oversight

First Review of Phasedown of United States Military Activities in Vietnam

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-03-15.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS’




First Review Of Phasedown
Of United States Military
Activities In Vietnam       B-171579




Department of Defense M




BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES



                          MARCH15,1971
               COMPTROLLER       GENERAL       OF      THE   UNITED      STATES
                               WASHINGTON.      D.C.     20548




B- 171579




To the    President       of the Senate     and the
Speaker     of the     House    of Representatives                        CUJ
        This is our report           on the first   review   of the phasedown
of United    States military          activities  in Vietnam    by the Depart-
ment    of Defense.

         Our examination   was made pursuant     to the qudget                    and
Accounting     Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C.  53), and the Accounting                      and
Auditing    Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C.  67).

       Copies   of this report   are being      sent to the Director,               Of-
fice of Management       and Budget;     the Secretary     of Defense;              and
the Secretaries    of the Army,      Navy,   and Air Force.




                                             Comptroller              General
                                             of the United            States




                      50 TH ANNIVERSARY                 1921-     1971
  I
  I
  I
  I.
  I       .
  I
* I
  I       COMPTROLLER
                    GENERAL'S                         FIRST REVIEW OF PHASEDOWN OF UNITED STATES
  I
  I       REPORT
               TO THECONGRESS                         MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM
  I                                                   Department of Defense B-171579
  I
  I
  I
  I
  I
          DIGEST
          ------
  I
  I
  I
  I       WHYTHEREVIEWWASMADE
  I
  I
                      With the Department of Defense (DOD) now being engaged in reducing U.S.
      I               combat operations and related military  activities in Vietnam, the Gen-
      I
      I
                      eral Accounting Office (GAO) has undertaken a series of reviews of pol-
      I               icies and procedures being applied in the phasedown and of results be-
      I               ing attained.
      I
      I
      I               GAO's objective    is to identify    problems being encountered, focussing
      I
      I               particularly    on the logistics    aspects, and to bring these problems
      I               promptly to the attention       of the responsible military  commanders and
      I
      I
                      the Secretary of Defense while the phasedown continues.
      I
      I               This first GAO report   is directed primarily  to matters connected with
      I
      I
                      the third incremental   reduction in troop strength (50,000) completed
      I               April 15, 1970.
      I
      I
      I
      I
      I
          FINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONS
      I
  I                    Between June 8, 1969, and April 15, 1970, U.S. forces in Vietnam were
   I
  I                    reduced from 538,000 troops to 425,500, a reduction of approximately
                       21 percent.
  I
  I
  I                    This was accomplished in three steps over periods of 3 to 4 months for
  I                    each step.  Despite the relatively   short time provided, the military
  I
  I                    services met each .of the directed troop reduction schedules.    (See
  I                    ch. 3)
  I
  I
  I                    The reductions were accomplished by redeploying military    units or plac-
  I
  I
                       ing them in an inactive status, by reassigning individuals,     and by
                       curtailing   replacements scheduled to be sent to Vietnam.
  t
  I
  I                    As a result large quantities    of supplies and equipment had to be dis-
  I                    posed of or redistributed    at the same time that the war was continuing.
  I
  I                    This was, and continues to be, a formidable task.
  I
  I
  I                    The circumstances made it difficult        for organizations in Vietnam, sub-
  I                    ordinate to the services'    command headquarters, to prepare for effi-
  I
  I
                       cient reductions of military    activities.
  I
  I
              Tear   Sheet
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  I
                                                                                                                               I
                                                                                                                          I
                                                                                                                       .I
                                                                                                   L                     I


These organizations        could not be provided           specific   information     as' to           I   . 1'
size and time of force          reductions    until     announced    by the President.                       I
Further,   they were placed          in the position       of having    to continue    their                               I
                                                                                                                           I
assigned   military     and combat missions          until    a few days prior      to re-                                 I
assignment     of personnel       and turn-in    of equipment.

In many cases        detailed     procedures    for   withdrawal   had to be improvised                                    I
and implemented         even    as the withdrawal      took place.    (See PP. 7 to 10.)                                   i
                                                                                                                           I
Notwithstanding     these      constraints,     DOD and the military      services  were                               I
                                                                                                                       I
making a concerted       effort      to account   for and control     arms, equipment,                                 I
and materiel    which became excess as the phasedown              proceeded.
                                                                                                                       I
                                                                                                                       I
The constraints    contributed     to a variety    of problems    requiring      atten-                                I
tion   of military   commands in Vietnam       and in Washington,      including      the                              I
                                                                                                                       I
Office   of the Secretary      of Defense.                                                                             I


  --There    was a need for more effective           teamwork among the three    mili-                             i
     tary services    to supply    the needs of the Vietnamese         Armed Forces.                               I
     Lack of uniform    procedures      resulted     in some cases in equipment                                    I
                                                                                                                   I
     needed by the Vietnamese        forces     being shipped   back to the United                                 I
     States.    (See p. 13.)                                                                                       I
                                                                                                                   I

  --Problems        in returning     Army equipment        to the United     States   developed                    i
     because      of a backlog      of equipment      which required      cleaning.       This
     backlog      was due to increased         enforcement      of U.S. Public      Health     Ser-            I
     vice and       Department    of Agriculture       standards    for the treatment          and             i
     processing       of materiel     being returned         to the United    States    and to                 I
     a shortage       of cleaning     equipment.        (See p. 30.)                                           I
                                                                                                               I
  --The Air Force had a backlog     of materiel  awaiting    shipment   to the                                 I

     United  States  because of a lack of people   qualified     in packing    and                             i
     crating  of materiel.   (See p. 30.)    .                                                                 I
                                                                                                               I
GAO also    observed       the following     situations      where improvements         might be               I
possible    in supply        and maintenance      operations     connected  with      the phase-               i
down.                                                                                                          I

  --Due to the lack of an effective        screening   procedure,                repair    parts
     and components    required   by the U.S. military     services                in Vietnam
     were issued    to the Vietnamese   Army as excess to U-S.                   requirements.
     (See p. 19.)

  --During     the first      8 months of fiscal     year 1970, Army depots         in Viet-
     nam were directed         to ship excess serviceable        secondary     items and
     supplies     valued    at $297 million      out of Vietnam.       In the same period
     U.S. military       assistance    funds available      for similar     items for the
     Vietnamese      Army totaled     $231 million.      (See p, 19.)
                                                                                                           I
  --The reporting      and      accounting     system did     not provide   management         with        i
     accurate,    complete,        or timely     logistical    data,    (See p. 20.)                       I
                                                                                                           I




                                          2
* I'I                       --Actions taken by some of the services to cancel requisitions   for
         *                     supplies that would not be needed because of force reductions
     I
     L                        were inadequate and could result in unnecessary shipment of sup-
     I
                               plies to Vietnam.  (See p. 20.)

                            --The Army had a significant        backlog of reparable equipment in Vietnam
                               mainly because of limited       maintenance capabilities.   (See p. 23.)

  I
  I                  Although GAO's review was not conclusive,         there may be a need for
  I                  stronger controls over transfers     of facilities      (such as buildings,    air-
  I
  t                  fields,  and water purification   plants) to the Vietnamese to ensure that
  I                  adequate consideration    is given to their capability       to use and maintain
  I
  I            ,     the real and personal property associated with the facility.             GAO has
  t                  brought this matter to the attention      of responsible officials.         (See
  I
  t                  p. 27.)
                     Notwithstanding    these and similar difficulties,       military commanders
                     were taking reasonable actions to prevent any accumulation of excess
                     assets from being left in the combat zone as had occurred after pre-
                     vious wars. Efforts made by the military          in Vietnam, in this respect,
                     were considerable.
  t

             RECOMMENDATIONS
                         ORSUGGESTIONS
                     The Secretary         of Defense should:

                            --Review existing   plans of the military  services for executing an-
                               ticipated withdrawals to ensure that these plans provide for cur-
                               rent and future withdrawals on a unit-by-unit    basis. (See p. 9.)

                            --Establish     uniform procedures and criteria    (1) for the transfer of
                               U.S. military     services'   excess materiel to the Vietnamese Armed
                               Forces and (2) to ensure that all excess materiel        in Vietnam is con-
                               sidered in fulfilling       requirements of the Vietnamese.    (See p. 14.)
  t
  t                         --Reduce the backlog of equipment awaiting        processing   and cleaning.
                              (See   P- 30.)

                            --Establish    procedures for determining and maintaining  that support
                               capability,   particularly in the packing and crating area, required
                               to support Air Force phasedown actions.    (See p. 32.)

                            --Examine into the other problem areas in supply and management re-
                               ported by GAO. (See p. 25.)
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             Tear
             ___-   Sheet




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                                                                                   .                               I
AGENCY
     ACTIONSANDUNRESOLVED
                       ISSUES                                                          ’   .                      I
                                                                                                                   ’ .

                                                                                                                  I
    The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations     and Logistics)  stated                                  I
                                                                                                                  I
    that the military   departments concurred generally   with GAO's conclu-
    sions and proposals.     (See p. 37.)                                                                        I
                                                                                                                 I
                                                                                                                I
    He stated also that the Air Force had published special plans for unit-                                     I
                                                                                                                I
    by-unit withdrawals (see p. 38) and that the Army had written special                                       I
    procedures for redeploying or inactivating  units and for redistribut-                                      I
    ing materiel while operations continued.   (See p. 39.)                                                     I
                                                                                                                 I
                                                                                                                I
    The Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated procedures in May 1970 designed                                     I
                                                                                                              I
    to facilitate  the transfer of equipment by the three military services                                   I
    to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.    (See p. 37.)                                                           I
                                                                                                              I
                                                                                                              I
    The Army provided 23 additional  water blasters to the forces in Viet-                                    I
    nam to expand their capability  to clean equipment scheduled for re-                                     I
                                                                                                             I
    turn to the U.S. or for transfer to the Vietnamese.   (See p. 40.)                                       I
                                                                                                             I
   The Air Force said that it was aware of the necessity for augmenting 1                                    I
                                                                                                             I
   its packaging and crating capabilities    in Vietnam to accommodate phase-                               I
   down actions and withdrawals of personnel and equipment and that it                                      I
   had taken steps to correct the situation.     (See p. 37.)                                               I
                                                                                                            I
                                                                                                           I
    The services have established and implemented several new procedures                                   I
    to strengthen their management of supply and maintenance operations                                    I
    in line with GAO's proposals.  (See p. 38.)                                                            I
                                                                                                           I
                                                                                                           I
    GAO believes that the actions taken, if consistently  applied, will im-                              I
                                                                                                        I
    prove conditions which existed during the early stages of the phase-                                I
    down.
                                                                                                        I
                                                                                                        I


MTTERSFORCONSIDERATION
                    BY THECONGRESS                                                                     1
                                                                                                       I
                                                                                                       I
   GAO is reporting on these matters to provide the Congress wl'th informa-                            I
                                                                                                       I
   tion on the logistical  actions being taken in connection with the                                  I
   phasedown of United States military  activities in Vietnam.      '                                  I
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                                    Contents
                                                                                 Page

        DIGEST                                                                     1

        CHAPTER

             1    INTRODUCTION                                                     5

             2    OBSTACLESTO EFFICIENT PHASEDOWNPLANNING
                  FOR LOGISTICAL MATTERS
                      Army planning
                      Air Force planning
                      Navy planning
                      Marine Corps planning
                      Agency connnents and our evaluation

             3    REDUCTION OF PERSONNELCEILINGS                                  11

             4    INTERSERVICE AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENTPROBLEMS                      13
                      Need for interservice              coordination     in
                        filling       the needs of Republic of
                        Vietnam Armed Forces                                      13
                             Agency comments and our evaluation                   14
                      Army reluctance           to accept stocks from
                        the Navy                                                  16
                      Observations         of other logistics         problems
                        warranting         increased management atten-
                        tion                                                      17
                             Weaknesses in procedures              for lateral
                                transfer       of Army assets                     17
                             Potential       for avoiding significant
                                costs in the supply of secondary
                                items to the Vietnamese Army                      19
                             Problems in the U.S. Army, Vietnam,
                                logistical        reporting     and account-
                                ing system                                        20
                             Potential       buildup of unneeded sup-
                                plies                                             20
                                   Army                                           20
                                   Air Force                                      21
                                   Marine Corps                                   22
                             Problems in the maintenance area                     23
                      Agency comments and our evaluation                          25
                                                                         8 .

                                                                  Page
CHAPTER

        5   TURNOVEROF EXCESS FACILITIES                          26
                Policy on turnover     of U.S. facilities
                  to the Republic of Vietnam                      26
                Capability   of Vietnamese to maintain
                  facilities   released by U.S. Forces            27

        6   TRANSPORTATIONRESOURCESAND PROBLEMS
            RELATED THERETO                                       29
                Available  transportation resources               29
                Inadequate Army cleaning facilities               30
                Inadequate Air Force packing and
                   crating capability                             ,30
                Agency comments and our evaluation                 32

        7   SCOPEOF REVIEW                                        33

APPENDIX

        I   Letter dated November 6, 1974 from the As-
               sistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-
               tions and Logistics)                               37

   II       Letter dated December 4, 1970, from the
              Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Installa-
              tions and Logistics)                                39

 III        Principal    officials     of the Department of De-
               fense and the Departments of the Army,
               Navy, and Air Force responsible        for ad-
              ministration       of activities  discussed in
               this report                                        42

                               ABBREVIATIONS

DOD         Department     of Defense

GAO         General    Accounting    Office
                                              I)
MSTS        Military     Sea Transportation        Service
.   'COMPTkOLLER
               GENERALrS                FIRST REVIEW OF PHASEDOWN OF UNITED STATES
     REPORT
          TO THECONGRESS                MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM
                                        Department of Defense B-171579


    DIGEST
    ------

    WHYTHEREVIEWWASMADE
        With the Department of Defense (DOD) now being engaged in reducing U.S.
        combat operations and related military  activities in Vietnam, the Gen-
        eral Accounting Office (GAO) has undertaken a series of reviews of pol-
        icies and procedures being applied in the phasedown and of results be-
        ing attained.

        GAO's objective    is to identify    problems being encountered, focussing
        particularly    on the logistics    aspects, and to bring these problems
        promptly to the attention       of the responsible military  commanders and
        the Secretary of Defense while the phasedown continues.

        This first GAO report   is directed primarily  to matters connected with
        the third incremental   reduction in troop strength (50,000) completed
        April 15, 1970.


    FINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONS
        Between June 8, 1969, and April 15, 1970, U.S. forces in Vietnam were
        reduced from 538,000 troops to 425,500, a reduction of approximately
        21 percent.

        This was accomplished in three steps over periods of 3 to 4 months for
        each step.  Despite the relatively   short time provided, the military
        services met each .of the directed troop reduction schedules.    (See
        ch. 3)

        The reductions were accomplished by redeploying military      units or plac-
        ing them in an inactive status, by reassigning   individuals,     and by
        curtailing   replacements scheduled to be sent to Vietnam.

         As a result large quantities    of supplies and equipment had to be dis-
         posed of or redistributed    at the same time that the war was continuing.
         This was, and continues to be, a formidable task.

         The circumstances made it difficult       for organizations in Vietnam, sub-
         ordinate to the services'    command headquarters, to prepare for effi-
         cient reductions of military    activities.




                                         1
These organizations        could not be provided           specific   information     as to           ,   ,   .
size and time of force          reductions    until     announced    by the President.
Further,   they were placed          in the position       of having    to continue    their
assigned   military     and combat missions          until    a few days prior      to re-
assignment     of personnel       and turn-in    of equipment.

In many cases      detailed     procedures    for    withdrawal   had to be improvised
and implemented       even    as the withdrawal       took place.    (See ppo 7 to lo.)

Notwithstanding     these constraints,     DOD and the military       services  were
making a concerted      effort  to account   for and control      arms, equipment,
and materiel    which became excess as'the       phasedown   proceeded.

The constraints    contributed     to a variety    of problems             requiring       atten-
tion   of military  commands in Vietnam        and in Washington,              including      the
Office   of the Secretary      of Defense.

  --There     was a need for more effective            teamwork among the three    mili-
     tary    services   to supply    the needs of the Vietnamese         Armed Forces.
     Lack of uniform      procedures      resulted     in some cases in equipment
     needed by the Vietnamese          forces     being shipped   back to the United
     States.       (See p. 13.)

  --Problems      in returning      Army equipment       to the United       States   developed
     because    of a backlog      of equipment      which     required    cleaning.       This
     backlog    was due to increased         enforcement        of U.S. Public      Health     Ser-
     vice and Department        of Agriculture        standards       for the treatment        and
     processing     of materiel      being returned        to the United      States    and to
     a shortage     of cleaning      equipment.       (See p. 30.)

  --The Air Force had a backlog     of materiel  awaiting    shipment   to the
     United  States  because of a lack of people   qualified     in packing    and
     crating  of materiel.   (See p. 30.)

GAO also   observed     the following     situations      where improvements            might be
possible   in supply      and maintenance      operations     connected  with         the phase-
down.

  --Due to the lack of an effective        screening   procedure,               repair    parts
     and components    required   by the U.S. military     services               in Vietnam
     were issued    to the Vietnamese   Army as excess to U.S.                  requirements.
     (See p. 19.)

  --During     the first      8 months of fiscal     year 1970, Army depots         in Viet-
     nam were directed         to ship excess serviceable        secondary     items and
     supplies     valued    at $297 million      out of Vietnam.       In the same period
     U.S. military       assistance    funds available      for similar     items for the
     Vietnamese      Army totaled     $231 million.      (See p. 19.)

  --The reporting      and    accounting     system did      not provide   management         with
     accurate,    complete,      or timely     logistical     data.    (See p. 20.)



                                        2
.   .      . --Actions taken by some of the services to cancel requisitions   for
                supplies that would not be needed because of force reductions
               were inadequate and could result'in  unnecessary shipment of sup-
                plies to Vietnam.  (See p. 20.)

             --The Army had a significant        backlog of reparable    equipment in Vietnam
                mainly because of limited       maintenance capabiliti   es'. '(See p, 23.)

           Although GAO's review was not conclusive,         there may be a need for
           stronger controls over transfers     of facilities      (such as buildings,    air-
           fields,  and water purification   plants) to the Vietnamese to ensure that
           adequate consideration    is given to their capability       to use and maintain
           the real and personal property associated with the facility.             GAO has
           brought this matter to the attention      of responsible officials.         (See
           p. 27.)

           Notwithstanding    these and similar difficulties,       military commanders
           were taking reasonable actions to prevent any accumulation of excess
           assets from being left in the combat zone as had occurred after pre-
           vious wars. Efforts made by the military          in Vietnam, in this respect,
           were considerable.


        RECOMMENDATIONS
                    ORSUGGESTIONS
           The Secretary   of Defense should:

             --Review existing   plans of the military  services for executing an-
                ticipated withdrawals to ensure that these plans provide for cur-
                rent and future withdrawals on a unit-by-unit    basis. (See p. 9.)

             --Establish    uniform procedures and criteria     (1) for the transfer of
                U.S. military    services'   excess materiel  to the Vietnamese Armed
                Forces and (2) to ensure that all excess materiel        in Vietnam is con-
                sidered in fulfilling      requirements of the Vietnamese.     (See p. 14.)

             --Reduce the backlog of equipment awaiting          processing   and cleaning.
                (See p1 30.)
             --Establish    procedures for determining and maintaining  that support
                capability,   particularly in the packing and crating area, required
                to support Air Force phasedown actions.    (See p. 32.)

             --Examine into the other problem areas in supply and management re-
                ported by GAO. (See p. 25.)




                                            3
AGENCYACTIONS AND UNRESOLVEDISSUES
                                                                                  .   *
     The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations    and Logistics) stated
     that the military  departments concurred generally   with GAO's conclu-
     sions and proposals.    (See p* 37.)

     He stated also that the Air Force had published special plans for unit-
     by-unit withdrawals  (see p. 38) and that the Army had written special
     procedures for redeploying or inactivating   units and for redistribut-
     ing materiel while operations continued.    (See p. 39.)

     The Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated procedures in May 1970 designed
     to facilitate  the transfer of equipment by the three military services
     to the Vietnamese Armed Forces.    (See p. 37.)

     The Army provided 23 additional   water blasters to the forces in Viet-
     nam to expand their capability  to clean equipment scheduled for re-
     turn to the U.S. or for transfer to the Vietnamese.    (See p. 40.)

    The Air Force said that it was aware of the necessity for augmenting
    its packaging and crating capabilities    in Vietnam to accommodate phase-
    down actions and withdrawals of personnel and equipment and that it
    had taken steps to correct the situation.     (See p. 37.)

     The services have established and implemented several new procedures
     to strengthen their management of supply and maintenance operations
     in line with GAO's proposals.  (See ii 38.)

     GAO believes that the actions taken, if consistently  appl ied, will im-
     prove conditions which existed during the early stages of the phase-
     down.


MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATIONBY T?iE CONGRESS

    GAO is reporting on these matters to provide the Congress with informa-
    tion on the logistical  actions being taken in connection with the
    phasedown of United States military  activities in Vietnam.




                                   4
                .
*       .
                    .

    .       .

                                                   CHAPTER
                                                         1

                                                INTRODUCTION
                            The General Accounting    Office examined into selected
                    aspects of the phasedown of United States military             forces
                    in the Republic of Vietnam.        This initial     effort   was di-
                    rected toward identifying      problems being encountered,         focus-
                    sing particularly    on the logistics    aspects,      and to bringing
                    the problems promptly to the attention           of the responsible
                    miiitary    commanders and the Secretary        of Defense while the
                    phasedown continues.

                           Our observations     were made during the third incremental
                    withdrawal   in troop strength which took place between Decem-
                    ber 15, 1969, and April 15, 1970. We made limited               inquiries
                    into the first     two incremental    withdrawals,    including     the
                    turnover   of facilities,      the availability    of transportation,
                    and the transfer       of personnel that were concurrent        parts of
                    the phasedown to date.         The scope of our review is shown on
                    page 33 of this report.

                          During the period June 8, 1969, through April 15, 1970,
                    the troop ceiling    of the U,S. Forces in Vietnam was reduced
                    from about 549,000 to 434,000--a    reduction  of approximately
                    21 percent.    This was accomplished in three incremental      re-
                    ductions as follows:

                          Phase I     On June 8, 1969, the President    announced that
                                      the initial   reduction, 25,000 troops,   was to
                                      be accomplished by the end of August 1969.

                          Phase II    On September 16, 1969, the President  an-
                                      nounced that the U.S. troop ceiling  was to be
                                      reduced to 484,000 by mid-December 1969.

                          Phase III   On December 15, 1969, the President        announced
                                      a further   reduction   in authorized   troop
                                      strength   of 50,000 to take place by April 15,
                                      1970. The effect      of this reduction    was to
                                      limit   the U.S. forces in Vietnam to 434,000
                                      troops as of April 15, 1970.



                                                         5
                                                                          .   .
       On April 20, 1970, the President   announced a further
reduction   of 150,000 troops that was to take place by the
spring of 1971. At the time of our fieldwork,       no action
had taken place on this withdrawal.      This report deals only
with actions that occurred through April 15, 1970, the date
of completion   of the third  phase of troop reductions.

       During our examination,     we brought certain     matters to
the attention    of responsible    officials    in Vietnam through
meetings and memoranda. We kept the Office of the Secretary
of Defense informed on our observations           through periodic
meetings with personnel of the Office of the Assistant             Sec-
retary   of Defense (Installations        and Logistics).
        .

            .

.   .

                                            CHAPTER2

                            OBSTK'IES TO EFFICIENT PHASEDOWN

                              PLANNING FOR LOGISTICAL MATTERS

                   The Department of Defense was faced with a formidable
            task in managing the inactivation           of units and reassignment
            of personnel to comply with the President's               phasedown di-
            rectives.       Large quantities      of supplies and equipment be-
            came available       for redistribution     or disposal.       At the same
            time, the war effort        with its attendant      logistical    and se-
            curity    requirements     continued.

                    There were constraints        that made it difficult        for or-
            ganizations      in Vietnam, subordinate           to the services'    com-
            mand headquarters,        to prepare detailed         plans for the ef-
            ficient    reduction     of military     activities       for each of the
            incremental      withdrawals.       We were told,       for example, that
            specific     details    on force reductions         were not passed to the
            lower echelons of command until             announcements had been made
            by the President.          Consequently,     the lower echelons were
            placed in the position         of having to prepare contingency
            plans andthen toreact          to announced withdrawals          as directed.

                  At the same time that the services were directed       to
            make substantial    force reductions,    they were expected to
            continue the war effort.      Planning for combat operations,
            adequate security;and     logistical    support of combat opera-
            tions would, of necessity,      take precedence over the planning
            for phasedown operations.

                    The necessity     that the services revise their conceptual
            approach to redeployment was another constraint                to efficient
            planning.      Prior to the President's        announcement of troop
            withdrawals,      the DOD plan for redeployment        was based on the
            premise that there would be a cessation            of hostilities        be-
            fore troops were withdrawn.          The plan, referred        to as the
            "T-Day Plan" provided for the time-phased withdrawal                  of
            personnel and materiel         in a nonhostile    environment.        De-
            tailed    procedures for redeploying       or inactivating        units and
            redistributing       equipment and supplies while operations             con-
            tinued had not been prepared and thus were not available.


                                                  7
Although certain     parts of the T-Day Plan could be used,
detailed   procedures had to be devised and implemented as
the withdrawal    took place.

ARMY PMNNING

        The U.S. Army, Vietnam, plans for the incremental            with-
drawal of forces called for combat, combat support,              and
combat service support organizations         and specified      equipment
and supplies to be phased out in a manner which would main-
tain a balanced force posture.        Organizations     identified
for inactivation    or redeployment were directed         to maintain
sufficient    combat capability   for security     and self-defense
until    time for actual unit movements.       Units to be inacti-
vated were required     to turn in all materiel       to the supply
system for use in satisfying      in-country    requirements.

       The Army did not have well-defined       operating     procedures
to control    the turn-in   and disposition   of equipment and sup-
plies.     The system was created during the initial          phasedown
and was revised as the phasedown progressed.             The system
was not effective,      however, in maintaining     accurate control
over the large quantity      of equipment being turned in, and
it could not keep up with the volume of transactions.
After the third phase of the withdrawal         started,    the Army
found it necessary to change from the manual system then in
use to a computerized      system.   This change was made to cope
with the large volume of transactions        being processed.
(See p. 20.1

AIR FORCE PLANNING

       The Headquarters,     Pacific  Air Force, issued directives
to the 7th Air Force, Vietnam, for each incremental          with-
drawal.     These directives    contained the objectives,    con-
cept 9 and specific     command/staff    actions required for each
withdrawal.

      The procedures were not completely      effective.    At one
base, $10.5 million    of excesses built    up after the redeploy-
ment of three aircraft     squadrons.    The buildup resulted
from (1) the turn-in    of large quantities    of supplies pecu-
liar to the aircraft    redeployed,   (2) the receipt    of supplies
for the redeployed units after the units had departed
Vietnam, (3) failure      of the base supply officer       to research
the base supply accounts and identify       items which were pe-
culiar   to the deployed aircraft    but not coded as such or to
identify     common items used by the departing      units and take
action to adjust their      stockage levels to reflect        reduced
requirements     (see p. 21), and (4) a shortage of personnel
trained    in the packing and crating    of materiel      (see p. 30).
NAVY PIANNING

      Joint United States Navy and Vietnamese Navy planning
was started    in November 1968 for the gradual turnover            of
naval missions and certain       watercraft    to the Vietnamese
Navy.    The plans for the mission turnover were accelerated
in May 1969 after the President's          announced military     phase-
down.    The U.S.  Navy  has  turned   over   hundreds  of   watercraft
to the Vietnamese.      We were informed that, by mid-1970,
most of the 500 patrol     craft and gunboats and the majority
of naval operations     in Vietnam would be in the hands of the
South Vietnamese.

I%RINE CORPS PLANNING

       The Marine Corps phasedown was carried  out through the
redeployment    of units, some of which were scheduled for in-
activation   upon reaching their destination.   The Marine
Corps plans provided for the movement of specific     equipment
and supplies along with the redeployed units.

       Although the Marine Corps strength      was being reduced
significantly,    a corresponding    reduction  had not been made
in the quantities    of supplies on order.      The Fleet Logis-
tics Command records indicated       that about $22 millionworth
of supplies on requisition      in March 1970 were not needed
but had not been canceled.        (See p. 22.)

AGENCY COMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATION

      On August 26, 1970, we brought         our findings and our
proposals for corrective   action to       the attention  of the
Secretary  of Defense.   We suggested        that the Secretary  of
Defense provide for a review of the          plans of each of the


                                    9
                                                                          .



military  services for executing  the anticipated  withdrawals
to ensure that such plans recognize and provide for the in-
cremental nature of current and future withdrawals.

        The Assistant    Secretary  of Defense (Installations      and
Logistics)    commented on our findings      and proposals in sep-
arate letters      dated November 6, 1970 (see app. I>, and De-
cember 4, 1970 (see app. II>.         The replies    stated that the
military    departments concurred generally       with our conclu-
sions and proposals.        The reply of November 6, 1970, stated
that the Air Force had developed and published a group of
special plans that provided for incremental           deployment and
logistics    guidance in all phases of withdrawal         actions.

        The reply dated December 4, 1970, stated that the Army
recognized     the need for detailed     procedures for redeploying
or inactivating     units and redistributing       equipment and sup-
plies while military      operations   continued.      The reply stated
further    that appropriate    procedures had been written       and
that associated     problems continued to receive top manage-
ment emphasis by the Army and its major subordinate             com-
mands.

       We have not had the opportunity     to review the actions
taken by the services;    however, we believe that these ac-
tions will   improve the conditions    which existed at the time
of our fieldwork.    We plan to look into these matters and
to evaluate the progress made by the military        services in
developing plans more closely aligned to the incremental
withdrawal   concept during the next phasedown, which is
scheduled to be completed by May 1, 1971.




                                  10
        .



.   .
                                        CHAPTER3

                          REDUCTION
                                  OF PERSONNEL
                                             CEILINGS
                  We found that, despite the relatively   short time al-
            lowed them, the services met each of the directed troop re-
            ductions.    The reductions were accomplished by the (1) in-
            activation or redeployment of organizations,     (2) redeploy-
            ment of individuals,    and (3) curtailment of incoming re-
            placements.
                  We noted that, although the authorized troop,ceiling
            was reduced by 115,000 as a result of the three Presidential
            announcements, the actual troop strength in-country was re-
            duced by about 112,500 from the beginning of phase I-through
            the end of phase III because actual troop strength in-
            country immediately prior to phase I was only 538,000 in
            contrast to an authorized troop ceiling of 549,500. At the
            end of phase III, April 15, 1970, the actual in-country
            troop strength was only 425,583 although the troop ceiling
            was 434,000. The following table summarizes the force re-
            ductions for the three withdrawal phases in terms of autho-
            rized troop ceilings and actual troop strengths.
                                              Authorized      Actual troop
                                            troop               strength
            Level at start of phase I           549,500          538,000
            Phase I reduction                    25,000           23,000
            Level at end of phase I             524,500          515,000
            Phase II reduction                   40,500           31,000
            Level at end of phase II            484,000          484,000
            Phase III reduction                  50,000           58,417
                                                434,000          425,583
                   The bulk of the reductions in authorized troop ceil-
            ings took place in the Army and Marine Corps. The follow-
            ing table summarizes the reductions in authorized troop
            ceilings for each service.


                                           11
                                                                         .
                       Summary of Reduction in
                      Authorized Troop Ceilings

Phase        L!Jz?I   Marine   Corps   !2!?xx   Air   Force    Total

        I   15,384        8,394        1,222         -         25,000
   II       14,082       18,465        5,412      2,541        40,500
 III        29,443       12,900        2,050      5,607        50,000

                         39.759        8,684                  115,500

        The reduction   in the number of personnel and the inac-
tivation    of units in Vietnam resulted     in the accumulation    of
large quantities      of supplies, equipment,   and materiel   which
had to be disposed of or redistributed.
.   .

                                      CHAPTER4

                 INTERSERVICE AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENTPROBLEMS

               We found that the services were making a concerted           ef-
        fort to account for and control       assets which became excess
        as the phasedown proceeded.        Responsible   officials    were tak-
        ing reasonable actions to preclude an accumulation            of ex-
        cesses being left behind as had occurred after prior major
        conflicts    involving  U.S. military   forces.     The efforts   made
        in this respect were considerable.         Nevertheless,    GAO found
        a number of opportunities     for improving the management of
        the current     and of future phasedown increments.

        NEED FOR INTERSERVICE COORDINATION
        IN FILLING THE NEEDS OF
        REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES

              There is a need for overall      control    in Vietnam to en-
        sure effective    coordination with respect to fulfilling         re-
        quirements of the Vietnamese forces.           Each of the services
        was implementing    its own procedures for the redistribution
        and utilization    of assets which were excess to its needs or
        in long supply in Vietnam.      There was, however, no organiza-
        tion overseeing or coordinating      the actions of the individ-
        ual services    to ensure that the needs of the Vietnamese
        forces were considered before other disposition           was made of
        excesses.

               At the time of our fieldwork,       the Military  Assistance
        Command, Vietnam, was not participating         in the redistribu-
        tion process other than to provide the Army Headquarters             in
        Vietnam with a list      of items required    by the Vietnamese
        forces,      This "want list"   showed some of the item re@ire-
        ments for each branch of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.              This
        list had not been furnished        to services other than the U.S.
        Army until     after our inquiries    into this matter in April 1970.
        We found that there was no cooperation         among the U.S. ser-
        vices to ensure that their excess assets would be used to
        fill   requirements    of any of the Vietnamese services.

             For example, we compared one "want list"   published by
        the Military Assistance  Command with a list  of vehicles ex-
        cess to the 7th Air Force.  We noted that the Air Force had

                                          13
approved 268 vehicles    for shipment to the United States.
We noted also that the "want list'? included a requirement
of the Vietnamese Army for 13 construction     vehicles  of the
same type included in the Air Force list.      This example
illustrates  that, unless a thorough screening of assets is
made by the services,    increased costs may be incurred
through processing    and shipment of the equipment from Viet-
nam and the subsequent shipment of like equipment to Vietnam.

        We inquired     further    into this apparent lack of coop-
eration     among the services        in filling    the Vietnamese Armed
Forces' requirements.           We were told that, as part of the
Military     Assistance      Service Funding Program, each of the
U.S.    services provides       funds for a portion         of the equipment
required     by its Vietnamese counterpart            service;     i.e., the
United States Army provides funds for the Vietnamese Army,
the United States Navy provides funds for the Vietnamese
Navy. When equipment is furnished                to a Vietnamese service
from other than its United States counterpart,                   the counter-
part service      is billed     by the service which provides the
equipment.

      The Military     Assistance    Command reported to the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific,         in 1970, that United States ser-
vices were reluctant       to accept less than new equipment for
their Vietnamese counterpart         as long as they had to reimburse
the service providing        the equipment at new equipment prices.
The command requested that a standardized           acceptance and
reimbursement     procedure be established      to prevent equipment
needed by the Vietnamese forces from being shipped out of
the country.      At the time our fieldwork      was completed,  this
matter had not been resolved.

       We suggested that the Secretary of Defense establish
uniform procedures and criteria     for the transfer    and reim-
bursement of the military   services'   excess materiel    to the
Vietnamese Armed Forces to ensure that all U.S. military          ex-
cesses in the country are screened against the requirements
of the Vietnamese.

Agency comments and our evaluation

       The Assistant     Secretary of Defense (Installation            and
Logistics)   stated    that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

                                     14
.   .
        promulgated procedures on May 28, 1970, which would facili-
        tate interservice  transfers of equipment to meet the needs
        of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. He also pointed out that
        procedures were implemented in August 1970, which would
        permit the transfer to the Vietnamese Army of United States
        military  excess materiel scheduled to be returned to the
        United States.
             We plan to review and to evaluate the effectiveness of
        the Joint Chiefs of Staff procedures during the conduct of
        our next review of this subject.




                                     15
ARMY RELUCTANCETO ACCEPT STOCKS
FROM THE NAVY

         At the time of our review, the Navy was in the process
of turning       over to the Army inventories   and related   respon-
sibility      for providing  common supply and service support to
all U.S. forces in the northern        section of the Republic of
Vietnam, commonly referred       to as I Corps.    The transfer    was
to be completed by July 1, 1970;

       We examined into the transfer     of packaged petroleum
products which had already been accomplished.        We found
that   the Army had not accepted more than a 5-l/Z-month       sup-
ply of these items from the Navy. The Army considered the
5-l/2-month   supply an optimum level of inventory     for pro-
viding adequate troop support.       The Army has a criterion,
however, that permits a lo-month supply of stock that is
already on hand to be retained     rather than disposed of.

         Quantities     of certain     stocks which had been prepared
 by the Navy for turnover were rejected               by the Army because
 the Army refused to accept more than a 5-l/2-month               supply.
The records indicated          that in some instances relatively        in-
 significant      quantities     of stocks were left in custody of
the Navy. For example, the Army accepted 1,256 drums of
lubricating       oil but refused to accept the 13 remaining
drums valued at about $425.               The Army also refused to ac-
cept 666 drums of motor gasoline valued at about $10,000
although it did accept 3,673 drums.                We discussed this mat-
ter with responsible         officials      in Vietnam and expressed our
concern that,        if the same criteria        were used for transfer
of the remaining Navy supplies,               it could result  in uneconom-
ical disposal or shipment of supplies.

       We recognize the Army's reluctance      to accept quantities
of material    that may later have to be declared excess and
disposed of.      However, inasmuch as this material      was already
in the country and requirements      would continue,    it would
have been more appropriate      to have retained   the supplies.
Such a course would have avoided the cost of shipping the
supplies out of the country,      handling and inventory     control
by both the Army and Navy, and possibly premature disposal
actions.


                                     16
-       .

    1       .


                        We brought this matter to the attention  of responsible
                officials     at the Department of the Army, and we were in-
                formed that the Army had broadened its criteria     for accept-
                ing stocks in line with our suggestions.

                OBSERVATIONSOF' OTHER LOGISTICS PROBLEMS
                WARRANTING INCREASED MANAGEMENTATTENTION

                        We observed the following     problems in supply and main-
                tenance operations      which appeared to warrant increased man-
                agement attention.       We brought these matters to the immedi-
                ate attention     of responsible    personnel  in the field  and of
                officials    in the Office    of the Assistant   Secretary  of De-
                fense (Installations      and Logistics).

                Weaknesses in procedures  for
                lateral transfer  of Army assets

                       In many instances        units scheduled for inactivation
                transferred      items of equipment to other U.S. Army units.
                This type of transfer,          known as a lateral      transfer,   was au-
                thorized     only when prior approval had been received from
                Headquarters,       U.S. Army, Vietnam.        We noted that the Army
                Headquarters       had approved the lateral       transfer     of major
                equipment valued at about $3 million.               We noted also that
                major.equipmept       valued at about $1.4 million          had been lat-
                erally    transferred      without   approval.    Our examination       of
                pertinent     records and our discussions         with responsible       offi-
                cials indicated       that:

                      --The Army Headquarters    did not require            units to sub-
                         mit data in support of their    requests           for lateral
                         transfers.  Consequently,   requirements             could not be
                         validated.

                      --The Army Headquarters I failure         to validate   the gain-
                         ing units'    requirements     and to determine the status
                         of stock requirements       with the Inventory     Control
                         Center, Vietnam, resulted        in transfers    of equipment
                         to units although units with higher priority            requi-
                         sitions    went without    equipment.

                       --When Army Headquarters approved a lateral               transfer,
                         no action was taken to suspend outstanding

                                                       17
                                                                                   .


         requisitions  to prevent           a duplicate    issue   by the In-
         ventory Control Center.

       --The Army Headquarters         approved lateral         transfers  of
          Department of the Army-controlled              items, contrary    to
          disposition    instructions.        Sixty-five      items valued
          at about $115,000, for which Department of the Army
          had directed     disposition     outside of Vietnam, were
          authorized   for lateral      transfer      to units in Vietnam.

       Headquarters,      U.S. Army, Vietnam, issued a request
that units which had received equipment through lateral
transfers    provide the Inventory            Control Center with a list
of requisitions        to be canceled.         At the time of our field-
work, the Inventory         Control Center had not received the re-
quested information         from any units and none of the open
requisitions     filled     by lateral      transfer      had been canceled.
Thus there were outstanding            requisitions        valued in excess
of $4 million,       which had been filled           through lateral      trans-
fers and which should have been canceled.                     Cur review in-
cluded only major items of equipment.                   If all types of
equipment were considered,           the potential         for cancellation
of additional      requisitions      filled     through lateral       transfers
would be even greater.

       We informed responsible   officials   at Headquarters,
U.S. Army, Vietnam, of our findings,       and they told us that
corrective    action would be taken prior tozany future
phasedown operation.




                                       18
Potential  for avoiding significant         costs
in the supply of secondary items          to the
Vietnamese Army

       Our review of records at U.S. Army, Vietnam, shows that
there is a potential        for avoiding significant     costs in fill-
ing the Vietnamese Army requirements           for secondary items
(secondary items are repair parts or components of major
items; e.g.,     transmissions    or batteries     for use in trucks).
This potential      is not being realized      because of the absence
of clearly    defined procedures for matching,         on a timely
basis, Vietnamese needs with secondary items determined to
be excess to U.S. Forces' needs.
                                                             .
       As of March 1, 1970, the fiscal         year 1970 U.S. military
assistance    funds available     for secondary items and supplies
for the Vietnamese Army totaled         $230.7 million.      During this
same period,     Headquarters,    U.S. Army, Vietnam, directed        its
depots to ship excess serviceable          secondary items and sup-
plies,   valued at $297.5 million,       out of Vietnam.

       We were unable to ascertain    what portion    of the excesses
released for shipment could have been used to fill          the re-
quirements    of the Vietnamese Army.     It is reasonable to as-
sume, however, that similar      items were included on both
lists,   as therrequirements   of the Vietnamese Army were for
secondary items required     to maintain    equipment transferred
to them from U.S. Army, Vietnam, excesses.

        The procedures    required    that U.S. advisors      to the Viet-
namese Army screen the lists         of U.S. Army excesses for items
required    by the Vietnamese Army. We found, however, that
the advisors were reluctant         to request items on the excess
listings    because the U.S.      Army   logistical activities      did not
provide them with timely and accurate information               on the
status of their      requests.

      On the other hand, we noted that secondary items turned
in to the U.S. Army depots as excess were not properly
screened against the U.S. Army's own requirements        prior  to
their  transfer    to Vietnamese forces.     The U.S. Army records
showed that over 3,000 such items shipped to the Vietnamese
were in a critical     supply position   within  the U.S. Army,
Vietnam.

                                     19
                                                                             .       -
                                                                         .


      We believe    that the potential savings from an effective'                L
screening program could be substantial      as U.S. Army require-
ments diminish    and the Vietnamese Army requirements   increase
as a result    of the phasedown.

Problems     in the U.S. Army, Vietnam,
logistical     reportinp and accounting      system

        The U.S. Army, Vietnam, devised a computerized     system
to provide management with supply information,      reports,    his-
torical    records, and an audit trail  to account for major
equipment items made available     as a result of the phasedown.
This system was developed during phase III of the withdrawals
when it became apparent that the punch card system, then in
use, was not adequate for the workload.

      We noted that the system did not fulfill            its intended
purpose.     The management reports were inaccurate           and incom-
plete and did not provide the desired accountability              records.
For example, there was a requirement        for the Army to provide
the Military    Assistance    Command with listings       of equipment
turned over to the Vietnamese Army. We reviewed these re-
ports and found the information        to be incomplete       and inaccu-
rate.    We also noted that many duplicate        entries    had been
fed into the computer which resulted        in recorded balances at
the Inventory    Control Point, Vietnam, being greater than
actual inventories      at the depots.

Potential    buildup   of unneeded
supplies

        The services   recognized  the need to cut back on their
ordering    of supplies    and to cancel requisitions for supplies
that would not be needed because of the force reductions.
We noted, however, that the actions taken by some of the
services    were not adequate and could have resulted     in the
receipt    of unneeded supplies.



       We reviewed the Army's requisition    registers at the
Inventory    Control Center, Vietnam, and found open requisi-
tions for supplies ordered for units which had been inac-
tivated   or redeployed   during the first two incremental
.   .

    withdrawals.     It was January 1970 before the Army took ac-
    tion to develop computer programs needed to identify     mate-
    riel on order which would not be required because of the
    troop reductions.

            This program; in late March 1970, identified               over.
    14,000 requisitions         on order for units to be inactivated
    during phase III of the withdrawals.              We were unable to. de- '
    termine the dollar value of the 14,000 requisitions                   which
    should have been canceled or the number which were actually
    canceled.       However, before developing         its own computer pro-
    gram, the Army had requested assistance               from the Logistical
    Control Office,       Pacific,    to identify    requisitions      for can-
    cellation.       We found that,     through March 27, 1970, the Lo-
    gistical     Control Office had confirmed cancellation               of 306
    requisitions      valued at about $360,000 for units scheduled
    for inactivation        during phase III.       Considering     that there
    was a potential       for cancellation       of 14,000 requisitions        for
    the same units,       we must conclude that the Army's initial               ac-
    tions were inadequate.          The new computer program, if effec-
    tively     implemented,     however, should identify        requisitions      to
    be canceled in future phasedown increments.

          Air   Force

           We made an examination  of the supply records at Cam
    Ranh Bay Air Base and noted that,      during phase III of the
    withdrawal,   the value of excess supplies increased from
    about $1.9 million,to    $12.4 million   and the value of excess
    equipment increased from $7.6 million       to $9.1 million.
    These increases were mainly attributable       to the redeployment
    of three squadrons of F4-C aircraft.

           We looked into actions taken to reduce the excesses
    and found that base supply personnel had sorted all F4-C-
    coded items and had identified       about 3,500 line items pecu-
     liar to the F4-C-aircraft.      The base supply officer     took
    action to cancel all requisitions       and dues-in for these
     items, wherever possible,     and to prepare the excesses for
    redistribution.     Action,  however, had not been taken to re-
     search the base supply accounts to identify       F4-C peculiar
     items which had not been coded or to identify        common items
    'used by the redeploying    units in order that these stockage
     levels might be adjusted to reflect       reduced requirements.

                                          21
We believe that failure     of the base supply office    to take
such action contributed     to the $10.5 million   increase in ex-
cess supplies.

      Marine   Corps

        The Marine Corps Force Logistics       Command financial   in-
ventory reports      disclosed  large quantities   of excess due-in
materiel    during the period of troop deployments.         We noted
that the Force Logistics       Command had submitted 33,000 can-
cellation    requests to supply sources during the period Sep-
tember 1969 to March 1970. At the time of our review in
March 1970, however, the value of excess due-in materiel
amounted to about $22 million.

      We selected 50 requisitions  for which cancellation   re-
quests had been submitted but for which responses from the
supply source had not been recorded.    We visited   the supply
sources to reconcile  their records with the Force Logistics
Command's records.   Our test showed that:

      --25 requisitions      had in fact been canceled by the sup-
         ply source.      (The Force Logistics Command recorded
         the cancellation     action for seven of these requisi-
         tions during our review.)

     --13 requisitions     were not on record at the supply
        source even though advice on the status of the requi-
        sitions  had been issued by the supply source for six
        of these requisitions.

     --9 requisitions     had been completed by shipment of the
        materiel   even though the cancellation  requests were
        dated prior to shipment for five of these requisi-
        tions.

     --3   requisitions    were still   outstanding   at the supply
        source.      (The procuring   activity   had been requested
        to cancel the buys, but responses to the requests had
        not been received by the supply source.>

      The results of our test demonstrate that there is a
need to improve the procedures   for cancellation of requisi-
tions for unneeded materiel.   It also indicates  that the

                                  22
.
    .   .

        Force Logistics    Command records             include a number of invalid
        transactions    and that the value             of excess dues-in may be
        significantly    overstated.

        Problems       in the maintenance       area

              The Army's maintenance procedures call for intermediate-
        level maintenance to be performed by direct    support and
        general support units.    Intermediate-level  maintenance is
        that maintenance exceeding the capability    of individual   or-
        ganizations  but less than major overhauling   or rebuilding
        of assets at a depot.

              We observed a large backlog of equipment requiring
        intermediate-level      maintenance which Army officials        in Viet-
        nam estimated to be considerably        in excess of a go-day work
        load.    We noted that equipment was being held in open stor-
        age and exposed to the elements for prolonged periods,              thus
        increasing     the maintenance work load as well as increasing
        the possibility     of loss through theft or enemy actions,            We
        believe that a lack of adequate organizational-letiel             main-
        tenance and a reduction       in the strength   of the,logistical
        support base contribute       to the problem in maintenance.

               Organizations      being inactivated    during phase III of the
        withdrawal    were directed       to maximize efforts  to bring equip-
        ment to the,highest        state of maintenance readiness.       They
        were instructed       to clean equipment and repair organizational
        deficiencies     prior-to     turn-in  of equipment.   Our examination
        revealed little       evidence to indicate     that any organizational
        maintenance had been performed by the organizations            being
        inactivated    prior to their turning        in the equipment.

                    We were told by 1st Infantry        Division     personnel -that
            it was almost impossible         to perform the required
            organizational-level        maintenance because units were not re-
            lieved of their       combat assignments until       they started      reas-
            signing personnel and turning          in equipment.        It appears
            that additional       time is required     by the units,       subsequent
            to the termination        of combat assignments,       if the required
            organizational       maintenance is to be performed prior to the
            turn-in    of equipment.



                                                  23
      The failure   of organizational        units to perform the re-
quired maintenance placed an extra work load on the direct
support and general support maintenance units.              At the same
time, there was a reduction       in the number of personnel as-
signed to these units which resulted           from normal rotations
and reductions    in overall  troop strengths.          For example, in
March 1970 a maintenance company was inactivated             during the
same period that responsible       officials      in Vietnam were advis-
ing the Department of the Army that they could not manage
the work load on hand with the resources available.




                                   24
AGENCY COMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATIONS

       We suggested that the Secretary     of Defense examine
into the potential    opportunities    for improvements in supply
and maintenance operations       which we observed and that he ad-
vise us of any actions which may be taken to improve these
operations.

       The Assistant      Secretary  of Defense (Installations          and
Logistics)    replied     that the identification       and cancellation
of requisitions       for unneeded supplies was of vital          interest
to the Secretary        of Defense and the military        departments.
He stated that the supply procedures             in effect   at the time
of the GAO audit were not fully           adaptable to the.current
rapid phasedown.         However, p ositive     steps were taken to
keep excesses, such as were observed in the Army, Air Force,
and Marine Corps, to a minimum.

        In a subsequent reply the Secretary                of Defense (Instal-
lations    and Logistics)       stated that,       in response to our find-
ings and proposals,        the Army had taken the following                 ac-
tions:     (1) implemented new procedures to control                   lateral
transfers     and associated       actions,     (2) assigned program and
fund control     responsibility        for all Vietnamese Army second-
ary requisitions      and consumable-item            requisitions      to the
2nd Logistic@       Command on Okinawa, (3) implemented an edit-
ing program to purify         input data in the logistical               report-
ing and accounting        system, (4) developed automatic                cancella-
tion procedures with an implementation                  target    date of De-
cember 1, 1970, and (5) provided for a technical                      evaluation
inspection     by Command Materiel          Maintenance Inspection           teams
to units designated        for redeployment          or inactivation.

     We plan to look into the effectiveness of the logisti-
cal actions taken during the next phasedown which is sched-
uled to be completed by May 1, 1971.




                                        25
                                                                             .   .

                               CHAPTER5

                    TURNOVEROF EXCESS FACILITIES

       We made a limited    examination      into the disposal    of real
property   and related   property.       Our examination   included a
review of the directives,       regulations,      reports, and other
pertinent   information   available      at the Military   Assistance
Command Headquarters.       We also visited       the Lai J&e base camp
which was in the process of being turned over to the Viet-
namese Armed Forces at the time of our review.

      As of March 8, 1970, 53 U.S. bases and facilities      had
been transferred    or were in the process of being transferred
to the Vietnamese.      Additional transfers are anticipated    in
conjunction    with future troop withdrawals  from Vietnam.

POLICY ON TURNOVEROF U.S. FACILITIES
TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

      The Military      Assistance     Command, Vietnam, is respon-
sible for establishing         the policy and publishing   the neces-
sary directives     relating      to the disposal of real property
and related    property    excess to the needs of the U.S. Armed
Forces in Vietnam.

      At the time    of our review,     the‘direotive    on transfer    of
excess facilities     required  that:

     --U.S. advisors   actively  assist  Vietnamese Armed Forces
        elements in planning long-term    utilization   of prop-
        erty to be transferred   to them.     Planning will in-
        clude fund and personnel programming to support oper-
        ational  and maintenance requirements.

     --When installations       or facilities       are to be transferred
       to the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the U.S. service be-
        ing relieved    will   ensure that Vietnamese personnel
       receive adequate training           in the operation   and main-
       tenance of associated        equipment and systems.        To the
        extent possible,     this training       will be accomplished
       within    the Vietnamese Armed Forces training           system.



                                   26
.
              .

    4   .




                      In expedient cases, on-the-job      training, under the
                      supervision  of military    personnel or the operating
                      and maintenance contractor,      may be used.

                    --Water purification       equipment will be recovered when
                       no U.S. personnel      will be served by it, if recovery
                       is economical.

                    --Air-conditioning        and refrigeration      equipment other
                       than that essential       to critical    facilities,    such as
                       hospital     operating   rooms and communications/elec-
                       tronics    facilities,    will be recovered.

            CAPABILITY OF VIETNAMESE TO MAINTAIN
            FACILITIES RELEASED BY U.S. FORCES

                     We made a limited   inquiry into the capability       of the
            Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to maintain           the facilities
            and related     equipment which had been transferred        to them by
            elements of the U.S. Armed Forces.        In some instances         items
            were left for the Vietnamese that--according           to established
            policies--    would not normally have been transferred.           In
            such instances      the Vietnamese had specifically‘requested
            that the items be left or determinations         had been made that
            to remove them would have disrupted       the operation       of the
            facility.

                     We noted, however, that in some cases the Vietnamese
            did not have the capability      to use or maintain equipment or
            facilities      left for them.

                    During     visit   at Lai Khe, a U.S. Army official      told   us
            that:

                    --More than 20 air-conditioners    were turned over to
                       the Vietnamese Army although they had neither   the
                       capability  nor the repair parts to maintain the
                       equipment.

                    --The     Vietnamese Army had the capability   to operate
                       the     electrical distribution  system, but they lacked
                       the     required parts for the high-voltage   system which
                       we    turned over to them.


                                                  27
        --The U.S. Army left the sump pumps intact;              however,
           the Vietnamese Army lacked the necessary            training   to
           maintain the pumps.

        --The electrical   system is an IlO-volt system while the
           light bulbs and fluorescent  lamps in the Vietnamese
           Army supply system are for use in a ZO-volt    system.

       A water treatment     plant at Binh Thuy was transferred
from the United States Air Force to the Vietnamese.             For the
first   6 months after the transfer,        U.S. Air Force advisors
assisted   in the operation      of the water plant,     At the end of
this period,     the Vietnamese operated the plant with only an
occasional    chlorine   test by a U.S. Air Force medical techni-
cian.    An inspection    made 1 year after the transfer       showed
that the entire water distribution          system was contaminated,
This resulted      from overloading    of the clarifiers   and removal
of three of the nine water distribution           pumps. Other por-
tions of the water treatment        plant were found to be deterio-
rated due to neglect.

      These examples indicate     that there may be a need for
stronger controls   over transfers     to ensure that adequate
consideration   is given to the capability      of the Vietnamese
to use and maintain the facilities.
        We brought    these matters        to the attention   of respon-
sible    officials.




                                      28
.




                                   CHAPTER 6

                       TRANSPORTATIONRESOURCESAND

                         PROBLEMSRELATED THERETO

           We limited   our effort in the transportation   area to
    inquiries    into the resources available   within Vietnam for
    the movement of supplies and equipment and to identifica-
    tion of problems associated     with the retrograding   of mate-
    riel.

    AVAILABLE TRANSPORTATIONRESOURCES

             In Vietnam the Traffic        Management Agency coordinates
    transportation         for the military     services.   Organizations
    requiring       transportation      of personnel or materiel     make their
    needs known to this agency which, on the basis of the pri-
    ority      assigned, arranges for the movement.          The agency for-
    wards requests for out-of-country             surface shipments to the
    Military       Sea Transportation      Service (MSTS) for action.       In-
    country movements may be made by air, truck,               or rail.   High-
    priority       movements are coordinated        by the Traffic   Management
    Agency with the 834th Air Division              located at Tan Son Nhut
    Air Base which airlifts           the personnel or materiel.

          We were informed that about 50 percent of the out-of-
    country shipments by water are carried   on MST%leased ves-
    sels, 40 percent are carried  on U.S. Navy or U.S.
    Government-owned ships, and 10 percent are moved by commer-
    cial shipping.

            Surface movements are difficult          because many roads are
    not fully      secured, and movement by military         convoy requires
    security      escorts.      Also, the rail transportation      system is
    not fully      operational,      and shipments by rail generally      are
    limited     to movements within       Corps tactical    zones.

           Although we were informed that there were no problems
    in obtaining    shipping space at the time it was needed, we
    did find two problem areas related     to the retrograding            of
    materiel --inadequate    Army cleaning facilities        and insuffi-
    cient Air Force personnel for preparing         materiel    for ship-
    ment.

                                       29
INADEQUATE ARMY CLWING        FACILITIES

       The out-of-country         shipment of phase III equipments
such as vehicles,      artillery,      and construction    equipment,
was delayed due to a large backlog of equipment requiring
cleaning.    This backlog resulted         from increased enforcement
of U.S. Public Health Service and Department of Agriculture
standards for the treatment           and processing    of retrograde
materiel   and a shortage of cleaning equipment.

        The Public Health Service and the Department of Agri-
culture    have ordinances      pertaining    to the shipment of mate-
riel to the United States.           These regulations    require  that
all materiel     scheduled for shipment to the United States be
cleaned and fumigated prior to shipment.              They are designed
to protect     American citizens       by preventing   the import of
diseased or illegal        products.     Both of the agencies have in-
spectors stationed        at the ports in Vietnam to enforce the
pertinent    regulations.

       In compliance with these regulations,   the Army required
that all equipment be cleaned prior to being placed in mar-
shalling   areas.   We found that the cleaning equipment was
inadequate to support both the regular retrograde     equipment
and those items being returned to the United States because
of the withdrawals.     We noted that items not scheduled for
return to the United States were being cleaned to meet the
standards of the Department of Agriculture    and the Public
Health Service.

     We suggested that appropriate  action be taken to re-
duce the backlog of equipment in Vietnam which was scheduled
for return to the United States.

INADEQUATE AIR FORCE PACKING
AND CRATING CAPABILITY

      The Air Force Programmed Action Directive  for the re-
deployment of a tactical   fighter wing did not provide for
adequate resources for packing, crating,   and shipping the
assets of the redeploying    unit.

       The directive   assigned the responsibility   for     the pack-
ing,   crating,   and shipping of equipment and related        supplies

                                  30
of the tactical      fighter    wing to the local Traffic    Management
Officer.     Included were equipment peculiar      to the F-4C air-
craft    and supplies to be moved on a priority       basis.    The ma-
teriel    to be moved included much electronic       equipment which
could deteriorate       rapidly   when subjected to outside storage
and adverse weather conditions.

      We found, however, that a team of packing and crating
specialists,   which had been working at the airbase at the
start of phase III,     departed on March 8, 19700-just       about
the time the turn-in     of more than 3,500 F-4C peculiar       items
was beginning.     We were informed that attempts to coordinate
the presence of the specialists      with the turn-in      of F-4C
items were frustrated     because of indecision     with respect to
the redeployment    date of the tactical    fighter    wing.

      The regular   assigned traffic     personnel were not able to
handle the work load after the team's departure.           Therefore,
the traffic   management officer     requested the Pacific    Air
Force to send another team of specialists         to assist with the
work load.    At the time of our review, the estimated         comple-
tion date for shipping F-4C items had been set forward to
July 6, 1970.     The estimate of July 6 was based on the prom-
ise that the requested specialists        would begin work on
May 6 and would work only on F-4C items for 60 days.

       As a result    of these delays, the potential         recipients
of F-4C items may be requisitioning           like items elsewhere to
fill   urgent requirements.        Moreover, the electronic        equip-
ment items could deteriorate         rapidly    when subjected to out-
side storage and possibly        adverse weather conditions.           Fi-
nally,    the backlog of F-4C items caused the shipment of all
other excess items to be deferred,           which may well result         in
additional    distressed    cargo.

       An Air Force audit report dated March 31, 1970, consid-
ered the backlog problem at local airbases in Vietnam.            The
report   stated that packing, crating,      and banding materiels
and the number and experience of traffic        management person-
nel assigned were inadequate to cope with the increased
work load.     The report recommended that the 7th Air Force
continue to provide assistance      to the affected    airbases in
view of the large dollar     amounts invested    in the assets to
be shipped and the requirements       for the assets at the re-
ceiving locations.
                                      31
                                                                          .

      We were informed by the Air Force Auditor General's
representative   at the 7th Air Force that the backlog problem
was widespread in the,7th   Air Force.

        We suggested that the Secretary       of the Air Force estab-
lish procedures for determining          and maintaining  that support
capability,    particularly     with respect to packing and crating
activities,    required     to support phasedown actions.
                                       ,
AGENCY COMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATION

      The Army informed us that, to expand the         equipment-
processing   capability  in Vietnam, 23 additional       water blast-
ers were being provided.     We believe that the       additional  wa-
ter blasters   will expedite the processing    of    equipment
scheduled for return to the United States or         for transfer    to
the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

      The Air Force stated that it was aware of the necessity
for augmenting their packaging and crating       capabilities    in
Vietnam.     The Air Force scheduled 40 additional     packaging
and crating    specialists  to arrive  in Vietnam by November 15,
1970 D Arrangements had been made to provide training         in the
fundamentals    of packaging for local employees and to rein-
force the skills     of Air Force packaging personnel.

        We believe that the actions taken by the Air Force to
increase the number of personnel trained     in packaging and
crating    of materiel will increase the spare parts availabil-
ity for the Air Force and may result     in significant  savings
in procurement and maintenance labor costs.




                                 32
.



                                      CHAPTER 7

                                  SCOPEOF REVIEW

            Our review consisted         of an examination         into the pol-
    icies,    procedures,     and practices       related      to the phasedown
    of U.S. military        activities      in Vietnam.       We concentrated
    our work on logistic          matters associated        with the third in-
    cremental withdrawal          of forces which was achieved during
    the period December 15, 1969, through April 15, 1970. We
    directed     our effort     primarily     toward identifying          problem
    areas and bringing        them to the attention           of responsible      of-
    ficials    for their consideration           and action.         During the en-
    tire period of the review, responsible                 officials      in the Of-
    fice of the Assistant           Secretary    of Defense (Installations
    and Logistics)      were periodically         informed of our observa-
    tions.
            Our work was performed during the period January
    through May 1970 at the following               locations      in the Far East.

                            Installation

          Military    Assistance    Command, Vietnam:
                U.S. Army:
                    Headquarters,      U.S. Army, Vietnam
                     1st Logistical     Command, Vietnam
                     Inventory    Control Center, Vietnam
                     1st Infantry    Division  Units,   Vietnam
                U.S. Navy:
                    Naval Forces, Vietnam
                    Naval Supply Activity,       Saigon, Vietnam
                    Naval Supply Activity,       Da Nang, Vietnam
                U.S. Air Force:
                     Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam
                     Cam Kanh Bay Air Base, Vietnam
                U.S. Marine Corps:
                     3rd Marine Amphibious Force, Vietnam
                     Force Logistics     Command, Vietnam
                     1st Marine Air Wing, Vietnam
                     3rd Force Service Regiment, Okinawa




                                           33
.




    APPENDIXES




      35
                                                                                                   APPEFiDIXI
                                                                                                      Page 1

                                           ASSISTANT   SECRETARY OF DEFIBWE
                                                 WASNIROCTWd,   D.C.   2SBO9




                                                                                             6   NOV1970
            -SP
INSTALLATIONS    hND LOOlSTtCS




                Mr. C. M. Bailey
                Director,     Defense  Division
                General     Accounting  Office
                Washington,      D. C. 20548

                Dear    Mr.      Bailey:

                The Secretary     of Defense has asked me to reply to your letter     of August    26,
                1970 which transmitted       copies of your Draft Report  entitled “Review    of the
                Phasedown     of Military   Activities in Vietnam, )* (OSD Case #3171).

                We and the Military      Departments        have reviewed     the report      and concur
                generally   with your conclusions         and recommendations.           Although    the Army
                is still developing   comments        regarding     your report,    we are providing
                 available  data concerning     findings,      observations     and recommendations.

                With regard       to the need for interservice       coordination       in filling     the needs of
                RVNAF,      the Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated             procedures        on 28 May 1970
                 (JCS 281501,       May 70) which facilitate     interservice       transfer       of equipment
                for RVNAF        requirements.      Although    not specifically       mentioned         in your
                Report,    the Marine       Corps has utilized     available     WESTPAC           assets since
                November        1969 to equip three VNMC infantry             and one VNMC artillery
                battalions     activated    under the consolidated       improvement         and modernization
                 program     for the Vietnamese       Armed    Forces.

                 The Army’s     restrictive      criteria for taking           over supplies  from the Navy
                 have been reviewed         by the Army    and action           has been taken to broaden   such
                 criteria in line with your suggestions.

                 The Air Force          is aware of the necessity           for augmenting        their packing        and
                 crating    capabilities      in Vietnam       to accommodate          phasedown       actions     and
                 withdrawal       of personnel       and equipment.          Procedures       are in effect whereby
                 the 7th Air Force          and the Pacific       Air Force      can request       “Rapid      Area Trans-
                 portation      Support”     (RATS) teams from the Air Force                  Logistics      Command
                 to assist in meeting          surge workloads.           These teams were employed                  at Cam
                 Ranh Bay for approximately              fifteen     months     during    1969 and 1970, and a
                  12-man     team presently         at Cam Ranh will remain             there through        February
                  1971.    A total of 4,575 mandays              of assistance       has been provided          Air Force


                                                                  37
 APPENDIXI
    Page 2

      activities in Southeast Asia since January 1969. Forty additional              packaging
      and preservation      specialists,   trained at the Joint Military   Packaging
      Training   Center,    are due to arrive in Vietnam by November           15, 1970.
      Arrangements       have also been made to send a packaging training          team to
      Vietnam   during October-November           1970 to provide training   in the funda-
      mentals of packaging       for local national employees     and to reinforce    the
      skills of Air Force packaging personnel.

      To insure maximum        utilization   of Army assets available  in                     Vietnam,  and
      preclude     shipment  of similar    Army owned assets to satisfy                       ARVN require-
      ments,    procedures    were implemented      in early August 1970                      which permit
      the transfer     to ARVN of assets scheduled to be retrograded                          to CONUS by
      the other Services.

      The identification      and cancellation       of requisitions  for unneeded supplies is
      of vital concern to us and the Military            Departments.      Supply procedures
      in effect at the time of your audit were not fully adaptable              to the current
      rapid phasedown.         Procedures       have been established     for the automatic
      return   of selected items to the General Services Administration                 and the
      Defense Supply Agency.            Positive    steps to keep such excesses to a minimum
      have been taken.        As firm redeployment          schedules are established      and
      promulgated,       requisitioning     objectives    are recomputed     to reflect reduced
      requirements.

      During the time period of your review the Air Force was in the process of
      developing    a family of special plans that provide for incremental      deploy-
      ment.     These plans have now been published,      and provide logistics   guidance
      in all phases of withdrawal     actions.

      As we stated earlier,           the Department   of the Army is currently  developing
      additional comments           regarding    your Report,  which we hope to provide by
      November    20, 1970.

      If the portions of the Draft Report which are now classified     are included
      in the Final Report,   it should be classified CONFIDENTIAL,       inasmuch   as
      the information  they contain has not been declassified.     [See GAO note.]

      The opportunity        to comment    on this Report   in draft form              is appreciated.
                                                              Sincerely,




                                                                             cretary  of Defense
                                                            (Instai!at;ons        and Logistics)
GAO note:          All classified      portions   have been omitted                    from
                   this report .




                                                  38
.                                                                                         APPENDIX II
                                                                                               Page 1

                               ASSISTANT    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                                      WASHINGTON,    D.C.   2D2Dl




                                                                                   4 DEC 1970
    SP



    Mr. C. M. Bailey
    Director,     Defense  Division
    General     Accounting  Office
    Washington,      D. C. 20548

    Dear    Mr.    Bailey:

    This is to provide    you with additional    comments    referred      to in our letter
    of November     6, 1970, regarding     your Draft Report       of August    26, 1970
    entitled tpReview of the Phasedown        of Military Activities     in Vietnam,    lf
    (OSD Case #3171).

    The Army        recognizes     the need for detailed        procedures    for redeploying
    or inactivating        units and redistributing        equipment     and supplies   while
    operations       continue.     Appropriate      procedures       have been ,written   and
    associated       problems     continue     to receive    top management      emphasis     by
    the Army       and its major       subordinate      commands.

    To insure       proper       control   of lateral       transfers,      a new procedure        was imple-
    mented      as part of U. S. Army,               Vietnam        (USARV) OPLAN         183-70.        Spe-
    cifically,     lateral      transfer     authority       is maintained      at Headquarters,          USARV
    level.     If  a  valid    requirement        exists       and  no  other  unit has   a  higher      priority,
    the requesting          unit’s’ requisition        is cancelled       and the lateral    transfer
    approved.         Army predisposition              instructions       serve to further       control
    lateral    transfers        and associated         actions.

    With respect       to the supply of secondary              items to tne Army        of the Republic
    of Vietnam      (ARVN),       the 2nd Logistical         Command      on Okinawa        has been
    assigned     program       and fund control       responsibility      for all ARVN secondary
    and consumable         item requisitions.          A new supply requisition             procedure,
    which implements           the U. S. Army,          Pacific     (USARPAC)     Logistics        Support
    System    71 (LSS-711,         has been initiated        by the 2nd Logistical         Command        which
    insures    that maximum          use is made of Army long supply stocks in the
     Pacific  Area.       Requisitions       are first edited to insure        Military       Assistance
    Service    Funded      (MASF)      program      authority.       MASF program          requirements
    are then released         for supply action-          There is also a procedure             which




                                                       39
 APPENDIX II                                                                                              .   '
     Page 2

 results   in screening        against long supply asset visibility               tapes of USARV,
Japan,    Thailand,       Koxea and Okinawa         stocks.       Aftef February         1, 1971 or
earlier    if possible,       ARVN low priority        requisitions         (Issue Priority      Groups
 09 through     20) will be forwarded         to the Pacific       Utilization       and Redistribution
Agency     (PURA) for supply action if long supply assets are not found available
in USARPAC          subordinate       commandse      Requisitions         are placed on the In-
ventory     Control     Points in the United States only when ARVN requirements
cannot be satisfied         from Pacific      Area long supply stocks.

Inaccurate     records      and reports      in the logistical      reporting       and accounting
 system    were generated        primarily      because     of the absence of an edit pro-
gram to purify       input data,      Such a program          has now been implemented,
to include    checks for valid materiel            categories,       complete      line and federal
 stock numbers,        valid Support       Command      and processing          location      codes,
and unique document           numbers8      to preclude      duplicate      input data.        Other
programs      and procedures         have been improved           to insure      purification      of
input data.

To minimize        the potential     buildup    of unneeded       supplies,    USARV now has
a fully operational        computer      program       at the Insrentory     Control    Center,
Vietnam      (XXV)     which cancels        all in-country      requisitions     and backorders
of units that are being redeployed              from Vietnam.            USARPAC     also is
currently     developing      automatic      cancellation     procedures      with implementation
target    date of December         1, 1970.

The backlog     of Army equipment        requiring      intermediate       level maintenance
did, at its maximum        point,  exceed the management             workload      of 90 days
at one of the support      commandse        To relieve       this situation,     the reparable       s
are transferred      to another   maintenance        area in-country         for repair,,      The
establishment     of a 90-day management           level was calculated          to cause a
management      review   to determine      if special      actions   are required         to balance
the workloade      This is frequently      reviewed       at the Department         of Army
level to insure    that the backlog is maintained             at a manageable       levels

Performance          of organizational          maintenance       prior to equipment       turn-in
was not totally        adequate.        Units designated        for stand-down        are now given
 a technical      evaluation      inspection      by USARV Command             Materiel    Maintenance
Inspection       (CMMI)      teams to provide          timely   determination       of equipment
condition      in relation      to turn-in      or transfer     standards,      The maintenance
backlog      of most commodity             categories      is expected     to be at acceptable
levels    during future        redeployments,

To expand     USARV’s, equipment    processing    capabi.litys twenty-three                    (23)
additional    water blasters  are being provided.      US,ARV will continue                    to




                                                     40
 .
      ,                                                                                        APPENDIXII
                                                                                                   Page 3

 clean all equipment      which is considered  essential    to support                     subsequent
 transactions   involving    the ARVN to Department      of Agriculture                      and Public
 Health Service standards.



                                    [See GAO note.]


             .
 We believe this supplemental       information together with our earlier   response,
 will assist you in finalizing    the Review of the Phasedown   of Military
 Activities  in Vietnam.

                                             Since rely,




                                                              Secretary       of Defense
                                             (Instailat;ons            and   Lcgistics)




GAO note:        Material  deleted from this letter  concerns infor-
                 mation included in the draft report, which is not
                 included in the final report.




                                                 41
APPENDIX III                                                      ,   .
     Page 1

     PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THLEDEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE

        DEPARTMENTSOF THE ARMY, NAW, AND AIR FORCE

     RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ACTIVITIES

                  DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT


                                             Tenure of of&ice
                                            -From           To

                    DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE

SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
   Melvin R. Laird                   Jan.      1969    Present
   Clark M. Clifford                 Mar.      1968    Jan.    1969
   Robert S. McNamara                Jan.      1961    Feb. 1968

DEPUTY SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
    David Packard                    Jan.      1969    Present
   Paul H, Nitze                     July      1967    Jan.    1969

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):
     Barry J. Shillito               Feb.      1969    Present
     Thomas D. Morris                Sept.     1967    Jan.    1969


                   DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

SECRETARYOF THE ARMY:
   Stanley R. Resor                  July      1965   Present
   Stephen Ailes                     Jan.      1964   July    1965

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE ARMY
  (INsTALL~~TI~Ns AND LOGISTICS) :
     J. Ronald Fox                   June      1969   Present
    Vincent P, Huggard (acting>      Mar.      1969   June 1969
     Dr. Robert A. Brooks            Oct.      1965   Feb. 1969




                              42
                                                        APPENDIX III
.                                                            Page 2

                                            Tenure of office
                                            From             -To
                      DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY (continued)

    U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND
      COMMANDINGGENERAL:
        Gen. Henry J. Miley              Nov.    1970    Present
        Gen. Ferdinand J. Chesarek       Mar.    1969    Oct.      1970
        Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr.        July    1962    Mar.      1969


                      DEPARTMENTOF THE NAVY

    SECRETARYOF THE NAVY:
       John H. Chafee                    Jan.    1969    Present
       Paul R. Ignatius                  Sept.   1967    Jan.    1969

    ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE NAVY
      (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):
         Frank Sanders                   Feb.    1969    Present
         Barry J. Shillito               Apr.    1968    Jan.    1969

    CHIEF, NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND:
        Vice Adm. J.D. Arnold            w3*     1970    Present
        Adm. Ignatius  J. Galantin       Mar.    1965    July    1970

                    DEPARTMENTOF THE AIR FORCE

    S&XETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:
       Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.        Jan.    1969    Present
       Dr. Harold Brown                  Oct.    1965    Jan.    1969
    UNDER SECRETARYOF THE AIR FORCE:
       John J .‘McLucas                  Mar.    1969    Present
       Townsend Hoopes                   Oct.    1967    Feb. 1969

    ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE AIR
      FORCE(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGIS-
      TICS):
        Phillip N. Whittaker             fiY     1969    Present
        Robert H. Charles                Nov.    1963    May     1969




                                    43
APPENDIXIII
     Page 3

                                   Tenure of office
                                   From           -To
              DEPARTMENT
                      OF TJZ AIR FORCE(continued)
COMMANDER,AIR FORCELOGISTICS
 COMMAND:
   Gen. Jack G. Merrell         Mar.   1968    Present
   Lt. Gen. Lewis L. Mundell    Feb.   1968    Mar. 1968
   Gen. Thomas P. Gerrity       Aug.   1967    Feb. 1968




                                              U.S.   GAO   Waah..D.C.


                         44