oversight

Plan to Address Issues Related to the Persian Gulf Crisis

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-10-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

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                       U n i te d S ta te s G e n e 4   A c c o u n ti n g   O ffi c e
                       N a ti o n a l S e c u ri ty a n d In te rn a ti o n a l
G AO                   A ffa i rs D i v i s i o n
                                                                /q * 2        q ((f



O c to b e r 1 9 9 0
                       P l a n to A d d re s s
                       Is s u e s R e l a te d to th e
                       P e rs i a n G u l f C ri s i s


                                                                                                               k
Foreword


            In the wake of dramati c                          changes        i n Europe and
            i m proved      East-West rel a ti o ns,                   the Uni t ed States is
             now faci n g a vol a ti l e           si t uati o n       i n the Persi a n Gul f .
           U.S. defense forces have undergone                                            the l a rgest
           rapi d depl o yment             si n ce Worl d War II. Whereas                                    US,
           forces have l o ng been faced wi t h the prospect                                               of a
           conventi o nal            war i n Europe agai n st                            Warsaw Pact
             forces, they now face a di f ferent                               mi l i t ary        adversary
           i n a vastl y di f ferent             envi r onment.                 Many woul d
             argue that the cri s i s i n the Persi a n Gul f is a fi e l d
           test of U.S. mi l i t ary             capabi l i t y        and an i n di c ator                  of
             the ki n ds of mi l i t ary          forces and equi p ment                             needed
             for future conti n genci e s.                      The cri s i s is further
             affecti n g   our domesti c                and i n ternati o nal                    affai r s as
             they rel a te, for exampl e ,                      to the budget defi c i t                  and
             our forei g n    mi l i t ary       and economi c                      assi s tance
             programs.

           Operati o n                    “D esert Shi e l d ”                       has become one of the
             most si g ni f i c ant                        mul t i n ati o nal           mi l i t ary       operati o ns
           i n the past 40 years-one                                               that hol d s l o ng-term
             i m pl i c ati o ns                 for the Uni t ed States+ How wel l the
              Uni t ed States wi l fare i n the cri s i s and the after-
              math is uncertai n                             at thi s poi n t. However, it coul d be
              a si g ni f i c ant                si g n of our mi l i t ary                       posture and
            standi n g                i n worl d affai r s i n to the next century. We
              have prepared                            thi s pl a n to gui d e our efforts i n eval -
              uati n g i s sues ari s i n g                             from the Persi a n Gul f cri s i s .
              We have recei v ed                             several              requests            from the
            Congress                     rel a ted to some of these i s sues and expect
            to recei v e other requests. Our work is i n tended                                                           to
               assi s t U.S. pol i c ymakers,                                  government                 admi n i s tra-
            tors, and l e gi s l a tors                              i n deci s i o ns          they face as events
             unfol d              i n the regi o n.




           Frank C. Conahan
           Assi s tant Comptrol l e r                        General
Conknts



A. U.S. and
   Forei g n
   Commi t ments
B. Pl a nni n g  for
   the Cri s i s
C. Mobi l i z ati o n
   and
   Depl o yment          of
   U.S. Forces
Il. Mi l i t ary
    Operati o nal
    Consi d erati o ns
E. Internati o nal
   Rel a ti o ns




                              Abbrevi a ti o na

                              DOD                 Department         of Defense
                              NA’IO               North Atl a nti c     Treaty Organi z ati o n
                              UN.                 Uni t ed Nati o ns
A. U.S. and             The worl d wi d e           concern           wi t h the Iraqi i n vasi o n                      of
                        Kuwai t was evi d ent                  i n the prompt and unani m ous
Forei g n               vote by member nati o ns                       of the U.N. Securi t y
Commi t ments           Counci l      to condemn              it. A conti n ued               commi t ment-
                        fi n anci a l    and otherwi s e-of                     al l i e d   nati o ns           i s essen-
                        ti a l if the Iraqi threat to worl d peace i s to be
                        thwarted.         Questi o ns             have been rai s ed as to the ful l
                        cost of mi l i t ary        operati o ns            i n the Gul f and the
                        extent to whi c h other nati o ns                               are shari n g         i n the
                        costs and commi t ments                       necessary             to resol v e             the
                        cri s i s . Concerns         are al s o bei n g expressed                          over U.S.
                        efforts to provi d e            l o ng-term            regi o nal          securi t y          to the
                        Persi a n Gul f area. Key i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                        1. What are the economi c            costs to the Uni t ed States
                        of supporti n g     Operati o n   “D esert Shi e l d ”      and of the
                        Uni t ed Nati o ns’ sancti o ns       agai n st     Iraq? What are
                        the domesti c      economi c    rami f i c ati o ns     and the U.S.
                        response?

                        2. What          i s the extent of burden-shari n g         among sym-
                        patheti c          countri e s  for the cri s i s i n terms of fi n ances,
                        mi l i t ary       support,    and other ai d ?

                        3. To what extent are new arrangements                                          or agree-
                        ments bei n g made between the Uni t ed                                      States and
                        other countri e s    wi t h respect to mi l i t ary                           overfl i g hts,
                        stati o ni n g,  and other requi r ements?

                        4. What commi t ments                 has the Uni t ed States made
                          for sustai n i n g      and repatri a ti n g     refugees   and di s -
                         pl a ced         persons from the Iraqi i n vasi o n       of Kuwai t ?
                         How are the resul t i n g            costs bei n g shared among the
                        i n ternati o nal        communi t y?

                        5. What i m pact wil the Persi a n Gul f cri s i s have                                          on
                        the U.S. abi l i t y to fulfil i t s securi t y commi t ments                                         in
                        other parts of the worl d ?


B. Pl a nni n g   for   Sound pl a nni n g         i s essenti a l      for the success of U.S.
                        operati o ns       and thei r i m pact i n the Gul f cri s i s . From
the Cri s i s           a mi l i t ary   perspecti v e,            the Department      of Defense’s

                        Page 1
(DOD) pl a nni n g               responsi b i l t i e s         i n cl u de          force mobi l -
i z ati o n,   depl o yment,              and warti m e                  operati o ns
  agai n st    an unfami l i a r                 adversary          under a radi c al l y
 di f ferent     scenari o          from that of the NATO/Warsaw
    Pact confrontati o n              i n Europe. The State Department
    al s o has Gul f cri s i s pl a nni n g                responsi b i l t i e s          such as
 those rel a ted          to noncombatant                     evacuati o n.               Key
  i s sues are as fol l o ws:

  1. How effecti v e          have DOD-establ i s hed              pl a ns been
i n carryi n g     out mi l i t ary       operati o ns      i n the Persi a n
 Gul f cri s i s ? What “le ssons                l e arned”    can be appl i e d
to future conti n gency             pl a nni n g?

2. To what extent has the “T otal                Force Pol i c y”      been                           /
                                                                                                      E
a workabl e    concept     i n establ i s hi n g     the appropri a te
force for Gul f operati o ns?            What cri t eri a  were pre-
domi n ant  i n DOD’s force mi x sel e cti o n?

3. Di d DOD cl e arl y     defi n e appropri a te    rol e s for the
vari o us  servi c es  (e.g., Army vs. Mari n es)           and thei r
forces i n the Gul f cri s i s so as to maxi m i z e
resources?

4. To what extent are Gul f operati o ns  affecti n g
pl a nned DOD force reducti o ns and restructuri n g?

5. To what extent do DOD pl a ns i n cl u de      the use of
host nati o n resources       for supporti n g U.S. mi l i t ary
operati o ns  i n the Gul f ?

6. What          programs          are i n pl a ce          or proposed            to assi s t
affected         Gul f -depl o yed        servi c e          personnel           and thei r
fami l i e s?

7. How effecti v e/effi c i e nt                   was State Department
emergency    acti o n pl a nni n g                  i n Iraq and Kuwai t ?




Page 2
C. Mobi l i z ati o n   reserve forces for the Gul f cri s i s have been massi v e
and Depl o yment        undertaki n gs.            Not si n ce the earl y 1970s has there
of U.S. Forces          been such a l a rge-scal e                   mobi l i z ati o n   of our reserve
                        forces. How wel l the US. executed                              these operati o ns
                        i s a si g ni f i c ant     measure of our defense capabi l i t y
                        and i m portant             for pl a nni n g             future conti n gency
                         operati o ns.          Key i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                        1. How effecti v e        was DOD i n mobi l i z i n g       i t s forces
                        and havi n g       them properl y     trai n ed        for a Persi a n
                        Gul f confl i c t?    What probl e ms         have been encoun-
                        tered, and how are they bei n g resol v ed?

                        2. How effecti v e             were ai r bft/seal i f t pl a ns and exe-
                        cuti o n i n depl o yi n g            U.S. forces and equi p ment   to
                        the Persi a n Gul f            regi o n?

                        3. Di d the recentl y              created        U.S. Transportati o n
                        Command      perform                duri n g      mobi l i z ati o n as i n tended?

                        4. To what extent was the movement             of U.S. troops
                        and equi p ment    constrai n ed by port faci l i t i e s and
                        i n tra-theater transportati o n  i n the Gul f regi o n?


D. Mi l i t ary         The Uni t ed States faces enormous                      chal l e nges                 in its
                        preparati o ns         for conducti n g      war-fi g hti n g                   operati o ns
Operati o nal           i n the Persi a n Gul f . Confronted             wi t h an unfami l i a r
Consi d erati o ns       foe i n a harsh envi r onment,             DOD must ensure the
                         adequacy        of i t s operati o ns    if the Uni t ed States i s to
                         achi e ve     a favorabl e       outcome    shoul d          hosti l i t i e s           erupt
                         i n the Gul f .


Weapon System           The envi r onmental        real i t i e s-hi g h heat and sand-
Performance             of the Gul f pose maj o r threats to the performance
                        and avai l a bi l i t y of DOD’s maj o r weapon       systems.
                        Key i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                        1. Does DOD have the proper mi x and types                                         of
                        weapon     systems to conduct effecti v e mi l i t ary                                  oper-
                        ati o ns In the Gul f ?

                        Page 3
                                2. Are US. maj o r weapon                    systems (e.g., the Apache
                                and the F-f17A)        performi n g              as expected        i n the
                                Gul f?’ What probl e ms        and “le ssons             l e arned”      have
                                surfaced      that have appl i c abi l i t y          to future mi l i t ary
                                operati o ns?

                                3. How effecti v e    have weapon              systems’ vul n era-
                                bility anal y ses  been i n anti c i p ati n g       probl e ms    i n the
                                Gul f regi o n?


Chemi c al / Bi o l o gi c al   The threat of a confl i c t                  i n a chemi c al         or bi o l o gi c al
Warfare                         envi r onment     i n the Gul f                  i s a concern.        Iraq report-
                                edl y has both offensi v e                     chemi c al     and bi o l o gi c al
                                capabi l i t y and has used                     it i n past confl i c ts.             Key
                                i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                                4. Can the Uni t ed States sustai n          mi l i t ary              operati o ns
                                (forces and equi p ment)      i n a chemi c al / bi o l o gi c al
                                envi r onment   i n the Gul f regi o n wi t hout                  l a rge and
                                unacceptabl e      l o sses?

                                5. Are U.S. medi c al     resources                     adequate          for the care
                                and treatment       of chemi c al / bi o l o gi c al                   casual t i e s in
                                the Gul f regi o n?


Communi c ati o ns/             The effecti v e          use of communi c ati o ns           and el e ctroni c
El e ctroni c     Warfare       warfare capabi l i t i e s         may provi d e       a deci s i v e       edge i n
                                wagi n g    war agai n st       Iraqi forces. Maxi m um                   use of
                                these capabi l i t i e s     requi r es    conti n ued     i n teracti o ns
                                wi t hi n  our own forces as wel l as wi t h our al l i e s,
                                Key i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                                6. How effecti v e have tacti c al                        communi c ati o ns       been
                                among U.S. forces and forei g n                           al l i e s i n the Gul f
                                regi o n?

                                7. How effecti v e               wil U.S el e ctroni c               warfare         assets
                                be i n counteri n g             the Iraqi threat?




                                Page 4
Sustai n abi l i t y/              The Uni t ed States is faced wi t h the task of sup-
Logi s ti c s                      porti n g      its forces-possi b l y     for a protracted             war-
                                    wi t hout       the benefi t of an establ i s hed    l o gi s ti c al
                                   i n frastructure         i n the Gul f area. Key i s sues are as
                                    fol l o ws:

                                   8. How effecti v e          has l o gi s ti c s        support   been i n pro
                                   vi d i n g suppl i e s    and equi p ment                to meet mi s si o n
                                   needs?
                                   9. What       l o gi s ti c s pl a ns and i n frastructure       woul d                           be
                                   necessary             for a protracted    confl i c t   i n the Gul f ?

                                   10. Were preposi t i o ned                equi p ment           and suppl i e s              in
                                   ready condi t i o n      when           off-l o aded          from mari t i m e
                                   shi p s?

                                     11. How effecti v e           have mai n tenance                     operati o ns
                                   been i n ensuri n g           the maxi m um        avai l a bi l i t y              of cri t -
                                   i c al equi p ment?

                                     12. To what extent are contract servi c es           bei n g used
                                   i n the Persi a n Gul f cri s i s ? What are the associ a ted
                                   costs and ri s ks i n vol v ed      i n the event of hosti l i t i e s?

                                   13. Has the i n dustri a l             base been abl e to overcome
                                   expanded       producti o n            bottl e necks    i n order to meet
                                   surge requi r ements                for mi s si o n  needs i n the Gul f ?


E. Internati o nal                 Al t hough   the Gul f cri s i s has defi n i t i v e                  i m pl i c ati o ns
                                   for the U.S. mi l i t ary          posture, it al s o               has i m pl i c a-
Rel a ti o ns                      ti o ns for U.S. i n ternati o nal         rel a ti o ns.


Forei g n           Assi s tance   Spurred by the cri s i s , several       of our al l i e s i n the
                                   Gul f regi o n have requested      i n creased          assi s tance
                                   from the Uni t ed States. Key i s sues are as fol l o ws:

                                     1. What securi t y   arrangements                        exi s t for the sal e of
                                    weapon     systems (e*g,, Sti n ger                    mi s si l e s) to countri e s
                                   i n the Gul f regi o n (e.g., Saudi                     Arabi a )?


                                   Page 6
                    2. Do countri e s    i n the Gul f regi o n (e.g., Saudi
                    Arabi a )  have the capabi l i t y     to effecti v el y mai n tai n
                    and support       weapon       systems (e.g., F-15 fi g hters)
                    sol d to them by the Uni t ed States?

                    3. What i s the i m pact of i n creased         mi l i t ary and eco-
                    nomi c assi s tance   to fri e ndl y  Mi d dl e     East countri e s
                    on our assi s tance    programs      to other nati o ns?

                    4. To what extent have U.S. economi c               assi s tance
                    reci p i e nts (e-g., Egypt and Paki s tan)       suffered       l o sses
                    as a resul t of the Gul f cri s i s ? What are the i m pl i c a-
                    ti o ns for the U.S. economi c       assi s tance   program?


Sancti o ns/Trade   The Uni t ed      States and the Uni t ed Nati o ns have
                      advocated      and i m posed      economi c          sancti o ns    agai n st
                    Iraq i n an     effort to resol v e      the cri s i s . These sanc-
                    ti o ns wil    have worl d wi d e       economi c          i m pacts.   Key
                    i s sues are    as fol l o ws:

                    6. To what extent have forei g n                   governments            com-
                    pl i e d wi t h Uni t ed Nati o ns-i m posed             embargo         sanc-
                    ti o ns agai n st    Iraq?

                    6. How effecti v e    have U.S. Treasury                    efforts      been      in
                    bl o cki n g Iraqi and Kuwai t assets?

                    7. What are the i m pacts  of the trade                     embargo        on
                    U.S. commodi t y  markets?

                    8. How effecti v e  are U.S. and i n ternati o nal efforts
                    to moni t or  and counter the effects of a worl d wi d e
                    oil shortage?


Terrori s m         Iraq has announced          the threat of empl o yi n g      ter-
                    rori s t attacks agai n st    U.S. i n stal l a ti o ns and per-
                    sonnel     A key i s sue i s as fol l o ws:

                    9. What measures         have the State Department                         and
                    DOD taken to combat the threat of i n ternati o nal                               ter-
                    rori s m ari s i n g from the Gul f cri s i s ?

                    Page 6
Page   7
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