oversight

U.N. Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict Countries Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-09-26.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                 United States General Accounting Office

GAO              Report to the Chairman, Committee on
                 International Relations, House of
                 Representatives


September 2003
                 U.N. PEACEKEEPING

                 Transition Strategies
                 for Post-Conflict
                 Countries Lack
                 Results-Oriented
                 Measures of Progress




GAO-03-1071
                                                September 2003


                                                U.N. PEACEKEEPING

                                                Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict
Highlights of GAO-03-1071, a report to the      Countries Lack Results-Oriented
Chairman, Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives             Measures of Progress



The United Nations responded to                 The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its peacekeeping
the failure of some past                        operations that takes a comprehensive and long-term view and focuses on
peacekeeping operations by                      the causes of the conflict. The U.N. strategy for making effective
developing a strategy to help                   peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing conditions for
peacekeeping operations move a                  sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the United Nations and
country from conflict to
sustainable peace. It has attempted
                                                other international organizations to establish these conditions and sustain
to apply this strategy to the large             assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3) developing objectives and
and costly peacekeeping                         results-oriented measures of progress to help manage and decide when a
operations in Sierra Leone, East                country’s conditions warrant the withdrawal of peacekeepers.
Timor, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo since 2001.               U.N. Troops and Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East Timorese Police
As a contributor of over 25 percent
of the cost of U.N. operations, the
United States has a stake in the
successful application of this
strategy. The strategy also has
implications for the conduct of
international peace operations in
other post-conflict countries. GAO
was asked to (1) identify the
elements of the U.N. transition
strategy; (2) assess the extent to
which the United Nations has
applied the strategy to operations;
and (3) assess the challenges to
implementing the strategy in these
three countries.
                                                The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of this strategy to
                                                help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
                                                transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous chal-
                                                lenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more expensive
                                                than originally planned in countries where rival factions may continue to
                                                fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult in countries with
                                                little experience of accountable government. Coordinating with independent
                                                international organizations and donor nations with different priorities is also
                                                a challenge. The United Nations has not yet developed results-oriented
                                                measures of progress for the three peacekeeping operations.

                                                Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal
                                                of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results-oriented measures to
                                                assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and subsequent
                                                events in each country showed that the situation was not as secure as
                                                available measures indicated. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1071.
                                                Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to
To view the full product, including the scope   measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining
and methodology, click on the link above.       sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these
For more information, contact Joseph A.
Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or                  indicators.
christoffj@gao.gov.
Contents


Letter                                                                                   1
               Results in Brief                                                         2
               Background                                                               4
               U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements         7
               United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy               11
               United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing
                 Transition Strategy                                                   22
               Conclusions                                                             35
               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                      35

Appendix I     Scope and Methodology                                                    37



Appendix II    U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by
               Mission                                                                  39



Appendix III   Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone,
               East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the
               Congo                                                                    44
               Sierra Leone                                                            44
               East Timor                                                              48
               Democratic Republic of the Congo                                        51

Appendix IV    Comments from the U.N. Department of
               Peacekeeping Operations                                                  56



Appendix V     GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments                                   58
               GAO Contacts                                                            58
               Staff Acknowledgments                                                   58


Tables
               Table 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives                        12
               Table 2: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and
                        Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone                           30



               Page i                                        GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
          Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice
                   Program for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and
                   Training                                                        33
          Table 4: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone        39
          Table 5: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor          41
          Table 6: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the
                   Democratic Republic of the Congo                                42


Figures
          Figure 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East
                   Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of
                   June 30, 2003                                                     6
          Figure 2: U.N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security
                   Checkpoint with East Timorese Police                            14
          Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U.N. Peacekeepers
                   in Sierra Leone                                                 20
          Figure 4: Revisions in U.N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police
                   Drawdown Schedule in East Timor                                 21
          Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the
                   Congo                                                           24
          Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border
                   with Liberia                                                    25
          Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone                                            45
          Figure 8: Map of East Timor                                              49
          Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila
                   Government in 1998, and the Location of Major
                   Antigovernment Groups and Natural Resources in the
                   Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003                     53




          Page ii                                        GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Abbreviations

DPKO              Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC               Democratic Republic of the Congo
ETPS              East Timor Police Service
RUF               Revolutionary United Front
U.N.              United Nations



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Page iii                                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548




                                   September 26, 2003

                                   The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
                                   Chairman, Committee on International Relations
                                   House of Representatives

                                   Dear Mr. Chairman:

                                   The United Nations, in partnership with other international organizations,
                                   has undertaken peace operations to establish security and the rule of law
                                   in war-torn countries such as Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia. However,
                                   years after these operations began, some of these countries do not have a
                                   sustainable peace or fully abide by the rule of law.1 The U.N. Security
                                   Council has since authorized other peace operations that have challenges
                                   comparable to previous efforts. By June 2003, U.N. costs for operations in
                                   East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
                                   exceeded $6 billion, with the United States contributing over 25 percent of
                                   these funds. To ensure greater success in such peace operations, the U.N.
                                   Secretary General developed a strategy for effective peacekeeping
                                   transitions—the process peace operations use to move a country from
                                   immediate conflict toward long-term sustainable peace. This strategy was
                                   to apply to countries with complex emergencies—countries confronting
                                   civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a breakdown of civil order.

                                   You asked us to assess the U.N. strategy for peacekeeping transitions in
                                   countries with complex emergencies. In this report, we (1) identify the
                                   elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the
                                   United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone, East
                                   Timor,2 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (3) assess the
                                   challenges to implementing the strategy in these countries.




                                   1
                                    For example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Cambodia: Governance Reform
                                   Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging, GAO-02-569 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2001);
                                   and Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of Dayton Peace
                                   Agreement, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-219 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000).
                                   2
                                    East Timor officially became the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste upon attaining
                                   independence in May 2002.



                                   Page 1                                                  GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                       To identify the elements of the peacekeeping transition strategy, we
                       reviewed U.N., GAO, and other organizations’ reports about peacekeeping.
                       We met with officials at the United Nations, the World Bank, and other
                       international organizations to discuss their peacekeeping and assistance
                       strategies in countries with complex emergencies. We performed
                       fieldwork at U.N. operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone, which are in
                       the initial drawdown phase. We conducted limited work at the U.N.
                       operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is expanding
                       operations. We selected these peace operations because they are the only
                       U.N. operations begun in countries with complex emergencies since the
                       United Nations developed a new peacekeeping strategy. Appendix I details
                       our scope and methodology.


                       The U.N. Secretary General’s strategy for making effective peacekeeping
Results in Brief       transitions focuses on achieving tangible results within a country and
                       consists of three elements that U.N. peacekeeping operations and other
                       international stakeholders are to carry out, including

                   •   establishing conditions for sustainable peace in the country, including
                       adequate security, rule of law and participatory governance, and economic
                       and social reform;

                   •   coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international
                       organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after
                       peacekeepers withdraw; and

                   •   specifying objectives (linked to the country conditions sought) and
                       developing results-oriented measures of progress toward achieving these
                       conditions to help manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers.3

                       The U.N. Security Council has noted its support for the strategy but
                       decides on a case-by-case basis whether to authorize the peacekeepers
                       and resources required to implement it.




                       3
                        We define results-oriented or outcome measures as the results of programs and activities
                       compared with their intended purpose. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for
                       Results: EPA Faces Challenges in Developing Results-Oriented Performance Goals and
                       Measures, GAO/RCED-00-77 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2000), and Performance
                       Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26
                       (Washington, D.C.: April 1998).




                       Page 2                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
The United Nations Secretariat is attempting to apply the elements of this
strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo transition to sustainable peace. First, to establish the conditions
for sustainable peace, the United Nations and other stakeholders have
deployed thousands of peacekeepers, police, and international
administrators in Sierra Leone and East Timor to establish security,
reform government institutions, and undertake economic reforms. In the
Congo, efforts are less extensive, but in July 2003 the Security Council
began expanding U.N. activities. Second, the United Nations, World Bank,
and donor countries are trying to coordinate their work through joint
planning and other mechanisms. Third, U.N. peacekeeping operations
have developed objectives and results-oriented measures to a limited
extent to plan drawdowns of peacekeepers. The Security Council,
however, makes the final decisions on the drawdown or termination of
peacekeeping operations based on factors such as political and budgetary
considerations.

The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each
element of the new strategy. First, establishing the conditions for
sustainable peace has taken longer and been more costly than expected.
Achieving adequate security in Sierra Leone and East Timor took more
time than expected because rival factions opposed the peace operation
and continued fighting. Continued fighting remains a problem in the
Congo. And developing rule of law and participatory governance has
proved difficult because the countries had limited experience with
democratic governance, traditions, and institutions. Second, the United
Nations must effectively coordinate efforts with other international
organizations working in complex emergencies, but each has its own
priorities. Third, the United Nations has not developed meaningful results-
oriented measures of progress for most objectives. For example, a primary
measure for East Timor’s capacity to provide internal security has focused
on the number of police to be trained, rather than how well they control
crime and violence. U.N. mission staff in the field stated that they had not
been directed to develop or use results-oriented measures. Moreover, they
stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to gather the needed data
and report it to U.N. headquarters.

This report contains no recommendations. We provided a draft of this
report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the U.S. Agency
for International Development; and the United Nations. We received verbal
comments from the State Department and written comments from the
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The remaining agencies did
not provide comments. The State Department generally agreed with our


Page 3                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
             findings and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we
             incorporated where appropriate.

             The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
             issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations further
             commented that the report (1) did not fully discuss its efforts to apply
             results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not
             acknowledge numerical measures of progress in mission reporting, and (3)
             did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the
             Congo or progress made. In response, we added information to the report
             about recent and ongoing U.N. efforts to develop results-oriented
             performance measures. We state in the report that the peacekeeping
             operations use numerical measures of progress but note that most of these
             are measures of output or tasks rather than measures of results. We
             discuss the broader security and economic objectives of the U.N. mandate
             in the Congo in several locations in the report, including table 2. We report
             on progress made in the Congo, particularly in appendix III, however,
             much of the progress is very recent.


             The U.N. Security Council authorizes all peacekeeping operations as a
Background   means to further international peace and security.4 The U.N. Department
             of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning,
             management, and logistical support of U.N. peacekeeping operations
             worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the Security Council
             authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these operations were
             ongoing as of August 2003.

             Most current U.N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow
             mandates that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease-fires
             and peace agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing
             operations—those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic
             Republic of the Congo—have broader, multidimensional mandates that
             address complex emergencies.



             4
              The 15-member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation
             and determines its mandate. Such decisions require at least nine votes in favor and are
             subject to a veto by the negative vote of any of the council’s 5 permanent members—China,
             France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U.N.
             Secretary General makes recommendations on how the operation is to be launched and
             carried out and reports on its progress. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations
             is responsible for providing political and executive direction to operations in the field.




             Page 4                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia,
and Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian
affairs, but they initially lacked long-term transition strategies. For
example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with
efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to
provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years
later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives
for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for
effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation
left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations
and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
sustainable peace.

In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as
the Security Council mandated new U.N. operations to address complex
emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these
countries faced and the United Nations’ response.) The council debated
the need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding
multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex
emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past
failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000, the
council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations
about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U.N.
peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each
country and the U.N. operation there.




Page 5                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Figure 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of
June 30, 2003

                                                                    U.N. Mission in the
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone                                        Democratic Republic of the Congo                            U.N. Missions in East Timor
Population (July 2003 estimate):                 5,732,681          Population (July 2003 estimate):             56,625,039     Population (July 2003 estimate):                997,853
Area:                                      71,740 sq. km.           Area:                                  2,345,410 sq. km.    Area:                                     15,007 sq. km.
Total peacekeepers:                                13,219           Total peacekeepers:                               6,886     Total peacekeepers:                                4,014
Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004: $2.6 billion              Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004     $1.9 billion   Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004      $1.8 billion



                                                                                                                 Bunia
                                                                                                          Kisangani

                                                                                                             Goma
                        Makeni          Koidu-
                                        Sefadu                                                                                                                             Baucau
                                                  Koindu                                                                                                           Dili
 Freetown                                                                   Kinshasa         Mbuji-Mayi
                                   Bo
                                           Kenema
                                                                                                                                             West Timor
                                                                                                                                             (Indonesia)




 0           50 miles                                               0                      500 miles                                                                      0     20 miles




                                                                   Sierra
                                                                   Leone
                                                                            Democratic
                                                                              Republic                                                            East Timor
                                                                                 of the
                                                                                Congo




Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web sites; MapArt.

                                                                 Note: U.N. fiscal years begin July 1 and end June 30 of the following calendar year.




                                                                 Page 6                                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                              Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy
U.N. Peacekeeping             for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U.N.
Transition Strategy           strategy consists of three elements:
Consists of Three         •   establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule
Elements                      of law, and economic and social reform;

                          •   coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organizations and
                              donor states; and

                          •   developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to
                              manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions.

                              The Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but
                              also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources
                              needed to carry it out on a case-by-case basis. The U.N. Secretariat,
                              particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help
                              implement this strategy.


Strategy Focuses on           In 2001, the U.N. Secretary General stated that the ultimate purpose of
Achieving Security, Rule of   peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this,
Law, and Economic             the U.N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the
                              United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to
Reform                        (1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide
                              rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for
                              economic and social recovery and reform.

                              Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U.N. peacekeeping
                              operations. However, when armed interventions have been necessary, the
                              United Nations generally has authorized alliances—such as the North
                              Atlantic Treaty Organization—or coalitions of nations to undertake
                              military operations to restore security. U.N. peacekeepers then have
                              responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other aspects of
                              the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move forward. In
                              the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing and
                              reintegrating ex-combatants into society, training a fair and impartial
                              police force, and building a professional army that is accountable to the
                              national government.

                              The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely if
                              the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To
                              support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners



                              Page 7                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
undertake programs to reform a country’s justice system so that it is fair,
transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening or
building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access, and
accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the
Security Council, may include supporting broad-based political parties,
overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting efforts
to combat corruption.

Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is
also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these conditions
include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and activities to
promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as supporting war
crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other efforts in this
area include support for resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not
focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace.
For example, a Department of Defense-sponsored study determined that
past failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to
restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with
the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a
tool for U.S. policy makers reached similar conclusions.5 The guide noted
that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and
political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency
situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the
police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The guide
concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in the
country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming ex-
combatants or holding elections) and/or transforming conditions on the
ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and
increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons
learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping
operations in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for
comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations.6 The
Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and




5
See Len Hawley, Generic Political-Military Plan for a Multilateral Complex Contingency
Operation (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2002).
6
See U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International Peace
Operations, GAO-02-707R (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002).




Page 8                                                GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                          began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for
                          sustainable peace.

                          In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for
                          effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable peace
                          requires a comprehensive approach that includes political, humanitarian,
                          and human rights programs to foster sustainable development, eradication
                          of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and rule of law.7
                          However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting that it decides
                          on a case-by-case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops,
                          funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities.


Strategy Emphasizes       The transition strategy recognizes that U.N. peacekeeping operations
Coordination with Other   cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must be
Organizations and Donor   closely coordinated among U.N. peacekeeping offices; U.N. development,
                          humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international financial
States                    institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and
                          nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that
                          peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these
                          other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation’s
                          earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged
                          cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated
                          response to the specific conditions in each country.

                          As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and
                          individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example,
                          the host government; international financial institutions, such as the World
                          Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for
                          economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace
                          operation ends.




                          7
                           Several U.S. government studies support this approach. For example, see DFI
                          International, Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace
                          (Washington, D.C.: September 1997). Moreover, the Special Coordinator of the Stability
                          Pact for Southeastern Europe noted that the pact, a multinational effort to implement a
                          comprehensive, long-term regional conflict prevention strategy, was also based on this
                          approach.




                          Page 9                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Strategy Focuses on         The U.N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked to
Developing Objectives and   the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward achieving
Results-Oriented Measures   those conditions. The objectives and results-oriented measures are
                            intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions
                            about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective
                            data. The emphasis on using objectives and results-oriented measures is
                            part of the U.N. decision to implement results-based budgeting. Approved
                            by the General Assembly in 2000, results-based budgeting links program
                            objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client or
                            users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended
                            purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program’s
                            objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended
                            to ensure that U.N. programs are designed to achieve results and to ensure
                            that the United Nations can measure performance.


U.N. Reforms Support        The U.N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management
Implementation of           capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and
Strategy                    transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations
                            made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts
                            convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of
                            the existing system for managing peace operations.8 Some key initiatives
                            included the following:

                        •   In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities
                            into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political Affairs was responsible
                            for developing and proposing the mandates of potential peace operations,
                            and DPKO was responsible for planning and logistical support.

                        •   In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in staff
                            for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By January
                            2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For example,
                            it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and increased the
                            civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it to provide useful
                            input in planning individual operations.

                        •   DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace
                            operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long-term


                            8
                             The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the
                            “Brahimi Report,” made recommendations to the Secretary General in November 2000 to
                            improve the strategic direction, planning, organization, and conduct of peace operations.




                            Page 10                                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                          aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to be
                          undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for
                          measuring success.

                      •   As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO
                          has begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task
                          force membership varies but should include core military and police
                          planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U.N. humanitarian
                          and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the
                          International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as
                          appropriate.

                      •   In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create a best
                          practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for
                          Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit’s mission is to analyze past
                          experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The
                          unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for
                          the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials
                          stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the
                          implementation of the United Nations’ revised approach to transition
                          planning.


                          The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition
United Nations Is         strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First,
Trying to Apply the       the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of
                          peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and
Transition Strategy       maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help
                          develop rule of law. U.N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the
                          World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address
                          human rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. efforts
                          are more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more
                          peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and
                          international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts with
                          each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third, each
                          U.N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and results-
                          oriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these to
                          manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes
                          the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation.




                          Page 11                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
U.N. Peacekeeping                           In countries with complex emergencies, U.N. peacekeeping operations and
Operations Seek to                          other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable peace
Establish Conditions for                    by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing institutions that
                                            provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) creating
Sustainable Peace                           conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1 illustrates the
                                            transition objectives associated with U.N. and other stakeholder efforts to
                                            achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic
                                            Republic of the Congo.

Table 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives

Results needed for
sustainable peace                  Sierra Leone                  East Timor              Democratic Republic of the Congo
Establish and maintain security    • Ensure security, freedom    • Establish secure      • Support the cease-fire agreement
                                     of movement                   environment           • Support border security and national
                                   • Strengthen police           • Provide executive       sovereignty
                                     capacity, accountability,     policing authority    • Assist with the disarmament,
                                     and loyalty                 • Develop local police    repatriation, or reintegration of foreign-
                                   • Strengthen Sierra Leone       capacity                and Congolese-armed groups
                                     armed forces                • Support               • Strengthen local police training capacity
                                   • Support reintegration of      strengthening of      • Support reform of security forces
                                     ex-combatants                 external security
                                   • Restore control over          capability
                                     diamond mining              • Assist in
                                   • Address external security     development of
                                     challenges (Liberia and       border control
                                     Guinea)
Develop institutions that ensure   • Consolidate state authority • Create and support    • Assist in the creation of a unified national
rule of law and participatory      • Restore local governance      national government     government
governance                                                         and rule of law       • Support establishment of an interim
                                   • Strengthen rule of law
                                                                 • Supervise and           government
                                                                   support elections     • Foster political reconciliation
                                                                 • Support
                                                                   development of
                                                                   public administrative
                                                                   capacity
                                                                 • Develop local
                                                                   governance




                                            Page 12                                                  GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
 Results needed for
 sustainable peace                                  Sierra Leone                  East Timor              Democratic Republic of the Congo
 Create conditions for economic                     • Facilitate reintegration of • Help institute        • Support reopening of internal waterways
 recovery and social reform                           refugees and internally       national                for free movement of goods and people
                                                      displaced persons             development plan      • Facilitate humanitarian assistance and
                                                    • Reduce poverty,             • Support international   human rights monitoring
                                                      encourage economic            poverty reduction
                                                      growth                        efforts
                                                    • Encourage national          • Assist in
                                                      reconciliation                investigations of and
                                                    • Promote human rights and      proceedings for
                                                      justice                       serious crimes
                                                                                  • Facilitate provision
                                                                                    of humanitarian
                                                                                    assistance
Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.




U.N. Peacekeeping Operations                                      The Security Council mandates for the U.N. peace operations in Sierra
Make Establishing and                                             Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining
Maintaining Security a Priority                                   security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as
                                                                  reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying out
                                                                  provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.N.
                                                                  Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel to
                                                                  provide security at key locations, government buildings, and disarmament
                                                                  sites.9 The mission also facilitated the free flow of people, goods, and
                                                                  humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council expanded the
                                                                  U.N. mission’s mandate in response to renewed violence and by March
                                                                  2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According to the
                                                                  force commander, the operation’s priorities since the election of a new
                                                                  government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to
                                                                  improving the capacity of the local police and government officials.10 The
                                                                  British government has also played a major role in achieving these
                                                                  objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the
                                                                  government and U.N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone’s
                                                                  armed forces and police.




                                                                  9
                                                                   The July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the parties stipulated that the primary
                                                                  rebel group would maintain a cease-fire, disarm and demobilize, transform itself into a
                                                                  political party, and participate in a government of national unity.
                                                                  10
                                                                   Another key task is to complete the reintegration of about 57,000 ex-combatants into
                                                                  society by the end of 2003.




                                                                  Page 13                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In
September 1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an
international force led by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread
violence perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias. According to members of
the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had
a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security
Council subsequently authorized (1) the U.N. Transitional Administration
in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150
troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U.N. Mission of Support
in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus 1,250
police. According to the deputy force commander and other U.N. officials,
these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have continued to
patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun training a
local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small East
Timor military force (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: U.N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East
Timorese Police




Page 14                                             GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                  The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the
                                  Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U.N. force had
                                  about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease-fire
                                  and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May
                                  2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate
                                  1,500-strong force on a limited mission to protect U.N. peacekeeping
                                  troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around
                                  the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the
                                  council increased the strength of the U.N. force to 10,800 and for the first
                                  time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in selected
                                  locations.

U.N. Efforts to Develop Rule of   U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have
Law and Participatory             undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory
Governance                        governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the
                                  U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked
                                  with the Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild
                                  courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges
                                  and prosecutors. In 2002, the U.N. operation provided transportation,
                                  supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections that
                                  observers characterized as “free and fair.” Mission officials also plan to
                                  provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local government
                                  elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U.N. plans and reports, the
                                  priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures
                                  throughout the country.

                                  In East Timor, U.N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory
                                  governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security
                                  Council empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative
                                  and executive authority for the country, including the administration of
                                  justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national consultative
                                  council to help make decisions about the future government and set up a
                                  transitional judicial commission. According to U.N. officials, international
                                  staff and advisors also provided on-the-job training to allow the East
                                  Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the
                                  government. The U.N. mission also supervised East Timor’s first popular
                                  election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the
                                  presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence
                                  and the end of the U.N. transitional administration in May 2002, the follow-
                                  on peace operation has focused on advising and training government
                                  officials and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts.




                                  Page 15                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                               In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.N. peacekeeping
                               operation’s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting
                               the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to
                               establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and
                               Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council
                               expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to help the government
                               restore stability, including support for security sector reform, elections,
                               and rule of law, in coordination with other international actors.

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations   U.N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward
Support Economic and Social    conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East
Recovery Efforts               Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U.N.
                               peacekeeping operation, and the U.N. Development Program helped the
                               government develop a 20-year national development plan. The plan
                               described short- and medium-term strategies for the country’s economic
                               recovery and growth, and was used by the international community to
                               determine their economic support programs. Although the U.N.
                               peacekeeping operation provided funding for some projects, other donors
                               provided major funding for programs to reduce poverty, increase power
                               generation, and support private sector development.

                               U.N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social
                               reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the
                               government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of
                               rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In
                               Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and
                               fund an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those
                               bearing “greatest responsibility” for violations of international
                               humanitarian law during that country’s civil war.11 The U.N. operation
                               assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies. In
                               East Timor, the U.N. operation established a unit to assist in the
                               investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United
                               Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to
                               commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and
                               fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for
                               Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra
                               Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these
                               efforts by providing security and logistical support.



                               11
                                The court’s draft budget for the fiscal year beginning in July 2003 was approximately $35.3
                               million.



                               Page 16                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
U.N. Peacekeeping        The U.N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try
Operations Attempt to    to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations.
Coordinate and Sustain   These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and
                         the establishment of a high-level position in the mission to coordinate
Assistance               security and economic recovery efforts.

                         In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and
                         international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation
                         deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8
                         months before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment
                         mission included members from five donor countries, four U.N. agencies,
                         the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World
                         Bank. The International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent
                         mission to assess East Timor’s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core
                         plans for reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its
                         planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in
                         other post-conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed
                         efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external
                         resources.

                         The U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also
                         coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor
                         meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of
                         Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of
                         Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised
                         strategic plans for that country. U.N. organizations working in Sierra
                         Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank)
                         subsequently collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their
                         national recovery and peace-building efforts. At an international donors
                         conference in November 2002, U.N. organizations and other donors agreed
                         to work together to support the government’s comprehensive national
                         recovery strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national
                         aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination
                         meetings.

                         Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among
                         U.N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out
                         peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of
                         Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second
                         highest ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between
                         security and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy
                         representative in East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping
                         operations and U.N. development programs allow him to better manage


                         Page 17                                        GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                the process of transitioning the mission’s emphasis from peacekeeping to
                                longer term peace building.


United Nations Is               DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and
Beginning to Use                identified some results-oriented measures of progress. The operations in
Objectives and                  Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to
                                plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council
Results-Oriented Measures       makes the final transition decisions.
in Peacekeeping
Operations

Peace Operations Are Making     The U.N. operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic
Efforts to Specify Objectives   Republic of the Congo have specified their objectives, based on mandates
and Measures                    from the Security Council, and have developed measures of progress,
                                some of which are results oriented. (App. II lists the objectives and
                                measures for the three missions.) For example, in Sierra Leone, one
                                objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. Measures
                                of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of households with
                                access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women who are AIDS
                                aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6 percent
                                annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of
                                movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and
                                containing cease-fire violations and opening roads and removing
                                roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are
                                quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing results-
                                oriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace
                                operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the
                                last section of this report.

Peace Operations Use            The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as
Measures of Progress to a       well as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making
Limited Extent in Planning      the final decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces.
Drawdown                        Nonetheless, the United Nations has to a limited extent used some
                                measures to plan the withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East
                                Timor. (The operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a
                                stage to begin withdrawing.) U.N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and
                                modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of
                                progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating ex-
                                combatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining.
                                Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the
                                security risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each
                                region to ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower


                                Page 18                                        GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along the
Liberian border. U.N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the force
was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of the
council’s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping
mission and not because the mission’s measures pointed to a reduced
threat to the country’s security and stability. In March 2003, the council
requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for
the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra
Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal
security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for
withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in
September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by
the Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by
the council in July 2003.




Page 19                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U.N. Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone


U.N. troops
18,000                                           Projected



16,000



14,000



12,000



10,000



 8,000



 6,000



 4,000



 2,000



     0

         2002                      2003                             2004                  2005

                    Sept.      Jan.        May               Nov.          June   Oct. Dec.       July

                Original
                Modified
                Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified

Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.



In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used
measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although
the United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and
international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack of
sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor police
service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of
June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule for
the troops and police.) According to U.N., U.S., and Australian officials,



Page 20                                                                     GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the
United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the
peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as
having a judicial system in place by mid-2003, will not change the
withdrawal date.

Figure 4: Revisions in U.N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police Drawdown Schedule in
East Timor

U.N. troops

6,000

                                                         Projected
5,000


4,000


3,000


2,000


1,000


    0

        2002                    2003                              2004

         May            Nov.            May July      Oct. Dec.           June




U.N. police
                                                         Projected
1,200

 800

 400

    0

        2002                    2003                              2004

        May             Nov.               June              Jan.        May

               Original
               Modified
               Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified


Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.




Page 21                                                                        GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Security Council Bases            Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help
Transition Decisions on Several   manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council
Factors                           decisions. According to U.N. officials, U.S. officials, and members of the
                                  council, the following factors are involved in these decisions:

                              •   Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for
                                  countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the
                                  opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support.

                              •   The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the
                                  country’s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their
                                  country and fulfill their commitments.

                              •   Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security
                                  Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it
                                  devotes resources to ongoing operations.12

                              •   The cost and resources needed for peacekeeping operations are high.
                                  Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support,
                                  particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest.


                                  The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each
United Nations                    element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for
Confronts Significant             sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable
                                  peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival
Challenges to                     factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their
Implementing                      internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers’ presence. Further,
                                  establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in
Transition Strategy               countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and
                                  democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken
                                  longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the
                                  United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities
                                  with those of other independent international organizations and donor
                                  states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third,
                                  developing clear objectives and meaningful results-oriented measures of
                                  progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by
                                  which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in



                                  12
                                   The Security Council has addressed calls for initiating peacekeeping operations in
                                  Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Iraq, and other locations in the past 2 years.




                                  Page 22                                                  GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                              attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made
                              developing or using these measures a priority.

Achieving Security, Rule of   Establishing security in war-torn countries is difficult because of uncertain
Law, and Economic and         and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements among
Social Reform Is Difficult    opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially threatened
                              by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted their
                              movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to
                              commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British
                              troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49
                              peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in East
                              Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with
                              Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro-integration militia created
                              widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A
                              military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to restore
                              security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died.

                              Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven
                              extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease-fire agreements, the two large
                              rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the
                              country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned
                              with neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U.N. peace operation.
                              The operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease-fires
                              frequently have been violated. The government’s forces only have control
                              over half of the country’s territory. After violations of several cease-fire
                              agreements, France led a coalition force to help U.N. peacekeepers control
                              large-scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the Ituri region
                              (see fig. 5).




                              Page 23                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo




Maintaining security in war-torn countries is also a problem. In East
Timor, pro-Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from
Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U.N.
military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to East
Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U.N. peacekeeping troops
should be maintained along the border.13 In April 2003, Sierra Leone
peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state
that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra Leone


13
  The boundary between East and West Timor is known as the Tactical Coordination Line,
pending the outcome of negotiations between East Timor and Indonesia in establishing an
international border.




Page 24                                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                           soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U.N. officials also noted
                           that large concentrations of ex-combatants, unemployed youths,
                           corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas
                           continue to be ongoing threats to security.

                           Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with Liberia




Limited Progress in        Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because
Establishing Rule of Law   countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with
                           transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and
                           institutions. For example, the U.N. strategy for restoring local government
                           to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary chieftaincies and
                           elected district councils. According to a British government analysis,
                           however, Sierra Leone’s reliance on hereditary chieftains has always
                           compromised transparency and accountability and provided a means for
                           the central government to control local affairs. Moreover, this reliance
                           limits democratic participation because only candidates meeting
                           hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections to
                           fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally, local
                           civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the National


                           Page 25                                              GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                               Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief. A
                               2002 U.K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as
                               unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the Anti-
                               Corruption Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate
                               corrupt practices among government officials, has been ineffective,
                               according to U.S. and U.K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies,
                               the World Bank and the U.K. government are planning a 5-year effort to
                               improve the justice system beginning in late 2003.

                               In East Timor, U.N. and other international officials told us that years of
                               mistrust of the Indonesian-imposed court system and the rural
                               population’s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and
                               informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women,
                               according to U.N. and other international officials. These issues present a
                               significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and
                               respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not
                               passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will
                               serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and services
                               beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government services or
                               representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital.

                               In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have
                               almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U.S.
                               government and U.N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that
                               the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory
                               was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo a
                               difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the
                               peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance
                               of the U.N. peacekeeping operation.

Economic Recovery Is a Long-   U.N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have
Term Effort                    noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than
                               those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that
                               developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty
                               will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U.N.
                               Children’s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population
                               is below the poverty level. The most recent U.N. health survey indicated
                               that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished.

                               Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra
                               Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in
                               regaining legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital
                               sector in its economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed


                               Page 26                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                 to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41 million
                                 in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British government
                                 estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise to as much
                                 as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated and effective
                                 anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone
                                 government, U.N., and other international officials agree that government
                                 systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical.

Implementing Overall             Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,
Transition Takes Longer and Is   overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more
More Costly than Originally      time and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone,
Planned                          international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the
                                 early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally planned.
                                 Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999)
                                 anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair
                                 election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit
                                 until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a limited
                                 operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine whether the
                                 nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or
                                 an independent country.14 The U.N. mission of 325 civilian police and
                                 military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following
                                 violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United
                                 Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later
                                 deployed thousands of U.N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition
                                 to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In
                                 the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U.N. observer and peace mission
                                 has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease-fire violations have
                                 occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim
                                 government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July




                                 14
                                  Under the agreement governing the referendum (formally termed a “popular
                                 consultation”), the people of East Timor could choose to accept or reject autonomy.
                                 However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the Indonesian President’s promise to
                                 seek to have Indonesia’s Supreme People’s Consultative Assembly reverse the territory’s
                                 annexation in the event of such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The
                                 agreement stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United
                                 Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence.




                                 Page 27                                                  GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
    2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new
    government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops.15

    Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace,
    implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over
    $6 billion:

•   The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6
    billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for
    the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U.N. fiscal
    year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security Council’s
    decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in response to
    continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for the current
    fiscal year is about $544 million.

•   The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about
    $1.8 billion through June 2004. The initial U.N. observer mission sent to
    organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected
    to cost about $53 million. The current operation’s annual cost is $292
    million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost
    for the current fiscal year is $193 million.

•   The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic
    of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have
    risen from $55 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an
    estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter
    estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council’s
    recent decision to expand the operation’s mandate and authorize a larger
    U.N. force.

    There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that
    are needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not
    funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about
    $69 million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the
    reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved
    access to health, water, and education services. International donors
    funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping


    15
      Experiences in the Balkans further demonstrate that transitions take longer than
    expected. In 1995, U.S. and international leaders stated that the NATO-led peacekeeping
    forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina would require a 1-year deployment and then withdraw.
    As of June 2003, 13,000 international peacekeeping troops remain in the country with some
    remaining for the foreseeable future.




    Page 28                                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                            operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor
                            resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U.N. Development
                            Program identified the need for 228 donor-funded international advisers to
                            begin to help manage government and economic development programs
                            once the U.N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided
                            48 advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100
                            positions.


Coordination among          Despite the numerous efforts at coordination—early planning, donor
Multiple Organizations Is   conferences, and other field representation—the United Nations,
Sometimes Ineffective       international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor
                            nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground. Part
                            of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the
                            country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can
                            create a variety of problems on the ground.

                            In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that
                            efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and
                            humanitarian agencies were not effective. One donor agency official
                            described donor efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and
                            Sierra Leone government representatives stated that neither the
                            government nor the United Nations has an adequate system to track the
                            amount and the impact of external aid, especially aid provided through
                            nongovernmental organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall
                            authority to direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or
                            overlap in specific locations.

                            In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate U.N. peacekeeping operations
                            with donors did not address critical needs in the governance and security
                            areas. According to World Bank officials and assessments, U.N. officials
                            planned activities to rebuild East Timor’s governance and security sectors
                            largely outside of the coordinated needs assessments conducted by the
                            international community in 1999. This situation contributed to some
                            conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For example, one of the first World
                            Bank projects was to help villagers in outlying regions establish local
                            governing councils using traditional law. However, according to the
                            Deputy Special Representative, this effort complicated outreach efforts by
                            the peace operation, as it began establishing central government authority
                            and providing consistent regulations throughout East Timor.




                            Page 29                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Developing Meaningful        The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results-oriented
Results-Oriented Measures    measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping
Poses Difficulties           transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO’s
                             Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for
                             peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable results-
                             oriented measures of progress.

Measures of Progress Often   Although U.N. missions are using measures of progress for their
Focus on Tasks Rather than   operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of
Conditions                   underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to
                             improve. For example, a U.K.-led coalition of donor nations in Sierra
                             Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of
                             progress in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of
                             the armed forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2
                             shows some objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.)

                             Table 2: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of
                             Progress in Sierra Leone

                             Results needed for
                             sustainable peace        Objective                   Measures of progress
                             Establish and maintain   Strengthen police           • Progress toward increasing force
                             security                 capacity, accountability,     to pre-war level (from current
                                                      loyalty                       6,500 to 9,500 personnel)
                                                                                  • Strengthen strategic
                                                                                    management
                                                                                  • Enhance training, expand police
                                                                                    training school capacity
                                                                                  • Provide essential transport and
                                                                                    communication equipment
                                                                                  • Rehabilitate key infrastructure

                                                      Strengthen Sierra Leone     •   Accelerate training
                                                      armed forces                •   Restructuring of armed forces
                                                                                      and Ministry of Defense
                                                                                  •   Ensure sustainability of army
                                                                                      deployments
                                                                                  •   Reduce combined government
                                                                                      and rebel force to 10,500
                                                      Support reintegration of    •   Offer reintegration opportunities
                                                      ex-combatants                   to all registered ex-combatants
                                                                                      (57,000)




                             Page 30                                                  GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
 Results needed for
 sustainable peace                  Objective                   Measures of progress
                                    Address external security   • Accelerate training and
                                    challenges (Liberia and       restructuring of armed forces,
                                    Guinea)                       and the Ministry of Defense
                                                                • Encourage regional political
                                                                  dialogue and collaboration
                                                                • Enhance national capacity to
                                                                  respond to refugee influxes
                                                                • Develop regional arms collection
                                                                  and destruction program
Source: United Nations documents.



According to U.K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such
as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly defined
or taken into account. These military trainers also said that measures for
this area do not provide meaningful indications of the capability of the
Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military trainers noted that while
the U.N. operation focuses on such performance measures as the speed at
which units can deploy, it overlooks such measures as troop discipline,
loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership.
Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and
effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the
armed forces were “much improved” and were effectively patrolling the
country’s border. He also stated that U.N. troops were supporting army
units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General
reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that
lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed
shortcomings in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army
troops retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70
Liberian raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police
investigation into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory
implicated several active-duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the
government and prevent the operation of the international tribunal.

A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East
Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased
capacity of the national police force to provide internal security. However,
these missions use output-oriented measures. For example, in East Timor,
the peace operation originally intended to train 2,830 police by 2004.
However, the operation established this target using a standard European
police-to-population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates.
Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their
training and whether they are improving security in the country. In



Page 31                                                           GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully staffed
police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the riots, the
United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units,
lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human
rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor
police officers by 500.

The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating
governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of
district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of progress
toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U.N. analysts in Sierra
Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas was
having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law.
However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the operations
of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or criteria, such
as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of their
cases within a reasonable period of time.

In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions’ objectives and measures to
develop results-based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so.
U.N. officials said that the missions’ measures were process-oriented and
did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping
operations were working to improve. A U.N. report in late 2002
acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to
objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties
in developing results-oriented measures.16

An example drawn from a Department of Justice international assistance
program could be useful, however. Justice’s framework for overseas
prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of
strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as
decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval for
an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable
measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the



16
 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Agencies Annual Performance Plans Under the
Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking,
GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18 (Washington, D.C.: February 1998); Managing for Results:
Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges,
GAO/GGD-98-44 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 1998); and The Government Performance and
Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven, GAO/GGD-97-109
(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1997).




Page 32                                              GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                                                corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results,
                                                                including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and
                                                                percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such
                                                                measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see
                                                                table 3).

Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and
Training

                                                                                                                                              Sample measures of
 Sample strategic                       Objectives/Results                    Sample measures of                 Sample measures of           impact on underlying
 objective                              soughta                               outputa                            outcome/impacta              conditionsa
 Strengthen judicial                    Identify needs of the host Facilitate development of                     •   Percentage increase      Percentage increase in
 independence in a host                 country:                   anticorruption task force                         in host country budget   public confidence in
 country                                • Decreased organized      by:                                               for anticorruption       government and judicial
                                           crime and corruption    • Securing legislative
                                                                                                                     efforts                  honesty
                                        • More efficient case         approval
                                           processing              • Assisting task force
                                                                                                                 •   Percentage increase
                                                                      formation                                      in corruption
                                        • Increased regard for                                                       complaints filed,
                                           human rights            • Delivering joint                                investigated, and
                                        • Justice for victims of      courses on corruption                          leading to convictions
                                           mass crimes                and surveillance

Source: Excerpted from the Department of Justice Handbook for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training.
                                                                a
                                                                Definitions (under the terms of the Government Performance and Results Act):

                                                                Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a
                                                                quantitative or qualitative manner.

                                                                Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with its objective.
                                                                Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving program objectives.




United Nations Has Not Yet                                      U.N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in past
Developed Results-Oriented                                      missions would be helpful in developing results-oriented measures for
Measures of Progress                                            future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping
                                                                Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition strategy, his
                                                                department needed to develop better measures by which to assess the
                                                                progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable
                                                                peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of results was
                                                                an important task.

                                                                Despite the importance of developing results-based measures, the
                                                                peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the
                                                                Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these
                                                                measures. Although DPKO’s revised planning process for peace operations
                                                                would require mission planners to clarify long-term aims in the country


                                                                Page 33                                                               GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military
planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to
develop results-oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers
for each of the three operations noted that they have received only general
guidance on developing results-oriented measures. Moreover, they stated
they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures and
collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed were
largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use
results-oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff
attempted to implement results-based budgeting for peacekeeping
operations for fiscal year 2003-04. According to one DPKO official,
however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations
staff had not made it a priority to develop results-oriented measures linked
to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U.N. officials noted that DPKO
and mission staff are working to develop results-oriented measures in
order to implement results-based budgets for most peacekeeping
operations by fiscal year 2004-05. They also indicated that the lessons
learned and best practices from this planning and budget preparation
process will be reflected in the 2005-06 budget. Nevertheless, DPKO has
only recently begun to provide the resources necessary to develop these
measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for policy and analysis and
peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best practices unit to
systematically review the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and
develop guidelines and general measures of progress to better plan and
conduct future operations. DPKO did not provide a director for the unit
until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August
2003.

State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for
providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example,
they monitor the progress of the 14 U.N. peacekeeping missions and track
the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent.
They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions.
According to these State officials, they have not focused on U.N. efforts to
develop results-based measures. However, they follow the progress of the
missions through U.N. reports and U.S. intelligence. Nonetheless, they said
more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor the
progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether
they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They
cautioned, however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the
United Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country
and helping it move toward sustainable peace.


Page 34                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                     The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous
Conclusions          challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in internal
                     conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of accountable
                     government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general
                     transition strategy for U.N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step in
                     overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and long-
                     term view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The
                     strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify
                     results-oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations
                     and the withdrawal of peacekeepers.

                     However, the United Nations has not yet developed quantifiable results-
                     oriented measures of progress to help the Security Council make
                     peacekeeping transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses
                     output measures to manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these
                     measures did not provide useful information about results, such as
                     progress in improving security in Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U.N.
                     Department of Peacekeeping Operations has not yet developed results-
                     oriented measures. It created a best practices unit to systematically review
                     the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and develop measures of
                     progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have
                     the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently.


                     We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice,
Agency Comments      and State; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the United
and Our Evaluation   Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the
                     U.S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from
                     the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The
                     remaining agencies did not provide comments.

                     The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided
                     technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where
                     appropriate. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided
                     technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate.

                     The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key
                     issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations was
                     concerned, however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts
                     to apply results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did
                     not acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine
                     peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain
                     the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not


                     Page 35                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have
added information to the report about recent and proposed U.N. efforts to
develop results-oriented performance measures. We describe in the report
a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used
numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of
tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the
United Nations’ results-based budgeting system. The report provides an
accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the
peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U.N. efforts to
develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report
fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and
appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council
voted to expand the operation's mandate. However, this operation's
limited focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations
we examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress
attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The
Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June
2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to
fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan ex-
combatants.


We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International
Development, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies
available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be made
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979, or at christoffj@gao.gov. Other GAO
contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,




Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade




Page 36                                          GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
             Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology


             To identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy, we obtained and
             examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on
             peacekeeping policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to
             the council from the United Nations’ Secretary General. To obtain
             additional detail, we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and
             operational management from officials of the U.N. Department of
             Peacekeeping Operations, as well as officials in the Department of
             Political Affairs who are responsible for contributing to planning peace
             operations. We also interviewed and obtained documents from officials
             from other U.N. bodies, such as the Office for the Coordination of
             Humanitarian Affairs and the U.N. Development Program, that contribute
             to overall U.N. efforts to restore stability in complex emergency countries.
             To obtain other perspectives on U.N. policies and initiatives and
             peacekeeping operations in general, we interviewed and/or obtained
             critical evaluations and analyses from government and nongovernment
             analysts, including officials from the U.S. mission to the United Nations;
             the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the U.S. Agency for
             International Development; the World Bank; the Organization for
             Economic Cooperation and Development; the Henry L. Stimson Center;
             and others.

             To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply
             the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
             the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping
             Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its
             operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to
             implement the United Nations’ commitment to applying results-based
             budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in
             Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those
             countries. These trips included visits to U.N. and national government
             military and police posts, ex-combatant reintegration centers, justice
             institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained
             documentation from U.N. and host government officials, bilateral and
             multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U.N.
             peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing
             internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we
             visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and
             Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in Sierra
             Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries
             allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of
             initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have
             completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to
             withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U.N.


             Page 37                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration
programs and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However,
due to unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United
Nations’ activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it
was in Sierra Leone and East Timor.

To assess challenges faced in applying the U.N. strategy in these countries,
we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping
operations over the last decade (including reviews of U.N. operations in
Cambodia and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues
in our interviews with U.N. headquarters and field-level staff, U.S.
government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad, as
previously described. Our findings regarding U.N. efforts to develop
meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by
our prior work on U.S. government efforts to develop and apply similar
frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the
Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent
and quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined
progress reports sent from the U.N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations headquarters in New York between November
2002 and May 2003.

We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




Page 38                                         GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                            Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures ofProgress, by Mission



Progress, by Mission

Table 4: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone

Results needed for
sustainable peace           Objective                          Measures of progress
Establish and maintain      Ensure security and freedom of     • Cease-fire violations minimized and contained
security                    movement                           • Roads opened, checkpoints removed

                            Strengthen police capacity,        • Progress toward increasing force to prewar level (9,500)
                            accountability, and loyalty        • Strengthen strategic management
                                                               • Enhance training
                                                               • Provide essential equipment, rehabilitate key infrastructure

                            Strengthen Sierra Leone armed      •   Restructure and reduce combined government and rebel forces to
                            forces                                 10,500 troops
                                                               •   Forces accept responsibility for security in areas vacated by U.N.
                                                                   peacekeepers
                            Support reintegration of ex-       •   Offer reintegration opportunities to all registered ex-combatants
                            combatants                             (57,000)
                            Restore control over diamond       •   Support for enforcement of mining regulations
                            mining                             •   Increase value of legal exports
                            Address external security          •   Accelerate training, restructuring of armed forces, Ministry of
                            challenges (Liberia and Guinea)        Defense
                                                               •   Ensure sustainability of army deployments
                                                               •   Encourage political dialogue, collaboration in the Mano River Uniona
                                                               •   Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes
                                                               •   Develop regional arms collection and destruction program
Develop institutions that   Consolidate state authority        •   Restore basic administrative capacity
ensure rule of law and                                         •   Increase number of District officials in office
participatory governance
                            Restore local governance           •   Enhance decentralization for improved public service delivery
                                                               •   Enhance decentralization for community participation in decision
                                                                   making, oversight
                                                               •   Build capacity
                                                               •   Hold local chieftain and district council elections
                            Strengthen rule of law             •   Support rebuilding of impartial, transparent, and independent
                                                                   judiciary
                                                               •   Rehabilitate courts
                                                               •   Train magistrates
                                                               •   Judicial coverage, legal aid in all districts
                                                               •   Rehabilitate essential elements of penal system
                                                               •   Support anticorruption measures (accountability, transparency)




                                            Page 39                                                   GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                                                  Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of
                                                                  Progress, by Mission




 Results needed for
 sustainable peace                         Objective                                   Measures of progress
 Create conditions for                     Facilitate reintegration of                 • Facilitate return of Sierra Leonean refugees
 economic recovery and                     refugees, internally displaced              • Support completion of assisted resettlement program for Internally
 social reform                             persons                                       Displaced Persons
                                                                                       • Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons returned
                                                                                         home
                                                                                       • Support shelter programs
                                                                                       • Improve food security
                                                                                       • Strengthen child protection

                                           Reduce poverty and encourage                •   Increase in percentage of households with access to safe drinking
                                           economic growth                                 water to 63 percent
                                                                                       •   Increase in percentage of children enrolled in primary school
                                                                                       •   Stimulate economic revival—increase annual gross domestic
                                                                                           product growth to 6 percent
                                                                                       •   Malaria: Increase in treated bed net use by pregnant women and
                                                                                           children
                                                                                       •   Health care: Increase in percentage of health units rehabilitated and
                                                                                           functional
                                                                                       •   HIV: Increase in percentage of women who are AIDS aware to 20
                                                                                           percent aware
                                           Encourage national reconciliation           •   Land disputes mechanism functioning
                                                                                       •   Foster policy of inclusion at local level
                                                                                       •   Promote reconciliation initiatives
                                                                                       •   Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioning
                                           Promote human rights, justice               •   Reinforce national human rights institutions
                                                                                       •   Increase capacity of local human rights groups
                                                                                       •   Harmonize domestic and international human rights instruments
                                                                                       •   Promote culture of peace, tolerance, and human rights
                                                                                       •   Special Court functioning
                                                                                       •   Observed decrease in human rights violations
Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.
                                                                  a
                                                                   The Mano River Union is a customs and economic union between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.




                                                                  Page 40                                                      GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                          Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of
                                          Progress, by Mission




Table 5: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor

Results needed for sustainable
peace                              Objective                                   Measures of progress
Establish and maintain security    Establish secure environment                • Reduction and containment of militia threat

                                   Continue to provide executive policing      •   Gradual handover of executive policing by district
                                   after independence                          •   Hand over five districts, eight specialized units by
                                                                                   the end of 2002 from U.N. to Timorese authority,
                                                                                   remaining districts by November 2003
                                                                               •   U.N. review and monitoring of handed over
                                                                                   districts
                                                                               •   Hand over headquarters by January 2004
                                                                               •   Downsize U.N. police from 1,250 to 325 in
                                                                                   January 2004
                                   Support the development of the East         •   Train 3,330 police officers (including 230 border
                                   Timor Police Service (ETPS)                     police) at Police College
                                                                               •   On-the-job mentoring by international experts
                                                                               •   ETPS is able to provide all basic functions
                                                                               •   Specialized training for ETPS in human rights and
                                                                                   management skills
                                   Support external security and territorial   •   East Timor defense force at full operational
                                   integrity                                       capability by June 2004
                                                                               •   June 2004 defense force assumes responsibility
                                                                                   for external security
                                   Assist in the development of border         •   Border demarcated by June 2003; ETPS to
                                   security and control                            assume patrolling and immigration responsibilities
                                                                               •   National government to normalize its customs
                                                                                   service
Develop institutions that ensure   Supervise and support elections             •   Presidential elections conducted April 2002
rule of law and participatory
governance
                                   Support development of the post-            •   Civilian Support Group to assist in 100 core
                                   independence public administration and          functions of government administration
                                   rule of law                                 •   Civilian Support Group to complete essential
                                                                                   services and legal systems activities by November
                                                                                   2003 and remaining functions by May 2004
                                                                               •   Ensure application of general public service
                                                                                   standards and systems throughout the public
                                                                                   administration
                                   Create local governance                     •   Government established in all 13 districts
Create conditions for economic     Facilitate provision of humanitarian        •   Refugees returned home and reintegrated
recovery and social reform         assistance
                                   Support international poverty reduction     •   U.N. Development Program coordinating 228
                                   efforts                                         donor-funded international social and economic
                                                                                   development advisers to the national government
                                   Help institute national development plan    •   10-year plan adopted in 2001; interim targets met




                                          Page 41                                                    GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                                                  Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of
                                                                  Progress, by Mission




 Results needed for sustainable
 peace                                                 Objective                                         Measures of progress
                                                       Assist in the conduct of serious crimes           • Conclude investigations in 10 priority cases and 5
                                                       investigations and proceedings                      other investigations by the end of 2002
                                                                                                         • Successful completion of trials throughout 2003

Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.




Table 6: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

 Results needed for sustainable
 peace                                                 Objective                                              Measures of progress
 Establish and maintain security                       Support cease-fire agreement                           •   Parties to conflict participate in Joint Military
                                                                                                                  Commission
                                                                                                              •   Cease-fire violations investigated
                                                       Assist disarmament and repatriation or                 •   Up to 90,000 Rwandan combatants and
                                                       reintegration of foreign and Congolese armed               dependents voluntarily disarmed and
                                                       groups                                                     repatriated
                                                                                                              •   Congolese combatants disarmed and
                                                                                                                  reintegrated
                                                                                                              •   Establish ban on supply of weapons or any
                                                                                                                  military assistance to armed groups in Ituri
                                                                                                                  and Kivus areas in northeastern Congo
                                                       Support border security and integrity and              •   Verify withdrawal and monitor continued
                                                       national sovereignty                                       absence of Rwandan, Ugandan, and other
                                                                                                                  foreign military forces from the Congo
                                                                                                              •   Establish functional joint Uganda-Congo
                                                                                                                  Pacification Commission to halt hostilities,
                                                                                                                  create administrative authority, and restore
                                                                                                                  law and order in Ituri area
                                                       Strengthen local police capacity                       •   Complete national assessment of police
                                                                                                                  capabilities and needs
                                                                                                              •   Provide limited police training and material
                                                                                                                  support to Kisangani training program
                                                       Foster political reconciliation                        •   All major parties participate in U.N.-
                                                                                                                  sponsored Inter-Congolese dialogue
                                                                                                              •   All parties agree on power-sharing plan
                                                                                                                                                               a
                                                                                                              •   Support the Ituri pacification commission
                                                       Assist in creation of unified national security        •   Establish high command of unified national
                                                       forces                                                     armed forces
                                                                                                              •   Form initial unified police unit in one city or
                                                                                                                  area




                                                                  Page 42                                                      GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                                                                  Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of
                                                                  Progress, by Mission




 Results needed for sustainable
 peace                                                 Objective                                         Measures of progress
 Develop institutions that ensure                      Assist in creation of unified national government • Transitional constitution approved by parties
 rule of law and participatory                                                                           • Transitional government formed by parties
 governance
                                                                                                         • Election plans for a democratic government
                                                                                                           finalized
                                                                                                         • Peacekeeping operation coordinates
                                                                                                           activities of U.N. system and other actors in
                                                                                                           supporting the transitional government and
                                                                                                           rule of law
 Create conditions for economic                        Support reopening of major riverways for free             •   Obtain agreements among parties to conflict
 recovery and social reform                            movement of goods and people                                  permitting commercial and other traffic along
                                                                                                                     the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani
Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews.
                                                                  a
                                                                   The commission, which includes the United Nations and all parties to the conflict in the Congo’s
                                                                  northeastern Ituri region, was created to develop and implement new structures to restore law and
                                                                  order and effective administration in this region along the Ugandan border.




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               Appendix III: Crises and International
Appendix III: Crises and International
               Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
               Democratic Republic of the Congo


Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo
               From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of
Sierra Leone   armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by
               decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption.
               The conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily
               from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to
               restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary
               rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a
               peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace. In
               2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after rebels took
               about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened and
               ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and
               other nationals and to support the government and international
               peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001
               had nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the
               rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or
               rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In
               May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted
               with U.N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The
               U.N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone
               in its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the
               country.

               Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated population
               in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for freed slaves
               by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an independent
               country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with substantial mineral
               resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern portion of the
               country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s prewar population lived in
               poverty.




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Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo




Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone




              GUINEA




                             SIERRA
                             LEONE



                                  Makeni
          Lungi

                                                 Koidu-
                                                 Sefadu
                                                                Koindu
           Freetown
                                                          Kailahun


                                            Bo   Kenema



                  Bonthe

                                                          LIBERIA
       North Atantic
          Ocean
      0                50 miles


Source: MapArt.



The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small-scale
revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later
president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone’s
diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive
struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition.
Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other,
the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of
conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing
conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations’



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global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much
of the nation’s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the
population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people
fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s
professionals.

Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the
international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end
the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African
States,1 with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated
agreements, sponsorship of democratic elections, and military
intervention. These attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra
Leone’s civilian and military institutions, continuing rebel resistance,
limitations of the international military forces operating in the country,
and competing international commitments to the region. The government
was overthrown by a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished
power to a new president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the
RUF did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results.
In November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement
(known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF.
This agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in
1997 by another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling
junta. The government was restored in 1998 after West African forces
drove the junta from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to
overthrow the government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and
destruction in Freetown and the surrounding area.

In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known
as the Lomé Agreement because it was signed in Lomé, Togo) negotiated
with the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF
agreed to maintain a cease-fire, transform itself into a political party, and
join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted
pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for
actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security
Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among
other things, assist in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, assist in



1
 The member states of the Economic Community of West African States are Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.




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Democratic Republic of the Congo




the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants,
and monitor the cease-fire. The council’s resolution authorized the
deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed
the Lomé Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and
engaged in a series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping
forces and, subsequently, with U.N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took
about 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage. U.N. and other assessments
concluded that insufficient military strength and other shortcomings
contributed to the peacekeeping force’s inability to deter and repel RUF
attacks and stabilize the country.2

The hostage-taking and other incidents prompted a significant change in
the United Nations’ and the international community’s approach to the
crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater
military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF
resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United
Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and other nationals
and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment
boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to
redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United
Nations began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series
of steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the
mission’s mandate to clarify its right to self-defense and tasked it to help
extend government authority throughout the country, including areas
controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean
armed forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United
Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country’s support for
the RUF. The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in
mid-2000 enhanced RUF cooperation.

The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U.N.
peacekeeping operation supported the extension of government authority
throughout the country, the disarmament and reintegration of ex-
combatants, and the conduct of free and fair national elections. According
to U.N. reports, by December 2001, U.N. troops had been deployed to all
districts of Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators
and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the



2
 These shortcomings included a serious lack of cohesion within the mission; confusion
about the mandate and rules of engagement; and problems in command and control,
leadership, planning, information sharing, and logistics.




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             Democratic Republic of the Congo




             U.N. forces, the U.N. Development Program, and international groups. In
             January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United
             Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the
             RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and
             parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U.N. operation played an
             important role in supporting these elections, which international and local
             observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of
             violence.

             In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic milestones,
             U.N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the size of the
             mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U.N. officials
             identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where progress
             would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its ability to
             maintain security and stability without substantial assistance from U.N.
             peacekeepers.3


             A former Portuguese colony, East Timor experienced years of intermittent
East Timor   conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low-level
             international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until 1998,
             when Indonesian-Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement on a
             referendum to decide the territory’s political future. The ensuing vote for
             independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from militias
             favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community
             intervened to end the fighting and established a U.N. transitional
             administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international
             assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and
             independence declared in May 2002. A U.N. peacekeeping operation
             remains in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing
             international efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country.

             East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000
             and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor
             (see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided
             between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side
             became part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under


             3
              U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1436 and 1470, adopted in September 2002 and March
             2003 respectively, instructed U.N. officials to base plans for withdrawing the operation on
             an evaluation of the security situation in Sierra Leone and the capacity of the country’s
             security sector to take responsibility for internal and external security.




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Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo




Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor
declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions
provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter
century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate
East Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By
1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last
place among Asian countries on the United Nations’ Human Development
Index.

Figure 8: Map of East Timor


           Banda Sea

                                  INDONESIA



                                            Liquica              Baucau
                                                      Dili
                                                 EAST TIMOR
                             Pante
                            Makasar




                        WEST TIMOR
                       INDONESIA
                                                        Timor Sea




                                                                     0      20 miles


Source: MapArt.




Although the United Nations refused to recognize Indonesia’s annexation
and called for self-determination for East Timor, these calls did not
achieve results until the government of Indonesia changed hands in 1998
and the new administration decided to enter U.N.-mediated discussions
with Portugal about the territory’s political future.

In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on
whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated
with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair


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Democratic Republic of the Congo




referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the
U.N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to
oversee the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility
for maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population
voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U.N.
administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response,
militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the
support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of
people, displacing 500,000 more—many of whom fled or were forcibly
removed to West Timor—and destroying much of the country’s already
damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the
country’s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in
origin.

Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others,
Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security
forces in fact provided considerable support to pro-union militias. In 1999,
the Secretary General noted that the potential for post-vote discord was
widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an effective
job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U.N. mission then in the
country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking
effective action to restore stability.

In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series of
interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence, create
a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that would
permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national government
and withdrawal of U.N. forces. In September 1999, the Security Council
authorized an Australian-led international force of approximately 8,000
military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and
facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force
quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East
Timorese were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced
went to West Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro-Indonesia
militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume
responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian-led force,
administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor’s
capacity for self-government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw
development of a national consultative council, began training a police
force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other
international organizations create the conditions for economic
development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August


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                      Democratic Republic of the Congo




                      2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent
                      assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president.

                      On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U.N.
                      transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to
                      Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the
                      Security Council created a U.N. Mission in Support of East Timor to
                      pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to
                      establish stability and security in the country. The mission has developed
                      implementation plans for its activities, identified security and governance
                      “milestones” to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable for
                      reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2-year period, with the final
                      withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid-2004.


                      Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996-
Democratic Republic   97 and again in 1998-99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has
of the Congo          been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic
                      armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support
                      or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring
                      peace, including a U.N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress
                      since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council
                      established a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. Organization Mission in
                      the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement
                      signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to
                      meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U.N.
                      mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign
                      troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a
                      transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded
                      the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the new government’s
                      efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council
                      authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force.

                      The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in
                      size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country shares
                      borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55 million.
                      The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial deposits of gold,
                      diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and enormous
                      potential for hydroelectric power generation.4 A colony of Belgium until


                      4
                       Coltan, or colombite-tantalite, is a metallic ore used in laptop computers and other
                      common electronic devices.



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1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after
declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in
power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel
the country’s considerable wealth into economic and social development.
Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population
remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support
opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near-total
collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do
little to resist rebels and outside forces.

The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the
1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1
million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became
refugees in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese
Tutsis, the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading
eventually to a 1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in
deposing Mobutu with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The
successor government under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged
in 1998 by a new coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan
troops. With support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad,
the Kabila government pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before
losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective
rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country
(see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the
continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998.




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                                                                    Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the
                                                                    Democratic Republic of the Congo




Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila Government in 1998, and the Location of Major
Antigovernment Groups and Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003

                                                              CHAD
                                                   CHAD
  NIGERIA
                       Chad
                                 Sudan
                                              Anti-GDRC                          CENTRAL
                                              countries                      AFRICAN REPUBLIC
     Pro-GDRC                                    Uganda
     countries             DRC                   Rwanda                                                                SUDAN              Ituri
                                                                                                                                         Armed
      Zimbabwe        Angola                                                                                                             Groups
     Namibia
                                                                                            MLC
                           CAMEROON                                                                                  RCD-N
                                                                              Congo River
          Pro-GDRC countries              0                                                                                      Bunia
                                                  500 miles
          Anti-GDRC countries

                                                                                                         Kisangani
                                                                                                                       RCD-
                                                                                                                       K/ML
                                                                                                                                 UGANDA
                        GABON                                                                                          Goma
                                                                                                                               RWANDA
                                  REPUBLIC
                                   OF THE
                                   CONGO
                                                                                                  RCD
                                                                                                                                BURUNDI


                                              Kinshasa
                                              Government-controlled                                                                        TANZANIA



  Atlantic
   Ocean
                                                                              ANGOLA

 Valuable Minerals             Gold            Coltan         Diamonds

               Location of current ethnic clashes in the Ituri region

               Area demilitarized by agreement
                                                                                                                                    ZAMBIA

 GDRC:     Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
 MLC:      Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
 RCD:      Congolese Rally for Democracy
 RCD-N:    Colgolese Rally for Democracy – National                                                 ZAMBIA
 RCD-K/ML: Congolese Rally for Democracy – Kisangani/Liberation Movement
                                                                                                                                                  MALAWI
 0                                                      500 miles

Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web sites; MapArt.




                                                                    Page 53                                                    GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
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In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a cease-
fire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a transitional
government and national elections. The Security Council authorized a U.N.
peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of hostilities, oversee the
withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks sponsored by the United
Nations and the African Union to create a new national government that
included the current government and foreign-supported rebel groups in
eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would then support the new
government’s efforts to restore peace, including a timetable calling for
agreement on the formation of a unified transitional government within 3
months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6 months, and
reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC within 9
months, that is, by April 2000.

The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to
implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a
national government was also substantially delayed. The parties
committed numerous violations of the cease-fire, and it was not until
December 2002 that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups
from eastern Congo5 signed a power-sharing agreement that would permit
the creation of the transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow
to withdraw in part because they want to retain control of mineral
resources.6 Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda
removed the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has
continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other
northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting after
foreign troops vacated the area.

Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and
mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace
process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for the


5
 The two major rebel groups participating in peace-building efforts are the Rwandan-
supported Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Ugandan-supported Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo. Splinters of these two groups and other rebel groups have also
been involved in the fighting and in recent negotiations to form a transitional government.
6
 A U.N. panel concluded in late 2002 that the conflict in the DRC had evolved into a dispute
about control over minerals. The panel observed that disintegration of civil authority in the
DRC, combined with incursion by foreign armies, had fostered the formation of criminal
networks linked to the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and to the DRC
government. These networks realized large profits from trade in the country’s natural
resources and had built up a “self-financing war economy” that is likely to remain a
challenge to establishing an effective national government.




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eastern rebel-occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River
to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and
repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to
Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the
peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military
liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual
forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly
below the ceiling because the country’s unstable political environment,
great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy
troops. Consequently, the number of U.N. troops actually deployed to the
DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May
2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French-led
force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end fighting
and restore order in the city of Bunia.

The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity
and Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security
Council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the
government in developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring
stability, including efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and
the establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other
international actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force
to stabilize Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force
level to 10,800 troops. The U.N. operation will also assume control over
international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new
resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for
elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the
holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate
time to end the current peacekeeping operation.




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             Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N.
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N.
             Department of Peacekeeping Operations



Department of Peacekeeping Operations




             Page 56                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations




Page 57                                 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
                  Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff
                  Acknowledgments



Acknowledgments

                  Tetsuo Miyabara, (202) 512-8974
GAO Contacts      B. Patrick Hickey, (202) 512-3163


                  In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De
Staff             Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions
Acknowledgments   to this report.




(320144)
                  Page 58                                       GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping
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