Recruiting for the All-Volunteer Force: A Summary of Costs and Achievements

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-10-04.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                          DOCUMENT FESUME

03681 -   B2794034)

Recrui.ting for the All-Volunteer Force: A Summary of Costs and
Achievements. FPCD-77-60; B-157371. October 4, 1977. 19 pp. + 9
appendices (29 pp.).

Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger,
Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.

Issue Area: Personnel Management and Compensation (300);
    Personnel Management and Cmpensation. All Volunteer Force
    Needs (303).
Contact: Federal Personnel and Compensation Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -
    Military (except procurement       contracts) (051).
Organizaticn Concerned:   Department   of the Navy; Department of
    the Army; Department   of the  Air  Force.
Congre3sional  Relevance:  House  Committee  on Armed Services;
    Senate Committee   on Armed  Services.
Authority: Military Service Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-129; P.L.
    93-64). Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act
    of 1974 (P.L. 93-277). Department of Defense Appropriation
    Act of 1974. Defense Supplemental Appropriation
    Authorization ,c..
          Since the all-volunteer force began, the Department of
Defense  (DOD) and the military services have substantially
recruited  the quantity and quality of personnel needed.
Recruiting shortfalls from July 1 through December 31, 1976,
aroused some concern for the level of recruiting that might be
experienced over the next several years; however, the 6-month
period from January through June 1977 showed improvement.
Findings/Conclusions: DOD and the military services have
expanded the recruiting program to accommodate the vclunteer
force concept. More than 1,17C,500 people have been recruited
into the all-volunteer force through fiscal year (FY) 1976, at a
cost of $1.48 billion. By the end of 1978, approximately
1,975,000 people will have been recruited at a 5-year recruiting
program cost of about $2.66 billion. The management and
operation of the recruiting program--consisting of the
recruiting staff, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and recruit
examining and processing--remain the key elements of recruiting
success. The size and composition of the recruiting forces is
believed to be closely related to success in meeting quantity
and quality goals.    or FY 1978, the recruiting forces will cost
approximately $378.4 million; advertising will cost about $105.6
million. The enlistment bonus program has increased from $43
million during FY 1974 to a proposed $74.5 million for 1978.

o /n ~~     UNITED STA TES

            Recruiting ForThe All-Volunteer
            Force: A Summary Of Costs
            And Achievements
            Up to now the Department of Defense and
            the military services have largely met their
            goals for quar.:;ty and quality in recruits.
            Various changes in recruiting management
            and operation I-ave been implemented over
            the last few years. T'he Department and the
            services view manyof these as ground breaking
            activity leading to further improvements.
            qSeveral major alternatives have been proposed
            to solve recruiting difficulties. Many appear
            worthy of further study.

            FPCD-77-60                                       OCTOBER 4, 1977
                                 WASHINGTON, D.C.   20548



       The Honorable
       The Secretary of Defense
       Dear Mr. Secretary:

            We have completed an overview of selected military re-
       cruiting activities. Because of the growing concern for the
       future of the all-volunteer force (AVF), w summarized and
       provided a more current view on primary areas of interest that
       were addressed in three previous reports. These reports are:
       "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits" FPCD-75-170,
       Feb. 27, 1976), "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency
       of Recruiting" (FPCL-75-169, Mar. 5, 1976), and "Advertising
       for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" (FPCD-76-168,
       Mar. 29, 1976).

           As you are aware, due to the new level of concern for
      AVF's future, various groups, including DOD, have proposed
      many options and alternatives during the past year. Some
      of these proposals are associated with the management and
      operation of the recruiting program; others address some of
      the roader staffing policy questions and issues.

           Despite the potential impact many of these proposals
      would have on the sustainability of the AVF concept, we
      nevertheless believe: that efforts to marimize the efficiency
      and effectiveness of the recruiting program should be con-

           We had the opportunity to have representatives of the
      Accession and Retention 3ranch, Office of the Assistant
      Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), informally review
      the draft of this report to assure the correctness of the in-
      formation presented. We did not attempt to verify the ac-
      curacy of the statistics and dollar figures obtained from
      various DOD reports, documents, or discussions with DOD
           We are sending copies of this report to the Director,
      Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House and
      Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services,
      the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the

House Committee on Government Operations; the Secretaries
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller).

     We appreciate the courtesy extended to us by your
Department and service fficlals during this effort.

                              Sincerely yours,

                              /it I
                              H. L. Krieger

REPORT TO THE                             VOLUNTEER FORCE: A SUMMARY

            Since the all-volunteer force b,.~gan, the
            Department of Defense and the services
            have substantially recruited the quantity
            and quality of personnel needed. Recruit-
            ing shortfalls from July 1 through Decem-
            ber 31, 1 9 7 6 r aroused some concern for the
            level of recruiting that might be experienced
            over the next several years; however, the
            6-month period from January through June 1977
            showed improvement. (See p 5.)

            The military forces have substantially met
            their quality recruiting goals (measured
            by the percentage of high school graduates
            and mental category). However, a basic
            question remains unanswered: What level
            of quality do the services need to effi-
            ciently match military skills and occupa-
            tions? (See p. 8.)
            Defense and the services have expanded the
            recruiting program to accommodate the volun-
            teer force concept. More than 1,170,500
            people have been recruited into the all-
            volunteer frce through fiscal year 1976,
            costing $1.48 billion. By the end of
            1978, approximately 1,975,000 people will
            have been recruited at a 5-year recruit-
            ing program cost of about $2.66 billion.
            (See     . 2.)

            The management and operation of the re-
            cruiting program--consisting of the
            recruiting staff, advertising, enlist-
            ment bonuses, and recruit examining and
            processing--remain the key elements of
            recruiting success.
            The recruiting staff is one of the most
            significant and costly components of the
            recruiting program. Defense and the

Ta   M.     Upon removal, the rport
          should be noted hereon.     i
services believe the size and composition
of their recruiting forces is closely re-
lated to their success in meeting quantity
and quality goals. For fiscal year 1978,
the recruiting forces will cost approxi-
mately $378.4 million. Due to the importance
and cost of this staff, Defense believes that
changes to its size and composition should
be based on a long-term assessment of require-
ments and not the short-term market outlook.
(See pp. 10 and 11.)
Advertising hs become the second most costly
aspect of the program and is one of the most
difficult to assess and justify. For fiscal
year 1978, the program will cost about
$105.6 million. Defense and the services
have recognized the need to determine how
advertising affects total recruiting and
have taken steps to improve the direction
and effectiveness of advertising. Cost and
evaluation warrant continued and secial at-
tention.  (See pp. 12 to 15.)

Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Sta-
tions have canged their management and
organization to include:
-- Establishing a new joint command, Military
   Enlistment Processing Command on July 1,
   1976, which assumed control of entrance
   testing and processing.
-- Developirig and using a common aptitude
   test in Jnuary 1976 to determine eli-
   gibility for service.
-- Developing and using standardized en-
   listment forms, including a multipur-
   pose military enlistment agreement.
   (See pp. 16 and 17.)
The enlistment bonus program has increased
from $43 million during fiscal year 1974 to
a proposed $74.5 million for 1978.
The success of the all-volunteer force de-
pends largely on the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the management of the recruit-
ing program. Nevertheless meeting recruiting

requirements is also dependent upon
driving policies and requirements    other
pact heavily on the size and complexity im-
the recruiting task.                     of
                      (See p. 19.)
Prior GAO reports have addressed
aspects of recruiting management
tions. Appendixes I through VIII ad opera-
the digests of major reports and    rovide
as general reference to several   may be used
tioned in this report.           issues men-
DIGEST                                                    i
   1       INTRODUCTION                                   1
             QUALITY GOALS                                4
               Quantity objectives and achievements       4
               Recruit quality                            5
                   High school graduate recruiting
                     goals and achievements               5
                   Recruiting results by mental
                     categories                           7
             COMPONENTS                                  10
               Recruiting forces                         10
               Advertising for recruiting                12
               Enlistment bonuses                        1.5
               Processing and screening new
                 recruits                                16
   4       SUMMARY                                       18

   I       Digest--Problems in Meeting Military
             Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer
             Force, B-177952 (May 2, 1973)               20
  II       Digest--Military Retention Incentives:
             Effectiveness and Administration,
             B-160096 (July 5, 1974)                     25
 III       Digest--Problems Resulting from Manage-
             ment Practices, Training, and Using
             Non-High School Graduates and Category
             IV Personnel, FPCD-76-24 (Jan. 12, 1976)   29
  IV       Digest--An Assessment of All-Volunteer
             Force Recruits, FPCD-75-170 (Feb. 27,
             1976)                                      31
   V       Digest--Improving the Effectiveness and
             Efficiency of Recruiting, FPCD-75-169
             (Mar. 5, 1976)                             34
APPENDIX                                                    Page

  VI       Digest--Advertising or Military
             Recruiting:  How Effective Is It?
             FPCD-76-168 (Mar. 29, 1976)                     39

 VII       Digest--Job Opportu ities for Women
             in the Military:  Progress and
             Problems, FPCD-7 -26 (May 11, 1976)             42

v1II       Digest--Marine Corps Recruiting and
             Recruit Training: Policies and
             Practices, FPCD-77-18 (Feb. 10,
             1977)                                           44

  IX       Principal officials responsible for
             administering activities discussed
             in this report                                  47


AFEES      Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations

AVF        all-volunteer force

DOD        Department of Defense

GAO        General Accounting Office
                             CHAPTER 1
      Except for brief periods cf time, the Department of
Defense (DOD) has relied on a draft system for more than
30 years to obtain men for the Armed Forces. However,
return to n all--volunteer force (AVF) began in March 1969
with plans to rely entirely on volunteers after July 1, 1973.
Following is a cwnology of events leading to the current

       -- In March 1969 the President appointed a commission
          to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating the
          dL ft.
       -- In November 1969 the President, with congressional
          approval, reduced the period of prime draft vulner-
          ability from 7 years to 1 year and provided draft
   k      selection by lottery.
       -- In ebruary 1970 the Presidential Commission concluded
          that the Nation's interest would be better sved by
          an AVF supported by an effective standby draft and
          that the first step was to remove the inequity in the
          pay of those serving their first terms in the Armed
       -- In October 1970 the Secretary of Defense directed
          the services to move toward an AVF by July 1, 1973.

       -- In January 1973 the President proposed that induc-
          tion authority be extended to July 1, 1973, and
          said that every endeavor would be made to eliminate
          the draft by that time.
       -- In September 1971, after extensive debate, the
          Congress extended induction authority to July 1,
          1973, and passed legislation on pay and benefits
          for an AVF.
    ---In August 1:972 the Secretary of Defense reported to
       the President and the Congress that DOD was within
       reach of achieving an AVF composed of 2.3 million
       active-duty and 1 million reserve forces.
    -- In January 1973 the Secretary of Defense announced
       that the draft had ended for all but doctors and
     -- On March 21, 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced
        that the administration would not ask for renewal of
        the induction authority.
During this period DOD and the services began to expand
their draft-supported recruiting effort into a higher cost
network of recruiting organizations and associated programs.
The true test of the services' ability to operate under AVF
began on July 1, 1973.

     In its first 3 years of operation, about 1,170,500
persons had been recruited under AVF at a cost of about
$1.48 billion. More than 804,500 persons are planned to
be recruited in fiscal years 1977 and 1978. For the 5-year
period ending with fiscal year 1978, about 1,975,000 per-
sons are expected to be recruited at approximately
$2.66 billion.

     Many rganizations, including DOD and the services,
have studied and analyzed various AVF activities, including
the expanded recruiting effort. Some of the recent studies
     -- Achievinq Americ's Goals: National Service or the
        All Volunteer Force, Dr. Wiliiam R. King, Univer-sty
        of Pittsburgh, December 1976.
     -- The All Volunteer Force, Current Status and Prospects,
        Department of Defense, December 1976.

     -- Costs of Defense Manpower:  Issues for 1977 (Budget
        Issue Paper), Congressional Budget Offtce, Congress
        of the U.S., January 1977,

     -- Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?, A
        Special Report, Assoclia-ion of the United States
        Army, April 1977.

     -- Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security,
        Report to the President and the Congress,Tefense
        Manpower Commission, April 1976.

     As a result of many of these studies, basic questions
continue to be raised, such as:
     --Will the services be able to recruit the required
       quantity and quality of volunteers and at what

     -- What options or alternatives should be considered to
        improve recruiting?

     Recruiting for AVF has created a growing level of con-
gressional and public concern as to whether AVF will remain
an effective and economically viable policy over the next
several years. Some issues being discussed are:

     -- Further expansion and increased financial support to
        the principal recruiting program components, includ-
        ing the recruiting forces, advertising, and enlist-
        ment incentives.
     --The level of efficiency and effectiveness of DOD and
       the services' management and operation of a higher
       cost and complex recruiting program effort.
     -- The relationship of quantitative and qualitative
        military staffing needs with the availability of
In addition, military policy questions are being discussed
regarding retention of military enlisted personnel and
the greater use of women, and civilians in noncombat-related
occupational categories.

     The several options and alternatives available t DOD
and the services will require their special attention over
the next several years. Although these options and alterna-
tives are not new to DOD, they have again become primary
topics of interest and study and will most likely be topics
of discussion during future congressional oversight and ap-
propriation hearings. The outcome of these discussions will
have a major bearing on whether AVF, as presently established
and operated, will remain the method to meet our military
staffing needs.

     We have also issued a series of reports on various
recruiting and recruiting-related aspects of AVF. Our first
report, "Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the
All-Volunteer Force," B-177952, May 2, 1973 (see app. I)
identified some of the significant topics, problem areas, and
pc:ential solutions known to DOD and the services. Some later
reports have addressed particular aspects of recruiting manage-
ment and operations. Appendixes I through VIII provide the
digests of major reports and may be used as general reference
to several issues mentioned in this report.

                                    CHAPTER 2

                           AND QUALITY GOALS

     The all-volunteer force recruiting from fiscal years
1974 through 1976r as reported by DOD, indicates that total
recruiting objectives have been met

     --96 percent in fiscal year 1974 (the first year of the
       AVF program),
     -- 102 percent in fiscal year 1975, and
     -- 100 percent in fiscal year 1976.
The services' quantity achievements as a percentage of
objective follows:

       Service            1974               1975            1976
     Army                   94                102            100
     Navy                  103                101            100
     Marine Corps           85                101            100
     Air Force             101                102            101
            Total              96             102            100
     An indication of a possible change in recruiting achieve-
ment surfaced on July 1 through December 31, 1976. With the
exception of the Air Force, the services fell short of their
nonprior recruiting objectives as follow:

                                                               Percent of
                    Objective       Actual      Difference     objective
Army                  95,500         90,000         -5,500          94
Navy                  55,600         53,700         -1,900          97
Marine Corps          26,200         23,800         -2,400          91
    Total            177,300        167,500         -9,800          95
     During recent congressional testimony, Defense officials
said that recruiting may become increasingly challenging in
the coming years. The testimony indicated that there is
the potential for growing quantity shortfalls and lower

recruit quality coupled with requests for increased funding
levels for recruiting activities.

     However, recent statistics, reported by DOD, on total
quantity achievement for January to June 1977 for all ac-
cessions indicate that the shortfall experience of the tran-
sition quarter and the first quarter of 1977 has been some-
what turned around. The following table shows this achieve-
ment. in addition, it should be noted that this is tradi-
tionaily the slow recruiting period of the year.

     Ser'ice          Objective      Actual    Percent
  Army                  91,000       90,000      98.8
  Navy                  49,800       48,000      96.4
  Marine Corps          22,400       21,600      96.4
  Air Force             37,900       37,900     100.0
      Total            201,100       197,500     98 ?
     The total recruiting objective for fiscal year 1977 is
about 410,400: for fiscal year 1978, about 394,100, or 16,300
fewer nonprior service personnel or a reduction of about
4 percent compared to fiscal year 1977. The fiscal year 1978
recruiting objective is also the lowest in AVF history since
fiesal year 1974.

     Categorization of mental ability and educational achieve-
ment are the two most widely used measures of recruit quality.
The services use the term "goals" rather than "requirements"
because to establish requirements would necessitate precise
and extensive analyses of the quality prerequisites for every
military skill and occupation.
High school graduate recruiting
goals and achievements

     According to DOD the high school diploma is an indicator
of an individual's motivation and discipline. Nonhigh school
graduates (those who do not possess a high school diploma or
the equivalent) tend to have more discipline problems, higher
retraining rates, and a higher percentage of early discharges.
We have made some of these observations in our report, "Prob-
lems Resulting from Management Practices in Recruiting,
Traininc and Using Non-High School Graduates and Category
IV Personnel," FPCD-76-24, January 12, 1976.  (See app. III.)

     In the DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 19.4, the
Congress imposed restrictions on enlisting nonhigh scLool
graduates and mental category IV recruits. The act reads:

     "None of the funds in this Act shall be available
     for the enlistment or pay of non-prior service
     personnel during fiscal year 1974 when the en-
     listmelit will cause the percentage of non-high
     school graduate enlistments of the services con-
     cerned to exceed 45 per centum or the mental
     category IV enlistments t exceed 18 per centum
     of the total non-prior service enlistments for
     the entire fiscal year."

     The Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization
Act, approved June 8, 174, removed the restriction on en--
listment of nonhigh school raduates because the Army and
Marine Corps anticipated roblems in meeting these quality
goals. The 1975 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act per-
mitted the services to use high school graduation as an
enlistment criterion, but did not prohibit enlisting non-
graduates to meet strength goals. The 18-percent restric-
ticn on enlistment of mental category IV personnel remained
in effect.

     Independently,   the services have established desired
quality goals to be   achieved by their recruiting programs
for a fiscal year.    The Air Force has not set numerical
goals nor felt that   they were needed in their recruiting

     In fiscal year 1974, the first year of AVF, the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps set desired goals for recruiting high
school graduates.  They were expressed as a percentage of
the total nonprior service recruiting objective as follows:
                                   High school graduates
                                      military service
       Service                              goals
     Army                                     70
     Navy                                     80
     Marine   orps                            65

     To provide perspective on the achievement of the
desired goals for high schol graduate recruitment, we
compared the aboJe with

     -- fiscal year 1964, which was a pre-Vietnam draft

        -- fiscal year 1969, a peak Vietnam war draft year; and

        -- fiscal year 1974 throuqh March 31, 1977.
The following table shows this achievement:

           Percentage of High School Graduate Recruitment

       Fiscal years           Army       Navy   Marine Corps   Air Force
    1964                       67        58          61           84
    1969                       62        80          55           94
AVF 1974
    Actual experience          56         70         54           92
       Actual experience       66         75         59           91
       Actual experience       64        84          67          95
1977 transition
    Actual experience          56        75          71           87
       Actual experience:
           October-December   50         72          63          83
           January-March      47         69          59          88
It should be noted that the 1974 congressional stipulation of
55 percent high school graduates has been met or exceeded
with the exceptions of the

       -- Marine Corps in fiscal year 1974 by 1 percent and

       -- Army in the first half of fiscal year 1977.
Pecruiting results bymental categories
     Another of the most used and emphasized quality
standards is the mental category derived from selection
and classification tests given all potential ecruits.
The scores from these tests are used to classify potential
recruits into mental category designations.
     On the basis of their percentile scores, service ap-
olicants are divided into five mental categories, I through

V, in order of decreasing scores. Category III is average.
Test scores n mental category V disqualify an individual
for service induction.
     The Congress imposed an 18-percent restriction on
enlistment of category IV personnel for fiscal year 1974.
The following table compares that restriction to the actual
experience of previous and following fiscal years.
                             Percentage of    jcate goy_personnel
                                                 iarine     Air
                               Army    Navy         Corps  Force

Historical experience
    FY 1964 (Pre-Vietnam
      draft year)               19.0   10.0      9.2      4.3
    FY 1969 (Peak Vietnam
      draft year)               27.5   19.2     25.7     17.7

Legislative restriction
  of fiscal year 1974           18.0   18.0     18.0     18.0

Actual   Experience
    FY   1974                   17.8    3.5      7.5       .6
    FY   1975                   10.0    4.8      3.5       .4
    FY   1976                    7.4    4,1      2.9       .5
    FY   1377
          October-December       6.6    2.4      3.8       .1
          January-March          7.0    2.0      4.0        -

     Two facts are noteworthy:

     -- The percentage of category IV personnel recruited
        annually has generally dropped &nd the congressional
        limitation of fiscal year 1974 has not been exceeded.

     -- The percentage of category IV persornel recruited
        in any AVF year is much lower than either the pre-
        Vietnam draft year of 1964 or the peak-Vietnam
        draft year of 1969.

With this progressive decline in the number of category IV
personnel over the years, there has also been a compensating
increase in the average and higher mental categories.
     To date, the services appear to have generally been
able to meet their quality goals. The basic question re-
mains, however, as to the appropriate level of quality
the services actually need, as it relates to specific
skills and occupations. Lacking that information quality

goals cannot be dealt with effectively as a criteria for
either establishing recruiting objectives or judging re-
cruiting results.

     We addressed aspects of quantity and quality achieve-
ment in our report, "An Assessment cf All-Volunteer Force
Recruits," FPCD-75-170, February 27, 1976. (See app. IV.)

                             CHAPTER 3

                     MANAGEMENT OF RECRUITING
                        PROGRAM COMPONENTS
     As discussed in chapter 1, resources provided the Active
Forces' recruiting program have been substantial. These re-
sources are applied to four major program components:
     1.     Costs of the recruiters and their support.
     2.     Advertising costs.

     3.     Enlistment bonuses paid to cert         n recruits.
     4.     Costs of processing a recruit through the re-
            quired entrance testing and examinations.
The following table sets forth these costs for fiscal years
1974 through 1978.

                                  Actual                      Estimated
                          1974     1975         1976        1977     1978

Recruiter force and
  support                $278.6   $328.0       $286.1    $314.6    $378.4
Advertising                96.1    102.1          67.3      89.2    105.6
Enlistment bonuses         43.0        58.8       68.5      65.5     74.5
Processing                 36.3        44.3      49.5       61.8     62.2
    Total                $454.0   $533.2       $471.4    $531.1    $620.7

     Among the major recruiting program components, the
services' recruiting forces are the most costly. The re-
cruiting foices are to (1,0 find and sell potenltial recruits
on the military way of life and (2) help determine whether
potential recruits are eligible to enlist. DOD and the
services believe a close relationship exists between the
size of service recruiter forces and the level of success
in meeting recruiting quantity objectives and cuality goals.
We discussed aspects of recruiting forces in our report,

 "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting,"
 FPCD-75-169, March 5, 1976.  (See app. V.)
      DOD and the services have annually invested considerable
 resources in staffing recruiting forces. The following table
 shows investments for fiscal years 1974 through 1978.

               Recruiting Force Size and Annual Cost

                                        Staff- ears
                           -§74     .1975 197-b     1977   19798
                         (note a)(note b)(note b)(note c)(note d)
       recruiters           -     11,927      10,920    11,588   12,198
      aides                 -           515      312     1,111    1,646
      support               -         8,019    6,846     5,770    6,202
      support               -         2,163    2,146     2,127    2,111
            Total       22,763    22,624      20,224    20,596   22,157
            Cost (mil-
              lions)   $278.6     $328.0      $286.-.   $314.6   $378.4
a/Distribution by personnel category not available for FY
b/Actual staff-years expended.


d/Budgeted request.

     DOD and service officials agree that precise evaluations
and determinations of recruiter force size and composition
are difficult t make and must be viewed in perspective with
other components and appropriately adjusted with changes in
the recruit market. Because of the importance and cost
placed on this particular component, DOD believes that
changes to the recruiter force structure should be based
on long-term assessments of recruiting requirements and not
on short-term market outlook.


     The advertising program is the second most costly re-
cruiting program component and is considered to be one of
the more complex to evaluate and justify.  Substantial re-
sources have been provided for the advertising effort.
In fiscal year 1973, the last year of the draft, advertis-
ing costs were $68.8 million; in fiscal years 1974 and 1975,
$96.1 and $102.1 million, respectively.

     For fiscal year 1976 DOD requested an advertising
budget of $104 million; however, as a result of congres-
sional review, the request was cut by 35 percent, establish-
ing the funding level at $67.3 million.   The Congress, at
that time, felt that as  the services gained several years
experience in recruiting for AVF  and as economic conditions
fostered enlistments, such a reduction in advertising fund-
ing was appropriate.   The program level for fiscal year
1977 is $89.2 million.   DOD has requested $105.6 million for
fiscal year 1978.

     According to DOD and the services, the recruit advertis-
ing objectives are to

     -- create an awareness of and provide information on the
        service as a potential post-high school job opportunity,

     -- improve the attitudes of youth toward the services and
        create a favorable recruiting environment, and

     -- generate prospect leads thru advertising response

To achieve these objectives DOD and the services employ ad-
vertising agencies and market research groups to advise and
help them identify the potential recruit market and design
the appropriate methods and materials for advertising cam-
paigns.  The advertising media being used include outdoor
billboards, posters, pamphlets, promotion items, public
service and paid radio and television, and newspapers and

     We have previously questioned whether the extent of the
advertising program and costs were necessary to meet recruit-
ing quantity objectives and quality goals.  Essentially, this
question was related to our concern about the dimension of
the actual contribution advertising made to the success of
the recruiting effort.  From a management efficiency stand-
point, we also found evidence of duplicative or inconsistent

practices among the services that offered potential for
reducing cost and increasing the potential effectiveness
of the advertising program. These topics were addressed
in our report, "Advertising For Military Recruiting:   How
Effective Is It?," FPCD-76-168, March 29, 1976.   (See app.

     These anagement and operational problems have generally
resulted from the highly independent manner in which each
service has conducted its advertising business, regardless
of basic commonality of the program. According to service
officials, the rationale behind this approach is the unique-
ness of each service and the need to tailor and direct their
own special recruiting message. However, according to DOD and
service sources, research hows that the items that attract
youth to the services are relatively common to each service
and have changed very little over the last several years;
that is, pay, educational benefits, training opportunities,
and travel. The recruiting messages that have been presented
by each of the services have contained these basic messages.

     DOD's attitude and awareness studies, made as recently
as the fall of 1976, have pointed out that the way youths per-
ceive the services can be an important factor on enlistments.
Research has also pointed out that the services' images have
not changed much in recent years. In effect, the percent of
youths likely to join the service and the service they are
most likely to oin has not changed. This is important be-
cause a major objective of advertising is to improve the
youth's attitudes and erceptions of military service.

     In our March 1976 report, we recommended that DOD and
the services

     -- devise methods to measure the effectiveness of the
        various types of advertising being used in recruit
        advertising and
     --improve their interservice communication, coordina-
       tion, and exchange of information on market research
       and review and analyze types and methods of adver-
       tising being employed to avoid duplication or un-
       r-essary research or advertising efforts.
     DOD and the services knew of many of the problem areas
noted in our report and have been taking actions for im-
provement. They have recognized the need to initiate ac-
tions to better assess the impact advertising has on the
total recruiting effort and have initiated several actions
to improve the direction and effectiveness of advertising.

Among some of the specific areas of che advertising program
in which DOD has taken or plans to cake action include:
     -- Establishing an interservice ommittee, Joint
        Advertising Directors or ecruiting, which provides
        an informal means for service representatives to
        discuss mutual advertising problems and a means for
        coordinating service advertising activities.
     -- resigning and implementing a new semiannual youth
        awareness and tracking study which will also provide
        advertising effectiveness tracking information.

     -- Developing a joint market research program and has
        recent3y completed a test to measure the effective-
        ness of pa4 d radio advertising.

     -- Establishing the Joint Market Analysis and Research
        Committee to conduct interserice discussion and
        improve the level of coordination and planning for
        advertising effectiveness analysis.
     -- Establishing the Joint Education Liaison Directors
        of Recruiting to improve coordination with educa-
        tional communities.
     DOD has also compieted an evaluation of paid broadcast
advertising and the impact it would have on public service
advertising. The evaluation showed the market testing of
paid radio had no systematic effect on the level of public
service advertising support. The test also indicated that
service advertising was not reaching the target audience.
The four services, working within their budgets have begun
paid radio and television advertising.
     Our previous analysis of the advertising cost data
provided by the services showed that what each service in-
cluded as advertising costs varied significantly. It
seemed that when the services were requested to submit ad-
vertising cost data to DOD or the Congress, each service
used its own discretion in selecting the format and in
 determining what costs should or should not be included.
Consistent comprehensive reporting is required so that the
Congress can be informed, but that program managers also
are in a good position to formulate effective plans and
make sound decisions. DOD has informed us that they have
developed and tested a format for the uniform reporting of
services' advertising costs.

     Although numerous efforts have been initiated to better
manage the advertising programs, its high cost and the dif-
ficulty in evaluating its effectiveness warrant continued and
special attention. The basis question that still remains
unanswered is how many advertising dollars are needed to at-
tract the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet service
accession goals.

      The Military Service Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-129) permitted
the payment of enlistment bonuses to persons enlisting in
combat arms elements of the armed services for 3 or more
years. Public Law 93-64 extended this bonus authority to
June 30, 1974.
     The Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act
of 1974 (P.L. 93-277) removed the limitation on bonuses for
the combat arms elements only and permitted payments to per-
sonnel on a selected basis in order to fill critical and
shortage skills. The authority for these payments expires
September 30, 1978.

     T': enlistment bonus, limited to $3,000, is to increase
the number of initial enlistments in critical and shortage
skills. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to
determine critical skills. Currently, only the Army and
Marine Corps pay enlistment bonuses in both combat arms
and highly technical skills.

     To be eligible for the bonus, an individual must meet
the following requirements:

     --Be a high school graduate or have successfully
       completed the General Educational Development
       program. In January 1975 the Army announced that
       effective June 1, 1976, Fersonnel certified by the
       program would no longer be eligible for the en-
       listment bonus.
     --Be classified as mental category group I, II, or III.

     -- Be qualified and serve in a bonus skill for at
        least 4 years.
Payment begins upon successful completion of bonus skill

     From fiscal years 1974 through 1976 the services awarded
72,473 bonuses at an estimated $170.3 million. Projected
bonuses and costs through fiscal year 1978 total an additional
61,141 at an estimated $140 million. The annual number of
bonuses and costs are shown below:

                                   Fiscal years
                                                   1977       1978
                1974       1975          1976    (note a)   (note b)

Costs (mil-
  lions)        $43.0      $58.8         $68.5     $65.5     $74.5

Number of
  payments     18,449   24,407          29,626    29,957    31,184

Average pay-
  ment          2,331      2,409         2,314     2,187     2,389

a/Estimated (includes transition quarter costs).
b/Budgeted request.

     Determining mental, moral, and medical eligibility of
new recruits, and processing them into individual services
according to individual service standards is the responsi-
bility of the Armed Forces Entrance art Examination Stations
(AFEES). AFEES is also responsible for quality control over
enlistment paperwork.

      Although the total annual costs of the recruit processing
and screening component is less than the other recruiting pro-
gram components, it is estimated that the cumulative cost for
fiscal years 1974 thru 1978 budget request is about $257 mil-

     Our previous report about these activities, "Improving
the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169,
March 5, 1976 (see app. V), revealed numerous administrative
and operational problem areas which contributed t increased
costs not only associated with processing and screening but
also recruiting and training.

     We reported that due to the subordinated level of AFEES
to the recruiting commands and the fragmented and incomplete
controls over service-administered mental examinations and

associated operational inefficiencies, AFEES had been ham-
pered from acting as an effective operating component of
the total recruiting program. Although of equal importance,
AFEES were emphasizing examining and processing recruits into
the military with little attention given to quality control.
We believed that as a result, more recruits not meeting
recruit standards were completing the enlistment process.

     Some actions DOD and the services have taken to improve
the processing and screening of recruits are:

    -- DOD has removed enlistment testing and processing fcr
       all nonprior service applicants from recruiting and
       placed the function under AFEES as of January 1, 1976.
       At the same time, the Armed Forces Vocational Testing
       Group was transferred to the Army from the Air Force
       as part of the centralization of entrance testing.

    -- On July 1, 1976, a new joint command, Military Enlist-
       ment Processing Command assumed control of entrance
       testing and processing. While operationally in-
       dependent, the commanding general of the Army re-
       cruiting command will also command the Military En-
       listment Processing Command.

    -- In January 1976 the services implemented a common
       aptitude tes.--Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
       Battery--to determine nonprior service applicants
       eligibility to serve. Although the services are
       now using the same test, the minimum acceptable
       scores vary.

    -- The services are taking steps to identify military
       Jobs common to all services to facilitate agreement
       on common aptitude areas. DOD has stated that common
       composites must be based upon validation data anu
       will be useful only if they are efficient for pre-
       dicting performance for all services in the appro-
       priate service occupations. Some measure of the
       feasibility of common composites will be possible
       in mid-1977. 'DOD will oversee the data collections
       and investigate the feasibility of common composites.

    -- DOD has developed a multipurpose enlistment agreement
       form which allows all enlistment transactions to be
       completed on one form. In addition, DOD and the
       services have either eliminated or replaced numerous
       recruiting and enlistment paperwork.

                             CHAPTER 4
      DOD and the services have generally been
 recruiting sufficient quantity and quality     successful in
 the Active Forces to meet their goals. Much of personnel   for
 has been the result of modifying and expandingof  this  success
                                                  the scope
 of recruiting programs of the draft era, to
                                              a more complex
 and higher cost network of recruiting organizations
 activities.                                            and

      DOD and the services have changed and improved
 management of the recruiting program. Review        their
 tion of the recruiting program, with emphasis and evalua-
 agement, direction, and control, is a basic   on its man-
 recruiting success is to continue and costs necessity if
                                             are to be con-
 strained to reasonable levels.

       During appropriations hearings, DOD officials
 the Congress of the need for stronger centralized       advised
 oversight and direction of the total recruiting        management
 that a first step toward this goal is commonality   effort and
 the services recruiting program components             between
 these components as interrelated             and to address
                                   parts of a total recruit-
 ing system. Managements decisions to establish
 uniformity and coordination in recruit testing greater
 essing is a major step in this direction.         and proc-

      DOD and the services are also aware of the
 in evaluating recruiting program components
for making sound management decisions for      and the necessity
                                             establishing and
adjusting these components. DOD and service
that they have not mastered the management      officials dmit
                                              and evaluative
techniques for making changes and adjustments
mix, but admit they are learning to manage        to the program
effort under the volunteer concept, and that  the  recruiting
phasis must be given to understanding the       special    em-
                                            effects of chang-
ing the program mix. Also, many of the management
operational improvements which have been taken          an.
 .ast several years are viewed as ground breaking  during   the
providing the basis for further refinements            ctivity,
                                               in recruiting
program management and evaluation.    DOD and the services
should be encouraged to aggressively seek
prove management capability.                solutions to im-

     It should also be pointed out, however,
ments on the management and direction of the that improve-
cruiting program components may not be the   principal re-
                                           total solution to

the problem o meeting military personnel strength require-
ments. Some of the other related policies and practices could
be modified to reduce the burden on the recruiting system.

     -- Reevaluation of physical and mental enlistment eli-
        gibility standards based more specifically n mili-
        tary occupational requirements.
     -- Reevaluation of policies concerning the recruitment
        and use of women in as many occupational areas as
        possible. ("Job Opportunities for Women in the
        Military: Progress and Problems," FPCD-76-26,
        May 11, 1976 (see app. VII).)
     -- Adjustments to policies concerning the use of civilian
        personnel in occupational areas not specifically need-
        ing military personnel as well as the greater use of
        private contract services where operationally and
        economically feasible.

     -- Improvements to retention/reenlistment management with
        concentration on hard to fill occupational areas, and
        the redirection (retaining) of young career personnel
        to shortage areas.   ("Military Retention Incentives:
        Effectiveness and Administration," B-160096, July 5,
        1974 (see app. II).)

     -- Establishing a wider variety of enlistment and
        reenlistment periods and options.

     -- Improving training capabilities and efficiency which
        have the impact of reducing enlistment requirements.
        ("Marine Corps Recruiting and Recruit Training:
        Policies and Practices," FPCD-77-18, February 10,
        1977 (see app. VIII).)
     -- Improving the process and methodologies, including
        enlisted career profile planning, used to determine
        enlisted personnel requirements.
The success of the all-volunteer force depends largely on the
efficiency and effectiveness of managing the recruiting pro-
gram. Nevertheless, meeting recruiting requirements is also
dependent upon other driving policies and requirements which
impact heavily upon the size and complexity of the recruit-
ing task.

APPENDIX I                                                     APPENDIX I

                                         ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
                                         Department of Defense       B-177952



As July 1, 1973, draws near, the         Background
Congress is faced, essentially, with
three choices in legislating the         In October 1966 the President
future metho. for obtaining men and      started actioa.s to move toward the
women to serve in this country's         AVF.
Armed orces.
                                         In January 1971 he proposed that
 -Let the present draft authority        the Congress extend induction au-
  expire and rely entirely on            thority to July 1, 1973, but in-
  volunteers.                            dicated that every effort would be
                                         made to eliminate the use of the
--Extend the present system of in-       draft by that time.
  ducting men into the service.
                                         In March 1973 the Secretary of De-
--Rely on an all-volunteer force         fense announced that the Administra-
  (AVF), but enact some orm of           tion would not ask for renewal of
  standby draft authority for the        the induction authority.
  President to use in case of an
  emergency or the development of        This has been mnade possible by
  manpower shortages that cannot be
  met through voluntary methods.         --significant improvement in
                                           first-term pay,
In this report GAO has sought
answers to some of the major issues      --improved conditions of service
associated with putting the vol-           life,
unteer system into operation.
                                       --training and assignment options,
GAO focused on the practicality and
cost of meeting military manpower      --bonuses,
objectives--both quantitative and
qualicative--in fiscal year 1974.      --greatly increased recruiting pro-
The report is based on data obtained     grams, and
from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), the military services, --reduction of the military force
and the Research Analysis Corporation,   structure to its lowest level
an Army contractor.                      since 1951.

APPENDIX I                                                           APPENDIX I

Selective Servie SysteL; to remain          To answer the question, GAO ob-
                                            tained data on true volunteers for
The Congress grants the President           a 3-year period and projected
induction authority for fixed pe-           fiscal year 1974 enlistments. GAO
riods of time--to supplement volun-         compared these past trends and
tary recruiting into the Amed               projections with fiscal year 1974
Forces--in accordance with the Mil-         service quantity requirements and
itary Selective Service Act.                quality gois--such as limitations
                                            on personnel in the below-average
Although this authority expires             mental category and non-high-school
June 30, 1973, all other sections           graduates. (See pp. 11 to 16.)
of the act remain unchanged. Section
10(h) specifically prescribes the           If these quality goals were rigid
functions to be performed by an ac-         requirements (which they are not)
tive standby Selective Service Sys-         there could be a shortfall of be-
tem.                                        tween 11,000 and 83,000 new enlist-
                                            ments in fiscal year 1974, compared
These include                               with a total requirement of 354,000.
                                            (See pp. 25 and 26.)
--registering men,
                                            The shortfall would occur primarily
--holding an annual lottery,                in the Army and the Marine Corps
                                            and to a small degree in the Navy.
--classifying registrants, and              (See . 26.)

--maintaining viable procedures and         To avoid these shortfalls the
  facilities to use in case                 services can accept more mental
  reinstatement of induction au-            category IV men and more enlistees
  thority becomes necessary. (See           who have not graduated from high
  p. 8.)                                    school. For example, to meet its
                                            fiscal year 1974 enlistment re-
                                            quirement of 162,000, the Army may
Problems in meeting                         need to accept between 21 and
Active Force requirements                   33 percent of mental category IV
                                            enlistees compared with a desired
Obtaining and retaining sufficient          limitation of 20 percent. (See
officers, except those in the health        p. 17.)
professions (discussed below), does
not appear to be a problem.                 Service quality goals hiave been set
                                            at levels difficult to obtain.
However, there appears to be less
optimism about the ability of the           --The Army's high school graduate
services t obtain a sufficient                goal, 70 percent, has been achieved
quantity of qualified enlisted                with true volunteers in only
personnel. For the Active Forces,             1 month since January 1970. (See
the key question is:                          p. 18.)
Can the milZitary services obtain a         --The Marine Corps' goal, 65 percent,
sufficient number of new enlistments          has not been achieved at all dur-
,n fisoal year 1974 and at the                ing this period. (See p. 21.)
same time meet their quality goalte-
i.e., volunteers with the ability           -- The Navy's goal, 80 percent, has
to learn and perform the hundreds              been achieved in only 1 month.
of ski.ls found in the military?               (See p. 23.)

 APPENDIX I                                                            APPENDIX I

 -The Air Force has had no diffi-             Pt za!w inobt!in
   culty inmaintaining quality.                 o ph
   (See p. 24.)
                                              At the end of calendar year 1972,
DOD officials, in comenting on                only 16 percent of the physicians
these matter- -'eted that the                 who entered military service in
quality mix .. lay's force is                 fiscal year 1970 were still in
substantially richer than it was             service. Few physicians have been
in the years of heavy draft use              drafted. To avoid being drafted,
and that service quality standards           more physicians inmedical train-
are unrealistically high. DOD                ing joined the military service
forecasts that military performance          under special programs. The
standards wiil not be lowered be-            largest of these is the Berry Plan
cause of any inability to obtain             which, in exchange for a 2-year
recruits of the quality needed.              service obligation, permits full
                                             deferment from active duty until
The importance of obtaining the              specialty training has been corn-
desired quality of enlistees is              pleted. (See p. 44.)
illustrated by the fact that the
services now have imbalances in              The number of physicians participat-
skills resulting from a combination          ing in the Berry Plan and in other
of                                           programs is expected to decline
                                             sharply without a draft. DOD ex-
--insufficient men of required ap-           pects, however, that a scholarship
  titude and school preference (see          program established in September
  pp. 28 to 30) and                          1972 and the proposed special pay
                                             and enlistment bonuses for health
--inadequate retention of men in de-         care professionals will help al-
  sired sills. (See pp. 31 tc 40.)           leviate shortages of pysicians in
                                             future years. (See p. 45.)
In the Armly and the Marine Corps,
for example, over half of the skill          Future requirements for hysicians
categories were either overmanned            can be reduced significantly by
or undermanned by more than 20 per-          exploiting many opportunities for
cent as of June 30, 1972.                    conserving medical manpower re-
                                             sources. (See pp. 46 to 49.)
These problems are likely to per-
sist, and perhaps worsen, under the
AVF. The Selective Reenlistment              AZternatieas for meeti
Bonus proposed by DOD is one tech-           Active Forcemititarm rqurement8
nique designed to cope with this
problem. (See p. 38.)                        Alternatives to using male volun-
                                             teers to fill military requirements
 Renewint the Combat Arms Bonus ap-          include
pears essential to avoid a shrt-
fall which could reach 20 percent            --increasing the use of military
 in the Army's combat arms enlist-             women and
ments in fiscal year 1974. Further-
more, DOD estimates that continuing          --converting military positions to
the bonus at current levels will re-           civilian positions.
duce the annual enlistment require-
ment by at least 5,700 from fiscal           Inaddition, recruiting men and
year 1975 on and that by 1979 the an-        women with civilian-acquired skills
nual reduction could be as high as           directly into upper enlisted grades
9,400. (See pp. 41 to 43.)                   (known as lateral entry programs)

 APPENDIX I                                                                APPENDIX

 could assist in alleviating the             met by recruiting those who have
 problem of skill imbalances.                acquired advanced skills in
                                             civilian life and who can be used
 Women                                       without a great amount of further
                                             training.    The services' lateral
 In fiscal year 1972 women (including        entry programs have been very
 nurses) represented 19 percent of           limited.    (See pp. 54 and    5.)
 military strength. If the services'
 goals are met, women will represent
 4.2 percent of military strength by         Problem in     eting the
 the end of fiscal year 1977.                maneper requiremens osf the
                                             Resere components
 It is apparent that much greater
 potential exists to use wooln in            On February 15, 1972, the Secretary
 uniform. (See pp. 50 and 51.)               of Defense tcld the Corgress that,
                                             under the President's policy, the
                                             Reserve and Guard would be the
Civiian                                      initial and primary sources for in-
                                             creasing the Active Forces in any
As of December 31, 1972, about               future emergency. On January 20,
 1.08 million civilians worked               1973, the Secretary told the
for DOD, or about 32 percent of              Congress that unit structures and
the total DOD manpower. In                   mission assignments were being
October 1972 a DOD task force                revised to make them more compatible
issued a report on substituting              with mobilization needs and that
civilians for military personnel             priority missions were being trans-
in the Armed Forces. The task                ferred from the Active Forces to
force concluded that, theoretically,         the Guard and Reserve where the
102,862 enlisted support positions           ability to perform such missions
in the continental United States             has been demonstrated.
could be converted to civilian
positions in fiscal yea;- 1974.              This increased emphasis on Reserve
                                             components makes shortfalls more
Two plans were considered realistic--        significant. DOD is predicting
one to convert 35,000 military posi-         that Guard and Reserve Forces'
tions to civilian positions (low             manning levels will decline from
plan), another to convert 70,000             914,000 on June 30, 1973, to about
(high plan).                                 875,000 by June 30, 1974. This.
                                             could be 97,000 below the mobiliza-
In Decemr 1972 the Deputy Secre-             tion objective level of 971,000 for
tary of Defense directed the Army,           June 30, 1974. (See pp. 56 to 62.)
Navy, and A- Force each to convert a
minimum of 10.000 military positions         Coat of the AVF
to civilian positions in fiscal year
1974. The Marine Corps was directed          DOD programs for the AVF have con-
to convert at least 1,000. Here              tributed about 23 percent of the
again, significant additional poten-         increased manpower costs which have
tial exists. (See pp. 52 to 54.)             occurred since 1968. OSD's Project
                                             Volunteer costs budgeted for fiscal
LateraZ entry                                year 1974 are about $3.192 billion
                                             (including $225 million for the
DOD requirements for high-quality            proposed Uniformed Services Special
military personnel can also be               Pay Act).

                                                                  APPENDIX I

The Army has budgeted about                   the draft? If unehipcyment
$2.022 billion, exclusive of Project          rates for young men decrease,
Volunteer funding, in soldier-                will this ake it more diffi-
oriented improvements, sme of                 cult to attract qualified
which received priority because of            personnel?
the effort to move to an AVF. GAO
estimates the incremental costs          3. Should come orm of standby
primarily related to the AVF, may           induction authorty be
be as much as $1.090 billion.               enacted

The transition to an AVF in recent            --to save time in the event
years has been accompanied by decreas-          of an emergency?
ing force levels and increasing man-
power costs. If force levels need to          --to provide a means of meeting
be increased in the future, the cost            serious shortages in peacetime?
of volunteers may increase sharply.
(See pp. 63 to 69.)                       4. Will ome type of draft be re-
                                             quired if there are not enough
MATTERS FCR CONSIDERATION                    physician, after fiscal year
BYs THEE CONGRESS                             1974?

1. What are realistic minimum             5. Will some type of draft be re-
   quality standards for each                quired if deficits in the Re-
   service, both for Active and              serve components cannot be over-
   Reserve Forces?                           come?
2. What is the probable force             6. Will the Uniformed Services
   level of minimum quality that             Special Pay Act overcome the
   can be supported without using            above problems?

  APPENDIX II                                                     APPENDIX II
                                            Department of Defense      B-160096


WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE                     combine their most effective features
                                            in a new selective reenlistment bonus
GAO wanted to find out how well             was approved May 10, 1974. If this
variable reenlistment bonuses (VRBs)        new bonus proves effective, DOD will
worked in helping the Department of         phase out shortage specialty profi-
Defense (DOD) eliminate career-             ciency pay.
manning shortages in critically
needed skills and how well DOD was
carrying out its incentive programs.        FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Balic facts                                 VRB effectiveness

To encouva|oe qualified nlisted             Although DOD considers VRB effec-
personnel--!specially thore with            tive, VRB does not produce enough
critical skills--to remain after            first-term reenlistments to
their first enlistments, the Con-           eliminate career-manning shortages.
gres; authorized DOD to pay several
kind!; of monetary incentives:              On the average, VRBs increase first-
                                            term reenlistments. However, VRB's
--A 'IRB for first-term reenlistees         effect on reenlistment rates in in-
 who have critical skills (pri-             dividual skills cannot be predicted
 marily skills having hiqh training         accurately. This is because of the
  costs and being inshort supply).          strong influence of factors other
                                            than money on reenlistment deci-
--A regular reenlistment bonus for          sions. (See pp. 6 to 9.)
  all first-term personnel upon re-
  enlistment.                               For the 4-year period ended June 30,
                                            1972, VRBs had only a marginal im-
--A shortage specialty proficiency          pact on attaining the required
  pay for career personnel having           career-manning level in 129 of the
  critical skills in short supply           eligible skills with the largest
  that continue to have insufficient        requirement for enlisted personnel.
  retention after maximum VRB isap-         (See pp. 9 and 10.)
                                            A long time is needed to overcome
DOD plans to spend $405 million on          career-manning shortages if VRBs are
these incentives in fiscal year 1974.       the only incentive. GAO estimates
In spite of these incentives, DOD           that the average Army skill less
still has low first-term reenlistment       than 80-percent manned and receiving
rates in many critical skills.              the maximum VRB gains 10 additional
                                            reenlistees because of VRB. Other
Legislation to elimirate regular re-        variables constant, it would take
enlistment bonuses ar.d VRBs and to         about 26 years for the additional

   APPENDIX II                                                   APPENDIX II

reenlistees to eliminate the average       Effectiveness of regular bonus and
career-manning shortage. (See              shortage specialty proficiency pay
pp. 11 and 12.)
                                           DOD found in 1971 that:
Factors influencin
reenlistment decisions                     --About 25 percent, or $40 million,
                                             Q'f the regular reenlistment bonus
GAO interviewed 2,240 military per-          was paid each year to individuals
sonnel who either had reenlisted             serving in skills in which ade-
recently for the first time or were          quate retention could be sustained
app;oaching their first-reenlistment         without incentive payments. This
decision. GAO found:                         is because the law requires that
                                             the bonus be paid to all reenlis-
--VRB influenced reenlistment of             tees. DOD concluded the bonus was
  only 8 percent of the eligible             unnecessary.
  first-term critical-skill
  population. (See pp. 13 and 14.)         --A major part of shortage specialty
                                             proficiency pay was paid to ca-
--Larger bonuses could attract               reerists already past critical re-
  15 percent more of the critical-           tention points. DOD concluded
  skill population sampled. (See             that this incentive had only a
  pp. 13 and 14.)                            marginal effect on influencing re-
                                             enlistments and was extremely cost
--VRB was the prime reason for re-           ineffective. This is because to
  enlistment for only 13 percent of          yield reenlistments, payments were
  the critical-skill personnel               ntade to all careerists in a skill
  sampled. Job satisfaction, jcb             father than only to those reenlist-
  security, and educational oppor-           ing in the skill.
  tunities ranked higher. (See
  p. 14.)                             Responses to GAO's interviews con-
                                      firmed that shortage specialty
--Factors most influencing first-     proficiency pay had little effect on
  term critical-skill personnel not   reenlistment decisions. Of 62 in-
  to reenlist were (1) family sepa-   dividuals in GAO's sample who were
  rations, (2) lack of personal free- eligible for the pay and reenlist-
  dom, (3) poor supervision and       ing, only 5 said that shortage spe-
  leadership, (4)work details, and    cialty proficiency pay had in-
  (5) living conditions. (See         fluenced their decisions. (See
  p. 14.)                             p. 14.)
--An alternative for increasing            Effectiveness of
 first-term reenlistments would be   progrim administration
 to allow reenlistment for an un-
 specified time. About 36 percent    The Army, Navy and Marine Corps
 of the critical-skill personnel not cannot develop proper first-term
 reenlisting claimed they would re-  reenlistment objectives because they
 enlist for unspecified periods.     have not established long-range
 (See p. 14.)                        requirements planning in their

  APPENDIX   II                                                 APPENDIX II

enlisted force management systems.          GAO estimates that about 15 to
As a result, these services use VRBs        25 percent of all bonuses are for
to correct total career-manning             already obligated service. This
shortages rather than to attract            problem was overcome by enactment
only the required number of first-          of the selective reenlistment
term personnel needed, by skill, to         bonus program. (See pp. 31
enter the career force each year to         to 33.)
maintain proper grade structure.
This shortcoming has greatly reduced        Problems occurring after
effective program administration.           payment of bonuses
(See pp, 2n +     24.)
                                            Many Army and Marine Cor`ps individ-
At the recunendation of the House           uals receiving VRBs were not work-
Armed Services Committee, in 1968           ing in the skilTs for which VRBs had
DOD directed each service to develop        Seen paid. (See pp. 36 to 3.)
a long-range planning system for
managing its career enlisted force.         A serviceman, once awarded a reen-
(See p. 22.)                                listment bonus, must either complete
                                            his tour of duty or refund the un-
By 1973 only the Air Force had              earned part of the bonus. A review
developed such a system. The Air            of 443 cases requiring such refunds
Force system identifies manning             disclosed that recoupment efforts had
deficits by skill and years of serv-        been largely unsuccessful. (See
ice. VRBs can be used to attract            pp. 39 and 40.)
each year only the actual nnber of
first-term reenlistees needed by
skill. If each service were to              RECOMMENDATIONS
establish a similar system, manage-
ment of first-term retention could          Because individuals place major in-
be improved. This could result in           portance on factors other than
a more balanced career force. (See          money in deciding whether to reen-
p. 22.)                                     list, the Secretary of Defense
                                            should impress upon the services
Although DOD guidelines provide that        the need to insure that individuals:
certain characteristics be con-
sidered in applying VRBs, firm cri-         --Do not have their personal free-
teria have not been developed for             dom restrained during off-duty
the services to follow in applying,           hours.
adjusting, or removing VRB. As a
result, decisionmakers have to use          --Receive the highest quality super-
their judgment in specifying use of           vision and leadership.
VRBs. (See pp. 24 to 31.)
                                            --Are effectively used in the skills
Most regular bonuses and YRBs are             for which they are trained.
computed, in part, on already cbli-
gated service time, because each            The Secretary should also:
service, in allowing its personnel
to reenlist before completing their         --Consider recommending legislation
initial enlistments, counts the time          which would allow enlisted per-
remaining in the initial enlistments          sonnel to reenlist for unspeci-
in computing the bonuses.                     fled periods.

  APPENDIX II                                                    APPENDIX II

--Develop optimum bonus administra-         AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES
  tion criteria that can be used in
  conjunction with approved long-           DOD generally agrees with many of
  range career management systems.          GA0's findings and recommendations,
                                            DOD concurs that it isdifficult to
--Improve the bon, administration           quantify effectiveness of VRB in
  criteria that the Arny, Navy, and         attracting additional reenlist-
  Marine Corps must use until they          ments, particularly on an individual-
  develop enlisted career management        skill basis. DOD's comments are
  systems that can predict reliably         included as appropriate in tie re-
  skill retention requirements by           port.
  years of service. These criteria
  should clearly delineate the cir-
  cumstances under which a bonus            XA'ZERS POR CONSIDERATION
  should be applied, adjusted, and          BY THE CONGRESS
                                            The military services should be
--Insure that (1)the services use           required to develop, as soon as
   ORB recipients in the skills which       possible, enlisted personnel man-
   qualified them for the VRBs, un-         agement systems which would be
   less the Secretary of the service        responsive to the House Armed
   determines that waivers are neces-       Services Committee's 1968 recom-
   sary in the interest of the service      mendation.
   Cncerned, and (2) misassigned VRB
   recipients are identified and            Since the advantages of such systems
   properly assigned.                       are fully accepted, the Appropria-
                                            tions and Armed Services Committees
The Secretaries of the Army and Navy        may want to-
and the CommandanT of the Marine
Corps should establish priorities           -- Inquire why the Army, Navy, and
for developing long-range require-             Marine Corps are taking so long to
ments planning in their enlisted per-          develop such systems.
sonnel career management systems.
                                            -- Consider restricting funds for en-
The Secretaries and the Commandant             listed retention incentives in the
shoulc review how well individuals           Arny, Navy, and Marine Corps if en-
awarded reenlistment bonuses are             listed personnel management systems
screened and the adequacy of the sys-        are not developed and approved by a
tem for recouping unearned bonuses.          specified date.

APPENDIX III                                     APPENDIX III

                              USING NON-HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES
                              AND CATEGORY IV PERSONNEL
                              Department of Defernse

        As of June 30, 1974, almost half a million military
        servicemen were non-high-school graduates and
        Category IV (low-aptitude) personnel. This
        group has been experiencing noticeably higher
        rates of disciplinary actions and administra-
        tive discharges than other personnel.
        GAO found that the military services do not
        have a directed policy for training and using
        non-high-school graduates and Category IV per-
        sonnel. From the data collected, we also
        identified a series of management practices
        that may be contributing to the problems we
        noted. They included

        --alleged recruiting irregularities (see p. 12),

        -- training and assignment promises perceived
           as made but not honored (see p. 10),

        -- underuse of skills and training (see p. 16),
        -- lack of encouragement to participate in ed-
           ucational programs (see p. 18).

       We compared the relationship of these question-
       able management practices to several performance
       indicators and found that

        -- many men were claiming that they spent little
           or no time doing the work for which they were
        -- participation in education programs was low
           compared to the interest expressed in educa-
           tional incentives, and

APPENDIX III                                       APPENDIX III

 -- there were undesirable effects associated with
    underuse and lack of training in the form of
    lower individual performance and retention of
    personnel in the service.

 High rates of disciplinary action and administra-
 tive discharges adversely affect the operational
 capability of the military services. Tney are
 also costly from a monetary as well as human
 standpoint. To improve management of recruit-
 ing, training, use, and education of non-higil-
 school graduates and Category IV personnel, GAO
 recommends that the Secretary of Defense require
 each service Secretary to implement specific
 policies and practices for these personnel.
 Particular consideration should be given to:

 -- Strengthening and monitoring controls aimed
    at insuring compliance with entrance screen-
    ing procedures.
 -- Policies governing the assignment of first-
    term personnel to advanced or on-the-job
    training to insure that servicemen receive
    opportunities for skill training commensur-
    ate with their ability and that such training
    is optimally used.

 -- Educational programs and related policies to
    insure that servicemen with low educational
    attainments are encouraged and provided ap-
    propriate opportunities to increase their

APPENDIX IV                                      APPENDIX IV

                            Department of Defense

        Due principally to the dedicated efforts of
        the recruiting commands, the Department of
        Defense has essentially met the services'
        strength goals without any appreciable drop
        in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first
        full year of operation under the all-
        volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes
        during fiscal year 1975 were even better, but
        were probably helped by depressed economic

        Department of Defense reports show that the
        personnel recruited into the all-volunteer
        force, when compared to their counterparts
        who either volunteered or were inducted into
        the services in a previous year (fiscal year
        1964) and during the Vietnam War (fiscal
        year 1969), were of higher quality by some
        standards and lower by others, with no ap-
        parent preponderance in either direction.

        Using traditional quality measures, GAO
        found a slight decline in the number of
        enlistees both with high school diplomas
        and with scotes above or below average on
        the military aptitude test. There was a
        moderate increase in the number of enlistees
        with average tests scores. GAO also found
        evidence that Defense may overstate quality
        in its reports.  (See pp. 6 to 12.)

        GAO looked at the mental testing practices
        of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine
        Corps. At the beginning of the review, no
        single mental test was acceptable to all
        the services and tne tests used could be

        When GAO brought this matter to the atten-
        tion of Department officials, they reacted
        immediately with a directive specifying a
        common test to be given at Armed Forces
        Examining and Entrance Stations for all

APPENDIX IV                                      APPENDIX IV

        the services. The Armed Forces Examining
        and Entrance Stations were given central
        management control over a single aptitude
        test to be used by all services as of
        January 1, 1976.
        Defense officials also said they are
        exploring ways to r'-vent compromising
        the test. The promptness of this action
        fortified GAO's belief, gathered through-
        out its review, that neither the services
        nor Department of Defense want or will
        condone these practices. Although the
        services are progressing satisfactorily
        toward adopting a common test, they are not
        doing enough to reach an agreement on an
        interpretation of its results.  (See pp. 18
        and 19.)
        The Department of Defense spent about
        $4.7 million during fiscal year 1974 to
        support its high school recruiting and
        testing program, testing about 1.1 million
        students for enlistment eligibility. Of
        307,000 male seniors, only 19C,000 were
        potential enlistees. Only 9,700 were en-
        listed on the basis of the test given them
        in high school. About 33,700 enlistees
        who had been tested in high school appear
        to have been unnecessarily retested at
        enlistment.   (See pp. 23 to 25.)

        In 1973, the Department of Defense estab-
        lished the Armed Forces Vocational Testing
        Group to manage the high school recruiting
        and testing program and to present the
        military services to the educational com-
        munity as a single entity.

        This latter objective has not been fully
        achieved because all the services, except
        the Marine Corps, developed separate pro-
        grams to further their recruiting inter-
        ests with the educational community. These
        programs are similar in many respects but
        are funded and managed independently. Each
        program employs civilians with a background
        in education to improve the service's
        image through better communications with the
        educational community.   (See pp. 26 and 27.)

APPENDIX IV                                       APPENDIX IV

        In order to improve the quality of personnel
        recruited, GAO recommends that the Secretary
        of Defense:

        -- Establish a time frame for the rservices
           to agree on common aptitude or occupa-
           tional areas composed of common compos-
           ites.  (See p. 20.)
        -- Evaluate the high school recrtiting and
           testing program and the services' various
           liason programs with the educational com-
           munity. If these programs are found
           justified, their management should be
           consolidated under one agency, independent
           of service affiliation. (See p. 30.)
       Defense officials agreed with this report and
       its recommenda:ions, except that they are
       not yet satisf.ed that common composites can
       be developed.   hey believe that test results
       must relate to performance in job training
       which is different among the services.

APPENDIX V                                          APPENDIX V

                                 Department of Defense


        Recruiting costs increased from $430 million
        during the last year of the draft, fiscal
        year 1973, to $508.1 million during the
        first year of the All-Volunteer Force, fis-
        cal year 1974.  Second year budgeted, costs
        rose to $511.3 million.

       Although all servi      except the Air Force
       encountered initie    problems recruiting in
       a nondraft environ....nt, the Department of
       Defense has essentially met the services'
       strength goals without any appreciable drop
       in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first
       full yeai of operation under the all-
       volunteer force concept.    Recruiting suc-
       cesses were een better in fiscal year
       1975, but were probably helped by depressed
       economic conditions.

       There is no central focus for monitoring
       quality control, recruiter malpractice,
       and fraudulent enlistment.  As a result,
       many unqualified recruits slip through the
       enlistment process, fail during training,
       and receive early discharges.  Forty-one
       thousand early discharges during fiscal
       year 1974 for conditions which were po-
       tentially identifiable before enlistment
       cost the services about $70 million.

       Although many of these conditions are diffi-
       cult, if not impossible, to detect during
       preenlistment screening, each 1-percent
       reduction can save $700,000.   (See pp. 4
       to 6.)  All the services recognize the dam-
       age such practices can cause and have worked
       hard to prevent them.  However, the
       principal thrust of their efforts have been
       after the fact, that is, identifying those
       instances that do occur and attempting to
       relate them back to the recruiter.

                                                    APPENDIX V

     The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance
     Stations are best suited to perform quality
     control over mental and medical examinations,
     moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. They
     have been precluded from independently moni-
     toring these functions because of subordina-
     tion to the recruiting services, fragmented
     and incomplete procedural controls, noncom-
     patible recruiting boundaries, and service-
     administered mental examinations.  (See pp. 6
     to 12.)
     Inefficiencies caused by distorted workload
     standards, monthly enlistment quota systems,
     varying service-imposed paperwork require-
     ments, and double contract processing of in-
     dividuals who delay entry into the military
     also wasted valuable time and increased exa-
     mining station costs.  (See pp. 16 to 21.)
     GAO estimated that standardizing paperwork
     and eliminating double contract processing
     could save $1.2 million annually.
    The Department of Defense and the Joint
    Service Task Force have acted to develop a
    standard enlistment application and an en-
    listment agreement which would allow all
    possible enlistment transactions to be com-
    pleted on one form and would revise examining
    station workload standards and adjust staff-
    ing levels.  (See p. 24.)
    The Defense Department has issued instruc-
    tions to the services that require a single
    mental test for all the services to be given
    under the control of the examining stations.
    In addition, GAO reviewed the management of
    the services' recruiter forces. Since 1971,
    Defense has increased recruiter staff-years
    by 3,800 and the se:vices have made numerous
    changes to increa£. rcruiter effectiveness.
    The services used increased effectiveness to
    eliminate enlistment incentives and end 2-year
    enlistments instead of reducing recruiter force
    size. GAO believes force size can be reduced
    at least 10 percent at a $16 million annual
    savings. Congress decreased the military per-
    sonnel recruiting budget request for fscal
    year 1976 by about 9 percent.   (See pp. 25
    and 27.)

APPENDIX   V                                        APPENDIX V

       Each service used nonrecruiting personnel
       to help recruiters locate prospects. Army
       studies show that nonrecruiting personnel
       productivity is higher than that of addi-
       tional recruiters.  None of the services,
       however, have conducted controlled field
       testing to explore the potential for using
       nonrecruiting personnel to reduce recruiter
       force size.  (See pp. 33 to 35.)
      GAO learned numerous organizations, military
      and contractor, evaluate recruiting programs.
      The Defense Department and the services per-
      form or contract for evaluations independ-
      ently. The Department of Defense has not
      given the services an overall plan specifying
      programs to evaluate and methods to use. As
      a result, programs GAO examined had not been
      evaluated; received liiited, inconclusive
      evaluation; or were evaluated by more than
      one service.  (See pp. 37 to 44.)
      The Department of Defense has been precluded
      from making many interservice comparisons in
      its evaluations because the information re-
      ceived from the services was not uniform,
      parallel data was difficult to obtain, pro-
      gram costs were not always compiled, and
      recruiting boundaries are not uniform.   (See
      pp. 37 to 44.)
      To help improve the effectiveness and effi-
      cienLy of recruiting, GAO recommends among
      other things that the Secretary of Defense:
      -- Remove the examining stations from opera-
         tional control of the recruiting organiza-
      -- Eliminate those factors precluding the
         examining stations from independently
         monitoring quality, malpractice, and
         fraudulent enlistment.

      -- Adjust staffing levels between the exa-
         mining stations and recruiting services
         to give the examining stations the re-
         sources to perform quality control and
         monitoring functions.

APPENDIX V                                              APPENDIX V

     -- Insure that the examining stations assess
        reliability of revised workload standards.

     -- Insure that the recruiting services change
        the system of monthend enlistment quotas;
        establish common boundaries and a common
        entrance examination; and adhere to time-
        tables to standardize enlistment paperwork
        and eliminate double processing of personnel
        who delay entry into the service.

     -- Adjust recruiting   force    levels.

     -- Establish uniform procedures to monitor re-
        cruiting results and assess recruiting force

     Department of Defense officials' responses to
     GAO's recommendations are as follow:

     -- The examining stations will be removed from
        operational control of the recruiting organ-
        izations in July 1976.

     -- Elimination of those factors precluding
        the examining stations from independently
        monitoring quality, malpractice, and
        fraudulent enlistment.  However; final deci-
        sions on enlistment should be left up to the

     -- Staffing levels will not      be adjusted.   (See
       p. 2.)
     --An industrial management survey will evalu-
       ate the examining stations' capacities and
       precise workload.

     --Agreed to change the system of monthend
       enlistment quotas.

     --Many actions, including the reorganiza-
       tion of the examining stations management
       structure, were considered necessary be-
       fore pursuing the issue of compatible
       boundaries.  Mental testing for the examin-
       ing stations was centralized January 1, 1976.

APPENDIX V                                       APPENDIX V

       --Elimination of double processing of
         personnal under the delayed-entry program
         has not been completely resolved.
       --The Defense Department does not agree that
         recruiter force levels need to be adjusted.
         (See p. 36.)

       Recruiter assistants are effective in help-
       ing the services meet special recruiting ob-
       jectives or seasonal differences.
      While agreeing with Defense's actions, GAO
      believes that the Department f Defense and
      the services need to determine the optimum
      mix of recruiter force and recruiter aides.
      As far as GAO could tell, neither the De-
      fense Department nor the services know what
      the optimum mix is.

APPENDIX VI                                       APPENDIX VI

                                        HOW EFFECTIVE IS IT?

        To support the military services' intensified
        recruiting efforts for the all-volunteer
        force, expenditu'res for advertising increasea
        over the past 4 years from about $7 million
        annually to $96.1 million.
        Several factors have influenced the services'
        recruiting success advertising increased,
        recruiting forces were expanded and improved,
        salaries were raised, and bonuses were added.
        Questions of whether less advertising would
        produce less recruits and whether a different
        approach might produce more for less were un-
        answered. The total number of potential re-
        cruits was not expanded, although the adver-
        tising campaigns were greatly expanded from
        1970 through 1974.

       When the services conduct large advertising
       programs they may be only competing with
       each other for the same potential recruit.
       GAO's review found considerable evidence of
       uncontrolled, duplicative, or inconsistent
       practices that offer considerable potential
       for reducing cost and increasing advertising
       programs' effectiveness.  (See pp. 12 to 22.)
        Each of the services have been left on its
        own as to how the money should be spent.
        Research has shown that the things that at-
        tract youth are common in all services;
        i.e., pay, educational benefits, raining
        opportunities, travel, and the avertising
        of the services, with occasional exceptions,
        of a particular service as perceived by
        young people appears to be the single most
        influential factor in their enlistment de-
        cision.   (See p. 41.)

APPENDIX VI                                          APPENDIX VI

       An analysis of studies done for and by the
       services and the Office of the Secretary of
       Defense showed that attitudes toward the
       military had changed little in a 4-year
       period.  (See p. 32.)

       Although no one really knows how much free
       time is being received, most people agree
       that paid radio and TV will cost the serv-
       ices a large part of the free time now be-
       ing received.  (See p. 10.)
       Recruiting research for the all-volunteer
       force has lacked central direction and
       control. Much research done was duplica-
       tive while, at the same time, needed re-
       search was not being accomplished.

       The Joint Advertising Directors of Re-
       search appeared to have recognized this
       problem early in 1974. Their recommenda-
       tions went largely unheeded, until re-
       cently when the Office of the Secretary
       of Defense recognized the problem and be-
       gan actions to make improvements.  (See
       p. 32.)
       GAO's recommendations to the SecretLry of
       Defense include the following:
       --Defense and the four services should under-
         take research programs that have potential
         for greatly improving the advertising pro-

       -- The Department of Defense should identify
          additional research that is common to the
          entire recruiting effort.

       -- Some mechanism should be established
          so that research performed by the serv-
          ices in common areas is not duplica-
          tive and is made available to those have
          use for it.

       --The services and Defense should begin
         to experiment with various advertising
         approaches such as:  (1) Defense mili-
         tary service advertising, (2) four

APPENDIX VI                                          APPENDIX VI

        service advertising, and (3) controlled
        test advertising to determine the ef-
        fect of various media such as direct
        mail and magazine advertising.

      -- Before pursuing any vpe of paid    road-
         cast advertising, the services should
         determine how much public service an-
         nouncement time is now being obtained,
         how effective this media is, and how
         !.uch of this time could be lost if the
         services went to paid broadcasting.

      -- Defense should examine the policy of using
         all response type media, especially the
         more costly popup cards considering the
         number of leads that can be traced to en-

      GAO also found that all advertising costs
      relating to the overall military recruiting
      compaign are not fully disclosed and re-
      ported by the services consistently.   With-
      out such information, program managers are
      not in a position to carry out their re-
      sponsibilities in formulating effective
      plans and making sound decisions.   (See
      p. 57.)
      The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and
      Reserve Affairs issues instructions and
      guidelines to the services for reporting
      advertising costs that will be helpful to
      Defense agreed with most of GAO's recom-
      mendations. It stated that it had begun
      efforts to improve Defense's ability to
      measure advertising effectiveness which
      included controlled experimerntation in the
      enlistment market.

     In addition, a consolidated market research
     program has been developed to improve DOD"s
     market and advertising research capability
     and eliminate market research redundancy
     within the Department.
     The Congress reduced Defenses' military ad-
     vertising budget request for fiscal year 1976
     by about 35 percent.

APPENDIX VII                                       APPENDIX VII

                                   PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
                                   Department of Defense


        The draft was to end.  Fewer men were expected
        to join the services.  Equal Rights Amendment
        reqirements were expected.

        This was the milieu in 1972 when the Depart-
        ment of Defense started recruiting more women
        and using them in as many jobs as possible
        within combat limitations,  ncluding those
        previously restricted to men.   (See p. 1
        and 2.)

        By December 1974, the Army, Air Force, Navy.
        and Marine Corps had opened essentially all
        noncombat jobs to women.  However, women
        were assigned to only 44 percent of the
        opened jobs in the Marine Corps; 63 percent,
        in the Army; 70 percent, in the Air Force;
        72 percent, in the Navy.  Most women were
        assigned to administrative or medical jobs.
        (See pp. 4 to 8.)

        This was primarily because:

        -- Recruiters failed to tell women about
           occupational options.

        -- Many women preferred administrative or
           medical jobs.

        -- Combat requirements, including specific
           overseas assignments restricted to men
           (restricting most or all jobs to men.)
           (See pp. 9 and 10.)

         Some women were assigned to jobs with re-
         quirements that kept them from working
         effectively.  This included aircraft and
         vehicle maintenance or work on combat
         vehicles.  No standards had been estab-
         lished for measuring women's strength,
         stamina, and other abilities.   (See pp. 14
         to 25.)

APPENDIX VII                                     APPENDIX VII

       The Air Force has recognized this problem
       and has started to develop standards for
       use in assigning both men and women to
       jobs. (See p. 18 to 20.)
       The services have a unique opportunity
       to evaluate the extent to which women are
       interested in, and can perform, jobs
       traditionally restricted to mer. To do
       this, GAO recommends that the ecretary
       of Defense have the services:

        -- Reevaluate all jobs to identify those
           that can really be opened to women, con-
           sidering jobs that (1) must be restricted
           to men because all authorized positions
           are required by combat units or the rota-
           tion base and (2) primarily involve com-
           bat vessels.

        -- Develop physical and other standards for
           jobs where either is a factor in effec-
           tive performance.
        -- Develop standards for measuring the
           strength, stamina, and other requirements
           for jobs where such attribut s are factors
           in effective performance.

        -- Tell women about the jobs for which they
           qualify and encourage them to select those
           previously restricted to men.

        --Require women to meet the same training
          and performance requirements as men in
          the jobs assigned.

        Department of Defense officials agree with
        these recommendations and agree that the op-
        portunities for women in the military should
        be newly evaluated. The Department of De-
        fense has formed a study group to address
        these issues and will keep GAO informed on
        the group's progress.

APPENDIX VIII                                  APPENDIX VIII

AND PERSONNEL, SENATE                Department of the Navy


        Over the past 1e months, the Marine Corps has
        announced a series of changes to correct prob-
        lems in its recruiting and recruit training.
        In July 1976, the Marine Corps placed the
        Recruit Training Depot commanders in charge
        of recruiting as well as training men and women
        with no prior service.  (See p. 3.)

        Since 1974 an increasingly larger percentage
        of high school graduates have been recruited
        by the Marine Corps.  (See  . 4.)

        The Marine Corps, through research, has at-
        tempted to identify individual attributes
        which indicate whether a person can success-
        fully complete recruit training and the first
        enlistment.  In the past little had been done
        to determine how the military environment af-
        fected recruit success and attrition.   (See
        p. 6.)

        During the 6 months following the announcement
        on April 1, 1976, of changes to the recruit-
        training program, GAO did not find any  osi-
        tive trends which could be at ributed solely
        to those changes.   However, it may be too
        early for effects of the changes to be measured
        in such trends.   (See p. 9.)

       Recruit-training procedures, administrative
       duties, and noninstructional time are not
       clearly and measurably related to training
       objectives.  The San Diego Recruit Depot in
       scheduling training did not follow the program
       of instruction directed by headquarters and
       increased the training days from 77 to 79 as
       a result of a misunderstanding, which has
       since been corrected.  The time recruits spend
       at the training depots can be greatly reduced.
       Unncessary, excessive, or delayed training
       should be eliminated.  (See p. 13.)

APPENDIX VIII                                    APPENDIX VIII

          Alternatives other than senaing recruits to
          special platoons for more instruction or re-
          habilitation should be considered. Marine
          Corps officials have questioned the need for
          the special platoons and in some cases dis-
          banded these platoons. The other services
          do not use correctional custody and medical
          rehabilitation platoons in their recruit-
          training rograms.    (See p. 17.)
          The Secretary of Defense should direct the
          Commandant of the Marine Corps to:
          -- Redirect much of the focus of its re-
             search to examine in depth the effects of
             the military and, more specifically, the
             recruit-training environment on attrition.
             (See p. 8.)
          --Establish a recruit-training program more
            fully based on measurable training objectives
            and require the conent and training proce-
            dures to relate to those objectives. Un-
            necessary content should be eliminated and
            the program shortened accordingly.
          -- Require periodic inspections to mtake sure
             that actual training conforms to the pre-
             scribed program.
          --Start processing recruits without delay and
            start platoons into training immediately
            after processing.
          -- Reevaluate the need for continuing each of
             the special training platoons. (See p. 20.)

          The Marine Corps generally agrees with GAO's
          recommendations. However, the Marine Corps
          did not agree that recruit-training proce-
          dures are not clearly and measurably related
          to training objectives.
          The Marine Corps is taking the following
          --Two studies have been started tc examine
            the relationship between attrition and
            organizational/environmental factors.

                                                 APPENDIX VIII

       -- During biennial visits, the Inspector
          General's investigation teams and assigned
          training officers will give special atten-
          tion to the problems noted in this report.
       --Ways are being studied to reduce the
         between the recruits' arrival and their
         first training day.
       -- Marine Corps Headquarters is reviewing
          recently completed study of effectiveness
          the special training branches at Parris     of
          Island. Also, the recruit management
          formation system is now providing ata in-
          ful in determining true costs and value use-
          the special training branch.             of

APPENDIX IX                                           APPENDIX IX

                      PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS



                                              Tenure of office
                                              From          To
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Harold Brown                       Jan.    1977   Present
    Donald H. Rumsfeld                 Nov.    1975   Jan.  1977
    James R. Schlesinger               July    1973   Nov.  1973
    William P. Clements, Jr.
      (acting)                         Apr.    1973   July   1973
    Elliot L. Richardson               Jan.    1973   Apr.   1973
    Charles W. Duncan, Jr.             Jan.    1977   Present
    William P. Clements, r.            Jan.    1973   Jan.  1977
    David P. Taylor (acting)           Feb.  1977     Present
    William K. Brenm                   Sept. 1973     Feb. 1977
    Carl W. Clewlow (acting)           June  1973     Aug.  1973

                      DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

    Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.         Jan.    1977   Present
    Martin R. Hoffman                  Aug.    1975   Jan.  1977
    Aorman R. Augustine (acting)       July    1975   Aug.  1975
    [oward H. Callaway                 May     1973   July 1975
    Paul D. Phillips (acting)          Feb.    1977   Present
    Donald G. Brotemar.                Mar.    1975   Feb.  1977
    M. David Lowe                      Feb.    1974   Jan.  1975
    Carl S. Wallace                    Mar.    1973   Jan.  1974
    Gen.   Bernard W. Rogers           Oct.  1976     Present
    Gen.   Fred C. Weyland             Sept. 1971     Oct.  1976
    Gen.   Creighton W. Abrams         Oct.  1972     Sept. 1974

APPENDIX IX                                              APPENDIX IX

                                              Tenure     f of'ice
                                              From             To

                     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

    W. Graham Clayton, Jr.             Feb.     1977     Present
    J. William Middendorf II           Apr.     1974     Jan.  1977
    John W. Warner                     May      1972     Apr.  1974

    Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.            Sept. 1973        Present
    James E. Johnson                   June  1971        Sept. 1973

    Adm. James L. Holloway III         July     1974     Present
    Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.          July     1970     July  1974

    Gen. Louis H. Wilson               July     1975     Present
    Gen. Robert G. Cushman, Jr.        Jan.     1972     June  1975


    Thomas C. Reed                     Jan.     1976     Present
    Jam-s W. Plummer (acting)          Nov.     1975     Jan.  1976
    John L. McLucas                    May      1973     Nov.  1975
    Robert C. Seaman, Jr.              Jan.     1969     May   1973

    Jaines P. Goode (acting)           Jan.     1977     Present
    David P. Taylor                    June     1974     Jan.  1977
    James P. Goode (acting)            June     1973     June  1974

    Gen.   David Jones                 Aug.     i9 7 4   Present
    Gen.   George J. Brown             Aug.     19T3     July  1974
    Gen.   John D. Ryan                Aug.     1969     July  1973