oversight

Federal Drug Law Enforcement Programs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-11-16.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                            DCCUMENT RESUME

04063 -   B3254486

Federal Drug Law Enforcement Programs. November     6,   1977.   1   pp.
+ 7 enclosures (18 pp.).
Testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse
and Control; by William J. Anderson, Deputy Director, General
Government Div.

Issue Area: Law    Enforcement and Crime Preventicn: Controlled
    Items (502);    Law Enforcement and Crime Provention: Approach
    to Drug Law    Enforcement (511);Law nforcenat and Crime
    Prevention:    Illegal Entry of People and Things (50(6).
Contact: General Government Div.
Budget Function: Law Enforcement and Justice:     ederal Law
    Enforcement and Prosecution (751).
Orqanization Concerned: Drug Enforcement Administration; United
    States Customs Service; Iemigration and Na:uralization
    sezvice; Office of Management and Budget: ffice of Drug
    Abuse Policy.
Congressional Relevance: House Select Committeet on Narcotics
    Abuse dand Control.

          The transit of illicit drugs and undocumented aliens
across the southwestern border bas been the target of law
enforcement efforts. There is general agreement that Mexico is
the major source of heroin roaching this ccuntry. The Federal
expenditures employed by the three     ajor enforcement agencies
during the period 1971 through 1976 have approximately doubled,
and the number of enforcement and support personnel have
increased 31%. Border forces interdict only a small       uantity of
the estimated heroin and cocaine eiteing the the United States
from Mexico; most seizures are of Aarihuana. Border interdiction
efforts have suffered from a lack of actionable intelligence and
from deficiencies in operations. A shortage of inspectors
existed at four ports-of-entry visited along the bcrder, and the
only detection devices available were data rcs the Treasury's
automated system, which is of limited value because it is
primarily keyed to vehicle license nnaters. Detector dogs are
not used to search people, and hard arcot- s which come through
the ports are believed to be packaged and isertid into the
human body. There is a need for an integrated ederal strategy
and comprehensive border control plan. GAO has reccamended a
single agency as the long-range solution. he priority and
commitment of the Mexican Government is necessary tc disrupting
the production and shipment of illicit drugs. (Si)
                                United States General Accounting Office
                                        Washington, D.C.     20548


                                                                     FOR RELEASE 3D DELIVERY
                                                                     Expected at 10 a.m., EST
                                                                     November 16, 1977

      .
      i-;t·                                   STATEMENT OF
:C)
                                  WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
                                       GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION
                                                BEFORE THE
                                        HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
                                       NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
                                                    ON
                                  FEDERAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS

          Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
                   As requested, our testimony today deals with the work we performed
          during the past year relative to drug abuse with particular emphasis on
          cur recent study of law enforcement programs along the United States-Mexico
              border.
                   During the past few years we have issued a number of reports dealing
              with the area of drug abuse.   A listing of these reports, and digests from

              some of the '-re pertinent reports, are attached to cur statement.        As a

              result of        .- r this area, during the past year we: iss;Aed three reports 1/
              dealing with u            ,tion efforts in Mexico, methadone deaths in New York


              l/"Opium Eradica-.c     arts in Mexico:    Cautious Optimism Advised,"
                GGD-77-6, February LE, 1977.
                "Methadone Deaths in New York City," GGD-77-25, February 18, 1977.
                "Drugs, Firearms, Currency, and Other Property Seized by Law Enforcement
                Agencies: Too Much Held Too Long," GGD-76-105, May 31, 1977.
City and te handling of drugs and other property seized by law enforcement.
agencies.   Two of these reports    ere the result of work we performed at the
request of a Member of this Committee.
     In addition, we currently have in process reports dealing with (1)efforts
to suppress retail level diversion of controlled substances, (2)the use of
science and technology to improvL drug enforcement, and (3)law enforcement
efforts along the United States-Mexico border.       As requested, Mr. Chairman,
the majority of our testimony will focus on this latter review.

     With that brief overview of our efforts in the drug area, the remainder
of my remarks will focus on our review of law enforcement efforts alren       the
Southwest border.
SIGNIFICA!NE OF THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
     As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the       ast few years law enforcement efforts
along the Southwest border have taken on increased significance° minly,
because of the transit of illicit drugs and undocumented aliens across this
border.   United States authorities estimated that, in 1971, heroin flowing
from and through     ex;co represented 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the
United States.     For 1975, it was estimated that 89 percent of the heroin
reaching the United States came from prppies grown in Mexico.      Although this
estimate is subject to question, there is general agreement that Mexico is
the major source of heroin reaching this country.



                                      - 2-
      Although meaningful figures on undocumented aliens are hard to come
 by, INS dta on apprehensions of such aliens shows that from 1971 to 175
 the number of apprehensions have increased by about 85 percent.   Most un-
 documented aliens apprehended are Mexisan--about 90 percent.
      The significance of the above figures is enhanced when one considers
that the Federal policy to prevent illegal immigration emphasizes interdiction
at the border rather than apprehension of illegal aliens after settlement.
t-oudrugs the policy calls for giving priority in both supply and demand
reduction efforts to those drugs which inherently pose a greater risk to
the individual and to society--heroin is the top priority drug.
FEDERAL PRESENCE AND RESOURCES
AT THE BORDER
     Control of the border is basically a task of controlling tIhe movement
of people, veaicles, aircraft, boats, and goods.   There are over 400 Federal
laws and regulations governing entry and departure of people and goods across
the border. While ther- are other agencies which play a role in controlling
th! Southwest border--Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); Department of Defense; Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA); Coast Guard; Department of Agriculture; Public Health Service--
the principal agencies involved in law enforcemelnt are the Customs Service,
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DLA).
     From a law enforcement standpoint, the rimary responsibilities of these
three agencies at the border are
     --preventing the   llegei entry of persons into tne United States,




                                   -3-
     --preventing contraband from entering the country, and
     --investigating narcotics and dangerous drug violations.
     In carrying out these responsibilities, both INS and Customs use patrol
officers, port-of-entry inspectors, and investigators.   DEA is the single
Federal agency charged with responsibility for investigation pertaining to
narcotics and dangerous drug violators.
     Difficult control problems exist at the Southwest border.   Some examples
of these problems are:
     --The increasing volume of legitimate traffi: serves to inhabit
       enforcement efforts necessary to detect contraband and illegal
       entrants.   From fiscal year 1971 through 1976, about 004 million
       people, 247 million vehicles, and 441,000 aircraft were inspected
       in the Southwest border area.
      -Only 2 percent of 'he entire Southwest border--O miles out of
       a total of 2,000 miles--offers sufficient topographical barriers
       to make illegal entry unlikely.
     --The Southwest contains thousands of square miles of land containing
       abandoned or little-used airstrips, dry lake beds, and isolated
       roads where light aircraft can land.   Radar coverage exists on
       portions of the border but is sufficiently limited in detecting
       low-flying aircraft that undetected entry by aircraft into the
       United States is relatively easy.
     --In San Diego, where 300 to 400 pleasure vessels depart or arrive
       on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, there are over 120 miles of




                                   -4 -
       waterfront, and it is only 10 miles from the entrance of
       San Diego Bay to Mexican waters.
      To meet this imposing enforcement problem, the Federal resources
employed by the three major enforcement agencies increased significantly
during the period 1971 through 1976.    Estimates prepared by these agencies
show that Federal   xpenditures have approximately doubled, going from about
$70 million in 1971 to just over $140 million in 1976 (see attachments 6 and_
7).   Enforcement and support personnel increased from 4,352 in 1971 to 5,707
in 1976--an increase of 31 percent.
WIAT IS BEiNG ACHIEVED
      While ipossible to measure thie deterrent effect of border law enforce-
ment, the available supply of drugs and the estimated number of illegal aliens
attest to the fact that it has not been a serious impediment to illegal entry.
The substantial Federal investment for enforcemeit at the Southwest border
i, achieving only a limited measurable impact on the drug and alien problem.
      --Border forces interdict only a small quantity of the estimated
        heroin and cocaine entering the United States from Mexico.
       Most seizures ae of marihuana.       In fiscal year 1976, Customs
        and INS seized about 2 percent of the heroin, less than 1 per-
        cent of the cocaine and-l0 percent of the marihuana estimated
        to come from and through Mexico.    Wien DEA's border area seizures
        are added, these totals equal 6 percent of the heroin, 3 percent
        of the cocaine, and 13 percent of the marihu na.     It is fairly
        obvious that the quantity of drugs being interdicted will not




                                      -5-
        have a significant effect on the drug problem. This is
       especially true when one considers that these figures
        oresume the drug seizures to be 100 percent pure while the
       purity of border seizures are significantly less--usually
       below 50 percent purity.
     Border aprehensions seldom involve high-level traffickers.      The over-
whelming majority of persons crossing the border in possession of drugs who
are apprehended by Customs and INS are drug users, small-time operators,
couriers, or low-level members of drug trafficking organizations.     DEA's
data'shows that less than 2 percent of the interdictions, referred from INS
and Customs, involve major violators, and about three-fourths oi these were
marihuana violators.
     The results with respect to apprehension of aliens are more impressive
but the problem remains serious.    More illegal aliens are successful in
getting into the United States than are prevented from entering.     Many aliens
apprehended are repeaters; some have been apprehended as many as 10 times.
When one considers the many points along the Southwest border that can be
used by aliens to enter the United States, it becomes apparent tat attempts
to prevent illegal migration at the border, by itself, will not solve the
illegal alien problem.
PROBLEMS AFFECTING BORDER
LAW ENFORCEMENT
     Although border control alone will not solve the drug or illegal alien
problems, it is a necessary element if the Nation is ever to control these
problems.   In ur opinion, much more could be done if Federal border law




                                   -6-
enforcement activities were better planned, coordinated, integrated, and
executed.   The efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts at
the brder would be enhanced if intelligence support was improved and the
costly overlapping and poor coordination of enforcement activities and
support systems were corrected.
INTELLIGENCE
     Under Reorganization Plan No. 2, DEA was tasked with providing nation-
wide drug intelligence.   DEA is currently working on this task and some
improvements have been made, but poblems still exist.    Some examples which
illustrate this problem are the lack of ftual data to reliably establish
the amount of illicit narcotics smuggled across the Southwest border and
the lack of actionable intelligence necessary for successful operations
along the border.
     One step taken by DEA to correct this situation was the establishing
of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).   The purpose of EPIC was to
provide an overall intelligence picture of drug trafficking and/or smuggling
by land, sea, or air between Mexico and the United States.   This would enable
DEA to provide tactical irtelligence to agencies with border enforcement
responsibilities.   In the early stages of EPIC's development, progress was
slow due to lack of support and agency resistance.   Recent progress supports
the concept of a single border intelligence center but problems persist.
     One such problem is that little intelligence was being developed within
Mexico to improve interdiction efforts at ports-of-entry and other locations
along the Southwest border. Another problem, which is of long-standing
duration, is the extent of cooperation among the major law enforcement agencies.




                                   - 7-
OPERATIONS
     Not only did border interdiction eft¢irts suffer from a lack of actionable
intelligence, but also from deficiencies in operations.   These are some of
the problems we identified.
     --We found that a shorage of inspectors existed at the four
       ports-of-entry we visited along the Southwest bordr, even
       though most seizures of hard narcotics were made at the
       ports-of-entry.    Inspection manpower has a significant
       impact on the thoroughness of inspections performed at
       these locations.
     --The only detection devices available to assist inspectors
       at the ports-of-entry are TECS data--Treasury's automated
       system, which is used by Customs for disseminating intelli-
       gence information to inspection and enforcement personnel--and
       trained detection dogs.   The value of TECS data for ports-of-
       entry interdictions is limited because it is primarily keyed
       to vehicle license numbers.

       Detector dogs are an effective time-saving drug interdictioni aid.
       However, border officials believe that much of the hard narcotics
       which comes through the ports is packaged and inserted into the
       human body. Detector dogs are not used to search people, and
       inspectors are reluctant to perform intensive personal searches.




                                     - 8 -
--The INS Border Patrol and the Customs Patrol have overlapping
  roles for control of illegal movements across the land borders
  between the ports. Poor coordination and cooperation between
  the Customs and INS border patrols, as well as costly overlapping
  facilities, have contributed to conflicts and tension and produced
  only marginal results.

  Although a Memorandum of Understanding exists between INS and
  Customs mandating "f ll cooperation between the two Sorvices,"
  this cooperation des not, in reality, exist. To illustrate,
  while waiting and watching with a Customs "atro'l oficer at a
  border canyon where a sensor hit occurred, the supervisory
  patrol officer told us that a lack of personnel might cause
  them to miss the intruder.   Right after he made this statement,
  an INS Border Patrol car cruised slowly by our position, but no
  attempt was made to contact it and ask for assistance.   Patrol
  officers could not recall a single example of assistance to one
 agency by the other on an as-needed basis.
--Air and sea operations along the Southwest border have produced
 only marginal results.    Most seizures involved marihuana.
--Since 1975, there have been three intensified interdiction
 operations along the United States-Mexico border.    These were
 to be cooperative and         nated efforts among the various
 Federal agencies.   As    6, urned out, there was minimal or no
 coordination among the enforcement agencies.    In evaluating




                               -9-
       one such program--Operation Diamondback--the participants reported
       a lack of planning, coordination, cooperation, and intelligence.
       Fundamental planning and coordination never got out of the idea
       stage.     The decisionmaking process was very poor due to confusion
       as to who had the authority and responsibility for directing
       actions.     In essence, the land, sea, and air units were going
       their separate ways.
Border Needs an Integrated Strategy
and Overall Control Plan
     Control of the United States-Mexico border is a complex and most difficult
task that requires a comprehensive, coordinated effort by all seqments of the
border law enforcement community.
     The executive branch of the Federal Governnent has not developed an
integrated strategy or a comprehensive border control plan to consider all
aspects of the problem and establish clear, measurable objectives indicating
what it intends to accomplish with the various law enforcement resources.      A
plan of this type is critical because of the many agencies with overlapping
responsibilities.
     Over the past few years the CongreF& . the executive branch, and GAO
have issued reports identifying problems among Federal border enforcement
agencies and containing suggestions for improving their cooperation and
coordination.   While some recommendations have been implemented and outward
appearances have changed as a result of these efforts, the essentia. char-
acteristics of the problem remain.    Separate agencies with different orienta-
tions continue to identify the best means to meet their specific missions,




                                      - 10 -
with limited consideration for the activity of the others.          This has led
to the development of separate but similar lines of effort that continue
to dilute border coverage and impact. Little consideration is given to
overall border security.
     We believe that sound management principles and the inherent difficul-
ties of multiagency cooperation calls for an integrated Federal strategy
and comprehensive border control plan.          In our opinion, a single agency
makes the most sense, in theory, as the long range solution.          Single-agency
management was recommended in our report "A Single Agency Needed to Manage
Port-of-Entry Inspections--Particularly at U.S. Airports" dated May 30, 1973.
    We believe:
    --The executive branch should provide the Congress, along with
      its appropriations requests,      n overview of law enforcement
      along the United States-Mexico border.          Included in this o,'er-
      view should be an analysis which brings together the budget
      requests and law enforcement strategies of the various border
      law enforcement agelicies.
    --The Office of Management and Budget, Office of Drug Abuse
      Policy, and the   rincipal bL der agen'cies should develop an
      integrated strategy and comprehensive operational plan for
      border contrlI.   This plan should consider the various alterna-
      tives to imanaging border operations ranging from the present
      management structure to single-agency management.




                                   -   11   -
SANCTIONS AGAINST DRUG SMUGGLERS
NEED TO BE ENFORCED AND STRENGTHENED
     Improved interdiction capability can do little by itself to deter
smuggling unless the penalties:imposed outweight the benefits derived.
Opportunities exist to diminish the incentive to smuggle drugs by enforcing
and strengthening criminal and administrative sanctions.   Some improvements
that could be made are:
     --Expansion of the jurisdiction of the Federal magistrates
       which would enable them to handle minor narcotics cases,
       Because the District court system is overourdened, most
       of these cases are not now prosecut d.
     --Improved administration of administrative sanctions and the
       providing of criminal sanctions against pilots smuggling
       illicit drugs by aircraft.
     It should be recognized, however, that criminal prosecution and enforce-
ment of existing administrative sanctions are limited as an effective deterrent
because of the large profits involved, the nature of the violators being
apprehended, and the ease with wnich penalties can be avoided by experienced
smugglers.   Improved effectiveness in stepping smugglers at the border is
dependent, in large measure, upon the priority and commitment of the Mexican
government to disrupting the production and shipment of illicit drugs.


     This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.   We believe this
Committee's oversight hearings provide the necessary forum for discussing
the border control problems.   Hopefully, the information contained in our
final report will assist the Committee in its oversight function.    We would be

pleased to respond to any questions.

                                       - 12 -
                                                                 ATTACHIV!ENT 1
                                                                 Page 1



                           GAO REPORTS ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT

           Title                                        Number             Date

 1.   Efforts to Prevent Dangerous                    B-175425           4/17/72
      Drugs From Illicitly Reaching
      the Public

 2.   Federal Efforts to Combat Drug Abuse            B-164031(2)        8/14/72

 3.   The Heroin Hotline                              B-176833           9/26/72

 _.   United States Efforts to Increase               B-1'6625           10/4/72
      International Cooperation in
      Controlling Narcotics Trafficking
      (ID - Serret)

 5.   Efforts to Prevent Heroin From                  B-164031(2)       10/20/72
      Illicitly Reaching the United States

 6.   Hercin Being Smuggled Into New York City        B-164031(2)        12/7/72
      Successfully

 7.   Difficulties in Immobilizing Major             B-175425           12/21/73
      Narcotics Traffickers

 3.   Identifying and Eliminating Sources            B-175425             6/7/74
      of Dangerous Drugs: Efforts Being
      Made Put Not Enough

 9.   Congressman Charles B. Rangel                  B-173123            7/23/74
      House of Representazives (Letter report
      concerning opium supply/demand.)

'D.   Recission of the Opium Poppy                   B-173123             9/9/74
      Growing Ban by Turkey (ID)

11.   United States Economic Assistance              B-125085           9/16/74
      to Turkey (ID)

12.   The Honorable William R. Cotter                B-173123          10/15/74
      House of Representatives (Letter report
      on drug abuse efforts in Hartford, Conn.
       area.)

13.   The Honorable Charles B Rangel                 B-173123          11/21/74
      House of Representatives (Letter report
      concerning additional information on             '-
      opiu, supply/demand.)
                                                               ATTACHMENT 1
                                                               Page 2


I..   Efforts to Stop Narcotics and                GGD-75-44         12/31/74
      Dangerous Drugs Coming From and
      Through Mexico and Central America (18634)

15.   Security Control for Methadone               GGD-75-50          1/30/75
      Distribution Need Improving (18632)

15.   Problems in Slowing the Flow of              GGD-75-80          5/30/75
      Cocaine and Heroin From and Through
      South A.nerica (Confidential) (18636)

17.   If The United Sates IsTo Develop             ID-75-77           7/29/75
      An Effective International Narcotics
      Contiol Program, Much More Must Be Done

'.    Imrov-ements Needed In Regulating and        GGD-75-102         8/28/75
      Mon'toring The Manufacture and
      Distribution of Licit Narcotics (18635)

.9. Letter Report: Inventory and Security of       B-173123            9/6/75'
    U.S. Opium Stockpile - (RestriLted)            LOGCOM

23.   Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong             GGD-76-32         12/18/75
      Guidance Needed (18640)

 !.   Alleged Improper Personnel Practices         FPCD-76-27        12/19/75
      At the Drug Enforcement Administration

22.   Stopping U.S. Assista.ce to Foreign          ID-76-5            2/19/76
      Police and Prisons

23.   More ffective Action Needed To Control       GGD-76-51           3/9/76
      Abuse and Diversion in Methadone
      Treatment Programs

      Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico:         GGD-77-6           2/18/77
      Cautious Optimism Advised
      (Rangel Request) Confidencial

 5.   Methadone Deaths In New York City            GGD-77-25          3/14/77
      (Rangel Request)

26.   Drugs, Firearms, Currency and Other          GGD-76-105         5/31/77
      Property Seized by Law Enforcement
      Agencies: Too Much Held Too Long
                                                             ATTACHM'IENT 2
             irs is n ;lssied igs- fin.shed in lieu of       Page
            a -peort con=i-. csfied security information
CCMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO           OPIUM ERADICATION EFFORTS
 .-- HOORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL           IN MEXICO:
    US@E OF REPRESENTATIVE3               CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ADVISED
                                          Departments of State
                                          and Justice


       DIGEST

       The opium poppy, from which heroin is derived,
       has been cultivated in Mexico for 30 years,
       despite increasing efforts by the Mexican
       Government to prevent it. With the disrup-
       tion of the Turkish-French heroin connection
       in recent years, more poppies have been culti-
       vated in Mexico 'o meet the demand fr heroin
       by addicts in the United States.  (See p. 1.)

       The Drug Enforcement Administration's analyses
       of selected seizures in 1975 identified Mexico
       as the source of 89 percent of the heroin in
       the United States.   (See p.. 2.) It estimates
       that 5.2 metric tons of Mexican heroin entered
       the United States during 1975 and that gross
       opium production in Mexico totaled between 100
       and li0 metric tons.

       Conflicting information on opium poppy (:ulti-
       vation exists; and, past estimates--as well as
       reports used in developing the estimates--may
       not accurately reflect the current situation.
       (See pp. 5 to 7.) The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
       tration, the Department of State, and the Foreign
       Intelligence Subcommittee of the Cabinet Com-
       mittee on International Narcotics Contzol are
       aware of this and have acted to improve the
       situation.   (See pp. 10 to 13.)

       Since 1970 the United States has contributed
       about $35 million to assist the Mexican
       Government with narcotics control efforts.
       Most of this assistance has been provided to
       the lexican Attorney General's Air Services
       Section for aircraft and related support for
       improving the mobility of enforcement and
       eradication personnel.  (See app. III.)




                                   i                       GGD-77-6
                                     ATTACHMENT 2
                                     Page 2

Eradicating poppies by aerially spraying them
with herbicides has been a priority goal of the
narcotics control program since late 1975.
This placed greater responsibility on the Air
Services Section.  (See p. 16.) According to
reporter results for January through April
1976, about twice as many fields were destroyed
during that period as during the 1975 program.
(See app. II.)

The narcotics control action plan is to be the
Lasic planning document for narcotics control
funding, through the Cabinet Committee on In-
ternational Narcotics Control. U.S. assistance
to Mexico has escalated without sufficient de-
tailed planning.   (See pp. 18 to 20.)

A new administration took office in Mexico in
December 1976, and its strong endorsement of
the eradication program will be necessary for
continued improvement. According to the De-
partment of State, the new administration has
recently pledged its continuing support of che
eradication program.
The Drug Enforcement Administration will ana-
lyze U.S. heroin "removal" statistics to
evaluate he eradication program. The Drug
Enforcement Administration believes that a
decline in availability, followed by a rise in
price and/or by a drop in purity of heroin at
the retail level, will indicate program suc-
cess. Heroin removal statistics show a 6-month
trend of lower purity and higher prices from
March through September 1976. The Drug En-
forcement Administration expects the trend to
continue.   (See pp. 34 and 35.)

To insure continued improvement and ultimate
success for the opium poppy eradication pro-
gram in Mexico, the Secretary of State, as
Chairman of tne Cabinet Committee on Inter-
national Narcotics Control, should require
the U.S. Mission in Mexico to develop a more
comprehensive narcotics control plan which
will




                     ii
                                        ATTACHMIEN   2
                                        Page 3




-- clearly define U.S. goals for assisting the
   Mexican Government in developing its own ca-
   pabilities to control narcotics and

-- develop specific objectives and criteria to
   evaluate progress being made.  (See p. 37.)

The Department of State advises that the out-
going Mexican administration prepared a study
of the resourqe needs for the ongoing program
which wll be reviewed by both governments and
that a plan is being developed for identifying
program goals and resources needed.  (See p. 38.)

Comments from the Departments of State and
Justice and from the Central Intelligence
Agency were obtained and considered in the
report.




                     iii
                                                           ATTACHMIENT 3
                                                           Page 1

Z:i'?TROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT            FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT:
 ;--..     ER.::ANENT SUBCOMIITTEE       STRONG GUIDANCE NEEDED
                         SENATE          Department of Justice
    -v-IGATIONS,
    :                                    Department of the Treasury
 ,'"MITTEE    ON  GOVERN:MENT
 pERATIONS
            DIG E ST
                                                      in the
             For years Federal druq law enforcement
             United States has not been  as effective as it
             could have been if  the agencies  responsible
                        together  to enforce  the drug laws.
             had worked
                                                 the lack
             The price paid 'n this country for   to con-
             of a concerted effort in attempting be
             trol illicit drug activities cannot
             measured.

             The Federal agencies concerned--primarily
                                                 and the
             the Drug Enforcement Administration
                                                    on
             U.S. Customs Service--have statistics
                                        and seizures.
             drug arrests, convictions,             are
             However impressive these appear, theyof how
             not necessarily accurate indicators
             effective drug enforcement is.
                                               arrests,
              True, statistics show increased enforcement
              convictions, and seizures.  Law
                                                   abuse is
              has not necessarily improved. Drug
              considered one of the most serious and most
              tragic problems in this country.

              In his Reorganization Plan No.  2, of 1973, the
                                 the Drug Enforcement   Admin-
              President intended
                                                     and the FBI
              istration, the U.S. Customs Service,
                                          their  forces  into
              to cooperate and coordinate                   en-
                                                   for drug
              a cohesive and powerful instrument
                                          so.
              forcement.  They did not do
                                                   must
              The Drug Enforcement Administration
              obtain more valuable and reliableCustoms
              intelligence to assist the U.S.
              Service in catching smugglers at border
              inspection posts.   (See pp. 23 to 28.)
                                                   Drug
               Since the 1973 reorganization, the
                                           and the FBI
               Enforcement Administrationrole
               have interpreted the FBI       in a narrow
                                              changed  their
               sense and have not materially
               working relationship.                   GGD-76-32

   'Ter heet Upor renov!. the re..r'
   :z efr C3de Should be noted heteon.

                                           i
                                              ATTACHMENT 3
                                              Page 2


the      Enforcement Administration head-
      .Dug
quaters hs not provided the FBI with names
                                      If
an- information  about drug traffickers.
                                        role in
the F£i was supposed to play a larger     the
drug enforcement, it seems logical that
                                 would  have
Dru Eniorcement Administration
provied the FBI with names and information
                                        pp.
abou certain major raffickers. (See
34 to 4i.)

A recommendation that problems be  solved
by action at the'highest level was  made by
                                     Force
the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task
in September 1975.   Its chief recommenda-
tion said:

      "The task fcrce recommends that the
      President direct the Attorney General
      and the Secretary of the Treasury
      te settle jurisdictional disputes
      between DEA and Customs by December 31,
      1975, or to report their recommenda-
      tions for resolution of the matter
      to the President on that date."
 GAO endorses this recommendation. History
 shows, however, that'establishing inter-
 agency agreements alone usually will not
 solve problems.
 It is questionable whether such agreements
 ever will work without a clear ondirective
 on the part of someone  acting     the
                     to compel  agencies to
 president's behalf
 comply.
 The Drug Enforcement Administration con-
 siders the purchase of evidence and in-
 formation as one of the most effective
 tools available in narcotics investiga-
 tions.
 The use of funds for purchase of evidence
 and information has been controversial.
                            use of these funds
 The effectiveness of the GAO
 is difticult  to assess.       recommends
 -. at the Attorney General  develop better
  oicy and criteria   governing  their use.
  'See pp. 43 to 57.)


                          ii
                                           ATTACHIM.T 3
                                           Page 3


GAO dic not obtain written comments from
either the Department of Justice or the
Treasury; however, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, FBI, and U.S. Customs Serv-
ice re;iewed the report and their comments
and sucgestions were considered.




                      iii
                                                        ATTACHMENT 4
                                                        Page 1


COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S                  IF THE UNITED   STATES IS
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS                 TO DEVELOP AN   EFFECTIVE
                                       INTERNATIONAL   NARCOTICS CONTROL
                                       PROGRAM, MUCH   MORE MUST BE DONE


            DIGEST

             u.S. policy on eliminating opium production
             and illicit narcotics trafficking     is not
             always clear to those who must follow it in
             attempting- to carry out international narco-
             tics control programs.

            Witn U.S. and international encouragement,
            Turkey halted all opium production--the
            growing of opium poppies--in June 1971, but
            3 years later, Turkey rescinded the ban.
            During the same period, the United States
            supported India's increasing its opium pro-
            duction for medicinal purposes. (See
            pp. 8 and 9.)

            GAO recommends that the secretary of State,
             as Chairman of the Cabi, .L Committee on
             International Narcotics Control:

             -- Clarify U.S. opium policy.     (See p. 22.)

             -- Assess U.S. drug control activities
                abroad.  (See p. 35.)

            -- Define U.S. narcotics control objectives.
               (See p. 64.)
             GAO makes a number of other recommendations
             to improve specific aspects of the narcotics
             control program.

             GAO also suggests that the Congress complete
             its consideration of enabling legislation to
             permit the Senate to consider ratifying the
             1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
             This Convention is aimed at curbing unlawful
             diversion and illegal international traf-
             ficking of psychotropic--or mind-altering--
             drugs. (See p. 76.)

             Annual worldwide illicit opium production
             is estimated at 1,130 to 1,520 metric tons.


TeAr Sheet. Upon removal, the report
cover date should be noted hereon.     i           ID-75-77
                                        ATTACHMENT 4
                                        Page 2

IMost comes from regions where opium
cultivation is illegal but governments lack
effective political control to enforce the
laws.   (See pp. 23 and 24.)

In 1974 there were four large international
narcotics trafficking networks. Enforcement
efforts have partly succeeded in restricting
trafficking through these networks, but much
remains o be accomplished. (See pp. 24
to 28.)

Foreign governn.n'
                1     cooperation is crucial
to the success of the t.S. international
narcotics control program     This cooperation
generally has been gocd,       ,.he United
States needs to strengthen.    plomatic ini-
tiatives and gain greater cooperation from
some countries.   (See p. 47.)

The United States could improve narcotics
control by supporting programs for educat-
ing, treating, and rehabilitating addicts in
other countries to reduce production, use,
and trafficking of illicit narcotics.  (See
p. 58.)

Although the United states continues to give
top priority to international narcotics con-
trol, (1) it was not included among U.S. ob-
jectives in some narcotics-problem countries
and (2) some U.S. embassies' officials were
uncertain as to whether it was an objective
in their countries.  (See p. 80.)

International operations of the Drug En-
forcement Administration have increased
steadily and contributed to foreign govern-
ment narcotics enforcement capabilities.
Continued expansion of the agencv's overseas
activities, however, should be carefully
considered in terms of potential problems
with foreign government sovereignty, pos-
sible displacement of indigenous police
functions, &.l appropriate development of
foreign government enforcement capabilities.
(See pp. 33 to 35.)

Most U.S. efforts have   been directed toward
short-term enforcement   measures. Long-term
measures, such as crop   substitution and in-
come replacement, will   require changes in

                      ii
                                                     ATTACHMENT 4
                                                     Page 3



             traditional economic and social conditions
             and establishment of political control over
             areas presently uncontrolled. (See p. 36.)

             If a country's development priorities do not
             Include replacing tne opium poppy, crop sub-
             stitution and income replacement are un-
             likely to follow without strong urging and
             assistance from outside sources.   (See
             p. 41.)

             The 1961 U.N.'Single Convention on Narcotic
             Drugs provides the mechanism for continuous
             international cooperation on narcotic drug
             control through essentially voluntary re-
             straints on the cultivation, production,
             manufacture, and import and export of opium
             and its products.  (See p. 66.)

             The 1971 Psychotropic Convention was aimed
             at limiting the manufacture, distribution,
             ain use of psychotropic drugs, including
             LSD, mescaline, amphetamines, barbiturates,
             and tranquilizers, to legitimate medical and
             scientific purposes. Although the United
             States has been a leader in sponsoring and
             negotiating international drug control
             treaties, it has yet to ratify the 1971
             Psychotropic Convention.   (See p. 66.)

             The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control was
             established in March 1971 as a coordinated
             international program against drug abuse.
             However, it depends on voluntary contribu-
             tions from governments and private sources,
             and its progress has been slow because of
             a shortage of funds.  (See p. 67.)

             The Department of State, the Agency for
             International Development, and the Drug
             Enforcement Administration have indicated
             in their comments (see app. II) that posi-
             tive actions are being or will be taken in
             response to GAO's recommendations. However,
             they do not agree that U.S. opium policy is
             unclear to those who must follow it.   (See
             pp. 18 to 22.)




T.r   SO*a                         ii
                                                                  ATTACHMENT 5
                                                                  Page 1


'-.=-3LL          R GENERAL'S                EFFORTS TO STOP ARCOTICS AND
-E:3T    -     TO THE CONGRESS               DANGEROUS DRUGS COMING FROM AND
                                             THROUGH MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA
                                             Drug Enforcement Administration
                                             Department of Justice
                                             Department of State
         ZSEST


     THE
  Y-"'         REVIEW WAS O?.DE              Accordingly, GAO examined U.S.
                                             programs designed to reduce the flow
T =e flow of narcotics and dangerous         of drugs coming from and through
c-b;s from and through Mexico to the         Mexico and Central Americ..
'-.ied States is increasing.
in 1971 about 20 percent of the              FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
heroin, 90 percent of the marihuana,
 C. percent of the dangerous drugs,          The United States is trying to stop
  :.rmuch of the cocaine consumed in         the flow of drugs from Mexico by:
  is country came from and through
 e.xico. By late 1973 heroin flow-           --Forcibly preventing shipment of
i-: from and through Mexico to the             drugs to the United States
iUited  States had increased to about          (called interdiction).
h.
 if the total consumption.
                                             --Eliminating illicit production
in September and October 1974, Drug            in Mexico.
E.orcement Administration officials
es-i-ted that                                --Assisting the Mexican Government's
                                               antidrug efforts.
--7 percent of all heroin reaching
       :-e United States comes from          The U.S. Ambassador, as the
       -  ppies grown in iMexico;            President's representative, is
                                             responsible for seeing that a._.
--virtually all the marihuana seized         objectives are chieved. In the
  t.-es from Mexico and the Carib-           drug area he is supported by
       :en;
                                             --the Drug Enforcement Administra-
       ---ut 3 billion tablets of danger-      tion, the prime U.S. enforcement
       :.s drugs, valued at more than          agency, maintaining liaison with
       51.5 billion on the illicit market,     Mexican Government narcotics en-
       :-2es from Mexico in a year; and        forcement agencies, and
--cozaine, which is becoming a pref-         --drug control committees in each
  erred drug of abuse, passes                  country. (See pp. 2 and 3.)
  -r-,Jgh Mexico on its way from
  _-n and Central America.                   Progress
 -- :-al America is also a potentially
C'                                           Since 1969 the United States and
i-:rt transshipment point for                Mexican Governments' antidrug ef-
-. :s corin to the United States.            forts have:
                                                                        GGD-75-4d
-r:,     -..     Upon removal. the report
::e      ce     hould be noted hereon.
                                                               ATTACIHIENT 5
                                                               Page 2

 --Increased drug seizures, opium and     traffickers ho flee to :Gexico are
   .arihuana eradication, and arrests.    not prosecuted ad icarcerated
                                          Mexico readily grants citizenship
 --Provided better information on         to persons having exican parents
   drug trafficking.                      or background, regardles of the
                                          solicitant's place of birth. Some
 --Improved Mexican capability            of them, before beco.ming ' xican
   through material assistance grants     residents, lived in the United
   and training.                          States until they ;,ere convicted or
                                          suspected of violating U.S. drug
 --Increased cooperation and discus-      laws.
   sion at.high diplomatic levels.
   (See pp. 15 and 16.)         "        The Administration estimates that
                                         more than 250 such persons now live
Problems                                 in Mexico. Some still traffick in
                                         drugs. Because they re Mexican
Even with this progress, increasing      citizens, the Mexican Government
amounts of drugs continue to reach       refuses to extradite them to the
the United States.                       United States for prosecution.
Factors which have hindered greater      In a few cases, Mexican citizens
effectiveness in reducing the flow       have been convicted in Mexico for
of drugs to the United Stztes inlude     drug violations in the United
                                         States. Greater use of this proce-
--lack of full cooperation betwee:i      dure might deter Mexicans who have
  the two Governments regarding drug     violated U.S. drug laws from using
  informdtion and extradition and        Mexico as a sanctuary fr.m prosecu-
                                         tion. (See p. 28.)
--linited technical resources and
  m,'npower. (See pp. 20 to 25.)
                                         Material assistance
Cooperation                              Mexico is not only a major trans-
                                         shipment area but also an indigenous
One way to reduce the flow of drugs      source of drugs. Its sparcely pop-
to the United States is the exchange     ulated and rugged mountains make
of accurate data about the activities    location and eradication of clandes-
of known and suspected drug traf-        tine cultivation areas difficult
fickers between the Drug Enforcement     and time consuming.
Administration and the Mexican Fed-
eral police. The Drug Enforcement         Its extended border with the United
Ad:iinistration, however, has had        .States and two long coastlines
only limited opportunity to inter-        afford traff,kers virtually un-
rogate persons arrested by the Fed-       limited locations for smuggling.
eral police for drug crimes and           This, in turn, makes it harder for
sometimes was denied access to in-        its ill-equipped police to locate
formation the police obtained.            trafficking routes. (See Dp. 6
(See p. 20.)                              and 25.)
Imr.obilization of drug traffickers      Since 1970 the United States has
is further hindered because drug         given Mexico $6.8 million n
                                                                      ATTACHHI-T 5
                                                                      Page 3

        .- :,::,,            t r. -s fo)r
                     as;heliko                   The Mexican Government rc;.e.
   .:.~     ~,i:,a.iJ4..    A,,ion.:l        .   that corruption exists at ann ;'
-.-
 :    .' n ha been appv.;i by tLie               its levels, including the ,;icc
  ;e::.t Co!iit.ec on Intcl;..'ional             Federal police, and developed lan;
          Con-rl . (Se? p. '2.)
          cs                                     to overcome this problem, s:.ch as
                                                 rcorganizing the police.    Thi
   ..;:       .)
             25    of thi 350 -i,::.ber          reorganization was    o bei: i.
:'' ,an Federal police forc:. have               January 1973, but no action h,;
    .n trined in drug enforcement                been taken as of September 19Y,.
             by the Drug Enforce-
   ,-c.-2urees                                   (See p. 18.)
-n- Ar:;inistration; this training
is cc,.ti.uing. (Se p. 26.)                      Central America
   _- ,.itnd States is also providing            Central America is not currently
.- Ji..nt and training to the Mex-               considered a prime source in tren'
 i-cn   CUStzi;s   Service.   (See p. 27.)       shipping drugs to the United Stat-:-
                                                 however, it does offer trafi'ir'q,
Ch;er matters                                    many of the same benefits as doe:,.
                                                 Mexico.
_-A has had some success in locating
aen eliminating narcotics laborato-
ries in other countries by publicly              As enforcement improves in Mexico,
cffuring rewards for information                 the Drug Enforcement Administreti"-.
bX0ut drug traffickers.                          expects traffickIrs to make greater
                                                 use of the Central American coun-
Though the Administration has had                tries. Plans are being developed,
 rfcration for a number of years                 end the Administration plans to
trat heroin laboratories are operat-             ass'gn gents to these countries.
      - at least eight areas in ex-
   irin                                           (See p. 34.)
ico, no significant laboratory had
'een seized until February 5, 1974.
  ince then six other laboratories               RECOMMENDATIONS
 ave been seized.
                                                 The Attorney General, in coopera-
s'-- believes that publicly offering             cion with the Secretary of State,
.rs;     ,;ould increae the identi-              should improve information oathpr-
;-.azian of illicit laboratories,                ing and cooperation in Mexico :
     t- exic.n Govern:-ent has not
     :                                           encouraging the Mexican Governmr-'nt
a-red t offer rewards for informa-               to
-i.n, despite repedted U.S. request;.
 .ihoijgh the Drug Enforcement Admin-            --share information obtained durii;
istration recognizes that many ocean-              interrogation of suspected drug
going vessels and aircraft are used                traffickers and
     -oving drugs from Mexico illic-
     -=
i&;1., it had not monitored the use              --prosecute traffickers fleeing
      caqirjr2 vessels and aircraft                to Mexico within the Mexican
      r;g traffickers. (See p. 18 and
     c,                                            judicial system if Mexico con-
                                                   tinues to refuse ext.'adition.
                                                               ATTACHMENT 5
                                                               Page 4

AGE:;CY ACTICOIS AND URESOLVED ISSUES   GAO rcognizes that many probleir;s
                                        affect the efforts to stop the
NCpart;ent of Justice                   ficw of narcotics and dngerous
                                        drau; into the United States tnrd
The unclassified version of the De-     that he3e pobliens and Lheir
partment of Justice's comments are      seriousness change fro:n time to
intluded in appendix I. A copy of       time.
Ate Department's classified response
will be made available to authorized'   At the completion of GAO's field-
persons upon request.                   work in late 1973, GAO's findings
                                        were discussed with.appropriate
The Justice Department                  U.S. agency officials in the field
                                        and in flashington. At that time
--agrees with GAO's analysis ofex-      GAO had not identified, nor had
  tradition problems and the possi-     agency officials recognized, the
  bility of prosecuting people in       three above areas mentioned by the
  Mexico for violations of U.S.         Department as causing major prob-
  statutes and                          lems.
--recognizes the merit of some ob-
  servations concerning enforce-        If the Department has suTicient
  ment operations.                      evidence to identify these areas
                                        as causing real problems to their
However, the Department believes        efforts to stop the flow of
GAO's findings, conclusions, and rec-   narcotics and dangerous drugs into
or.endations have serious weakness-     the United States, no additional
es. The Department believes the         work by GAO to develop these prob-
report is a random collection of ob-    lems.should be necessary. GAO
servations and includes items of        suggests that the Department con-
secondary importance and that it        tinue to work with the Governmnt
ignores some significant issues,        of Mexico to overcome these prob-
such as (1) investigative proce-        lems.
dures used by the Mexican Judicial
Police, (2) lack of operating agree-    The Department also commented ex-
  :ents between the Drug Enforcement    tensively on how it believed (1)
Administration and local Mexican        the Government of Mexico could im-
police officers on custody and pro-     prove its drug enforcement activi-
secution of arrested carriers, and      ties and (2)U.S. operations on
(3) problems created for U.S. border    the border could be improved. It
investigations by the policy of the     said that actions had been or were
Government of Mexico which requires     being taken to improve activities
that known narcotics and dangerous      in both areas but that more efforts
drugs being smuggled out of Mexico      were needed.
be seized in Mexico. (This policy
prevents the identification of          The Drug Enforcement Administra-
U.S. traffickers by keeping the         tion's comments on specific actions
drugs under surveillance until they     planned or being taken on GAO's rec-
are delivered.)                         omniendations are included in the
                                                                              ATTACHMENT. 5
                                                                              Page 5


    c,f t.     r ;;c.       (,Ce p. 22   !nd       t,'Vll tf'RS FOR COilSIDEPR ATON
                                                   LY T'I'-t1
                                                           CONGRESS
    ' -r     a.cf   State                          This report is being sent to the
                                                   Congress to advise it of efforts
T'e :ep.rt,-ent of State (see app.                 needed and being taken to reduce
 ;, endorse the recommendations                    the flow of drugs into the United
a- said actions are underway and                   States from Mexico and Central
 -il be pursued. These actions are                 America. The report should be use-
i.-l&_ed in the body of the report.                ful to those committees having over-
*See . 32.)                                        sight responsibilities in this area.




                                               V
                                                                               ATTACHMENT,




                                                                        $141.7




                                                               $122.0


                                                  $110.3




                                       $89.9
                           $87.2




Fiscal Year:   1971        1972       1973        1974       1975       1976
                       Customs, INS, and Bureau of Narcotics
                       and Dangerous Drugs/DEA Expenditures
                                    (Millions)

/No cost for BNDD/DEA was included since such data was unavailable.
  BNDD/DEA esimatsd cost for 1972 was $4.3 million.
            The following chart illustrates the mix and general purpose for whi ch    ATTACHMENT 7
            these expenditures were made.
                  1971
                  $73.9

                                      $17.1 Customs, 23%




                                       .       $4.3 BNDD/DEA, 6%/

           $52.5 INS, 71%                  /

                                                                         1976
                                                                         $141.7

                                                                           __/_~     $39.7 Custbms, 28%




                                                      $82.4 INS, 58A


; 7     29% in 1971 and 42% in 1976
   ''   spent for narcotics and
        contraband control


                                                                                           $19.6 DEA, 14%


                            Customs, INS and BNDD/DEA Expenditures
                                    fiscal year 1971 and 1976
                                        (dollars in' milliorisT
-/Since BNDD/DEA cost estimate for FY 71 unavailable, FY 72 cost for
    BNDD/DEA was used