The Clemency Program of 1974

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-01-07.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         DOCUMENT RESUMF
00609 - [A0590924

The Clemency Program of 1974.   -183498; FPCD-76-64. January 7,
1977. 95 p.
Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.
Issu Area: Personnel Management and Compensation (300).
Contact: Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.
Budget Function: Law Enforcement and Justice: Federal Law
    Enforcement and Prosecution (051); National Defense:
    Defense-related Activities (054); National Defense:
    Department of Defense - Military (except procurement 6
    contracts) (751) .
Organization Concerned: Department of Defense; Department of
    Justice; elective Service System.
congressional Relevance: Congress; House Ccmmittee on Armed
    Services; Senate Committee on Armed Services.
Authority: Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. 462).
    Executive Order 11803, 11804. Uniform Ccde of Military
    Justice, art. 85-87. 10 U.S.C. 885-87.

         The Departments of Justice and Defense, the Selective
Service System, and the Presidential Clemency Board have the
responsibilities for carrying out the Clemency Program for the
return of Vietnam era draft evaders and military deserters.
Findinas/Conclusions: Out of an estimated 113,000 to 300,000 who
were eligible, about 21,700 have participated with 13,750
assigned to alternate service, 6,052 receiving pardons, 911
denied clemency, and 100 cases pending. The Department of
Justice dismissed cases not subject to prosecution, and assigned
alternate service according to U.S. attorneys' assessments of
social and economic circumstances. DOD used the military board
of officers to determine the amount of alternative service for
alleged deserters according to prescribed military criteria,
generally excluding social and economic circumstances. At
Selective Service, 2 years after the program began, 74% of those
assigned alternate service had not shown up cr had been dropped,
15% were in alternate service Jebs or waiting or placement, and
about 11% had completed alternate service. (iTW)



            The Clemency Program Of 1974

            This report describes the :ole and responsi-
            bilities of he Department of Justice, Depart-
            ment of Defense, and the Selective Service
            System in carrying out the Clemency Prograr,,
            of 1974 for the return of Vietnam era draft
            evaders and military deserters. The report also
            describes how each agency administered its
            responsibilities and observes that while several
            thousands elected to accept this opportunity
            to resolve their status, under provisions of he
            proclamation, many thousands did not.

            FPCD-76-64                                  JANB.   7. 1 9   7
                       WASHINGTON. D.C. 2084


To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

     In this report we have described the administration of
the President's Clemency Program as carried out by
the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and
the Selective Service System.

     We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53) and the Accounting anc Auditing
Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     We are sending copies of this report to the President
of the United States; the Director, Office of Management
and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Attorney General of the
United States; and the Director, elective Service System.

                                        Comptroller General
                                        of th( United States
                       Con ten ts

DIGEST                                                    i

   1      INTRODUCTION                                    1
              The President's proclamation                1
              Scope                                       2
              Agency comments                             3
             CLEMENCY PROGRAM                             4
              Definition                                  4
              Organization                                6
            OF JUSTICE                                   7
              Unconvicted draft evaders                  7
              Files cleared and cases dismissed          7
              The final list                             8
              What the participants were like           10
              Physically entering the program           11
              The alternate service determination
                process                                 11
              Incompleted alternate ervice              17
            OF DEFENSE                                  18
              Unconvicted deserters                     18
              What the participants were'like           19
              Organization for administration
                of the program                          19
              Physically entering the program           20
              Beginning the pregram process--the
                right to legal counsel                  21
              The alternate service determination
                process                                 26
              The board's case load                     29
              How the board determined the period
                of alternate service                    29
              The results                               31
              Some potentially eligible Army members
                chose another route                     33
              Agency comments                           34

   5       THE ALTERNATE SERVICE PROGRAM                    35
               Alternate service requirements               35
               Different consequences for not
                 completing alternate service               35
               Different outcomes after completing
                 alternate service                         36
               Administration of alte-nate service         36
               Criteria for alternat   ervice jobs         37
               Types of employers and jobs                 38
               Program participation                       41
               Why they dropped out                        42
               Who got out and who stayed in               45
               Agency comments                             47
   6       SUMMARY                                         48

   I       Proclamation 4313 - Announcing a Program
             for the return of Vietnam Era Draft Evaders
             and Military Deserters                        50
  II       Executive Orders 11803 and 11804                54
 III       Presidential Clemency Board's Executive
             Summary                                       58
  IV       A Summary Evaluation of the Presidential
             Clemency Board's Operations                   73
   V       Brief: The Vietnam Era Deserter:
             Characteristics of Unconvicted Army
               Deserters Participating in the
               Clemency Program                            86
 VI        Additional Information Sources                  88
VII        Agency Comments                                 90
VIII       Principal officials responsible for
             administering activities discussed
             in this report                                94

           The Vietnam era covered 8-1/2 years--from
           August 4, 1964, through March 28, 1973.
           On Septembet 16, 1974, the President issued a
            rroclaination stating that "the status of
           thousands of our countrymen--convicted,
           charged, investigated, or still sought
           for violation of the Military Selective
           Service Act or of the Uniform Code of Mili-
           tary Justice--remains unresolved."

           The proclamation offered these U.S. citizens an
           "opportunity to earn return to their country upon
           their agreement to a period of alternative service
           in the national interest, together with an acknow-
           ledgement of their allegiance to the country
           and its constitution." The Presidential Clemency
           Board, the Department of Justice, Department
           of Defense, and the Selective Service System
           were charged with responsibilities for
           the program.

           So began the clemency program which terminated
           March 31, 1975.

           Estimates of those eligible to participate in the
           clemency program have ranged from 113,000 to
           300,000 or more.  (See p. 4.) Abouc 21,700 individ-
           uals participated as follows:
              Assigned to alternate service        13,750
              Received pardon                       6,052
              Denied clemency                         911
              Pending cases (not determined
                as of Feb. 9, 1976)                 1,000

                                                   21,713 (See p. 5.)
           This report examines the administration of the
           program by the:

              -- Department of Justice for alleged draft
                 evaders.  (See ch. 3.)

CImies.   Upon removal t report                        FPCD-76-64
cove da should
          cover  noted
                  do Shereon.     i ~~i
 -- Department of Defense for alleged military
    deserters. (See ch. 4.)
-- Selective Service System for alternate
   service.  (See ch. 5.)
Within Justice:

-- The number of months of alternate service
   assigned to alleged draft evaders depended
   on the U.S. attorneys' assessment of
   mitigating social and economic circumstances.
   (See p. 11.)

In Defense:
-- The military board of officers who determined
   the amount of alternate service for alleged
   deserters adhered to a prescribed set of
   military criteria, generally excluding social
   and economic circumstances, which yielded
   consistent results.  (See p. 29.)
At Selective Service:
-- Two years after the program began, 74 percent
   of those assigned alternate service either
   had never showed up or had been dropped; 15
   percent were in alternate service jobs or
   waiting for placement; and about 11 percent
   had completed alternate service.  (See p. 42.)
Defense and Selective Service commented on GAO's
preliminary report. (See p. 3.) Both said
that GAO should have discussed the operations
of the Presidential Clemency Board. GAO was not
able to gain access to the Board's records but
has included the Board's summary report and mi-
nority views as appendixes to its report.
Defense also said that the program should not
be judged purely in statistical terms. GAO
agreed but pointed out that statistics were
used where quantification was descriptive of
the events or activities they reported on.
(See p. 31 and p. 46.)

                          CHAPTER 1


     On Sptember 16, 1974, the President announced " A
program for the return of Vietnam era draft evaders and
military deserters."  Included in his proclamation were
the following paragraphs.

    "In the period of its involvement in armed hostilities
    in Southeast Asia, the United States suffered great
    losses. Millions served their country, thousands
    died in combat, thousands more were wounded, others
    are still listed as missing in action.
    "Over a year after the last American combatant left
    Vietnam, the status of thousands of our countrymen -
    convicted, charged, investigated or still sought for
    violations of the Military Selective Service Act or
    of the Uniform Code of Military Justice - remains

    "In furtherance of our national commitment to justice
    and mercy these young Americans should have a chance
    to contribute a share to the rebuilding ,, peace
    among ourselves and with all nations. They should be
    allowed the opportunity to earn return to their
    country, their communities, and their families, upon
    their agreement to a period of alternate service in
    the national interest, together with an acknowledgement
    of allegiance to the country and its Constitution."
    "Desertion in time of war is a majcr, serious offense,
    failure to respond to the country's call for duty is
    also a serious offense. Reconciliation among our
    people does not require that these acts be condoned.
    Yet, reconciliation calls for an act of mercy to bind
    the Nation's wounds and heal the scars of the
    devisiveness." 1/

    1/Full text of the proclamation is appendix I.
The Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the
Presidential Clemency Board, and the Selective Service
System were charged with responsibilities for the program.

     Two Executive orders (see app. II) accompanied the
President's proclamation. The first established "The
Presidential Clemency Board," and the second designated the
Selective Service System to administer a program of
"alternate service."
     When the program was proclaimed and implementing
activities became operative, we recognized the importance
of providing an independent factual record of subsequent
events. The program has nearly run its course and we are
reporting some additional information and insight which
might otherwise be lost.
     This report deals exclusively with programs and activities
of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and
the Selective Service System. The Presidential Clemency Board
has not been inadvertently omitted. A review of its program
and activities was not possible because of a legal question
concerning access to necessary records. Nevertheless, the
executive summary of the Board's final report and the minority
report are included as appendixes III and IV. This is not to be
construed as our endorsement or concurrence with either of
those reports.

     To obtain the information for this report we interviewed
and obtained data and opinions from many officials associated
with the administration of the clemency program including:

    -- The Department of Defense.

    -- The Joint Clemency Processing Center.

    --The Joint Alternate Service Board.
    --The Department of Justice Headquarters.

    -- U.S. Attorney District Offices in eastern, western,
       and southern New York, New Jersey, northern and
       central California, southern Florida, and
    -- Selective Service System Headquarters.

     -- Selective System offices in Ohio, Tennessee, Florida.
        Michigan, California, Illinois, Texas, New York City,
        New York State and Ncrth Carolina.
     We also considered it essential to obtain information
directly from those program participants who nad dropped out
of the alternate service program. A questionnaire was
developed to elicit their views. It was designed to obtain
(1) background data, (2) information on their employment
status, and (3) reasons for quitting or refusing alternate
service jobs. That questionnaire was mailed with the
cooperation of the Selective Service and the responses to
GAO were completely anonymous. Also the Selective Service
at our request prepared data heets on the alternate service
activities of each participa, - active in the alternate service
programs as of September 1, lj75. The data sheets did not
disclose the identity of the participant.

     Background information and data included in this eport
were also obtained from sources listed in appendix VI.

     An opportunity to formally comment on our preliminary
report was provided through the Office of the Counsel to the
President to the Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
and the Selective Service System. The nc'jrtment of Defense
and the Selective Service System responded and their comments
are included or discussed, as appropriate, in the following
chapters dealing with their respective activities.

                          CHAPTER 2

                  THr. CLEMENCY PROGRAM

     The President's Proclamation of September 16, 1974,
"Announcing a Program for the Return of Vietnam Era Draft
Evaders and Military Deserters," set in motion the clemency
program. Under this program persons convicted, charged,
investigated, or still sought for violations of the Military
Selective Service Act or for unauthorized absences under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice committed during the
Vietnam era (Aug. 4, 1964, through March 28, 1973) were
offered conditional clemency.

     This program was the first since the Civil War to offer
clemency to

     -- draft evaders prior to court action and completion
        of the judicial process and

     -- servicemen who allegedly deserted during a period
        of armed conflict.

The general stipulation of earned return through performance
of a prescribed period of alternate service was a condition
of final clemency. Alternate service was to be performed
to "pru&.lte the national health, safety, or interest."
The amount of alternate service time would not exceed 24
months and could be less depending upon onsideration of
individual mitigating circumstances.

     Estimates of the total number of persons eligible to
participate in the program have ranged from about 113,000 1/
to over 300,000 or more. 2/ There does not appear to us
any way to resolve the difference in these estimates
because, among other reasons, if individuals never
registered for the draft and they were never discovered,
they never became part of the statistics. However, we can

1/Presidential Clemency Board Report to the President

2/Testimony before Subcommittees of the Seinate and House
  Committees on the Judiciary

state with reasonable certainty that about 21,700
individuals actually participated in some elements
of the program.

         Assigned alternate service             13,750
         Received pardons                        6,052
         Denied clemency                           911
         Pending cases (as of Feb. 9, 1976)      1,000

     The program provided the basic option to those who
were eligible of whether to participate at all. For
those who wanted to participate, the following were

     -- Unconvicted draft evaders could complete a specified
        period of alteL;ate service and thereby be relieved
        of possible prosecution or punishment for their

     -- Convicted draft evaders could be offered, depending
        upon individual circumstances, unconditional
        Presidential pardons or Presidential pardons
        conditioned upon completion of a prescribed
        period of alternate service.

     -- Service members classified by the military departments
        as deserters, but not ccnvicted, could request
        immediate undesirable discharges, receive
        prescribed periods f alternate service, and
        upon the completion of alternate service obtain a
        new type of discharge--a clemency discharge. 1/

     -- Ex-service members with punitive discharges or un-
        desirable discharges resulting from unauthorized
        absences could be offered, depending upon
        individual circumstances, unconditional Presidential
        pardons and clemency discharges, or Presidential
        pardons and clemency discharges conditioned upon
        completion of prescribed periods of alternate
        service. 1/

1/No entitlement to benefits under Public Law 85-857
  administered by the Veteran's Administration.

     The President assigned responsibility for the Clemency
Program to the following executive departments:
     -- Department of Justice for those parts of the
        program that pertained to unconvicted draft
     -- Department of Defense for those parts of the program
        that pertained to servicemen classified as deserters
        but not convicted.
     -- Selective Service System for establishment,
        implementation, and administration of the program
        for alternate service.
Completing the organizational framework for the program,
the President established the Presidential Clemency Board
to make clemency recommendations to him for convicted
draft evaders and ex-servicemen holding punitive and
undesirable discharges.

     The President assigned the administration of three
parts of the clemency program to existing Government
agencies with previous responsibility for the types of
cases involved and prior experience in handling
programs similar to those outlined in the Presidential
Proclamation. Those agencies accommodated the program
within their own ways of operating. Since only general
guidance was issued to lower echelons within each of
the larger bureaucracies, substantial tolerances were
allowed for individual interpretation of the intent
of what was to be accomplished.

     Within just a few days of the President's Proclamation,
the organization for implementation of its provisions
became operative and began to process cases. The process
was initially scheduled to terminate on January 31, 1975.
On January 30, 1975, the President extended the deadline
to March 1, 1975. On February 28, 1975, the PresideiJt
extended the program again--this time until March 31, 1975.
Official entrance into the program was stopped on that date.

                        CHAPTER 3

                 ADMINISTRATION BY THE

                  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


     At the outset of the program or shortly thereafter,
the Department of Justice had on file 6,238 cases of
alleged draft law violation. The definition of an
alleged draft evader is:

     An individual who allegedly unlawfully failed
     under the Military Selective Service Act or
     any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder,
     to register or register on time, to keep the
     local board informed of his address, to
     report for or submit to preinduction or in-
     duction examination, to report for or submit
     to induction itself, or to report for or
     submit to, or complete alternate service as a
     conscientious objector.

     At the outset of the program it was unclear whether
individuals not in jeopardy of prosecution because of
insufficient evidence would be allowed to participate in
the clemency program. On October 31, 1974, the Attorney
General announced that "No individual will be required
to perform alternate service if (the) Department does
not believe the evidence against him is sufficient to
justify draft evasion prosecution." On November 18, 1974,
the Attorney General directed U.S. attorneys to review their
files of unconvicted evaders eligible for the clemency
program and dismiss indictments or terminate investigations
in those instances when the cases lacked prosecutive merit.
     In response to the Attorney General's direction, the
U.S. attorneys and their staffs reviewed cases against
alleged draft law violators. Department of Justice
records show that 1,717 of 6,238 cases under indict-
ment or investigation were dismissed or investigations
were terminated.
     Department of Justice statistics show a variation
in the perccnf of cases dismissed or declined by various

U.S. attorney offices. For example, the Massachusetts
office eliminated only 6 of the original 196 cases in its
inventory while the Northern California office dismissed
or declined 286 of its 315 cases. Six other offices
eliminated more than half of the cases in their original
caseload. Thirty-five offices, most with small case-
loads, did not eliminate any cases.
     We examined the declined and/or dismissed cases
at eight offices, including Massachusetts and northern
California. Figures for Massachusetts included onll
indictments and therefore were not comparable to other
offices which included both indictments and cases
under investigation. The Department of Justice figures
for the northern California office showed 29 cases
remaining after review. We were told by the Assistant
UoS. Attorney in the northern California office who
handled most of the draft cases, that there were 62
cases in the office inventory including 26 individuals
enrolled in the clemency program.
     We examined 1,1'0 case records in eight districts
where U.S. Attorneys had reviewed and dismissed indict-
ments or declined prosecution of alleged draft evaders.
Numerous specific reasons were cited for dismissing or
declining prosecution. The most common were:

     -- lack of evidence showing willful violation of
        the draft laws,

     -- subsequent compliance with the draft laws
        allegedly violated,

     -- Selective Service procedural or administrative
     -- insufficient evidence, and
     -- intervening case law.


     During hearings by the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
on December 19, 1974, the subcommittee Chairman requested
the Department of Justice to submit a final listing of
all draft evaders the U.S. attorneys believed to be
subject to prosecution. The intent of the list was to

provide persons unsure of their eligibility a means of
inquiring about their status without fear of self-
     Five weeks later and more than 4 months after the
program started, the Department of Justice furnished the
subcommittee the names of about 4,500 individuals believed
to be prosecutable for draft law violation and eligible
for participation in the clemency prolrqam.  The Attorney
General certified the finality of that list stipulating
that it did not cover late registrants or nonregistrants.
The same list was also made available to various non-
Government counseling services.

     The Department of Justice estimated that no more
than 100 individuals were relieved of prosecution because
their names were erroneously omitted f:om the final list
of eligibles. For example, one assistant U.S. attorney
told us that he deliberately omitted two cases from the
list of eligibles because at the time he was preparing
the list one individual iad expressed his intention to
complete a clemency greement and the other expressed
his intention o go to trial. When the final list was
published, exclusive of those names, the two individuals'
indictments were dismissed.  In another instance a page
of names was inadvertently excluded during compilation
and duplication of the list submitted by one of the
U.S. attorney's offices. That resulted in 22 individuals
being excluded from the certified final list.
     The certified final list of eligible participants
consisted of about 4,500 of an original total of more
than 6,200. There were only about 727 individuals who
finally did enter the President's program to earn clemency
and at least 3,800 remained fugitives or subject to
        The situation is graphically portrayed on the next

             ti 70(


4000                                                                       3800


       [ J    CSES    OFALLEGED DRAFT                        ENTEREDPROGRAM

                                                   CRIIDFNLLSREMAINED FUGITIVE OR SUBJECT
           ~i;: CERTIFIED       045I
                            FINAL LIST                        TO PROSECUTION


     From data available to us on the majority of these
participants at the time they entered the program we
found that:

       --Ages ranged from 19 to 34 with the majority
         between 22 and 26;
       -- 23 percent of the participants had not completed
         high school;

       -- 29 percent were high school graduates;
       --32 percent had attended some college;

       --15 percent had at a minimum a college degree;

     -- Approximately 43 percent were married;
     -- 60 percent were unemployed; and
     --Alleged violations covered the entire range of
       eligible offenses, with many individuals not
       identified to the Department of Justice before
       the beginning of the program being charged with
       late registration.

     The cases of program applicants were processed by
the Department of Justice's U.S. attorneys who first
determined whether the applicants were eligible and then
prescribed a period of alternate service.
     Entering the clemency program required appearance
before a U.S. attorney. At that point the usual procedure
was to relieve eligible individuals from fugitive status
and release them on their own recognizance with the
understanding that they would return at a later date with
counsel to xecute agreements to perform alternate service.
After they signed agreements the participants were allowed
a number of ays specified in their agreements to report
to their States Selective Service Offices. During such
periods of alternate service the Department of Justice
deferred further prosecution.

     U.S. attorneys were guided in their administration
of the program by policy statements from the Attorney
General. This guidance was in the form of a basic
document, Prosecutive Policy With-Respect-to-Certain
Persons Al i-     oave    o ated Section      or the
Military-eective-SS" rice Act 50 AP;TUSC 462)-Pursuant
to the President's Proclamation, and followup telegrams
with specific guidanc    TF.-TFeisic instructions included
the following guidance for assessing mitigating
circumstances and prescribing the length of alternate
service assigned.

     "IV. The length of alternate service shall normally
     be 24 months, but the United States Attorney may
     reduce the term in light of the following

      (1)   whether the applicant, at the time he committed
            the acts allegedly constituting a violation
            of section 12 of the Military Selective Service
            Act, was erroneously convinced by himself or
            by others that he was not violating the law;

      (2)   whether the applicant's immediate family is in
            desparate need of his personal presence for
            which no other substitute could be found,
            and such need was not of his own creation;
      (3)   whether the applicant lacked sufficient mental
            capacity to appreciate the gravity of his
            actions; and
      (4)   such other similar circumstances."
     At the outset of the clemency program each U.S.
attorney was directed to obtain Department of Justice
approval before completing alternate service agreements.
After a series of cases was received by the Department
of Justice, a summary was distributed to each U.S.
attorney for his guidance. That summary is quoted in its
entirety below, except that the names of the U.S.
attorneys and their districts have been deleted.

      "Representative profiles on individuals whose
      term of service was mitigated from the 24-months
I.    24 Months

     As indicated in our teletype to all United States
Attorneys, 21 of the initial 26 agreements concluded
involved evaders who were single, in their early or
mid-20s and 'lad no dependents, or financial problems.

II.   15-18 Months

     a. Four of initial 26 agreements concluded in-
volved individuals who were married, had dependents,
and if required to serve the 24-month period, would
undergo alonq with their dependents irreversible
financial disasters.

     b. In one case in the (district deleted), the
individual was single, and appeared to be easily led.
He was an alleged "Jesus Freak" and marijuana smoker.
The fact that he had a generally weak character led
(name deleted) to believe that 18 months service would
be sufficient.

      c. In one case from the (district deleted), the
individual was single, had pleaded guilty to the offense
 in May 1973, but had not been sentenced when the President
announced the Clemency Program, (name deleted) offered
the defendent an opportunity to enter the Clemency
Program, and agreed to permit him to withdraw plea, if
he signed up. The defendent agreed, the plea was with-
drawn and case is in a continued status. Since the
individual had been sweating out his sentence for over
a year, (name deleted) decided that 15 months service
would be sufficient.
III. 12-Months

     a. Of initial 26 agreements, one was for 12 months.
As you ecall the individual had been in pre-trial con-
finemert for 3 months because he could not raise bail.
It was determined that three months pre-trial confine-
ment should equal 12 months of alternate service.

     a. In another case from the (district deleted),
the individual had pleaded guilty in May 1973, and was
awaiting sentence when the proclamation was announced.
Since the individual had entered into a program which
was directed towards the national welfare on his own,
in hopes of getting a light sentence, (name deleted)
considered this fact in permitting the individual to
withdraw his plea, continue case and enter into an agree-
ment for 12 months.
IV.     10 Months
      a. The (district deleted) case where the Assistant
believed the facts were extremely close. However, the
reasons given for mitigating the term of service to
10 months was (sic) because the evader was married, had
two children, hoped to become a (name of city deleted)
policeman, and in fact stated to the Assistant that he
would have returned and entered the Army 3 years ago
in lieu of trial if he had received the letter which the
United States Attorney had sent him offering this

V.      6 Months
     a. A case from the (district deleted) where the
individual appeared to be a C. O. but had never established
a prima facie case before his local board and never appealed
its denial, (name deleted) said at the time he entered the
agreement the defendant had become a full-fledged Mennoite.

     b. This agreement which emanated out of the (district
deleted), is one of (name deleted) cases (district deleted.)
Accordingly (sic) to (name deleted), the case was close
and the individual may still back out of agreement. It
is a case which under our Clemency guidelines has mitigating
     We attempted to evaluate how consistently the U.S.
attorneys applied criteria for assigning alternate service.
To do so we reviewed 389 cases or about 54 percent of the
total number of participants. Eight separate U.S. attorneys'
offices handled these cases. Our evaluation was hampered
because verbatim records of the proceedir   ':ere not required
by the Department of Justice and not kep-    the U.S.
attorneys. In most of the cases we reviewed, the rationale
for assigning less than the maximum of 24 months alternate
service, including consideration of mitigating circumstances,
was not precisely recorded.  In cases whe e such notations
did exist or where we could determine an apparent reason
for the reduction we were able to discern that they involved
U.S. attorneys' opinions about
     -- degree of willfulness to violate the law,
     -- potentially severe economic hardship in
        performing alternate service,
     -- personal circumstances involving mental
        and physical health, and
     -- prior work already performed in the public
     Based on discussions with the staffs at those eight
offices and our review of the 389 available records, we
found differing views resulted in differing applications
of the criteria. For example.
     --The U.S. attorney who advised us that all
       participants he processed were assigned 24
       months. Although he had received the guidance
       shown above, he told s that he interpreted the
       length of alternate service to be 24 months
       with possible subsequent reduction for mitigating
       circumstances. A total of 92 persons was
       processed for clemency in that district. Each
       person was assigned 24 months alternate service.
       As of March 1, 1976, the length of alternate
       service had not been reduced for any of the

      -- The Assistant U.S. attorney who S:tated that the
         most frequent reason he used to reduce the period
         of alternate service was hardship and, in his
         judgment, any man who was supporting a wife and
         family may have a degree of hardship in doing
         alternate service. Cases of individuals processed
         by some other offices received no reduction in
         the period of alternate service even though they
         were married.
     -- The U.S. attorney who said he believed the President
        intended true clemency and did not believe that
        the program meant to give the maximum period of
        alternate service to all participants. We noted
        that the participants processed in his district
        averaged lower periods of alternate service than
        any of the seven other districts we reviewed.
     -- The Assistant U.S. attorney who advised us
        that he assigned no one less than 12 months
        alternate service. His stated rationale was
        that he would have declined to prosecute the
        cases of those who, in his opinion, did not
        deserve 12 months or more alternate service.
The results of these differing views expressed in terms
of alternate service periods follow:

                       Cases       Average period     Assigned the
                      reviewed      of alternate    maximum alternate
Judicial district      by GAO        'service---- -service-period -
                                     (Months)       Number   Percent
Eastern New York         34            11.7          2          6
Western New York         31            17.0          8        26
New Jersey               22            19.3          7        32
Massachusetts            50            17.0         12        24
Central California      105            19.0         22        21
Southern New York        88            24.0         88       100
Southern Florida         33            23.8         30        91
Northern California      26            22.4         22        85
The periods of alternate service assigned to participants by
offices not included in our review also varied.

     Statistics compiled by Department of Justice headquarters
on 711 participants show the average period of alternate
service as 19.8 months. Summarized below is data tabulated
to show the range f alternate service.
          Months of
       alternate service
          (months)                                    Participants

           1   to     6                                            31
           7   to     12                                           53
          13   to     18                                         1'59
          19   to     23                                           92
               24                                                366

     The same distribution is graphically presented below
in percent terms.







  10                        8.9

               16          7-12        13-18          19-23             24

                            MONTHS OF ALTERNATE SERVICE

     As of September 1, 1975, the Selective Service
   itied the Department of Justice that 33 of its program
farticipants were considered noncooperative by the Selective
Service and were terminated :rom the program. As of
March 1, 1976, 1 of these 33 individuals had been tried
and found guilty and 7 had ben relieved of further
prosecution for their draft offenses for various reasons.
The Department of Justice gave us the following statistics
on the remaining 25.

Status                                          Number

Indicted case where defendant is believed
to be a fugitive--bench warrant has been
issued                                            14

 idicted case awaiting trial                       2

Indicted case being reviewed pending
further action                                     1

Indicted case--U.S. attorney has written
defense counsel and is waiting for a response      2

Unindicted case being reviewed for
presentment to a grand jury                        3

Unindicted case referred to the FBI
for investigation                                  1

Unindicted case--U.S. attorne.~ has written
defense counsel and is waiting for a response      1

Unindicted case where the U.S. attorney
agreed to give the participant "One last
chance" to fulfill his agreement                   1

     It was not possible, based on information available
in March 176, to predict the ultimate disposition of the
cases of all individuals who hve not or may not complete
their alternate service.

                              CHAPTER 4
                        ADMINISTRATION BY THE

                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

     A dtserter, as defined in this program, is a member of
the Armed Forces classified as such by his service because
of unauthorized absence. Three articles of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice pertain to the categories of
individuals witnin that definition. They are:

       -- Article 85 which covers service members who go or
          remain absent from assigned duty with the intent to
          rema.n away permanently.

       -- Article 86 which covers service members who are
          absent from an assigned place of duty at a time
          when prescribed to be there.
       -- Article 87 which covers service members who miss
          the movement of a ship, airplane, or unit with
          which they are required to move.

      The Department of Defense estimated that
servicemen were eligible for the program when about   10,000
                                               the President
issued his proclamation; over half ultimately participated.
Of the 10,000 about 9,500 were fugitives and about 600
were under military control awaiting disposition of their
cases    The distribution of eligible& and participants ',
military service was:

Military           Number                  Number of
service           eligible    Percent     participants   Percent
Army                 7,827      77              4,266       77
Navy                   625          6             205        4
Mariie Corps         1,508      15                987       18
Air Force              155       2                 46        1
       Total       10,115      100              5,504    100

     Although the above total (10,115) seems to be a precise
number, we found it virtually impossible to verify its
accuracy.   This situation resulted partly from a very
complex series of screenings for eligibles in an enormous
number of records, numerous data refinements, and the
condition of records available to the military services
themselves.   Regardless, about half of the estimated
number of eligibles did report to the military services for
consideration of their cases.   Some clarification of this
situation is provided in the brief of the Army Research
Institute Research Problem Review 76-6 (app. V.)


     The average age of these participantgs at the time they
entered the military service was 19.  On the average these
participants became alleged deserters at the age of 21.
At the time of processing through the clemency center the
average age of these alleged deserters was approximately
25.  This indicates that on the average 4 years passed
between the time the participants allegedly deserted or
absented themselves and the time they entered the program.

      Many of these participants' military service careers
tended to be short since 71 percent served 18 months or
less.   The majority of these participants (64 percent)
were not high school graduates, 26 percent were, 8 percentr
had some college, and 2 peLcent had graduated from college.

     Approximately 60 percent of the participants in the
program were married.  The rmber of dependents was
largely unknown.

     Reasons given for desertion by Army participants were
generally unassociated with the war.  Approiximately 50
percent stated they hbd left because of personal, family,
or financial problems--the same reasons given by most
deserters during the last two wars.  Eighty-eight percent
of all the Army participants claimed that they remained
in the United States throughout their absence.


Joint Clemency Processing Center

     The President's proclamation assigned responsibility for
the program to each of the military service Secretaries:  The
Secretary of Defense was to establish guidelines.  The Joint

Clemency Processing Center was initially established at
Camp Atterbury, Indiana.  In mid-October 1974 the Center
was relocated to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, with
facilities to house, feed, and conduct the proceedings
for applicants from all services.

Joint Alternate Service Board

     To conduct the proceedings for determining alternate
service, the service Secretaries established the Joint
Alternate Service Board at Fort Benjamin Harrison. The
Board was composed of four officers--three colonels, and
a Navy captain and six alternates of equal rank. Criteria
for selection to the Board required that the member be
(1) a War College graduate, (2) combat experienced, (3)
a Vietnam veteran, and (4) available for assignment on
short notice. The Air Force and Marine Corps members
were additionally required to have personnel management
     The primary role of the Board was to evaluate each
participant's case and to prescribe the period of alternate
service. To form such judgments, the Board was guided
by criteria promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.

     To enter the program, eligible alleged deserters had
to return to military control. Each military service
established a clemency information contact point where
potential participants could inquire in person, by
telephone, or mail as to their eligibility. Following
such inquiries the military services sent personal letters
to eligibles advising them of the nature of the program,
processing procedures, assignment of alternate service,
and their right to legal counsel. These letters also
directed those wishing to participate to return to the
nearest military activity or to Fort Benjamin Harrison for
processing. If they reported to a military facility other
than Fort Benjamin Harrison they were provided transportation
to the Joint Clemency Processing Center at Fort Benjamin
Harrison with the understanding that the Government was to
be reimbursed for tansportation costs.
     In mid-December 1974, about 6 weeks before the originally
scheduled end of the program, the services mailed over 7,500
letters to next of kin of known alleged military deserters.
These letters advised the next of kin about the alleged
deserters' eligibility and procedures for participation in

the program. About 4,500 of these letters were delivered;
the balance was returned as undeliverable.

     On September 20, 1974, the first 14 participants
arrived at Fort Benjamin Harrison.   They, and future
arrivals in their turn, were assigned living quarters and
began a processing cycle which included legal briefings,
physical and psychological examinations, finance office
checks, and similar administrative steps.   As part of
the processing cycle, available personnel records were
assembled and prepared for the Joint Alternate Service
Board's deliberations.   The majority of the participants
completed the processing  cycle within 24 hours.


     On September 17, 1974, the Secretary of Defense issued
a memorandum implementing the program.   Among other matters,
the Secretary specified that each participant  in the program
should be *  * * afforded an opportunity  to consult counsel."

     Eacn of the services established a pro.ess for legal
counsel which included an initial session, either before
or after participants arrived at the Processing Center,
and a final session after the participants' alternate
service period was determined by the Board.

     Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force participants were
generally given individual, initial legal counsel.  Their
attorneys had all of their clients' available service
records and were able to discuss merits of the service's
case against their client, possible available defenses, and
extenuating factors that could influence the outcome of a
military court martial.  The attorneys then gave professional
judgments on the probable outcome of their cases should a
court martial be elected rather than entrance into the

     Initial Army legal counseling was provided in group
sessions.  Sometimes the groups had from 30 to 40
participants.  The Army reported that this "* * * placed
restrictions which led to either inattention or a lack of
responsiveness on the part of the absentee (participants)."
In mid-October, after about 25 percent of the participants
had been processed, the Army limited the group legal
counseling to 15 participants.

     The legal counseling provided for Army participants
was characterized in the "After Action Report" prepared
by the U.S. Army Administration Center, Fort Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana, as follows:
     "The enlisted absentees filed into the Legal
      Section and were divided into groups of 10
      to 15. Once seated the doors were closed
      and the attorney and his clients were the
      only ones present. The initial legal
      briefing was an information briefing; a
      group session was permissible per LOI (Letter
      of instructions). However, indlviduals were
      offered the opportunity for one--on-one
      counseling and, if requested, an individual
      sessior was immediately arranged. All officers
      received individual initial beiefings. The
      absentees were advised not to discuss their
      personal matters with anyone except their
      lawyers. The consequences of an Undesirable
      Discharge were fully explained to the absentees
      as well as the legal implications of all aspects
      of the program. The appeal system available
      for discharge was also explained. Additionally,
      each absentee was advised that he was entitled
      to consult a civilian attorney of his choice.
      Although not permitted in group counseling
      session, civilian attorneys could be present
      during individual counseling. Initial legal
      counseling took approximately two hours."
     Official Army personnel records were not available
for use during the initial group legal briefing. Specific
cases involving participants in the group were not discussed.
Precise data on the number of participants either requesting
individual military legal counsel and a review of their
records or those with civilian attorneys was not available.
Based on review of a random selection of 226 cases we
estimate that no more than 14 percent of the Army's
4,255 enlisted participants may have received individual
legal counsel and a legal records review before the Joint
Alternate Service Board considered their cases.
     After mid-December each participants was required to
sign a form documenting his refusal or acceptanced of a
review of his records by a defense lawyer. This form, which
was included in each file, is shown below:


                                       DATE              .____________

I fully understand that I have the opportunity for military
counsel to inspect my military records to see if any
irregularities, inconsistencies or information that may
be beneficial to my case exist or which may act as either
a defense or in mitigation to any administrative or
judicial actions which may be pursued at any time.
Having been advised by military counsel, I (do) (do not)
desire that my military records be checked.

I hereby authorize my military counsel.---------------------
to inspect any copy my military records, to include personnel,
medical, and finance.
This authorization expires   ----------             -----

                               T . .     . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . .


                                  NAME (Printed)


                                  Control Number

     Legal counsel for appli2cents was also a requirement
after the Board determined the period of alternate
service. At that point all participants were individually
counseled by Army attorneys. They were then advised
the (1) options, (2) consequences of accepting undesirable
discharges, and (3) commitment to perform alternate
service as a condition of earning the clemency
                                                disr' ,rge.
During this process the advising attorney generall
not have the individual's records, but was provided id
summary form.                                        a
               (See p. 31.)
      The Army could not force participants to take advantage
of available individual legal counseling. This
 is supported by the recent Supreme Court decision
Faretta-v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which in
                                                    held that
a defendant in a state criminal trial had a constitutional
right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
intelligently elected to do so. In Faretta, the        and
indicated that the defendant, who haTT-a h school  court
and a general understanding of the ground rules
by the trial court but no understanding of the to be used
                                                rules of
evidence, could "knowingly and voluntarily" forego
benefits of counsel.                                 the
                       A determination that any participant
was incapable of making a "knowing" waiver of benefits
individual legal counsel is a delicate an4 difficult     of
     We did not attempt to make the above judgment
                                                    on any
of the individual cases we reviewed. Instead,
                                               we  reviewed
Army statistical data which we believe might provide
sight into this complex and subjective issue.         in-
showed that                                    The  data

    -- 64 percent of the Army group who went through
       the process had not graduated from high school

      --39 percent of the Army group was classified
        30th percentile or lower (category V and     in the
        the Armed Forces Qualification Test. 1/   V)  on

     No claim is made per se that the above facts
clusive evidence that there were groups             are con-
                                        of individuals
lacking the capacity to make a knowing decision
individual legal counsel.                        to waiver
                           Equally, we cannot rule out the
possibility that there were individuals
                                        in the non-high
school graduate and/or mental category IV-V
the requisite capacity to understand without who did lack
assistance the many subtleties and intricacieslegal
                                                of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, defenses to alleged
and possible extenuating circumstances.        violations,

     The Chief of the Army Legal Counseling Section
Joint Clemency Processing Center told us:           at the

     -- an individual's chances of receiving a
        under honorable conditions because of administrative
        or procedural error were remote unless he
        represented by military or civilian counsel.
     -- many Army participants in the clemency
        probably could have fared better had they
        requested individual military legal counsel
        or civilian counsel, and
     -- many participants did not take advantage
        individual legal counsel because they did of
        want to spend the additional time inherent not
        a review of their records by the attorneys.

l/The Armed Forces Qualification Test is
  mental qualification for service in the the basic test for
  administered at the Armed Forces Entrancemilitary
  Stations. Scores on the Qualification Testand Examination
                                               result in
  classifications into five mental groups:
      Mental group                  Percentile score
           I                           93    to 100
          II                           65    to 92
         III                           31    to 64
          IV                           10    to 30
           V                            9    and below


     The Sr -otary of Defense established the criteria to
be used by     Joint Alternate Service Board in prescribing
periods of alternate service. Starting with a given
maximum period of 24 months, the Board could adjust the
period downward after considering

     (1) length of satisfactory service completed prior
         to absentence,
     (2) length of service in Southeast Asia in hostile
         fire zone,
     (3) awards and decorations received,
     (4) wounds incurred in combat,

     (5) nature of employment during the period of
         absence, and
     (6) such additional guidelines as experience
         indicated appropriate and which are
         promulgated by future memorandum.

No further guidance beyond the criteria above was issued
by the Secretary.  '      ed set up its own internal
procedures and ope   _      nomously.
     The records of each participant were reviewed by
personnel clerks (some files contained little paper while
others were quite voluminous). The clerks prepared a
single page form, duplicated on the following page, which
summarized in precise order the criteria prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense for consideration in reducing
the period of alternate service.

                             JOINT ALTERNATE SERVICE BOARD

 This is to certify that the Joint Alternate Service Board
 established by PRES PROC No. 4313 has reviewed the official
 records of the below listed individual.  By a majority
 vote of the members, it was determined that this individual
 will be required to serve     months of alternate service.

                                                              --            -------------------
                                                          RANK7KGR-E7RATE                                                       SERVICE

                                                          FROM                                                          TO


LENGTH OF SERVICE IN SEA UNDER HOSTILE                                                            FIRE CONDITIONS:

    ------           --         -------                   ----------                                            -------------                 ---------

                 …-----                    --------                                   ------------------


EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT DURING                                PERIOD OF UA:

             -     -      ------- --            -------                                                         ---

DESERTER:_        _AWOL:_                             MISSING MOVE__                                            LAST DUTY ASSIGNMENT

                                     -…-----                                         -                     --                             …----------------------


     Next, the entire file and summary, along with a
statement prepared by the participant and duplicated
below, was provided to the Board for review and
prescription of a period of alternate service.

I,                                    , Social Security
Number,                       , submit the following
matters to the -a-ternate service board for consideration
in their determination of the number of months of alternate
service that I must serve. I voluntarily submit this
statement with full knowledge and understanding that I am
not obligated to make this statement or complete any part
of this form. The information submitted in this statement
is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.





             Captaln, JAGC

                                          CURRENT MAILING ADDRESS:

                                            Street, Route
Discharge Date:

                                            City, State, ZIP CODE


     Board members told us that time spent on individual
cases varied substantially; there was no statistical norm
or fixed time allotted for a case.      The Board reported
that they were  in session  up to  16 hours  on some days.
On 3 days the  Board used  its alternate   members and
convened as two  Boards to  handle  the  large caseloads.

      On September 26, 1974, the Board reviewed the
records and determined the period of alternate service for
186 participants.   Even if the Board was in session 16
hours that day the average time available for deliberation
by each Board member would have been about 5 minutes a
case.   On January 28, 1975, the Board reviewed the records
and determined the period of alternate service for 135
cases.   Again, if the Board would have been in session
16 hours the average time available for deliberation by
each Board member would have been 7 minutes a case.

     On 34 other occasions the Boara averaged about
72 alternate service determinations a day.  If, on these
occasions, the Board would have been in session 16 hours
each day the overall average time available for deliberation
by each Board member would have been 13 minutes a case.


     using tne  ecretary of Defense criteria as guidelines,
a set of records assembled into a file, a single page
cover sneet summarizing the file, and generally a single
page statement from the applicant, the Board proceeded
to uetermine individual periods of alternate service.

      In our interviews with three primary and two alternate
Board members, we were told that no precise weight was
given to any particular mitigating factor and that each
t3oaru member reviewed tne files, evaluated all factors,
and reached an independent conclusion on the period of
alternate service to be assigned.   Three Board members
tolu us that, as a rule of thumb, the time spent in Vietnam
was deuucted month for month from the maximum 24 months
of alternate service.   If the participant had been wounded
in Vietnam and evacuated before completing a 12-month
tour he was generally credited for a full tour and his
alternate service reduced by 12 months.   One year of service
time in non-vietnam duty was equated to a reduction of

2 to 3 months, depending on the quality of service. Time
in Vietnam beyond 12 months was credited about the same as
other military service--2 to 5 months for each year.

     We were also told that the nature of employment
during absence was considered in very few cases and only
when it was of the same type as alternate service.

      In addition, two Board members told us that they
considered the factors surrounding the participant's
absence but that it was a subjective determination.
Economic hardship or family circumstances were not considered
in the determination.   Board members told us that time
spent in confinement or custody awaiting trial in connection
with unauthorized absence was not considered as a mitigating
factor to reduce the period of alternate service. About
600 participants were in military custody when the program

     The following reasons for the participant's alleged
desertion were cited in the Board's report to the service

    -- Personal hardship caused by death, illness, or
       disability in the deserter's immediate family.
    -- Financial problems arising from problems associated
       with military pay and support allotments for

    -- Immaturity and inability of alleged deserters to
       adjust to military life.

    -- Failure of leaders to help alleged deserters solve
       problems within military channels.

    --Fear of punishment following short periods of AWOL.
    -- Fear of war.

    -- Conscientious objection to killing or taking human life.

    -- Political opposition to the Vietnam war.
    --Problems associated with the use of alcohol and

    --Medical problems.

     -- Problem associated with the Selective Service

     -- Perceived unkept promises following enlistment
        or reenlistment.

     -- Perceived make-work tasks assigned to alleged
        deserter after returning from Vietnam with
        short periods of obligated service to go.


     Alternate service assigned to program participants
varied from 1 month to the 24 months maximum. Statistics
compiled by the Joint Alternate Service Board on 5,479
program participants show the average period of alternate
service as 20.5 months.  Summarized below is additional
data tabulated to show the range of alternate service.

                  Months of
              alternate service
                  assigned                Participants

                 1   to 6                      215
                 7   to 12                     634
                13   to 18                     358
                19   to 23                   1,334
                     24                      2,938

       The same distribution is graphically
  in percent terms.                         presented below








                 ~14   7-12         13-18         19.23      24
                        MONTHS OF ALTERNATE SEnVICE

     We discussed with various Bsard members
reduced periods of alternate service          how they
prescribed criteria. Based on those   in considering  the
applied to 226 randomly selected casesdiscussions we
rule-of-thumb test in which we used     an arithmetic
                                     precise amounts of
time reduction in alternate service
criteria. These were:                related to prescribed

       -- A reduction of 2 months from the maximum
          each year of military service exclusive for
          Vietnam service.                         of

     --A reduction of 1 month from the maximum for each
       month of service in Vietnam up to 12 months and
       a reduction of 2 months for each year beyond
       12 months.

     -- A reduction of 12 months for a full Vietnam tour
        if the individual was evacuated from Vietnam due
        to wounds.

     The results of this arithmetic rule-of-thumb test
support our understanding of how the Board conducted its
ueliDerations and used the prescribed set of criteria
issued by the Secretary of Defense.  In 92 percent of
the cases our results were within 2 months of the
alternate service period assigned by the Board.


     As o March 31, 1975, 2,086 eligible individuals were
processed by 12 designated Army personnel control facilities
in the United States.  Of that number

     -- 1,238 accepted the clemency program and were
        transferred to Fort Benjamin Harrison for processing,

     --7 were returned to military duty,

     -- 31 elected to walk out without resolving their cases,

     -- 38 had cases which   reqUiLed   further deliberation, and

     -- 77z requested and were given undesirable discharges
        which resolved their fugitive status.

     It iz important t  ne   that military regulations
permit individuals charged with certain offense, in-
cluding asence without leave, to request an administra-
tive discharge for the good of the service instead of
standing trial.  Upon approval of such requests they are
then, in fact, discharged.   e were told by Air Force,
Navy, and arine Corps officials that they cid not    rovi6e
this option to individuals processed at their respective
control facilities.


      The epartment of Defense stated that this report
provides incomplete insight into the operations of the
clemency program because of oission of discussion about
the operations of the Presidential Clemency Board which
processed substantial numbers of program eligibles.   The
reason we aid not discuss these matters is stated in the
introduction to this report (See p. 2).  Discussion and
analysis of information external to our audit without
verifying its accuracy would not, in our opinion, be
appropriate or serve the informational purpose of this
report. Subsequent discussion of our observations of the
alternate service program includes program participants
processed by the Presidential Clemency Board.

     DOD states that there is an "unspoken premise" in the
report that the program should be measured solely in
quantitative terms and that positive numerical oals were
not the principal objective of the program. Further, the
program was aeliberately designed as a voluntary program.
According to CD, to judge the program purely in
statistical terms tends to provide "* * * a distorted and
misleauing view."
      !e do not agree that the report contains an unspoken
premise.   It uses statistics where they are descriptive
of activities or events requiring quantification.   We
agree that numerical goals were not the principal objective
of the program. We have stated in he report that the
program provided the basic option to those who were eligible
of whether to participate at all and about half of the
estimated numter of eligibles did report for consideration
of their cases.

     We agree that the program should not be judged in
purely statistical terms.

                            CHAPTER 5



     Clemency for about 14,000 of the individuals who entered
the program was conditioned on the performance of alternate
service for an assigned period of time.  The Presidential
Proclamation stipulated that "* * * alternate service
shall promote the national health, safety or interest."
The alternate service called for in the Proclamation was
similar to the type described in section 6(j) of the Military
Selective Service Act which prescribes that persons who
are conscientiously opposed to participation in military
service will, in lieu of induction, perform civilian work
contributing to the maintenance of national health, safety,
or interest.


     Alternate service was voluntary.  It was the individual's
responsibility to fulfill his committment and a system to
help nim do so was provided.  The consequences for not doing
so have legal implications for some and none for others.
For example:

     -- Alleged deserters who went through the Joint Alternate
        Service Board process were given undesirable dis-
        charges which ended their fugitive status.  For them
        there were no legal consequences for failure to
        complete alternate service.

     -- Alleged draft evaders processed by the Department
        of Justice had their prosecution deferred contingent
        upon completion of alternate service.  For them
        failure to do so carried with it the legal conse-
        quence of possible prosecution for alleged draft

     -- Ex-servicemembers anu convicted evaders processed
        by the Presidential Clemency Board faced no legal
        consequences for failure to complete alternate


     The value of completing alternate service is a judgment
to be made by the individual.  Technically, the outcome
was that:

     -- Alleged deserters who successfully completed tl ir
        alternate service had their undesirable discharges
        replaced by clemency discharges.

     -- Alleged evaders who successfully completed their
        alternate service had the threat of prosecution
        dropped and avoided the possibility of imprison-
        ment and the stigma of a felony conviction.
     -- Convicted evaders who completed their alternate
        service received Presidential pardons which
        relieved any continuing impairment of Federal civil
        rights and in most states restored rights lost
        by their felony convictions. Pardons do not
        expunge or seal the records of their convictions.

     -- Ex-service members who completed alternate service
        received clemency discharges and Presidential

     An additional outcome for those successfully completing
the program, as expressed by the Department of Defense, was
the "* * *   intangible, highly individualized, and un-
quantifiable satisfaction of fulfilling their obligations
to their country."


     Concurrent with the President's Proclamation of
September 16, 1974, Executive Order 11804 designated the
Director of Selective Service to administer the alternate
service program for all clemency program participants.

     At the outset of the program, the Selective Service
System had more than 650 offices as a network for
administering the program. State Directors were assigned
responsibility for day-to-day supervision of alternate
service and were responsible for assisting in placing
participants in acceptable jobs.

     Selective Service planning contemplated that starting
in October 1, 1976, the regular Selective Service System
would employ no more than 100 full-time employees.   However,
recognizing the requirement to continue supervision of
the alternate service rogram, the budget request for
fiscal year 1977 included $800,000 for salaries for
additional personnel.   Selective Service advised us that
for nearly a year after  October 1, 1976, substantial numbers
of alternate service participants should still be in the


     The Presidential Proclamation and Selective Service
regulations established criteria for acceptable jobs.
Each State Director was responsible for applying these
criteria in his State.

     In general, Federal, State, local government, or non-
profit organizations were considered eligible employers by
Selective Service.   Selective Service regulations define
eligible employer  as:

     -- The Government, a State, territory, or possession
        of the United States or a political subdivision,
        or the District of Columbia.

     -- An organization, association, or corporation which
        is primarily engaged either in a charitable activity
        conducted for the benefit of the general public or
        in carrying out a program for the improvement of
        the public health or welfare including educ tional
        and scientific activities in support thereor.   The
        activity or program should be a nonprofit one  and
        not primarily for the benefit of the member of
        such organizations, associations, or corporations
        and it should not increase the membership thereof.

In addition, Selective Service regulations require that
specific jobs offered by employers must meet the following

     -- National health, safety, or interest--The job must
        promote the natrona1-health, safety, or interest.

     -- Noninterference with the cometitive labor market--The
        participant cannot be asslgnea to a ob--or-w-ff
        there are more numerous qualified applicants who are
        not participants thin positions available.

      --Compensation--The compensation will provide a
        standard  f living to the participant reasonably
        comparable to the standard of living he would have
        enjoyed had he gone into military service. This
        criteria can be waived by the State Director under
        certain conditions.
      -- Skill and talent utilization--Where possible, the
         participant will be permitted to utilize his special

     As of September 1, 1975, about a year after the
clemency program started functioning, over 1,800 participants
were working in alternate service jobs. 1/ Below is data
furnished by Selective Service.

                                               Number of
      Employers                          participants employed
Federal (note a)                              63
State                                        246
Local government                             635
      Total                                            944
Nonprofit organizations                                855
For profit organizations                                57
      Total                                          1,856
(a)   Included in the number of Federal employees are 28
      individuals paid under the Comprehensive Employment
      and Training Act administered by the Department of
      Labor. An additional 435 individuals included in
      other categories in the Selective Service data are
      also working in the Act's funded positions.
Government jobs

     The jobs held by participants working for government
agencies varied widely. Some examples are:

           -- crop inspector, Department of Agriculture;

           -- laborer, Forestry aide;
1/By early February 1976, this number had reached more than

            -- draftsman, Veterans Administration; and

            --secretary, Army recruiting


            -- gardener

            -- highway workers,

            *-stock room clerk, and

            -- park worker


            -- janitor,

            -- watchman - receptionist,

            -- street cleaner, and
            -- laborer, city golf course

Nonprofit organizatiojobs
     The jobs held by participants working for nonprofit
organizations also varied widely; however, about 44 percent
were employed by health related organizations in jobs such as
     -- child care worker for emotionally disturbed children,
     -- laundry and kitchen help,

     -- technicians,
     -- nurses aids,

     -- orderlies,

     -- clerical workers, and

     -- janitors

Some examples of other jobs in nonprofit organizations are
     -- truck drivers, Goodwill industries and Salvation Army;

      -- organist and music teacher;
      -- counselor for drug abuse prevention; and

      -- minister
Profitmaking organization jobs

     Based on a strict interpretation of Selective Service
regulations, profitmaking organizations were not eligible
employers for alternate service. Nevertheless, Selective
Service data indicated that 57 participants were employed
in jobs approved by Selective Service even though the
employers were profitmaking firms. These included:

                                              Sumber of
Type business                          participants employed
Hospitals and nursing homes                    24
Agriculture                                    10
Construction                                    8
Ambulance services                              3
Other                                          12
     The participants working with profitmaking organizations
were in jobs approved by Selective Service offices in 15
States. The jobs performed included

     --orderlies, kitchen workers, and maintenance workers
       with hospitals and nursing homes operated for profit;

     -- equipment operators and other farm workers;

     -- equipment operators with paving contractors
        doing road work;

     -- tree trimmer with a utility company; and

     -- construction laborer with a private firm building
        a hospital.
Volunteer jobs
     There were 100 participants in 22 States performing
alternate service as volunteers with governmental agencies
and nonprofit organizations.

     Selective Service's operational instructions at
the outset of the clemency program neither encouraged nor
prohibited volunteer work.   In October 1975, the
instructions were changed to specify that full-time
volunteer work was acceptable as alternate service.
Those instructions also provided that participants
assigned 6 months' or less alternate service could work
part time, at least 20 hours a week, as volunteers when
they agreed to extend their total alternate service
period proportionately.  This permitted a participant
with 3 months alternatre service, for example, to work
part time as a volunteer for 6 months and earn clemency.

     Volunteer work by participants   included a wide
range of jobs such as:

     Clerical office work           Public relations
     Volunteer firemen              Chemical analyst
     Counselors                     Recreati)n worker
     Theatrical technician          Assistart manager of Little
     Refugee work/social service      League baseball club
     Assistant teacher of the       Librari n
       Tibetan language             Red Cro s volunteer
     Spanish interpreter            Radio programmer
     Park worker                    Research assistant at
     Security guard                   a university
     Civil Defense volunteer        Cafeteria/store worker
     Police patrolman                 at a religious
                                    Assistant to Athletic
                                      Director with religious
                                   College coaching assistant


     By September 2, 1975, approximately a year after the
program started, Selective Service statistics showed that
7,272 eligibles had been referred to Selective Service
offices.  In July 1976 the last eligibles referred by the
Office of the Pardon Attorney increased the total number
referred to 13,272. The statistics for September 20,
1976, 2 years after the program began, continue to show
total referrals as 13,272. Here is what happened to them.

                       As of Seet. 2, 1975      As of Sept. 20, 1976
                        Number        Percent    Number     Percent
Never reported to
  Selected Service
  Office                 1,862          25.6      4,806       36.2
Dropped from the
  program without
  alternate service      2,165          24.8      5,082       38.3
In or awaiting
  alternate service
  jobs                   3,147          43.3      2,009      15.1
Completed alternate
  service require-
  ments                     98           1.3      1,375      10.4
                         7,272        100.0      13,272-    100.0
a/Source: Selective Service System data as of October 29, 1976.
  Varies with compilations derived from reports of the
  Presidents Clemency Board, Department of Justice, and
  Department of Defense which totaled about 13,750.


     When the statistics for the first year of the program
became available, we tried to determine:
     -- why about 1,900 eligible participants never
        reported to Selective Service offices for
        alternate service and
     -- why about 2,200 participants already had been
        dropped from the program without completing their
        alternate service.
     Virtually no feasible means existed to directly
determine why individuals never showed up at Selective
Service offices after taking time and expending effort to
complete the initial entrance requirements. We know that the
majority were unconvicted deserters who had already been
relieved of their fugitive status after reporting to
Fort Benjamin Harrison and receiving undesirable discharges.

     We were able to gain some insight into why in-
dividuals who had actually reported to Selective
Service for alternate service jobs did not complete
their alternate service. A questionnaire was mailed to
almost 2.,600 participants who had reported for alternate
service but who had dropped out and were terminated from
the program before completion.   Responses were received
from about  22 percent of the addresses.

     A variety of reasons for quitting or refusing
acceptable alternate service jobs were offered.   Low
pay was most frequently cited with many responses  in-
cluding supplementary information.  For example the

     -- With 4 dependents who claimed he was earning
        $175 a week when he entered the clemency program.
        His wife was expecting a child and he is buying
        a house and car.  He claimed the job which would
        have been acceptable to Selective Service paid
        $2 an hour and was 35 miles away from his home.

     -- Who claimed he was earning $140 a week when he
        entered the clemency program and that with a
        family of eight he could not accept a lower
        paying alternate service job.

     --Who claimed that he would go $300    month in debt
       for each of the 23 months he was  spposed  to serve.

     At 9 of the 10 State or city Selective Service
Headquarters visited, officials reinforced the indication
that low pay was a major reason for participants refusing
to work in alternate service jobs.   Selective Service
officials at five of those  headquarters expressed the
opinion that participants could  receive more money from
welfare or unemployment compensation  than from most
available alternate service  jobs.

     Thirty-seven percent of those indicating reasons for
quitting or refusing acceptable jobs cited distance to
the job.  This reason appeared to involve two problems.
One was the relocation sometimes necessary for parti-
cipants to take jobs acceptable to Selective Service.
The relocation was necessary for individuals living in
areas where employment simply was not available. The
other problem was commuting distan   to work.  For example,
the respondent who claimed that

     --the Selective Service expected him to move
       360 miles from his home to work in an
       acceptable job,
     --the job offer he received was 150 miles
       from home,
     -- his only job referrals were to hospitals
        and 40 miles from his home, and
     -- he was fired from an acceptable job because
        it was 20 miles from his home and he lacked
        transportation to get there.
     Selective Service officials in five offices
distance to the job was a major factor in participants
dropping out.  For example, in one State we were advised
that participants in some rural parts of that
could not possibly obtain alternate service    State
relocating because of high unemployment rates.    without

     Other reasons, less frequently cited by respondents
to our questionnaire were:

     --Did not like that kind of work.

     --Job was below ability.

     -- Did not get along with supervisors or
        fellow workers.
     Several State Selective Service officials told
that other factors hindering placements for         us
service jobs, included                      alternate

    --lack of employable skills (five offices),
    -- poor physical appearance of participants
       the extent that it impedes employability
       (six offices),
    --high unemployment rates (five offices),

    -- personal problems of the participants
       (four offices),
    --poor attitudes toward alternate service
                                                (four offices!,
    -- poor attitudes toward work (three offices),
    --criminal records of participants (two offices).

     Opinions as to satisfaction with Selective Service
efforts to help find alternate service jobs were also
solicited in our questionnaire. The question and
answers follow:


  "How satisfied are you with Selective Service
   efforts to help you find an Alternate Service jobs"

  very satisfied       13%       Somewhat dissatisfied   22%
  Somewhat satisfied   15%       Very dissatisfied       50%

     As of September 1, 1975, about 57 percent of the allegea
deserters failed to complete their alternate service and
had been terminated from the program. These deserters had
been granted an undesirable discharge.   In comparison, only
5 percent of the alleged draft evaders participating in
the alternate service program failed to complete it, and
were terminated as of September 1, 1975.   The alleged draft
evaders who failed to complete alternate service were
subject to resumed prosecution for their alleged offenses.

     A comparison of the data we obtained on those who
were active in the program with data from our questionnaire
is statistically shown on the following page:

                         Dropouts                  Participants
Employed at entry
  into program              72                         37
Weekly salary of those
  employed at entrance
  into program:
    More than 150           66                        46
    Less than $150          34                        54
Number of jobs referred
  to by Selective
    None                    16                        10
    one to three            61                        68
    four or more            23                        22
       Under 25 years       29                        31
       25 years to 30 years 64                        63
       Over 30 years         7                         6
    Non-high school
      graduate           58                           45
    High school graduate 25                           34
    Post high school
      education          17                           21
Marital status:
    Single, divorced,
      or separated         38                         43
    Married                62                         57
    two or less            43                         49
    three or more          57                         51
Months of a'ternate
  service tc be
    24 months              54                         50
    18 to 23 months        25                         25
     1 t 17 months         21                         25


     The Director of Selective Service provided important
updated statistics which have been incorporated where
appropriate in this report. No other comments were
offered about the specific matters concerning the
Selective Service System activities discussed in this
     A further comment was offered that this report lacks
poresentation and analysis of the policy, regulations,
problems and statistics of the Presidential Clemency
Board and "* * * therefore leaves too much of the program
to the imagination of the reader." The view is offered
that the data contained in the Presidential Clemency
Board's executive summary and minority report (app. III
and IV) be analyzed in the context of the entire program
and incorporated in this report, thereby "* * * becoming
supportive of the conclusions."

     The reason we did not audit the activitiec and results
of the Presidential Clemency Board is explained in the
introduction to this report (See p. 2.) Analyzing
information external to our audit without verifying its
accuracy would not, in our opinion, be appropriate or
serve the informational purpose of this report. This
report therefore confines itself to the responsibilities
and processes of the agencies involved in the program
which we were able to audit or observe.

                           CHAPTER 6


     ihe Vietnam era encompassed ¼tse 8 1/2 year period
from August 4, 1964, through March 28, 1973.   The era
ended without resolving the status of thousands of
Americans who remained convicted, charged, investigated,
or still sought for draft law violations of offenses
related to unauthorized absences during military service.

     On September 16, 1974, the President issued his
proclamation announcing the program which among other
matters, stated:

           "Over a year after the last American
     combatant had left Vietnam, the status of
     thousands of our countrymen--convicted,
     cnarged, investigated or still sought for
     violations of the Military Selective Service
     Act or of the Uniform Code of Military
     .;ustice--remains unresolved.

          "In furtherance of our national commitment
     to justice and mercy these young Americans
     should have the chance to contribute a share
     to the rebuilding of peace among ourselves
     and with all nations. They should be allowed
     the opportunity to earn return to their country,
     their communities, and their families, upon
     their agreement to a period of alternate service
     in the national interest, together with an
     acknowledgment of their allegiance to the
     country and its Constitution."

     In this report we have aiscussed that there were
thousands whose status was unresolved at the time of the
proclamation.  We have also discussed that several
thousands elected to take the opportunity to resolve
their status under the provisions of the proclamation
while many thousands did not.

     This report also describes the roles and responsi-
bilities of the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, and Selective Service System in carrying out
the program. It describes the processes used by each
of those agencies and the outcomes.

     The program has nearly run its course. This report
is therefore intended to add to the historical record
some additional information that may be useful in future

APPENDIX I                    COPY                  APPENDIX I


                  TITLE 3--The President

                    PROCLAMATION 4313

             Announcing a Program for the
              Return of Vietnam Era Draft

             Evaders and Military Deserters

     By the President of the United States of America
                      A Proclamation

  The United States withdrew the last of its forces from the
Republic of Vietnam on March 28, 1973.

  In the period of its involvement in armed hostilities in
Southeast Asia, the United States suffered great losses.
Millions served their country, thousands died in combat,
thousands more were wounded, others are still listed as mis-
sing in action.

  Over a   year after the last American combatant had left
Vietnam,   the status of thousands of our countrymen--convicted,
charged,   investigated or still sought for violations of the
Military   Selective Service Act or of the Uniform Code of
Military   Justice--remains unresolved.

  In furtherance of our national commitment to justice and
mercy these young Americans should have the chance to contri-
bute a share to the rebuilding of peace among ourselves and
with all nations. They should be allowed the opportunity
to earn return to their country, their communities, and
their families, upon their agreements to a period of alter-
nate service in the national interest, together with an
acknowledgment of their allegiance to the country and its

  Desertion in time of war is a major, serious offense;
failure to respond to the country's call for duty is also a
serious offeni.e. Reconciliation among our people does not
require that these acts be condoned. Yet, reconciliation
calls for an act of mercy to bind the Nation's wounds and
to heal the scars of divisiveness.

APPENDIX I                                        APPENDIX I

                           THE PRESIDENT

  NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United
States, pursuant to my powers under Article II, Sections 1, 2
an( 3 of the Constitution, do hereby proclaim a program to
commence immediately to afford reconciliation to Vietnam era
draft evaders and military deserters upon the following
terms and conditions:

  1. Draft Evaders--An individual who allegedly unlawfully
failed under the Military Selective Service Act or any rule
or regulation promulgated thereunder, to register or register
on time, to keep the local board informed of his current ad-
dress, to report for or submit to preinduction or induction
examination, to report for or submit to induction itself, or
to report for or submit to, or complete service under section
6(j) of such Act during the period from August 4, 1964 to
March 28, 1973, inclusive, and who has not been adjudged
guilty in a trial for such offense, will be relieved of pro-
secution and punishment for such offense if he:

        (i) presents himself to a United States Attorney
     before January 31,1975,

        (ii) executes an agreement acknowledging his al-
     legiance to the United States and pledging to fulfill
     a period of alternate service under the auspices of
     the Director of Selective Service, and

        (iii) satisfactorily completes such service.

The alternate service shall promote the national health,
safety, or interest. No draft evader will be given the
privilege of completing a period of alternate service by
service in the Armed Forces.

  However, this program will not apply to an individual
who is precluded from re-entering the United States under
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(22) or other law. Additionally, if in-
dividuals eligible for this program have other criminal
charges outstanding, their participation in the program
may be conditioned upon, or postponed until after, final
disposition ot the other charges has been reached in
accordance with law.


APPENDIX I                                        APPENDIX I

  The period of service shall be twenty-four months, which
may be reduced by the Attorney General because of mitigating

  2. Military Deserters--A member of the armed forces who has
been administratively classified as a deserter by reason of
unauthorized absence and whose absence commenced during the
period from August 4, 1964 to March 28, 1973, inclusive, will
be relieved of prosecution and punishment under Articles
85, 86 and 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
such absence and for offenses directly related thereto if
before January 31, 1975 he takes an oath of allegiance
to the United States and executes an agreement with
the Secretary of the Military Department from which he
absented himself or for members of the Coast Guard, with
the Secretary of Transportation, pledging to fulfill a pe-
riod of alternate service under the auspices of the Direc-
tor of Selective Service. The alternate service shall
promote the national health, safety, or interest.

  The period of service shall be twenty-four months, which
may be reduced by the Secretary of the appropriate Military
Department, or Secretary of Transportation for members of
the Coast Guard, because of mitigating circumstances.

  However, if a member of the armed forces has additional
outstanding charges pending against him under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, his eligibility to participate
in this program may be conditioned upon, or postponed
until after, final disposition of the additional charges
has been reached in accordance with law.
  Each member of the armed forces who elects to seek
relief through this program will receive an undesirable
discharge. Thereafter, upon satisfactory completion of
a period of alternate service prescribed by the Military
Department or Department of Transportation, such individual
will be entitled to receive, in lieu of his undesirable
discharge, a clemency discharge in recognition of his fulfill-
ment of the requirements of the program. Such clemency
discharge shall not bestow entitlement to benefits admin-
istered by the Veterans Administration.

  Procedures of the Military Departments implementing
this Proclamation will be in accordance with guidelines
established by the Secretary of Defense, present Military
Department regulations notwithstanding .


APPENDIX I                                              APPENDIX I

  3. Presidential Clemency Board--By Executive Order I have
this date established a Presidential Clemency Board which
will review the records of individuals within the following
categoriess (i) those who have been convicted of draft
evasion offenses as described above, (ii) those who have
received a punitive or undesirable discharge from service
in the armed forces for having violated Article 85, 86, or
87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice between August 4,
1964 and March 28, 1973, or are serving sentences of con-
finement for such violations. Where appropriate, the Board
may recommend that clemency be conditioned upon completion
of a period of alternate service. However, if any clemency
discharge is recommended, such discharge shall not bestow
entitlement to benefits administered by the Veterans Adminis-
  4. Alternate Service--In prescribing the length of alter-
nate service in individual cases, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of the appropriate Department, or the Clemency
Board shall take into account such honorable service as
an individual may have rendered prior to his absence,
penalties already paid under law, and such other mitigating
factors as may be appropriate to seek equity among those
who participate in this program.

  IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this six-
teenth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred seventy-four, and of the Indepe ,dence of the United
States of America the one hundred and ninety-ninth.

                                /S/   Gerald R. Ford

             [FR Doc.74-21742 Filed 9-16-74;12:47 pm]


APPENDIX   II                                                                   APPENDIX II

                                      EXECUTIVE ORDER

                    TIONS FOR, VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 65, 86 or 87 OF

                     By virtue of the authority vested in me as President

                of the United States by Section 2 of Article II
                                                                of the
                Constitution of the United States, and in the interest

                of the internal management of the Government, it
                ordered as follows:

                    Section 1.     There is hereby established in the

                Executive Office of the President a board of 9
                which shall be known as the Presidential Clemency
                The members of the Board shall be appointed by
                President, who shall also designate its Chairman.

                    Sec. 2.   The Board, under such regulations as it

            may prescribe, shall examine the cases of persons
            apply for Executive clemency prior to January
                                                          31, 1975,
            and who (i) have been convicted of violating
                                                         Section 12 or
            6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act (50
            U.S.C. S462), or of any rule or regulation promulgated

           pursuant to that section, for acts committed between

           August 4, 1964 and March 28,                 1973, inclv.ive, or   (ii)   have
           received punitive or undesirable discharges
                                                       as a conse-
           quence of violations of Article 85,                86 or 87 of the
           Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C.
                                                       SS 885, 886,
           8X7)     that occurred between August 4, 1964 and March
           1973,    inclusive,     or are serving sentences of confinement

           for such violations.              The
                                      oard will only consider the
           e ;es of Military Selective Service Act violators
           wr-re cnvicted of       unlawfully failing          (i) to register or
           :'4ist'e    on time,    (ii) to keep the local board informed
           c!    th!ir current aress, (iii)               to reporL for or submit
           t'. plrindj-cotirl o-    'd.Cij     ior examination,     (iv) to report for

APPENDIX II                                                     APPENDIX II

        or submit to induction itself, or (v) to report for or
        submit to, or cc..plete service under Section 6(j) of
        such Act.    However, the Board will not consider the
        cases of individuals who are precluded from re-entering

        the United States under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(22) or other
               Sec. 3.   The Board shall report to the President its
        findings and recommendations as to whether Executive clemency
        should be granted or denied in any case.      If clemency is recom-
        mended, the Board shall also recommend the form that such
        clemency should take, including clemency conditioned upon a
        period of alternate service in the national interest.        In the
        cna;e of an individual discharged from the armed forces with
        a punitive or undesirable discharge, the Board may recommend
        to the Preside.t that a clemency discharge be substituted
        for a punitive or undesirable discharge.      Determinatic   of
        any period of alternate service shall be in accord with the
        Proclamation announcing a program for the return
        of Vietnam era draft evaders and military deserters.
               Sec. 4.   The Board shall give priority consideration to
        those applicants who are presently confined and have been
        convicted only of an offense sev forth in section 2 of this
        order, and who have no outstanding criminal charges.
               Sec. 5.   Each member of the Board, except any member
        who then receives other compensation from the United States,
        may receive compensation for each day he or she is      tngaged
        upon the work of the Board at not to exceed the daily rate
        now or hereafter prescribed by law for persons and positions
        in GS-18, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 3109), and may also
        receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of sub-
        sistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703) for persons in
        the government service employed intermittently.
               Sec. 6.   Necessary ;:xpenses of the Board may be paid from
        the Unnticipated Personnel Needs Fund of the President or from

        such other funil   as may ba available.

APPENDIX II                                                   APPENDIX II


              Sec. 7.   Necessary administrative services and support may
        be provided the Board by the General Services Administration
        on a reimbursable basis.
              Sec. 8.   All departments and agencies in the Executive
        branch are authorize' and directed to cooperate with the
        Board in its work, and to furnish the Board all appropriate
        information and assistance, to the extent permitted by law.
              Sec. 9.   The Board shall submit its final recommendations
        to the President not later than December 31, 1976, at which
        time it shall cease to exist.

              September 16, 1974.

APPENDIX   II                                                       APPENDIX II

                                       EXECUTIVE ORDER


                       By virtue of the authority vested in me as
                President of the United States, pursuant to my powers
                under Article II, Sections 1, 2 ad 3 of the Constitution,
                and under Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States
                Code, it is hereby ordered as follows:
                       Section 1.   The Director of Selective Service

                is designated and empowered, without the approval,
                ratification or other action of the President, under
                such regulations as he may prescribe, to establish,
                implement, and administer the program of alternate
                service authorized in the Proclamation announcing a
                program for the return cf Vietnam era draft evaders
                and military deserters.
                       Sec. 2.   Departments and agencies in the Executive

                branch shall, upon the request of the Director of
                Selective Service, cooperate and assist in the im-
                plementation or administration of the Director's
                duties under this Order, to the extent permitted by

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                         September 16, 1974.

APPENDIX III                                              APPENDIX III

                                               EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

                             I. Introduction
            In the years before President Ford assumed office,
      public opinion was sharply divided over what government
      policy should be toward those who had committed Vietnam-era
      draft   violations and military absence offenses.      Many
      believed that these actions could not be forgiven in light
      of the sacrifices endured by cthers during the war. Yet
      mary citizens believed that only unconditional amnesty was
      appropriate for offenders who had acted in good conscience
      to oppose a war they believed wrong and wasceful.
            something had to be done to bring Americans together
      again.   The rancor that had divided the country during the
      Vietnam War still sapped its spirit and strength.       The
      national interest required that Americans put aside their
      strong personal feelings. Six weeks after taking office,
      President Ford announced a program of clemency, offering
      forgiveness and reconciliation to Vietnam-era draft and
      military absence offenders.

                   2. The President's Clemency Program

             In his Proclamation of September 16, 1974, President
      Ford created a program of conditional clemency for roughly
      13,000 civilians and 100,000 servicemen who had committed
      draft or military absence offenses between the adoption of
      the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (August 4, 1964) and the day
      the last American combatant left Vietnam (March 28,     1973).
      He authorized the Departments of Justice and Defense,
      respectively, to review applications from the 4,522 draft
      offenders and the      10,115 undischarged servicemen still at
      large.    He created the Presidential Clemency Board to
      consider   applications from the 8,700 convicted and punished
      draft offenders and the estimated 90,000 servicemen given
      bad discharges for absence offenses. He gave all eligible
      persons 4-1/2 months (later extended to 6-1/2 months) to
      apply.    He promised that their cases would be reviewed
      individually. He further indicated that applicants would be
      asked to earn clemency where appropriate by performing up to


                                                                    AYPENDIX III

       24 month, of alternative service in the national interest,
       under the supervision of the Seectrvo Service System.
               Under the Justice Dpartment program, unconvicted
       draft offenders would have their prosecutions                    dropped,
       enabling them    to  avoid  imprisonment    and  the  stigma    of  felony
       convictions. Under the Defense Department program,                       as
       servicemen were offered immediate undesirable Discharges         enabling
       permanent ends to their fugitiv.3 status, similarly  of Bad Conduct or
       them to avoid imprisonment and the stigmaoffered             the canCe
       Dishonorable Discharges.        They  were  also
       to earn a Clemency Discharge.               Under the Clemency Boayd
        program, convicted draft offenders were offered                full and
       unconditional     presidential   pardons   for  their   draft   offenses.
        Former servicemen who had received bad discharges                 pardons
        offered Clemency Discharges       and   full   Presidential
        for their absence offenses.
                By   granting     pardons to convicted or discharged
        offenders, President Ford was exercising the               most potent
                                                                          to him.
        constitutional form of executive clemency available   forgiveness      for
        The  Presidential    pardon  connotes    official
                     draft  or  military   offenses,    restoring    all  Federal
        desigated                                                       offenses.
        civil rights lost as a result of those specific        indicates that
        Likewise, a full and unconditional pardon pardoned               offenses
        government agencies should disregard all                         clemency
        in any subsequent       actions    they    take   involving
                By directing that the military services upgrade                bad
                       substituting   Clemency    Discharges    in  their   place,
         discharges,                                      equal        employment
         the    President     wanted     to    insure
                            for those who received clemency. to              A    a
         opportunities                                                           be
          "neutral" discharge, the Clemency Discharge appears
         working:     a recent survey of large national employers and
         local (Pennsylvania) employers found that they             view it as
          almost identical to a General            Discharge under honorable
                                             .    an Undesiraole Discharge
         conditions and much better t
          under other-than-honorab)e     ccd,   :ions.
                 A   Clemency     Dii v.,ge does not confer veterans'
          benefits, but it leaves an individual with         the same appeal
          rights that were available to him before. Indeed,              Discharge
          receipt of a Presidential     pardon   and   a   Clemency
          should    improve an individual's chances for a further
          discharge upgrade.
                 Altogether, 21,729 eligible persons               applied      for


APPENDIX III                                                      APPENDIX III

                        TABLE 1: PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR THE
                           PRESIDENT'S CLEMENCY PROGRAM
                                               Number    Number    Percent
     Aqency             Applicants            Eliible   Applying   ApDlyina
      Lafense     Fugitive AWOL offenders      10,115    5,555      55S
      Justice     Unconvicted draft
                  offenders                    4,522        706     16S
      P.C.B.     Discharged AWOL
                 offenders                    90,000    13,589      15%
      P.C.B.      Convicted draft
                  offende-s                    8,700     1,879      221
                TOTAL                         113,337   21,729      19%

           Through the first week in January, the Clemency Board
     had received only 850 applications, with the initial January
     31 deadline just a few weeks away. At that time, the public
     did not realize that the program included not only fugitives
     but also punished offenders--including servicemen who had
     served in Vietnam.     Very few people realized that the
     President's program included     the   following   sort   of
      (Case 1)              While a medic in Vietnam, this military
                            applicant   (an American Indian) received
                            the Bronze Star for heroism because of his
                            actions during a night sweep operation.
                            When his platoon came under intense enemy
                            fire, he moved through a minefield under a
                            hail of fire to aid his wounded comrades.
                            While in Vietnam, he was made Squad Leader
                            of nine men, seven of whom (including
                            himself) were wounded in action.      After
                            returning    to   the   United States, he
                            experienced     post-combat     psychiatric
                            problems.    He went AWOL several times to
                            seek psychiatric treatment. He received a
                            bad discharge for his absences.
           Because f tnis widespread public misunderstanding, we
     began public service a::nouncements on thousands of radio and
     television stations, held meetings and press conferences at
     over two dozen cities, met with thoucands of veterans'
     counselors throughout the country, and circulated bulletins
     to agencies in direct contact with eligible persons--such as
     Veterans' Administration offices, employment offices, post
     offices, and prisons. Given a limited information budget of
     $24,000, the results were dramatic.     During the rest of
     January,  we received over 4,000 new applications. Because
     of this response, the President extended the application
     deadline another month. we received 6,000 in February and,
     after a final extension, another 10,000 before the March
     31st final deadline--for a total of about 21,500, of whom
     15,468 turned out to be eligible.         This increase    in
     applications   was   directly attributable to our public


APPENDIX III                                             APPENDIX     III

       information campaign.     By asking applicants when     they
       learned they were eligible, we discovered that over 95% did
       not realize they could apply uamtl after the January 8 start
       of the campaign; ninety percent applied withIn days or even
       hors of the.i      discovery that they were eligible. The
       Departments of Defense and Ju3tice did not experience a
       similar increase in applications, because it was already
       widely understood that fugitive draft and military absence
        (AWOL) offenders could apply for clemency.
             Despite our efforts, public understanding of the
       program has not changed appreciably. An August 1975 Gallup
       Poll found that only 15% of the American people understood
       that convicted draft offenders and discharged AWOL offenders
       could also apply for clemency.        Virtually   the   same
       percentage -- 16% -- of eligible persons in those categories
       actually did apply.     We are convinced that most of the
       remainder st.ll do not know that they were eligible for the
       program.   others may not have applied because their lives
       are settl-, with their draft offense convictions or bad
       discharges of no present consequence to them. We believe
       that relatively few failed to apply to the Clemency Board
       because of their opposition to the Presidentes program.
             The press and the public were, and indeed still are,
       preoccupied with anti-war fugitives who fled to Canada.
       However, we found that only six percent of our civilian
       applicants and two percent of our military applicants had
       ever gone to Canada.      Virtually all of them subsequently
       returned to the United States long before they applied for
       clemency.   Oi the 15,468 Clemency Beard applicants, less
       than 00 (3%) ever went to Canada. Thi3 stands in marked
       contrast to the 3,700 (24%) who were Vietnam veterans. In
       recent years, many estimates nave been made of the number of
       fugitive draft and AWOL offenders in Canada, usually on the
       basis of very limited data. Based on our own data and our
       understanding of applicants to the Justice and Defense
       programs, we estimate that a maximum of 7,000 persons
       eligible for clemency were ever Canadian exiles. ie further
       estimate that only ,000 (less than -%) of the 91,500 who
       were eligible but did not apply for clemency are still in
       Canada, contrary to the usual public impression.
             What happens next to those who did not apply?     The
       8,300 who are still fugitives can surrender to authorities.
       While they are likely to receive a bad discharge or felony
       conviction, they will end their fugitive status and will
       probably not be sentenced to imprisonment. The 91,500 who
       have already been punished can apply to the Pardon Attorney
       in the Department of Justice or to the appropriate military
       discharge review boards, avenues of relief which are not
       related to the President's clemency program and which are
       not affected by the program's end.


APPENDIX III                                              APPENDIX III

           Chance and circumstance    had much to do with the
     sacrifices faced by each individual during the Vietnam War.
     Conscription is, by nature, selective. Only nine percent of
     all draft-age men served in ietnam. Less than two percent
     ever faced charges for draft or desertion offenses, and only
     0.4%--less than one out of two hundred--were convicted or
     remained charged with these offenses at the start of the
     clemency program.
           Many Clemency Board applicants fell into        common
     categories:    the   civilian   war resister who had his
     application for conscientious objector (CO) status denied
     and who stood trial rather than leave the count:cy; the
     Jehovah s Witness who was granted   CO exemption but %went to
     jail because his religious convictions prohibited hint from
     accepting an alternative service assignment from selective
     Service; the Vietnam veteran who went AWOL because of his
     difficulties in adjusting to post-combat garrison duty; the
     serviceman with a low aptitude score who could not adjust to
     military life; the serviceman who went AWOL to find a
     better paying job to get his family off welfare.
           The civilian applicants were not unlike most young men
     of their age. They grew up in stable middle-class families.
     Eleven percent wera black, and 1.3% were Spanish-speaking.
     Ov2r three-quarters graduated from high school, and their
     average IQ was 111.      Ro'lghly one in four was a Jehovah's
     Witness or member of another religious sect opposed to war.
     Almost half applied for conscientiJus objector exemptions,
     which were usually denied. The typical draft offense was
     failure to report for or submit to induction. Three-
     quarters committed their      offenses   because   of   their
     opposition   to war in general or the Vietnam War in
     particular. For 96%, it was their or.ly felony offense,
     committed at an average age of 21.
           Most civilian applicants surrendered immediately, and
     most who were ever fugitives lived openly at home. Only six
     percent ever sought exile in Canada. After indictment, most
     pled guilty.    Two-thirds were sentenced to      probation,
     usually on the condition that they perform alternative
     service. The other one-third went to prison, usually for
     periods of less than one year. Less than one percent served
     prison terms of two years or longer, but some were in prison
     for as long as five years.
           At the time of their applications for clemency, almost
     all were either working full-time or in school. Only two
     percert were unemployed, with another two percent in prison
     for unrelated felony offenses. Approximately 100 were still
     imprisoned for their draft offenses when the President
     announce d his clemency prcgram. They were released upon the
     condition that they apply for clemency.
           Unlike the civilian applicants, the ast majority of
     military applicants were not articulate, well-educated, or
     motivate5 explicitly by opposition to the war. Almost none
     had applied for a conscientious objector exempt' on before


APPENDIX III                                              APPENDIX III

      entering the service, and less than five percent committed
      their AWOL offenses because of opposition to the war. Most
      grew up iJn !r-kenhomes, with parents struggling to cope
      with low incomes. Roughly one in five were black, and 3.5%
      were Spenish-speaking. Despite an average IQ of 98, over
      three-quarters dropped out of high school before entering
      military service at the aqe of 17 or 18.    Almost one in
      three    were  tested   at below the 30th percentile of
      intelligence (Category .V on the Armed Forces Qualifying
      Test), making them only marginally qualified for military
            Most military applicants enlisted rather than be
      drafted, usually joining the Army or the Marines. Slightly
      over one-third were ordered to Vietnam.        Seven percent
      failed to report. The other 27% did serve in Vietnam, with
      half either volunteering     for   a   Vietnam    assignment,
      volunteering for a combat mission, or re-enlisting while in
      vietnam. of Vietnam veteran applicants, almost one in four
      suffered from mental stress caused by combat, and two in
      five have experienced severe personal problems as a result
      of their Vietnam tours.      Two percent of all military
      applicants returned from Vietnam with disabling injuries.
      Very few went AWOL in Vietnam; only four percent of all
      applicants went AWOL from apparent combat situations.
             AWOL offenses usually occurred after training and in
      stateside bases.     Over half of all military applicants
      committed their offenses because of serious personal or
      family problems.     Other common reasons for AWOL offenses
      included esentment of some action ty a superior or a
      general iialike of military service. Typically, applicants
      went AWOL two or three times. Most returned to their home
      t owns, where they lived openly. Only two percent of the
      military applicants ever sought exile in Canada.      Almost
      half surrendered voluntarily after their last AWOL offenses.
      At the time of their last AWOLs, they were typically 20 or
      21 years old and had accumulated 14 months of creditable
      military service.
            Upon their return to military control, about 15% were
      given administrative UndesirLble Discharges for Unfitness.
      The other 85% faced court-martial charges, roughly hali
      accepting an ndesirable Discharge in lieu of curt-martial.
      This was a particularly frequent practice amcnq applicants
      discharged after 1970. The remaining 40% stood General or
      special Court-Martial, were convicted, and received Bad
      Conduct or Dishonorable Discharges.      All court-martialed
      applicants spent at least some time in confinement, with
      their sentences averaging five months in length. About 170
      were still confined when the clemency program started, ana
      they were released upon application to the Clemency Board.
            The bad discharges have seriously affected the current
      employment st3tus of military applicants. Seventeen percent
      were unemployed at the time of their clemency applications,
      whereas only eight percent were unemployed during their last
      AWOL offenues. Anotlier seven percent were incarcerated for
      civilian  felony offenses at the time the program started.
      Twelve percent had been convicted for at least one civilian
      felony offense sometime in their lives.


APPENDIX   III                                                 APPENDIX   III

                  4. Procedural and Substantive Rules
           The Clemency Board was the only new entity created by
    President Ford for the special    purpose  of reviewing    the
    cases   of clemency applicants.     Originally, the President
    named nine members to the Board,    designating   former U.S.
    Senator Charles E. Goodell as the Chairman.   After the great
    increase   in applications, the President expanded the Board
    to 18 members.   Both the original Board   and the    expanded
    Board were representative of a cross-section of views on the
    Vietnam War    and on the    issue of   clemency.    The Board
    consisted of 13 veterans of military service,   three women,
    and two priests.    The Board included five Vietnam veterans,
    two of whom were severely disabled      in  comnat.    Another
    member   has a husband who still      is listed as missing in
    action.   Our policies  and  case dispositions reflected     a
    synthesis   of  the  different backgrounds and experiences of
    all Board members.

          The Board worked hard throughout the year  to  fulfill
    the   President's   requirement   that we give each     case
    individual attention before his September 15 deadline.   The
    consensus  was remarkable,   given the wide range of views
    represented on the Board.  What we sought to maintain was a
    reasoned,  middle ground. The President's goal of national
    reconciliation found expression in the spirit o   compromise
    and accommodation that guided us.

          To assure    the   fairness and consistency of our case
   dispositions, we developed a case-by-case      review procedure
   consistent with     the Presidents goal of clemency.       Because
   this was a program of clemency, not        law e forcement, we
   unanimously decided not to seek the assistance of the FBI in
   preparing our cases. We limited our file acquisition to the
   official   military or court records.     To preserve the spirit
   of reconciliation, we promised strict confidentiality to all
   who applied to the Board.     For each   case, staff    attorneys
   prepared narrative      summaries which were carefully checked
   for accuracy.    Each applicant was      sent his    summary and
   encouraged    to    identify   errors   and provide    additional
   information.     Staff attorneys    presented   cases   in    oral
   hearings   before   panels   consisting of three or four Board
   members   who had read the       summaries in advance.         The
   attorneys'   supervisors    were  present   as panel counsels to
   assure   staff objectivity.      They also served      as    legal
   advisors to ensure that Board policy precedents were applied
   correctly.    Every Board     member had the right to refer any
   case to the full Board.     This right was   exercised in only
   about    700  (5%)   of our    cases.    The Chairman     referied
   additional   cases   to the    full Board,    having    had    the
   assistance of     a computer-aided     review which flagged case
   dispositions for being either t       harsh or too lenient.

           Case dispositions varied little  from week to week,
    especially after our basic policy decisicns had been made.
    During   our first   six months,   we  decided   500   cases,
    recommending outright pardons (without alternative service)
    for 46% of all cases, denial of clemency for three percent,
    and conditional    clemency  with alternative service for the
    remainder. During our latter six months, we decided    14,000


APPENDIX III                                                APPENDIX   III

      more cases, recommending outright pardons for 44%, denial of
      clemency for six percent, and alternative service for the
             Contributing to the fairness and consistency of our
       process were the clear rules we established and published
       for deciding cases.    Our alternative service Obaseline"
       formula took account of the fact that all of our applicants
       had been punished for their offenses. We started with 24
       months, deducting three months for every one month spent in
       confinement, and deducting one month for every month spent
       in satisfactory performance of probation or court-ordered
       alternative service. In cases where military oftiials and
       Federal judges had adjudged short sentences, we reduced the
       baseline figure to match the sentence actually given.   Our
       minimum baseline was three months, and almost 98S of our
       applicants had baselines of sir months or less.
             To determine whether an applicant deserved clemency--
       and, if so, whether his assigned period of alternative
       service should be different from his baseline -we applied 28
       specific aggravating and mitigating factors.   As with our
       baseline formula, we developed our list of factors by
       consensus. We were especially concerned about the reasons
       for an applicant's offense and the circumstances that had
       prompted it. Likewise, we considered his overall record as
       a serviceman and as a member of his community. Almost all
       of our designated factors were established very early. Only
       two totally new aggravating factors were established by the
       expanded   Board, although all factors were continually
       clarified as new fact situations arose.    Each factor wan
       codified,   with   illustrative   case precedents, through
       publication of five issues of an in-house policy precedent
       journal called the Clemency Law Reporter.
             Our final list of aggravating factors consisted of the
             1.    Other adult convictions;
             ;.    False statement to the Clemency Boards
             3.  Use of physical force in committing offense;
             4.  AWOL in Vietnam;
             5.  Selfish motivation for offense;
             6.  Failure to do alternative service;
             7.  Violation of probation r parole;
             8.  Multiple AWOL offenses;
             9.  Extended AWOL offense;
             10. Missed overseas movement;
             11.  'on-AWOL offenses contributing to discharge   fr
                 unfitness; and
             12. Apprehension by authorities.


APPENDIX   III                                                   APPENDIX    III

            our final list of mitigating factors consisted of         the
                 1.    Inability to understand obligations or remedies;
                 2.    Personal or family problems;
                 3.    Mental or physical condition;
                 4.    Public service employment;
                 5.    Service-connected disability;
                 6.    Extended creditable military service;
                 7.    Vietnam service;
                 8.    Procedural unfairness;
                 9.    Questionable denial of conscientious      objector
                 10.   Conscientious motivation for offense;
                 11.   Voluntary submission to authorities;
                 12.   Mental stress from combat;
                 13.   Combat volunteer;
                 14.   Above average military performance ratings;
                 15.   Decorations for Valor; and
                 16.   Wounds in Combat.

                                 5. Case Dis>ositions
             We did not apply each f ctor with equal weight.    For
      example, conscientious motivation or serious personal or
      family    problems   often    led    to    outright    pardon
      recommendations. Tl.e following two cases are typical:
      (Case 2)                ThiF   ivilian applicant had participated
                              in anti-war demonstratiu,..s before refusing
                              induction.    He stated that he could not
                              fight a war which he could not support.
                              However, he does believe in the need for
                              national defense and would have served in
                              the war if there had been an attack on
                              United States territory. He stated that
                              "I know that what is happening now is
                              wrong t so I have to take a stand and hope
                              that it helps end it a little sooner,"
      (Case 3)                This   military   applicant's   wife   was
                              pregnant,  in financial difficulties, and
                              faced with eviction; she suffered from an
                              emotional disorder and nervous problems;
                              their oldest child was asthmatic       and
                              epileptic, having seizures that sometimes
                              resulted in unconsciousness.     Applicant
                              requested    transfer   and   a   hardship
                              discharge, both of which were denied.
            Creditable Vietnar service     was   also   a  highly
      mitigating factor, usu&lly resulting in an outright pardon.
      In particularly meritorious cases, we recommended that the
      military immediately upgrade the pplicant's discharge to
      one under honorable conditions, with full entitlement trj
      veterans' benefits.    we were particularly concerned about
      the eligibility of wounded or disabled veterans for medical


                                                           APPENDIX III

     benefits.   'Se made upgrade recommendations in about eighty
     cases, of Rlch the following two are typical:

      (Case 4)         This applicant did not go AWOL un.til after
                       returning from two tours of duty         in
                       Vietnam, when his beliefs concerning the
                       war changed. He came to believe that the
                       United   States   was    wrong in getting
                       involved in the liar and that he was wrong
                       in killing people in Vietnam."     He had
                       over three years' creditable service, with
                       14   excellent   conduct    and efficiency
                       ratings.   He re-enlisted to serve his
                       second tour within three months of ending
                       his first. He served as an infantryman in
                       Vietnam, was wounded, and received the
                       Bronze Star for Valor.

      (case 5)         During applicantes combat tour in Vietnam,
                       his platoon leader, with whom he shared a
                       brothe-ly relationship, was killed while
                       awakening applicant to start his guard
                       duty. The platoon leader was mistaken for
                       a Viet Cong and shot by one of his own
                       men. This event was extremely traumatic
                       to applicant, who subsequently experienced
                       nightmares.   In an attempt to cope with
                       this experience, applicant turned to the
                       use of heroin. After becoming an addict,
                       he went AWOL.      During his   AWOL,   he
                       overcame his drug addiction only to become
                       an alcoholic.     After obtaining help and
                       curing his alcoholism, he turned himself

             On the other hand, some aggravating factors were
      considered very grave, generally leading to "no clemency"
      recommendationse.  There were a few applicants who clearly
      went AWOL from combat situations.
      (Case 6)          This military applicant would not go into
                        the field with his unit, because he felt
                        that the new commanding officer of his
                        company was incompetent. He was getting
                        nervous about going out on an operation;
                        there is evidence that everyore believed
                        that there was a good likelihood of enemy
                        contact.     He asked to remain in the rear,
                        but his request was denied. Consequently,
                        he left the company area because, in the
                        words of his chaplain,        the threat of
                        death caused him to exercise his right to
                        self-preservation."      His   company   was
                         subsequently dropped onto a hill, where it
                        engaged the enemy in combat.       Applicant
                        was apprehended while traveling on a truck
                         away from his unit without any of his
                         c.nmbat gear.

             We recommended that the President deny clemency in the
       above case, but other cases of AWOL in Vietnam involved

APPENDIX III                                              APPENDIX III

      strong mitigating factors.     Often, combat wounds or the
      psychological effects of combat led to AWOL offenses    For
      example, we recommended an outright pardon in the fliloving
       (Case 7)         Applicant was assigned to an infantry unit
                        in Vietnam. During his combat service, he
                        sustained an injury which ca\used      his
                        vision to blur in one eye. F:is vision
                        steadily worsened, and he was referred to
                        an   evacuation hospital in JaNang for
                        testinq. An eye doctor's assistant told
                        him that the doctor was fully booked and
                        that he would have to report back to his
                        unit and come back to te hospital in
                        couple of weeks.     Fruatated by     thJ
                        rejection and fearful of hs inability to
                        function in an infantry unit, applicant
                        went AWOL,
            Applicants who had been convicted of felony offenses
      involving serious bodily harm       were generally  denied
      clemeicy, as in the following case:
      (Case 8)          This civilian applicant had three other
                        felony convictions in addition to his
                        draft offense. In 1970, he received a
                        one-year sentence for sale of drugs. In
                        1971, he received one year of imprisonment
                        and two years of probation for possession
                        of stolen property.     In 1912, he was
                        convicted of failure to notify his local
                        board of his address. He was sentenced to
                        three   years'   imprisonment,   but   his
                        sentence was suspended and he was put on
                        probation.   In 1974, he was convicted of
                        assault, abduction, and rape, for which he
                        received a 20-year sentence.
            Perhaps our most difficult and disputed cases involved
      applicants who had been convicted of unrelated civilian
      felony offenses, but who had strong mitigating factors
      applicable to their cases. Some Board members argued that
      this was a program of clemency for Vietnam-related offenses,
      requiring    the    Board  to  disregard   other, unrelated
      convictions.     Others argued that granting clemency     to
      convicted felons would cheapen all other clemency grants.
      The majority of the Board took the middle view--that a
      felony conviction would be viewed as a highly aggravating
      factor, but each case sould be decided on its total facts,
      in accordance with the President's policy of case-by-case
      review.   Even so, 42% of the applicants        with   other
      convictions were denied clemency because of the serious
      nature of their offenses or because of the absence of strong
      mitigating factors.
            Less serious felony convictions did not overshadow   an
      applicant's Vietnam service or other mitigating facts:
      (case 9)         This app'icant volunteered foz the Special
                       Forces after his first year in the Army.


APPENDIX III                                                              APPENDIX III

                        Be r-enlisted to effect a transfer to
                        Vietnam, where he served as a parachute
                        rigger and earned excellent conduct and
                        proficiency    ratings.    Altogether,  he
                        served for 18 months in Vietnam and over
                        three years in the       Army,   with  two
                        Honorable    Discharges for re-enlistment
                        purposes. His AWOL offenses totalled 29
                        days, did not occur until after his return
                        from Vietnam, and were attributed to his
                        problems    with   alcohol.    After   his
                        Undesirnbl    Discharge in lieu of court-
                        martial, he was convicted of stealing a
                        television set and served six months in
                        prison. He was recently paroled.
            In a few cases, a clear connection existed between                 an
      applicants'Vietnam service and his civilian conviction:
      (Case 10)         This military applicant      served   eight
                        months in Vietnam as a supply specialist
                        before his reassignment back to the United
                        States.   Hia conduct    and    proficiency
                        scores had been uniformly excellent during
                        his Vietnam service.     However, while in
                        Vietnam he became addicted to heroin.   He
                        could   not break his habit after returning
                        stateside, and he began a series of seven
                        AWOL offenses as he "got into the local
                        drug scene." ]Fventually, he "ran out of
                        mondy" ad "had a real bad habit," so he
                        "tried to hzeak into a store ith another
                        guy   that   was   strung out."    He was
                        arrested, convicted for burglary,     and
                        given an Undesirable              Discharge for AWOL
                        while on bail.
            Others rehabilitated themselves after their offenses,
      indicating their desire to be productive and law-abiding
      members of their communities:
       (Case 11)        Shortly     after        receiving     a    Bad    Conduct
                        Discharge       from     the Navy for his             AWOL
                        offenses,       this     military applicant            was
                        convicted for transporting stolen checks
                        across sta :e lines. He was sentenced to a
                        ten-year term, but was paroled after one
                        year      and     four      months.         During     his
                        confinement,        he     underwent        psychiatric
                        care. Since his parole, he has re-married
                        and has recently established a successful
                        subcontracting busJness. Currently, he is
                        working with young people in his community
                        in connection with church groups, trying
                        to provide guidance for them. his parole
                        officer   stated   that   applicant    had
                        straightened        out     and   is    a    responsible
                        member of the community.
             In each of the above three cases, the Clemency Board
       recommended that the     resident grant outright pardons for


APPENDIX III                                                APPENDIX III

      th, abser-e off..nses. Obviously, we had no jurisidiction to
      recmmead clemency for the unrelated convictions.

            Our case disposition    tallies   are   listed  below.
      civilian   applicants   received a    greater proportion  of
      outright pardons because they involved a higher frequency of
      conscientious reasons for the   offense   and a much   lower
      frequency of other criminal convictions.


                                               Numbe..    Percent

      Outright pardon                           1432       82%
      Alternative service:
        3 months                                 140        8%
        4-6 months                                91        5%
        7+ months                                 68        4%
      No Clemency                                 26        1%
      TOTAL:                                    1757      100%


                                               Number     Percent

      Outright pardon                           4620       36%
      Alternative Service:
        3 months                                 2555      20%
        4-6 months                               2941      23%
        7+ months                                1756      14%
      No Clemency                                 885       7%
      TOTAL:                                   12,757     1001

                          6. Management Process

              During the   first months of the Board's existence, we
      experienced little difficulty in organizing our work and
      :reviewing   our  small  number   of cases. However, after the
      late winter flood of applications, we were faced with a
      seemingly    impossible task.   Through mid-April, the original
      rine-member Board had beard 500 cases.           To meet    the
      President's deadline of September 15, we had to experience a
      40-fold increase in our case disposition rate. We met that
      deadline--to the day--with the Board deciding every one of
      the 14,514 cases for which we had enough information. After
      September    15,  1975, about    1,000 additional cases with
      partial or recently-arriving     files were referred to the
      Department    of Justice   for action in accordance with Board

             Meetinq  the  President's  deadline would have been
      impossible   without a competent and dedicated staff. We and
      our staff emerqged from this process with an experience in
      crisis   management  which we think may be useful to managers

APPENDIX III                                               APPENDIX III

      of comparable entities in the future.     The senior staff
      developed solutions to management problems which enabled us
      to act upon over a thousand cases per week.    At the same
      time, we maintained high standardsof quality and integrity
      in our legal process. All policy decisions were made by the
      Board and implemented by the staff.   Having to manage an
      organization which mushroomed from 100 to 600 employees
      during a six-week period, it is remarkable that our process
      involved as little confusion as it did.

                           7. Historical Perspective
             To place the President's clemency program in its
       proper perspective, one must take note of the manner in
       which Presidents Washington, Lincoln, and Truman applied
       their powers of executive clemency in dealing with persons
       who had committed war-related offenses. President Ford's
       program compares favorably with other President's clemency
       actions, when consideration is given to the nature of the
       benefits offered, the conditions attached, the number of
       individuals benefitted, and the speed with which the program
       followed the war.   Yet the President's program did rot break
       precedent in any fundamental way. The only new features of
       President Ford's program were the condition of alternative
       service and the use of a neutral Clemency Discharge.

                               8. Conclusions

             We are proud of what the President has accomplished in
       his   clemency   program.    He   implemented   his program
       courageously, in the face of criticism both from those who
       thought he did too much and from those who thought he did
       too little.
               When the program started, a Gallup Poll found that
       only    19% of those polled approved of a conditional clemency
       program.   The overwhelming    majority   preferred either
       unconditional amnesty or no program of any kind.        By
       contrast, an August 1975 Gallup Poll found that a majority
       of   those expressing an opinion are now in favor of
       conditional clemency, with a minority equally split on the
       opposite ends of the issue. The same poll found that almost
       nine out of ten people would accept a clemency recipient as
       at leaJt an equal member of their community.    Likewise,  a
       aurvey of employer attitudes has discovered that a Clemency
       Discharge and Presidential pardon would have real value when
       a clemency recipient applies for a job.        The clemency
       program is in fact accomplishing the President's objective
       of reconciling Americans.
             While we are confident that history will regard this
       program as a success, much of the work remains unfinished.
       As of September 1975, only a very small percentage of our


APPENDIX III                                               APPENDIX III

     applicants have as yet been required to contact Selective
     Service to begin performing alternative service. Of the 52%
     of our applicants who received conditional clemency, three-
     quarters were assigned six months or luss of alternative
     service. We hope that most will complete this assignment
     and receive clemency. The responsibility for implementing
     the alternative service portion of the program in a fair and
     flexible manner, fully in accord with the clemency spirit of
     the President's program, rests with the Selective Service
     System.   The Chairman of the Clemency Board, on behalf of a
     majority of the Board, recommended to Selective Service that
     individuals in the Clemency Board program be able to fulfill
     their alternative service by performing unpaid work ii the
     national interest for 16 hours per week for the designated
     period--three or six months in most cases.         Select'.ve
     Service   has   implemented  part of this recommendation,
     allowing alternative service to be completed through 20
     hours per week of unpaid work. This part-time work must be
     stretched out to as long as twice the designated three or
     six month period.
           We are pleased that the United States Pardon Attorney,
     entrusted   with   the carry-over responsibility for our
     program, has applied the policies and spirit of the Clemency
     Board. Likewise, we hope that other government agencies
     which will later come in contact with clemency recipients--
     especially the Veterans Administration and the discharge
     review boards of the Armed Forces--will deal with them as
     clemently as their responsibilities permit.
           In conclusion, we consider ourselves to have been
     partners in a mission of national reconciliation, wisely
     conceived by the President. A less generous program would
     have left old wounds festering;      blanket, unconditional
     amnesty would have opened new wounds. we are confident that
     the President's clemency program provides the cornerstone
     for national reconciliation at the end of a turbulent and
     divisive era. We ale proud to have played a role inr that


APPENDIX IV                                      APPENDIX IV


                  SUMMARY EVALUATION



                                    Submitted by
                                    A Minority of the Board
                                    September 15, 1975

APPENDIX IV                                                          APPENDIX IV



    Purpose    . . . . . . .    .   . . . .           .       .           .   1


    Composition of the Board         . . . . . . . . . . . .                  1


    Staffing   . . . .          . . .       .    . . . . . . . .              2


    Applicants    .     . . . . . . .           . .       .   . . . . .       3


    Board Functions       . . . . . . . . . . .                   . . . .


    Changes in Board Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . .                         6


    Credibility of Board's Decisior.                  . . . . . . . .         8


    Conclusion        . . . . . . . . . . .            .      . . . . . .     9

APPENDIX IV                                          .PPENDIX    IV

                           SECTION I


The purpose of this report is to reflect the views of a
minority of the members of the PCB concerning the composi-
tion, staffing, policies and credibility of the operations
and decisions of the PCb.

We have reviewed the first draft of the final report of the
PCB, including subsequent revised sections of that draft,
and it contains numerous misleading statements, is non-
factual in many areas, and contains whole chapters that
are entirely irrelevant to the duties and functions of the
Board.  The proposed report can best be characterized as
a report written by the staff, and reflecting their very
biased pro-amnesty views, views which ar~ often directly
contrary to the views of many Board members and, perhaps,
the majority of the American public.   This Staff-Management-
authored report is not in keeping with the mission and
the objectives of the Board as set forth in the President's
Executive Order and Proclamation.  We,   s the concerned
minority, desire to disassociate ourselves from the Board

                        SECION   II


The original nine-member Board appointed by the President
represented a fair balance among liberal, middle-of-the-
r-ad and conservative views.   This group in its early meet-
ings established and adopted policies and guidelines by
which decisions of the Board would be determined in accord-
ance with the President's Executive Order and Proclamation.
However, many of these policies were ch    3ed when the mem-
bership of the Board was increased to eighteen members in
May 1975.  By his own admission, the Chairman had a fairly
free hand in picking the new Board members and he include"
two members from his staff.   The new Board members were    ot
given an orientation on Board policies and guidelines.    This
led to much confusion.   Initially, it was difficult for th~
new Board members to rake sound decisions, d     to lack of
knowledge of Board operation.   The Chairman gave gidance
which, or occasion, seemed not to De strictly in accord-
ance with previous Board policy and decisions.    At this
point, the Board as a wnole became a more amnesty-oriented,
Goodell-influenced group, with Goodell, inturn, seemingly
under the infl   ce of the General Counsel and his somewhat

APPENDIX IV                                      APPENDIX IV

biased anti-Vietnam War staff. From this point on, the
Board became, in effect, a captive of the Chairman and the
Staff, and policy decisions were made by the Chairman and
the General Counsel which influenced Board actions and re-
sults without the realization of Board members.
An example of the continual effort of the Board's Executive
Staff to distort the President's Program was a written pro-
posal by a senior staff member to "create some doubt in the
minds of people" about the meaning of a Clemency Discharge.
In making such a proposal, the Staff member suggested, in a
memorandum, that "one way to genezate such ambiguity" would
be to invite Honorably Discharged Veterans to request
clemency discharges "as an expression of their opposition to
the Vietnam War."

The idea of using the Presidential Clemency Board as a
vehicle to incite great numbers of Honorably Discharged
 eterans to "express their opposition to the Vietnam War"
sould be a gross dis-service to the President.

                         SECTION III

Since the PCB was only a temporary organization, it was
determined by the President, through OMB, that no funds
would be made available to hire a permanent staff. Rather,
all administrative and operational personnel would be de-
tailed "on loan" from oher agencies. In the beginning,
DOD offered its facili- s and professional trained per-
sonnel to prepare the case summaries, but this offer was
rejected by the Board's General Counsel. We feel that
this assistance would have been a real asset to the Board
effort in that the summaries would have been objective and
factual. lt was turned down on the grounds that the General
i.unsel felt the briefs must be prepared by lawyers. The
result was that attorneys were detailed from other agencies
to work with the General Counsel and his associates in the
preparation of applicant cases. Due to the number of cases
to be presented within a very short time period, the legal
staff was augmented by approximately two hundred law
students acting as legal interns during their summer va-
caticn. However, approximately ninety percent of the
cases were military and these young men and women, even
thouuh eager and dedicated, were generally biased against
the military and the Vietnam War and had practically no
experience in or with the miiitary. The work they did in
preparing the case summaries was, as a result, often

APPENDIX IV                                        APPENDIX IV

amateurish, biased, and many times incomplete.   In reality,
the young staff attorneys themselves, were of the same
influence and were generally without the benefit of any ex-
perience with the Military Forces, which compounded the
problem.  Also, these young "case writers" were instructed
by some senior staff members to pr'qsent the case "in the
best light".  Consequently, many of the resulting summaries
were  n inaccurate presentation of facts o:n which Board
members had to make their decisions.

The administrative staff consisted of personnel on loan from
other agencies.  It appeared that the majority of those who
occupied top level management positions with the PCR had
little or no prior experience in an administrative capacity.
Over-staffing, lack of organization, lack of personnel disci-
pline and improper utilization of personnel assets was
evident throughout.  Management built up the staff to a peak
of over six hundred professional  and administrative person-
nel.  This appeared to be considerably more than was neces-
sary to get the job done if proper organization and super-
vision had been practiced.  For example, on 1 July, at the
peak of the six hundred plus staff, it was stated by a
senior member that OMB believed that less than half of the
secretaries were being used effectively in the production
process.  Even with this surplus of secretaries, only one
was assigned to all of the eighteen Board members.     Regular
working hours were not established  nor observed  -  employees
seemed to come and go at their   onvenience.   On a week-day
mid-afternoon in July (the Boaru's busiest   month),  the
Personnel Director made a head-count and over one hundred
sixty erloyees could not be accounted for,

On two different occasions in March and May, OMB sent in a
management team to survey the operations of the PCB.    In
both instances, they recommended that a top-flight   adminis-
trator be obtained to oversee the administrative functions
of the PCB, and both times, the management of PCB refused
to accept this recommendation of the OMB.   These are only a
few examples of the maladministration which,   rn our opinion,
has jeopardizea and plaqued  he management of the Clemency
Board since the beginning.  This resulted in many instances
of mismanagement, low morale adnd lack of control.

                          SECTION IV


The PCB was established to review the records of individuals
within the following categories:

APPENDIX IV                                              APPENDIX      IV

       (1) Those who had been convicted of one or more draft
 evasion offenses:   failure to register or to register on
 time, to keep the local board informed of current address,
 to report for or submit to pre-induction examination, to re-
 port for or submit to induction itself, to report for or
 submit to, or complete service under Secion 6(j) of the
 Military Selective Service Act,

      (2) Those who have received a punitive or undesirable
 discharge from service in the armed forces for havirr
 violated Article 85, 86 or 87 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
 tary Justice between August 4, 1964, and March 28, 1973, or
 are serving sentences of confinement for such violations.

 In   the   first   four months of    the program, only some eioht
 hundred individuals made application to the PCB.             This ap-
 peared to be due primarily to a lack of proper publicity and
 understanding of the program. In January, 1975, the mem-
 bers of the Board initiated a nationwide publicity program
 which resulted in several thousand new applications. Fur-
 ther, the Chairman, without the knowledge of the Board,
 wrote letters to all major penal institutions c the
 United States, advising them that inmates Eco met the
 eligibility criteria should apply. This penitentiary ail
 produced over two thousand applications, on which the
 Board has taken action and, in the majority of cases,
 recommended pardons. In contrast with this is the fact
 that President Truman's Amnesty Board refused clemency
 for all persons navin, a prior criminal recorc of one
 or more serious offenses, stating "The Board would
 have failed in its duty to society and to the memory
 of the men who fought and died to protect it, had amnesty
 been recommended in these cases."

 By the end of March, approximately 18,00 applications had
 been rceived.   In about ninety percent of the military
 cases, there was no evidence of conscientious objection or
 other objection to the Vietnam War.          Approximately    ifty-
 eight percent of the military cases were involved in other
 offenses in addition to AWOL or desertion. The most common
 reasons given for goin AWOL were family and financial
 problems. The vast majority, eighty-four percent, were
 volunteer enlistees.
 The most common offense of te typical violator of the
 Selective Service Act was failure to report for or submit
 to induction. Only forty-five prcent had made any at-
 tempt to claim conscientious obj ction before being
 ordered for induction or civilian service. The Selective
 Service violator possessed a much higher educational level
 than that of the military applicant.

APPENDIX IV                                       APPENDIX IV

The Rules and Regulations section 101.5(a) provides that the
Board would consider as an initial filing any written communi-
cation post-marked not later than March 31, 1975, and received
by the Board, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Transportaion, or the Selective
Service System. Oral applications made out not later than
March 31, 1975, were considered sufficient if reduced to
writing, and post-marked not later than May 31, 1975.  "hese
rules were later amended on July 14, 1975, over strenuous
objections by some Board members, to read "A 'timely' appli-
cation was defined as an inquiry made to a responsible U.S.
Government official or agency, in writing or orally, prior
to the deadline for applications, provided that the request
for consideration was received within a reasonable time after
the initial contact.  However, in several instances, the Board
by a bare majority vote chose to accept as timely, applications
which did not fulfill the requirements stated above.  The
Board, again in oe highly publicized case, accepted an un-
verified phone call, not completed by a written application,
as sufficient to give it jurisdiction. In the same case,
jurisdiction having been accepted, recommendation was made
to the White House, again despite the lack of a formal,
written application.

On June 4, 1975, we-l after the delimiting date set by the
White House, the PCB Staff was correspendiny with the College
Coordinater at U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth. Kansas
and sending him sending 75 kits "for use by potential
applicants currently incarcerated" in that institution
extending the time for submission of applications to
June 15, 1975, cear!   in violation of the President's
o:der, making May 31, 1975, the final deadline, when
preceded by an or-. application made not later than
March 31, 1975.

                         SEC'iION V


During the lfrst five months the PCB functioned as a Full
Board with five members in attendance considered a quorum.
However, in March, as the number of cases to be acted on
increased, the Board was divided into panels o   three  r
more members and each panel acted independently on cases.
Unanimous decisions by the panels were considered final.
Split decisions could be referred to the Full Board by
any panel member° Policy and guidelines were generally
determined by the Full Board.  Howeier, in some instances
they were determined by the Chairman and hi; Exectutive

APPENDIX I                                         APPENDIX    I

Staff without referring the matter to or getting the approval
of the Full Board.   For example, the "Rules and Regulations
of the Clemency Board" signed by Chairman Goodell on March 18,
1975, and submitted to the Federal Register were never for,nally
submitted to the Board for comment or approval.   The major;cy
of the Board members did not know of the existence of such
"Rules and Regulations" until they    -eegiven a copy i.. May
1975.   The Board members were hai   -pped by not being allowed
staff or secretarial assistance. The voluminous case briefs
and other material put out by the staff made it impossible
for   oard members to keep track of what was going on without
assistance of this type. Requests for secretarial and staff
assistance were made on several occasions by Board members
but they were told that the staff was short-Landed. The eigh-
teen Board members were finally allotted a total of one secre-
tary to answer :he phone, take messages, type correspondence
and maintain files for them.

The administrative functions of the PCB appear to have been
accomplished on a crisis-to-crisis basis rather than by
norn, 1 and acceptable organization and planning. For

      (1) From the beginning, the processing of applications
was so bogged down in complicated procedures that records
could not be ordered on a timely manner which, in turn, re-
sulted in a severe shortage o   cases during the month of
May to be assigned to action attorneys, thereby causing
serious delays in the Board's work.

      (2) nue to a lack of organization and pla.ining, by
February, a backlog or cases which had been acted on by the
Board, began to build up and by September it had built up to
over ten thousand   ases still to be submitted to the
President for action.

                         SEC'TION VI


The first sig:,ifica.c rove on the part of the Chairman and
his Executive Staff, in our opinion, was to introduce the
word "pardon" into the Cemency decision on each applicant's
case althoujh the word "pardon" never appeared once in the
President's Executive Order or Proclamation.    The Chairman
ar.d Executive Stc.ff argued that "pardon" and "clemency"

APPENDIX IV                                       APPENDIX   IV

were synonymous terms and they won the argument, by claiming
the tacit approval from the Wite douse, over the strenuous
objection of some of the Board members.     Eventually in the
Board  decisions  and  in the letters going to the applicant
after the Board action, the words "clemency" and "ardon"
were no longer used as synonymous terms but were separated
and used in the terms of "a pardon" and a "Clemency Dis-
charge".    We quote from a letter dated July 16, 1975,
written  to  an applicant and signed by Chairman Goodell,
"...Ti.- President has signed a master warrant granting you
a full, free Unconditional Pardon and a Clemency Discharge to
replace your Tles than honorable discharge." We believe this
is quite a different connotation and meaning than was
initially argued by the Chairman and Executive Staff last
October.    Further, a person who has been convicted of a
felony (a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year) may legally purchase a firearm from a licensed
tirearms dealer if the person convicted of said felony
had received an unconditional Presidential Pardon.     The
Freiidential Pardon, however,    only applies to Federal

The unilateral revision of the President's program from a
middle-of-the-road clemency program into an amnesty-
oriented program was effected primarily by expansion of
the original nine-member Board into an eighteen-member
Board.  Some of the new members did not have the maturity,
experience and broad spectrum of views which characterized
the original Board and which we believe represents the
cross section of the general public.  The more liberal
eighteen-member broad then proceeded- many times unknowingly
and under the influence of the Chairman, to alter pre-
viously adopted rules and regulations by constantly out-
voting the more conservative aligned middle-of-the-road

In the early months of the Board's deliberations a real
effort was made to maintain the "meaningfulness" and "value"
of the Clemency Discha'-qe.   For such offenses as AWOL from
combat, refusal t go combat, multiple and long AWOis,
civil. convictions for relony; the Board wuld nrmally
vote "no clemency".   However, and in sharp contrast, during
the latter monLn. of the    Board's operation and after the
more amnesty-oriented eighteen-member Goodell-influenced
Board came into being, clemency was voted in cases in-
volving multiple AWOLs (8) from the battle field, multiple
refusals to go into combat; multiple (as high as ten AWOLs)
and long (seven years) AWOLs, civilian felony convictions
(rape, murder, manslaughter, grand larceny, armed robbery,

APPENDIX   IV                                    APPENDIX IV

aggravated assault).   Also, a man given an Undesirable
or even Punitive Discharge for a few days or even hours
of AWOL Iwhich, according to the Board General Coonsel s
ruling, qualified him for the Clemency Board Program) was
recommended for a pardon and clemency discharge, by a     are
majority vote, even though the official offense charged
might include aggravated assault, disrespect to officer or
NCO, striking an officer or NCO, wrongful appropriation of
personal or government property, etc.   This again was a
turnabout from the policy set by the ilne iimember Board.
Another questionable move, cndoned by the Chairman, was to
make drug addiction a mitigating factor on behalf of the ap-
plicant and drug use a possible qualification for mitigation.
The Board, or the other hand, was instructed not to consider
the ue of   rugs as an aggravating factor een though suc.
use was unlawful.  This change from the nine-member Board
policy again was strenuously objected to by the constantly
"out-voted" minority.

As a result of the policy changes by the eighteen-member
Board, the next move by the Chairman and his Executive Staff
was to recycle numerous of the "tough decision" (No Clemency)
cases of the original nine-member Board and later panels,
either to a more amnesty motivated panel or to the Full Board
to gair a more favorable decision on behalf of the appli-
cant.  The above moves on the  art of the Chairman and his
Executive Staff, tended ro circumvent the spirit of the
President's Proclamation and Executive Order.  These moves
were accomplished by various means. The Board members were
kept uninformed by:

     (1) Denying them clerical help or staff assistants.

      (2) Asking the Board to act after the fact in matters
having to do with policy changes.

     (3) Denying them access to staff memorandums concerning
matters of interest to the Board. including Board periodic

      4' eeping the Board on unduly heavy schedule (seven
days   week) and  wamp 4 ng them with applicant cases to e
read  nd presented. and epresetec ), making it next to
impossible foL Board members to monitor Board results.
This whole process seemed to us to be something more than

In addition, a three-part post-audit review was established.
First, there was the standard review, which applied to all n-
clemency cases and all cases which were given over 12 months

APPENDIX   IV                                     APPENDIX   IV

alternative service; second, there was a review of attorney-
flagged cases which the Actioc  Attorney felt the Board mem-
bers had decided unfairly; and third, there was computerized
review which, by use of quantitative guidelines weeded out
cases which had the harsher decisions.    The post-audit team
reviewed cases and made its recommendation to the General Coun-
sel with an explanation for reccmmending reconsideration.
Practically no cases were found which were repanelled for a
more harsh decision.  The General Counsel then forwarded the
cases to the Chairman, with his recommendation.    Further,
many cases were panel-shopped  without  going through the
post-audit procedure and  without the  second or subsequent
panel or Board being informed of the previous decision.

                        SECTION VII


The Presidential Clemency Board program announced by the
President was a very good and workable program but, due to
improper administration, it has failed to accomplish the
President's goal.  Throughout the year of the Board's exist-
ence the:e seemed to be a determined effort by the Chairman
and his Executive Staff to turn the Presidentially mandated
clemency program into an amnesty-oriented operation.

In reliance upon an Executive Proclamation designed to
"...bind the Nation's wounds and to heal the seas of de-
viseness", it appeared the Chairman and the Staff sought to
expand the Board's jurisdiction over every situation pos-
sible.  As a result, jurisdiction was taken over applicants
whose discharges were obviously not precipitated in the
main by AWOL/Desertion type offenses.   A Pardon and Clemency
Discharge were aiso granted applicants who 'lad multiple civil
felony convictions both during their military service and
after their discharge from the Armed Services or in the civil-
ian cases, after their conviction rci 'ra£t resistance.
The end result is that the public will have a distorted
perception of the Clemency Discharge.   The Clemency Discharge
is likely to be associated with criminality.    It wi3l be
degraded and s.ill not achieve the intended employer accep-
tability.  Through the apparent ill-considered and misguiie6
recommendations of the majority of the Eoard, the 7emency
Discharge may be so dcgraded and discredited   hat it will
longer be meaningful as an instrument of Ciemency for t;i
deservinq recipient.

APPENDIX IV                                                    APPENDIX IV

                                     SECTION VIII


 We believe that the original concept and plan as conceived
 and announced by the President was a good, sound, workable
 plan, but the President's objectives have not been attained
 because of the misdirection and maladministration of the
 plan.  We feel deeply obligated and honor bound to appraise
 the President of these facts.

It appears that the Chairman and his Executive Staff have
misinterpreted, circumvented and violated at least the
spirit of the Executive Order of 16 September 1974, and Pro-
clamation #4313.  This questionable action has been initiated,
it appears, to increase the number of "eligible" applicants,
to liberalize the ccisions of the majority of the Board in
order to gain more fvorable decision for the applicants,
and to set a liberal  recedent relative to Executive par-
dons closely associated with felonious crimes. A move
which could degrade the true meaning of a Presidential
pardon.  The actions, in our opinion, are not only unethical,
but they may also border on illegality, and could greatly dis-
credit the President's Clemency Program in the eyes of the
American public.

In short, we have lost confidence in the Board results, whicn
under Chairman Goodell's direction are being recommended to the
President.  We feel that the limited capability of the already
hard-pressed White House staff to monitor and screen these
recommendations, is inadequate to insure that the President
will approve only recommendations which meet his high stand-
ards.  This problem is further aggravated by a backlog of
some ten thousand cases which may soon be dumped on the
White House Staff in a short period of time.

We believe that the recent steps the President has taken to
terminate the Clemency Board activity on September 15, 1975,
ant to place the Program under the auspices of the Attorney
Ge_ ~ i - more specifically - under the direction of the
iard-  At,.orney of the Department of Justice, is ;f very
sou i Rove.   It is our hope that the Pardon Attorney will
take a close and conscientious look at the Clemency Board
recommendations, so as to insure that the value of the
Clemency Discharge is restored to its original respected
level, and only those applicants who deserve the discha;ge
are awarded it.

We,   a          nMnority   of   the Presiden:ial   Ciemency   oard,   do   not

          .   .~~~~~~~~~1
APPENDIX IV                                          APPENDIX IV

Any min who has two or more convictions (civilian or
military) of serious crimes on his record, should be given
clemency.  We do not believe that a man who deserted his
comrades on the battle field in Vietnam or who refused
to go to Vietnam when he was so ordered, should be given

We believe,   as did the Truman Board,   that when the majority
oi the Board recommends clemency in such cases, it has
failed in its duty to society, and to the memory of those
men who fought and died to protect it.  We also feel that it
has been negligent in carrying out its responsibility and
has not fulfilled its obligation to protect the integrity
of the Presidency.

James P. Dougovito                   Lewis W. Walt
Board Member                         Generai USMC (Ret)
                                     Board Member

Dr. Ralph Adams                      Harry Riggs
Board Member                         Board Member

APPENDIX   V                                                                          APPENDIX   V


                 equtirnt    I

                    To decribe the typical Army participant in order to learn more about
                Arq deertera end the nature of desertion during the Viuoam period,
                using the records of the enlisted Army participants in the Presidential
                Clemency Progrin


                    The characteristics and experiences of those who participated in the
                Program were copeared   ith other relevaut groups.    The sourcee of data
                included the nlirted    ecord Cnter pre-desertion records, Program
               records,   nd ntervites with the men by Army mental health staff.       Tables
               present the percentages of that part of the participant ample with
               given characteristic (e..   , percenutcage of participants entering the
               Army at ge 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 or 23, or 24 and older) for a variety
               of descriptive ctegories at the time the men entered the service, the
               time of last abdence, during absence, and during the Program.      A dis-
               tinction i   made between participants who had been apprehernded and
               those who enterea the program voluntarily, for better comparison with
               precious research on deserters.     Participant data were also contrasted
               with avail'ble date on known deserters who did not participate in the
               Proram end on several     mall samples of anti-var proteatert.,


                    IDmographic characteristics of   e enlisted men who participated in
               the Presidential Program resembled t )ase of other deserters.   Compared
               to their contemporaries, they were less educated.   cored lower on the
               AFQT,   nd they were less likely to be white or from the North Central
               region of the country.   They were more likely to be volunteer, and under
               20    en enlisted.

                   Their    erv-ce creere  tended to be short; most (751) served to
               years or less, few (191) saw service in Vietnam, And fmtr yet (12)
               deserted from combat.    Many (442) had been previously AOL.   Occupa-
               tional sehlift   nd redeed renk &leo polned to histories of trouble in
               the service among these men

                Their reasoos for leaving were generally      unasoristed with the war.
           Most (02)    atcted that they had left because     of prsonal/famliy/or
           financial problems (the same reeason given by      mott deeerters during the
            last t   were as wei).    Only 142 of the men      entioned Vietnae as
           in any wy responsbie for their deciion to          leave the Asmy.

APPENDIX V                                                                    APPENDIX   V

              loet (81X) ot the prticipant rined      in the aIlted States through-
         eut their aobecK     lThose Vo rtmaeind n tit United States wrm siuch
         leon likely to have left the Army because of nti-mr reaso      (   versus

               A comperison s also mde betuen those ho prticipated nod those
         -duo did not.    The groups wer remarkably similar. Those differences
          'uhich mre detected could smot *&eily b explained by assuming that
           aon-participatou e mainly        function of not havig heard about the
           Prtro.    Thils interpretetion is also supported by a Gallup Poll in
           &Au et uf 1975 vhich howed thai only 721 of the public had ever heard
         of the Progrem despite the extenslve publicity it received.   Further-
         mro, an-6    those who had e·rd of the Progrr,   only 175 reallsd that
         fugitives living in this country (the bulk of the ms)    era eligible
         for tbe   rogra.

         Utiltization   f Findings

              The finding that 251 of the prticipants vere not In the deserter
         apprehension system has led to changes in the systoe.   Date from the
         report were also used in DOD preparations ior dfense against    uits
         challenging the nanner of processing en through the DD portio of
         the PrograM  Suggestions for reducing desertio~ arisitn from this
         research re being considered.  An bstract of this eaport uas
         ilcorporatcd   into the DUD After Action Report   on the Program.

APPENDIX VI                                       APPENDIX VI


Presidential Clemency Board Report to the President - 1975

Department of Defense Implementation of Presidential Procla-
  mation 4313
    Presidential Clemency Program
    After Action Report prepared by the Office of the Deputy
      Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army
      (as Department of Defense Executive Agent) - October

Department of Defense Implementation of Presidential Procla-
  mation 4313
    President's Clemency Program
    After Action Report prepared by Headquarters, U.S. Army
      Administration Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana -
      June 19, 1975

Report to the Service Secretaries by the Joint Alternate
  Service Board in Support of Presidential Proclamation 4313. -
  April 11, 1975

Research Problem Review 76-6
The Vietnam Era Deserter:   Chatacteristics of Unconvicted
  Army Deserters
    Participating in the Presidential Clemency Program.
      U.S. Arimy Research Institute for the Behavioral
      and Social Sciences. July 1976

The Presidential Clemency Program
    Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
      Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
      Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.
    Ninety Fourth Congress.  First Session on the Presidential
      Clemency Program and Related Legislation - April 14,
      17, 18, 1975.

Clemency Program Practices and Procedures
    Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative
      Practice and Procedure of the Committee on the Judi-
    United States Senate.
    Ninety Third Congress
    Second Session on Review of Agency Practices and Proce-
      dures in the Administration of the Presidential Clem-
      ency Program - December 18 and 19, 19i4

APPENDIX VI                                      APPENDIX VI

    Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts. Civil
      Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
      Committee on the Judiciary,
    House of Representatives
    Ninety Third Congress.
    Second Session Relating to Amnesty - March 8, 11, and 13,

Congressional Reference Service:
    Amnesty: A Brief Historical Overview
    U B 340 USD - September 27, 1974
    Clemency: The President's Program, Problems
    Issue Brief Number IB 74132 - October 31, 1974
      and updates.

APPENDIX VII                                                                       APPENDIX VII

                                ASSTANT sE1CREIT~,.       OF JEFENSE
                                             TO       3. C. 20301

                                                                             13 OCT   WX

         Honorable Elmer R Sta te
         ComptrollUr General of the United States
         Wahinton, D. C. 20548

         Dear Mr. Statrs:

         The Departmnet of Defense aprciate the opportunity t -nammt cn
         +be Comptroll r General's Draft Reporv on the Cleome.      rogra of
          19,I For the past everal months the Department of Defence staff has
         been wcr-* ,tth GAO representatives to develop and correlate relevant
         information about the Program in an effort to provide a better public
         understanding of the numerous and complex isetue involved. A a result
         of these dircueions,       the GAO Report, in its rev.i.d   form,   is a decided
         improvement over earlier dsaft.

        The Comptroller General's Report to the Congrers povides some insignt
        into the operations of the Clemency Program, al;et an incompiete one
         because of the omission of any discussion as to ts opesrations of the
         President's Clemency Board. For ernple, *',e Presidential Clemency
         Boa-d was rrp    nible for 86%*of the eligiles, and processed 71% of the
         participants. Cnsequeonly, the Report provides only a very limited
         baesi for judging whether the Program achieved its stated purposo.
        (See GAO comments, p. 34.)
         In the succeeding paragraphr, the Department ,LADefenee olfers additional
         obser tions relating to the operations of the Program as they relate to
        the Military Departments. Hopefully, these will prove coretructive in
        judging whether the Clemency Program has served its . rpose.

         There is an unspolen premise in the Rfeport that the Clemency Program
         should be measured solely in quantitative terms, i.e., how many eligible
         persons elected to participate in the Program as compared with the totel
         number of eligible persons. To the contrary, positive numerical goals
         were not the principal oojective of the Program. The President's stated
         objective was to offer the opportunity for each indiidual affected to mt :
         his own choice as to whether he or he would accept the President's

APPENDIX VII                                                                       APPENDIX VII

         offer of reconciliation. The Program wae deliberately desigmed as a
         aclaitory program. Members in deserter's status were not required
         to take part in the Program, nor were members then serving in confine-
         met. Likewise, those who had already received a military discharge
         for deeerter-rolated offenses were under no compulsion to come forward.
         Additionally, there were a ineabl' number who did not participte, simply
         becue they never became acquainted with the opportunities available to
         them. Consequent;y, to judge the Clemency Program purely in statistical
         terms tends to provide a distorted and misleading view.
        (See GAO coments, p. 34.)
         What it important is Chat m-re than half of the military members who
         were in a fgitive status at the beginning of the Program did return to
         military control, nd did elect to take part in the Prcgram. AdditioaUly,
           omne o00 military members then confined in prieson for deserter offenses
         were role sed from confinement for the purpooe of enterinf the Program.
         Consequently, the Program did reach large numbers of those who were
         then in prison or who were, previous to the President'e Proclamation,
         unwilling to lurmnder themselves to the military authorities.
         (See GAO coments, p. 34.)
         If the goal of the Program had been to obtain OL participation, changoe
         in the benfits aend requirements levels would obviously be required. In
         turn, this would call for a reco, Ideration of the equities between hose
         who served end those who deserted or evaded, and how an/ chayee would
         induce reater participation. These fundamental questions were not
         addres&ed. The Report also offers no uggested means of recruiting thboe
         who had already returned to civilian ife, how to notify deserters whose
         whereaboute were unknown, &nd how to measure the costr of changig or
         e*endin~ the Program.

         Viewed from a Department of Defense p1rapective, the Clemency Program
         offered the opportunity for those charged with or con icted of deertion to
         return to the maluetreem of society. In turn, it represented a challenge
         to the Military Services to respond to the President's Proclamation in a
         fair end reeponsible manner. Despite the potential conflicts involved,
         even the Department's severest critics concluded that the Departmentis
         adminietration of the Program was both responsive to the President's
         mandate, and sensitive to the needs of those who returned. The GAO
         Report, with some slight reservations, bears this out.


                                                D.;it P. taylor
                                                 : ',-'t     ., ;- :- of Defsn r
                                                9(;.lp;~owcr Y iscrve Alfairs).

APPENDIX VII                                                                                    APPENDIX VII

                                                   NAMTNAL HE AUATERS
                                                       9 *||?C'tSYsIM
                                                    ! rv
                                                    *|lVICI     srs t"                                vwJ
                                                            r FLOM
                Vw f   w            In~S·lt                 a sIYIas.   ..                 ,         m-

                                                                   October 29,   1976

          bar      .       1Stat.

                      A draft copy of the proposed report to the Consrue, '"e
          Clency r re of 1974," has been reviewed, and I wish to ublCt y
          brief ammts for your consideration and to update theo tatistic
           eoncemnigl pare·os participetig io the lternate service work partil
          of the pregr     eEr *whichI mrei      control per !xcutive Ordr LOL.
                        u , thia report of Le Clemency rogram lacks the required
          p:eaatios   Am d analysis of the policy, reulationa, problems d
           taetiotics of the Presidential Clemecy oard nd therefore leave too
          mch of the progrm to the iagination of the reater. In my viev, to
          mab the report meaigful the data contained in Appendix III, entitled
          "Tb   Presidential            Clemency    oard'     Ixecutive SuIary,"        nd that in
           ppendixz    , the minority rtport, should be analysed in th context
          of      e etire program nd incorporated in the body of the pblibad
          r-ort, thereby bcoming supportive of the conclusoM. PresenLi           ts
          critical data i tan appenices to the rport o          not sottify the md
          to include te urterial within a truly meaningful pooentatior of this
          i.portnt progsr.       (See GAO coe nts, p. 47. )
                    Since the repott portrays only portion of the progrm, I
          recmud for your consideration that the document not be pblibed
          until final d cenplet data from all segments can be incorporated
          in the lselc rport. (See GAO comment, p. 47.)

           AO note:           1.        The deleted comeente pertain to using later
                                        statistics than appeared in the draft report.
                                        The uggested tatistics have been included
                                        on p. 42.
                              2.        The deleted comment pertainc to a statement
                                        omitted on the final report as suggested.

                SUffU IFNErOM'·           UTUI-ANIO                     O
                                                       OUR OWN-UY UNirTED         TE    sVINOS SON"e

APPENDIX VII                                                                    APPENDIX VII

         te   brable ler              . Stte
         Otober      ,. 1976

                   I offer tme updated utatistic ad te recod       tiom ua
         to cOMteat of the report in the imtereat of pravdi- tm Comjrame .
              bed      u    _mo t of the prograB.


        GAO note,        tattitical            data included in final report.

        Toe   rblc       liner    . Staut
         omtroller Georal of thb               United States

APPENDIX VIII                                     APPENDIX VIII

                           PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

                                                Tenure of office
                                                From        To


Secretary of Defense:
  Donald H. Rumsfeld                            Nov. 1975   Present
  James R. Schlesinger                          July 1973   Nov. 1975

Deputy Secretary of Defense:
  William P. Clements                           Jan. 1973   Present

Assistant Secretary of Defense:
  (Manpcwser and Reserve Affairs)
  David P. Taylor                               July 1976 Present
  John F. Ahearne (acting)                      Mar. 1976 July 1976
  William K. Brehm                              Sept. 1973 Mar. 1976

                DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Secretary of the Army:
  Martin R. Hoffman                             Aug. 1975 Present
  Norman R. Augustine (acting)                  July 1975 Aug. 1975
  Howard H. Callaway                            May 1973   July 1975

                DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Secretary of the Navy:
  J. William Middendorf II                      Apr. 1974   Present

Commandant of the Marine Corps:
  Gen. Lewis B. Wilson                          July 1975   Present
  Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.                   Jan. 1972   June 1975


Secretary of the Air Force:
  Thomas C. Reed                                Jan. 1976   Present
  James W. Plummer (acting)                     Nov. 1975   Jan. 1976
  John L. McLucas                               May 1973    Nov. 1975

 APPENDIX VIII                              APPENDIX VIiI


Attorney General:
  Edward H. Levi                        Feb. 1975   Present
  Laurence H. Silberman (acting)        Feb. 1975   Feb. 1975
  William B. Saxbe                      Jan. 1974   Feb. 1975

Assistant Attorney General
  For Criminal Division:
  Richard L. Thornburgh                 June 1975   Present
  John C. Keeney                        Jan. 1975   July 1975
  Henry E. Petersen                     Jan. 1972   Dec. 1974


National Director:
  Byron V. Pepitone                     Apr. 1973   Present