oversight

Information Security: Answers to Posthearing Questions

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-08-09.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

      United States

GAO   General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      Accounlxng and Information
      Management Division

      B-283396

      August 9,1999

      The Honorable Constance A. Morella
      Chairwoman
      Subcommittee on Technology
      Committee on Science
      House of Representatives

      Subject: Information Securitv: Answers to Posthearing Questions
      Dear Ms. Chairwoman:

      This letter responds to your July l&1999, request that we answer questions relating
      to our June 24,1999, testimony1 on the need for stronger information security
      management. Your questions, along with our responses, follow.

      1. Over the years, GAO has issued a number of reports on agencies’computer
         security practices. In your opinion, how effective has the implementation of the
         1987 Computer Security Act been?

      The Computer Security Act’s primary objectives were to provide for (1) a computer
      standards program within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NISI’),
      (2) governmentwide computer security, and (3) traj.ning in security matters for
      persons involved in the management, operation, and use of federal computer systems.
      While a standards program and some training have been provided, governmentwide
      computer security has not been achieved, primarily because individual agencies have
      not taken the steps needed to effectively implement NISI% standards and related
      guidance.

      In 1998, we analyzed the results of the previous 2-l/2 years’ computer security audit
      reports (both our reports and agency inspector general [IG] reports) and found that
      significant weaknesses were reported for aI.I 24 of the agencies covered by our
      analysis.’ These weaknesses placed a broad range of critical operations and assets at

      ’Information Securiix: Recent Attacks on Federal Web Sites Underscore Need for
      Stronger Information Securitv Management (GAO/T-AIMD-99-223, June 24,1999).
      2Information Securitv: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Onerations and
      Assets at Risk (GAp/ATMD-98-92, September 23, 1998).



                                            GAOi’AIMD-99-272R Information   Security Questions
great risk of fraud, misuse, and disruption. We also reported that, although a number
of agencies, councils, and task forces were attempting to improve federal information
security by addressing selected issues, there was no governmentwide strategy in this
regard.

2. In 1998 Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63) was issued. Among its
   goals was improved information security at federal agencies. What gaps will PDD-
   63 fill within existing federal programs that will improve the security of federal
   computer systems?

During the 14 months since its issuance, PDD-63 has focused increased attention on
computer security and raised awareness of our government’s dependence on
computer and telecommunications systems, the threats to these systems, and the
significant damage to our national welfare that could ensue should these systems be
successfully attacked. Most notably, PDD-63 has prompted efforts to develop a
national plan, which is expected to address (1) evaluating and improving agency
computer security plans and (2) developing improved capabilities for detecting and
responding to serious computer-based attacks. In addition, PDD-63 recognized the
interdependencies among public and private sector entities, especially as they relate
to protecting our nation’s computer-supported critical infrastructures. In this regard,
the Directive initiated efforts to improve public-private sector cooperation. As of
early August, it is too soon to determine how successful the PDD-63 efforts will be. In
particular, the anticipated national plan has not yet been issued, so we cannot
comment on any specific planned actions.

3. In 1998, GAO issued an Information Security Management guide that was
   subsequently distributed to all agencies. How does the GAO document differ from
   existing NIST issued guidelines and bulletins? Also, how have agencies responded
   to your guidelines and have they implemented your suggestions?

Our guide3is based on the results of our study of eight nonfederal organizations
regarded as having superior computer security programs. As a result of this study, we
identified a risk management cycle of activity, including 16 specific practices that
these organizations told us were important to the success of their programs. These
practices are consistent with NIST guidance as well as with Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) guidance. In this regard, our guide complements NIST and OMB
guidance and should be viewed as a supplement to their publications. The primary
characteristics that distinguish our guidance from NISI% are listed below:




3Information Securitv Management: Learning Prom Leading Organizations
(GAO/AI&ID-98-68,May 1998).



                                       GAO/AND-99-272R     Information SecurityQuestions
l   The GAO guide focuses almost exclusively on the design and management of an
    effective security program. NIST’s guidance also focuses on these topics, but much
    of it also elaborates on specific control techniques.
 e The GAO guide is aimed primarily at senior federal program officials, and it
    emphasizesthe role of these officials in ensuring that the data and systems
    supporting their programs are adequately protected. W h ile some of NISI’s
    guidance is also targeted at this audience, most of it is designed to assist agency
    security specialists in carrying out their often more technical responsibilities.
 l  The GAO guide provides illustrative examples of practices in operation at each of
    the eight organizations studied. NIST guidance usually does not provide such
    examples.
In response to the secondpart of your question, agencies, as well as several private
sector organizations, have responded very favorably to our guide. The Chief
Information Officers Council endorsed the guide for use by the federal community,
and NIST issued a summary of the guide as one of its Information Technology
bulletins. Several agencies,including the departments of State, Justice, and
Education and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have used the guide to
strengthen and reorient their security programs to address the risks associated with
today’s highly interconnected computing environment. GAO and some IGs have
incorporated the guide’sprinciples and practices into their own information security
audit criteria, so future audit results should help gauge the guide’s impact. However,
it is important to note that while establishing a risk management framework is a
fundamental step, an effective security program also depends on other factors, such
as the availability of (1) sufficient technical experts to implement and maintain an
agency’ssecurity program and (2) effective software tools to combat threats like
hacker intrusions.

4. You recommend independent audits of agencies’information security programs.
   Several years ago, OMB tasked NIST and the National Security Agency (NSA), on
   a one-time basis, to audit agencies.Was this audit effective and useful? Do you
   believe that NISTNSA should perform these audits on a regular basis?

The effort you refer to was completed in 1992. At that time, representatives from
OMB, NIST, and NSA visited 28 agencies in an attempt to gain an overview of the
agencies’information security programs, raise awareness of risks, and promote
compliance with existing guidance. According to a January 1992letter to the Director
of OMB from the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, the visits
were enthusiastically received by the agencies and resulted in greater awareness on
the part of senior officials, which, in turn, resulted in increased management support
for agency computer security programs. In addition, the visits resulted in proposals
for improving federal information security, most of which were incorporated in
OMB’s February 1996revision of Circular A-130, Appendix III.
W h ile reportedly serving their intended purpose, the 1992visits were not audits
because they did not involve direct observation or testing of agency security controls


3                                     GAO/AIMD-99-272R
                                                     Information Security Questions
     in operation. We have found that only through such observation and testing is it
     possible to reliably assessthe effectiveness of agency controls and identify specific
     recommendations for improvement. Also, to serve as a useful measure of
     performance, such audits need to be performed periodically so current performance
     can be compared to past performance and related recommendations.

     NIST and NSA should have a significant role in any such audits. Depending on the
     scope and frequency of audit requirements that might be imposed, this role could
     vary. For example, NIST and NSA could (1) perform audits at selected agencies, (2)
     assist agency inspectors general, especially in performing the more technical aspects
     of the audits, or (3) review and evaluate the quality of audits performed by others.

     Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me
     at 202-512-6412.I can also be reached by e-mail at rhodesk.aimd@nao.gov. Key
     contributors to this assignment were Jean Boltz and William Wadsworth.




,’     Information Technology Assessment




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                                                           Information Security Questions
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