Information Security: Weaknesses at 22 Agencies

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-11-10.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)


         Accwntabilii       l   Inte@y     l   Rcliibllity

United States General Accounting                             Office                                  Accounting   and Information
Washington,  DC 20548                                                                                        Management    Division


            November                     lo,1999

            The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
            Ranking Minority Member
            Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism
              and Government Information
            Committee on the Judiciary
            United States Senate

            Subject: Information                             Securitv:   Weaknesses at 22 Agencies

            Dear Senator Feinstein:

            On October 6,1999, I testified before the Subcommittee on the need for improved
            federal information security.’ I noted that audits by GAO and agency inspectors
            general show that 22 of the largest federal agencies were not adequately protecting
            critical federal operations and assets from computer-based  attacks. I concluded that
            addressing this widespread and persistent problem would require significant
            management attention and action within individual agencies as well as increased
            coordination and oversight at the governmentwide     level.

            During the question-and-answer    period of that hearing, you requested that we provide
            summaries of significant information    security weaknesses previously reported at
            those 22 federal agencies. My response to your request is included in the two
            enclosures to this letter.

            Enclosure 1 provides brief summaries of the reported information security
            weaknesses at each of the 22 federal agencies and cites the reports from which this
            information was drawn. These reports were issued from May 1998 through October
             1999, and they describe conditions that existed at the time of the related audits.
            Since then, many agencies have undertaken efforts to correct reported weaknesses.
            However, until the results of subsequent audits become available, we cannot assess
            the effectiveness of these corrective actions.

                                       cture Protection. . Fundamjatal                        Needed to Assure Secuntv of Federal
            1      .    .
                                                                       ImD rovements
            @emtiom                (GAOA’-AIMD-O@7, dctober 6,1999).

                                                                GAO/AI&ID-OO-32R     Federal Information    Security Weaknesses

  Enclosure 2 lists GAO‘ reports that chronicle our assessments of federal information
 security since 1993. These reports provide additional insight into widespread
 information security weaknesses in the federal government.

 We are sending a copy of this response to the Honorable John Kyl, Chairman,
 Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Senate
 Committee on the Judiciary. Please contact me at (202) 512-6240 or Bob Dacey,               ,
 Director, Consolidated Audit and Computer Security Issues, at (202) 512-3317, if your   ’
or your staff have any questions. I can also be reached by e-mail at                         i
broc~.aimd@gao.gov. Key contributors to this summary were Jean Boltz, David
Irvin, and Jeffrey Knott.

Sincerely yours,

Jack L. Brock
Director, Governmentwide     and Defense
 Information Systems


Page 2                   GAOMMD-00-32R       Federal Information Security Weaknesses
Enclosure      1

       Information        Securitv Weaknesses ReDorted             for Federal    Agencies
                           From Mav 18.1998 to October             4.1999

Department         of Agriculture

 In July 1999, we reported that the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) National
 Finance Center (NFC) had serious access control weaknesses that affected its
 ability to prevent and/or detect unauthorized changes to payroll and other
payment data or computer software. NFC develops and operates administrative
and financial systems, including payroll/personnel,  property management, and
accounting systems for both the USDA and over 60 other federal organizations.
During fiscal year 1998, NFC processed more than $19 billion in payroll payments
for more than 450,000 federal employees. NFC is also responsible for maintaining
records for the world’s largest 401(k)-type program, the federal Thrift Savings
Program. This program, which is growing at about $1 billion per month, covers
about 2.3 million employees and had over $60 billion in assets as of September 30,
 1.998. The weaknesses we identified increased the risk that users could cause
improper payments and that sensitive information    could be misused, improperly
disclosed, or destroyed. Also, in February 1999, the USDA JG reported that Rural
Development had not implemented a “firewall system” to provide security over
Internet telecommunications.

Fraud. Misuse. and Imurouer Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-99-227, July 30,1999) and u,S.
DeDXtment of A&culture Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Year 1998, Audit
Report No. 50401-30-FM,       February   1999.

Deuartment         of Commerce

In March 1999, the Department of Commerce Inspector General (IG) reported
weaknesses in the Department’s information     system controls. The review found
that formal, comprehensive   security policies did not exist or were incomplete.
Also, controls over access to operating systems and the associated fmancial
applications were inadequate, and controls associated with the procedures for
making software changes were weak. Weaknesses also existed in properly
segregating duties and controlling physical access to the data centers.
Furthermore, disaster recovery plans were incomplete or outdated.

Office of Inspector    General,   Audit Report   No. FSD-1OS999-0001,    March   1999.

DeDartment         of Defense

In August 1999, we reported that serious weaknesses in Department of Defense
(DOD) information  security continue to provide both hackers and hundreds of

Page 3                     GAOIAIMD-00-32R         Federal Information     Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 1

thousands of authorized users the opportunity to modify, steal, inappropriately
disclose, and destroy sensitive DOD data. These weaknesses impair DOD’s ability
to (1) control physical and electronic access to its systems and data, (2) ensure
that software running on its systems is properly authorized, tested, and
functioning as intended, (3) limit employees’ ability to perform incompatible
functions, and (4) resume operations in the event of a disaster. As a result,
numerous Defense functions, including weapons and supercomputer research,
logistics, finance, procurement, personnel management, military health, and
payroll, have already been adversely affected by system attacks or fraud.

DOD Information Securitv: Serious WeaknessesContinue to Place Defense Onerations at
f&&c (GAO/AIMD-99-107,August 26,1999).

Deuartment     of Education

In May 1998, the Department of Education IG reported that improvements were
required in security over financial systems and in disaster recovery capabilities.
The deficiencies in the department’s payment system could have enabled
unauthorized users to access confidential data, change data, make unauthorized
payments, or bring down the system. The payment system was used to annually
process about $33 billion in grant and contract disbursements. Education decided
to spend minimal resources on the system, which was replaced in fiscal year 1998
with a core financial management system.

Annual Accountabilitv Renort - Fiscal Year Ended Seutember SO.199’7,Office of the Chief
Financial Officer, July 21,1998. (As of October 15,1999,the Department of Education IG
had not published its fiscal year 1998consolidated financial statement audit report, which
is expected to include an updated assessment of information system general controls.)

Deuartment     of Energy

In its fiscal year 1998 accountability report, the Department of Energy (DOE)
recognized the need to improve unclassified computer security, noting the
apparent increase in system and network vulnerabilities at the department. Such
vulnerabilities increase the likelihood of unauthorized intrusions into DOE’s
publicly available systems. The report states that one of the primary causes was
the lack of a meaningful policy and program framework, while another root cause
was the lack of awareness of system vulnerabilities by employees, line managers,
and upper management.

U.S. Denartment of EnerEfvFiscal Year 1998Accountabilitv Renort, DOE/CR-0067,
February 1999.

Page 4                GAO/AIMD-OO-32R Federal Information Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 1

Environmental        Protection   Aaencv

In September 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) IG reported
weaknesses in critical mainframe operating system software controls. These
weaknesses could affect system integrity, or allow a knowledgeable user to
 circumvent or disable security mechanisms and/or modify programs or data files
on the computer without leaving an audit trail. The IG also identified continuing
security concerns for regional computer facilities and data, citing weaknesses in
security planning, contingency and disaster recovery planning, and security

Environmental Protection Agencv Office of Insuector General Audit Reuort - Financial
Management: Audit of EPA’s Fiscal 1998Financial Statements, Report Number 99B0003,
September 28, 1999.

Federal   Emernencv       Management       Arrencv

In February 1999, as part of its audit of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s (FEMA) financial statements, an independent accounting fum reported
information system security and access control deficiencies. The fun? concluded
that these deficiencies indicate that FEMA’s computer-based controls do not
contribute to the reliability of the accounting systems.

Federal Emereencv Management Agencv Office of Insuector General Audit Division,
Auditor’s Reuort on FEMA’s Fiscal Year 1998F’inancial Statements, H-&99, March 1999.

General   Services    Administration

In February 1999, an independent accounting firm recommended that GSA
(1) strengthen logical and physical access controls over its information
technology environment, and (2) apply security policies and procedures uniformly
across service lines. The fum’s review of four GSA systems identified weaknesses
associated with (1) logical access granted being consistent with job
responsibilities, (2) controls to monitor and detect unauthorized access,
(3) physical access to computer resources, and (4) access privileges for users who
had been terminated or had changed job responsibilities. These four systems
include processes for accounting, tracking real property, supporting GSA’s
worldwide supply function, and managing its motor vehicle fleet. The firm also
found that security policies and procedures throughout GSA did not in all cases
address control issues such as password administration and management, access
violation monitoring, and security awareness training. In the absence of certain
preventive and detective controls, GSA cannot ensure that its mission critical
applications and data are protected from unauthorized access, modification, or
deletion by internal users or external sources.

Page 5                  GAO/AIMD-00-32K        Federal Information   Security Wealmesses
 Enclosure 1

 GSA 1998    Annual Report, February 1999.

Department       of Health    and Human       Services

In February 1999, the Health and Human Services IG reported serious control
weaknesses associated with the Department’s Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) computers. HCFA relies on extensive automated
operations at both its central office and the Medicare contractors to administer
the Medicare program and to process and account for Medicare expenditures.
The HCFA central office maintains administrative data, such as Medicare
enrollment, eligibility, and paid claims data, and processes all payments for
managed care. In fiscal year 1998, managed care payments totaled $33 billion.

United States DeDartment of Health      and Human   Services. Accountabilitv   ReDOIT: Fiscal
Year 1998, February 26,1999.

Department       of Housing       and Urban   DeveloDment

In March 1999, the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) IG reported the need
for improvements related to general system security, administration of personnel
security operations, and access controls over HUD’s two major payment systems.
The IG identified general system security weaknesses associated with protecting
sensitive and critical mainframe systems, administering local area network
passwords, monitoring network security, developing and testing disaster recovery
plans, and controlling software changes for critical mainframe applications.
HUD’s automated information systems are critical in supporting all facets of its
programs, including mortgage insurance, servicing, and administrative operations.
During fiscal year 1998, HUD’s two major payment systems processed
disbursements for approximately $33 billion, including support of Section 8
programs and a broad range of grants to states, municipalities, independent
companies, nonprofit institutions, and individuals.

Office of InsDector General Audit ReDort - US DeDartment of Housing: and Urban
DeveloDment    Audit of Fiscal Year 1998 Financial Statements, 99-FO-177-0003, March 29,

Department      of the Interior

In April 1999, the Interior IG reported general control weaknesses at the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the U.S. Geological Survey. The IG considered general
controls over certain automated information systems operated by the Bureau of
lndian Affairs to be ineffective. For example, the Bureau did not (1) have an
effective security program, (2) classify resources to determine the security level
needed, (3) properly safeguard computer hardware, (4) perform reviews to ensure

Page 6                  GAO/AIMD-OO-32R Federal Information               Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 1

 appropriate user access levels, (5) have segregation of duties for system support
 functions, (6) have controls over system software to effectively detect and deter
 inappropriate use, and (7) have an effective means of recovering or continuing
 computer operations in the event of system failure. The IG also reported that
 security weaknesses identified at one of the U.S. Geological Survey’s data centers
 increased the risk of unauthorized access and modifications to, and disclosure of,
 information processed on the data center’s mainframe computer.

S,                                                     April 1999.

DeDartment        of Justice

In February 1999, the Department of Justice IG reported that improvements were
needed in general controls at the department’s data centers and component
financial management systems. For example, at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, improvements were needed to correct deficiencies associated with
entitywide security program enhancements, logical access controls, a formal
change control process, and a comprehensive, tested business continuity plan.
The Drug Enforcement Administration lacked an incident response training
program for certain systems, a disaster recovery plan that includes alternate
backup sites, and access controls that ensure transferred or terminated
employees are promptly removed from user access files. Similar issues were
noted at the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Marshals
Service. The control weaknesses identified increase the risk that software
programs and data processed on these systems are not adequately protected from
unauthorized access.

U.,                                                                       Office of the
inspector   General,   Report   Number   99-05, February   1999.

DeDartment        of Labor

 In February 1999, the Department of Labor IG reported weaknesses associated
with entitywide security, access controls, and application software development
and change control. For example, standard security-related personnel policies
had not been developed or coordinated for five of the six systems reviewed. As a
result, these systems were exposed to potential risks that may result from
accidental and/or intentional personnel security failures or violations. Also, for
five of the six systems reviewed, independent risk assessments had not been
performed or properly documented on a regular basis or whenever systems had
changed. If risk assessments are not performed, then it is likely that threats and
vulnerabilities are not being identified and considered.

1J S. DemZtrnent of Labor Consolidated Financial Statement Audit, Office of Inspector
Gkneral, Report Number 12-99-002-13-001, February 26,1999.

Page 7                     GAO/AIMD-OO-32R Federal Information       Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 1

National    Aeronautics     and SDace Administration

In May 1999, we reported that, as part of our tests of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration’s (NASA) computer-based controls, we successfully
penetrated several mission-critical systems, including one responsible for
calculating detailed positioning data for earth orbiting spacecraft and another that
processes and distributes the scientific data received from these spacecraft.
Having obtained access, we could have disrupted ongoing command and control
operations and stolen, modified, or destroyed system software and data. A major
factor in our ability to penetrate these systems was that NASA was not effectively
managing information security throughout the agency.

Information Securitv: Manv NASA Mission-Critical Svstems Face Serious Risks
(GAO/AIMD-99-47, May X),1999).

Office   of Personnel     Management

In February 1999, an independent accounting firm reported weaknesses in OPM’s
entity-wide security program, access controls, application change control, and
service continuity based on its overall assessment of OPM’s information system
control environment. The firm found that the Retirement and Insurance Service’s
ri-minfi%me security policies did not specifically address important aspects of
security, and its local area network did not have formal documented security
policies and procedures. As a result, security controls may be inadequate,
responsibilities may be unclear, and controls may be inconsistently applied. Such
conditions may lead to insufficient protection of sensitive or critical resources
and disproportionately high expenditures for controls over low-risk resources.

Office of Personnel Management - Financial Statements - Retirement Program. Health
Benefits Program. Life Insurance Program - Fiscal Year 1998,Report Number 2F-00-98
103, March 1,1999.

Small Business Administration

In September 1999, the Small Business Administration (SBA) IG reported that
SBA’s general controls did not fully comply with established policies and
procedures. For example, (1) SBA had not funded and implemented an
entitywide security program, (2) unnecessary and excessive access privileges
reduced accountability and created segregation of duties weaknesses,
(3) application development and change control procedures were not consistently
applied in systems outside the Office of the Chief Information Officer’s control,
(4) programmers’ abilities to access operating systems could not be monitored,
and (5) security administrators and program managers needed training. As a
result of such weaknesses, SBA personnel, contractors, and business partners had
access to information and functions involving loan applications, financial

Page 8                  GAOIAJMD-00-32R Federal Information    Security Weaknesses
Enclosure 1

obligations, collections, disbursements, and write-offs that may be unnecessary or
reduce accountability. This increased the risks of financial loss and misuse of

Audit of SBA’s Information Svstems Controls, U.S. Small Business Administration, Offke
of Inspector General, Audit Report Number 9-19, September 2,1999.

Social Security   Administration

In November 1998, an independent accounting firm found that the Social Security
Administration’s (SSA) systems environment remained threatened by weaknesses
in several components of its information protection control structure.
Weaknesses were noted in the entitywide security program, and associated
weaknesses were identified in local area network and distributed systems
security, SSA’s mainframe computer security (controlling access to sensitive
information), and physical access controls. The fum concluded that, until
corrected, these weaknesses would continue to increase the risks of unauthorized
access to, and modification or disclosure of, sensitive SSA information. In turn,
unauthorized access to sensitive data can result in the loss of data, loss of trust
fund resources, and compromised privacy of information associated with SSA’s
enumeration, earnings, retirement, and disability processes and programs. SSA
programs disbursed about $416 billion in-fiscal year 1998, and delivered cash
benefits to about 50 million beneficiaries every month.

>,                                                                       November 20,

DeDartment    of State

 In August 1999, an independent accounting firm reported that the Department of
 State’s mainframe computers for domestic operations are considered vulnerable
to unauthorized access. Consequently, other systems, which process data using
these computers, may also be vulnerable. Similar weaknesses were found in the
 Paris Financial Service Center’s Accounting and Disbursing Center. A year
 earlier, in May 1998, we had reported that our tests at State demonstrated that its
 computer systems and the information they maintained were very susceptible to
hackers, terrorists, or other unauthorized individuals seeking to damage State
 operations or reap financial gain by exploiting the department’s information
security weaknesses. For example, without any passwords or specific knowledge
of State’s systems, we successfully gained access to State’s networks through dial-
in connections to modems. Having obtained this access, we could havemodified,
stolen, downloaded, or deleted important data; shut down services; and
monitored network traffic, such as e-mail and data files. In addition, we were able
to circumvent State’s internal network security controls and access.information
and sensitive data that would normally be off limits to most employees.

Page 9                GAO/AlMD-00-3ZR Federal Information         Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure    1

 Audit of the DeDartment of State’s 1997 and 1998 PrincitxIl Financial Statements, Leonard
 G. Birnbaum   and Company, I.&P, August 9, 1999; Computer                         Serious
 Weaknesses JeoDardize State Department     Orlerations (GAO/AIMD-98145,     May 18, 1998).

 Department        of TransDortation

 In March 1999, the Department of Transportation     IG reported that DOT’s
 Intermodal Data Network, which connects local area networks within DOT
agencies, was found vulnerable to unauthorized access. This weakness was
identified in fiscal year 1996 and considered on target for correction as of
December 1998. DOT was continuing work to ensure that weaknesses identified
in a previous GAO report were corrected. In May 1998, we reported that the
Federal Aviation Administration’s   controls were ineffective in all critical areas
included in our security review, including facilities physical security, operational
systems information security, future systems modernization security,
management structure, and policy implementation.       Vulnerabilities created by
inadequate controls place the safety of the airplane passengers at risk, while
sensitive information could be compromised and flight services interrupted.

Offke of InsDector General Audit ReDort - F’iscal Year 1998 Consolidated Financial
Statements,   Department   of Transportation, Report Number FE1999081,   March 30, 1999,
and Air Traffic Control: Weak Securitv Practices Jeowrdize Flight Safetv (GAO/
AIMD-98-155,   May l&1998).

DeDartment        of the Treasury

In December 1998, we reported that weaknesses in the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) computer security controls continued to place IRS’ automated systems and
taxpayer data at serious risk to both internal and external threats that could result
m the denial of computer services or in the unauthorized disclosure, modification,
or destruction of taxpayer data. Also, in October 1999, we reported that general
computer controls at the Department’s Financial Management Service and its
contractor data centers placed its financial systems at significant risk of
unauthorized    disclosure and modification  of sensitive data and programs, misuse
or damage to computer resources, or disruption of critical operations. As a result,
billions of dollars of payments and collections were at risk of fraud.

IRS Svstems Securitv: Although Significant    Imm-ovements  Made. Tax Processing
ODerations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38,    December 14, 1998) and
F’inancial Management    Service: Significant Weaknesses in Comwter   Controls
(GAO/A.IMD-OO-4,   October 4,1999).

Department        of Veterans   Affairs

In October 1999, we reported that Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) systems
continued to be vulnerable to unauthorized access. VA operates the largest health

Page 10                  GAO/AIMD-OO-32R     Federal Information     Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 1

 care deIivery system in the United States and reported spending more than
 $17 billion on medical care in fiscal year 1998. The department also processed
more than 42 million benefit payments totaling about $22 billion in fiscal year 1998
and provided life insurance protection through more than 2.4 million ,policies that
 represented about $23 billion in coverage. In providing these benefits and
services, VA collects and maintains sensitive medical record and benefit payment
information for veterans and their family members. We, as well as the VA IG,
continued to find serious problems that placed sensitive information at increased
risk of inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, improper disclosure, or
destruction, possibly occurring without detection. For example, at one VA
insurance center, 265 users who had not been authorized to perform data entry
had the ability to read, write, and delete information related to insurance awards.
Such unauthorized access could lead to improper insurance payments.

Information &stems: The Status of CommuterSecuritv at the Denartment of Veterans
Affairs (GAO/AIMD-00-05,October 4,1999).

U.S. Agencv for International     DeveloDment

In March 1999, the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) IG
reported that USAID’s client-server and mainframe general controls are not
effective. Specifically, the audit found that USAID’s (1) entity-wide security
program and management, (2) access controls, (3) application software
development and change control, and (4) segregation of computer system duties
provided inadequate control over client-server and mainframe operations. Also,
deficiencies were noted for system software controls and continuity of services
for the client-server computer environment. Because of these weaknesses,
USAID lacks the assurance that the data are accurately processed or that systems
and data are adequately secured. A primary reason for the ineffective controls is
the lack of an agencywide security program that includes clear security
responsibilities and agencywide security processes.

Audit of GeneralControls Over USAID’s Mainframe Commuter Environment, Office of the
Insuector General,Audit Report No. A-000-99-004-P, March 1,1999 and Audit of General
9,Oflke                                                         of the Inspector
General,   Audit Report No. A-00@!39-00&P,
                                        March 1,1999.

Page 11               GAO/AIMD-00-32R Federal Information      Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 2

                 GAO Information  Securitv Reports      and Testi-mow
                           Issued Since SeWember        1993

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to Assure
Securitv of Federal Onerations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, October 6, 1999).

Financial Management Service: Significant Weaknesses in Computer Controls
(GAO/A.IMD-004, October 4,1999).

Information Svstems: The Status of Commuter Securitv at the Denartment of Veterans
Affairs (GAO/AIMD-00-5, October 4, 1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Stratedr Can Draw on Year 2000
Exneriences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, October 1, 1999).

Information Securitv: The Pronosed Commuter Securitv Enhancement Act of 1999
(GAO/T-AlMD-99-302, September 30, 1999).

Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls (GAO/
AIMD-99-280, September 15).

Information Securilx -NRC’s Commuter Intrusion--Detection   Capabilities   (GAO/
AIMD-99-273R, August 27, 1999).

DOD Information Securitv: Serious Weaknesses Continue to Place Defense Operations
at Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-107, August 26, 1999).

Battlefield Automation: Opportunities to Inmrove the Armv’s Information     Protection
(GAO/‘NSIAD-99-166, August l&1999).

Information Securitv: Answers to Posthearing Questions(GAO/AIMD-99-272R,        August 9,

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Improvement   in Computer Controls (GAO/
AIMD-99-242, August 6,1999).

USDA Information Securitv: Weaknesses at National Finance Center Increase Risk of
Fraud. Misuse. and Improper Disclosure (GA.O/AIMD-99-227, July 30,1999).

Medicare: Improvements Needed to Enhance Protection of Confidential Health
Information (GAOHEHS-99-140, July 20,1999).

Medicare: HCFA Needs to Better Protect Beneficiaries’   Confidential Health Information
(GAO/T-HEHS99-172, July 20,1999).

Page 12                    GAO/AIMD-00-32R Federal Information       Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 2

Information Securitv: Recent Attacks on Federal Web Sites Underscore INeed for
St,rengthened Information Securitv ManagemBt (GAO/T-AIMDi99-223, June 24,1999).

VA Information Svstems: The Austin Automation Center Has Made Progress in Imoroving
Information Svstem Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-161, June 8, 1999).

Information Securitv: Manv NASA Mission-Critical     Svstems Face Serious Risks
(GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999).

Information Securitv: The Melissa Commuter Virus Demonstrates Urgent Need for
Stronger Protection over Svstems and Sensitive Data (GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15,

Financial Audit: 1998 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States
Government (GAO/AIMD-99-130, March 31,1999).

Securities Fraud: The Internet Poses Challenges to Regulators and Investors (GAO/
T-GGD-99-34, March 22,1999).

IRS Svstems Securitv: Although Signifi;cant Improvements Made. Tax Processing
Ooerations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38, December 14, 1998).

Financial Management Service: Areas for Imnrovement in Commuter Controls
(GAO/AIMD-99-10, October 20,1998).

Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Imnrovement       in Computer Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-6,
October 14,1998).

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Imnrovement     in Computer Controls (GAO/
AIMD-99-2, October 14, 1998).

and Controls (GAO/AIMD-98-274, September 28,1998).

Information  Securi
at, Risk (GAO/AIMD-9892, September 23,1998).

Information Securitv: Strentiened Management Needed to Protect Critical Federal
Ooerations and Assets (GAO!I’-AIMD-98-312, September 23,1998).

V.A Information Svstems: Computer Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of Fraud. Misuse
and Imoroner Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-98-175, September 23,1998).

Defense Information Superioritv: Progress Made, but Significant Challenges Remain
(GAOMSIADIAIMD98257,      August 31,1998).

Page 13                   GAO/AIMD-OO-32R Federal Information        Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 2

 F’AA Svstems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000.and Comnuter Security
 Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98251, August 6,1998).

DOD’s Information Assurance Efforts (GAOLNSIAD-98132R, June 11, 1998).

Information Securitv: Serious Weaknesses Put State Demu-tment and FAA Ouerations at
IX& (GAO/T-AIMD-98170, May 19,1998).

Commuter Securitv: Pervasive, Serious Weaknesses Jeopardize State Demu-trnent
Onerations (GAO/AIMD-98-145, May 181998).

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Securitv Practices Jeopardize Flight Safety
(GAO/AIMD-98155, May 18,1998).

Executive Guide: Information Securitv Management: Learning From Leading
Organizations (GAO/AIMD-98-68, May 1998).

U.S. Government Financial Statements: Results of GAO’s Fiscal Year 1997 Audit
(GAO/T-AIMD-98128, April. 1,1998).

Financial Audit: 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States
Government (GAO/AIMD-98127, March 31,1998).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1996 Custodial Financial Statements
(GAO/AIMD9818, December 24,1997).

Financial Management: Review of the Militarv .Retirement Trust Fund’s Actuarial Model
and Related Computer Controls (GAO/AIMD97-128, September 9, 1997).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1996 Administrative    Financial
Statements (GAO/AIMD97-89, August 29,1997).

Small Business Administration: Better Planning and Controls Needed for Information
Systems (GAO/AIMD97-94, June 27,1997).

Social Securitv Administration: Internet Access to Personal Earnings and Benefits
Information (GAO/T-AIMDHEHS-97-123, May 6,1997).

Budget Process: Comments on S-261-Biennial Budgeting and Anprom-iations Act
(GAO~ AIMD-97-84).

IRS Svstems Securitv and Fundine: EmDIovee Browsing Not Being Addressed
Effectivelv and Budget Reauests for New Svstems Development Not Justified(GAO/
T-AIMD-97-82, April 151997).

Page 14                    GAOIAIMD-00-32R     Federal Information     Security Weaknesses
Enclosure 2

IRS Svstems Securitv: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due to Serious
Weaknesses (GAOm-AIMD-97-76, April 10,1997).

IRS Svstems Securitv: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due to Serious
Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-9749, April 8,1997).

High Risk Series: Information Management and Technology(GAO/HR-97-9,       February

lnformation Securitv: Opuortunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agencv Practices
(GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24,1996).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1995 Financial Statements(GAO/AIMD-
96-101, July 11, 1996).

Tax Svstems Modernization: Actions Underwav But IRS Has Not Yet Corrected
Management and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-96-106, June 7,1996).

Information Securitv: Computer Hacker Information Available on the Intemet(GAO/T-
AIMD-96108, June 5,1996).

Information Securitv: Cornouter Attacks at Dewrtment   of Defense Pose Increasing
Risks (GAO/AIMD-9884, May 22,1996).

Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-9692,    May 22,1996).

Securitv Weaknesses at IRS’ Cvberfile Data Center(GAO/AIMD-9685R,      May 9, 1996).

Tax Svstems Modernization: Management and Technical Weaknesses Must Be
Overcome to Achieve Success (GAOA’XMD-9675,   March 26, 1996).

Financial Audit: Federal Familv Education Loan Program’s Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (GAO/AIMD-9622, February 26,1996).

Financial Management: General Computer Controls at the Senate Comwter       Center
(GAO/AZMD-9615, December 22,1995).

Financial Officers Act (GAOm-AIMD-961,     November 14,1995).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1994 Financial Statements (GAO/
Al-MD-95141, August 4,1995).

Financial Audit: Resolution Trust Corporation’s 1994 and 1993 Financial Statements
(GAO/MD-95-157,     June 22,1995).

Page 15                    GAO/AI&ID-OO-32R Federal Information     Security Weaknesses
 Enclosure 2

Federal Familv Education Loan Information Svstem: Weak Computer Controls increase
Risk of Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data (GAO/AIMD-95-117, June 12, 1995).

Deoartment of Energv Procedures Lacking to Protect Computerized Data (GAO/
AIMD-95118, June 5,1995).

Financial Management Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of Improper Navv Civilian
Pavroll Pavments (GAO/AIMD-95-73, May 8,1995).

Information Superhighwav: An Overview of Technoloev Challenges (GAO/AIMD-9523,
January 23,1995).

IRS Automation: Controlling Electronic Filing Fraud and Improper Access to Taxoaver
Data (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-94-183, July 19,1994).

Financial Audit: Federal Familv Education LoanProgram’s Financial Statements for
Fiscal Years 1993 and 1992 (GAO/A.IMD-94131, June 30, 1994).

Financial Audit: Examination of Customs’ Fiscal Year 1993 Financial Statements
(GAO/AIMD-94-119, June 15, 1994).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1993 Financial Statements(GAO/
AIMD-94120, June 15,1994).

HUD Information Resources Strategic Focus and Improved Management Controls
Needed (GAO/AIMD-9434, April 14,1994).

Financial Audit Federal Deoosit Insurance Corooration’s Internal Controls as of
December 31.1992 (GAO/A.IMD-9435, February 4,1994).

Financial Management Strong Leadership Needed to Improve Armv’s FinanciaI
Accountabilitv (GAO/AIMD-9412, December 22,1993).

Communications   Privacy Federal Policv and Actions (GAO/OSI-942, November 4,

Document Securitv Justice Can Imorove Its Controls Over Classified and Sensitive
Documents (GAO/GGD-93-134, September 7,1993).

IRS Information Svstems: Weaknesses Increase Risk of Fraud and Impair Reliabilitv of
Manapement Information (GAO/AIMD-93-34, September 22,1993).



Page 16                    GAOIAIMD-00-32R Federal Information     Security Weaknesses

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