DCCUMENT RESUME 04063 - B3254486 Federal Drug Law Enforcement Programs. November 6, 1977. 1 pp. + 7 enclosures (18 pp.). Testimony before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control; by William J. Anderson, Deputy Director, General Government Div. Issue Area: Law Enforcement and Crime Preventicn: Controlled Items (502); Law Enforcement and Crime Provention: Approach to Drug Law Enforcement (511);Law nforcenat and Crime Prevention: Illegal Entry of People and Things (50(6). Contact: General Government Div. Budget Function: Law Enforcement and Justice: ederal Law Enforcement and Prosecution (751). Orqanization Concerned: Drug Enforcement Administration; United States Customs Service; Iemigration and Na:uralization sezvice; Office of Management and Budget: ffice of Drug Abuse Policy. Congressional Relevance: House Select Committeet on Narcotics Abuse dand Control. The transit of illicit drugs and undocumented aliens across the southwestern border bas been the target of law enforcement efforts. There is general agreement that Mexico is the major source of heroin roaching this ccuntry. The Federal expenditures employed by the three ajor enforcement agencies during the period 1971 through 1976 have approximately doubled, and the number of enforcement and support personnel have increased 31%. Border forces interdict only a small uantity of the estimated heroin and cocaine eiteing the the United States from Mexico; most seizures are of Aarihuana. Border interdiction efforts have suffered from a lack of actionable intelligence and from deficiencies in operations. A shortage of inspectors existed at four ports-of-entry visited along the bcrder, and the only detection devices available were data rcs the Treasury's automated system, which is of limited value because it is primarily keyed to vehicle license nnaters. Detector dogs are not used to search people, and hard arcot- s which come through the ports are believed to be packaged and isertid into the human body. There is a need for an integrated ederal strategy and comprehensive border control plan. GAO has reccamended a single agency as the long-range solution. he priority and commitment of the Mexican Government is necessary tc disrupting the production and shipment of illicit drugs. (Si) United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 FOR RELEASE 3D DELIVERY Expected at 10 a.m., EST November 16, 1977 . i-;t· STATEMENT OF :C) WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL ON FEDERAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: As requested, our testimony today deals with the work we performed during the past year relative to drug abuse with particular emphasis on cur recent study of law enforcement programs along the United States-Mexico border. During the past few years we have issued a number of reports dealing with the area of drug abuse. A listing of these reports, and digests from some of the '-re pertinent reports, are attached to cur statement. As a result of .- r this area, during the past year we: iss;Aed three reports 1/ dealing with u ,tion efforts in Mexico, methadone deaths in New York l/"Opium Eradica-.c arts in Mexico: Cautious Optimism Advised," GGD-77-6, February LE, 1977. "Methadone Deaths in New York City," GGD-77-25, February 18, 1977. "Drugs, Firearms, Currency, and Other Property Seized by Law Enforcement Agencies: Too Much Held Too Long," GGD-76-105, May 31, 1977. City and te handling of drugs and other property seized by law enforcement. agencies. Two of these reports ere the result of work we performed at the request of a Member of this Committee. In addition, we currently have in process reports dealing with (1)efforts to suppress retail level diversion of controlled substances, (2)the use of science and technology to improvL drug enforcement, and (3)law enforcement efforts along the United States-Mexico border. As requested, Mr. Chairman, the majority of our testimony will focus on this latter review. With that brief overview of our efforts in the drug area, the remainder of my remarks will focus on our review of law enforcement efforts alren the Southwest border. SIGNIFICA!NE OF THE SOUTHWEST BORDER As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the ast few years law enforcement efforts along the Southwest border have taken on increased significance° minly, because of the transit of illicit drugs and undocumented aliens across this border. United States authorities estimated that, in 1971, heroin flowing from and through ex;co represented 20 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States. For 1975, it was estimated that 89 percent of the heroin reaching the United States came from prppies grown in Mexico. Although this estimate is subject to question, there is general agreement that Mexico is the major source of heroin reaching this country. - 2- Although meaningful figures on undocumented aliens are hard to come by, INS dta on apprehensions of such aliens shows that from 1971 to 175 the number of apprehensions have increased by about 85 percent. Most un- documented aliens apprehended are Mexisan--about 90 percent. The significance of the above figures is enhanced when one considers that the Federal policy to prevent illegal immigration emphasizes interdiction at the border rather than apprehension of illegal aliens after settlement. t-oudrugs the policy calls for giving priority in both supply and demand reduction efforts to those drugs which inherently pose a greater risk to the individual and to society--heroin is the top priority drug. FEDERAL PRESENCE AND RESOURCES AT THE BORDER Control of the border is basically a task of controlling tIhe movement of people, veaicles, aircraft, boats, and goods. There are over 400 Federal laws and regulations governing entry and departure of people and goods across the border. While ther- are other agencies which play a role in controlling th! Southwest border--Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); Department of Defense; Federal Aviation Adminis- tration (FAA); Coast Guard; Department of Agriculture; Public Health Service-- the principal agencies involved in law enforcemelnt are the Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DLA). From a law enforcement standpoint, the rimary responsibilities of these three agencies at the border are --preventing the llegei entry of persons into tne United States, -3- --preventing contraband from entering the country, and --investigating narcotics and dangerous drug violations. In carrying out these responsibilities, both INS and Customs use patrol officers, port-of-entry inspectors, and investigators. DEA is the single Federal agency charged with responsibility for investigation pertaining to narcotics and dangerous drug violators. Difficult control problems exist at the Southwest border. Some examples of these problems are: --The increasing volume of legitimate traffi: serves to inhabit enforcement efforts necessary to detect contraband and illegal entrants. From fiscal year 1971 through 1976, about 004 million people, 247 million vehicles, and 441,000 aircraft were inspected in the Southwest border area. -Only 2 percent of 'he entire Southwest border--O miles out of a total of 2,000 miles--offers sufficient topographical barriers to make illegal entry unlikely. --The Southwest contains thousands of square miles of land containing abandoned or little-used airstrips, dry lake beds, and isolated roads where light aircraft can land. Radar coverage exists on portions of the border but is sufficiently limited in detecting low-flying aircraft that undetected entry by aircraft into the United States is relatively easy. --In San Diego, where 300 to 400 pleasure vessels depart or arrive on a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, there are over 120 miles of -4 - waterfront, and it is only 10 miles from the entrance of San Diego Bay to Mexican waters. To meet this imposing enforcement problem, the Federal resources employed by the three major enforcement agencies increased significantly during the period 1971 through 1976. Estimates prepared by these agencies show that Federal xpenditures have approximately doubled, going from about $70 million in 1971 to just over $140 million in 1976 (see attachments 6 and_ 7). Enforcement and support personnel increased from 4,352 in 1971 to 5,707 in 1976--an increase of 31 percent. WIAT IS BEiNG ACHIEVED While ipossible to measure thie deterrent effect of border law enforce- ment, the available supply of drugs and the estimated number of illegal aliens attest to the fact that it has not been a serious impediment to illegal entry. The substantial Federal investment for enforcemeit at the Southwest border i, achieving only a limited measurable impact on the drug and alien problem. --Border forces interdict only a small quantity of the estimated heroin and cocaine entering the United States from Mexico. Most seizures ae of marihuana. In fiscal year 1976, Customs and INS seized about 2 percent of the heroin, less than 1 per- cent of the cocaine and-l0 percent of the marihuana estimated to come from and through Mexico. Wien DEA's border area seizures are added, these totals equal 6 percent of the heroin, 3 percent of the cocaine, and 13 percent of the marihu na. It is fairly obvious that the quantity of drugs being interdicted will not -5- have a significant effect on the drug problem. This is especially true when one considers that these figures oresume the drug seizures to be 100 percent pure while the purity of border seizures are significantly less--usually below 50 percent purity. Border aprehensions seldom involve high-level traffickers. The over- whelming majority of persons crossing the border in possession of drugs who are apprehended by Customs and INS are drug users, small-time operators, couriers, or low-level members of drug trafficking organizations. DEA's data'shows that less than 2 percent of the interdictions, referred from INS and Customs, involve major violators, and about three-fourths oi these were marihuana violators. The results with respect to apprehension of aliens are more impressive but the problem remains serious. More illegal aliens are successful in getting into the United States than are prevented from entering. Many aliens apprehended are repeaters; some have been apprehended as many as 10 times. When one considers the many points along the Southwest border that can be used by aliens to enter the United States, it becomes apparent tat attempts to prevent illegal migration at the border, by itself, will not solve the illegal alien problem. PROBLEMS AFFECTING BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT Although border control alone will not solve the drug or illegal alien problems, it is a necessary element if the Nation is ever to control these problems. In ur opinion, much more could be done if Federal border law -6- enforcement activities were better planned, coordinated, integrated, and executed. The efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts at the brder would be enhanced if intelligence support was improved and the costly overlapping and poor coordination of enforcement activities and support systems were corrected. INTELLIGENCE Under Reorganization Plan No. 2, DEA was tasked with providing nation- wide drug intelligence. DEA is currently working on this task and some improvements have been made, but poblems still exist. Some examples which illustrate this problem are the lack of ftual data to reliably establish the amount of illicit narcotics smuggled across the Southwest border and the lack of actionable intelligence necessary for successful operations along the border. One step taken by DEA to correct this situation was the establishing of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). The purpose of EPIC was to provide an overall intelligence picture of drug trafficking and/or smuggling by land, sea, or air between Mexico and the United States. This would enable DEA to provide tactical irtelligence to agencies with border enforcement responsibilities. In the early stages of EPIC's development, progress was slow due to lack of support and agency resistance. Recent progress supports the concept of a single border intelligence center but problems persist. One such problem is that little intelligence was being developed within Mexico to improve interdiction efforts at ports-of-entry and other locations along the Southwest border. Another problem, which is of long-standing duration, is the extent of cooperation among the major law enforcement agencies. - 7- OPERATIONS Not only did border interdiction eft¢irts suffer from a lack of actionable intelligence, but also from deficiencies in operations. These are some of the problems we identified. --We found that a shorage of inspectors existed at the four ports-of-entry we visited along the Southwest bordr, even though most seizures of hard narcotics were made at the ports-of-entry. Inspection manpower has a significant impact on the thoroughness of inspections performed at these locations. --The only detection devices available to assist inspectors at the ports-of-entry are TECS data--Treasury's automated system, which is used by Customs for disseminating intelli- gence information to inspection and enforcement personnel--and trained detection dogs. The value of TECS data for ports-of- entry interdictions is limited because it is primarily keyed to vehicle license numbers. Detector dogs are an effective time-saving drug interdictioni aid. However, border officials believe that much of the hard narcotics which comes through the ports is packaged and inserted into the human body. Detector dogs are not used to search people, and inspectors are reluctant to perform intensive personal searches. - 8 - --The INS Border Patrol and the Customs Patrol have overlapping roles for control of illegal movements across the land borders between the ports. Poor coordination and cooperation between the Customs and INS border patrols, as well as costly overlapping facilities, have contributed to conflicts and tension and produced only marginal results. Although a Memorandum of Understanding exists between INS and Customs mandating "f ll cooperation between the two Sorvices," this cooperation des not, in reality, exist. To illustrate, while waiting and watching with a Customs "atro'l oficer at a border canyon where a sensor hit occurred, the supervisory patrol officer told us that a lack of personnel might cause them to miss the intruder. Right after he made this statement, an INS Border Patrol car cruised slowly by our position, but no attempt was made to contact it and ask for assistance. Patrol officers could not recall a single example of assistance to one agency by the other on an as-needed basis. --Air and sea operations along the Southwest border have produced only marginal results. Most seizures involved marihuana. --Since 1975, there have been three intensified interdiction operations along the United States-Mexico border. These were to be cooperative and nated efforts among the various Federal agencies. As 6, urned out, there was minimal or no coordination among the enforcement agencies. In evaluating -9- one such program--Operation Diamondback--the participants reported a lack of planning, coordination, cooperation, and intelligence. Fundamental planning and coordination never got out of the idea stage. The decisionmaking process was very poor due to confusion as to who had the authority and responsibility for directing actions. In essence, the land, sea, and air units were going their separate ways. Border Needs an Integrated Strategy and Overall Control Plan Control of the United States-Mexico border is a complex and most difficult task that requires a comprehensive, coordinated effort by all seqments of the border law enforcement community. The executive branch of the Federal Governnent has not developed an integrated strategy or a comprehensive border control plan to consider all aspects of the problem and establish clear, measurable objectives indicating what it intends to accomplish with the various law enforcement resources. A plan of this type is critical because of the many agencies with overlapping responsibilities. Over the past few years the CongreF& . the executive branch, and GAO have issued reports identifying problems among Federal border enforcement agencies and containing suggestions for improving their cooperation and coordination. While some recommendations have been implemented and outward appearances have changed as a result of these efforts, the essentia. char- acteristics of the problem remain. Separate agencies with different orienta- tions continue to identify the best means to meet their specific missions, - 10 - with limited consideration for the activity of the others. This has led to the development of separate but similar lines of effort that continue to dilute border coverage and impact. Little consideration is given to overall border security. We believe that sound management principles and the inherent difficul- ties of multiagency cooperation calls for an integrated Federal strategy and comprehensive border control plan. In our opinion, a single agency makes the most sense, in theory, as the long range solution. Single-agency management was recommended in our report "A Single Agency Needed to Manage Port-of-Entry Inspections--Particularly at U.S. Airports" dated May 30, 1973. We believe: --The executive branch should provide the Congress, along with its appropriations requests, n overview of law enforcement along the United States-Mexico border. Included in this o,'er- view should be an analysis which brings together the budget requests and law enforcement strategies of the various border law enforcement agelicies. --The Office of Management and Budget, Office of Drug Abuse Policy, and the rincipal bL der agen'cies should develop an integrated strategy and comprehensive operational plan for border contrlI. This plan should consider the various alterna- tives to imanaging border operations ranging from the present management structure to single-agency management. - 11 - SANCTIONS AGAINST DRUG SMUGGLERS NEED TO BE ENFORCED AND STRENGTHENED Improved interdiction capability can do little by itself to deter smuggling unless the penalties:imposed outweight the benefits derived. Opportunities exist to diminish the incentive to smuggle drugs by enforcing and strengthening criminal and administrative sanctions. Some improvements that could be made are: --Expansion of the jurisdiction of the Federal magistrates which would enable them to handle minor narcotics cases, Because the District court system is overourdened, most of these cases are not now prosecut d. --Improved administration of administrative sanctions and the providing of criminal sanctions against pilots smuggling illicit drugs by aircraft. It should be recognized, however, that criminal prosecution and enforce- ment of existing administrative sanctions are limited as an effective deterrent because of the large profits involved, the nature of the violators being apprehended, and the ease with wnich penalties can be avoided by experienced smugglers. Improved effectiveness in stepping smugglers at the border is dependent, in large measure, upon the priority and commitment of the Mexican government to disrupting the production and shipment of illicit drugs. This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. We believe this Committee's oversight hearings provide the necessary forum for discussing the border control problems. Hopefully, the information contained in our final report will assist the Committee in its oversight function. We would be pleased to respond to any questions. - 12 - ATTACHIV!ENT 1 Page 1 GAO REPORTS ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT Title Number Date 1. Efforts to Prevent Dangerous B-175425 4/17/72 Drugs From Illicitly Reaching the Public 2. Federal Efforts to Combat Drug Abuse B-164031(2) 8/14/72 3. The Heroin Hotline B-176833 9/26/72 _. United States Efforts to Increase B-1'6625 10/4/72 International Cooperation in Controlling Narcotics Trafficking (ID - Serret) 5. Efforts to Prevent Heroin From B-164031(2) 10/20/72 Illicitly Reaching the United States 6. Hercin Being Smuggled Into New York City B-164031(2) 12/7/72 Successfully 7. Difficulties in Immobilizing Major B-175425 12/21/73 Narcotics Traffickers 3. Identifying and Eliminating Sources B-175425 6/7/74 of Dangerous Drugs: Efforts Being Made Put Not Enough 9. Congressman Charles B. Rangel B-173123 7/23/74 House of Representazives (Letter report concerning opium supply/demand.) 'D. Recission of the Opium Poppy B-173123 9/9/74 Growing Ban by Turkey (ID) 11. United States Economic Assistance B-125085 9/16/74 to Turkey (ID) 12. The Honorable William R. Cotter B-173123 10/15/74 House of Representatives (Letter report on drug abuse efforts in Hartford, Conn. area.) 13. The Honorable Charles B Rangel B-173123 11/21/74 House of Representatives (Letter report concerning additional information on '- opiu, supply/demand.) ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 I.. Efforts to Stop Narcotics and GGD-75-44 12/31/74 Dangerous Drugs Coming From and Through Mexico and Central America (18634) 15. Security Control for Methadone GGD-75-50 1/30/75 Distribution Need Improving (18632) 15. Problems in Slowing the Flow of GGD-75-80 5/30/75 Cocaine and Heroin From and Through South A.nerica (Confidential) (18636) 17. If The United Sates IsTo Develop ID-75-77 7/29/75 An Effective International Narcotics Contiol Program, Much More Must Be Done '. Imrov-ements Needed In Regulating and GGD-75-102 8/28/75 Mon'toring The Manufacture and Distribution of Licit Narcotics (18635) .9. Letter Report: Inventory and Security of B-173123 9/6/75' U.S. Opium Stockpile - (RestriLted) LOGCOM 23. Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong GGD-76-32 12/18/75 Guidance Needed (18640) !. Alleged Improper Personnel Practices FPCD-76-27 12/19/75 At the Drug Enforcement Administration 22. Stopping U.S. Assista.ce to Foreign ID-76-5 2/19/76 Police and Prisons 23. More ffective Action Needed To Control GGD-76-51 3/9/76 Abuse and Diversion in Methadone Treatment Programs Opium Eradication Efforts in Mexico: GGD-77-6 2/18/77 Cautious Optimism Advised (Rangel Request) Confidencial 5. Methadone Deaths In New York City GGD-77-25 3/14/77 (Rangel Request) 26. Drugs, Firearms, Currency and Other GGD-76-105 5/31/77 Property Seized by Law Enforcement Agencies: Too Much Held Too Long ATTACHM'IENT 2 irs is n ;lssied igs- fin.shed in lieu of Page a -peort con=i-. csfied security information CCMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO OPIUM ERADICATION EFFORTS .-- HOORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL IN MEXICO: US@E OF REPRESENTATIVE3 CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ADVISED Departments of State and Justice DIGEST The opium poppy, from which heroin is derived, has been cultivated in Mexico for 30 years, despite increasing efforts by the Mexican Government to prevent it. With the disrup- tion of the Turkish-French heroin connection in recent years, more poppies have been culti- vated in Mexico 'o meet the demand fr heroin by addicts in the United States. (See p. 1.) The Drug Enforcement Administration's analyses of selected seizures in 1975 identified Mexico as the source of 89 percent of the heroin in the United States. (See p.. 2.) It estimates that 5.2 metric tons of Mexican heroin entered the United States during 1975 and that gross opium production in Mexico totaled between 100 and li0 metric tons. Conflicting information on opium poppy (:ulti- vation exists; and, past estimates--as well as reports used in developing the estimates--may not accurately reflect the current situation. (See pp. 5 to 7.) The Drug Enforcement Adminis- tration, the Department of State, and the Foreign Intelligence Subcommittee of the Cabinet Com- mittee on International Narcotics Contzol are aware of this and have acted to improve the situation. (See pp. 10 to 13.) Since 1970 the United States has contributed about $35 million to assist the Mexican Government with narcotics control efforts. Most of this assistance has been provided to the lexican Attorney General's Air Services Section for aircraft and related support for improving the mobility of enforcement and eradication personnel. (See app. III.) i GGD-77-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 Eradicating poppies by aerially spraying them with herbicides has been a priority goal of the narcotics control program since late 1975. This placed greater responsibility on the Air Services Section. (See p. 16.) According to reporter results for January through April 1976, about twice as many fields were destroyed during that period as during the 1975 program. (See app. II.) The narcotics control action plan is to be the Lasic planning document for narcotics control funding, through the Cabinet Committee on In- ternational Narcotics Control. U.S. assistance to Mexico has escalated without sufficient de- tailed planning. (See pp. 18 to 20.) A new administration took office in Mexico in December 1976, and its strong endorsement of the eradication program will be necessary for continued improvement. According to the De- partment of State, the new administration has recently pledged its continuing support of che eradication program. The Drug Enforcement Administration will ana- lyze U.S. heroin "removal" statistics to evaluate he eradication program. The Drug Enforcement Administration believes that a decline in availability, followed by a rise in price and/or by a drop in purity of heroin at the retail level, will indicate program suc- cess. Heroin removal statistics show a 6-month trend of lower purity and higher prices from March through September 1976. The Drug En- forcement Administration expects the trend to continue. (See pp. 34 and 35.) To insure continued improvement and ultimate success for the opium poppy eradication pro- gram in Mexico, the Secretary of State, as Chairman of tne Cabinet Committee on Inter- national Narcotics Control, should require the U.S. Mission in Mexico to develop a more comprehensive narcotics control plan which will ii ATTACHMIEN 2 Page 3 -- clearly define U.S. goals for assisting the Mexican Government in developing its own ca- pabilities to control narcotics and -- develop specific objectives and criteria to evaluate progress being made. (See p. 37.) The Department of State advises that the out- going Mexican administration prepared a study of the resourqe needs for the ongoing program which wll be reviewed by both governments and that a plan is being developed for identifying program goals and resources needed. (See p. 38.) Comments from the Departments of State and Justice and from the Central Intelligence Agency were obtained and considered in the report. iii ATTACHMIENT 3 Page 1 Z:i'?TROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT: ;--.. ER.::ANENT SUBCOMIITTEE STRONG GUIDANCE NEEDED SENATE Department of Justice -v-IGATIONS, : Department of the Treasury ,'"MITTEE ON GOVERN:MENT pERATIONS DIG E ST in the For years Federal druq law enforcement United States has not been as effective as it could have been if the agencies responsible together to enforce the drug laws. had worked the lack The price paid 'n this country for to con- of a concerted effort in attempting be trol illicit drug activities cannot measured. The Federal agencies concerned--primarily and the the Drug Enforcement Administration on U.S. Customs Service--have statistics and seizures. drug arrests, convictions, are However impressive these appear, theyof how not necessarily accurate indicators effective drug enforcement is. arrests, True, statistics show increased enforcement convictions, and seizures. Law abuse is has not necessarily improved. Drug considered one of the most serious and most tragic problems in this country. In his Reorganization Plan No. 2, of 1973, the the Drug Enforcement Admin- President intended and the FBI istration, the U.S. Customs Service, their forces into to cooperate and coordinate en- for drug a cohesive and powerful instrument so. forcement. They did not do must The Drug Enforcement Administration obtain more valuable and reliableCustoms intelligence to assist the U.S. Service in catching smugglers at border inspection posts. (See pp. 23 to 28.) Drug Since the 1973 reorganization, the and the FBI Enforcement Administrationrole have interpreted the FBI in a narrow changed their sense and have not materially working relationship. GGD-76-32 'Ter heet Upor renov!. the re..r' :z efr C3de Should be noted heteon. i ATTACHMENT 3 Page 2 the Enforcement Administration head- .Dug quaters hs not provided the FBI with names If an- information about drug traffickers. role in the F£i was supposed to play a larger the drug enforcement, it seems logical that would have Dru Eniorcement Administration provied the FBI with names and information pp. abou certain major raffickers. (See 34 to 4i.) A recommendation that problems be solved by action at the'highest level was made by Force the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task in September 1975. Its chief recommenda- tion said: "The task fcrce recommends that the President direct the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury te settle jurisdictional disputes between DEA and Customs by December 31, 1975, or to report their recommenda- tions for resolution of the matter to the President on that date." GAO endorses this recommendation. History shows, however, that'establishing inter- agency agreements alone usually will not solve problems. It is questionable whether such agreements ever will work without a clear ondirective on the part of someone acting the to compel agencies to president's behalf comply. The Drug Enforcement Administration con- siders the purchase of evidence and in- formation as one of the most effective tools available in narcotics investiga- tions. The use of funds for purchase of evidence and information has been controversial. use of these funds The effectiveness of the GAO is difticult to assess. recommends -. at the Attorney General develop better oicy and criteria governing their use. 'See pp. 43 to 57.) ii ATTACHIM.T 3 Page 3 GAO dic not obtain written comments from either the Department of Justice or the Treasury; however, the Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, and U.S. Customs Serv- ice re;iewed the report and their comments and sucgestions were considered. iii ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S IF THE UNITED STATES IS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM, MUCH MORE MUST BE DONE DIGEST u.S. policy on eliminating opium production and illicit narcotics trafficking is not always clear to those who must follow it in attempting- to carry out international narco- tics control programs. Witn U.S. and international encouragement, Turkey halted all opium production--the growing of opium poppies--in June 1971, but 3 years later, Turkey rescinded the ban. During the same period, the United States supported India's increasing its opium pro- duction for medicinal purposes. (See pp. 8 and 9.) GAO recommends that the secretary of State, as Chairman of the Cabi, .L Committee on International Narcotics Control: -- Clarify U.S. opium policy. (See p. 22.) -- Assess U.S. drug control activities abroad. (See p. 35.) -- Define U.S. narcotics control objectives. (See p. 64.) GAO makes a number of other recommendations to improve specific aspects of the narcotics control program. GAO also suggests that the Congress complete its consideration of enabling legislation to permit the Senate to consider ratifying the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This Convention is aimed at curbing unlawful diversion and illegal international traf- ficking of psychotropic--or mind-altering-- drugs. (See p. 76.) Annual worldwide illicit opium production is estimated at 1,130 to 1,520 metric tons. TeAr Sheet. Upon removal, the report cover date should be noted hereon. i ID-75-77 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 2 IMost comes from regions where opium cultivation is illegal but governments lack effective political control to enforce the laws. (See pp. 23 and 24.) In 1974 there were four large international narcotics trafficking networks. Enforcement efforts have partly succeeded in restricting trafficking through these networks, but much remains o be accomplished. (See pp. 24 to 28.) Foreign governn.n' 1 cooperation is crucial to the success of the t.S. international narcotics control program This cooperation generally has been gocd, ,.he United States needs to strengthen. plomatic ini- tiatives and gain greater cooperation from some countries. (See p. 47.) The United States could improve narcotics control by supporting programs for educat- ing, treating, and rehabilitating addicts in other countries to reduce production, use, and trafficking of illicit narcotics. (See p. 58.) Although the United states continues to give top priority to international narcotics con- trol, (1) it was not included among U.S. ob- jectives in some narcotics-problem countries and (2) some U.S. embassies' officials were uncertain as to whether it was an objective in their countries. (See p. 80.) International operations of the Drug En- forcement Administration have increased steadily and contributed to foreign govern- ment narcotics enforcement capabilities. Continued expansion of the agencv's overseas activities, however, should be carefully considered in terms of potential problems with foreign government sovereignty, pos- sible displacement of indigenous police functions, &.l appropriate development of foreign government enforcement capabilities. (See pp. 33 to 35.) Most U.S. efforts have been directed toward short-term enforcement measures. Long-term measures, such as crop substitution and in- come replacement, will require changes in ii ATTACHMENT 4 Page 3 traditional economic and social conditions and establishment of political control over areas presently uncontrolled. (See p. 36.) If a country's development priorities do not Include replacing tne opium poppy, crop sub- stitution and income replacement are un- likely to follow without strong urging and assistance from outside sources. (See p. 41.) The 1961 U.N.'Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs provides the mechanism for continuous international cooperation on narcotic drug control through essentially voluntary re- straints on the cultivation, production, manufacture, and import and export of opium and its products. (See p. 66.) The 1971 Psychotropic Convention was aimed at limiting the manufacture, distribution, ain use of psychotropic drugs, including LSD, mescaline, amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers, to legitimate medical and scientific purposes. Although the United States has been a leader in sponsoring and negotiating international drug control treaties, it has yet to ratify the 1971 Psychotropic Convention. (See p. 66.) The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control was established in March 1971 as a coordinated international program against drug abuse. However, it depends on voluntary contribu- tions from governments and private sources, and its progress has been slow because of a shortage of funds. (See p. 67.) The Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the Drug Enforcement Administration have indicated in their comments (see app. II) that posi- tive actions are being or will be taken in response to GAO's recommendations. However, they do not agree that U.S. opium policy is unclear to those who must follow it. (See pp. 18 to 22.) T.r SO*a ii ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 '-.=-3LL R GENERAL'S EFFORTS TO STOP ARCOTICS AND -E:3T - TO THE CONGRESS DANGEROUS DRUGS COMING FROM AND THROUGH MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA Drug Enforcement Administration Department of Justice Department of State ZSEST THE Y-"' REVIEW WAS O?.DE Accordingly, GAO examined U.S. programs designed to reduce the flow T =e flow of narcotics and dangerous of drugs coming from and through c-b;s from and through Mexico to the Mexico and Central Americ.. '-.ied States is increasing. in 1971 about 20 percent of the FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS heroin, 90 percent of the marihuana, C. percent of the dangerous drugs, The United States is trying to stop :.rmuch of the cocaine consumed in the flow of drugs from Mexico by: is country came from and through e.xico. By late 1973 heroin flow- --Forcibly preventing shipment of i-: from and through Mexico to the drugs to the United States iUited States had increased to about (called interdiction). h. if the total consumption. --Eliminating illicit production in September and October 1974, Drug in Mexico. E.orcement Administration officials es-i-ted that --Assisting the Mexican Government's antidrug efforts. --7 percent of all heroin reaching :-e United States comes from The U.S. Ambassador, as the - ppies grown in iMexico; President's representative, is responsible for seeing that a._. --virtually all the marihuana seized objectives are chieved. In the t.-es from Mexico and the Carib- drug area he is supported by :en; --the Drug Enforcement Administra- ---ut 3 billion tablets of danger- tion, the prime U.S. enforcement :.s drugs, valued at more than agency, maintaining liaison with 51.5 billion on the illicit market, Mexican Government narcotics en- :-2es from Mexico in a year; and forcement agencies, and --cozaine, which is becoming a pref- --drug control committees in each erred drug of abuse, passes country. (See pp. 2 and 3.) -r-,Jgh Mexico on its way from _-n and Central America. Progress -- :-al America is also a potentially C' Since 1969 the United States and i-:rt transshipment point for Mexican Governments' antidrug ef- -. :s corin to the United States. forts have: GGD-75-4d -r:, -.. Upon removal. the report ::e ce hould be noted hereon. ATTACIHIENT 5 Page 2 --Increased drug seizures, opium and traffickers ho flee to :Gexico are .arihuana eradication, and arrests. not prosecuted ad icarcerated Mexico readily grants citizenship --Provided better information on to persons having exican parents drug trafficking. or background, regardles of the solicitant's place of birth. Some --Improved Mexican capability of them, before beco.ming ' xican through material assistance grants residents, lived in the United and training. States until they ;,ere convicted or suspected of violating U.S. drug --Increased cooperation and discus- laws. sion at.high diplomatic levels. (See pp. 15 and 16.) " The Administration estimates that more than 250 such persons now live Problems in Mexico. Some still traffick in drugs. Because they re Mexican Even with this progress, increasing citizens, the Mexican Government amounts of drugs continue to reach refuses to extradite them to the the United States. United States for prosecution. Factors which have hindered greater In a few cases, Mexican citizens effectiveness in reducing the flow have been convicted in Mexico for of drugs to the United Stztes inlude drug violations in the United States. Greater use of this proce- --lack of full cooperation betwee:i dure might deter Mexicans who have the two Governments regarding drug violated U.S. drug laws from using informdtion and extradition and Mexico as a sanctuary fr.m prosecu- tion. (See p. 28.) --linited technical resources and m,'npower. (See pp. 20 to 25.) Material assistance Cooperation Mexico is not only a major trans- shipment area but also an indigenous One way to reduce the flow of drugs source of drugs. Its sparcely pop- to the United States is the exchange ulated and rugged mountains make of accurate data about the activities location and eradication of clandes- of known and suspected drug traf- tine cultivation areas difficult fickers between the Drug Enforcement and time consuming. Administration and the Mexican Fed- eral police. The Drug Enforcement Its extended border with the United Ad:iinistration, however, has had .States and two long coastlines only limited opportunity to inter- afford traff,kers virtually un- rogate persons arrested by the Fed- limited locations for smuggling. eral police for drug crimes and This, in turn, makes it harder for sometimes was denied access to in- its ill-equipped police to locate formation the police obtained. trafficking routes. (See Dp. 6 (See p. 20.) and 25.) Imr.obilization of drug traffickers Since 1970 the United States has is further hindered because drug given Mexico $6.8 million n ATTACHHI-T 5 Page 3 .- :,::,, t r. -s fo)r as;heliko The Mexican Government rc;.e. .:.~ ~,i:,a.iJ4.. A,,ion.:l . that corruption exists at ann ;' -.- : .' n ha been appv.;i by tLie its levels, including the ,;icc ;e::.t Co!iit.ec on Intcl;..'ional Federal police, and developed lan; Con-rl . (Se? p. '2.) cs to overcome this problem, s:.ch as rcorganizing the police. Thi ..;: .) 25 of thi 350 -i,::.ber reorganization was o bei: i. :'' ,an Federal police forc:. have January 1973, but no action h,; .n trined in drug enforcement been taken as of September 19Y,. by the Drug Enforce- ,-c.-2urees (See p. 18.) -n- Ar:;inistration; this training is cc,.ti.uing. (Se p. 26.) Central America _- ,.itnd States is also providing Central America is not currently .- Ji..nt and training to the Mex- considered a prime source in tren' i-cn CUStzi;s Service. (See p. 27.) shipping drugs to the United Stat-:- however, it does offer trafi'ir'q, Ch;er matters many of the same benefits as doe:,. Mexico. _-A has had some success in locating aen eliminating narcotics laborato- ries in other countries by publicly As enforcement improves in Mexico, cffuring rewards for information the Drug Enforcement Administreti"-. bX0ut drug traffickers. expects traffickIrs to make greater use of the Central American coun- Though the Administration has had tries. Plans are being developed, rfcration for a number of years end the Administration plans to trat heroin laboratories are operat- ass'gn gents to these countries. - at least eight areas in ex- irin (See p. 34.) ico, no significant laboratory had 'een seized until February 5, 1974. ince then six other laboratories RECOMMENDATIONS ave been seized. The Attorney General, in coopera- s'-- believes that publicly offering cion with the Secretary of State, .rs; ,;ould increae the identi- should improve information oathpr- ;-.azian of illicit laboratories, ing and cooperation in Mexico : t- exic.n Govern:-ent has not : encouraging the Mexican Governmr-'nt a-red t offer rewards for informa- to -i.n, despite repedted U.S. request;. .ihoijgh the Drug Enforcement Admin- --share information obtained durii; istration recognizes that many ocean- interrogation of suspected drug going vessels and aircraft are used traffickers and -oving drugs from Mexico illic- -= i&;1., it had not monitored the use --prosecute traffickers fleeing caqirjr2 vessels and aircraft to Mexico within the Mexican r;g traffickers. (See p. 18 and c, judicial system if Mexico con- tinues to refuse ext.'adition. ATTACHMENT 5 Page 4 AGE:;CY ACTICOIS AND URESOLVED ISSUES GAO rcognizes that many probleir;s affect the efforts to stop the NCpart;ent of Justice ficw of narcotics and dngerous drau; into the United States tnrd The unclassified version of the De- that he3e pobliens and Lheir partment of Justice's comments are seriousness change fro:n time to intluded in appendix I. A copy of time. Ate Department's classified response will be made available to authorized' At the completion of GAO's field- persons upon request. work in late 1973, GAO's findings were discussed with.appropriate The Justice Department U.S. agency officials in the field and in flashington. At that time --agrees with GAO's analysis ofex- GAO had not identified, nor had tradition problems and the possi- agency officials recognized, the bility of prosecuting people in three above areas mentioned by the Mexico for violations of U.S. Department as causing major prob- statutes and lems. --recognizes the merit of some ob- servations concerning enforce- If the Department has suTicient ment operations. evidence to identify these areas as causing real problems to their However, the Department believes efforts to stop the flow of GAO's findings, conclusions, and rec- narcotics and dangerous drugs into or.endations have serious weakness- the United States, no additional es. The Department believes the work by GAO to develop these prob- report is a random collection of ob- lems.should be necessary. GAO servations and includes items of suggests that the Department con- secondary importance and that it tinue to work with the Governmnt ignores some significant issues, of Mexico to overcome these prob- such as (1) investigative proce- lems. dures used by the Mexican Judicial Police, (2) lack of operating agree- The Department also commented ex- :ents between the Drug Enforcement tensively on how it believed (1) Administration and local Mexican the Government of Mexico could im- police officers on custody and pro- prove its drug enforcement activi- secution of arrested carriers, and ties and (2)U.S. operations on (3) problems created for U.S. border the border could be improved. It investigations by the policy of the said that actions had been or were Government of Mexico which requires being taken to improve activities that known narcotics and dangerous in both areas but that more efforts drugs being smuggled out of Mexico were needed. be seized in Mexico. (This policy prevents the identification of The Drug Enforcement Administra- U.S. traffickers by keeping the tion's comments on specific actions drugs under surveillance until they planned or being taken on GAO's rec- are delivered.) omniendations are included in the ATTACHMENT. 5 Page 5 c,f t. r ;;c. (,Ce p. 22 !nd t,'Vll tf'RS FOR COilSIDEPR ATON LY T'I'-t1 CONGRESS ' -r a.cf State This report is being sent to the Congress to advise it of efforts T'e :ep.rt,-ent of State (see app. needed and being taken to reduce ;, endorse the recommendations the flow of drugs into the United a- said actions are underway and States from Mexico and Central -il be pursued. These actions are America. The report should be use- i.-l&_ed in the body of the report. ful to those committees having over- *See . 32.) sight responsibilities in this area. V ATTACHMENT, $141.7 $122.0 $110.3 $89.9 $87.2 Fiscal Year: 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Customs, INS, and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs/DEA Expenditures (Millions) /No cost for BNDD/DEA was included since such data was unavailable. BNDD/DEA esimatsd cost for 1972 was $4.3 million. The following chart illustrates the mix and general purpose for whi ch ATTACHMENT 7 these expenditures were made. 1971 $73.9 $17.1 Customs, 23% . $4.3 BNDD/DEA, 6%/ $52.5 INS, 71% / 1976 $141.7 __/_~ $39.7 Custbms, 28% $82.4 INS, 58A ; 7 29% in 1971 and 42% in 1976 '' spent for narcotics and contraband control $19.6 DEA, 14% Customs, INS and BNDD/DEA Expenditures fiscal year 1971 and 1976 (dollars in' milliorisT -/Since BNDD/DEA cost estimate for FY 71 unavailable, FY 72 cost for BNDD/DEA was used
Federal Drug Law Enforcement Programs
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-11-16.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)