DOCUMENT FESUME 03681 - B2794034) Recrui.ting for the All-Volunteer Force: A Summary of Costs and Achievements. FPCD-77-60; B-157371. October 4, 1977. 19 pp. + 9 appendices (29 pp.). Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by H. L. Krieger, Director, Federal Personnel and Compensation Div. Issue Area: Personnel Management and Compensation (300); Personnel Management and Cmpensation. All Volunteer Force Needs (303). Contact: Federal Personnel and Compensation Div. Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense - Military (except procurement contracts) (051). Organizaticn Concerned: Department of the Navy; Department of the Army; Department of the Air Force. Congre3sional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services; Senate Committee on Armed Services. Authority: Military Service Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-129; P.L. 93-64). Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-277). Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1974. Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization ,c.. Since the all-volunteer force began, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have substantially recruited the quantity and quality of personnel needed. Recruiting shortfalls from July 1 through December 31, 1976, aroused some concern for the level of recruiting that might be experienced over the next several years; however, the 6-month period from January through June 1977 showed improvement. Findings/Conclusions: DOD and the military services have expanded the recruiting program to accommodate the vclunteer force concept. More than 1,17C,500 people have been recruited into the all-volunteer force through fiscal year (FY) 1976, at a cost of $1.48 billion. By the end of 1978, approximately 1,975,000 people will have been recruited at a 5-year recruiting program cost of about $2.66 billion. The management and operation of the recruiting program--consisting of the recruiting staff, advertising, enlistment bonuses, and recruit examining and processing--remain the key elements of recruiting success. The size and composition of the recruiting forces is believed to be closely related to success in meeting quantity and quality goals. or FY 1978, the recruiting forces will cost approximately $378.4 million; advertising will cost about $105.6 million. The enlistment bonus program has increased from $43 million during FY 1974 to a proposed $74.5 million for 1978. (Author/SW) co o /n ~~ UNITED STA TES ,'"i GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Recruiting ForThe All-Volunteer Force: A Summary Of Costs And Achievements Up to now the Department of Defense and the military services have largely met their goals for quar.:;ty and quality in recruits. Various changes in recruiting management and operation I-ave been implemented over the last few years. T'he Department and the services view manyof these as ground breaking activity leading to further improvements. qSeveral major alternatives have been proposed to solve recruiting difficulties. Many appear worthy of further study. FPCD-77-60 OCTOBER 4, 1977 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548 PILDRAL PZRSOC.YEL AND COMPINATION DIVISION B-157371 The Honorable The Secretary of Defense Dear Mr. Secretary: We have completed an overview of selected military re- cruiting activities. Because of the growing concern for the future of the all-volunteer force (AVF), w summarized and provided a more current view on primary areas of interest that were addressed in three previous reports. These reports are: "An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits" FPCD-75-170, Feb. 27, 1976), "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting" (FPCL-75-169, Mar. 5, 1976), and "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" (FPCD-76-168, Mar. 29, 1976). As you are aware, due to the new level of concern for AVF's future, various groups, including DOD, have proposed many options and alternatives during the past year. Some of these proposals are associated with the management and operation of the recruiting program; others address some of the roader staffing policy questions and issues. Despite the potential impact many of these proposals would have on the sustainability of the AVF concept, we nevertheless believe: that efforts to marimize the efficiency and effectiveness of the recruiting program should be con- tinued. We had the opportunity to have representatives of the Accession and Retention 3ranch, Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), informally review the draft of this report to assure the correctness of the in- formation presented. We did not attempt to verify the ac- curacy of the statistics and dollar figures obtained from various DOD reports, documents, or discussions with DOD personnel. We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the B-157371 House Committee on Government Operations; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Assistant Secre- tary of Defense (Comptroller). We appreciate the courtesy extended to us by your Department and service fficlals during this effort. Sincerely yours, /it I H. L. Krieger Director 2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE RECRUITING FOR THE ALL- REPORT TO THE VOLUNTEER FORCE: A SUMMARY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF COSTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS DIGEST Since the all-volunteer force b,.~gan, the Department of Defense and the services have substantially recruited the quantity and quality of personnel needed. Recruit- ing shortfalls from July 1 through Decem- ber 31, 1 9 7 6 r aroused some concern for the level of recruiting that might be experienced over the next several years; however, the 6-month period from January through June 1977 showed improvement. (See p 5.) The military forces have substantially met their quality recruiting goals (measured by the percentage of high school graduates and mental category). However, a basic question remains unanswered: What level of quality do the services need to effi- ciently match military skills and occupa- tions? (See p. 8.) Defense and the services have expanded the recruiting program to accommodate the volun- teer force concept. More than 1,170,500 people have been recruited into the all- volunteer frce through fiscal year 1976, costing $1.48 billion. By the end of 1978, approximately 1,975,000 people will have been recruited at a 5-year recruit- ing program cost of about $2.66 billion. (See . 2.) The management and operation of the re- cruiting program--consisting of the recruiting staff, advertising, enlist- ment bonuses, and recruit examining and processing--remain the key elements of recruiting success. The recruiting staff is one of the most significant and costly components of the recruiting program. Defense and the FPCD-77-60 Ta M. Upon removal, the rport co should be noted hereon. i services believe the size and composition of their recruiting forces is closely re- lated to their success in meeting quantity and quality goals. For fiscal year 1978, the recruiting forces will cost approxi- mately $378.4 million. Due to the importance and cost of this staff, Defense believes that changes to its size and composition should be based on a long-term assessment of require- ments and not the short-term market outlook. (See pp. 10 and 11.) Advertising hs become the second most costly aspect of the program and is one of the most difficult to assess and justify. For fiscal year 1978, the program will cost about $105.6 million. Defense and the services have recognized the need to determine how advertising affects total recruiting and have taken steps to improve the direction and effectiveness of advertising. Cost and evaluation warrant continued and secial at- tention. (See pp. 12 to 15.) Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Sta- tions have canged their management and organization to include: -- Establishing a new joint command, Military Enlistment Processing Command on July 1, 1976, which assumed control of entrance testing and processing. -- Developirig and using a common aptitude test in Jnuary 1976 to determine eli- gibility for service. -- Developing and using standardized en- listment forms, including a multipur- pose military enlistment agreement. (See pp. 16 and 17.) The enlistment bonus program has increased from $43 million during fiscal year 1974 to a proposed $74.5 million for 1978. The success of the all-volunteer force de- pends largely on the efficiency and effec- tiveness of the management of the recruit- ing program. Nevertheless meeting recruiting ii requirements is also dependent upon driving policies and requirements other which pact heavily on the size and complexity im- the recruiting task. of (See p. 19.) Prior GAO reports have addressed particular aspects of recruiting management tions. Appendixes I through VIII ad opera- the digests of major reports and rovide as general reference to several may be used tioned in this report. issues men- Contents Page DIGEST i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 ACHIEVEMENT OF QUANTITY OBJECTIVES AND QUALITY GOALS 4 Quantity objectives and achievements 4 Recruit quality 5 High school graduate recruiting goals and achievements 5 Recruiting results by mental categories 7 3 MANAGEMENT OF RECRUITING PROGRAM COMPONENTS 10 Recruiting forces 10 Advertising for recruiting 12 Enlistment bonuses 1.5 Processing and screening new recruits 16 4 SUMMARY 18 APPENDIX I Digest--Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force, B-177952 (May 2, 1973) 20 II Digest--Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration, B-160096 (July 5, 1974) 25 III Digest--Problems Resulting from Manage- ment Practices, Training, and Using Non-High School Graduates and Category IV Personnel, FPCD-76-24 (Jan. 12, 1976) 29 IV Digest--An Assessment of All-Volunteer Force Recruits, FPCD-75-170 (Feb. 27, 1976) 31 V Digest--Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting, FPCD-75-169 (Mar. 5, 1976) 34 APPENDIX Page VI Digest--Advertising or Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It? FPCD-76-168 (Mar. 29, 1976) 39 VII Digest--Job Opportu ities for Women in the Military: Progress and Problems, FPCD-7 -26 (May 11, 1976) 42 v1II Digest--Marine Corps Recruiting and Recruit Training: Policies and Practices, FPCD-77-18 (Feb. 10, 1977) 44 IX Principal officials responsible for administering activities discussed in this report 47 ABBREVIATIONS AFEES Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations AVF all-volunteer force DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Except for brief periods cf time, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on a draft system for more than 30 years to obtain men for the Armed Forces. However, a return to n all--volunteer force (AVF) began in March 1969 with plans to rely entirely on volunteers after July 1, 1973. Following is a cwnology of events leading to the current AV'F. -- In March 1969 the President appointed a commission to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating the dL ft. -- In November 1969 the President, with congressional approval, reduced the period of prime draft vulner- ability from 7 years to 1 year and provided draft k selection by lottery. -- In ebruary 1970 the Presidential Commission concluded that the Nation's interest would be better sved by an AVF supported by an effective standby draft and that the first step was to remove the inequity in the pay of those serving their first terms in the Armed Forces. -- In October 1970 the Secretary of Defense directed the services to move toward an AVF by July 1, 1973. -- In January 1973 the President proposed that induc- tion authority be extended to July 1, 1973, and said that every endeavor would be made to eliminate the draft by that time. -- In September 1971, after extensive debate, the Congress extended induction authority to July 1, 1973, and passed legislation on pay and benefits for an AVF. ---In August 1:972 the Secretary of Defense reported to the President and the Congress that DOD was within reach of achieving an AVF composed of 2.3 million active-duty and 1 million reserve forces. -- In January 1973 the Secretary of Defense announced that the draft had ended for all but doctors and dentists. -- On March 21, 1973, the Secretary of Defense announced that the administration would not ask for renewal of the induction authority. During this period DOD and the services began to expand their draft-supported recruiting effort into a higher cost network of recruiting organizations and associated programs. The true test of the services' ability to operate under AVF began on July 1, 1973. In its first 3 years of operation, about 1,170,500 persons had been recruited under AVF at a cost of about $1.48 billion. More than 804,500 persons are planned to be recruited in fiscal years 1977 and 1978. For the 5-year period ending with fiscal year 1978, about 1,975,000 per- sons are expected to be recruited at approximately $2.66 billion. Many rganizations, including DOD and the services, have studied and analyzed various AVF activities, including the expanded recruiting effort. Some of the recent studies are: -- Achievinq Americ's Goals: National Service or the All Volunteer Force, Dr. Wiliiam R. King, Univer-sty of Pittsburgh, December 1976. -- The All Volunteer Force, Current Status and Prospects, Department of Defense, December 1976. -- Costs of Defense Manpower: Issues for 1977 (Budget Issue Paper), Congressional Budget Offtce, Congress of the U.S., January 1977, -- Manpower for the Military - Draft or Volunteer?, A Special Report, Assoclia-ion of the United States Army, April 1977. -- Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, Report to the President and the Congress,Tefense Manpower Commission, April 1976. As a result of many of these studies, basic questions continue to be raised, such as: --Will the services be able to recruit the required quantity and quality of volunteers and at what cost? 2 -- What options or alternatives should be considered to improve recruiting? Recruiting for AVF has created a growing level of con- gressional and public concern as to whether AVF will remain an effective and economically viable policy over the next several years. Some issues being discussed are: -- Further expansion and increased financial support to the principal recruiting program components, includ- ing the recruiting forces, advertising, and enlist- ment incentives. --The level of efficiency and effectiveness of DOD and the services' management and operation of a higher cost and complex recruiting program effort. -- The relationship of quantitative and qualitative military staffing needs with the availability of manpower. In addition, military policy questions are being discussed regarding retention of military enlisted personnel and the greater use of women, and civilians in noncombat-related occupational categories. The several options and alternatives available t DOD and the services will require their special attention over the next several years. Although these options and alterna- tives are not new to DOD, they have again become primary topics of interest and study and will most likely be topics of discussion during future congressional oversight and ap- propriation hearings. The outcome of these discussions will have a major bearing on whether AVF, as presently established and operated, will remain the method to meet our military staffing needs. We have also issued a series of reports on various recruiting and recruiting-related aspects of AVF. Our first report, "Problems in Meeting Military Manpower Needs in the All-Volunteer Force," B-177952, May 2, 1973 (see app. I) identified some of the significant topics, problem areas, and pc:ential solutions known to DOD and the services. Some later reports have addressed particular aspects of recruiting manage- ment and operations. Appendixes I through VIII provide the digests of major reports and may be used as general reference to several issues mentioned in this report. 3 CHAPTER 2 ACHIEVEMENT OF QUANTITY OBJECTIVES AND QUALITY GOALS QUANTITY OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS The all-volunteer force recruiting from fiscal years 1974 through 1976r as reported by DOD, indicates that total recruiting objectives have been met --96 percent in fiscal year 1974 (the first year of the AVF program), -- 102 percent in fiscal year 1975, and -- 100 percent in fiscal year 1976. The services' quantity achievements as a percentage of objective follows: Service 1974 1975 1976 Army 94 102 100 Navy 103 101 100 Marine Corps 85 101 100 Air Force 101 102 101 Total 96 102 100 An indication of a possible change in recruiting achieve- ment surfaced on July 1 through December 31, 1976. With the exception of the Air Force, the services fell short of their nonprior recruiting objectives as follow: Percent of Objective Actual Difference objective Army 95,500 90,000 -5,500 94 Navy 55,600 53,700 -1,900 97 Marine Corps 26,200 23,800 -2,400 91 Total 177,300 167,500 -9,800 95 During recent congressional testimony, Defense officials said that recruiting may become increasingly challenging in the coming years. The testimony indicated that there is the potential for growing quantity shortfalls and lower 4 recruit quality coupled with requests for increased funding levels for recruiting activities. However, recent statistics, reported by DOD, on total quantity achievement for January to June 1977 for all ac- cessions indicate that the shortfall experience of the tran- sition quarter and the first quarter of 1977 has been some- what turned around. The following table shows this achieve- ment. in addition, it should be noted that this is tradi- tionaily the slow recruiting period of the year. Ser'ice Objective Actual Percent Army 91,000 90,000 98.8 Navy 49,800 48,000 96.4 Marine Corps 22,400 21,600 96.4 Air Force 37,900 37,900 100.0 Total 201,100 197,500 98 ? The total recruiting objective for fiscal year 1977 is about 410,400: for fiscal year 1978, about 394,100, or 16,300 fewer nonprior service personnel or a reduction of about 4 percent compared to fiscal year 1977. The fiscal year 1978 recruiting objective is also the lowest in AVF history since fiesal year 1974. RECRUIT QUALITY Categorization of mental ability and educational achieve- ment are the two most widely used measures of recruit quality. The services use the term "goals" rather than "requirements" because to establish requirements would necessitate precise and extensive analyses of the quality prerequisites for every military skill and occupation. High school graduate recruiting goals and achievements According to DOD the high school diploma is an indicator of an individual's motivation and discipline. Nonhigh school graduates (those who do not possess a high school diploma or the equivalent) tend to have more discipline problems, higher retraining rates, and a higher percentage of early discharges. We have made some of these observations in our report, "Prob- lems Resulting from Management Practices in Recruiting, Traininc and Using Non-High School Graduates and Category IV Personnel," FPCD-76-24, January 12, 1976. (See app. III.) 5 In the DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 19.4, the Congress imposed restrictions on enlisting nonhigh scLool graduates and mental category IV recruits. The act reads: "None of the funds in this Act shall be available for the enlistment or pay of non-prior service personnel during fiscal year 1974 when the en- listmelit will cause the percentage of non-high school graduate enlistments of the services con- cerned to exceed 45 per centum or the mental category IV enlistments t exceed 18 per centum of the total non-prior service enlistments for the entire fiscal year." The Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act, approved June 8, 174, removed the restriction on en-- listment of nonhigh school raduates because the Army and Marine Corps anticipated roblems in meeting these quality goals. The 1975 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act per- mitted the services to use high school graduation as an enlistment criterion, but did not prohibit enlisting non- graduates to meet strength goals. The 18-percent restric- ticn on enlistment of mental category IV personnel remained in effect. Independently, the services have established desired quality goals to be achieved by their recruiting programs for a fiscal year. The Air Force has not set numerical goals nor felt that they were needed in their recruiting program. In fiscal year 1974, the first year of AVF, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps set desired goals for recruiting high school graduates. They were expressed as a percentage of the total nonprior service recruiting objective as follows: High school graduates military service Service goals Army 70 Navy 80 Marine orps 65 To provide perspective on the achievement of the desired goals for high schol graduate recruitment, we compared the aboJe with -- fiscal year 1964, which was a pre-Vietnam draft year; 6 -- fiscal year 1969, a peak Vietnam war draft year; and -- fiscal year 1974 throuqh March 31, 1977. The following table shows this achievement: Percentage of High School Graduate Recruitment Fiscal years Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Draft 1964 67 58 61 84 1969 62 80 55 94 AVF 1974 Actual experience 56 70 54 92 1975 Actual experience 66 75 59 91 1976 Actual experience 64 84 67 95 1977 transition quarter Actual experience 56 75 71 87 1977 Actual experience: October-December 50 72 63 83 January-March 47 69 59 88 It should be noted that the 1974 congressional stipulation of 55 percent high school graduates has been met or exceeded with the exceptions of the -- Marine Corps in fiscal year 1974 by 1 percent and -- Army in the first half of fiscal year 1977. Pecruiting results bymental categories Another of the most used and emphasized quality standards is the mental category derived from selection and classification tests given all potential ecruits. The scores from these tests are used to classify potential recruits into mental category designations. On the basis of their percentile scores, service ap- olicants are divided into five mental categories, I through 7 V, in order of decreasing scores. Category III is average. Test scores n mental category V disqualify an individual for service induction. The Congress imposed an 18-percent restriction on enlistment of category IV personnel for fiscal year 1974. The following table compares that restriction to the actual experience of previous and following fiscal years. Percentage of jcate goy_personnel iarine Air Army Navy Corps Force Historical experience FY 1964 (Pre-Vietnam draft year) 19.0 10.0 9.2 4.3 FY 1969 (Peak Vietnam draft year) 27.5 19.2 25.7 17.7 Legislative restriction of fiscal year 1974 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 Actual Experience FY 1974 17.8 3.5 7.5 .6 FY 1975 10.0 4.8 3.5 .4 FY 1976 7.4 4,1 2.9 .5 FY 1377 October-December 6.6 2.4 3.8 .1 January-March 7.0 2.0 4.0 - Two facts are noteworthy: -- The percentage of category IV personnel recruited annually has generally dropped &nd the congressional limitation of fiscal year 1974 has not been exceeded. -- The percentage of category IV persornel recruited in any AVF year is much lower than either the pre- Vietnam draft year of 1964 or the peak-Vietnam draft year of 1969. With this progressive decline in the number of category IV personnel over the years, there has also been a compensating increase in the average and higher mental categories. To date, the services appear to have generally been able to meet their quality goals. The basic question re- mains, however, as to the appropriate level of quality the services actually need, as it relates to specific skills and occupations. Lacking that information quality 8 goals cannot be dealt with effectively as a criteria for either establishing recruiting objectives or judging re- cruiting results. We addressed aspects of quantity and quality achieve- ment in our report, "An Assessment cf All-Volunteer Force Recruits," FPCD-75-170, February 27, 1976. (See app. IV.) 9 CHAPTER 3 MANAGEMENT OF RECRUITING PROGRAM COMPONENTS As discussed in chapter 1, resources provided the Active Forces' recruiting program have been substantial. These re- sources are applied to four major program components: 1. Costs of the recruiters and their support. 2. Advertising costs. 3. Enlistment bonuses paid to cert n recruits. 4. Costs of processing a recruit through the re- quired entrance testing and examinations. The following table sets forth these costs for fiscal years 1974 through 1978. Actual Estimated 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 (millions)- Recruiter force and support $278.6 $328.0 $286.1 $314.6 $378.4 Advertising 96.1 102.1 67.3 89.2 105.6 Enlistment bonuses 43.0 58.8 68.5 65.5 74.5 Processing 36.3 44.3 49.5 61.8 62.2 Total $454.0 $533.2 $471.4 $531.1 $620.7 RECRUITING FORCES Among the major recruiting program components, the services' recruiting forces are the most costly. The re- cruiting foices are to (1,0 find and sell potenltial recruits on the military way of life and (2) help determine whether potential recruits are eligible to enlist. DOD and the services believe a close relationship exists between the size of service recruiter forces and the level of success in meeting recruiting quantity objectives and cuality goals. We discussed aspects of recruiting forces in our report, 10 "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169, March 5, 1976. (See app. V.) DOD and the services have annually invested considerable resources in staffing recruiting forces. The following table shows investments for fiscal years 1974 through 1978. Recruiting Force Size and Annual Cost Staff- ears -§74 .1975 197-b 1977 19798 (note a)(note b)(note b)(note c)(note d) Personnel category: Production recruiters - 11,927 10,920 11,588 12,198 Recruiter aides - 515 312 1,111 1,646 Military support - 8,019 6,846 5,770 6,202 Civilian support - 2,163 2,146 2,127 2,111 Total 22,763 22,624 20,224 20,596 22,157 Cost (mil- lions) $278.6 $328.0 $286.-. $314.6 $378.4 a/Distribution by personnel category not available for FY 1974. b/Actual staff-years expended. c/Estimated. d/Budgeted request. DOD and service officials agree that precise evaluations and determinations of recruiter force size and composition are difficult t make and must be viewed in perspective with other components and appropriately adjusted with changes in the recruit market. Because of the importance and cost placed on this particular component, DOD believes that changes to the recruiter force structure should be based on long-term assessments of recruiting requirements and not on short-term market outlook. U1 ADVERTISING FOR RECRUITING The advertising program is the second most costly re- cruiting program component and is considered to be one of the more complex to evaluate and justify. Substantial re- sources have been provided for the advertising effort. In fiscal year 1973, the last year of the draft, advertis- ing costs were $68.8 million; in fiscal years 1974 and 1975, $96.1 and $102.1 million, respectively. For fiscal year 1976 DOD requested an advertising budget of $104 million; however, as a result of congres- sional review, the request was cut by 35 percent, establish- ing the funding level at $67.3 million. The Congress, at that time, felt that as the services gained several years experience in recruiting for AVF and as economic conditions fostered enlistments, such a reduction in advertising fund- ing was appropriate. The program level for fiscal year 1977 is $89.2 million. DOD has requested $105.6 million for fiscal year 1978. According to DOD and the services, the recruit advertis- ing objectives are to -- create an awareness of and provide information on the service as a potential post-high school job opportunity, -- improve the attitudes of youth toward the services and create a favorable recruiting environment, and -- generate prospect leads thru advertising response mechanisms. To achieve these objectives DOD and the services employ ad- vertising agencies and market research groups to advise and help them identify the potential recruit market and design the appropriate methods and materials for advertising cam- paigns. The advertising media being used include outdoor billboards, posters, pamphlets, promotion items, public service and paid radio and television, and newspapers and magazines. We have previously questioned whether the extent of the advertising program and costs were necessary to meet recruit- ing quantity objectives and quality goals. Essentially, this question was related to our concern about the dimension of the actual contribution advertising made to the success of the recruiting effort. From a management efficiency stand- point, we also found evidence of duplicative or inconsistent 12 practices among the services that offered potential for reducing cost and increasing the potential effectiveness of the advertising program. These topics were addressed in our report, "Advertising For Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?," FPCD-76-168, March 29, 1976. (See app. VI.) These anagement and operational problems have generally resulted from the highly independent manner in which each service has conducted its advertising business, regardless of basic commonality of the program. According to service officials, the rationale behind this approach is the unique- ness of each service and the need to tailor and direct their own special recruiting message. However, according to DOD and service sources, research hows that the items that attract youth to the services are relatively common to each service and have changed very little over the last several years; that is, pay, educational benefits, training opportunities, and travel. The recruiting messages that have been presented by each of the services have contained these basic messages. DOD's attitude and awareness studies, made as recently as the fall of 1976, have pointed out that the way youths per- ceive the services can be an important factor on enlistments. Research has also pointed out that the services' images have not changed much in recent years. In effect, the percent of youths likely to join the service and the service they are most likely to oin has not changed. This is important be- cause a major objective of advertising is to improve the youth's attitudes and erceptions of military service. In our March 1976 report, we recommended that DOD and the services -- devise methods to measure the effectiveness of the various types of advertising being used in recruit advertising and --improve their interservice communication, coordina- tion, and exchange of information on market research and review and analyze types and methods of adver- tising being employed to avoid duplication or un- r-essary research or advertising efforts. DOD and the services knew of many of the problem areas noted in our report and have been taking actions for im- provement. They have recognized the need to initiate ac- tions to better assess the impact advertising has on the total recruiting effort and have initiated several actions to improve the direction and effectiveness of advertising. 13 Among some of the specific areas of che advertising program in which DOD has taken or plans to cake action include: -- Establishing an interservice ommittee, Joint Advertising Directors or ecruiting, which provides an informal means for service representatives to discuss mutual advertising problems and a means for coordinating service advertising activities. -- resigning and implementing a new semiannual youth awareness and tracking study which will also provide advertising effectiveness tracking information. -- Developing a joint market research program and has recent3y completed a test to measure the effective- ness of pa4 d radio advertising. -- Establishing the Joint Market Analysis and Research Committee to conduct interserice discussion and improve the level of coordination and planning for advertising effectiveness analysis. -- Establishing the Joint Education Liaison Directors of Recruiting to improve coordination with educa- tional communities. DOD has also compieted an evaluation of paid broadcast advertising and the impact it would have on public service advertising. The evaluation showed the market testing of paid radio had no systematic effect on the level of public service advertising support. The test also indicated that service advertising was not reaching the target audience. The four services, working within their budgets have begun paid radio and television advertising. Our previous analysis of the advertising cost data provided by the services showed that what each service in- cluded as advertising costs varied significantly. It seemed that when the services were requested to submit ad- vertising cost data to DOD or the Congress, each service used its own discretion in selecting the format and in determining what costs should or should not be included. Consistent comprehensive reporting is required so that the Congress can be informed, but that program managers also are in a good position to formulate effective plans and make sound decisions. DOD has informed us that they have developed and tested a format for the uniform reporting of services' advertising costs. 14 Although numerous efforts have been initiated to better manage the advertising programs, its high cost and the dif- ficulty in evaluating its effectiveness warrant continued and special attention. The basis question that still remains unanswered is how many advertising dollars are needed to at- tract the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet service accession goals. ENLISTMENT BONUSES The Military Service Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-129) permitted the payment of enlistment bonuses to persons enlisting in combat arms elements of the armed services for 3 or more years. Public Law 93-64 extended this bonus authority to June 30, 1974. The Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-277) removed the limitation on bonuses for the combat arms elements only and permitted payments to per- sonnel on a selected basis in order to fill critical and shortage skills. The authority for these payments expires September 30, 1978. T': enlistment bonus, limited to $3,000, is to increase the number of initial enlistments in critical and shortage skills. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to determine critical skills. Currently, only the Army and Marine Corps pay enlistment bonuses in both combat arms and highly technical skills. To be eligible for the bonus, an individual must meet the following requirements: --Be a high school graduate or have successfully completed the General Educational Development program. In January 1975 the Army announced that effective June 1, 1976, Fersonnel certified by the program would no longer be eligible for the en- listment bonus. --Be classified as mental category group I, II, or III. -- Be qualified and serve in a bonus skill for at least 4 years. Payment begins upon successful completion of bonus skill training. 15 From fiscal years 1974 through 1976 the services awarded 72,473 bonuses at an estimated $170.3 million. Projected bonuses and costs through fiscal year 1978 total an additional 61,141 at an estimated $140 million. The annual number of bonuses and costs are shown below: Fiscal years 1977 1978 1974 1975 1976 (note a) (note b) Costs (mil- lions) $43.0 $58.8 $68.5 $65.5 $74.5 Number of payments 18,449 24,407 29,626 29,957 31,184 Average pay- ment 2,331 2,409 2,314 2,187 2,389 a/Estimated (includes transition quarter costs). b/Budgeted request. PROCESSING AND SCREENING NEW RECRUITS Determining mental, moral, and medical eligibility of new recruits, and processing them into individual services according to individual service standards is the responsi- bility of the Armed Forces Entrance art Examination Stations (AFEES). AFEES is also responsible for quality control over enlistment paperwork. Although the total annual costs of the recruit processing and screening component is less than the other recruiting pro- gram components, it is estimated that the cumulative cost for fiscal years 1974 thru 1978 budget request is about $257 mil- lion. Our previous report about these activities, "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169, March 5, 1976 (see app. V), revealed numerous administrative and operational problem areas which contributed t increased costs not only associated with processing and screening but also recruiting and training. We reported that due to the subordinated level of AFEES to the recruiting commands and the fragmented and incomplete controls over service-administered mental examinations and 16 associated operational inefficiencies, AFEES had been ham- pered from acting as an effective operating component of the total recruiting program. Although of equal importance, AFEES were emphasizing examining and processing recruits into the military with little attention given to quality control. We believed that as a result, more recruits not meeting recruit standards were completing the enlistment process. Some actions DOD and the services have taken to improve the processing and screening of recruits are: -- DOD has removed enlistment testing and processing fcr all nonprior service applicants from recruiting and placed the function under AFEES as of January 1, 1976. At the same time, the Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group was transferred to the Army from the Air Force as part of the centralization of entrance testing. -- On July 1, 1976, a new joint command, Military Enlist- ment Processing Command assumed control of entrance testing and processing. While operationally in- dependent, the commanding general of the Army re- cruiting command will also command the Military En- listment Processing Command. -- In January 1976 the services implemented a common aptitude tes.--Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery--to determine nonprior service applicants eligibility to serve. Although the services are now using the same test, the minimum acceptable scores vary. -- The services are taking steps to identify military Jobs common to all services to facilitate agreement on common aptitude areas. DOD has stated that common composites must be based upon validation data anu will be useful only if they are efficient for pre- dicting performance for all services in the appro- priate service occupations. Some measure of the feasibility of common composites will be possible in mid-1977. 'DOD will oversee the data collections and investigate the feasibility of common composites. -- DOD has developed a multipurpose enlistment agreement form which allows all enlistment transactions to be completed on one form. In addition, DOD and the services have either eliminated or replaced numerous recruiting and enlistment paperwork. 17 CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY DOD and the services have generally been recruiting sufficient quantity and quality successful in the Active Forces to meet their goals. Much of personnel for has been the result of modifying and expandingof this success the scope of recruiting programs of the draft era, to a more complex and higher cost network of recruiting organizations activities. and DOD and the services have changed and improved management of the recruiting program. Review their tion of the recruiting program, with emphasis and evalua- agement, direction, and control, is a basic on its man- recruiting success is to continue and costs necessity if are to be con- strained to reasonable levels. During appropriations hearings, DOD officials the Congress of the need for stronger centralized advised oversight and direction of the total recruiting management that a first step toward this goal is commonality effort and the services recruiting program components between these components as interrelated and to address parts of a total recruit- ing system. Managements decisions to establish uniformity and coordination in recruit testing greater essing is a major step in this direction. and proc- DOD and the services are also aware of the complexities in evaluating recruiting program components for making sound management decisions for and the necessity establishing and adjusting these components. DOD and service that they have not mastered the management officials dmit and evaluative techniques for making changes and adjustments mix, but admit they are learning to manage to the program effort under the volunteer concept, and that the recruiting phasis must be given to understanding the special em- effects of chang- ing the program mix. Also, many of the management operational improvements which have been taken an. .ast several years are viewed as ground breaking during the providing the basis for further refinements ctivity, in recruiting program management and evaluation. DOD and the services should be encouraged to aggressively seek prove management capability. solutions to im- It should also be pointed out, however, ments on the management and direction of the that improve- cruiting program components may not be the principal re- total solution to 18 the problem o meeting military personnel strength require- ments. Some of the other related policies and practices could be modified to reduce the burden on the recruiting system. -- Reevaluation of physical and mental enlistment eli- gibility standards based more specifically n mili- tary occupational requirements. -- Reevaluation of policies concerning the recruitment and use of women in as many occupational areas as possible. ("Job Opportunities for Women in the Military: Progress and Problems," FPCD-76-26, May 11, 1976 (see app. VII).) -- Adjustments to policies concerning the use of civilian personnel in occupational areas not specifically need- ing military personnel as well as the greater use of private contract services where operationally and economically feasible. -- Improvements to retention/reenlistment management with concentration on hard to fill occupational areas, and the redirection (retaining) of young career personnel to shortage areas. ("Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration," B-160096, July 5, 1974 (see app. II).) -- Establishing a wider variety of enlistment and reenlistment periods and options. -- Improving training capabilities and efficiency which have the impact of reducing enlistment requirements. ("Marine Corps Recruiting and Recruit Training: Policies and Practices," FPCD-77-18, February 10, 1977 (see app. VIII).) -- Improving the process and methodologies, including enlisted career profile planning, used to determine enlisted personnel requirements. The success of the all-volunteer force depends largely on the efficiency and effectiveness of managing the recruiting pro- gram. Nevertheless, meeting recruiting requirements is also dependent upon other driving policies and requirements which impact heavily upon the size and complexity of the recruit- ing task. 19 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I CLPTROLLER GENERAL'S PROBLEMS IN MEETING MIli TARY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS MANPOWER NEEDS IN HE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE Department of Defense B-177952 GYTHE ST WHY THE STUDY WAS MADE FINDINGS AND CON'CLUSIONS As July 1, 1973, draws near, the Background Congress is faced, essentially, with three choices in legislating the In October 1966 the President future metho. for obtaining men and started actioa.s to move toward the women to serve in this country's AVF. Armed orces. In January 1971 he proposed that -Let the present draft authority the Congress extend induction au- expire and rely entirely on thority to July 1, 1973, but in- volunteers. dicated that every effort would be made to eliminate the use of the --Extend the present system of in- draft by that time. ducting men into the service. In March 1973 the Secretary of De- --Rely on an all-volunteer force fense announced that the Administra- (AVF), but enact some orm of tion would not ask for renewal of standby draft authority for the the induction authority. President to use in case of an emergency or the development of This has been mnade possible by manpower shortages that cannot be met through voluntary methods. --significant improvement in first-term pay, In this report GAO has sought answers to some of the major issues --improved conditions of service associated with putting the vol- life, unteer system into operation. --training and assignment options, GAO focused on the practicality and cost of meeting military manpower --bonuses, objectives--both quantitative and qualicative--in fiscal year 1974. --greatly increased recruiting pro- The report is based on data obtained grams, and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military services, --reduction of the military force and the Research Analysis Corporation, structure to its lowest level an Army contractor. since 1951. 20 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I Selective Servie SysteL; to remain To answer the question, GAO ob- tained data on true volunteers for The Congress grants the President a 3-year period and projected induction authority for fixed pe- fiscal year 1974 enlistments. GAO riods of time--to supplement volun- compared these past trends and tary recruiting into the Amed projections with fiscal year 1974 Forces--in accordance with the Mil- service quantity requirements and itary Selective Service Act. quality gois--such as limitations on personnel in the below-average Although this authority expires mental category and non-high-school June 30, 1973, all other sections graduates. (See pp. 11 to 16.) of the act remain unchanged. Section 10(h) specifically prescribes the If these quality goals were rigid functions to be performed by an ac- requirements (which they are not) tive standby Selective Service Sys- there could be a shortfall of be- tem. tween 11,000 and 83,000 new enlist- ments in fiscal year 1974, compared These include with a total requirement of 354,000. (See pp. 25 and 26.) --registering men, The shortfall would occur primarily --holding an annual lottery, in the Army and the Marine Corps and to a small degree in the Navy. --classifying registrants, and (See . 26.) --maintaining viable procedures and To avoid these shortfalls the facilities to use in case services can accept more mental reinstatement of induction au- category IV men and more enlistees thority becomes necessary. (See who have not graduated from high p. 8.) school. For example, to meet its fiscal year 1974 enlistment re- quirement of 162,000, the Army may Problems in meeting need to accept between 21 and Active Force requirements 33 percent of mental category IV enlistees compared with a desired Obtaining and retaining sufficient limitation of 20 percent. (See officers, except those in the health p. 17.) professions (discussed below), does not appear to be a problem. Service quality goals hiave been set at levels difficult to obtain. However, there appears to be less optimism about the ability of the --The Army's high school graduate services t obtain a sufficient goal, 70 percent, has been achieved quantity of qualified enlisted with true volunteers in only personnel. For the Active Forces, 1 month since January 1970. (See the key question is: p. 18.) Can the milZitary services obtain a --The Marine Corps' goal, 65 percent, sufficient number of new enlistments has not been achieved at all dur- ,n fisoal year 1974 and at the ing this period. (See p. 21.) same time meet their quality goalte- i.e., volunteers with the ability -- The Navy's goal, 80 percent, has to learn and perform the hundreds been achieved in only 1 month. of ski.ls found in the military? (See p. 23.) 21 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I -The Air Force has had no diffi- Pt za!w inobt!in culty inmaintaining quality. o ph (See p. 24.) At the end of calendar year 1972, DOD officials, in comenting on only 16 percent of the physicians these matter- -'eted that the who entered military service in quality mix .. lay's force is fiscal year 1970 were still in substantially richer than it was service. Few physicians have been in the years of heavy draft use drafted. To avoid being drafted, and that service quality standards more physicians inmedical train- are unrealistically high. DOD ing joined the military service forecasts that military performance under special programs. The standards wiil not be lowered be- largest of these is the Berry Plan cause of any inability to obtain which, in exchange for a 2-year recruits of the quality needed. service obligation, permits full deferment from active duty until The importance of obtaining the specialty training has been corn- desired quality of enlistees is pleted. (See p. 44.) illustrated by the fact that the services now have imbalances in The number of physicians participat- skills resulting from a combination ing in the Berry Plan and in other of programs is expected to decline sharply without a draft. DOD ex- --insufficient men of required ap- pects, however, that a scholarship titude and school preference (see program established in September pp. 28 to 30) and 1972 and the proposed special pay and enlistment bonuses for health --inadequate retention of men in de- care professionals will help al- sired sills. (See pp. 31 tc 40.) leviate shortages of pysicians in future years. (See p. 45.) In the Armly and the Marine Corps, for example, over half of the skill Future requirements for hysicians categories were either overmanned can be reduced significantly by or undermanned by more than 20 per- exploiting many opportunities for cent as of June 30, 1972. conserving medical manpower re- sources. (See pp. 46 to 49.) These problems are likely to per- sist, and perhaps worsen, under the AVF. The Selective Reenlistment AZternatieas for meeti Bonus proposed by DOD is one tech- Active Forcemititarm rqurement8 nique designed to cope with this problem. (See p. 38.) Alternatives to using male volun- teers to fill military requirements Renewint the Combat Arms Bonus ap- include pears essential to avoid a shrt- fall which could reach 20 percent --increasing the use of military in the Army's combat arms enlist- women and ments in fiscal year 1974. Further- more, DOD estimates that continuing --converting military positions to the bonus at current levels will re- civilian positions. duce the annual enlistment require- ment by at least 5,700 from fiscal Inaddition, recruiting men and year 1975 on and that by 1979 the an- women with civilian-acquired skills nual reduction could be as high as directly into upper enlisted grades 9,400. (See pp. 41 to 43.) (known as lateral entry programs) 22 APPENDIX I APPENDIX could assist in alleviating the met by recruiting those who have problem of skill imbalances. acquired advanced skills in civilian life and who can be used Women without a great amount of further training. The services' lateral In fiscal year 1972 women (including entry programs have been very nurses) represented 19 percent of limited. (See pp. 54 and 5.) military strength. If the services' goals are met, women will represent 4.2 percent of military strength by Problem in eting the the end of fiscal year 1977. maneper requiremens osf the Resere components It is apparent that much greater potential exists to use wooln in On February 15, 1972, the Secretary uniform. (See pp. 50 and 51.) of Defense tcld the Corgress that, under the President's policy, the Reserve and Guard would be the Civiian initial and primary sources for in- creasing the Active Forces in any As of December 31, 1972, about future emergency. On January 20, 1.08 million civilians worked 1973, the Secretary told the for DOD, or about 32 percent of Congress that unit structures and the total DOD manpower. In mission assignments were being October 1972 a DOD task force revised to make them more compatible issued a report on substituting with mobilization needs and that civilians for military personnel priority missions were being trans- in the Armed Forces. The task ferred from the Active Forces to force concluded that, theoretically, the Guard and Reserve where the 102,862 enlisted support positions ability to perform such missions in the continental United States has been demonstrated. could be converted to civilian positions in fiscal yea;- 1974. This increased emphasis on Reserve components makes shortfalls more Two plans were considered realistic-- significant. DOD is predicting one to convert 35,000 military posi- that Guard and Reserve Forces' tions to civilian positions (low manning levels will decline from plan), another to convert 70,000 914,000 on June 30, 1973, to about (high plan). 875,000 by June 30, 1974. This. could be 97,000 below the mobiliza- In Decemr 1972 the Deputy Secre- tion objective level of 971,000 for tary of Defense directed the Army, June 30, 1974. (See pp. 56 to 62.) Navy, and A- Force each to convert a minimum of 10.000 military positions Coat of the AVF to civilian positions in fiscal year 1974. The Marine Corps was directed DOD programs for the AVF have con- to convert at least 1,000. Here tributed about 23 percent of the again, significant additional poten- increased manpower costs which have tial exists. (See pp. 52 to 54.) occurred since 1968. OSD's Project Volunteer costs budgeted for fiscal LateraZ entry year 1974 are about $3.192 billion (including $225 million for the DOD requirements for high-quality proposed Uniformed Services Special military personnel can also be Pay Act). 23 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I The Army has budgeted about the draft? If unehipcyment $2.022 billion, exclusive of Project rates for young men decrease, Volunteer funding, in soldier- will this ake it more diffi- oriented improvements, sme of cult to attract qualified which received priority because of personnel? the effort to move to an AVF. GAO estimates the incremental costs 3. Should come orm of standby primarily related to the AVF, may induction authorty be be as much as $1.090 billion. enacted The transition to an AVF in recent --to save time in the event years has been accompanied by decreas- of an emergency? ing force levels and increasing man- power costs. If force levels need to --to provide a means of meeting be increased in the future, the cost serious shortages in peacetime? of volunteers may increase sharply. (See pp. 63 to 69.) 4. Will ome type of draft be re- quired if there are not enough MATTERS FCR CONSIDERATION physician, after fiscal year BYs THEE CONGRESS 1974? 1. What are realistic minimum 5. Will some type of draft be re- quality standards for each quired if deficits in the Re- service, both for Active and serve components cannot be over- Reserve Forces? come? 2. What is the probable force 6. Will the Uniformed Services level of minimum quality that Special Pay Act overcome the can be supported without using above problems? 24 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II COMPTROLLER GENER4L3 MILITARY RETENTION INCENTIVES: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS EFFECTIVENESS AND ADMINISTRATION Department of Defense B-160096 DIGEST WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE combine their most effective features in a new selective reenlistment bonus GAO wanted to find out how well was approved May 10, 1974. If this variable reenlistment bonuses (VRBs) new bonus proves effective, DOD will worked in helping the Department of phase out shortage specialty profi- Defense (DOD) eliminate career- ciency pay. manning shortages in critically needed skills and how well DOD was carrying out its incentive programs. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Balic facts VRB effectiveness To encouva|oe qualified nlisted Although DOD considers VRB effec- personnel--!specially thore with tive, VRB does not produce enough critical skills--to remain after first-term reenlistments to their first enlistments, the Con- eliminate career-manning shortages. gres; authorized DOD to pay several kind!; of monetary incentives: On the average, VRBs increase first- term reenlistments. However, VRB's --A 'IRB for first-term reenlistees effect on reenlistment rates in in- who have critical skills (pri- dividual skills cannot be predicted marily skills having hiqh training accurately. This is because of the costs and being inshort supply). strong influence of factors other than money on reenlistment deci- --A regular reenlistment bonus for sions. (See pp. 6 to 9.) all first-term personnel upon re- enlistment. For the 4-year period ended June 30, 1972, VRBs had only a marginal im- --A shortage specialty proficiency pact on attaining the required pay for career personnel having career-manning level in 129 of the critical skills in short supply eligible skills with the largest that continue to have insufficient requirement for enlisted personnel. retention after maximum VRB isap- (See pp. 9 and 10.) plied. A long time is needed to overcome DOD plans to spend $405 million on career-manning shortages if VRBs are these incentives in fiscal year 1974. the only incentive. GAO estimates In spite of these incentives, DOD that the average Army skill less still has low first-term reenlistment than 80-percent manned and receiving rates in many critical skills. the maximum VRB gains 10 additional reenlistees because of VRB. Other Legislation to elimirate regular re- variables constant, it would take enlistment bonuses ar.d VRBs and to about 26 years for the additional 25 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II reenlistees to eliminate the average Effectiveness of regular bonus and career-manning shortage. (See shortage specialty proficiency pay pp. 11 and 12.) DOD found in 1971 that: Factors influencin reenlistment decisions --About 25 percent, or $40 million, Q'f the regular reenlistment bonus GAO interviewed 2,240 military per- was paid each year to individuals sonnel who either had reenlisted serving in skills in which ade- recently for the first time or were quate retention could be sustained app;oaching their first-reenlistment without incentive payments. This decision. GAO found: is because the law requires that the bonus be paid to all reenlis- --VRB influenced reenlistment of tees. DOD concluded the bonus was only 8 percent of the eligible unnecessary. first-term critical-skill population. (See pp. 13 and 14.) --A major part of shortage specialty proficiency pay was paid to ca- --Larger bonuses could attract reerists already past critical re- 15 percent more of the critical- tention points. DOD concluded skill population sampled. (See that this incentive had only a pp. 13 and 14.) marginal effect on influencing re- enlistments and was extremely cost --VRB was the prime reason for re- ineffective. This is because to enlistment for only 13 percent of yield reenlistments, payments were the critical-skill personnel ntade to all careerists in a skill sampled. Job satisfaction, jcb father than only to those reenlist- security, and educational oppor- ing in the skill. tunities ranked higher. (See p. 14.) Responses to GAO's interviews con- firmed that shortage specialty --Factors most influencing first- proficiency pay had little effect on term critical-skill personnel not reenlistment decisions. Of 62 in- to reenlist were (1) family sepa- dividuals in GAO's sample who were rations, (2) lack of personal free- eligible for the pay and reenlist- dom, (3) poor supervision and ing, only 5 said that shortage spe- leadership, (4)work details, and cialty proficiency pay had in- (5) living conditions. (See fluenced their decisions. (See p. 14.) p. 14.) --An alternative for increasing Effectiveness of first-term reenlistments would be progrim administration to allow reenlistment for an un- specified time. About 36 percent The Army, Navy and Marine Corps of the critical-skill personnel not cannot develop proper first-term reenlisting claimed they would re- reenlistment objectives because they enlist for unspecified periods. have not established long-range (See p. 14.) requirements planning in their 26 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II enlisted force management systems. GAO estimates that about 15 to As a result, these services use VRBs 25 percent of all bonuses are for to correct total career-manning already obligated service. This shortages rather than to attract problem was overcome by enactment only the required number of first- of the selective reenlistment term personnel needed, by skill, to bonus program. (See pp. 31 enter the career force each year to to 33.) maintain proper grade structure. This shortcoming has greatly reduced Problems occurring after effective program administration. payment of bonuses (See pp, 2n + 24.) Many Army and Marine Cor`ps individ- At the recunendation of the House uals receiving VRBs were not work- Armed Services Committee, in 1968 ing in the skilTs for which VRBs had DOD directed each service to develop Seen paid. (See pp. 36 to 3.) a long-range planning system for managing its career enlisted force. A serviceman, once awarded a reen- (See p. 22.) listment bonus, must either complete his tour of duty or refund the un- By 1973 only the Air Force had earned part of the bonus. A review developed such a system. The Air of 443 cases requiring such refunds Force system identifies manning disclosed that recoupment efforts had deficits by skill and years of serv- been largely unsuccessful. (See ice. VRBs can be used to attract pp. 39 and 40.) each year only the actual nnber of first-term reenlistees needed by skill. If each service were to RECOMMENDATIONS establish a similar system, manage- ment of first-term retention could Because individuals place major in- be improved. This could result in portance on factors other than a more balanced career force. (See money in deciding whether to reen- p. 22.) list, the Secretary of Defense should impress upon the services Although DOD guidelines provide that the need to insure that individuals: certain characteristics be con- sidered in applying VRBs, firm cri- --Do not have their personal free- teria have not been developed for dom restrained during off-duty the services to follow in applying, hours. adjusting, or removing VRB. As a result, decisionmakers have to use --Receive the highest quality super- their judgment in specifying use of vision and leadership. VRBs. (See pp. 24 to 31.) --Are effectively used in the skills Most regular bonuses and YRBs are for which they are trained. computed, in part, on already cbli- gated service time, because each The Secretary should also: service, in allowing its personnel to reenlist before completing their --Consider recommending legislation initial enlistments, counts the time which would allow enlisted per- remaining in the initial enlistments sonnel to reenlist for unspeci- in computing the bonuses. fled periods. 27 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II --Develop optimum bonus administra- AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES tion criteria that can be used in conjunction with approved long- DOD generally agrees with many of range career management systems. GA0's findings and recommendations, DOD concurs that it isdifficult to --Improve the bon, administration quantify effectiveness of VRB in criteria that the Arny, Navy, and attracting additional reenlist- Marine Corps must use until they ments, particularly on an individual- develop enlisted career management skill basis. DOD's comments are systems that can predict reliably included as appropriate in tie re- skill retention requirements by port. years of service. These criteria should clearly delineate the cir- cumstances under which a bonus XA'ZERS POR CONSIDERATION should be applied, adjusted, and BY THE CONGRESS removed. The military services should be --Insure that (1)the services use required to develop, as soon as ORB recipients in the skills which possible, enlisted personnel man- qualified them for the VRBs, un- agement systems which would be less the Secretary of the service responsive to the House Armed determines that waivers are neces- Services Committee's 1968 recom- sary in the interest of the service mendation. Cncerned, and (2) misassigned VRB recipients are identified and Since the advantages of such systems properly assigned. are fully accepted, the Appropria- tions and Armed Services Committees The Secretaries of the Army and Navy may want to- and the CommandanT of the Marine Corps should establish priorities -- Inquire why the Army, Navy, and for developing long-range require- Marine Corps are taking so long to ments planning in their enlisted per- develop such systems. sonnel career management systems. -- Consider restricting funds for en- The Secretaries and the Commandant listed retention incentives in the shoulc review how well individuals Arny, Navy, and Marine Corps if en- awarded reenlistment bonuses are listed personnel management systems screened and the adequacy of the sys- are not developed and approved by a tem for recouping unearned bonuses. specified date. 28 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM REPORT TO THE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND USING NON-HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES AND CATEGORY IV PERSONNEL Department of Defernse DIGEST As of June 30, 1974, almost half a million military servicemen were non-high-school graduates and Category IV (low-aptitude) personnel. This group has been experiencing noticeably higher rates of disciplinary actions and administra- tive discharges than other personnel. GAO found that the military services do not have a directed policy for training and using non-high-school graduates and Category IV per- sonnel. From the data collected, we also identified a series of management practices that may be contributing to the problems we noted. They included --alleged recruiting irregularities (see p. 12), -- training and assignment promises perceived as made but not honored (see p. 10), -- underuse of skills and training (see p. 16), and -- lack of encouragement to participate in ed- ucational programs (see p. 18). We compared the relationship of these question- able management practices to several performance indicators and found that -- many men were claiming that they spent little or no time doing the work for which they were trained, -- participation in education programs was low compared to the interest expressed in educa- tional incentives, and 29 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III -- there were undesirable effects associated with underuse and lack of training in the form of lower individual performance and retention of personnel in the service. High rates of disciplinary action and administra- tive discharges adversely affect the operational capability of the military services. Tney are also costly from a monetary as well as human standpoint. To improve management of recruit- ing, training, use, and education of non-higil- school graduates and Category IV personnel, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require each service Secretary to implement specific policies and practices for these personnel. Particular consideration should be given to: -- Strengthening and monitoring controls aimed at insuring compliance with entrance screen- ing procedures. -- Policies governing the assignment of first- term personnel to advanced or on-the-job training to insure that servicemen receive opportunities for skill training commensur- ate with their ability and that such training is optimally used. -- Educational programs and related policies to insure that servicemen with low educational attainments are encouraged and provided ap- propriate opportunities to increase their education. 30 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL-VOLUNTEER REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FORCE RECRUITS Department of Defense DIGEST Due principally to the dedicated efforts of the recruiting commands, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full year of operation under the all- volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes during fiscal year 1975 were even better, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions. Department of Defense reports show that the personnel recruited into the all-volunteer force, when compared to their counterparts who either volunteered or were inducted into the services in a previous year (fiscal year 1964) and during the Vietnam War (fiscal year 1969), were of higher quality by some standards and lower by others, with no ap- parent preponderance in either direction. Using traditional quality measures, GAO found a slight decline in the number of enlistees both with high school diplomas and with scotes above or below average on the military aptitude test. There was a moderate increase in the number of enlistees with average tests scores. GAO also found evidence that Defense may overstate quality in its reports. (See pp. 6 to 12.) GAO looked at the mental testing practices of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. At the beginning of the review, no single mental test was acceptable to all the services and tne tests used could be compromised. When GAO brought this matter to the atten- tion of Department officials, they reacted immediately with a directive specifying a common test to be given at Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations for all 31 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV the services. The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations were given central management control over a single aptitude test to be used by all services as of January 1, 1976. Defense officials also said they are exploring ways to r'-vent compromising the test. The promptness of this action fortified GAO's belief, gathered through- out its review, that neither the services nor Department of Defense want or will condone these practices. Although the services are progressing satisfactorily toward adopting a common test, they are not doing enough to reach an agreement on an interpretation of its results. (See pp. 18 and 19.) The Department of Defense spent about $4.7 million during fiscal year 1974 to support its high school recruiting and testing program, testing about 1.1 million students for enlistment eligibility. Of 307,000 male seniors, only 19C,000 were potential enlistees. Only 9,700 were en- listed on the basis of the test given them in high school. About 33,700 enlistees who had been tested in high school appear to have been unnecessarily retested at enlistment. (See pp. 23 to 25.) In 1973, the Department of Defense estab- lished the Armed Forces Vocational Testing Group to manage the high school recruiting and testing program and to present the military services to the educational com- munity as a single entity. This latter objective has not been fully achieved because all the services, except the Marine Corps, developed separate pro- grams to further their recruiting inter- ests with the educational community. These programs are similar in many respects but are funded and managed independently. Each program employs civilians with a background in education to improve the service's image through better communications with the educational community. (See pp. 26 and 27.) 32 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV In order to improve the quality of personnel recruited, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense: -- Establish a time frame for the rservices to agree on common aptitude or occupa- tional areas composed of common compos- ites. (See p. 20.) -- Evaluate the high school recrtiting and testing program and the services' various liason programs with the educational com- munity. If these programs are found justified, their management should be consolidated under one agency, independent of service affiliation. (See p. 30.) Defense officials agreed with this report and its recommenda:ions, except that they are not yet satisf.ed that common composites can be developed. hey believe that test results must relate to performance in job training which is different among the services. 33 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND EFFICIENCY OF RECRUITING Department of Defense DIGEST Recruiting costs increased from $430 million during the last year of the draft, fiscal year 1973, to $508.1 million during the first year of the All-Volunteer Force, fis- cal year 1974. Second year budgeted, costs rose to $511.3 million. Although all servi except the Air Force encountered initie problems recruiting in a nondraft environ....nt, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full yeai of operation under the all- volunteer force concept. Recruiting suc- cesses were een better in fiscal year 1975, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions. There is no central focus for monitoring quality control, recruiter malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. As a result, many unqualified recruits slip through the enlistment process, fail during training, and receive early discharges. Forty-one thousand early discharges during fiscal year 1974 for conditions which were po- tentially identifiable before enlistment cost the services about $70 million. Although many of these conditions are diffi- cult, if not impossible, to detect during preenlistment screening, each 1-percent reduction can save $700,000. (See pp. 4 to 6.) All the services recognize the dam- age such practices can cause and have worked hard to prevent them. However, the principal thrust of their efforts have been after the fact, that is, identifying those instances that do occur and attempting to relate them back to the recruiter. 34 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations are best suited to perform quality control over mental and medical examinations, moral fitness, and enlistment paperwork. They have been precluded from independently moni- toring these functions because of subordina- tion to the recruiting services, fragmented and incomplete procedural controls, noncom- patible recruiting boundaries, and service- administered mental examinations. (See pp. 6 to 12.) Inefficiencies caused by distorted workload standards, monthly enlistment quota systems, varying service-imposed paperwork require- ments, and double contract processing of in- dividuals who delay entry into the military also wasted valuable time and increased exa- mining station costs. (See pp. 16 to 21.) GAO estimated that standardizing paperwork and eliminating double contract processing could save $1.2 million annually. The Department of Defense and the Joint Service Task Force have acted to develop a standard enlistment application and an en- listment agreement which would allow all possible enlistment transactions to be com- pleted on one form and would revise examining station workload standards and adjust staff- ing levels. (See p. 24.) The Defense Department has issued instruc- tions to the services that require a single mental test for all the services to be given under the control of the examining stations. In addition, GAO reviewed the management of the services' recruiter forces. Since 1971, Defense has increased recruiter staff-years by 3,800 and the se:vices have made numerous changes to increa£. rcruiter effectiveness. The services used increased effectiveness to eliminate enlistment incentives and end 2-year enlistments instead of reducing recruiter force size. GAO believes force size can be reduced at least 10 percent at a $16 million annual savings. Congress decreased the military per- sonnel recruiting budget request for fscal year 1976 by about 9 percent. (See pp. 25 and 27.) 35 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V Each service used nonrecruiting personnel to help recruiters locate prospects. Army studies show that nonrecruiting personnel productivity is higher than that of addi- tional recruiters. None of the services, however, have conducted controlled field testing to explore the potential for using nonrecruiting personnel to reduce recruiter force size. (See pp. 33 to 35.) GAO learned numerous organizations, military and contractor, evaluate recruiting programs. The Defense Department and the services per- form or contract for evaluations independ- ently. The Department of Defense has not given the services an overall plan specifying programs to evaluate and methods to use. As a result, programs GAO examined had not been evaluated; received liiited, inconclusive evaluation; or were evaluated by more than one service. (See pp. 37 to 44.) The Department of Defense has been precluded from making many interservice comparisons in its evaluations because the information re- ceived from the services was not uniform, parallel data was difficult to obtain, pro- gram costs were not always compiled, and recruiting boundaries are not uniform. (See pp. 37 to 44.) To help improve the effectiveness and effi- cienLy of recruiting, GAO recommends among other things that the Secretary of Defense: -- Remove the examining stations from opera- tional control of the recruiting organiza- tions. -- Eliminate those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. -- Adjust staffing levels between the exa- mining stations and recruiting services to give the examining stations the re- sources to perform quality control and monitoring functions. 36 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V -- Insure that the examining stations assess reliability of revised workload standards. -- Insure that the recruiting services change the system of monthend enlistment quotas; establish common boundaries and a common entrance examination; and adhere to time- tables to standardize enlistment paperwork and eliminate double processing of personnel who delay entry into the service. -- Adjust recruiting force levels. -- Establish uniform procedures to monitor re- cruiting results and assess recruiting force needs. Department of Defense officials' responses to GAO's recommendations are as follow: -- The examining stations will be removed from operational control of the recruiting organ- izations in July 1976. -- Elimination of those factors precluding the examining stations from independently monitoring quality, malpractice, and fraudulent enlistment. However; final deci- sions on enlistment should be left up to the services. -- Staffing levels will not be adjusted. (See p. 2.) --An industrial management survey will evalu- ate the examining stations' capacities and precise workload. --Agreed to change the system of monthend enlistment quotas. --Many actions, including the reorganiza- tion of the examining stations management structure, were considered necessary be- fore pursuing the issue of compatible boundaries. Mental testing for the examin- ing stations was centralized January 1, 1976. 37 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V --Elimination of double processing of personnal under the delayed-entry program has not been completely resolved. --The Defense Department does not agree that recruiter force levels need to be adjusted. (See p. 36.) Recruiter assistants are effective in help- ing the services meet special recruiting ob- jectives or seasonal differences. While agreeing with Defense's actions, GAO believes that the Department f Defense and the services need to determine the optimum mix of recruiter force and recruiter aides. As far as GAO could tell, neither the De- fense Department nor the services know what the optimum mix is. 38 APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S ADVERTISING FOR REPORT TO THE CONGRESS MILITARY RECRUITING: HOW EFFECTIVE IS IT? DIGEST To support the military services' intensified recruiting efforts for the all-volunteer force, expenditu'res for advertising increasea over the past 4 years from about $7 million annually to $96.1 million. Several factors have influenced the services' recruiting success advertising increased, recruiting forces were expanded and improved, salaries were raised, and bonuses were added. Questions of whether less advertising would produce less recruits and whether a different approach might produce more for less were un- answered. The total number of potential re- cruits was not expanded, although the adver- tising campaigns were greatly expanded from 1970 through 1974. When the services conduct large advertising programs they may be only competing with each other for the same potential recruit. GAO's review found considerable evidence of uncontrolled, duplicative, or inconsistent practices that offer considerable potential for reducing cost and increasing advertising programs' effectiveness. (See pp. 12 to 22.) Each of the services have been left on its own as to how the money should be spent. Research has shown that the things that at- tract youth are common in all services; i.e., pay, educational benefits, raining opportunities, travel, and the avertising of the services, with occasional exceptions, of a particular service as perceived by young people appears to be the single most influential factor in their enlistment de- cision. (See p. 41.) 39 APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI An analysis of studies done for and by the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense showed that attitudes toward the military had changed little in a 4-year period. (See p. 32.) Although no one really knows how much free time is being received, most people agree that paid radio and TV will cost the serv- ices a large part of the free time now be- ing received. (See p. 10.) Recruiting research for the all-volunteer force has lacked central direction and control. Much research done was duplica- tive while, at the same time, needed re- search was not being accomplished. The Joint Advertising Directors of Re- search appeared to have recognized this problem early in 1974. Their recommenda- tions went largely unheeded, until re- cently when the Office of the Secretary of Defense recognized the problem and be- gan actions to make improvements. (See p. 32.) GAO's recommendations to the SecretLry of Defense include the following: --Defense and the four services should under- take research programs that have potential for greatly improving the advertising pro- gram. -- The Department of Defense should identify additional research that is common to the entire recruiting effort. -- Some mechanism should be established so that research performed by the serv- ices in common areas is not duplica- tive and is made available to those have use for it. --The services and Defense should begin to experiment with various advertising approaches such as: (1) Defense mili- tary service advertising, (2) four 40 APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI service advertising, and (3) controlled test advertising to determine the ef- fect of various media such as direct mail and magazine advertising. -- Before pursuing any vpe of paid road- cast advertising, the services should determine how much public service an- nouncement time is now being obtained, how effective this media is, and how !.uch of this time could be lost if the services went to paid broadcasting. -- Defense should examine the policy of using all response type media, especially the more costly popup cards considering the number of leads that can be traced to en- listments. GAO also found that all advertising costs relating to the overall military recruiting compaign are not fully disclosed and re- ported by the services consistently. With- out such information, program managers are not in a position to carry out their re- sponsibilities in formulating effective plans and making sound decisions. (See p. 57.) The Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issues instructions and guidelines to the services for reporting advertising costs that will be helpful to management. Defense agreed with most of GAO's recom- mendations. It stated that it had begun efforts to improve Defense's ability to measure advertising effectiveness which included controlled experimerntation in the enlistment market. In addition, a consolidated market research program has been developed to improve DOD"s market and advertising research capability and eliminate market research redundancy within the Department. The Congress reduced Defenses' military ad- vertising budget request for fiscal year 1976 by about 35 percent. 41 APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S JOB OPPORTUNITIES REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS Department of Defense DIGEST The draft was to end. Fewer men were expected to join the services. Equal Rights Amendment reqirements were expected. This was the milieu in 1972 when the Depart- ment of Defense started recruiting more women and using them in as many jobs as possible within combat limitations, ncluding those previously restricted to men. (See p. 1 and 2.) By December 1974, the Army, Air Force, Navy. and Marine Corps had opened essentially all noncombat jobs to women. However, women were assigned to only 44 percent of the opened jobs in the Marine Corps; 63 percent, in the Army; 70 percent, in the Air Force; 72 percent, in the Navy. Most women were assigned to administrative or medical jobs. (See pp. 4 to 8.) This was primarily because: -- Recruiters failed to tell women about occupational options. -- Many women preferred administrative or medical jobs. -- Combat requirements, including specific overseas assignments restricted to men (restricting most or all jobs to men.) (See pp. 9 and 10.) Some women were assigned to jobs with re- quirements that kept them from working effectively. This included aircraft and vehicle maintenance or work on combat vehicles. No standards had been estab- lished for measuring women's strength, stamina, and other abilities. (See pp. 14 to 25.) 42 APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII The Air Force has recognized this problem and has started to develop standards for use in assigning both men and women to jobs. (See p. 18 to 20.) The services have a unique opportunity to evaluate the extent to which women are interested in, and can perform, jobs traditionally restricted to mer. To do this, GAO recommends that the ecretary of Defense have the services: -- Reevaluate all jobs to identify those that can really be opened to women, con- sidering jobs that (1) must be restricted to men because all authorized positions are required by combat units or the rota- tion base and (2) primarily involve com- bat vessels. -- Develop physical and other standards for jobs where either is a factor in effec- tive performance. -- Develop standards for measuring the strength, stamina, and other requirements for jobs where such attribut s are factors in effective performance. -- Tell women about the jobs for which they qualify and encourage them to select those previously restricted to men. --Require women to meet the same training and performance requirements as men in the jobs assigned. Department of Defense officials agree with these recommendations and agree that the op- portunities for women in the military should be newly evaluated. The Department of De- fense has formed a study group to address these issues and will keep GAO informed on the group's progress. 43 APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII COMPTROLLFR GENERAL'S MAPINE CORPS RECRUITING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, AND RECRUIT TRAINING: SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER POLICIES AND PRACTICES AND PERSONNEL, SENATE Department of the Navy ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DIGEST Over the past 1e months, the Marine Corps has announced a series of changes to correct prob- lems in its recruiting and recruit training. In July 1976, the Marine Corps placed the Recruit Training Depot commanders in charge of recruiting as well as training men and women with no prior service. (See p. 3.) Since 1974 an increasingly larger percentage of high school graduates have been recruited by the Marine Corps. (See . 4.) The Marine Corps, through research, has at- tempted to identify individual attributes which indicate whether a person can success- fully complete recruit training and the first enlistment. In the past little had been done to determine how the military environment af- fected recruit success and attrition. (See p. 6.) During the 6 months following the announcement on April 1, 1976, of changes to the recruit- training program, GAO did not find any osi- tive trends which could be at ributed solely to those changes. However, it may be too early for effects of the changes to be measured in such trends. (See p. 9.) Recruit-training procedures, administrative duties, and noninstructional time are not clearly and measurably related to training objectives. The San Diego Recruit Depot in scheduling training did not follow the program of instruction directed by headquarters and increased the training days from 77 to 79 as a result of a misunderstanding, which has since been corrected. The time recruits spend at the training depots can be greatly reduced. Unncessary, excessive, or delayed training should be eliminated. (See p. 13.) 44 APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII Alternatives other than senaing recruits to special platoons for more instruction or re- habilitation should be considered. Marine Corps officials have questioned the need for the special platoons and in some cases dis- banded these platoons. The other services do not use correctional custody and medical rehabilitation platoons in their recruit- training rograms. (See p. 17.) The Secretary of Defense should direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to: -- Redirect much of the focus of its re- search to examine in depth the effects of the military and, more specifically, the recruit-training environment on attrition. (See p. 8.) --Establish a recruit-training program more fully based on measurable training objectives and require the conent and training proce- dures to relate to those objectives. Un- necessary content should be eliminated and the program shortened accordingly. -- Require periodic inspections to mtake sure that actual training conforms to the pre- scribed program. --Start processing recruits without delay and start platoons into training immediately after processing. -- Reevaluate the need for continuing each of the special training platoons. (See p. 20.) The Marine Corps generally agrees with GAO's recommendations. However, the Marine Corps did not agree that recruit-training proce- dures are not clearly and measurably related to training objectives. The Marine Corps is taking the following actions: --Two studies have been started tc examine the relationship between attrition and organizational/environmental factors. 45 APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII -- During biennial visits, the Inspector General's investigation teams and assigned training officers will give special atten- tion to the problems noted in this report. --Ways are being studied to reduce the time between the recruits' arrival and their first training day. -- Marine Corps Headquarters is reviewing a recently completed study of effectiveness the special training branches at Parris of Island. Also, the recruit management formation system is now providing ata in- ful in determining true costs and value use- the special training branch. of 46 APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT Tenure of office From To DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Harold Brown Jan. 1977 Present Donald H. Rumsfeld Nov. 1975 Jan. 1977 James R. Schlesinger July 1973 Nov. 1973 William P. Clements, Jr. (acting) Apr. 1973 July 1973 Elliot L. Richardson Jan. 1973 Apr. 1973 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: Charles W. Duncan, Jr. Jan. 1977 Present William P. Clements, r. Jan. 1973 Jan. 1977 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): David P. Taylor (acting) Feb. 1977 Present William K. Brenm Sept. 1973 Feb. 1977 Carl W. Clewlow (acting) June 1973 Aug. 1973 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. Jan. 1977 Present Martin R. Hoffman Aug. 1975 Jan. 1977 Aorman R. Augustine (acting) July 1975 Aug. 1975 [oward H. Callaway May 1973 July 1975 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): Paul D. Phillips (acting) Feb. 1977 Present Donald G. Brotemar. Mar. 1975 Feb. 1977 M. David Lowe Feb. 1974 Jan. 1975 Carl S. Wallace Mar. 1973 Jan. 1974 CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. Bernard W. Rogers Oct. 1976 Present Gen. Fred C. Weyland Sept. 1971 Oct. 1976 Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Oct. 1972 Sept. 1974 47 APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX Tenure f of'ice From To DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY: W. Graham Clayton, Jr. Feb. 1977 Present J. William Middendorf II Apr. 1974 Jan. 1977 John W. Warner May 1972 Apr. 1974 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): Joseph T. McCullen, Jr. Sept. 1973 Present James E. Johnson June 1971 Sept. 1973 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: Adm. James L. Holloway III July 1974 Present Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. July 1970 July 1974 COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS: Gen. Louis H. Wilson July 1975 Present Gen. Robert G. Cushman, Jr. Jan. 1972 June 1975 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE: Thomas C. Reed Jan. 1976 Present Jam-s W. Plummer (acting) Nov. 1975 Jan. 1976 John L. McLucas May 1973 Nov. 1975 Robert C. Seaman, Jr. Jan. 1969 May 1973 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS): Jaines P. Goode (acting) Jan. 1977 Present David P. Taylor June 1974 Jan. 1977 James P. Goode (acting) June 1973 June 1974 CHIEF OF STAFF: Gen. David Jones Aug. i9 7 4 Present Gen. George J. Brown Aug. 19T3 July 1974 Gen. John D. Ryan Aug. 1969 July 1973 (961055) 48
Recruiting for the All-Volunteer Force: A Summary of Costs and Achievements
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-10-04.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)