oversight

Defense Management: Army Needs to Address Resource and Mission Requirements Affecting Its Training and Doctrine Command

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-02-10.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                United States General Accounting Office

GAO             Report to Congressional Requesters




February 2003
                DEFENSE
                MANAGEMENT
                Army Needs to
                Address Resource and
                Mission Requirements
                Affecting Its Training
                and Doctrine
                Command




GAO-03-214
                                               February 2003


                                               DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

                                               Army Needs to Address Resource and
Highlights of GAO-03-214, a report to          Mission Requirements Affecting Its
Congressional Requesters
                                               Training and Doctrine Command



The Army’s Training and Doctrine               Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown as a result of
Command (TRADOC) trains                        new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet
soldiers and develops doctrine and             those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the Command’s
future warfighting concepts to fight           operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC allocated these
the battles of today and tomorrow.             and other operations money to support its highest mission priority—
As such, the Command has been
designated as the lead in the
                                               training—while other areas received less emphasis. The table below depicts
Army’s transformation from a Cold              the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed to perform its
War-oriented force into a rapidly              workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number of personnel the
deployable and responsive force                Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved differences exist between
better able to meet the diverse                TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC’s personnel requirements.
challenges of the future. Concerns
have been raised at congressional              Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel authorizations,
hearings about TRADOC’s                        TRADOC has met its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, the
readiness to perform its mission,              Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, such as developing
particularly within the context of             training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these backlogs is
Army transformation and                        illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports, which show that the
associated funding priorities. GAO
assessed the impact of budget,
                                               Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its
workload, and personnel changes,               units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and attributed the low ratings
as well as ongoing transformation              primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two Army leadership panels
plans, on TRADOC’s ability to                  concluded that TRADOC’s training and development standards had
perform its mission and deliver                deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and leader
well-trained soldiers to the combat            development programs were lacking.
forces.
                                               Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOC’s ability
                                               to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to reassess
                                               TRADOC’s process for determining personnel requirements and ongoing
GAO recommends that the Army
validate TRADOC’s workload and                 efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant commands
personnel requirements before                  to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing flexibility to shift
further reducing the Command’s                 funds from one mission area to another because the Army established the
personnel authorizations, and                  Installation Management Agency to manage its facilities. TRADOC is
ensure that the Command’s                      developing a reengineering plan that Command officials believe will increase
reengineering plan adequately                  TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements;
addresses efficiency, effectiveness,           however, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital
and human capital issues. In                   issues associated with the plan are not yet clear.
commenting on the report, the
Department of Defense concurred
                                               TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001
with the recommendations related
to TRADOC’s reengineering but                                                 1995     1996     1997    1998 a   1999 a   2000 a    2001
expressed various concerns about                   Personnel required by
                                                   TRADOC                    79,298 77,069 76,650 75,613 76,139 76,409 78,255
other related recommendations,
                                                   Personnel authorized by
leaving unclear what overall
                                                   the Army                  63,139 57,814 57,700 56,814 55,852 54,659 55,204
actions would be taken.
                                                   Authorizations as a
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-214.             percent of requirements    80%       75%      75%      75%      73%      71%      71%
                                               Source: TRADOC.
To view the full report, including the scope   a
and methodology, click on the link above.      Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of two TRADOC subcommands.
For more information, contact Barry Holman
at (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov.
Contents


Letter                                                                                1
               Results in Brief                                                       2
               Background                                                             5
               TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While
                 Budget Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload             10
               TRADOC’s Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met;
                 Leadership Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems           18
               Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain          31
               Conclusions                                                           40
               Recommendations for Executive Action                                  41
               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                    41

Appendix I     Objectives, Scope, and Methodology                                    44



Appendix II    Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions                             47



Appendix III   Comments from the Department of Defense                               50



Appendix IV    GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments                                 51




Tables
               Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001              11
               Table 2: TRADOC’s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development
                        Priorities (as of October 2002)                              21
               Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies
                        Announced during Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of
                        November 2002)                                               35
               Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the
                        Active Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal
                        Years 1991 and 2001                                          49




               Page i                                     GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figures
          Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations                                                       6
          Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation                                 9
          Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area                             10
          Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected
                   Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001                                            13
          Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a
                   Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-
                   2001                                                                             14
          Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission
                   Areas for Fiscal Years 1995-2001                                                 16
          Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for
                   Fiscal Years 1995-2001                                                           17
          Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003                                  19
          Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002)                                   22
          Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting
                   Units, for the Period January 2001 – February 2002                               25
          Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for
                   Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001                                        47
          Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for
                   Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001                                        48


          Abbreviations

          AMC               Army Materiel Command
          DOD               Department of Defense
          FORSCOM           Army Forces Command
          IMA               Installation Management Agency
          O&M               Operations and Maintenance
          OMB               Office of Management and Budget
          POI               Programs of Instruction
          TRADOC            Training and Doctrine Command



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          Page ii                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548




                                   February 10, 2003

                                   The Honorable Joel Heffley
                                   Chairman
                                   The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz
                                   Ranking Minority Member
                                   Subcommittee on Readiness
                                   Committee on Armed Services
                                   House of Representatives

                                   The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force
                                   into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet
                                   the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational and
                                   operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every element
                                   of the Army. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has
                                   been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as the
                                   architect of the Army’s future, TRADOC has a key role in the
                                   transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the
                                   Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing
                                   warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, training,
                                   and associated support for military personnel. Like the Department of
                                   Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred significant
                                   decreases in its resources—particularly its personnel resources—during
                                   the 1990s as the department took major steps to reshape and reduce the
                                   size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 and 2001, Army active duty
                                   military personnel and civilian personnel were reduced by about 33
                                   percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC incurred similar reductions
                                   during this period.

                                   Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources
                                   among competing priorities and programs within and among the Army’s
                                   operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has chosen
                                   to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and accept a higher
                                   level of risk of mission failure in support organizations such as TRADOC.
                                   At the same time, at congressional hearings over the last few years,
                                   concerns have been raised about TRADOC’s readiness to perform its
                                   mission, particularly within the context of Army transformation. At your
                                   request, we reviewed the resources and workload assigned to the
                                   Command and its readiness to carry out its mission. Our specific review
                                   objectives were to examine (1) the Training and Doctrine Command’s
                                   personnel, workload, and budget trends since 1995; (2) the impact of
                                   personnel and budget changes on the Command’s ability to perform its


                                   Page 1                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                   mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the
                   actions taken or planned that could have an effect on the Command’s
                   ability to perform its mission.

                   In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed
                   officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and
                   Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Command’s personnel
                   and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through
                   2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I.


                   Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown due to new
Results in Brief   mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, its
                   authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. Specifically,
                   the number of authorized personnel declined during this period from
                   about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization represents about
                   70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes are needed to
                   perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which have ranged
                   from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.1 The reductions in authorized
                   personnel were caused by a number of DOD and Army decisions. Key
                   among these were reductions mandated by force structure reshaping
                   decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as “Quicksilver,”2 and other
                   department initiatives that occurred since 1995, such as reductions
                   recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.3 While TRADOC
                   officials believe that the Command’s reported personnel requirements are
                   accurate, unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army
                   Headquarters staff over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as
                   they relate to the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the
                   Command’s primary funding source—operations and maintenance
                   funding—increased about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the
                   Command’s discretion, funding for all of TRADOC’s programs did not
                   increase—funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while



                   1
                    Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and personnel authorizations.
                   Personnel requirements refer to the number of personnel, both civilian and military,
                   deemed necessary by TRADOC to support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to
                   the number of personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire.
                   Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of budget constraints.
                   2
                    “Quicksilver” was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force structure and create a
                   more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and ready force.
                   3
                       The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S. forces.




                   Page 2                                                    GAO-03-214 Defense Management
funding devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the
Command reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also,
a large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract
personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army
transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001,
contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about
$317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of personnel
authorizations, according to Command officials.

Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its
highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns
about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more
difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements—such as those
involving the development of training materials and doctrine—many of
which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload
backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports. Our analysis
of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the lowest
readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001
and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings primarily to the lack of
personnel. The impact of these conditions has been observed by
organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership panels chartered by
the Army Chief of Staff—one representing officers and one representing
noncommissioned officers—concluded in 2001 and 2002 that TRADOC’s
training and development standards had deteriorated and that
mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development programs
were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command—a primary
customer of TRADOC services—have also expressed concern about
TRADOC’s reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully quantified
due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although TRADOC does
not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality and relevance
of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command officials
indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOC’s individual training
programs and doctrine products has declined. For example, they cite the
lack of a training strategy to support operational units’ adoption of digital
technology, as well as the outdated condition of some doctrine used to
guide tactics and procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces
Command officials noted that TRADOC’s support for an element of the
Army transformation—the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—had been
good. Continuing disconnects between mission requirements and
resources could adversely affect TRADOC’s ability to carry out its mission
and improve its readiness posture in the future as it continues to address
additional transformation requirements, while also training and supporting
the current force.


Page 3                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Command’s ability to
perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is unclear
at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters initiative, already
underway, began shifting budgetary resources and about 10,000 personnel
authorizations related to base operations away from the Command to the
new Army Installation Management Agency. This reorganization will
reduce TRADOC’s mission requirements, but will also eliminate base
operations funds that, in the past, were used by the Command as a source
of training support; thus, in the future, the Command will have less
flexibility to shift funding among its primary missions. Another Army
Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing the process used to
determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and other commands that
support warfighting units, but the outcome is uncertain because
differences of opinion exist over TRADOC’s requirements and the extent
to which its requirements have been offset by contractor support. Also, the
Army is conducting commercial activities studies to identify opportunities
to use in-house personnel more efficiently and to contract some activities
to an outside vendor. Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel
requirements in the activities studied but would not necessarily free
personnel for assignment to other activities or mission areas where
shortages exist. In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known
as “Manning the Force,” which is transferring military personnel from the
noncombatant forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the
Army’s combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal
year 2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to
TRADOC; however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of
this specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan
that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command
structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the
Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command
officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will increase
TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements.
However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital
issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet clear. Also, the
extent to which this effort will lead to organizational consolidations and
reductions in personnel requirements remains unclear. These issues could
take on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts
and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased
risk in its role as the Army’s architect of the future.

We are making recommendations for executive action to help the
Command address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its
products and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately


Page 4                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                            addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is
                            properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a
                            draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to
                            TRADOC’s reengineering process but expressed various concerns about
                            other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions
                            would be taken.


                            The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The
Background                  institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and
                            maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that
                            enable operational forces—combat and support units—to deploy and fight
                            in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Army’s institutional
                            forces. The Command is viewed as the Army’s “architect of the future”
                            because much of what it does is focused on identifying future warfighting
                            requirements and developing organizations, training curriculum, doctrine,
                            and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as well as those of today.


TRADOC’s Responsibilities   TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training centers
                            located on 15 major installations throughout the continental United States.
                            (See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle laboratories, which support
                            research and development activities associated with weapon systems and
                            combat operations. The schools and battle laboratories specialize in
                            developing and testing warfighting capabilities such as air defense, armor,
                            artillery, aviation, infantry, and transportation. During fiscal year 2001,
                            TRADOC was authorized about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700
                            civilian personnel.




                            Page 5                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations




                                           In general, TRADOC’s overall mission focuses on five primary areas:

                                       •   Combat Development. Through its combat development mission,
                                           TRADOC identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and
                                           existing weapon and battlefield management systems to improve
                                           warfighting capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and
                                           requirements are designed and incorporated into current and new weapon
                                           systems to improve the Army’s warfighting capabilities. As part of this
                                           effort, TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and
                                           development activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The
                                           Command’s battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat
                                           development mission.
                                       •   Doctrine Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the
                                           complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and
                                           operating environments—from infantry operations to aviation—that
                                           combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics,



                                           Page 6                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
    techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out their
    warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare. Much of the
    Army’s doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number more than
    600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, as well as
    develop organizational structures for combat units.
•   Training and Training Development. TRADOC’s training and training
    development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers,
    capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides
    soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also
    provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate a
    tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for
    over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also develops
    training material for unit training, which takes place in the combat units.
    In addition, through training development, TRADOC certifies staff and
    faculty associated with its schools, develops a distance-learning
    curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its military personnel.
    During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about 323,000 military and
    civilian personnel at its schools.
•   Accessions/Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers
    for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United
    States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities in
    Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand
    called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002.
    From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, accessions
    activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, the Cadet
    Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These
    commands are now components of the Accessions Command.
•   Base Operations. TRADOC has historically maintained the school
    buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used to
    carry out its mission. Base support activities have included facilities
    maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 2002, base
    operations support across the Army was consolidated and transitioning to
    a new Army agency called the Installation Management Agency was begun.
    Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have direct
    responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the TRADOC
    personnel and funding resources associated with base operations is being
    transferred to the new agency.

    TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This
    transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move
    the Army’s Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more
    strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a strategic gap
    in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is expected to be
    capable of responding to a broad range of operations—from peacekeeping



    Page 7                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                     to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To realize the transformation,
                     the Army plans to develop new equipment, revise its operating concepts
                     and doctrine, build unit-level organizations that can quickly adapt to
                     changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and change how it
                     trains its soldiers and leaders. Transformation will touch on all of
                     TRADOC’s mission areas because TRADOC is heavily involved in
                     developing requirements for current and new equipment, revising
                     doctrine, developing new organizations, and training soldiers and leaders.
                     As part of its transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played
                     a lead role in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—
                     commonly referred to as the Stryker brigades—which are being organized
                     and equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with
                     more lethality and survivability.


Overview of TRADOC   In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion to
Funding              carry out its mission.4 This total, however, does not include funding to pay
                     the Command’s military personnel, who are paid from funds that are
                     centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 depicts TRADOC’s
                     funding by appropriation.




                     4
                      We focused primarily on TRADOC’s fiscal year 2001 budget because the Command had
                     not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at the time we conducted a significant
                     portion of our analysis.




                     Page 8                                                   GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation




The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or
about 91 percent of TRADOC’s total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M
funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas.




Page 9                                          GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                        Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area




                        Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding.
                        Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat
                        developments and training development.

                        TRADOC’s O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year
                        2002—about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of the
                        increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war on
                        terrorism.


                        Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC has
TRADOC Personnel        been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the number
Authorizations Have     of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While personnel
                        requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 1995 and
Been Reduced, While     2001, TRADOC’s workload increased and its personnel authorizations
Budget Increases        decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape and constrain
                        the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army Headquarters
Have Gone to Training   officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOC’s personnel
and New Workload        requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased, TRADOC’s budget
                        increased; however, the increase was not applied uniformly across all of
                        TRADOC’s programs or mission areas. An increasing percentage of the
                        budget was shifted to the Command’s highest-priority mission area—
                        training. In addition, a portion of the budget increase was directed to new
                        mission requirements related to Army transformation. Because TRADOC



                        Page 10                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                          did not have the in-house personnel to address the new requirements, the
                          Command increased its use of contractors to satisfy some of the new
                          mission requirements.


TRADOC Personnel          Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s personnel requirements, as identified by
Authorizations Are Down   the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel
Despite Increasing        authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have gradually
                          declined by nearly 13 percent—from about 63,000 to 55,000—to where
Workload and Associated   they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of the
Personnel Requirements    Command’s personnel requirements. Table 1 details these personnel
                          trends.

                          Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001
                                                                                        a          a          a
                                                    1995      1996       1997     1998       1999       2000        2001
                              Requirements        79,298    77,069     76,650    75,613     76,139     76,409     78,255
                              Authorizations      63,139    57,814     57,700    56,814     55,852     54,659     55,204
                              Actual              61,207    57,036     57,273    54,839     53,699     51,993     50,936
                              Authorizations as
                              a percent of
                              requirements          80%       75%        75%        75%        73%       71%        71%
                              Actual as a
                              percent of
                              requirements          77%       74%        75%        72%        71%       68%        65%
                              Actual as a
                              percent of
                              authorizations        97%       99%        98%        97%        96%       95%        92%
                          Source: TRADOC.

                          a
                           Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of personnel requirements and
                          authorizations, and actual personnel that are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the
                          Recruiting Command and Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see
                          app. I).


                          TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between
                          fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was staffed
                          at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at only 65 percent
                          of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also shows that the
                          Command has experienced a decline in the number of actual personnel
                          assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC officials, this shortfall in
                          actual personnel provides an even clearer indication that the Command’s
                          full workload cannot be accomplished. The reductions in TRADOC’s
                          personnel authorizations were similar to those of the Army overall, as well
                          as for selected commands. See appendix II for a comparison of TRADOC’s




                          Page 11                                                    GAO-03-214 Defense Management
personnel authorizations with those of other selected major Army
commands.

Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s workload has grown due to the addition
of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated
with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge
after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command
acquired responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new
aspects of the Army’s fighting forces—the interim and objective forces—
while still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and
transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include
developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine,
and training courses to facilitate the transformation.

In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in
TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995
and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller
commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the
Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff
College.5 Each of these commands and agencies brought new workload
requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the
personnel authorizations associated with that workload.

The personnel requirements associated with the Command’s major
mission areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between
fiscal years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4.




5
 TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training Education
Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical Services Agency, and the Army
Nuclear Chemical Agency.




Page 12                                             GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001




                                       Note: The training component of TRADOC’s training and training development mission area has the
                                       single most personnel requirements and is shown in the chart separately from the training
                                       development component. The doctrine development mission area is included in the figure, but
                                       TRADOC does not account for doctrine development personnel separately. Instead, doctrine
                                       development personnel are accounted for in the training development and combat developments
                                       mission areas.


                                       As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOC’s training mission area
                                       ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between fiscal
                                       years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for the training
                                       development, combat development, and base operations mission areas
                                       had some minor changes from year to year.

                                       The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995 and
                                       2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to ensure
                                       that it successfully performed its highest-priority function—training.
                                       Figure 5 shows TRADOC’s authorization allocations relative to personnel
                                       requirements during this period. In comparison to the other mission areas,
                                       training was authorized the highest percentage of personnel authorizations



                                       Page 13                                                    GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                                        in each year. Furthermore, training authorization levels remained
                                        relatively steady, while those in the base operations mission area were
                                        steadily reduced.

Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-
2001




                                        Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a
                                        large portion of TRADOC’s personnel authorization reductions.
                                        Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure
                                        reshaping initiatives—including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial
                                        Defense Review—that were aimed at streamlining the military services.
                                        Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel
                                        authorizations and often left the military services and their commands to
                                        determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such
                                        initiative—referred to as “Quicksilver”—was implemented between fiscal
                                        years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Army’s force structure to create a
                                        balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready force than
                                        existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative eliminated 3,134 civilian




                                        Page 14                                           GAO-03-214 Defense Management
positions and 6,224 military positions at TRADOC between fiscal years
1991 and 2001.

TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported
personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements
determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as
proof that their process produces valid requirements.6 Also,
representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOC’s
personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound
methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC
and Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Command’s
personnel requirements. Representatives of the Army’s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions used
by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these
officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account for
work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference between
the Command’s requirements and authorizations is not as large as it
appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap between
requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did not provide
any objective analysis to document the extent to which this might be the
case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient data to show the
extent to which they were relying on contractors.7 However, according to
TRADOC officials, the Command’s personnel requirements determination
process appropriately considers work being done by contractors. Although
we did not independently validate TRADOC’s personnel requirements
processes, our discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of
available documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was
based on a rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the
work being performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in
this report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of
low readiness ratings.




6
 The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for overseeing and
certifying the Army requirements determination processes used by Army commands. The
Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower &
Reserve Affairs).
7
 During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to identify the size of its
contractor workforce.




Page 15                                                   GAO-03-214 Defense Management
TRADOC Received Budget      Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOC’s O&M budget increased
Increases, but Additional   $544 million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001
Funds Benefited Limited     dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all of
                            TRADOC’s mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding for
Areas                       the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or about
                            2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 million,
                            or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the recruiting or
                            accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, or almost
                            100 percent. (See fig. 6.)

                            Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for Fiscal
                            Years 1995-2001




                            Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget
                            categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in
                            the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while


                            Page 16                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian
personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations.

During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted
from base operations accounts to the Command’s highest priority
mission—training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally left
TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and maintenance on
its facilities.

Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal Years
1995-2001




The largest increases in TRADOC’s budget were directly related to
contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995
and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by
38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars).
According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this contract
funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. They noted
that in several instances the Army provided funding for transformation-
related activities but did not provide the associated personnel


Page 17                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                         authorizations. TRADOC did not have available in-house personnel to
                         address the new requirements, which effectively forced the Command to
                         contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the Command received
                         $289 million related to new mission funding. Of that total, $150 million, or
                         52 percent of new mission funding, was directly associated with Army
                         transformation and was used to acquire contractor support. For example,
                         contractors were used to develop doctrine and training materials for the
                         new Stryker brigades.


                         Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged
TRADOC’s Full            personnel requirements, have affected TRADOC’s ability to meet workload
Workload                 requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to
                         perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs of
Requirements Are Not     work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat
Being Met; Leadership    development, and base operations mission areas. The Command’s inability
                         to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected in
Panels and Combat        its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness
Forces Cite Quality      levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a
Problems                 formal process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate
                         the effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential
                         problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001
                         and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOC’s ability to effectively carry
                         out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces
                         Command (FORSCOM)—a major TRADOC customer—indicates that the
                         quality of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and
                         confirms that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and
                         other potential future requirements will likely place new demands on
                         TRADOC, making it even more challenging for the Command to perform
                         its mission at its current resource levels.


TRADOC Performed         Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its training
Training Mission but     mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality of the
Experienced Difficulty   training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time equivalent students
                         per year—referred to as the training workload—decreased significantly
Meeting Other Mission    between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily as a result of DOD
Workload                 downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training workload has remained
                         relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 full-time equivalent students
                         annually. Due to the high priority placed on meeting the training workload,
                         TRADOC ensures that the students arriving at its schools receive timely
                         scheduled training.



                         Page 18                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003




                                        However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the
                                        TRADOC schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality
                                        in some aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe
                                        that the Command does not have enough experienced training instructors
                                        to provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that
                                        personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate
                                        knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine
                                        publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing
                                        doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine as a
                                        secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the decreasing
                                        number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, resulted in more
                                        students per instructor and less individual training time.


Workload Backlogs Exist                 Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOC’s primary mission
in Some Mission Areas                   areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the
                                        Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing.
                                        Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the
                                        Command’s ability to carry out base operations.




                                        Page 19                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
TRADOC Has Training and   According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine
Doctrine Development      development backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and
Backlogs                  doctrine materials must complement one another so that soldiers are
                          trained according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an
                          insufficient number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not
                          been able to maintain the currency of its highest-priority training
                          courses—commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)—and
                          associated doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the
                          shortage of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used
                          contractors in some instances to write and revise doctrine publications.
                          Even with the use of contractors, backlogs continue.

                          TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Command’s highest-
                          priority training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership
                          uses the information contained in this database to make resource and
                          workload allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from
                          the database, identifies the Army’s top 13 training and doctrine
                          development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top
                          priorities do not represent the entirety of the Command’s training and
                          doctrine development workload. The work associated with these priorities
                          is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years available to
                          perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOC’s available personnel
                          cannot complete the workload associated with these top priorities—only
                          45 percent of the staff-years required for the top priority training and
                          doctrine development work were available, indicating a significant
                          shortfall in personnel available to do this work.




                          Page 20                                      GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Table 2: TRADOC’s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities (as of
October 2002)

 Priority ranking       Workload categories                                   Staff-years
                        Contemporary operating environment/force
 1                      protection                                                 717.98
 2                      Unit set fielding – 1st Cavalry                            108.49
                        Interim B\brigade combat teams (Stryker
 3                      brigades)                                                  850.22
 4                      Distance learning courseware                             1,911.81
 5                      Doctrine (field manuals, joint and NATO pubs)              306.82
 6                      Mission training plans                                   1,403.97
 7                      Soldier training pubs                                       17.02
 8                      TRADOC transformation                                      103.80
 9                      Institutional digital education plan                        84.00
 10                     Interim division                                           187.18
 11                     Individual training requirements (POI, etc.)             1,326.19
 12                     Total army training system courseware                       35.17
 13                     Warrior training support packages                          265.43
 Total staff-year
 requirements                                                                    7,318.08
 Total staff-years
 available                                                                       3,294.00
 Shortfall in
 staff-years                                                                   (4,024.08)
Source: TRADOC.


Most of the Command’s training and doctrine developers are focusing on
the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and fourth
priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the staff-years
required, while attention given to other areas—such as Mission Training
Plans and TRADOC Transformation—varies.8

Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of
doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related to
TRADOC’s doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials told
us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 percent
of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion of this
backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, reviewed


8
  TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials were confident that the
Contemporary Operating Environment/Force Protection and the Distance Learning
Courseware priorities were filled to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have
received resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing for these
areas.




Page 21                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
periodically, and revised.9 In total, TRADOC is responsible for more than
600 field manuals and publications, which include joint operations with
other military services and U.S. allies.

We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the field
manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 67 percent
of the manuals required work, including the development of at least 81
new publications, the review of 129 existing publications, and the revision
of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new publications, 26 are directly
related to the Stryker brigades and Army transformation. Without updated
field manuals, the Army’s combat units may not have the benefit of the
tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to help them better perform
their missions in future conflicts.

Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002)




9
 The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has six phases:
(1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) print and dissemination,
and (6) implementation and evaluation. This process may take from 18 to 24 months to
complete. The length of time varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly
written or revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the
staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required.




Page 22                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                              Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to satisfy
                              some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is
                              responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker
                              brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new
                              brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us that the
                              contractor used retired military personnel with infantry experience to help
                              write the field manuals. The officials noted that the retired military
                              personnel being used by the contractor had relevant experience needed
                              for writing doctrine; however, they also expressed concern that reduced
                              personnel authorizations may eventually shrink the pool of available
                              retired military personnel with the experience needed to fill the contract
                              positions.

Combat Development Backlog    TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat
Is Growing                    developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to
                              develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements
                              related to force modernization and transformation, among other things.
                              According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about
                              46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted that
                              the Command’s workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 percent
                              per year because the mission area does not have enough personnel to
                              address the large volume of tasks that needs to be completed.

Declining Resources Affect    TRADOC’s base operations mission area, which involves activities like
TRADOC’s Ability to Provide   logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real
Base Operations               property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC officials
                              told us that they frequently were able to provide only emergency or
                              minimal real property maintenance at installations between fiscal years
                              1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. Moreover, during
                              that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base operations accounts to
                              training accounts to ensure that the training mission could be
                              accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of reported real property
                              maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, the funding level for the
                              Command’s base operations was set at about 70 percent of its workload
                              requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more funding available for
                              higher-priority mission areas, such as training.

                              Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the
                              difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, officials
                              from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training
                              Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training exercises,
                              has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and provide
                              feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result, FORSCOM units


                              Page 23                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                          have had to use their own personnel to augment National Training Center
                          personnel, particularly in the area of forward observers; consequently,
                          some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to participate fully in
                          training exercises.


Readiness Reports Show    TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of
                          most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to the
Personnel Shortages and
                          Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a majority of
Effects                   the Command’s organizations were assigned the lowest readiness rating
                          throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal year 2002 and that 17 of
                          TRADOC’s 30 reporting units identified personnel shortages as the primary
                          reason for their lower readiness status.10 TRADOC’s readiness rating
                          criteria call for a unit to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has
                          less than 70 percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the
                          30 units included in the reports were rated.




                          10
                            Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to personnel levels, equipment on
                          hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The ratings are measures of a
                          unit/component’s ability to perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest
                          readiness position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, a C-4
                          rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that the mission cannot be
                          accomplished.




                          Page 24                                                  GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for the
Period January 2001 – February 2002




Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports.


A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had
other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For
example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating identified
the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient personnel as the
reason for its low readiness ratings.

Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the
readiness ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The
comments highlight the types of problems being experienced and the
effect those problems have on the unit’s mission performance. We
reviewed the comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the
following quote is representative of many of the comments that appeared
in the monthly reports:

[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer presence, has put
Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk resulting in the use of outdated
doctrine and training materials.…The Operating Force has to compensate by developing
what it needs on its own.

According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage
of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness



Page 25                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding
for 400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the
Command’s large training development backlog. Another comment noted
that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training developers
severely degraded the Command’s capability to maintain current force
training materials as well as support the evolving future forces’
requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units reported a
shortage of developers as a major concern at least once.

Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions in
the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training
positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced
military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel
reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they were
marginally qualified or not qualified at all.

DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform their
respective training functions. This readiness assessment is presented to
Congress in the department’s quarterly and annual Institutional Training
Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has consistently reported a low
overall readiness status, the quarterly reports DOD provided to Congress
generally showed Army institutional training readiness at the C-1 and C-2
levels. The readiness reports provided to Congress, however, only reflect
the training portion of TRADOC’s mission and do not rate the Command’s
readiness to carry out training, doctrine, and combat development. For
example, the department’s annual Institutional Training Readiness
Report for Fiscal Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOC’s
institutional training readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven
training categories assessed.11 The report did note, however, that
personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1,
particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that TRADOC
had to put other mission areas—combat, doctrine, and training
developments—at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In addition,
DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the number of
students projected to enter the training system and the number that
actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do not provide a
measure of training quality.



11
  The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed were (1) recruiting,
(2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial skill training, (5) skill
progression training, (6) functional training, and (7) flight training.




Page 26                                                     GAO-03-214 Defense Management
TRADOC Lacks                  While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in
Information to Evaluate Its   readiness—often attributed to resource constraints—the impact on its
Mission Effectiveness         ability to support operational forces is not well established and is often
                              limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. TRADOC
                              previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in the form
                              of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have the
                              capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability was
                              eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Command’s response to
                              reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback from
                              customers is a good management practice. The Government Performance
                              and Results Act12 as well as prior GAO reports reference the need to obtain
                              and analyze data related to the quality of services provided by and to
                              government organizations.13 Obtaining feedback from customers is an
                              important aspect of assessing the quality of services. Without a systematic
                              process to collect and evaluate customer feedback information, the ability
                              to plan and prioritize workload based on customers’ needs is hindered.

                              The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality
                              assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the program’s
                              objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational
                              structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of
                              education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components are
                              trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a contemporary
                              operating environment;14 (3) ensure that students can perform to training
                              standards; and (4) ensure that education/training meets the needs of the
                              legacy, interim, and objective forces. However, it is unclear how many



                              12
                                The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal agencies to set
                              strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which the goals are met.
                              Its intent is to focus agencies more on results, service delivery, and program outcomes
                              (P.L. 103-62, 1993).
                              13
                                See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving Customer Feedback
                              Program Could Enhance DLA’s Delivery of Services, GAO-02-776 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
                              9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS Faces Challenges in Measuring Customer Service,
                              GAO/GGD-98-59 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries: Limited
                              Data Available on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/GGD-98-50 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16,
                              1998).
                              14
                                According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-8, Operation
                              Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the contemporary operational
                              environment is the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future,
                              out to the year 2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-
                              technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized
                              forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways.




                              Page 27                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                             resources TRADOC would be able to allocate to this program and whether
                             the program would incorporate a customer feedback component.


Army Leadership Panels       Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various
and FORSCOM Officials        FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOC’s products—such
Believe the Quality of       as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training
                             materials—has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at
TRADOC Products Has          one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with
Declined                     anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOC’s products that
                             reinforced the panels’ observations.

                             During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development
                             Panels—one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned
                             officers—raised issues about the quality of TRADOC’s products. The
                             purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of Staff,
                             was to assess the quality of the Army’s training and leader development
                             programs and identify areas needing improvement. In particular, the
                             panels were to determine the relevancy of existing training and leader
                             development programs to the needs of the future forces. The first panel
                             focused on evaluating training and leader development efforts related to
                             commissioned officers, and the second panel focused on
                             noncommissioned officers.

                         •   The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the Army
                             with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe lack of
                             training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or
                             developing training and education products fast enough to support both
                             the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational publications
                             and products related to standards-based training and leader development
                             were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating training and leader
                             development programs were lacking. The panel made the general
                             observation that the Army’s combat forces were evolving at a pace that
                             was not allowing the institutional training base to provide up-to-date
                             training and educational products.
                         •   The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed
                             conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other things,
                             that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational specialties did
                             not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and development
                             standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) the Army’s failure
                             to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War had created a
                             generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not know and are
                             not executing the principles and processes of Army training doctrine.



                             Page 28                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                            FORSCOM’s observations complement the findings of the two Training
                            and Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted
                            that soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as
                            they once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel
                            it needs to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that
                            TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for
                            training personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle
                            Command System. Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being
                            used for training was not current, and thus the training being provided on
                            those systems was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the
                            equipment that their operational units were using. For example, they said
                            that armor officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks
                            at TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer
                            digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood said
                            that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor officers
                            coming from TRADOC’s Armor School in order to familiarize the officers
                            with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks.

                            Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army
                            doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents. They
                            noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units in
                            FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures
                            based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current operating
                            environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to their general
                            observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had provided both
                            timely and quality doctrine development and related support for the new
                            Stryker brigades.


TRADOC Likely to Face       TRADOC’s ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be
Additional Workload         challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission
Challenges as the Army’s    requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload
                            backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue
“Architect of the Future”   to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.15
                            Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army modernizes
                            existing equipment and transitions to the interim and objective forces.




                            15
                             See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Has a
                            Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges,
                            GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001).




                            Page 29                                            GAO-03-214 Defense Management
This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating concepts, doctrine, and
training.

The Army’s plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of current
capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and establishing the
interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army plans to sustain,
recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize many of the systems
currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams tanks currently in the
Army’s arsenal will eventually be equipped with digital battlefield
command systems as part of modernization and transformation efforts and
will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. Maintaining and upgrading
current capabilities will continue to place demands on TRADOC’s combat,
doctrine, and training developments mission areas.

Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding
challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and
continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May
2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force will
require significantly more resources—current systems alone would require
substantial investment to sustain and modernize.16 As we noted in the
report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) said on September 6, 2000, that the Army would require
$23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 2007,
but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for that purpose, a
$7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget shortfalls, without
additional budgetary resources and improved operating efficiencies, the
Army will have to make trade-offs between modernization initiatives and
operational demands. Moreover, Army Headquarters has not been
persuaded to provide TRADOC with significantly more resources,
primarily because it does not have extra resources available. Officials
involved in prioritizing Army budgetary resources stated that the Army
simply had too many other, higher-priority programs and requirements to
satisfy before it could provide TRADOC with additional funding.




16
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces
Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001).




Page 30                                            GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                          Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process
Effect of Ongoing and     that could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect
Planned Actions on        the Command’s resource posture or its ability to perform its mission.
                          Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base
TRADOC Is Uncertain       operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide
                          organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel
                          requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing
                          commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on
                          contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing
                          some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Army’s
                          “Manning the Force” initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of
                          developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to
                          streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information
                          technology, and be more responsive to the Army’s combat forces. Issues
                          and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or
                          unanswered.


Base Operations Mission   As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and improve
Transferred to New        resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 to
Organization              create a new agency for managing all of its base operations activities. The
                          new agency, called the Installation Management Agency (IMA), was
                          activated in October 2002 and assumed management responsibilities for
                          base operations activities such as force protection, logistics, public works,
                          facilities maintenance, and morale and welfare programs under one
                          management organization.17 The Army hopes to achieve several goals with
                          IMA, which include improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
                          installation management and allowing mission commanders to focus more
                          on maintaining readiness. The Army expects to transfer about 35,000
                          personnel authorizations and about $8 billion in funding from various
                          Army commands to IMA during fiscal year 2003.

                          For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements
                          and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army
                          began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from
                          TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be
                          transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel



                          17
                            IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C. area and seven
                          regional offices—four located within the continental United States and one each in Hawaii,
                          Germany, and Korea.




                          Page 31                                                GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                           authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations
                           allocated to TRADOC’s base operations mission area.

                           The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having less
                           flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In the past,
                           TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its higher-priority
                           mission areas by taking some funds from base operations. For example, in
                           fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Command moved $115 million,
                           $98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts—
                           which were primarily base operations accounts—to training accounts.18 As
                           a result, TRADOC was able to complete its primary mission—training—at
                           the expense of some base operations activities, such as the maintenance
                           and rehabilitation of facilities. TRADOC officials told us they will no
                           longer have the flexibility to do this after base operations funding is
                           reallocated to IMA.


Army Reassessing Process   The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel
for Determining            requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional force’s
Institutional Force        personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis
                           is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional
Personnel Requirements     organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-priority
                           functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law specifies
                           that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis of the
                           workload required to carry out the functions and activities of their
                           respective military department and the funds made available to the
                           department.19 The law also requires the military department secretaries to
                           report annually on their compliance with the provisions of this law.

                           However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional force
                           personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO and
                           Army Audit Agency reports.20 Since early 1995, the Army has developed


                           18
                              The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure sustainment,
                           rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility reduction; (c) integrated training
                           management; and (d) combat developments.
                           19
                             The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129; the annual reports are to
                           be completed by February 1 of each year.
                           20
                             See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army’s Efforts to Improve
                           Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results, GAO/NSIAD-98-65
                           (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U.S. Army Audit Agency, Managing Workload,
                           Organizations and Staffing, HQ 94-751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994).




                           Page 32                                                   GAO-03-214 Defense Management
plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to develop personnel
requirements for the institutional forces. Nevertheless, we reported in May
2001 that the accuracy of the personnel requirements for the Army’s
institutional forces was questionable.21 We recommended that, among
other things, the Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency
reviews to improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces.

While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements
has been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems:
(1) the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel
requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying
workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did not
have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor
workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was
managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload
required to carry out the functions and activities of the department during
fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which contractors
were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army expends about
one-third of its total obligation authority for contractor support, its
estimates of the number of contractor personnel supporting the Army
ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.22 Without accurate information
about the contractor workforce, the Army was not confident that its
civilian personnel requirements were valid. In 2002 the Army began an
effort to identify the size of its contractor workforce; this effort is still
underway.

In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel requirements
and the widening gap between personnel requirements and authorizations,
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans within Army
Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements determination process




21
   See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some
Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO-01-485 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001).
22
  The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed in March 2002. The Assistant
Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is responsible for Army personnel policies.




Page 33                                                GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                           for all of the commands that comprise the institutional forces.23 The intent
                           of the study was twofold—to arrive at a process that produces valid
                           requirements and to strengthen the role of Army leadership components in
                           the review and approval of the requirements. Among other things, the
                           study team proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply
                           be adjusted downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations.
                           This proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements
                           determination process had previously been certified as valid by the Army’s
                           Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was
                           expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force
                           to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army
                           Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as
                           well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several
                           reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid requirements
                           processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge existing workload
                           backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes areas of risk more
                           visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role the commands play in
                           validating requirements; and (d) comply with legislative requirements to
                           manage personnel requirements solely on the basis of workload. As a
                           result of the commands’ concerns, the proposal has been abandoned.
                           However, the study team continues to seek out other options for
                           strengthening senior Army managers’ control over the process and to
                           identify potential new policy guidance related to the personnel
                           requirements determination process for institutional forces. The follow-on
                           study is not expected to be completed until sometime during fiscal year
                           2003.

Commercial Activity        Studies conducted as part of the Army’s commercial activities program
Studies Likely to Reduce   will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at TRADOC.
Personnel Requirements     To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army
                           established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under
and Authorizations         Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies is
                           to identify commercial functions that could be performed more efficiently,
                           either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract with the private


                           23
                             The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for conducting the Total Army
                           Analysis, which determines the allocation of personnel resources among the operational
                           and institutional forces. Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has
                           had a long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Army’s combat forces.
                           The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this study and believes it needs to be
                           more involved in allocating personnel authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief
                           of Staff for Operations and Plans also receives TRADOC’s monthly status reports on
                           readiness.




                           Page 34                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
sector. In either case, the required number of personnel authorizations
would likely be reduced—either because the in-house workforce would
become more efficient and would not require as many staff or because the
function would no longer be performed by current federal employees.
However, these studies by themselves will not free personnel for
assignment to other mission areas where shortages exist.

Most of TRADOC’s commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal
years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years to
complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal year
2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had been
made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the
activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining
decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3
shows the status of the studies.

Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during Fiscal
Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002)

                                        1997             1999            Total
 Studies announced                        13               44              57
 Total positions to be
 studied                               4,833            3,999            8,832
    Civilian                           4,709            2,043            6,752
    Military                             124            1,956            2,080
 Studies completed                        13               26               39
    Positions retained in-house          935            1,429            2,364
    Positions to contract              3,898              423            4,321
Source: TRADOC.



The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most of
the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and involved
the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOC’s base
operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 2002, the
Command will not be affected in the future by most of these studies. Of
TRADOC’s remaining primary mission areas, training and training support
will be most affected by some of the smaller commercial activities studies
that are currently underway.

In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army
announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions that
do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these plans are
carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 personnel



Page 35                                         GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                         authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to the private
                         sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to be seen.

                         Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOC’s
                         personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can
                         increase the Command’s budget requirements when their outcome results
                         in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor personnel. In
                         these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the military positions to
                         other needs. However, the increase in budgetary requirements occurs
                         because the Command must budget for the cost of its civilian personnel
                         and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They no longer have the
                         benefit of the military personnel who were paid by Army Headquarters
                         from centrally managed funds. These additional costs are referred to as
                         “military buy-back” costs. In September 2001, TRADOC estimated that its
                         military buy-back costs would be about $44 million, $90 million, and $92
                         million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.


“Manning the Force”      The Army’s “Manning the Force” initiative was announced in fiscal year
Initiative Is Reducing   2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the
TRADOC’s Military        institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of combat
                         forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal year 2003.
Authorizations           Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military personnel to the
                         combat units as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. Since a lack
                         of military personnel is already contributing to workload backlogs and low
                         readiness reports, the initiative is not likely to improve TRADOC’s ability
                         to reduce backlogs and improve readiness. Furthermore, the loss of
                         authorized military personnel will not free funds for the Command
                         because, as discussed above, military personnel are not paid from
                         TRADOC’s O&M funds.

                         However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of
                         military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat units
                         as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. They explained that
                         several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel assigned to
                         TRADOC, such as “Quicksilver,” were already underway when the
                         “Manning the Force” initiative began.


TRADOC’s Plan to         TRADOC has begun developing a plan to overhaul its structure and
Reengineer the Command   processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe that the
Is Still Evolving        Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and processes to
                         ensure that it continues to support the combat forces’ readiness and Army


                         Page 36                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
    transformation. They believe that an overhaul is needed because (1) the
    rapid pace of change related to transformation is stressing the systems and
    processes associated with combat, doctrine, and training development;
    (2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon
    systems requirements determination process does not respond to the
    needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of
    maintaining TRADOC’s current organizational structure cannot be
    sustained.

    In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff
    to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the TRADOC
    Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to
    Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction—the 2002 Army
    Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The
    TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the
    Command’s organization and processes and (2) make better and more
    extensive use of information technology. The Command’s staff is also in
    the process of updating policies and regulations to support the
    reengineering effort.

    Although TRADOC’s draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is
    considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its goals:

•   Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is
    considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across
    organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission
    areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize
    personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better
    products and eventually result in more effective partnership arrangements.
    As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC Headquarters will
    evolve from program management to the integration of functions and
    organizations within TRADOC.
•   Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC is considering
    establishing a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined
    Arms Command. This command will focus on training and leader
    development. Most of TRADOC’s educational institutions will be placed
    under this organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools.
•   Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and
    combat systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development
    activities as a by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model
    (as discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training
    development, doctrine development, and combat development for the
    future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six primary



    Page 37                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
    battlefield mission areas associated with future combat operations—
    maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires, command and
    control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of these primary
    battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a general
    officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area would be
    supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas would report to
    the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual schools to become more
    focused on the primary mission of training soldiers. TRADOC believes
    doing this would help the command become more efficient and effective.
•   Readopt the standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was
    established in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers
    (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way
    they were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained,
    the schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited
    the commanders’ needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of
    TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is
    considering a move away from the decentralized management approach
    and back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would
    be clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas
    associated with future combat operations.
•   Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management. The
    command’s 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOC’s
    schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor
    school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the
    infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the
    management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary
    battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning the
    laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering
    arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such as
    Army transformation.
•   Use distance learning more extensively. Distance learning is expected
    to become an integral part of the Command’s training curriculum.
    Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at
    TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based
    training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent duty
    location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete the course.
    TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning courses by
    2010.

    TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of
    information technology is just as important as the organizational changes
    it is considering. These officials state that information technology will be
    the basic building block of the reengineering effort. TRADOC officials
    believe the Command has to address mission requirements more quickly



    Page 38                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
with fewer resources. They also believe improved processes built on the
latest technology will allow TRADOC and its customers to share data and
develop products—such as doctrine, training materials, and operational
requirements documents—in a timely manner.

At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not
yet developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan,
and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would result in
organizational realignments or consolidations that might reduce personnel
requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an analysis of costs and
benefits would take place and be incorporated into an implementation
plan after the reengineering concepts and organizing principles were
agreed to within the Army. The analysis is to be completed by mid-fiscal
year 2003.

We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge
the progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to
support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one being
undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework,
which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance
measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the
goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires
DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In
addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their human
capital policies with their strategic goals.24 A human capital plan that
supports or is integrated with an overall strategic plan can help align the
policies and identify the necessary workforce size and skills mix and
where those skills need to be deployed. When the right personnel are on
board and provided the training, technology, structure, incentives, and
accountability to work effectively, the likelihood of organizational success
will be increased.

We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures
but had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not



24
  See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for
Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.: September 2000, Version I); U.S.
General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the
Departments of Defense and State, GAO-01-565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help
Maintain Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002).




Page 39                                              GAO-03-214 Defense Management
              developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort;
              however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital plan,
              which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the effort
              addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope with
              the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not address
              workforce issues associated with military personnel or contractors, which,
              in a broad sense, are also part of the Command’s human capital. Given the
              personnel downsizing that TRADOC has experienced and its potentially
              increasing reliance on contractors to meet its workload, a human capital
              plan could help the Command thoroughly assess its personnel
              requirements and integrate them into the reengineering effort.


              Although TRADOC’s budget has increased in recent years, the Command
Conclusions   has experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have
              challenged it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC
              data indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and
              its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units were
              not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of personnel.
              Most of the training workload is getting done, but a significant amount of
              mission work associated with training material, doctrine, and combat
              developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not know how well it is
              accomplishing its mission because it does not have a process in place to
              obtain systematic feedback from its customers on the quality and
              relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this type of information, the
              Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to fully assess the
              Command’s mission effectiveness, which could lead to inefficient
              allocation of resources and ranking of requirement priorities. Army
              Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOC’s difficulties, but,
              operating within existing resource constraints, officials have had to make
              difficult choices and allocate resources to higher Army priorities.

              However, issues related to TRADOC’s personnel and workload could take
              on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts and,
              if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased risk in
              its role as the Army’s architect of the future. TRADOC is currently
              developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent to which this
              effort could lead to organizational consolidations and reduced personnel
              requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment of TRADOC’s
              workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its reengineering
              plans would help it set its future direction. Because the Command’s
              reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC have an
              opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework for


              Page 40                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                         addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital,
                         reengineering costs, and performance measures.


                         To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of its
Recommendations for      missions in an effective and efficient manner—supporting current forces
Executive Action         as well as the transformation effort—we recommend that the Secretary of
                         the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve
                         Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
                         as part of their personnel and force management oversight responsibilities,
                         to examine TRADOC’s workload requirements, the adequacy of TRADOC’s
                         resources, and TRADOC’s mission performance as it finalizes plans for its
                         reengineering efforts. In doing this, action is needed to

                     •   reassess TRADOC’s backlog of current work and future work
                         requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel
                         requirements are identified and validated before further reducing
                         TRADOC’s personnel authorizations;
                     •   develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOC’s
                         reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and skills
                         of civilian, military, and contractor personnel;
                     •   establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the costs
                         and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and
                     •   develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information
                         possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services it
                         provides to its customers.


                         In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of
Agency Comments          Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with the
and Our Evaluation       recommendations related to TRADOC’s reengineering process without
                         elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about the
                         recommendations related to reassessing TRADOC’s personnel
                         requirements and developing a customer feedback system—leaving
                         unclear what overall actions would be taken. The department’s written
                         comments are reprinted in Appendix III.

                         DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOC’s backlog of
                         current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing
                         TRADOC’s personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence
                         TRADOC’s current work force, and it cited resource constraints and
                         competing demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the
                         department’s response expressed concern that our report did not quantify



                         Page 41                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
the resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine,
and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be
taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC personnel,
but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and personnel
requirements as part of TRADOC’s ongoing reengineering effort. Likewise,
our intent was not to quantify the resources required to remedy the
backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort can best be done
by the Army in the context of a number of considerations. From our
perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several options if they are to
effectively deal with reported shortfalls in personnel related to workload
requirements. The options include identifying functions and activities that
may no longer be required, identifying opportunities to reduce personnel
requirements or reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts,
obtaining additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that
TRADOC’s reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that
TRADOC’s new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the
potential for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what
changes in resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the
resource constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly
readiness reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC
reassess its work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts.

Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback
system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms
help evaluate TRADOC’s support to its customers. It indicated they would
evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and likely
accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that it
would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve
product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC
reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our report
did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report on
operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside from
information contained in TRADOC’s readiness reports, more qualitative in
nature based on the results of internal Army studies and our limited
discussions with leaders in the Army’s Forces Command. Given the nature
of the concerns identified, we continue to believe that the Army could
benefit from a more formal feedback system, one that, if appropriately
designed, could be useful to the Army in better determining how well
TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the combat forces. Absent
such a system, it will be more difficult to fully assess the impact of the
shortcomings noted in our report.




Page 42                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact
me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV.




Barry W. Holman, Director
Defense Capabilities and Management




Page 43                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
              Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
              Methodology



Methodology

              As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on
              Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel
              resources at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our
              review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately
              resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to
              examine (1) TRADOC’s personnel, budget, and workload trends since
              1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command’s
              ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to combat
              forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an effect on
              the Command’s ability to perform its mission.

              To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget,
              personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met with
              Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and
              training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload
              documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the
              magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on
              documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able
              to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002
              budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our analysis.
              We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader guidance,
              including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army
              Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and
              TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army
              personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis
              process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas—combat
              development, doctrine development, training and training development,
              accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base
              operations—and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and
              workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data
              was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. Our
              analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required,
              authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. We
              also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the
              process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel
              requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with
              TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management
              Support Agency representatives. The documentation included
              mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop
              manpower estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in
              TRADOC’s civilian and military authorizations with those of the total
              active Army and two of the Army’s largest commands—Army Materiel
              Command and Forces Command—to put the personnel changes into an


              Page 44                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology




overall Army context. We also identified the changes in budgetary
resources allocated to TRADOC’s mission areas for fiscal years 1995
through 2001. Because aspects of TRADOC’s accessions mission were
added to its responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently
eliminated from its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission
when we analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included
personnel requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998
through 2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900
for this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission
are noted, where appropriate, in the report.

To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the
Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from
TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their
installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained
documentation related to the Command’s ability to measure mission
effectiveness. This included reviewing the Command’s monthly readiness
reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its
schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army
Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOC’s readiness reports
with DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the
same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the two;
the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to Congress
annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited—the armor school, the air
defense school, and the infantry school—we discussed the resources
available to support the facilities’ workload. We also identified examples
of impacts that resulted from resource shortages and obtained information
about how the facilities were measuring their mission effectiveness. At
Forces Command Headquarters and one of its heavy armor installations,
Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of soldiers coming out of TRADOC
schools and requested available data that measured the quality of
TRADOC products—trained soldiers, doctrine, and training support
materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and analyses of agencies
and groups that have examined TRADOC—such as RAND Corporation,
TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board—to obtain any
additional observations and findings not revealed during our review of
TRADOC.

To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on the
Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with Army Headquarters
officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, or future initiatives
that could affect the resources TRADOC will have available to carry out its
mission. During these discussions, we obtained documentation and


Page 45                                        GAO-03-214 Defense Management
    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
    Methodology




    testimonial evidence regarding several initiatives. These included the
    Command’s commercial activities program, the Armywide Transformation
    of Installation Management initiative, and the Command’s plan to
    reengineer itself. We analyzed the impact of the commercial activities
    program, which is being carried out under OMB’s Circular A-76 process,
    on TRADOC’s budget and personnel since fiscal year 1995. We determined
    the number of positions announced for competition, the number of
    positions awarded to contractors, and the number of positions retained by
    TRADOC’s in-house workforce. We also discussed the scope and
    implementation schedule for the Army’s Transformation of Installation
    Management initiative, which is an Armywide program that is moving base
    operations and support from garrison commanders to a new agency called
    the Army Installation Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the
    status of plans to reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational
    streamlining and better use of information technology.

    We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC
    officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis
    appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the
    following locations:

•   Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia;
•   TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
•   Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
•   Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas;
•   Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia;
•   Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
•   4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas;
•   Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and
•   Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

    We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




    Page 46                                       GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                                        Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide       Reductions



Personnel Reductions

                                        Since the early 1990s, the Army’s civilian and military personnel
                                        authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and
                                        reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, the
                                        Army’s authorizations for civilian and active duty military personnel have
                                        been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, respectively, since
                                        fiscal year 1991.1 The following figures show the reductions for the Army
                                        and three of its largest commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command
                                        (FORSCOM), which provides unit training for combat forces; and the
                                        Army Materiel Command (AMC), which is responsible for acquiring and
                                        supporting weapon systems.

Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001




                                        Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.




                                        1
                                            The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National Guard.




                                        Page 47                                                 GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                                        Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel
                                        Reductions




Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001




                                        Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data.


                                        As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant
                                        reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions that
                                        occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001.




                                        Page 48                                          GAO-03-214 Defense Management
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel
Reductions




Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active Army and
Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001

                           Civilian personnel              Military personnel
                         Number of                       Number of
                         reductions         Percent      reductions         Percent
 Active Army                153,200           -41.5         245,400           -33.8
 TRADOC                      13,515           -41.9          13,549           -27.1
 FORSCOM                     10,056           -36.4          28,694           -12.4
 AMC                         41,561           -45.5           5,915           -79.5
Source: Army.

Note: GAO analysis of Army data.




Page 49                                               GAO-03-214 Defense Management
              Appendix III: Comments from the Department
Appendix III: Comments from the
              of Defense



Department of Defense




              Page 50                                      GAO-03-214 Defense Management
                            Appendix IV: GAO Contact and
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
                            Staff Acknowledgments



Acknowledgments

                  James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963
GAO Contact
                  In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively,
Acknowledgments   Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key
                  contributions to this report.




(350113)
                  Page 51                                    GAO-03-214 Defense Management
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