworkable devices. (See p. 7.) The sensor and surveillance systeals developed by the Planning Group would have limited applications in domestic law enforcement because of their bulk, size, and cost. These devices were developed primarily to withstand the rigors of a battlefield environment. They are used primarily in areas where any personnel or vehicle movement monitored is considered evi dcnce of unfriendly activity. Sensors have been used by the U.S. Border Patrol to monitor selected portions of the border be- tween the United States and Mexico. (See p, 10.) Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1368 prohibits the manufacture, possession, sale, or transportation of de- ' vices used primarily for surreptitious interception if distribution through the mails or some aspect of interstate or foreign commerce is involved. The act does not prohibit their sale and distribution to domestic police forces and other ut,its of local government engaged in legitimate activities. (See p. 70.) Uses and eff~ctizmcss of sensors in Southasi; -cI Aoin Sensors have been used in Southeast Asia to --relieve troops from routine surveillance and guard duty, --monitor the movement of enemy troops and supplies in areas inacces- sible to ground troops, --provide early warning of impending attacks by enemy troops on allied installations, and --provide intelligence information for use in setting up ambushes and determining patterns of enemy movements. (See p. 17.) : - : I Officials of the military services have stated that the sensors and surveillance devices used in Southeast Asia have been effective combat 1 tools. GAO found it impracticable to obtain a complete picture of the results of the sensor surveillance activity from a review of combat reports. (See p. 17.) To objectively evdluate thesl system; from the standpoint of effcctive- ness, cost, and/or alternative methods is, in GAO's opinion, not feasible. (See p0 17.) It is probable, however, that, through the ;sc of these systems, some American lives have be!?n saved; enerr.5' personnel, vehicles, and supplies have been destroyed; and fcwr troops have been required to accomplish combat missicns. C/hat is not clear is, how miny lives have been saved, how much damage hat been inflicted on the et:emy, and how many fewer troops have been required. (See p0 17.) Sensor-aided surveillance systems have undergone a number of opera- tional and technological chwges in a relatively short period of time. A number of these chanc,;es Ilave irr:provcd sensor performance and reliabil- ity. The ncwet* sensors have been designed to be more able to withstand severe implant shock and changes in climatic conditions during and after implant. Gkr) has been jnformed that sensors arc relatively immune to destruction from artillery and that generally a direct hit is re- , quired to render them inoperable. (See p. 18.) From 19G8 to 1970 unit ccsts of sensors in general have been reduced and their useful field liftttitzs halve ken incrczc?. The daily in-thz- ground cost of a particular sensor, for example, has been 13educed by 47 percsrit. (See p* 19.) USt3 3iJ --._ ~fc3i?7i~~-r(?:I'i1;~-.~~ Sensors have been provided to the Australian Forces in Scuth Vietnam. The Australian Governr::ent reilnbut-scs the United Statzs Governme!~t for the equipment provided. (See p. 20.) Interest has been expressed by several foreign yovernmcnts in sensor equi pinent. DOD is currently considering providing equipment similar to that used in Southeast Asia to some of these foreign governments. (See p. 20.) Purchase of newer sensors is continuing in orcier for D3D to provide the South Vietnamese with a detection and intelligence capability. It is impracticable, in GAO's opinion, to ob.jecti;fely evaluate the cffective- ness of existing sensor systems. Because of this fact, it appears to be a question of policy tha t the executive branch and the Congress should decide on the need for newer sensors or dcvelo~metlt of more ad- vanced models. (See p. 21.) 3 kb2pmcr -re~uiramcnts for fxtLtm sensor system Officials of the military departmen~ts~have stated that no additional personnel will be required to operate and monitor sellsor and surveillance sys tems in the future. Support units required to operate these systems will be provided from within th e existing manpo,k/er available to the services. (See p. 24.) Sensors apparently have increased the services' ability to monitor the movement of enemy forces and-to make more efficient use of military personnel in combat areas. GAO has, however, found no indications that the use of these devices will result in any reductions in overall mili- tary manpower requirements. (See p. 24.) 4 . . - . . I - , . _ CHAPTER 1 ---- INTRODTTCTICN __-- -- The Chaisxxn b .I uint Economic Co,mmittee, in a letter dated August 20, 1970, requested the General Accounting Of- fice to make an investigation of the cost, effectiveness, and certai.n other aspects of- L1-l.eelectronic battlefield pro- gram. (See app. I.) To presmt: an unclassified report, we have omitted cc:rta.in detailed information such as operating ! statistics) capability ef sensors and readoclt devices, lo- cation of monitoring facilitFes, available statistics on battle dnmzgc assesx~f-nt 9 ai~ci design objec:ti.ves and c'flarac- teristics of flltu-re senscer sys-Leii.5 y Our observations and conclusiorts have noT been di scussed with officials of the Department of Defense. I INTEGRATED-A.2~d.-p --- T3~'I'YYL":FIIXD CONXCL _-..------ -. SYSTEH .I The term 'lelectronic bat tlefield'? has been used i-n the past to de:;cribc tl;e sensor and surveillance program in Southeast Asia. It he.5 al.~o been confused with the Army's future plans for the Integrated battlefield Control System in which seiisors ar.~cl surveill~.:nce devices will play a major role, these devices will provide the comninlider with current intelligence data which, when combined wirh information from other intelligence sources, will assist him in making com- mand and control decisions. The total Integrated Dattleficld Control System concept envisions a future Army built around an integrated system that exploits the advanced technology of communications, sen.sors, fire direction, and the required automatic data processing Lsystems and equipment. Sensors are electronic devices which are used to detect the presence and movement of vehicles and personnel in the vicinities where sensors are implanted, A sensor-aided com- bat surveillance system consists basically of (1) the sen- sors, (2) a communications link (usually radio) from the sensor to a readout device, (3) the readout device which re- ceives sensor transmissions, and (4) the display and proc- essing equipment which assist in counting the sensor acti- vations and in analyzing the data to determine the di.rection and rate of movement of the detected objects. : - i/_ MANAGDEPJTOF SF,Iu'sOR -----PROGRA?5 -- I?sTA.BLISTM34T OF THE DEFENSE ?t!%ii?~TIONS PLANNING GROUP Up to the present time, the management of the deve'lop- merit, production, and procurement of sensor devices has been centralized in the Defense Communi.cations Planning Group (redesignated the Defense Special Projects Group as of April 1, 1971). This Group was established by the Secretary of Defense in September 1966 to manage the development and deploymen t of an anti-infiltration system for Southeast Asia that would impede the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, This initial mission was-further expanded in April 1968 to include a wide ?_a:,::? of tactical applications of electronic sensors within South Vietnam, The Director of the Planning Group was authorized direct contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thz milf.tary depxt- merits, and theater commanders. He ~:'as instructed to report directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for broad policy and fund- ing decisions. He 1572s also gLven the responsibility and au- thority, within broad DOD guidance, to m&e decisions per- taining to concept formulation, design, development, test, requirements analysis, procurement, and distribution of equipment. In addition, the Secretary of Defense authorized the Director of the Planning Group to utilize the resources of the military departments and other agencies for the accom- plishment of specific tasks requiring facilities and man- power resources not available within the Planning Group- These tasks included engineering design and development of sensors and related equipment and munitions, as well as the testing, production management, shippin:; and continued lo- gistic support of these items. Funds to accomplish these tasks were included in the budgets of the military dcpart- ments; however, they were controlled 2nd relcascd only upon authorization of the Planning Group. .. CONTROL AND COST OF TJIE SENSOR PROGRAM To ensure system integrity, the Planning Group retained management responsibility for planning, system engineering, establishment of overall schedules, evaluation and analysis of theater requirements, financial management, and identifi- cation of specific tasks to be assigned to the military de- partments and other agencies. (This management responsibil- ity of sensor systems for Souiheast Asia wi.11 be terminated by June 30, 1971. See p* 22,) Instructions issued to those organizations assisting in the program contained specific guidance on technicaL configuration, quantities required, target schedules, logistics support, funding designations, and other instructions needed to direct the effort wj.thi.n the parameters of the overall. program. The design, development, and production of the required, equipment had to be expedited because of the urgency of this program. Generally, time was not spent restudying, redesign-- ingr or repackaging an item to determine whether a better model could he produced, As soon as an item under develop- ment demonstr:ited that it Wx~Id 187011=,it was put into yro- duction. Equipment was designed only to witllstand cnvironmcntal. conditions existing in Southeast Asia. These limited envi- ronmental requirements contributed to a reduction in the development cycle for the introduction of new equipment from about 6 years to between 15 and 21 months for most items. Since its inception the Planning Group has sponsored the development of several different types of sensors, asso- ciated ground and airborne reLays, other ancillary equipment, and the development of related special antipersonnel and antivehicular munitions. The latter were designed to protect sensors and to interdict enemy troops and supplies infil.trat- ing on foot and in vehicles. Illustrations of several air- delivered sensors used in Southeast Asia are on page 9. The Planning Group was established hurriedly, ‘and it was given an extensive program to accomplish in a very limited time. It appears that,undcr these circumstances, the orga- nization succeeded in its efforts with a minimum of false starts and development of unworkable devices. The cost of 7 the Planning Group's program for fiscal year 1967 through 1970 was about $1.4 billion. An additional $21.9.7 million has been appropriated for fiscal-year 1971, for a total es- timated program cost from inception through fiscal year 1971 of about $1.6 billion. A breakdown of these costs by mili- tary service and type of appropriation is shown in cxhi.bit A. 8 .I. ;a ‘+.. ‘L ,- : .,A P ..-. ..-. .. ._.. _ -- .- .- . CHAPTER 3 POTENL'IAL UTILI>:ATION OF SENSORS BY DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEKEL~T AGFKIFS --- The sensor and surveillance systems developed by the De- fense Communications Planning Group appears to offer only limited opportunities for use by domestic law enforcement agencies because of their bulk, size, and cost. These de- vices were developed primarily to withstand the rigors of a battlefield environment. The sensing devices developed by the Planning Group have application primarily in areas where any personnel or vehicle movement monitored is considered evidence of un- friendly activity. The U.S. Border Patrol has been using these devices to monitor selected portions of the border be- tween Mexico and the United States and has been able to in- crease its apprehension of persons attempting to enter the country illegally, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510-2520) prohibits the manufacture, possession? sale, or transportation of any mechanical device used primarily for the purpose of surreptitious interception if their distribution involves the mails or some aspect of interstate or foreign conLmerce, However, the act restricts itself from applying to work done by officers, agents, em- ployees, or persons under contract with the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, Therefore, it does not prohibit distribution and sale of sensor de- vices to domestic police forces and other units of local gov- ernment engaged in legitimate activities but does preclude I such sale to other groups. i: - The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has prepared a compilation of the Federal and State statutes relating to electronic surveillance. This compila- tion, entitled "Wire Tapping and Eavesdropping," was pub- lished on June 18, 1970. 10 The original ,m:lssion of the Defense Communication,5 Plannj-ng Group was to develop an infi.i:-r.;:ti.n:n and interdic*- tion cnpaL)ility to impede the Zlcw of vc,hicles and personr,el into South Vietnam. The program was to include an air.- supported, anti-infiltrration system in Laos FiTId b&Trier a system extendixg along izl;e DeG2 i-carized Zoije (.R]Q) frol!l the Gulf of Torikin ;;'hroug:~ the road and trail net-x:ork in Laos used by the infiltrators, TIx Jhel Bind?, Igloo White, and Duffei Baz operations are discussed below. Duel Blade was to E!IlCoJ;!paSS cleared areas I.00 to 150 meters tn depth and Zt~~rOXiLKl2t~~iy 27 kilometers long* csce illustration on p* 12.) The sides of the cleared areas were to be enc!.osed rJi;h barb?<1 ic:ire, rind the space bei:iaf:pn thz wire obstacl.cs w35 to be planted with antipersonnel mines * A lo-meter ccnte:: strip was to cont,>in sensors which wo111.d be monitored at the variolis strorq; points and forward op?rat- ing bases. The sensors and other cquipme:lt necessary to support the Duel Blade operation were delivered to the tlleat-er in 1967. After at) area 600 meters wide and 13 kilometers long had been clczr&, construction xas terminated in June 1967 because of an adverse tactical situation. The fixed-barrier 11 z t- i u j:_ 3 x 0 v) i i ! i. concept wa.s then abnndoncd in favor of tactics which called for the use of rnobfl.c, qui-ck-reacting combat units to re- spond to North Vi.ctna;xse infiltration in the area of the DPZ. Selecteci operatjng bases of t&e originaL Duel Blade concept are cur;Tently funci:ior,ing, and some hand-impLanted sensors are being u,~ed in the eastern portion of the DHZ. In the s;ie;;tern ptirtion, air--deLiT<Tered s~l’r:s:.)rs h3ve bee11 implanted, and the GPllSOl?t~i3riSlX~~~!~iOll~; are being reLa)7cd by aircraft to a monitoring faci!.ity at C?,uangTri. IGUN -TJ-EITE __-_--_ The objective of the antivehicular subsystem is to de-- tect and provide intel.Ligence information for use in the interdiction of enemy truck traffic along specific road networks, in order to stop or reduce the flow oZ trucks carrying f;roops and suppLies into South Vietllarn. (See il- lustration on p0 14 for a diagram of the concept of this systeme) Both acoilstic and seismic sensors are used in the antivehicular subsystem and ar2 im?l.anted primarily by F--4D jet aircraft assigned to the Igloo White delivery mission. Selected incapacitating antipersonnel mines a-re also air I - delivered by the F-4's to cause casualties amang personnel in truck parks or storage areas and to protect sensors from retrieval. by the enemy. Sensors are activated by lrehicles passing within the detection range. The sensor transmissions are then trans- mitted to the Infiltration Sur~,7eiLLance Center located ii-1 Thailand where they are analyzed by intelligence specialists. 13 . 14 r “ I I Targets identified by the Center arc reported to the air control system, which controls the strike aircraft, Nor- mally, the forward air control aircraft are then directed to the target for visual confirmation-and for direction of strike aircraft. In addition to identifying targets for immediate strikes, the Center uses sensor data to establish patterns of enemy activity. These patterns indicate the location of truck parks and storage areas which are potential targets for la- ter air strikes, To complement the use of sensors in the Igloo White System, a specialized munitions package was developed. After roads are closed by bombiIlg, mines are dropped along approaches to the destroyed portions of the roads to detczr repair by heavy equipment and to prevent bypass. The con- centration of enemy truck traffic in the area then creates ' targets for air attack. DUFFEL --2.-z RFC III Janu:zr> 1968 the CclXcander of U.S. Forces in Souttl Vietnam directed that the sensors and related eq-?ipJ32nt earmarked for the Igloo I4hite antipersonnel subsyste:n be used in the defense of Khe Sanh. These sensors were dropped from aircraft among the North Vietnamese troops and alcn;: the trails and routes leading to Khe Sanh. The data der.Lved from the sensors, combined with informatio:l received from other intelligence-gathering devices, such as night obser*,rn.- tion systems and aerial photography, provided the basis for directing artillery fire and air strikes against tile enemy. The reportedly successful use of sensors in the deferlse of Khe Sanh indicated that they could be used in support of ground combat operations. As a result the Pla:1nin~ Croup was directed by th e Deputy Secretary of Defense in /Ipri?. I.968 to support plans to use sensors in a ITide ral?gc of tactical operations against the enemy within South Vietnam. A sample of the use of sensors in the ground tactical system is illustrated on page 16. 15 i The acoustic and seismic sensors initially used in . Duffel Bag were those designed for delivery by fixed-wing aircraft in the I&Loo White system. These sensors proved to be too hca\7y, too large, and too costly fore use by ground forces. As experience was acquired, smaller and lighter sensors more suitable for hand emplacement by ground troops were developed. In addition, readout equipment for use in a ground environment was dcvcloped to receive data from the sensors. Sensors have been used in Sowtl~ast Asia to (I.1 re- lieve troops from routine surveillance and gl.~rd (luty , (2) monitor the movement of enemy troops and supplies in areas inaccessible to ground troops, (3) proL:idc early Warning of impending attacks by enemy troops on allied installations, and (4) provide intelligence information for use in setting up ambushes and deter?j;Lning patterns cjf enern/ movcm:;~ts. Officials of the rnilf.ta:y scrviccs hav2 stated that the sensors and su~vcillanc:e dc~viccs -tiscd in SOU~~IF~ 2 i: 1~~j.a ha.:?" been effective combat tools. Ijot; c;.p2 r 3 to objelc'l-ii'ely evaluate these Sj7StClXS from the standpoirii: of effectiveness, cost and/or alternative mcth~ds is, in our opinion, not fca- sible, It is probable that, throu& the use of tIle:;e systems) some American lives have been saved; enemy per.c;on~7el, vchi- cles 9 and suppliec: have been dcsLrojred; and fewer troops have been needed to accomplish combat missions, What is not clear is how mm>7 lives have been saved, hopi much dam- age has been inflicted on the enemy, and how maily fewer troops have been required as a direct ' result o f the use of sensor surveillance systems. In reviewing combat reports, we found that it was im- practicable to obtain a complete picture of the results of the sensor surveillance activities, WI21212a series of sensor activations results in artillery fire, aircraft strike, etc., there must be almost instantaneous battle damage as- sessment if a commander is to have positive confirmation of the results of the action taken. Frequently this is impos- sible because weather conditions are not suitable; troops 17 _ - --. -.- ._ . . - . I. Y.. “. .-- _,“. = .-. -,__.. ^ __ . - . for pez-forming the assessment are l,az.kinZ; or the area is no t SeCil;‘e ) and sending troqs -in would e?;pase them to dan- ecr c, unnece s sar ily. Tile L.ei;orts did indicate 9 however, that so312 p-I.YL r;tive results wer~~ being obtained, T'~P estimated coots fcr sensor and suu'xwi.l.rLailc~ sys- tam ‘and a ssociated munitions (sez pe 8) dc not include mi1.I car-y pessonncl costs. Offirials of the Military Assis- tance Coxxznd and the 7th Air Force estimated that about 2,_7;25 .merican fi milj.tary personnel wzre required in the ear- ious activities and organizations directly related to the operations of the sensor programs in Southzazt Asia as of October !.? 1970. This esiimnte included personnel i.n~~~~lved in the n~anagin~;,P maintaining, implanting, and monitoring of sel?.sors and the training of pt-~~-~onnei 3 in Southeast Asia, We were inforxzd that no ad<!itfo:lal troops were provided 'to t-122 ti~cater co~~wnders in Vietnam for implanting and moni- torinj-; L5n,nso;Cs. The newer phase III see:xors have been designed to be more 23lc to withstand severe implant shoz'k, temperature, IlLliilidity~ and rainfall durj'.ng :~nd after implant. In addi- tion, officials of the Planning Group and the military de- partments informw?. us that th? sensors z~re relatively im- nmie to destruction from artillery fire. They stated that generally it rqufxcc a direct hit to render tile sensors in- qmAd.e. Not only have the capabilities of sensors been improved, but their unit costs have been reduced and their useful field lifetimes have been increased. By increasing the use- ful life, the requirement for new sensors decreases and the operating cost of sensors in the ground decreases, For ex- ample, in 1968 a hand-emplaced seismic detector cost $1,1~65 and had a useful lifetime of 45 days. Its cost per sensor- day in the ground was about $26, The unit production cost of an improved model of this sensor in 1969-70 was $825, and it had a life of GO days. This resulted in a cost per sensor-day of about $14, or a reduction of 47 percent. The following table illustrates the reduction in unit operating co.,~1:s achieved during the period 1965 to 1970. The two tyljes listed account for approximately 67 percent of the sensors in use in Southeast Asia at the time of out review. ._ Hand-Emplaced - Seismic .--_I_~_~ Sensors Unit costly: _~__ day --_._ Sensor '1.968 I__- 1970 -. - Minia turc _ Scisiui c Into-us-ion Dctcctor $25.90 $13.75 Ground Emplaced %ismic Intrusion Detector 15.60 7.80 Air-Delivered Seismic ___-.Sensors -__- Unit cos;:Jer-_- daJ ._._-_. Sensor 1968 1970 -__ Helicopter-Deliverc~~ Seismic Intru- sion Detector $70.00 $15.70 Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion De- tector 32.20 16.10 UTILIZAT‘fON BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES Sensors have been provided to the Australian Forces in South Vietrxm by the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The Australian Government rein?burses the United States Goverrment for the sensors and related equipment pro- vided. Canada, The United- Kingdom, and 0th:. r: NATO countries have been briefed by the PLanning Group on the sensor and surveillance equipment developed and their tacticnl applica- tions, Because of the interest expressed by severcsl foreign governn~nts in this equipnicnt, DOD i:i currently considering selling equ%pmcnt sinnil.car to that used ii1 Souihea,qt Asia to some of these governrents e At the time of our inquiry, a policy had not been established regaxling restriciions on the use of sensors that night be sold to other countries. The identification of tl,: govermc.izts be-ing considered and the intendc.:i use of the devices by these govern3,2i-;zS: are classified information, t 20 - . . _ .. .~, CHAPTER 5 NEED -~___ FOR FUTUR1;:SENSC)KAND SURVEILLANCX SYSTEFlS NECESSTTY FOR PROCEEDING WITH --1__- FlJTlrRE PROCURl3:IENT II__- --- A6DEVEILX'MENT OF SEK'SORSYSTEXS - As pointed out previously (see pO X7), we cannot objec- tively evaluate the effectiveness of sensor devices. Be- cause of this fact, the need for continued procurement of phase III sensors and the development of more advanced mod- els for the future appears to be a question of policy for the executive branch and the Congress to decide. Cur- rently procurement of newer sen:jors is continuing in order for DOD to provide the South Vietnamese forces \Gth a deteq tion and intelligence capability. In additton to their use in Vietnam, the phase III sensor systems al-so may have ap- plications in other areas of the world. The use of se1nsors by the Vietnam ;e and the need for procurencnt of sensor systtms in the future are discussed below. Use of sensor:: ---_ bv .A In March 1969 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that a plan be developed to train the South Vietnamese in the use of sensors as part of the Vietnamization Program. Training of the Vietnamese began in August 1969 and is con- tinuing. Special training teams are assigned in each divi- sion, and a central training course is corlducted at Vung Tau, South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese have employed sensors to perform several missions since the Vietnamization Program has been established. These missions include (1) interdiction of enemy infiltration and resupply routes, (2) surveillance over areas otherwise requiring reconnaissance by ground troops (economy of force), (3) surveill.ance of known enemy mortar and rocket-firing sites, (4) base camp and fire sup- port base deFense, and (5) collection of intelligence. At the time of our reviex2 the South Vietnamese forces had as- sumed responsibility for emplacing and monitoring about 45 percent of the sensors used in South Vietnam. DOD plans to continue to provide sensors to the South Vietnamese under the Vietnamization Program. 21 Msnzgernent -.----. ., --.- and cost. ---- of ,sen.sox- systems in the-- future.-- On AugJst 8, 1968, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering D formed a corr~~fttce composed of senior scicn- tific aild military personnel to evaluate the present and future programs of the Planning Group. During its investi- ,?at ion, this committee recognized thF& improved sensor sys- tems could b2 applied in other areas of the wor1.d and in a range of battlefield s;itu.ations beyond t-hose encountered in Soutl1east Asia. As a result of tlw appzr~?~~t: successes achieved in the use of sensors and survei.llance devices in Soutlieast Asia, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have each established organi- zntioris to study and manqg,e future uses of sensor systems. These staffs are to be responsible fur exploi.ting the 'cxist- ing sensor technobog;r and for deve:iopincn, ne:i technoloq, equip!"":'t 9 and operational cortccpts ~~'flic?~can be used for v~o~~~~d~~iidecombat survei llc?.?lce a;ld target accl?lisition missions in any type of conflict. On September 26, 1970, the Deputy SeCiYCt3T) of Dcfensc directed that full respoiisibj.liEy fcr opcr~tional scnsc'r systel::s in Southeast j-sin be trcnsfcrred to tlit! Army and Air Force by June 30, 1971.. Currentlyp the Planning Group is coordinating the transfer of these operational systems with the Departments of the Army and Air Force, On December 12, 1970, t!le Deputy Secretary of Defense assigned to the Director, Dcfcnsc Communications Pl.anning Group B the mission of coordinating the future sensor pro- grCl:TS of each of the military departments. At the time of our review, procedures for acco::lpIishir:g this new mission had not been established. During our inqujry Air Force officials informed us that they were proposing a S-year development program to improve the Air Force ground sensor surveillance system, The total cost of this program will be about $20 million over the S- year period. At the time of our review, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were in the process of definitizing their 10111,- range development programs. The specific a:nounl:s of funds being proposed for these programs a1.e classified. Ve were informed that no estimated procurement costs were available for future sensor systems beyorid those in the proposed budget for fiscal year 1972. Procurement funds programmc:d for future sensor systems--during the next 10 years will depend on the re.c;ults of each service’ s research and devc~lopmcnt progr'ams and the number and types of systems selected to be added to the inventory. At the time of our review, specifi.c quantitative requirements for future scn- sor systems had not been developed. 23 Ke have been infonnsd by officials of thi: military de- pEWt~Wl?tS that no additional parsonno will be rcq~sirecl to operate and monitor senc3or and surveillance system; in the future m Support units required to operate these q~~,tcms will be provided from within the existing manpower availsble to the services. Currentfy the Navy has a "Sensor Application T;tn:r?' on each coast with i~s Az~phibi~~~usForces to provide the expc.r- tise for other Navy organizations l.ess knowledgeable in sen- sor uses. The Marine Corps has progrnrmcd rhrce sensor sup- port units, one per division. These units are scheduled to become operational on Zuly 1, 1971. Each unit will consist of one officer and 39 enlisted T;:':Ix. At tt1c t~mc of our rc- . and Air Force had noi: identified the type of vbev, the Ari?? $‘,J support ur;its that will li? required to op::;--ate :ind monitor sensor system n The use of sensors has apparently increased the ability to monitor the movement of enemy fort,. us and to make more ef - ficient use of military personnel iri combat areas, We have, however, found no indicationc that the use of the::2 devices F7i11 result in any reductions in overail miiiinry manyo~~er requirements, Each of the military services have addc.d c'.~~ses in the concepts of empSoymci!t of sensor systems to the curriculum of their existing service schools, In addition, the Army has added to the curriculum of its school_ at Fort Huachuca, Ari- zona, new courses of instruction on tile installment and use of specific sensor systems, The Narine Corps also sends its personr~~l to Fort Huachuca for training in the use of spe- i 4 cific sensor systems, The Air Force conducts its specialized training on the use of sensors at Eglin Air Force Base, Flor- ida. The 1Jav-y trains its personnc!. in tile use of sensors i for riverinc and special warfare applications at Nare Island, Vallcjo, California. 24 1 / ! i . : f The Army has established Project NASSTER (Mobile Army -; Sensor System Test, Evaluation and Review) at Fort Hood, i Texas, which is to be the Army's test facility for intelligence-gathering systems and devices under development and the related military doctrines, organizations, and tac- II tical concepts for the Army' s future use of these systems and devices. All. testing at MASSTER is performed from the t user's or soldier!s po.i.nt of view. The intelligence- gathering-type systems and devides tested at MASSTER include devices employing the unattended ground sensors discussed in this report, as well as devices and systdms employing low- light-level television; radars; optics; chemical, aural, I radioactive, magnetic, and biochemical detection; thermal I and image intensification. The systens tested imagery; f successfully at Project IGSSTER will eventually become a part of the Army' s Integrated Battlefield Control System. .. Currently, Project 1"iASSTERconducts three types of I tests. 1, I$teria]- field test--field tes'ilng of equipI,?.-nt that has been developed or is being developed in which a high level of confidence exists. 2. System field test--fiel.d testing of various organi- zational concepts involving battalion and larger forces. 3. Material--system field test--field testing of various arrangements of equipment and personnel (organiza- tional concepts) at platoon or company echelons to determine optimuim organizational structure and equip- ment requirements, This project had 282 personnel assigned to it in Sep- tember 1970 and is expected to have more than 500 assigned 5 during 1971. 25 .I 27 _ ; .- I I. . , EXHIBIT A I_ 20.7 --- 30.0 --A21 3 --- 9.2 --- 6.0 -__ 07.7 $ 65.4 : 40.6 $ 24.4 $ 22.0 $ 17.5’ $ 170.3 =z. z-_ _- -2735.5 11.6 . -T;f, ._-. 1.7 --- 2.2 --L 2 2 --v;3 23.3 3.3 2.G - 5.3 2.6 1.7 5.2 ;.2 8.7 43.8 14.3 13.0 l?. 3 10.7 95.1 7-c-G -75s -ITo -- ;z ---71 --zr- 7.9 - 7.0 9.2 G.7 li.0 li.2 10.6 54.7 9.9 2.2 - 12.1 ---1G.G -- 14.7 _-Lt-97 --2.-h5 -L- 50 -.---_r.e51 9 AIP FORCE $ 91.7 $133.6 $213.1 $17/..3 $117.8 $ 682.5 -- -zL-- Z-Y- ---- :z-_-m-: icz- s-.-=-e Operations and wintenance 3.5 21.6 32.9 47.2 40.0 141.2 X-121/F-4 hircraft --rs -ix4 -2ci.8 -232 --20.5 -851 Illfjltration Svrveillar.ce Center, Urployn?lc hurs-2::~ Relay Tercinal, Sensor R~,,::>rti~,; Post 4.2 10.6 11.1 11.1 37.0 Long-Range Navigation, Cti-3 i.el:copt?r, POT LID test site - .5 .5 1.2 1.1 3.3 Drone5 .4 2.6 4.3 7.3 Transporraticli and other .1 i.l .6 3.1 3.0 7.9 Procure,rent 51.5 93.5 157.2 66.6 63.6 444.6 Ajrcraft modification -XT -m-7 -i-cc 7x5 -1I;;ci 752T& Spares and repalr parts 4.0 52.6 6.6 Classffied drol,es CcwGrmnicetions and eleclronics equi?m*;:lt 22.0 88.2 Drsgontooth nines, Cluster to-.lj unit 28/3? 9.3 - - - 9.3 Wide area antiper:onnel mine, Cluster tomb unit 34/4? 2.0 17.0 40.6 30.0 - 89.6 M-36 Cluster bomb Other munitions ;,C 12.0 6.1 -9.2 13.8 10.0 31.2 24.9 Tactical Fighter Dispenser, Si’O-41 Aircraft r.lnc dispenser i .: 1.0 - - - 2.7 SUU-42 Aircraft sen!,or dispenser 17.0 18.1 - - - 35.1 Military construction program d--171 _-~ - L- __- - -I ..-I- 17 7 Research, developrcnt, trut, and evrluation -2- 90 A 23 5 -L 20 0 -__L- 12 5 &_14 0 Lo. 79 0 DEFENSE CCW~JNICATIOKS PJAk’i’!IxG GROUP $ -..- 7.3 S 22.4 S 16.5 $ 14.5 $ 15.7 $ 7f.4 -..._ - _ _-_ _._.__ =-: -;- _ Operations and n.aintel,zncc, Defense agencies 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7 - --2. 7 9 Research, deVelOpaent, test, and evalu.atiOn, Defense agencies ___ 5.9 ---I20 6 --..15.n 13.0 ___ --.-14.0 ---- 68.5 TOTAL PRWRA’l COST $370.0 $;ZS.O c/.11.7 $213.0 $219.7 $~21,~~i3.4 c.:z --._ ___ = ‘- . i ‘-. “. August 20, 1970 Mr. Elmer Stoats Comptroller General of the United States C*neral Accounting Off ice Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. Stants: Recently I have been raising qucsLicns and requesting inforoiition about a new progrim knorin as the electronic or integrated battlefield. This system is composed of various senrors backed hy cosputers which are designed to prcvidc field comxnndern \ritl: general battl.eficld in- telligence. In the course of my inquiries about the program, a nun>~rr of questions have been raised which deserve detailed study before the Congress proceeds wit.h its further dcvclopncnt. Therefore, I would li.ke to request that you undertake an invcsrl ;ation of co;t. and cficc- tivcnecs of tile prc;r:si ce:;tcrcd ‘9rouiid the follow;ng qljesl ions: 1. To what cytcnt ha;ie the three Lrxjr’l:zr of the ar-cd forces coordinated tln:ir efforts in the development of electronic battlefield devices and what action, if any, has been taken to avoid duplication? 1 2. How effective have these devices been in combat in Vietnam? Have they corltributed to improved combat capability and hoF: reliable have they proven in actual combat? 3. Is it necessary, in view of the Victnzmizntivn program, to proceed with the procurcmunt of so-called phase III sensors and with the developmznt of more advanced sensors for 1972 and 19757 4. Does the Department of Defense plan to make these devices and related equipment available to foreign countries under the Foreign Military Sales Act or ot!ler foreign assistance programs, and if so, what restrictions, if any, will be placed on their USC? Hr, Elmer Steats August 20, 1970 Page So 5. What kind of support units will be necessery to operate and J monitor devices such devices and to what extent will permft a reduction in military the use of such ~+npower? 6. What are the potential applications of tl‘tse devices in domrrtic law enforcement? h’nat restrictions, if any, could be placed on their distribution and sale to domer-tic police forces and other groups? 7. k’hat long range plans, if any, does the Department of Defense have co:,:erning the devcld;;rent and procurement of these de- vices durir.5 the next ten years? What are the project costs of eny long range programs? I do not accept classified information and I therefore msk that your repsz I to me be u;:classified. I would hope that you could have this report ccmpleted by Mrch 31, 1971. If you have any questions, please do not I, citatr: to ~~21 n+eR(. ‘Lhmk YOM for your cooper;tion in this nrttcr. U.S. GAO Wash., D 34
Cost and Effectiveness of Electronic Sensor and Surveillance Systems
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-06-10.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)