oversight

Need To Improve Management of the Army's Tactical Vehicles Development Program

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1971-01-27.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

Need To Improve Management
Of The Army’s Tactical Vehicles
Development Program B.133z6




BY THE COMPTROLLER   GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES



                    JAH. 27, I !3 7 1
          r   I




**.   ,
                         COMPTROLLER     GENERAL     OF   THE      UNITED   STATES
                                       WASHINGTON.    D.C.      20548




          B- 133256




          To the      President   of the Senate    and the
     ,/
    v     Speaker       of the House   of Representatives

                 This is our report    on the                need to improve       management
I                                                                                                       :
          of the Army’s   tactical  vehicles                 development     program.

                   Our review  was made pursuant                        to the Budget    and Account-
          ing   Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C.    53) and the                   Accounting    and Auditing
          Act   of 1950 (31 U.S.C.   67).

                 Copies   of this report    are being sent to the                      Director,
          Office  of Management        and Budget;  the Secretary                      of Defense;
          and the Secretary      of the Army.




                                                          Comptroller            General
                                                          of the United          States
COMPTROLLER
          GENERAL'S                                 NEED TQ IMPROVEMANAGEMENT  OF
REPORT
     TO THE CONGRESS                                THE ARMY'S TACTICAL VEHICLES
                                                    DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM B-133256


DIGEST
------

WHYTHE'REVIEW
            WAS'MADE
    I The Army Tank-Automotive Commandis responsible to the Army Materiel      I!:
      Commandfor the d                                       c~J-yhe&,Land
      t-Q&                                                   of $35.5 million
      was programmed by the Army Tank-Automotive Command for functions re-
      lating to research and development of vehicles,   and the command awarded
      contracts valued at about $545.7 million  for tactical   vehicle produc-
      tion.

         Previous studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Army
         Audit Agency revealed m                             Recommendations for im-
         provement had been made                     Titudies.     This review was
         made as a follow-up to the earlier    reviews and concerned all tactical
         vehicle development programs initiated     subsequent to the previous GAO
         review.


FINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONS
         The review established        that problems have continued      despite   organiza-
         tional and procedural        changes.

                 --Vehicle engineering development efforts were initiated    and permitted
                    to continue although required determinations   had not been made to
                    show that the development objectives expressed by the prospective
                    user were valid and technically    feasible. As a result there were
                    many deviations  from desired design or performance characteristics
                    and the vehicles either did not meet user requirements or were
                    only marginally  acceptable.    (See p. 17.)

                 --Emphasis on reducing development lead time resulted in premature
                    authorizations    for mass production and the manufacture of vehicles
                    that were defective or did not fully satisfy     user requirements.
                    As a result,    costly modifications  were necessary to vehicles af-
                    ter production.       (See p. 23.)

                 --Decisions made on the future course of development effort at in-
                    process review meetings were based on incomplete or outdated in-
                   formation,   or projects were unnecessarily   delayed because avail-
                    able information   was not furnished for consideration   prior to the
                   meeting.    Also, continuity   of personnel was lacking from one meet-
                    ing to the next.    As a result, meaningful evaluation was hampered,

 Tear -- Sheet
                                                                  JAH.     27,153     7   I

                                                1
        timely and proper decisionmaking       was impaired,    and projects   were
        delayed.  (See p. 32.)


RECOMMENDATIONS
            ORSUGGESTIONS
    The Army should improve the management of its        tactical   vehicles   develop-   .
    ment program to ensure that

      --requirements   documents specifying,   in accordance with existing  regu-
         lations,  the desired characteristics   of the vehicles to be developed
         are prepared, thoroughly analyzed, and approved at the Department
         level before any full-scale   development efforts   are initiated
         (see p. 201,

      --approved requirements documents clearly set forth valid and real-
         istically  attainable requirements, based upon prior exploratory
         and experimental work, to permit full-scale  development and produc-
         tion within the designated time frame (see p. 20),

      --coordination     and communication between the developing and using
         agencies are improved, to preclude the need for significant     devia-
         tions from, or later waiver or relaxation    of, design or performance           ,
         characteristics    deemed essential by the user (see p. 20),

      --mass      production of vehicles is authorized only after the vehicles
         have     demonstrated the capabilities    to meet the essential character-
         istics     established    and after the prospective user has pronounced
         them     suitable,   thereby minimizing  costly changes during production
         (see     p. 29), and

      --management places greater emphasis on the timely dissemination    of
         complete and current data to decisionmaking   agencies and, to the
        extent possible, maintains continuity   of participants  from one
        meeting to the next throughout the development project to promote
        stability  (see p. 38).


AGENCY
     ACTIONSANDUNRESOLVED
                       ISSUES
   The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development), in
   general, agreed with the GAO recommendations.   He said that the re-
   port was a case study, using selected programs,of how not to execute a
   development program. He felt,  however, that actions taken had signifi-
   cantly reduced the possibility that the same errors would be repeated.

   Recent actions       reported   include:

     --Army regulations    were changed in April 1970 to require an in-
        process review that will show proof that advanced development is
        progressing satisfactorily,   or that the degree of risk is known


                                          2
             and is acceptable   to the Army, prior   to continuing   development.
             (See p. 20.)
         --Another change in Army regulations,    effective  January 1970, re-
            quires more detailed information   to obtain authorization  for mass
            production.  (See p. 30.)

         --Continuity   has been maintained at the review meetings by project
            managers' deputies and other high-level  project management members.
            The in-process review procedure has been strengthened by requiring
            voting members to comment on the meeting minutes within 30 days.
            (See p. 39.)

      GAO believes that adequate implementation   of the above actions should
      improve the Army's management of its tactical   vehicles development pro-
      gram. GAO believes, however, that continuing management attention    is
      necessary to prevent recurrence of conditions presented in the report.
      As shown in a February 1970 report of the Army Audit Agency on a ccm-
      prehensive review of the Army Materiel Conmand's research and develop-
      ment program, weaknesses in management of current development projects
      still  exist.  (See p. 31.)

      The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel stated in its July 1970 report to the
      President and the Secretary of Defense that a major problem with the
      requirements process occurred at its very beginning.      The Panel said
      that there was no doubt that the overall requirements process could be
      improved greatly by specifying   that operations analysts study require-
      ments at the point of origin--so    that requirements reaching higher
      headquarters would have greater validity.      (See p. 22.)


MATTERS
      FORCONSIDERATION
                    BY THECONGRE3S
      This report is being submitted to the Congress because of continuing
      problems in the management of the Army tactical  vehicles development
      program. GAO previously   reported areas needing management improvement
      in November 1960. Some of the conditions noted in that report were
      found to exist at the time of this review.




Tear Sheet



                                          3
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                         Contents
                                                        Page

DIGEST                                                    1

CHAPTER

   1      INTRODUCTION                                    4

  2       NEED TO PRECLUDEINITIATION OF DEVELOP-
          MENT PROJECTS UNTIL REQUIREMENTSARE
          DETERMINEDVALID AND FEASIBLE                  11
              XM41OEl Z-l/Z-ton     cargo truck         12
                   Conclusions                          13
              M548 6-ton tracked cargo carrier          14
                   Agency comments and our evaluation   16
                   Conclusions                          16
              M561 1-l/4-ton    cargo truck             17
                   Conclusions                          18
              Actions by the Army and our evaluation    18
              Recommendation                            20
              Agency comments and our evaluation        20
  3       NEED TO ENSURE THAT DEVELOPMENTOBJECTIVES
          ARE MET BEFOREVEHICLES ARE AUTHORIZED
          FOR MASS PRODUCTION                           23
              p4548 6-ton-tracked      cargo carrier    24
                   Conclusion                           25
              M561 I-l/4-ton      cargo truck           25
                   Agency comments and our evaluation   26
                    Conclusions                         27
              M656 5-ton cargo truck                    27
                   Conclusion                           28
              Action by the Army and our evaluation     28
              Recommendation                            29
              Agency comments and our evaluation        30

  4       NEED TO ENSUREMEANINGFUL EVALUATIONS
          AND TIMELY AND PROPERDECISIONS DURING
          DEVELOPMENT                                   32
              Incomplete or untimely data furnished
                 to decisionmakers                      33
                   M561 1-l/4-ton   truck and M548
                     6-ton trac'ked cargo carrier       33
                   XM759 l-l/Z-ton    soft tire
                     tracked cargo carrier              34
                                                              Pane
CHAPTER

               Lack of continuity     of agency personnel
                 at in-process    reviews                     37
               Conclusions                                    37
               Recommendations                                38
               Agency comments and our evaluation             38
      5    SCOPE OF REVIEW                                    40
APPENDIX

      I    Letter   dated April    29, 1970, from the
             Assistant   Secretary    of the Army (Research
              and Development)                                43
 II        Principal     officials    of the Department of
              Defense and the Department of the Army
              responsible       for administration  of
              activities      discussed in this report        55
COMPTROLLER
         GENERAL'S                         NEED TO IMPROVEMANAGEIMENT OF
REPORT
     TOTHE CONGRESS                        THE ARMY'S TACTICAL VEHICLES
                                           DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM6-133256


DIGEST
-m-w--

WHYTHEREVIEWWASMADE
    The Army Tank-Automotive Commandis responsible to the Army Materiel
    Commandfor the development and procurement of tactical     wheeled and
    tracked vehicles.  During fiscal year 1970, a total of $35.5 million
    was programmed by the Army Tank-Automotive Commandfor functions re-
    lating to research and development of vehicles,   and the command awarded
    contracts valued at about $545.7 million  for tactical   vehicle produc-
    tion.

    Previous studies by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Army
    Audit Agency revealed management weaknesses. Recommendations for im-
    provement had been made as a result of the studies.      This review was
    made as a follow-up to the earlier    reviews and concerned all tactical
    vehicle development programs initiated     subsequent to the previous GAO
    review.


FINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONS
    The review established      that problems have continued    despite   organiza-
    tional and procedural      changes.

         --Vehicle engineering development efforts were initiated       and permitted
            to continue although required determinations      had not been made to
            show that the development objectives     expressed by the prospective
            user were valid and technically    feasible.    As a result there were
           many deviations from desired design or performance characteristics
            and the vehicles either did not meet user requirements or were
            only marginally  acceptable.    (See p. 11.)

         --Emphasis on reducing development lead time resulted in premature
            authorizations    for mass production and the manufacture of vehicles
            that were defective or did not fully satisfy     user requirements.
            As a result,    costly modifications  were necessary to vehicles af-
            ter production.      (See p. 23.)

         --Decisions made on the future course of development effort       at in-
            process review meetings were based on incomplete or outdated in-
            formation,  or projects were unnecessarily   delayed because avail-
            able information  was not furnished for consideration    prior to the
            meeting.   Also, continuity   of personnel was lacking from one meet-
            ing to the next,    As a result, meaningful evaluation was hampered,
        timely and proper decisionmaking       was impaired,    and projects   were
        delayed.  (See p. 32.)


RECOkPdENDATIONS
            ORSUGGESTIONS
    The Army should improve the management of its        tactfcal   vehicles   develop-
    ment program to ensure that

      --requirements   documents specifying,   in accordance with existing regu-
         lations,  the desired characteristics   of the vehicles to be developed
         are prepared, thoroughly analyzed, and approved at the Department
         level before any full-scale    development efforts  are initiated
         (see p. 20),
      --approved requirements documents clearly set forth valid and real-
         istically  attainable requirements, based upon prior exploratory
         and experimental work, to permit full-scale  development and produc-
         tion within the designated time frame (see p. 20),

      --coordination     and communication between the developing and using
         agencies are improved, to preclude the need for significant     devia-
         tions from, or later waiver or relaxation    of, design or performance
         characteristics    deemed essential by the user (see p. 20),

      --mass      production of vehicles is authorized only after the vehicles
         have     demonstrated the capabilities    to meet the essential character-
         istics     established    and after the prospective user has pronounced
         them     suitable,   thereby minimizing  costly changes during production
         (see     p. 29), and

      --management places greater emphasis on the timely dissemination  of
        complete and current data to decisionmaking agencies and, to the
        extent possible, maintains continuity  of participants from one
        meeting to the next throughout the development project to promote
        stability (see p. 38).


AGENCY
     ACTIONSANDUNRESOL;IZD
                        ISSUES
    The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development), in
    general, agreed with the GAO recommendations.   He said that the re-
    port was a case study, using selected programs,of how not to execute a
    development program. He felt,  however, that actions taken had signifi-
    cantly reduced the possibility that the same errors would be repeated.

    Recent actions     reported   include:

      --Army regulations    were changed in April 1970 to require an in-
         process review that will show proof that advanced development is
         progressing satisfactorily,   or that the degree of risk is known


                                         2
       and is acceptable   to the Army, prior   to continuing   development.
       (See p. 20.)
     --Another change in Army regulations,    effective  January 1970, re-
       quires more detailed information    to obtain authorization  for mass
        production. (See p. 30.)

     --Continuity    has been maintained at the review meetings by project
        managers' deputies and other high-level   project management members.
        The in-process review procedure has been strengthened by requiring
        voting members to comment on the meeting minutes within 30 days.
        (See p, 39.)

   GAO believes that adequate implementation   of the above actions should
   improve the Army's management of its tactical   vehicles development pro-
   gram. GAO believes, however, that continuing management attention    is
   necessary to prevent recurrence of conditions presented in the report.
   As shown in a February 1970 report of the Army Audit Agency on a com-
   prehensive review of the Army Materiel Command's research and develop-
   ment program, weaknesses in management of current development projects
   still  exist.  (See p. 31.)

   The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel stated in its July 1970 report to the
   President and the Secretary of Defense that a major problem with the
   requirements process occurred at its very beginning.      The Panel said
   that there was no doubt that the overall requirements process could be
   improved greatly by specifying   that operations analysts study require-
   ments at the point of origin--so    that requirements reaching higher
   headquarters would have greater validity,      (See p. 22.)


MATTERS
      FORCONSIDERATION
                    BY THECONGRESS
   This report is being submitted to the Congress because of continuing
   problems in the management of the Army tactical  vehicles development
   program. GAO previously   reported areas needing management improvement
   in November 1960. Some of the conditions noted in that report were
   found to exist at the time of this review.




                                    3
                               CHARTER1

                            INTRODUCTION

      Significant      expenditures     are made by the Army for the
research,     development,     and production   of tactical      vehicles.
During fiscal      year 1970, $35.5 million      was programmed for
the Army Tank-Automotive         Command for functions      relating     to
research and development of vehicles,           and the command
awarded contracts       valued at about $545.7 million         for the
production     of tactical    vehicles.     These awards were based
mainly on drawings and specifications            furnished     by the
command.

      We previously reviewed the Army's tactical    vehicles
development program and reported our results     in a November
1960 report to the Congress (B-133256) entitled     "Review of
Development and Procurement of New Combat and Tactical        Ve-
hicles by the Department of the Army."    In addition,     the
Army Audit Agency issued a report on its 1966 review of the
M107, M110, M578 weapon/vehicle  family since our earlier
review.

        Our most recent review of the Army's management of its
tactical    vehicles    development program was a follow-up        to our
earlier    review and the Army Audit Agency review.           It was
directed     toward (1) an evaluation     of the policies     and pro-
cedures established       for the management of major phases of
development and (2) a determination          as to whether actual
practices      conformed to the stated policies       and procedures.
The scope of our effort        is more fully   described on page 40.

       A list of the principal    officials of the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Army responsible       for ad-
ministration   of activities   discussed in this report is
shown as appendix II.

       The Arrny Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia,   is primarily  responsible   for directing    the Army's
combat developments activities.       The Combat Developments
Command recommends materiel     development objectives      to the
Chief of Research and Development and materiel        requirements
to the Assistant    Chief of Staff for Force Development,


                                     4
Department'of       the &my, Washington,        D-C. The Chief of Re-
search and Development has Army Staff responsibility               for the
overall     planning,   programming,     coordinating,    and supervis-
ing of all Army research,          development,     test, and evaluation
activities.        The Assistant    Chief of Staff for Force Devel-
opment has Army Staff responsibility             for overall  supervi-
sion and coordination         of combat developments and related
policy in conjunction         with research and development func-
tions assigned to the Chief of Research and Development.

       The Army Materiel      Command, Washington,             D.C., under the
functional    supervision     of the Army Staff,           is responsible
for research,    development,       engineering,        testing     and evalu-
tion,   and procurement and production            of tactical        and combat
vehicles.    The Army Materiel         CommandOs development,            test-
ing, and production       functions      are carried       out by its major
subordinate    commands. The Army Tank-Automotive                   Command
develops and produces tactical            vehicles      for the Army and
other defense agencies either            in-house or through contracts
with industry.      In connection with its development and pro-
duction efforts,      the Army Tank-Automotive             Command is re-
sponsible for preparing         the technical       data package which
sets forth drawings,        specifications,        etc.,     for use in mass
production    of the vehicles,         The U.S. Army Test and Evalua-
tion Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland,                     tests and
evaluates   the vehicles.

       Following   is a brief  description  of the policies and
approved procedures covering the process after economic,
technical,     and operational  feasibility  of the product has
been determined.

       --The Combat Developments Command prepares or processes
          and the Assistant     Chief of Staff for Force Develop-
          ment approves a document --called      a Qualitative    Mate-
          riel Requirement-- identifying      the essential    and de-
          sired characteristics      for the end-item vehicle.      The
          Qualitative  Materiel     Requirement is required     to be
          preceded by prior developmental       work.
        --The Technical Committee, Army Materiel       Command, au-
           thorizes    the initiation of a development1 project    to
           accomplish the work required    to meet the character-
           istics   stated in the approved Qualitative    Materiel
           Requirement.

        --The Army Tank-Automotive        Command prepares an engi-
           neering plan identifying       the approach to be under-
           taken in the development1 of the vehicle.              The com-
           mand is also responsible       for the detailed      develop-
           ment and refinement      of the technical      characteristics
           of a militarily    acceptable vehicle.         When there is
           necessity    for supplementing      its own capabilities,
           the command awards a contract          to a private    company
           for the development work.         The Army Tank-Automotive
           Command's responsibilities        include preparing       compo-
           nent drawings and specifications          and making certain
           tests.

        --The Army Test and Evaluation         Command performs engi-
           neering tests to evaluate the technical         performance
           and safety characteristics        of the vehicle finally
           designed by the Army Tank-Automotive         Command. These
           tests establish     the vehicle's    general adequacy for
           service tests.      The Army Test and Evaluation       Command
           then makes service tests to determine whether the
           vehicle  is militarily     acceptable under certain      actual
           or simulated field     conditions.

        --The Army General Staff approves the decision           as to
           the adequacy of the vehicle      for mass production.
           This decision is termed the type classification           Stan-
           dard A action.      The Army Tank-Automotive     Command
           prepares the draft of the type classification          action
           which should include all pertinent       information    re-
           lating   to the vehicle's   readiness  for mass produc-
           tion,   deployment,   and use.

        --The Army Tank-Automotive   Command prepares           the tech-
           nical data package used in making initial            and


1This  is also called engineering            development and follows
 the phase in which feasibility            is determined called ad-
 vanced development.
                                       h
        follow-on   awards to contractors      to produce the ve-
        hicle.    The  technical   data package   includes the nec-
        essary drawings and specifications,           The command also
        makes the necessary design changes and furnishes          en-
        gineering   assistance   to contractors     to resolve any
        technical   problems that arise during production.

      --The Test and Evaluation      Command performs separate
         tests of the initial    lots of production   vehicles to
         ensure that specifications     are met.

        Research and development of vehicles            and components
have been continuing        processes at the Army Tank-Automotive
Command since 1942 when it was initially              assigned that re-
sponsibility.       Since our November 1960 report to the Con-
gress, seven new tactical         vehicle     developments have been
initiated     at the Army Tank-Automotive          Command. One of these
was terminated      while in development;        three are still   in de-
velopment;     one is in production        and has not yet been issued
to the troops;      and two have completed development and have
been produced and issued to the troops.               During this period
four new combat vehicle developments were also initiated                and
other vehicle developments initiated             before November 1960
were continued.       In addition,      existing    vehicles  were modi-
fied to satisfy      specific    needs.

      This report concerns the effectiveness     of the Army's
management of its tactical  vehicles    development program.
Although development of the seven tactical      vehicles  was ini-
tiated many years ago and organizational      and procedural
changes have been made, the management weaknesses still        ex-
ist as shown by the Army Audit Agency report of February
1970 * (See p. 31.)

       The following five tactical   vehicle developments ini-
tiated   since 1960 are reported   herein to illustrate  these
management weaknesses.
      XM41OEl 2-l/2-ton,     8x8 cargo truck
      M548 6-ton tracked cargo carrier
      M561 1-l/4-ton,    6x6 cargo truck (Gama Goat)
      M656 5-ton, 8x8 cargo truck
      XM759 1-l/2-ton,    soft tire tracked cargo carrier
      U.S. Army photographs       of these   vehicles   follow.

                                     7
XM410El           2%-ton,     8x8 cargo truck




 M548     6-ton   tracked   cargo   tamer




                       8
           M561       1%ton,   6x6   cargo   truck




                  i     c




.
    ::__




                                     9
                                                            .




XM759   1%~ton   soft   tire    tracked   cargo   carrier




                               10
                              CHAPTER 2

         NEED TO PRECLUDEINITIATION         OF DEVELOPMENT

                 PROJECTSUNTIL REQUIREMENTSARE

                  DETERMINEDVALID AND FEASIBLE

      Army Regulation      705-5 states that research and devel-
opment activities      are to be directed      primarily    toward devel-
oping materiel     which satisfies      the valid needs of the using
forces as set forth by them in a document called a Qualita-
tive Materiel     Requirement.      The document is prepared by the
Combat Developments Command and approve,d by the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Force Development.             The Qualitative   Mate-
riel Requirement states materiel           needs in terms of required
characteristics     and priorities      and relates     them to the oper-
ational    and organizational      context in which they will be
used.    It includes a listing       of specific    requirements   to
permit a clear understanding         of features    that are essential
to a product's     acceptance.

      As provided in the Army regulation,       after economic,
technical,   and operational feasibility     has been determined
by prior development1 and testing,       a Qualitative  Materiel
Requirement is to be published which authorizes        the develop-
ment* of specific   materiel toward end-item use.

       Items requiring   major developmental   effort  must conform
to a Qualitative     Materiel Requirement unless there has been
specific    exception granted by Headquarters,     Department of
the Army.


1This  stage of development      is known as advanced development
 during which the feasibility       of developing the item is de-
 termined.

2rhis  stage of development is referred to as engineering  de-
 velopment during which the item is engineered for service
 use.



                                    11
        Cur review indicated      that vehicle     engineering    develop-
ment efforts      had been initiated     and were permitted       to con-
tinue although a Qualitative          Materiel  Requirement had not
been authorized.       Thus there was no assurance that develop-
ment objectives      were valid or technically         feasible.     As a
result,    many deviations     from design or performance charac-
teristics    were required     during development and resulting
vehicles    either    did not meet user requirements          or were only
marginally     acceptable.     In the following      cases, the waiver
of essential      requirements    and the user's acceptance of ve-
hicles not meeting such requirements,            in our opinion,      cast
doubt on the validity        of the initial    requirements      determi-
nations.

XM410El 2-l/2-TON      CARGOTRUCK

        In 1956 the U.S. Army Continental           Army Command estab-
lished a requirement        for a 2-l/2-ton,       6x6 truck,    simple in
design, with a curb weight (fully            equipped, less payload
and personnel)       not to exceed 7,500 pounds.          However, the
Assistant      Secretary   of Defense (Engineering),         over objec-
tions from the agency that requested development of the ve-
hicle,     directed    the development of an 8x8 version.           The 8x8
pilot     models weighed about 9,000 pounds each and were un-
able to meet the reliability,          durability,     and maintain-
ability     requirements.      After several design modifications,
this project --designated         XM410--was terminated.

        However, the Continental     Army Command's study of motor
vehicle requirements       approved by the Army in April 1961
recognized    a continuing    need for a lightweight       2-l/2-ton,
8x8 truck,    and the project     was reestablished      in June 1961.
This truck was designated the XM410El.            Neither the XM410
project    nor the XM4lOEl project     had a Qualitative'Materiel
Requirement.

       When the project      was reestablished         in 1961, some char;
acteristics      were revised and others were added by the Con-
tinental      Army Command which resulted           in weight increases.
For example,      the added    requirement      for   a diesel engine
rather     than for a gasoline engine increased the weight by
about 900 pounds. The maximum curb weight of 7,500 pounds
specified      by the original     characteristics       was eliminated
with no corresponding        limitation     other than "a high payload


                                    12
to net weight ratio      is desired but shall not compromise the
requirements   of durability       and reliabilityess       The pilot
models produced were frequently          modified     after testing     and
the curb weight was eventually         increased to about 11,300
pounds.    Nevertheless,     this truck also failed         to meet dura-
bility  and reliability      requirements      and the Froject      was
again terminated      in April 1946.

         The Chief of Research and Development decided to termi-
nate the project        because of the inability            of the XM410El to
demonstrate adequate durability,            reliability,         and maintain-
ability.      He noted that a third redesign would not correct
major deficiencies.           He also stated that the similarity               of
characteristics        and costs of the XM410El 2-l/2-ton               truck
and the XM656 5-ton truck did not justify                   having both vehi-
cles in the inventory          and that cost savings could be ob-
tained by producing more 5-ton trucks and reducing the to-
tal line-item       inventory    by substituting         5-ton trucks for
2-l/2-ton     trucks.     As a result,     after 9 years of development
effort     at a cost of about $6 million,            the project       was termi-
nated and the user's need for a lightweight                   2-l/2-ton     truck
was not satisfied.

      We believe that the ultimate         issue to the troops of a
5-ton, 8x8 truck having a curb weight of more than 17,000
pounds can hardly be construed as satisfying             either   the
user's original    requirement     for a 2-l/2-ton     truck having a
curb weight of 7,500 pounds or the revised requirement                 for
a lightweight   2-l/2-ton    truck.      In this regard,     available
studies continue to show a need for a new 2-l/2-ton               truck.
The Chief of Research and Development stated in November
1965 that the Qualitative       Materiel     Requirement authoriza-
tion procedure would be used for any future            2-l/2-ton     truck
development.    We were advised by an Assistant           Chief of
Staff for Force Development official           in May 1969 that a
Qualitative   Materiel    Requirement would probably be pro-
cessed for development of such a truck in the next 2 years.

Conclusions

      We believe this example demonstrates          that vehicle   de-
velopment efforts,    if uncontrolled,     can lead to numerous
changes and eventually    result    in a vehicle not meeting
stated needs.     Had the project     been controlled    by a valid

                                         13
and technically  feasible   Qualitative    Materiel Requirement,
we believe that a Z-l/2-ton     truck might have been developed
and the Army might have fulfilled       the need for such a vehicle
rather than using a 5-ton truck for that need.

M548 6-TON TRACKED CARGO CARRIER

         The first        indication      of a need for a vehicle          to accom-
 pany and support the MlO7, MlO8, M109, and Ml10 self-
 propelled      artillery        weapons was identified         in a January
 1962 study conducted by the Office of Combat Development
 and Doctrine,          U.S. Army Artillery        and Missile        School.     This
 study concluded that the proposed XM548 was the least desir-
 able of the vehicles              studied to fill      the role of an accom-
 panying vehicle for the M107, M108, M109, and Ml10 weapons
 because of limitations               in its cruising      range and capability
 for trench crossing and vertical                wall climbing,         its inade-
 quate cargo capacity,              and the vulnerability         of its suspen-
 sion system.           The study compared the XM548 with various ex-
 isting    and certain          proposed tracked and wheeled cargo ve-
 hicles.
        Although the study concluded that other cargo carriers
would better         fill     the role of an accompanying and support
vehicle,     the Chief of Research and Development in March
1963 approved a proposal by the Fifth                    Army Corps for the
XM548. Since the Fifth                 Army Corps did not propose a Quali-
tative     Materiel        Requirement nor identify          the specific       charac-
teristics      desired in such a vehicle,              the Chief of Research
and Development requested the Combat Developments Command
to initiate       action toward establishing              requirements        and
characteristics.             He also directed       the Army Materiel          Com-
mand to initiate            development of the vehicle.              Thus develop-
ment was expedited before a Qualitative                     Materiel     Require-
ment was officially              established.

     The draft of the XM548 Qualitative          Materiel   Require-
ment prepared by the Combat Developments Command stated
that the then-standard     2-l/2--and     5-ton trucks used as ac-
companying and support vehicles        for the self-propelled      weap-
ons would not satisfy    the requirement       because the trucks did
not possess operational     characteristics      equal to the.weap-
ons. Further,    it stated that the failure        to develop ade-
quate accompanying vehicles would severely degrade mission
accomplishment.

                                          14
        As stated previously,           a January 1962 study showed that
the XM548 also could not realistically                   satisfy       such user
requirements.         In addition,        the draft document did not pro-
pose design characteristics               which would overcome the short-
comings identified          by the study.        For example, the XM548
cannot cross more than a 66-inch trench whereas the vehicles
it must accompany can cross a 93-inch trench,
        Subsequent testing          of the XM548 models disclosed                that
the vehicles would not even meet the essential                         characteris-
tics stated in the draft document.                   For example, test re-
ports showed that the XM548 (1) was incapable of carrying
the required       6-ton load without          degrading the suspension
system, (2) had a cruising              range of only 240 miles without
a towed load over the required                course in relation           to the
required      300 miles with a towed load, and (3) had failed                         to
attain    the essential       reliability,        durability,         and maintain-
ability     requirements.         Thus the vehicle         fell     short. of the
requirements       of the draft document which in itself                     did not
meet the justification            for the project        in the first         place.
For example,       although     the    self-propelled        artillery       weapons
which the XM548 was to accompany have a cruising                          range of
450 miles,      the   draft   Qualitative       Materiel      Requirement
 stated that the required            cruising     range for the XM548 was
300 miles, and the demonstrated                range of the XM54-8 was
only 240 miles.
       In December 1964--19 months after project              initiation
and after test results        were available--the        Qualitative      Mate-
riel Requirement was approved.            We noted that several es-
sential   characteristics      included in the approved document
agreed with the performance exhibited             during testing        but
were less stringent        than the draft document.         For example,
the cruising    range was relaxed from 300 miles--consisting
of 75 miles on highways, 75 miles cross-country,                  and 150
miles on secondary roads while carrying              full payload and
towing a load --to 300 miles over paved roads with full pay-
load but without       towing a load.      One essential      characteris-
tic--a   6-ton capacity--was       retained     in the approved Qualita-
tive Materiel    Requirement but was not included in the devel-
opment contract,      which specified       only a 5-ton capacity.
     Although        this    vehicle was type classified               Standard A
and authorized         for   mass production, we believe               that it fell
far short of meeting the requirements      for which it had been
justified,   i.e. , possessing operational    characteristics
 equal to the vehicles   which it was to accompany.

Agency comments and our evaluation

      The Assistant   Secretary    of the Army (Research and De-
velopment),   in commenting on our draft report           (see p. 481,
compared several mobility       characteristics      of the M548 with
M107, M109, and Ml10 vehicles.          In addition,    he stated that
"the M548 has been a mainstay and workhorse in Southeast
Asia and is satisfying     a user requirement."

        The comments did not address the fact that the vehicle
was incapable of carrying          a 6-ton load without         degrading
the suspension system; failed             to attain   essential    durability,
reliability,       and maintainability       requirements;      and its
trench-crossing       capability     fell   far short of equaling the
characteristics       of the vehicles       to be supported.       Simply
stating      that the M548 has been a mainstay and workhorse in
Southeast Asia and that it is satisfying               user requirements
ignores      the fact that the user had to settle           for much less
than it desired.

Conclusions

        We believe that the example illustrates         how a develop-
ment project      can be justified,   continued,    and completed al-
though original      development objectives      and requirements     are
not feasible      and realistic.    In addition,    the apparent fail-
ure to adequately       consider available    study results    illus-
trates,    we believe,     the lack of emphasis on a thorough anal-
ysis before proceeding with development effort.

       In this case, initiation   of development without       an ap-
proved Qualitative    Materiel  Requirement not only violated
Army regulations    but also precluded the screening for tech-
nical feasibility    and the control    over development efforts
necessary to ensure materiel     satisfying   user's expressed
needs.    Moreover, although the Qualitative      Materiel   Require-
ment was later approved, it had been relaxed to agree with
the lesser performance exhibited       during testing.     A thor-
ough beforehand analysis might have precluded the



                                      16
initiation   of this development or instigated    a more fea-
sible alternative.    The prior preparation    of a requirements
document should have led to such an analysis.
M561 l-l/4-TON     CARGOTRUCK

      The need for a l-l/4-ton       cargo truck was determined by
a motor vehicle requirements        study (see pa 12) approved by
the Army in 1961. Although the preparation          and approval of
a Qualitative   Materiel     Requirement was required,    it was
never prepared for this development project.           The essential
characteristics   originally     expressed by the user included
decreased weight,    increased cargo space, improved reliabil-
ity, and ease in loading and unloading of personnel as
compared with characteristics        of the M37 3/4-ton   truck
which it was to replace.

      These characteristics       were not met, however, and pos-
sibly were not realistically         achievable.    For example, the
M561 weighs 7,445 pounds (the user desired a curb weight of
2,500 pounds) compared with 5,700 pounds for the M37. The
cargo space is only slightly         increased over the M37, and,
in our opinion,   the PI561 could hardly provide the capacity
needed to carry light,       bulky loads which the M37 was also
unable to carry.     Loading and unloading of cargo and per-
sonnel are more difficult        in the M561 because of its hull-
type design.    Reliability,       durability,   and maintainability,
although somewhat improved over the M37, are still             far from
meeting user requirements        despite a waiver of some require-
ments after tests showed that the vehicle was incapable of
meeting them.

       In addition,     since various   special purpose kits--such
as weapon, winterization        and heater,   winch, and a.mbulance--
are necessary for the vehicle         to perform its mission,       it
was considered essential        that such kits be developed con-
currently     with the vehicle.      We found, however, that, be-
cause in some cases firm kit requirements           were not estab-
lished on a timely basis, development of some of the kits
was not completed concurrently         with the vehicle.      As a re-
sult,    such kits could not be tested with the vehicle and
modifications      to the current production      contract   will have
to be made to procure such kits.           Any delay in delivery       of
kits to the user might impair accomplishment             of vehicle
missions.
Conclusions

       We believe that the M561 development,               costing at least
$9 million,     is another example of how9 in the absence of a
Qualitative    Naterie      Requirement,       development efforts      can
be expended on requirements           that are not technically        fea-
sible and can result        in materiel       which9 although eventually
accepted by the user, substantially               deviates from the
user's expressed needs.            We believe that, had the PI561 de-
velopment been preceded by an approved Qualitative                  Materiel
Requirement,      it is more likely        that the development effort
would have been directed           to satisfying     user needs or that
the analysis      leading to such approval would have indicated
that some of the requirements            established      by the user were
unrealistic    or not feasible.          In addition,      adequate review
of the Qualitative        Materiel    Requirement,      we believe,   would
have resulted       in the initiation        of more timely and firm de-
terminations      involving   kit requirements.

ACTIONS BY THE ARMY AND OUR EVALTJATION

         The Army, in September 1968, revised its regulations
governing the preparation            of the Qualitative       Materiel    Re-
quirements       to provide for greater clarity           in describing     es-
 sential     characteristics     and to require more justification
for them prior to proceeding with development,                   The Combat
Developments Command advised us that the revised regulation
required      that each Qualitative       Materiel      Requirement submit-
ted for approval must be supported by a written                  rationale
justifying       each vehicle characteristic          shown in the docu-
ment.      In addition,      the revised regulation        which contains
the format for the Qualitative            Materiel      Requirement submis-
sion explains that (1) essential            characteristics       are those
which cannot be relaxed,           (2) the user must be able to jus-
tify    them, and (3) the technical         feasibility       must have been
established       by the developer,

      We believe that, although the revised regulation             does
provide improved guidance for the Qualitative            Materiel    Re-
quirement preparation,      it is basically    a reiteration      of
guidance already provided but not adhered to in the past.
For example, approved Qualitative       Materiel    Requirements
have been required     at least since 1958 as a prerequisite           to
development effort     but, as noted by the examples in this


                                      18
‘   .




        report,   such documents have not always been prepared and
        thereby have not been available        as a controlling        feature
        during development.        In our opinion,     therefore,    revision   of
        the regulation    in itself    will not resolve a more basic
        problem pointed out in this report,            We believe that the
        basic problem has been the lack of emphasis on careful
        analysis   of the validity     and feasibility       of meeting ex-
        pressed user requirements       based upon sufficient        experimental
        work and testing    conducted prior to approval of the Quali-
        tative   Materiel  Requirement and initiation          of engineering
        development.

               This led, we believe,    to unrealistic     or overly opti-
        mistic   development objectives      which later necessitated       re-
        laxation     of or significant  deviations     from essential    re-
        quirements.      We found that,   in some instances,    essential
        characteristics     of major significance      had been relaxed or
        waived to agree with development and test results             simply be-
        cause at that point in time no other alternative            was prac-
        ticable,

                In this regard, the Combat Developments Command advised
        us that relaxation      of requirements         in trade-off       analyses1
        had been considered       throughout       vehicle development and par-
        ticularly     at each in-process        review, when development or
        test results     had disclosed     that original          (essential)    char-
        acteristics     were attainable      only at drastic          cost increases
        or perhaps were beyond the state of the art.                     In our opin-
        ion, such relaxation        of requirements         would be minimized if
        sufficient     experimental    work and testing          were performed as
        a basis of determining        feasibility        (including      what is within
        the state of the art) prior to establishing                   the specific
        requirements     for an item included in a Qualitative                 Materiel
        Requirement.

              We believe that better analyses and controls       are needed
        prior to the Qualitative    Materiel    Requirement approval to
        lessen the need for significant      trade-offs   such as occurred
        in the cases noted in this report.


        1
         A trade-off  analysis  is the process of weighing alternatives
          in terms of time, cost, and performance to decide which is
          best.


                                               19
RECOMMENDATION

     We recommend that the Army improve its management of
the tactical vehicles  development program to ensure that

      --in accordance with existing          regulations,       Qualitative
         Materiel  Requirements are       prepared,     thoroughly       ana-
          lyzed, and approved by the       Army at the Department
         level before initiation   of      effort     specifically       di-
         rected toward development        of an end-item,

      --approved   Qualitative     Materiel  Requirements clearly
         set forth requirements      that are valid and are real-
         istically  attainable,     based upon prior exploratory
         and experimental     work, within   the designated  time
         frame, and

      --improved       coordination     and communication    exist be-
         tween the       developing and using agencies to preclude
         the need      for significant     deviations   from or later
         waiver or       relaxation    of design or performance char-
         acteristics        deemed essential    by the user.

AGENCY COMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATION

      The Assistant  Secretary of the Army (Research and De-
velopment)  commented on our recommendations and advised us
of several actions being taken to improve the management
of vehicle  development projects.    (See app. I.>

        The Assistant     Secretary concurred with the first    part
of our recommendation and advised that a change to Army
regulations     had been prepared to require an in-process       re-
view that would show proof that advanced development was
progressing     satisfactorily     or that the degrees of risks
were known and were acceptable          to the Army prior to contin-
uing development.1          We plan to examine into the implemen-
tations    of the revised regulation       during our future audit
work.

1We were subsequently  advised that the Assistant    Secretary
 was referring  to change 2 to Army Regulation    705-5 dated
 April 14, 1970, which became effective   on June 15, 1970.


                                    20
       In connection with the second part of our recommenda-
tion,    the Assistant   Secretary    of the Army (Research and De-
velopment)      advised us that, although the user's representa-
tive (Combat Developments Command) had originated                   the ma-
teriel     requirements  for hardware,      including      tactical    vehi-
cles, the requirements       document would be reviewed exten-
sively both before and after approval by the Department of
the Army. He stated that the requirement                usually would be
presented in the requirements         document in terms which made
development possible and was intended to incorporate                   only
those characteristics       which were determined to be within
the state of the art.        He stated,    however, that,         in some
cases, achievement of required          characteristics,         once devel-
opment had started,      had been found to be beyond the state
of the art or too costly,        which necessitated         revisions     to
the document.

        We believe that adequate prior experimental      work and
testing    will provide good indications     of what is feasible
and within     the state of the art and thereby minimize revi-
sions to the document to eliminate       characteristics   later
found to be beyond the state of the art or too costly.

        Concerning the third part of our recommendation,               the
Assistant     Secretary agreed that it was desirable             in most
instances     for the developing agency not to significantly
change an essential      user requirement        for any reason.       He
stated,    however, that the relaxing        of certain     requirements
might be more cost effective,          in terms of money and time,
than to continue development to attain              a capability    which,
if deleted,      would not significantly      degrade performance of
the end-item.       We agree with the Assistant         Secretary    that
changes may be necessary in limited            instances Puring early
phases of development such as he described.                We believe,
however, that, when changes are necessary,              they should al-
ways be coordinated      with the user agency to ensure that es-
sential    requirements    remain unchanged.

      The Assistant    Secretary also commented on the individ-
ual tactical   vehicle   projects which we used to demonstrate
the need to preclude initiation      of development projects  un-
til requirements    are determined to be valid and feasible.
(See p. 48 .) We were advised that our examples demonstrated



                                    21
                                                                          ..




the utility     of pilot  fabrication     and testing     prior to ini-
tiation     of mass production      to (1) confirm or deny the fea-
sibility     of a design concept or (2) provide a mechanism for
developing and testing       trade-offs    between the user perfor-
mance objectives      and the realities     of cost,!reliability,
durability,     and maintainability.

       We agree that our examples show that pilot         fabrication
and testing    are preferable  to mass production.       -For examples
the M548 vehicle was authorized        for mass production      without
meeting user reliability,     durability,    and maintainability
requirements.

       We believe that, had the necessary prior experimental
work and testing     been performed before preparation      and ap-
proval of the Qualitative       Materiel Requirement as required
by Army regulations,       the user would have had a better
chance of receiving      equipment to satisfy   its essential   re-
quirements.      As already pointed out, we believe that such
preparatory    work would lessen the need for such significant
trade-offs    as occurred in the cases noted in this report.

       We noted that the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in its re-
port to the President       and Secretary  of Defense in July
1970, also pointed out that a major problem with the re-
quirements process occurred at its very beginning.           The
Panel indicated     that there was no doubt that the overall
requirements    process could be improved greatly      by specify-
ing that operations      analysts  study requirements   at the
point of origin.       In that way those requirements    reaching
higher headquarters      should have greater validity.




                                  22
                                CHARTER3
                                --

     NEED Tp ENSURE THAT DEVELOPMENTOBJECTIVES ARE MET

     BEFOREVEHICLES ARE AUTHORIZED--FOR MASS PRODUCTION

         Army regulations     require Department of the Army--Assis-
tant     Chief of Staff for Force Development--approval        of a
type     classification    action before production    is authorized.
Type     classification    actions are considered major decision
points      in the life cycle of materiel     and operational    plan-
ning     is affected    by them.

        Standard A-type classification       is the designation       given
a combat-acceptable      item suitable    for mass production        which,
through engineering      and service tests,      has demonstrated       the
capability     to meet all essential     characteristics      specified
in the Qualitative      Materiel   Requirement.       The Army Materiel
Command procedures      state that a technical        data package suit-
able for competitive       procurement   should be complete at the
time an item is type classified        as Standard A. Type classi-
fication     as Standard A signifies     completion      of development
effort     and adoption for overall    Army use.

      Army regulations      stress the need, however, for direct
and forceful      action to reduce development lead time.             In
this regard, implementing        regulations     permit type classifi-
cation as Standard A prior to completion             of all tests and
correction     of defects if correction        can be made during ini-
tial   production     of the vehicle.      In addition,    Army regula-
tions provide for type classifying            an iteTn as limited    pro-
duction which permits production           prior to completion      of de-
velopment and tests to fill         an urgent operational       require-
ment for which no other existing           item is adequate.

       Our review indicated      that the Army"s emphasis on reduc-
ing development lead time has led to premature type classifi-
cation actions and release of technical           data packages which,
in turn, has resulted     in production      of defective    vehicles   or
vehicles   that do not fully       satisfy user requirements.        In
addition,    premature type classifications        not only resulted
in expensive modifications         during production,     but also might
have increased rather than reduced the time necessary to
field   an acceptable   vehicle.

                                     23
                                                                            ..




M548
__II 6-TON    TRACKED CARGOCARRIER
       --.- -1-------11
        As discussed on page 14, the M548 cargo carrier       was de-
veloped beginning in 1963 under an expedited program to sat-
isfy a stated urgent need for an accompanying and support
vehicle for the M107, M108, MlO9, and Ml10 self-propelled
weapons which were issued to the troops in 1963.           Because
of its stated urgency, the planned development cycle was se-
verely reduced from the normal 4 years to 16 months from
project    initiation   to Standard A-type classification.      We
believe that the compressed schedule did not provide for
sufficient      testing prior to type classification.

       Although engineering      and service tests conducted during
the period February to October 1964 disclosed              that the ve-
hicle had numerous and serious defects and did not meet ex-
pressed user requirements,        the Chief of Research and Devel-
opment in February 1965 approved type classification               as
limited     production   to permit the Army Materiel         Command to
take advantage of a multivehicle,         multiyear     procurement.
Because of the defects disclosed         by engineering       and service
tests,    the technical     data package used for procurement in-
corporated      numerous design modifications       proposed to correct
the defects.        The adequacy of these modifications,         however,
was not verified       by tests prior to release of the technical
data package for procurement.

       The Army awarded a 3-year production        contract     for
2,638 units in April 1965 and in October 1965 approved the
vehicle    for Standard A-type classification       on the basis of
assurance that tests would be completed and defects cor-
rected prior    to initial   production.    Check tests performed
from February 1965 to March 1966, however, to determine the
adequacy of the proposed modifications,         disclosed     that the
modifications   --although   incorporated    in the technical       data
package-- were inadequate and that additional          modifications
and tests were necessary.        We noted that testing      of these
modifications     and necessary redesign continued for over a
year after release of the technical        data package for pro-
curement.

     In addition, although the vehicle was made Standard              A
in October 1965, environmental tests were not completed


                                   24
until    March 1966     and--due to the compressed development cy-
cle--the    vehicle     had not demonstrated   the ability   to operate
under arctic      and   desert conditions   as specified   by the Qual-
itative    Materiel     Requirement.

        Moreover, tests from April through September 1966 of
vehicles    in the initial        production    lot continued to show var-
ious defects requiring          correction.      We noted that numerous
additional     modifications        became necessary as production      and
testing    progressed     simultaneously.        As a result,  as many as
500 of the vehicles        initially      procured were unsuitable    for
troop use and were stored while awaiting modifications.
Consequently,     the vehicles,        deemed urgently    needed by the
user in early 1963, were not issued to the troops until                 May
1967.

Conclusion
        We believe that this example illustrates            the conse-
quences of prematurely        proceeding with Standard A-type clas-
sification     and production     of vehicles     before the vehicles
are tested and proven adequate.            In this case, the Army's
effort     to expedite the development to meet a stated urgent
requirement     not only resulted      in a failure     to meet the ur-
gency 2 but also undoubtedly        resulted    in additional     cost
since modification      to production      vehiclescostsconsiderably
more than modification        during engineering       development.     The
change then was not limited         to a few developmental        models
but instead had to be applied to large quantities                of produc-
tion vehicles.

M561 l-l/4-TON     CARGO TRUCK

      The M.561 l-l/4-ton       truck was made Standard A in June
1966 and authorized       for mass production        on the basis of as-
surances that numerous defects would be corrected                 prior to
award of a production         contract.    The technical      data package,
although incomplete,       was initially      released in September
1966. However, the production            contract,    normally awarded
about 6 months after        type classification,       was delayed for
nearly 2 years.      We found that numerous design changes, made
to correct  defects found during engineering              and service
tests and included in the technical              data package, had not



                                     25

                         .
been validated  by test when the type classification      action
was approved.   During preproduction  testing,    many of these
changes proved inadequate and necessitated     additional   revi-
sions to the technical  data package in January and again in
September 1967.

        As late as September 1967, major equipment defects
found during engineering       and service tests remained unre-
solved and many of the modifications          made to correct       prepro-
duction defects had not been tested sufficiently              to validate
their    adequacy.   Nevertheless,    the revised technical         data
package was used in the September 1967 solicitation                of bids
for production     of the vehicle.      Tests were then initiated           to
test the adequacy of modifications,          some of which constituted
completely     new components, such as sealed brakes.            As a re-
sult of the continued testing,        numerous additional         changes
were made to the technical        data package.      Contractors,      in
the middle of bid preparation,        experienced considerable           dif-
ficulty    because of the vacillating       design and nearly all of
them requested an extension of the bid opening date because
of problems encountered with the technical            data package.
Tests were not completed until        after award of the production
contract     in June 1968 and necessary design changes resulting
from the tests were incorporated         by contract    modification.

Agency comments and our evaluation

       The Assistant     Secretary   of the Army (Research and Devel-
opment) said that the technical         data package was not incom-
plete or inadequate for competitive          procurement and that
seven firms competed for the procurement without             submitting
a protest   for any reason.        (See p. 50.)     He said that the
Army believed that the intensity          of the competition    and the
requirement    for bidders to thoroughly        evaluate the techni-
cal data in accordance with the pre-production-evaluation
clause were responsible        for requests for extension of the
bid preparation      period.

        As shown above, unresolved major equipment defects
existed when the bids were solicited       which indicated    that
the technical      data package was incomplete.    In addition,
testing    continued after bids were solicited     and numerous
changes were subsequently      made to the technical    data package.


                                     26
Although we have no evidence of any formal protests     by the
seven firms that competed for the procurement,   the record
shows that a 3%day extension   for bid submission was recom-
mended in view of complaints  by four of the contractors
that the technical data package was inadequate or required
changes.

        The Assistant    Secretary     also stated that there were
relatively     few cost-type     engineering      change orders processed
during the life of the contract             and that the time spent be-
tween type classification          (June 1966) and issuance of the
solicitation      (September 1967) was well spent in generating
product improvements.         We recognize that the time interval
of more than a year from the standardization              action to the
request for bids permitted          correction     of many of the known
deficiencies.       Nevertheless,      the classification     as Stan-
dard A denotes that the item is ready for mass production
and issuance      to the troops,     and it is evident that such
classification      of this vehicle       in June 1966 was premature.

Conclusions

       We believe that this case illustrates        how the Army's
emphasis on leadtime reduction         can cause management to ori-
ent decisions     toward Standard A-type classification        irre-
spective of known vehicle defects and the incompleteness               of
the technical     data package.    In our opinion,    both the ap-
proval of Standard A-type classification         and the initial       re-
lease of the technical       data package were premature.        Revi-
sions to the data package during and after preproduction
testing   indicate,    we believe,   that the technical    data pack-
age was obviously      incomplete and inadequate when initially
released in September 1966 and was still         incomplete when
released   in   September   1967 and used    for   bid   solicitation   and
contract   award.

M656 5-TON CARGO TRUCK

      The M656 truck was type classified      as Standard A in
April 1966 although extensive    engineering     and service test-
ing showed that numerous essential     characteristics     had not
been met. For example, the time and cost of maintenance was
excessive,  durability and reliability     requirements    were not



                                    27
attained,   fuel economy was not improved, numerous engine
failures   were experienced,    and the vehicle contained      safety
hazards in swimming, braking,       and protection    of the crew
from exhaust fumes.      Type classification      was approved, how-
ever, on the basis of assurance by the Project Manager that
unresolved    problems would be corrected      during the preproduc-
tion phase.

        In February 1967, however, preproduction         tests were ter-
minated prior to completion      because of an excessive failure
rate (one every 300 miles).       For example, in the two trucks
tested,    five transmissions   and six engines failed        for vari-
ous reasons, and maintenance cost was excessive.              After nu-
merous modifications      were made to overcome the problems,           ad-
ditional     tests were made. Late in 1967, however, because of
the excessive engine maintenance,        the test agency (Army Test
and Evaluation     Command) recommended deferring        a decision to
release the M656 for production       pending additional        extensive
testing    of improved engines.     Shortly  thereafter,      however,
in January 1968 a limited      buy of 500 vehicles was made, pri-
marily for use in converting      the Pershing      IA missile      system
from tracked to wheeled transport.

        Information obtained from the Project   Manager in March
1969 (nearly 3 years after type classification)      indicated
that another engine may be substituted     in future procurement.
We were told that this would probably delay fielding        of the
vehicle by about 2 years because of necessary redesign and
retest.

Conclusion

      As in the previous examples, we believe that this case
also illustrates      how the Army--on the basis of promises--can
prematurely     type classify   a known defective     vehicle as Stan-
dard A and put the vehicle in production          before development
is completed.       The Army, in our opinion,     has placed more em-
phasis on reducing development lead time than on ensuring
that satisfactory      vehicles  are obtained.

ACTION BY THE ARMY AND OUR EVALUATION

     In April    1968, a revision  to Army Regulation 705-5 gave
the Assistant    Chief of Staff for Force Development

                                    28
(user-oriented)      the responsibility       for the life cycle evalua-
tion of materiel,        including   coordination      and integration       of
development,     validation      of materiel    objectives      and require-
ments, and type classification,            and reclassification        of mate-
riel.     Formerly,    the development-oriented         Chief of Research
and Development had the responsibility.

       We believe that this action should ensure that vehicles
are satisfactorily      developed to meet user requirements       prior
to approval of type classification       as Standard A and autho-
rized for production.        We plan to continue monitoring     the
tactical    vehicles   development program including    implementa-
tion of the revised Army Regulation       and the effects    the re-
organization      has on the program.

RECOMMENDATION

      We recommended, therefore,     that Army regulations      be re-
vised to permit classification      of vehicles    as Standard A
and that mass production     be authorized    only when such vehi-
cles have demonstrated    the capabilities      to meet all essential
characteristics  of the Qualitative       Materiel   Requirement and
are considered by the user to be suitable,         thereby minimiz-
ing costly changes during production.




                                      29
&GENCYCOMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATION (see p. 4.5)

        The Assistant  Secretary  of the Army (Research and De-
velopment) concurred with our conclusion       that type classi-
fication    of some items as Standard A has been granted in the
past prior to successful      completion of all tests.   However,
he stated:

       "The Army is of the opinion that the decisions      to
       initiate   production, in the foregoing    three cases,
       were sound and based on careful    analysis of alter-
       natives."'

He stated also that the implementation          of Army Regulation
71-6, effective     January 1,     1970, should  eliminate    recurrence
of this particular      deficiency    because the regulation      estab-
lishes additional      procedures to be followed       and requires
more detailed    information     to accomplish a request for type
classification     action.

       Our review showed that each of the examples cited was
type classified      as Standard A and production      initiated     be-
fore the items were proven by satisfactory          results      in ser-
vice tests.      We believe that the quantity      of modifications
made to these three vehicles       and the testing    made of the
modifications     after type classification     action clearly       in-
dicate that the vehicles       were not ready for production         when
type classified.

        We examined Army Regulation           71-6, which became effective
on January 1, 1970, and noted that the regulation                     provides
more detailed      procedures for obtaining             a Standard A-type
classification       action.      Previously      an item    was designated
as Standard A when it was suitable                for mass production,          had
completed engineering           and service tests,         and had demon-
strated     the capability       to meet all essential          characteristics
specified      in the Qualitative        Materiel      Requirement.       Under
the new regulation,          the designation        of a Standard A item is
a preferred      and fully      acceptable    item which has successfully
completed all required           test and evaluation,          meets Department
of the Army-approved requirements,                military     characteristics,
and specifications         for worldwide or specified            geographic
areas, is totally        suitable     for performing        the required       mis-
sion, can be properly           maintained    and logistically         supported,

                                         30
 and is suitable   for mass production,   An appendix to the
 regulation  explains the type of information     and technical
 data needed for type classification    and reclassification
 actions,

        We believe that the April 1968 reorganization            action
 and proper implementation      of Army Re     latisn    71-6  issued     in
 November 1969 should improve the Ar           s management of its
 tactical   vehicles   development program by preventing          prema-
 ture type classification      and authorization      for production.
 The; need for continuing     management attention       is further
 demonstrated,     however, in a February 1970 audit report by
 the Army Audit Agency on a comprehensive review of the Army
 Materiel   Command's research and development program.              their
 review, like ours, disclosed      that
       --items were type classified      and procurements          initiated,
           although prescribed classification     criteria         were not
           met, and
       --some items were type classified     as Standard A before
          the materiel had been successfully    tested and, in a
          few cases, before a specific   need had been estab-
          lished.
       Further,   the Army Audit        ency report    indicated     that:
       IlIt seemed that there was a general trend of push-
       ing a type classification       action through because
       funds were available      for procurement-or      a promised
       date had been reached-rather         than tying in the
       timing of the type classification        to- achievement
       and need.'"
        The Army Audit        eney"s recommendations were also sim-
 ilar to ours,      The      envy recommende that the Assistant
 Chief of Staff for Force Development not approve Standard
 A-type classification        proposals unless sufficient      supporting
 data were furnished       to provide reasonable assurance that al-1
-prescribed    type classification       criteria were met and that
 materiel   not be classified       as Standard A until   after suffi-
 cient tests have demonstrated         that the materiel   meets firm
 approved characteristics.          According to the Army Audit
 Agency, its recommendations were ful.ly implemented by Army
 Regulation   71-6, effective       January 1, 1970, and by Chief of
 Staff Regulation      71-6, dated November 29, 1969,
                                CHAPTER4

                            NEED TO ENSURE

                MEANINGFUL EVALUATIONS AND TIMELY

             AND PROPERDECISIONS DURING DEVELOPMENT

       Regarding management decisionmaking          during   development,
applicable    Army guidelines state:

      I'*** The most important     and relatively    inexpen-
      sive phase of the materiel      life   cycle is re-
      search and development *Jc* Research and develop-
      ment is most efficiently      conducted sequentially
      because problems at one stage are not fully          ap-
      parent until    the test data is available       from the
      previous stage, **Jc it is cheaper to do engineer-
      ing development work than it is to procure and
      field   a system.   Hence, successive decisions       be-
      come more costly as a system nears completion
      and is distributed     for field use."

       To provide for periodic       evaluation     of the progress and
potential    success of Army developmental          materiel,    accom-
plish effective      coordination,    and facilitate       proper and
timely decisions      bearing on the future course of a project,
the Army requires      that in-process     reviews be held at a min-
imum of five critical       points in the development cycle.            I-n-
process reviews are formal meetings intended to result                in
decisionmaking     at each of these checkpoints          by obtaining
opinions,    recommendations,      and acceptance from all commands
concerned.

        Also, Army regulations      specify that an in-process    re-
view agenda will be published and distributed           to each par-
ticipating     agency.    The agenda will     identify each area for
which a decision       is required    and contain data, such as test
results,     necessary to permit each participating       agency to
establish     a valid position     prior to the meeting.    A partic-
ipant from each agency, therefore,          should be prepared to
state the official       position   of his command at the in-process
review meeting.


                                     32
        The Army's Inspector    General reported      that, on the
basis of his inquiry      in 1965 into development of the
XM41O/XM410El Z-l/Z-ton      truck,    the in-process      review meet-
ingswereused      as sounding boards for desired concepts
rather than for review and decisionmaking           points.       He found
 (1) that,   in many instances,     the lack of adequate-prepara-
tion by interested     agencies for in-process        reviews negated
an objective    and timely decision by responsible            individuals,
 (2) that a lack of unanimity       of position    within     interested
and decisionmaking     agencies was prevalent,        and (3) that
some representatives      at the meetings did not have the au-
thority    to make decisions    for the agencies which they rep-
resented.

       Cur review showed that required        in-process   review
meetings were held and attended by representatives              of the
various decisionmaking        agencies for most of the vehicle de-
velopments we reviewed.         We believe,   however, that some
meetings were ineffective        in achieving    their objectives    be-
cause, prior to the meeting, decisionmaking            agencies were
furnished     incomplete   data on which to establish      their posi-
tions,    and, from one meeting to the next, there was a lack
of continuity      of agency personnel.      As a result,    meaningful
evaluation     was hampered, timely and proper decisionmaking
was impaired,      and projects   were delayed.

INCOMPLETE OR UNTIMELY DATA
FURNISHED TO DECISIONMAKERS

M561 1-l/4-ton    truck and M548
6-ton tracked    cargo carrier

        For the in-process     review on the M561 held in April
1966 to decide on type classification           of the M561, we found
participants     were furnished     data on the results     of tests
completed only through November 1965 on which to establish
their agency positions       for the meeting.      Tests, however,
continued until      June 1966. At the April meeting,         results  of
testing     since November 1965 were summarized and other data
were presented which the decisionmaking           agencies had not
had a chance to consider prior to the meeting.              Because of
the data not previously        considered,   the Combat Developments
Command, the user representative,          nonconcurred   in type
classification     of the M561 as Standard A. Later,          in June,


                                    33
the Combat Developments Command concurred in type classify-
ing the vehicle  as Standard A on the condition  that an in-
process review meeting be held after completion    of the pre-
production  test and before the award of a production    con-
tract.

       Again, at the MS61 in-process review held early in
April 1968 to consider whether to award a production                     con-
tract,   the Combat Developments Command would not concur be-
cause of unsatisfactory           pre-production-test        results   fur-
nished to them for the meeting.                Subsequent to the meeting,
however,    results      of additional      tests,   begun after the pre-
production     tests,     were furnished       to the Command officials
that had not been previously             provided to or considered by
them when developing          the Command's position.           We were told
that these data, although available,               were not provided to
decisionmakers        prior to the meeting because it was not
thought necessary.          On the basis of the additional           data,
however, the Combat Developments Command later in April con-
curred in awarding the M561 production                contract.

       With respect to the M548 6-ton tracked cargo carrier,
we found that pertinent         data apparently      were not furnished
to all participants       prior to the in-process         review held in
August 1965 to consider Standard A-type classification                     for
the M548. After the meeting,            the Combat Developments Com-
mand obtained test results          available     but not furnished       prior
to the meeting which showed that the vehicle                failed    to meet
at least one essential        characteristic       of the Qualitative
Materiel     Requirement.     Whether such disclosures           would have
altered    the Command's decision on the M548 is not known.
However, the Combat Developments Command said that,                   to im-
prove future     in-process    review meetings,        such pertinent       data
must be furnished       to participants        for consideration      prior to
the meeting for establishing          official     agency positions.

XM759 l-l/Z-ton       soft   tire
tracked cargo      carrier

       The XM759, not previously    discussed in this report,was
originally     being developed by the Army for the Marine Corps
under an expedited program to satisfy       a stated urgent need
in Southeast Asia.      The approved development project    ini-
tiated     in May 1966 provided for just 17 months to first


                                       34
production    roll-off,     includrng  only 4 months of initial
testing    on which to base a production        decision,      In April
1969, the Marine Corps directed         a revision     of the program
to a more normal development program and termination                of the
accelerated     production     phase because of problems and delays.
Records at the Army Tank-Automotive          Command revealed that
the Command's research and development experts,              prior   to
program initiation,        did not endorse the proposed abbrevi-
ated schedule because of the following           anticipated     problems.

   . --Slope operation--hazardous--concept                   extremely     dan-
        gerous.

      --Braking--unsafe--        possibility        of rolling   vehicle     over.

      --Riding     characteristics--         exceed acceptable      human tol-
         erance    limits.

      --Water     speeds--unachievable.

      --Reliability-- requirements              too stringent,     extensive
         research and development              necessary.

      --Tires--vulnerable--a   long way from reliable                    and dur-
         able bag-type suspension.

      --Maintenance--may         be as high as 50 percent           of operat-
         ing hours@

      --Curb weight of 8,000 pounds--unattainable      without
         compromising performance, durability     and reliability.

      Although the Marine Corps concurred in the 17-month de-
velopment schedule, records at the Army Tank-Automotive
Command revealed that the anticipated     problems were not made
known to the Marine Corps or the Army Materiel       Command for
consideration   at the initial decisionmaking    point.

        We noted that the problems anticipated    by the Army Tank-
Automotive Command's research and development experts con-
tinued to plague the vehicle     development after 3 years of
effort.     For example,the vehicle   is incapable of attaining
the required water speed without      assistance,  and improve-
ment is still    needed in the braking.


                                        35
       We believe that, had the Army provided complete infor-
mation to the Marine Corps on the anticipated           problems at
the initial     decisionmaking    point in early 1966, the com-
pressed development schedule might have been deemed not
feasible     and accordingly   not approved.    We have noted that
this lack of communication also resulted          in the premature
procurement of a quantity       of 405 power-train    assemblies
costing     $2 million  which might become excess,




                                 36
LACK OF CONTINUITY OF AGENCY
PERSONNELAT IN-PROCESS REVIEWS

        The Inspector     General reported in 1965 that agency re-
presentatives       at in-process     review meetings on the XM41OEl
Z-l/Z-ton      truck development were frequently         rotated,    were
not completely       conversant with the history        of the project,
and were not prepared to express a firm position                for their
agency.      He found that 503 different        individuals     represent-
ing 29 agencies participated            in one or more of 11 decision--
making meetings.         Seven of the agencies had decisionmaking
responsibilities.         Two of these seven agencies had nine in-
dividuals      who attended only one meeting, and four agencies
had three individuals         who attended only one meeting.          High-
lighting     this lack of continuity,        one decisionmaking      agency
sent 132 different        individuals     at one time or another to
the 11 meetings during the development.               The Inspector    Gen-
eral concluded that the lack of continuity              of personnel
from one meeting to the next tended to impair decisionmak-
ing and confuse the issues.

       In our review of the development of the M561 1-l/4-ton
truck and the M656 5-ton truck,     we found conditions       similar
to those identified    by the Inspector     General.     For example,
we found that 192 representatives       of various agencies atten-
dedoneor    more of five in-process     review meetings during the
development of the M561 (the roster for one meeting is un-
available).    The record shows, however, that 133 of the 192
individuals   attended only one meeting and only 24 attended
more than two meetings.      No one individual      attended all the
meetings.

      Further,    we found that 78 of the 192 individuals        repre-
sented decisionmaking       agencies.   Of the 78 individuals,58
attended just one meeting and four attended more than two
meetings.      Of the 29 individuals    representing    the develop-
ing agency, 27 attended only one meeting.            Similarly,  13 of
the 20 individuals      representing  the user attended only one
meeting.

CONCLUSIONS

        The in-process   review procedure appears to provide           an
effective    means for   coordinating  and facilitating


                                      37
decisionmaking       bearing on the progress of an item through
various    development phases.          Although most of the required
meetings were held for the vehicle              developments we reviewed,
we question      the effectiveness       of many of these meetings in
achieving     coordination      and control     over development efforts.
Agency representatives          responsible     for decisionmaking        who
attended in-process         review meetings had been furnished             data
prior    to the meetings which often were neither                current   nor
complete,     and therefore       they were not in a positio'n          to make
well-founded       decisions.       Consequently,     decisions    were based
on incomplete       or outdated information         or projects      were de-
layed pending evaluation            of additional     data furnished      during
or subsequent to the meetings.               In addition,     the lack of '
continuity      of personnel from one meeting to the next, in our
opinion,     was also detrimental        to the decisionmaking         process.
Earlier    findings     of the Inspector       General tend to substanti-
ate this opinion.

       In the case of the XM759, we believe an inappropriate
decision    to proceed with an unrealistic development schedule
might have been averted through complete disclosure    of avail-
able information.

RECOMMENDATIONS

         So that in-process     reviews can be more effective       and
facilitate      proper decisionmaking,      we recommend that manage-
ment place greater       emphasis on the timely dissemination         of
complete and current        data to decisionmaking      agencies and, to
the extent possible,        maintain   continuity   of participants
from one meeting to the next throughout            development to pro-
mote stability.

AGENCY COMMENTSAND OUR EVALUATION (see p. 46)

      The Assistant       Secretary  of the Army (Research and De-
velopment)    agreed that,      where there is continuity      of person-
nel, information       flow is good. He stated that the lack of
personnel    continuity     in key materiel   development positions,
cited in our report,        occurred during a period of almost
constant   turbulence      due to major reorganization      in the Army
and because of the increase in level of activity              in South-
east Asia.     He advised us that recently,        attendance at in-
process reviews had improved.

                                      38
        The Assistant     Secretary   said that the lack of continu-
ity of attendance at the in-process-review             meetings had been
effectively     eliminated     or diminished    through the stable
structures     established     by project    management, commodity man-
agement, and system engineering.             He said also that,    although
project     managers or staff      supervisors   might be rotated,     their
deputies and other high-level           project  management staff members
had maintained      continuity     at the meetings.     He said further
that the in-process        review procedure had also been strength-
ened by requiring       that voting members comment on the meeting
minutes within      30 days so that voting-member        concurrence or
comment would be obtained regardless            of the authority    of the
representative      attending    the meeting.

      We believe that implementation   of the above actions
should improve the in-process   review meeting procedure.    We
plan to examine into the implementation     during future audits.

      With respect to the XM759 vehicle,    the Assistant Secre-
tary advised us that corrections    to current remaining prin-
cipal problems were under test and that upon completion of
the tests,   a review was planned to determine the future
course of the program.

      The Assistant   Secretary   tooE exception    to our statement
that the Army Materiel     CommandLand $e Marine Corps agencies
were not apprised of the numerous significant          anticipated
problems.   (See p. 37.)      He stated that they had been in-
formed of the technical     risks and schedule problems through-
out the program.     He stated also that, despite prior develop-
mental experience in a similar       program, problems and delays
had occurred and that in April 1969 the Marine Corps directed
a revision  of the program to a more normal development pro-
gram and termination    of the accelerated     production     phase.

      There is no record to show that the Army Materiel        Com-
mand or the Marine Corps was advised of the problems.          The
record does show, however, that      all the problems experienced
in this program had been identified      by the Army Tank-Automo-
tive Command's research and development experts before devel-
opment began.    Had such information    been furnished   to the in-
volved agencies,   they would have been alerted      not only as to
the unlikelihood   of meeting the compressed development
schedule, but also of the possible program failure.
                                CHAPTER 5

                            SCOPEOF REVIEW

        We reviewed the regulations          and procedures,      issued by
the Department of the Army and the Army Materiel                 Command,
setting    forth the policies        and practices      to be followed     in
managing development projects.             We    also  examined  pertinent
records and interviewed         officials      to determine the extent
of compliance with such regulations               and procedures by those
responsible       for the tactical      vehicles     development program.
Specific     tactical    vehicle developments which we reviewed
are listed      on page 7 of this report.            Our review, which in-
cluded an evaluation         of the effectiveness         of Army management
of major phases of the vehicle development process, was per-
formed at the following         locations:

      Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
           Office of Assistant    Chief of Staff for Force Devel-
              opment
           Office of Chief of Research and Development
      Army Materiel  Command, Washington, D.C.
      Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir,     Vir-
        ginia
      Army Tank-Automotive     Command, Warren, Michigan

       In addition, we reviewed an audit report--issued     in
1966 by the Army Audit Agency, Midwestern District,
St. Louis, Missouri --involving   the M107, MllO, M578 weapon/
vehicle   family and an Army Audit Agency report issued in
February 1970-- subsequent to completion   of our fieldwork--on
a comprehensive review of the Army Materiel     Command's re-
search and development program.

      Further, we reviewed the results   of the Blue Ribbon De-
fense Panel study on the Department of Defense which was re-
ported to the President   and the Secretary   of Defense on
July 1, 1970.




                                      40
APPENDIXES




   41
                                                                                   APPENDIX I
                                                                                       Page 1

                         DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                   OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRmARY
                                    WASHINGTON        D.C.     20310




                                                                               29 APR 1970




Mr.     Charles     M, Bailey
Director,       Defense      Division
United    States     General       Accounting         Office
Washington,        D. C.       20548



Dear    Mr.     Bailey:

The Secretary         of Defense     directed     the Department     of the Army
to reply    to your     letter   of 29 January       1970 forwarding     the January
 1970 draft    report      on “Need     to Improve      Management     of Tactical
Vehicle    Development         Program”         (Code 66504) (OSD Case #3074).

The inclosed   comments             were  prepared               by the Department      of the
Army   and coordinated            with the Office,               Secretary  of Defense.




                                         Assistant     Sbqetary      of the Army
                                           (Research,and        Development)

2 Incls
   1. DA Position,         GAO
        Recommendations
   2. Army       Comments,     GAO
        Findings




                                                 43
APPENDIX I
    Page 2




                       DEPARTMENT         OF THE       ARMY     POSITIONS

                                        ON



General    Accounting      Office  Draft    Report    to the Congress     of the United
States RD-54,       dated January       1970,   subject:     Need to Improve     Manage-
ment of Tactical       Vehicle    Development       Program,     Department     of the
Army    (Code 66504)       (OSD Case #3074).


I.   GAO     Recommendations:

      A.  Recommendation             No. 1.   That the     Army   improve       management
of its tactical vehicle         development     program      to assure    that:

           1. In accordance        with existing     regulations,       materiel      re-
quirements     documents    are prepared,        thoroughly       analyzed,      and
approved    by the Army     at the Department         level before       any initiation
of development      effort specifically    directed      toward     end-item      use;

             2.   Approved    requirements      documents          clearly      set forth    re-
quirements       that are valid and are realistically             attainable--based           upon
prior   exploratory      work- - within    the designated        time frame;        and

              3. Improved      coordination     and communication             exist between
the developing       and using agencies       to preclude  the need          for significant
deviations      from   or later waiver      or relaxation  of design          or performance
characteristics       deemed     essential    by the user.

      Army        Position:

              1. Concur.      A change to Army         Regulations     has been pre-
pared.       This change will require        a review     (System    Development          Plan/
Coordinated        Test Program      In-Process      Review)     to be held prior        to
entering      Engineering    Development.        This In-Process        Review      will
show proof that Advanced           Development       is progressing      satisfactorily
or that the degrees        of risks are known and are acceptable                to the Army
prior    to continuing    development.        This is but the latest       action in a
series     of corrective    measures      which have been instituted           in recent
years.

             2. Materiel     requirements         for hardware,      to include        tactical
vehicles,      originate with USACDC,           the user’s    representative.            The




                                                  44
                                                                                                              APPENDIX I
                                                                                                                  Page 3


requirements                 document           (Qualitative           Materiel           Requirement             or Small
Development                Requirement)               is extensively              reviewed          prior       to sub-
mission         to Department                  of the Army            for     approval          and is subject            to
a disciplined               challenge          even     after     Department               of the Army            approval.
The      Qualitative            Materiel          Requirement              or Small           Development             Re-
quirement             states       the requirement                in terms           which       make       development
possible         and is intended                 to incorporate              only      those      characteristics
which       are determined                  to be within           the state-of-the-art.                      Of necessity,
this    is sometimes                 a judgment            area      and not infallible.                  In some
instances          achievement                of required           characteristics,                 once      development
has started,              is found        to be beyond             the state-of-the-art                    or too costly.
When       this      happens,           it often       necessitates             revision         of the requirement
document           to reflect          that which            is both      realistic          and reasonable.                 The
Army        should         not be prevented                 from      taking        this     approach.

                 3.      The third          part     of this       recommendation                  indicates          that
the Department                  of the Army             should       not significantly               change        an
essential          user       requirement             for    any reason.                Admittedly          this     is
desirable           in most         instances.             However,           the relaxing            of certain
requirements                 may      be more         cost     effective,           in terms         of money           and
time      than      to continue           development              to attain         a capability,           which        if
deleted        would         not significantly              degrade         performance              of the end item.
In this      light      it iwould        appear        prudent        for the Department                   of the Army
to reevaluate               the overall          requirement              (after        a period       of Advanced
Development)                 and to analyze             trade-offs           rather        than    to blindly          continue
development               to achieve          capabilities           written          in a requirements                 docu-
ment        which,          for various           reasons,          may       no longer          be completely
valid.

      B.      Recommendation            No.      2. That     the Army     improve       management
of its tactical      vehicle     development        pr,ogram      to assure     that    classifica-
tion  of vehicles        as Standard        A is approved       only  when     such    vehicles
have   demonstrated          the capabilities        to meet     the essential       characteris-
tics  established        and are considered           by the user     to be suitable          in
every    respect      for mass       production.

         Army       Position:          Concur       m Type           classification              of an item           as
Standard         A has been           granted         in the past           prior       to successful              completion
of all tests          and production              checks        in some           cases.          Adherence             to the
provisions           of the most           recent       Army        Regulation             on type        classification
should       eliminate         recurrence             of this      particular            deficiency.              (AR 71-6,
20 November               1969, subject:               Force       Development                Type       Classification/
Reclassification              of Army           Materiel,          establishes              additional         procedures
to be followed             and requires            more        detailed          information            to accomplish
a request         for type        classification             action.          The      implementation                  of these
regulations           should      provide         the required               emphasis           to preclude             or re-
duce      premature           type      classification             Standard          A).



                                                           45
APPENDIX I
    Page 4




                                   [See GAO note 1,                 p.     54.1




         D. Recommendation                     No.     4.   That    the     Army    improve     manage-
     ment of its tactical            vehicle         development          program     to assure    that:

                 1.      Management        place     greater     emphasis    on the timely
     dissemination           of complete        and current       data to decision-making
     agencies,          and increased        efforts     are made to maintain         continuity
     of personnel          in decision-making            meetings     to promote     stability             and
     continuity;         and



                                  [See GAO note 1,                 P.     54.1


         Army         Position:

               1. Information              flow and continuity          of key personnel             are
     related.      In general,          where     there    is a continuity        of key personnel
     the flow of information                is good.      The basic      period      addressed         by the
     GAO report        was one         of almost      constant    turbulence          tiong     both
     military     and civilian          personnel       of the Army.          The’early       sixties     saw
     major    reorganization             of the Army        staff and establishment              of both




                                                           46
                                                                                                         APPENDIX I
                                                                                                             Page 5




USACDC         and USAMC.             The increase        in the level      of activity     in
Southeast       Asia from        about    1965 on further         contributed       to the lack
of personnel         continuity       in key materiel        development         positions.
Continuity       is desirable         among    key personnel         in the development
chain;     recently,       attendance       at In-Process        Reviews       has improved.




                         [See GAO note 1,                   p.    54.1




        E.      General.            Concur        in general         in the remarks              contained       in
subject       GAO report               regarding        tactical        vehicle      development           programs.
The report          is a case study,                using       selected        programs,          of how not to
execute        a development                program.            The reported            deficiences         and errors
of management                cited       had their       origin      in the mid to late fifties                 and
very     early      sixties,          and were        some of the reasons                   for major        reorgani-
zation     of the Army               in 1962.        Although          no system          can be guaranteed
foolproof,         the reorganization                  in 1962 and subsequent                    actions      up to
the current          time       have significantly               reduced         the possibility         that the
same errors             will be repeated.                  The current             system       and supporting
organizational             structure           have an inherent               array      of checks       and
balances         designed          to prevent         future       error.




                                                       47
APPENDIXI
   Page 6

                       AlUlY COMMENTSON PRINCIPAL FINDINGS


1. The GAO Report contains four principal    findings   which are allegedly
supported by detailed  examples related to each finding.     The comments
set forth below address these four (4) findings     and the cited examples.

2. GAO Finding - There is a need to preclude initiation                           of development
projects until requirements are determined to be valid                          and feasible.

     Example %l -- XM410El 2-l/2           Ton Cargo Truck

      The Army's objective  was to develop a high mobility       2-l/2 ton truck
with a curb weight of approximately      7,500 pounds and with improved
reliability,    durability, and maintainability   characteristics.

     After building    and testing    pilot vehicles with both gasoline and
diesel engines, the Army concluded that,           although this type vehicle
remains a design objective,        the durability,     reliability,     maintainability
and projected    production   cost were    unsatisfactory        and not correctable
by redesign of the XM 410El vehicle.            The development project was
terminated    in April 1966.

     Example #2 --     M548 Tracked       Cargo Carrier

       The Army's objective       was   to develop an ammunition carrying vehicle
with mobility     characteristics        approximating     those of its self-propelled
artillery    pieces Ml09 (155mm         howitzer),    Ml07 (175mm gun), and Ml10 (8"
howitzer).      The M548 was type        classified    Standard A in October 1965.

Mobility characteristics        of this     vehicle    with        its    supported      artillery           are
compared below:

                                                                   M109          -Ml07               -Ml10
           Range (miles)                       300                 220           450                 450
           [See GAO note 2, p. 54.1
           Speed (max mph)                      39                   35           34                  34

           Fording    Depth (in)              swims                swims          42                  42
                                                           (with     kit)

           HP/Ton                             15.3                 15.7         13.8             14.5




                                                      48
                                                                               APPENDIXI
                                                                                  Page 7

                                                M548          Ml09   Ml07          Ml10

          Ground Pressure         (PSI)          8.6          11.1    11.1         10.9

          Ground Clearance         (in)         16            17.6     18           18

          Angle of Approach (")                 57            65       30           65

          Angle of Departure          (")       37             78      43           43

          Vertical    Step (in)                 36             21      40           40

          Wheel Travel     (in)                  6             9.8         7         7

          Turning    Radius (ft)                14            18.5     26           15
                                                                                     CA
          Vehicle    Width (in)                105.7          124    124          124

          Longitudinal    Slope (X)             60             60      60           60

          Side Slope (W)                        30             30      30           30
The M548 has been a mainstay              and workhorse in Southeast Asia and is satisfying
a user requirement.

    Example #3 -- M561 l-1/4              Ton Cargo Vehicle

      The Army's objective was to develop a high mobility    vehicle for use
by combat elements forward of the brigade rear boundary.       The primary use
of the vehicle was to be as an equipment and personnel carrier.        First
priority   in design was in cross-country   mobility.   The M561 met its cross-
country mobility,    specific weight, cargo area and ease of loading require-
ments. Although it weighs approximately       1600 pounds more than the M37
it provides a significant     improvement in payload to curb weight ratio.
The M561 was type classified     Standard A in June 1966.

     In the Army's view, the foregoing examples demonstrate the utility           of
pilot fabrication    and testing prior to initiation     of mass production to
(1) confirm or deny the feasibility        of a design concept, or (2) provide
a mechanism for developing and testing trade-offs        between the user
performance objectives     and the realities    of cost, reliability,  durability
and maintainability.

3. GAO Finding -- There is a need to assure development objectives                       are
met before vehicles are type classified Standard A.




                                                49
APPENDIXI
     Page 8

     Example fl    -- fi48,   6 Ton Tracked    Cargo Carrier

       The Army expedited       the dcvclopnent    of this vehicle and awarded the
 first   production     contract    in *April 1365 because its automotive      components
 were identical       to those of the XI13 Personnel Carrier which had been in
 production      since 1960. The difference       between the two vehicles was in
 the configuration       of the bodies of the vehicles:         the Ml13 intended as
 a personnel carrier        with a closed roof, the M548 intended as a cargo
 carrier    with    an open roof and somewhat thinner walls.         The accelerated
 program was considered          to be a low risk, particularly     since the developer
  (Food Machinery Corporation)         was selected to be the first      producer.

        The contractor   ran into production     difficulties      at his new plant,
 located in Charleston,       West Virginia,    primarily     with the welding of the
 M548 cargo bodies.       After solution     of these production      difficulties,  the
 M548 vehicles      were deployed to Vietnam and proved to be the only common
 ammunition carrying       vehicle able to move cross-country         in support of the
 artillery    weapons.

      Example #2 --    MS61 l-1/4   Ton Cargo Truck

      The M!561, 1 l/4 ton truck offers the front line infantryman            a degree
 of mobility   heretofore    not available     to unmechanized forces.      As described
 in the technical     data package this vehicle comes as close to meeting the
 user's requirements      as the state-of-the-art       will allow.   The original
 technical   data package released in Aug 66 was for record purposes only,
 not procurement.      Release for procurement was made 22 Sep 67 as part of Step
 1 of a two step invitation      for bid.      Step 1 included notification      to all
 bidders of intended changes including            sealed brakes, which were not included
 in Step 2 in Jan 68.

      The Army does not agree that the technical           data package for the Gama
 Goat was either    incomplete     or inadequate    for competitive    procurement.      Seven
 reputable  firms competed for this procurement and none submitted               a protest
 for any reason.      The Army believes that the intensity          of the competition
 end the requirement      for bidders to thoroughly       evaluate   the technical    data in
 accordance with the pre-production         evaluation    clause were responsible      for
 requests for extension       of the bid preparation      period.    Of the seven firms
 that picked up a bid package only one dropped out of the competition,                 all
 others submitted     respectable    bids.   The Army considers the number of ECO's
 processed during the life of contract,          a better    measurement of the validity
 of the technical     data than the time required for bid preparation.              In the case
 of the Gama Goat contract,        cost type ECO's have been remarkably few attesting
 to the worth of the package and the enforcement             of the pre-production
 evaluation   clause.

      The Army also feels that the time between type classification         and issuance
 of the solicitation       was well spent by the developer and the Army in generating
 a number of product improvements which materially        improved the reliability
 and durability      of the vehicle.




                                                  50
                                                                     APPEKDIXI
                                                                        Page 9

     While there may be instances when the Army prematurely       approved
type classifications    actions and used incompleted    TDP's on the basis
of false promises, which eventually      led to the production  of defective
vehicles,    the Gama Goat does not fairly   represent such an instance.

    Example #3 -- M656 5-Ton Cargo Truck

     The Army's objective  was to develop a high mobility,  5-ton truck
for use by the forward area combat elements.     Design emphasis was on
cross-country  mobility,  including a swimming capability.

     The Vehicle, as developed,    essentially  met its mobility design
objectives  and was type classified    Standard A in April 1966.

     Subsequently,    the Army decided to replace the multi-fuel       engine in
its 5-ton truck fleet with a standard commercial diesel engine.             The
Army, on the basis of this engine decision coupled with an overall
re-examination     of vehicle mix requirements    for the post-Vietnam    war
period, has for the time being limited       procurement of the M656 to a
quantity   of 500, primarily   for the specialized    PERSHING requirement,

      Several commercial diesel engines have been applied to the M656 for
testing.     After testing  and after vehicle mix and trade-off   analyses are
complete,    decisions will be forthcoming   as to future procurement of this
vehicle.

    The Army is of the opinion that the decisions to initiate          production,
in the foregoing three cases, were sound and based on careful          analysis
of alternatives.




                         [See GAO note 1, p. 54.1




                                     51
                                                                                .

APPENDIXI
  Page 10




                         [See   GAO note   1, p.   54.1




5. GAO Finding -- There, is a need for adherence to the decision-making
process to assure meaningful evaluations and timely and proper decisions
during development.

    Example #l -- M561 l-l/4    Ton Truck and M548 6-Ton Tracked   Cargo
                   Carrier

     The GAO report states that complete data were not furnished     to
decision-makers   at In-Process Reviews during 1965 and 1966 in connection
with the M561 l-l/4    ton truck and the M548 tracked cargo carrier.

    The GAO report is not clear as to what the impact, if any, of these
incomplete  data was on the two vehicle programs.      Lacking such a
conclusion  the Army can do little   more than agree that total information
was not available  to the decision-makers    at the cited In-Process Reviews.




                                           52
                                                                                                                               APPENDIX I
                                                                                                                                  Page 11

       Example         #2 --   This    example        relates       to the development        of the XM759
 l-l/Z     ton soft tire track        cargo     carrier.          This development        was undertaken
by the Army           for the Marine        Corps     in May 1*>66 to meet            an urgent     Southeast
Asia     requirement.         The GAO report              alleges      that if the Army      had fully
informed        the Marines       of the infeasibility            of meeting     the design     require-
ments,       the compressed          development           schedule       would   not have been approved.

        The XM759         was an ambitious             program       intended      to meet an existing
 combat      requirement.            The reduction          in intensity      of combat      in Vietnam
 coupled      with troop      withdrawals,          pa,rticularly        of Marine     forces,     has
provided        a climate      which     will   permit       a somewhat        longer    and therefore
lower     risk     development         program       for the x759.              The requirement          still
exists     and the Marine           Corps     is in agreement            with the extended        development
program.

        Example      #3 --   The GAO reports                            on the turnover        among    these
individuals       who attend   decision-making                           In-Process      Review      meetings.                       The
Army,       based    on its own evaluations,                          reached      this conclusion      some                  time
ago.

        The lack of continuity                     of attendance             at In-Process               Review        meetings
has, from           the developer’s                viewpoint,            been effectively              eliminated            or
diminished            through        the stable           structures           established           by project            manage-
ment,        commodity             management               and system             engineering.              While        project
managers            or staff supervisors                    may be rotated               their     deputies          and other          high
level     project         management               staff members                have maintained                continuity           at In-
Process         Review          meetings.             Consideration               is currently           being       given      to further
improvement               through         greater         stabilization            of project         managers             assignments.
In addition,            the Army’s            procedures             and regulations               have since been
revised        for formalized                stratified          review       to ensure          uniform          and adequate
management               throughout           development               programs.              The effectiveness                  of In-
Process         Reviews,            as addressed               on pages          51-53     of the report,               are
particularly             pertinent.           The concept              of the In-Process                 Review         is excellent
and a better             system        probably           does not exist.               However,           the human             element
often reduces              the effectiveness                 of this management                   tool.        Although         the
report       goes into great               detail       to show the large                number          of personnel
attending         In-Process             Reviews           and the lack of continuity                      among         those       in
attendance,             the report          ignores         the key fact of who these                       representatives
were.         In-Process            Reviews           are constituted               with only four voting                    members;
the principal             representatives                 are CONARC,                USACDC,             USAMC           and LDSRA.
Any others            in attendance             are either            observers          or backup           for the voting             mem-
bers.        The In-Process                  Review         process         has been strengthened.                         Information
copies       of In-Process               Review          minutes          must be forwarded                   to all voting            mem-
bers     and interested               Department              of the Army             Staff elements.                 The letter          of
txansmittal            requires         that command/agency                         comments            or concurrence




                                                                          53
APPENDIX I
   Page 12


with the minutes be forwarded to Office Chief of Research and Develop-
ment within 30 days. This technique will obtain voting member con-
currence or comment regardless of authority    of representative     attending
the In-Process Review. The objective     of the In-Process Review is not
to obtain concurrence but to give visibility    to differing    opinions.

      It is the Army's view that this GAO finding addressed to the materiel
development decision-making       process is not without merit.       The Army has
long been aware of shortcomings in this area and had addressed considerable
effort,    in the past, to analysis and correction     of difficulties.      The new
structure     of the Army, established in 1962, brought the elimination         of
the Technical Services and the advent of three (3) new organizational
elements, the Army Materiel Command, the Combat Developments Command, and
the Assistant      Chief of Staff for Force Development.     Necessarily,     there
have been growing pains with the new organizations        and new organizational
relationships      and process.   The Army took a look at itself      with the Brown
Board, in the 1968-9 time frame, and has evolved the Life Cycle Management
Model which should go far toward achieving the improvements recommended
in this GAO report.


GAO notes:
  1. Deleted comments relate to matters presented in the
     draft report which have been omitted in the final
     report.

   2. Although the Army comments indicate   that the M548
      has an all-terrain   cruising range of 300 miles, test
      reports  indicate  a cruising range of only 240 miles
      on roads, but without the required towed load.




                                       54
                                                     APPENDIX II
                                                          Page 1

                PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE

               DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSEAND THE

                  DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

             RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF

            ACTIVITIES    DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT


                                         Tenure of office
                                         From             To
                                                          -
                   DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE

SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
   Melvin R. Laird                    Jan.    1969   Present
   Clark M. Clifford                  Mar.    1968   Jan.    1969
   Robert S. McNamara                 Jan.    1961   Feb.    1968
   Thomas S. Gates, Jr.               Dec.    1959   Jan.    1961

UNDER SECRETARYOF DEFENSE:
   David Packard                      Jan.    1969   Present
   Paul H. Nitze                      July    1967   Jan.    1969
   Cyrus R. Vance                     Jan.    1964   June 1967
   Roswell L. Gilpatric               Jan.    1961   Jan.    1964
    James H. Douglas                  Dec.    1959   Jan.    1961

DIRECTOR OF DEFENSERESEARCHAND
  ENGINEERING:
    Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.           Oct.    1965   Present
    Dr. Harold Brown                  &Y      1961   Sept. 1965
    Herbert F. York                   Dec.    1958   Apr.    1961

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF DEFENSE
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):
     Barry J. Shillito                Jan.    1969   Present
     Thomas D. Morris                 Sept.   1967   Dec. 1968
     Paul R. Ignatius                 Dec.    1964   Aug. 1967
     Thomas D. Morris                 Jan.    1961   Dec. 1964
     Perkins McGuire                  Jan.    1957   Jan.    1961



                               55
APPENDIX II
     Page 2

                  PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE

                 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSEAND THE

                    DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

               RESPONSIBLEFOR ADMINISTRATION OF

              ACTIVITIES   DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

                                            Tenure of office
                                            From             To
                                                             -
                    DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

SECRETARYOF THE ARMY:
   Stanley R. Resor                     July    1965   Present
   Stephen Ailes                        Jan.    1964   July    1965
   Cyrus R. Vance                       July    1962   Jan.    1964
   Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.                  Jan.    1961   June 1962
   Wilber M. Brucker                    July    1955   Jan.    1961

UNDER SECRETARYOF THE ARMY:
   Thaddeus R. Beal                     Mar.    1969   Present
   David E. McGeffert                   July    1965   Mar.    1969
    Stanley R. Resor                    Mar.    1965   July    1965
   Vacant                               Dec.    1964   Mar.    1965
   Paul R. Ignatius                     Mar.    1964   Dec. 1964
   Vacant                               Jan.    1964   Feb.    1964
   Stephen Ailes                        Feb.    1961   Jan.    1964
   Hugh M. Milton II                    Aug.    1958   Jan.    1961

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE ARMY
  (RESEARCHm rmmmmm):
    Robert L. Johnson                   Nov.    1969   Present
    Va.cant                             Jan.    1969   Nov. 1969
    Russel D. O'Neal                    Oct.    1966   Jan.    1969
    Willis  M. Hawkins                  Ott *   1963   Oct.    1966
    Vacant                              Aug.    1963   Sept. 1963
    Finn J. Iarson                      Aug.    1961   July    1963
    Richard S. Morse                    June    1959   July    1961




                                 56
                                                          APPENDIX II
                                                              Page 3

                  PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF T-HE

                  DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSEAND THE

                    DEPAR-T          QF THE ARMY

             RES?ONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF

            ACTIVITIES       DISCTJSSEDIN THIS REPORT (continued)

                                              Tenure of office
                                              From             To
                    DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY (continued)

ASSISTANT SECRETARYOF THE ARMY
  (INsTALL~~TIONS Am 3.mIsTIcs~:
     J. Ronald Fox                         June  1969     Present
     Vincent P. Huggard (acting)           Mar.  1969     June 1969
     Dr. Robert A. Brooks                  Ckt.  1965     Feb.    1969
     Daniel M. Luevano                     July  1964     Ott * 1965     ,
     A. Tyler Port (acting)                Mar. 1964      June 1964
     Paul R. Ignatius                      MEbEp 1961     Feb.    1964
     Vacant                                Jan.  1961     &Y      1961
     Courtney Johnson                      Apr.  1959     Jan.    1961

CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY:
    Gen. William C. Westmoreland           July    1968   Present
    Gen. Harold K. Johnson                 July    1964   July    1968
    Gen. Earle G. Wheeler                  Ott *   1962   June 1964
    Gen. George H. Decker                  Sept.   1960   Sept. 1962

QFFICE OF CHIEF   OF RESEARCHAND
  DEVELOPMENT:
    Lt. Gen. A.   W. Betts                 Apr.    1966   Present
    Lt. Gen. W.   W. Dick,     Jr.         Sept.   1963   Mar.    1966
    Lt. Gen. D.   Beach                    July    1962   Aug. 1963

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE
  DEVELOPMENT:
    Lt. Gen. Robert R. Williams    Nov.            1970   Present
    Vacant                         Aug.            1970   Nov. 1970
    Lt. Gen. Frederic'k C. Weyand  Jan.            1970   Aug. 1970
APPENDIX II
    Page 4

                     PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE

                    DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSEAND THE

                       DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY

                  RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTRATION OF

                 ACTIVITIES    DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)


                                                  Tenure of office
                                                  From             To
                                                                   -
                       DEPARTMENTOF THE ARMY (continued)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE
  DEVELOPMENT(continued):

    Lt.   Gen.    Arbor S.    Collins,   Jr.   Jan.    1967     Dee,           1969
    Lt.   Gen.    Harry W.    0. Kinnard       Nov.    1966     Jan,           1967
    Lt.   Gen.    Polk                         Mar.    1966     Nov,           1966
    Lt.   Gen.    Davidson    (acting)         Feb.    1966     Mar.           1966
    Lt.   Gen.    Conway                       4.      1965     Feb,           1966
    Lt.   Gen.    Davidson    (acting)         MaY     1965     June           1965
    Lt.   Gen.    Harrell                      Feb.    1963     MaY            1965

COMMANDINGGENERAL, UNITED STATES
  ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND:
    Gen. Henry A. Miley,  Jr.                  Nov.    1970     Present
    Gen. Ferdinard J. Chesarek                 Mar.    1969     Nov. 1970
    Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr,                  July    1962     Mar. 1969

COMMA.NDINGGENERAL, COMBAT
  DEVELOPMENTSCOMMAND:
    Lt. Gen. John Norton                       Oct.    1970     Present
    Lt. Gen. George Forsythe                   Sept.   1970     Ott * 1970
    Lt. Gen. Harry W. 0. Kinnard               Jidy    1967     bz*     1970
    Lt. Gen. Ben Harrell                       %Y      1965     June 1967
    Lt. Gen. Dwight E. Beach                   Aug.    1963     &Y      1965




                                                              U.S.   GAO   Wash.,   D.C.

                                         58