oversight

Military Personnel: Navy Actions Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total Ownership Costs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-06-09.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

             United States General Accounting Office

GAO          Report to Congressional Requesters




June 2003
             MILITARY
             PERSONNEL
             Navy Actions Needed
             to Optimize Ship Crew
             Size and Reduce Total
             Ownership Costs




GAO-03-520
                                                June 2003


                                                MILITARY PERSONNEL

                                                Navy Actions Needed to Optimize
Highlights of GAO-03-520, a report to           Ship Crew Size and Reduce Total
Congressional Requesters
                                                Ownership Costs



The cost of a ship’s crew is the                The Navy’s use of human systems integration principles and crew size
single largest incurred over the                reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only
ship’s life cycle. One way to lower             the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early
personnel costs, and thus the cost              in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew
of ownership, is to use people only             size. The Navy’s goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by about 70 percent
when it is cost-effective—a
determination made with a systems
                                                from that of the previous destroyer class—a reduction GAO estimated could
engineering approach called human               eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-ship class. The goal was
systems integration. GAO was                    included in key program documents to which program managers are held
asked to evaluate the Navy’s                    accountable. Although the Navy did not set specific crew reduction goals for
progress in optimizing the crew                 the T-AKE cargo ship, it made some use of human systems integration
size in four ships being developed              principles and expects to require a somewhat smaller crew than similar
and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer,              legacy ships. The two other ships—the recently cancelled JCC(X) command
T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X)                        ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship—did not establish human
command ship, and LHA(R)                        systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not
amphibious assault ship. GAO                    establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more
assessed (1) the Navy’s use of                  consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition
human systems integration
principles and goals for reducing
                                                process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy
crew size, and (2) the factors that             may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which
may impede the Navy’s use of those              are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process (see
principles.                                     figure). For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems
                                                integration certification standards for new ships.

                                                Several factors may impede the Navy’s consistent application of human
To facilitate the Navy’s efforts to             systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew
optimize ship crew sizes and
                                                size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that
minimize total ownership costs,
GAO is recommending that the                    allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human
Secretary of the Navy: (1) require              systems integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy
that ship programs use human                    systems to save near-term costs and discourage research and investment in
systems integration to establish                labor-saving technology that could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy
crew size goals and help achieve                organizational authority to require human systems integration’s use in
them, (2) clearly define the human              acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy’s lack of cultural acceptance of new
systems integration certification               concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies that
standards for new ships,                        require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise.
(3) formally establish a process to
examine and facilitate the adoption
                                                Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System’s Development
of labor-saving technologies and
best practices across Navy
systems.

In commenting on a draft of this
report, DOD agreed with GAO’s
recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-520.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Henry L.
Hinton, Jr., at (202) 512-4300 or
hintonh@gao.gov.
Contents


Letter                                                                                   1
               Results in Brief                                                          3
               Background                                                                5
               Navy’s Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew
                 Size and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably
                 Across Ship Programs                                                  10
               Several Factors Contribute to the Inconsistent Application of
                 Human Systems Integration and May Impede the Navy’s Ability
                 to Optimize Crew Size                                                 20
               Conclusions                                                             26
               Recommendations for Executive Action                                    28
               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                      29

Appendix I     Scope and Methodology                                                    31



Appendix II    Ships Included in Our Evaluation                                         33



Appendix III   Defense Acquisition                                                      37



Appendix IV    Summary of DD(X) Destroyer Gold Team
               Trade Studies                                                            41



Appendix V     Comparison of DDG 51 and DD(X) Crew Sizes                                42



Appendix VI    Comments from the Department of Defense                                  49




               Page i                                    GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Tables
          Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by
                   Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from
                   1998-2002                                                                        41
          Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A
                   and the DD(X)                                                                    45
          Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions
                   on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers                                        48


Figures
          Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a
                   System’s Development                                                              6
          Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases,
                   Milestones, and Key Activities                                                   39




          Abbreviations

          DD(X)             destroyer
          DOD               Department of Defense
          JCC(X)            joint command and control ship
          LHA(R)            amphibious assault ship replacement
          MSC               Military Sealift Command
          T-AKE             auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship




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          Page ii                                              GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548




                                   June 9, 2003

                                   The Honorable Jim Talent
                                   Chairman
                                   The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
                                   Ranking Minority Member
                                   Subcommittee on Seapower
                                   Committee on Armed Services
                                   United States Senate

                                   The cost of a ship’s crew is the single largest expense incurred over
                                   a ship’s life cycle. As such, transitioning from the personnel- and
                                   workload-intensive ships of the past to optimally crewed ships with
                                   reduced workloads has tremendous potential to free up resources for the
                                   Navy to use in recapitalizing the fleet. The Department of Defense’s (DOD)
                                   planned procurement rate for fiscal years 2004-2008 is 7.4 ships per year, a
                                   rate that supports a fleet of about 259 ships—below the 2001 Quadrennial
                                   Defense Review goal of 310 and farther below the Navy’s desired fleet of
                                   375 ships. In recognition of the budgetary challenges the Navy faces in
                                   recapitalizing its fleet, House and Senate conferees have expressed an
                                   interest in identifying ways to reduce these personnel expenses through
                                   the acquisition of ships that would require smaller crews.1

                                   One way to lower costs associated with personnel is to use people only
                                   when it is cost-effective to do so—determining this by using a systems
                                   engineering approach known as human systems integration. In this
                                   process, tasks and functions are systematically analyzed and assigned to
                                   the most cost-effective solution—humans, software, or hardware. When
                                   applied to ships early in their development and throughout their design,
                                   human systems integration has the potential to substantially reduce
                                   requirements for personnel, leading to significant cost savings.
                                   Additionally, it can improve operational performance by enhancing
                                   situational awareness and decision making; reduce human error, which
                                   causes an estimated 80 percent of ship accidents; and reduce training
                                   difficulty and cost. Human systems integration also has the potential to
                                   improve shipboard habitability, reduce workload and fatigue, and




                                   1
                                    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 Conference Report 107-772
                                   (Nov. 12, 2002).



                                   Page 1                                             GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
thereby improve a sailor’s quality of life—key enablers for recruiting
and retention.

Because the size of ship crews has such a significant impact on long-term
costs, you asked us to evaluate the Navy’s progress in optimizing the crew
size in four new ships that DOD was in the process of developing and
acquiring: the DD(X) destroyer,2 the T-AKE cargo ship,3 the recently
canceled JCC(X) command ship,4 and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship.
During our review, three of these ships were in the early stages of
development while only one ship, the T-AKE, had entered acquisition
phase three, production and deployment. (App. II includes a description of
the ships’ missions and acquisition program history and status.) In this
report, we assess (1) the Navy’s use of human systems integration
principles and goals to reduce crew size on these four ships and (2) the
factors that may impede the Navy’s use of human systems integration
principles in developing new ships.

To assess the Navy’s use of human systems integration principles and
crew size reduction goals, we obtained and analyzed key program and ship
crewing documents as well as human systems integration plans and
analyses. We also assessed whether and to what extent human systems
integration principles and crew reduction goals were addressed in the first
two acquisition phases (concept and technology development and system
development and demonstration) and reflected in key acquisition
documents. To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy’s application
of human systems integration principles, we interviewed DOD officials,



2
 At the time the ship’s mission need statement was developed, it was referred to as the
Surface Combatant 21, a term used in the early stages of the Land Attack Destroyer
program. It eventually became known as DD 21 and subsequently as the DD(X). For
uniformity, we will refer to the ship as the DD(X) in all of its stages.
3
 The ship program was previously known as the Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier (ADC(X) or
T-ADC(X)). The program subsequently became known as the Auxiliary Cargo and
Ammunition Ship (T-AKE). For uniformity, we refer to the ship as the T-AKE or the T-AKE
cargo ship in all of its stages.
4
 The program was formally named the Joint Maritime Command and Control Capability
Ship Program, hereafter referred to as the JCC(X) command ship. DOD’s fiscal year 2004
Program Objective Memorandum canceled the JCC(X) program. Instead, DOD has directed
that the analysis of alternatives for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F),
examine the feasibility of incorporating as a module or variant an additional mission
package that provides joint and coalition command and control. MPF(F) ships are the
Marine Corps’ forward-deployed floating warehouses of military ammunition, fuel, and
food that are the centerpiece of the Navy’s future sea basing concept.




Page 2                                                GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                   contractors, and human systems integration experts and reviewed
                   acquisition guidance to determine the extent to which it discusses or
                   requires the use of human systems integration principles in ship programs.
                   We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in
                   accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The
                   scope and methodology used in our review are described in further detail
                   in appendix I.


                   The Navy’s use of human systems integration and crew size reduction
Results in Brief   goals varied significantly in the four ship programs we examined. Only the
                   DD(X) destroyer program placed a significant emphasis on human systems
                   integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive
                   goal to reduce crew size. The Navy’s goal for the DD(X) destroyer, which
                   was included as a principal program goal or key performance parameter,
                   is expected to cut the ship crew size by about 60 to 70 percent from that of
                   the previous destroyer ship class,5 a reduction we estimated could save
                   about $18 billion (fiscal year 2002 dollars)6 in personnel-related costs over
                   the service life of a future class of 32 ships.7 This goal was established at
                   program initiation, provided the initiative for developing a comprehensive
                   human systems integration plan, and was reiterated in the key program
                   documents to which the program manager is held accountable at key
                   milestone reviews. For the T-AKE cargo ship, the Navy made some use
                   of human systems integration and expects to require somewhat fewer
                   personnel than the legacy ships it is replacing. It did not, however,
                   establish specific crew size reduction goals or apply human systems
                   integration principles to the ship’s primary mission, intership underway
                   replenishment. The remaining two programs, the JCC(X) command and
                   the LHA(R) amphibious assault ships, did not develop comprehensive
                   human systems integration plans early in the acquisition process and do
                   not have crew size reduction as a formal program goal. Because the Navy
                   did not consistently apply human systems integration principles and set
                   goals for reducing crew size for three of the ships we reviewed, it may
                   have missed opportunities to reduce crewing requirements and lower total
                   ownership costs, which are determined largely by decisions made early in


                   5
                       A ship class represents a number of vessels built alike or nearly so.
                   6
                    Unless otherwise noted, all dollars are expressed as current dollars (also known as
                   then-year dollars).
                   7
                    Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not yet clear how many
                   DD(X)s will be purchased.




                   Page 3                                                    GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
    the acquisition process but which will be incurred throughout these ships’
    30-40 year life spans.

    Based on briefings and discussions with agency officials and a review
    of acquisition policies, we found that a number of related factors
    contribute to the Navy’s inconsistent application of human systems
    integration principles and may impede the adoption of innovations to
    optimize crew size. These factors include the following:

•    DOD and Navy acquisition policies allow program managers considerable
    latitude in optimizing crew size and in determining the timing and extent
    to which they employ human systems integration.
•    Funding challenges when acquiring new ships encourage the use of legacy
    subsystems to save near-term costs instead of the investment in research
    and development of labor-saving technologies that would reduce costs
    over the long term.
•    Most Navy organizations responsible for human systems integration
    oversight are not empowered to require the use of human systems
    integration to optimize crew size. The Naval Sea Systems Command’s
    newly established directorate for human systems integration, which is
    responsible for certifying that ships delivered to the fleet have optimized
    crews, had not established a process or criteria for achieving certification.
•    Even when new labor-saving approaches and technologies are identified
    during the concept and technology development phase, implementing
    them is a difficult and time-consuming process due to the Navy’s
    long-standing traditions and culture and the extensive network of
    personnel, safety, training, maintenance, and other policies and
    procedures that affect ship personnel levels. Moreover, there is no process
    to help Navy program managers identify and coordinate with other
    stakeholders to modify or eliminate policies and procedures that may
    impede the introduction of labor-saving practices and technology
    identified during ship design.

    These factors cause Navy decision makers to set goals of not exceeding
    the crew size of 30-year old ships, for program managers to wait until
    preliminary design to begin human systems integration efforts, and
    exclude primary and secondary ship functions from rigorous analysis. As a
    result, the Navy is designing and procuring some new ships that may not
    cost-effectively address one of the biggest cost drivers in the Navy—
    personnel. The DD(X) experience also shows that even when these
    practices are followed, the program will still face challenges in achieving
    these goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system
    design progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts’
    view that human systems integration plans and activities should receive


    Page 4                                       GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                          continued review and focus throughout the acquisition process. Unless the
                          Navy more consistently applies human systems integration at the earliest
                          stages of the development process and establishes meaningful goals for
                          crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total
                          ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made
                          early in the acquisition process.

                          To facilitate the Navy’s efforts to optimize ship crew sizes and minimize
                          total ownership costs, we are recommending that the Secretary of the
                          Navy (1) require that ship programs use human systems integration to
                          establish crew size goals and help achieve them, (2) clearly define the
                          human systems integration certification standards for new ships,
                          (3) formally establish a policy evaluation function to examine and
                          facilitate the adoption of cost-saving technologies and best practices
                          across Navy systems. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed
                          with our recommendations.



Background
Total Ownership Costs     Decisions made in setting requirements very early in a ship’s development
Are Determined Early in   have enormous impact on the total ownership costs.8 Total ownership
a System’s Development    costs include the costs to research, develop, acquire, own, operate,
                          maintain, and dispose of weapon and support systems; the costs of other
                          equipment and real property; the costs to recruit, retrain, separate, and
                          otherwise support military and civilian personnel; and all other costs of
                          DOD’s business operations. Navy analyses show that by the second
                          acquisition milestone (which assesses whether a system is ready to
                          advance to the system development and demonstration phase), roughly
                          85 percent of a ship’s total ownership cost has been “locked in” by design,
                          production quantity, and schedule decisions while less than 10 percent of
                          its total costs has actually been expended. (See fig. 1.)




                          8
                           In another report we recommend that DOD treat total ownership costs as a performance
                          requirement equal in priority to any other performance requirement prior to beginning
                          the acquisition program. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting
                          Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs,
                          GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2003).




                          Page 5                                            GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Figure 1: Total Ownership Costs Are Determined Early in a System’s Development




                                       Figure 1 depicts the relative apportionment of research and development,
                                       procurement, and operating and support costs over the typical life cycle
                                       of a ship program (the complete life cycle of a ship, from concept
                                       development through disposal, typically ranges from 40 to 60 years).
                                       Research and development funds are spent at program initiation and
                                       generally comprise only a small fraction of a new ship’s total ownership
                                       costs. Then, in the next acquisition phase, procurement funds, comprising
                                       about 30 percent of total ownership costs, are spent to acquire the
                                       new ship. The vast majority of the total ownership costs, about 65 percent,
                                       is comprised of operating and support costs and is incurred over the life of
                                       the ship. Personnel costs are the largest contributor to operating and
                                       support costs—approximately 50 percent.




                                       Page 6                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Defense Acquisition Policy   Recognizing that fiscal constraints pose a long-term challenge, DOD
Requires Setting Goals to    policy states that total ownership costs of new military systems should
Optimize Performance and     be identified and that DOD officials should treat cost as a military
                             requirement during the acquisition process.9 This approach, referred to as
Minimize Cost                treating cost as an independent variable, requires program managers to
                             consider cost-performance trade-offs in setting program goals.

                             During the acquisition process, program managers are held accountable
                             for making progress toward meeting established goals and requirements at
                             checkpoints, or milestones, over a program’s life cycle.10 (See app. III for a
                             discussion of the DOD acquisition process). These goals and requirements
                             are contained in several key documents. The first to be generated is a
                             mission need statement that describes a warfighting deficiency, or
                             opportunity to provide new capabilities, in broad operational terms and
                             identifies constraints such as crewing, personnel, and training that may
                             affect satisfying the need. These capabilities and constraints are examined
                             during the initial phase of the program in a second key document, a study
                             called the analysis of alternatives. This study assesses the operational
                             effectiveness and estimated costs of alternative systems to meet the
                             mission need. The analysis assesses the pros and cons of each alternative
                             and their sensitivity to possible changes in key assumptions. The analysis
                             should consider personnel as both a life-cycle cost and a design driver.
                             Systems engineering best practices dictate that the analysis of alternatives
                             should be supported by a front-end analysis11 and trade-off studies so that
                             better and more informed decisions can be made. Using the results of the
                             analysis of alternatives, program objectives are formalized in an
                             operational requirements document. This third key document specifies
                             those capabilities or characteristics (known as key performance
                             parameters) that are so significant that failure to meet them can be cause
                             for the system to be canceled or restructured. In establishing key
                             performance parameters, DOD officials specify both a threshold and an


                             9
                              Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1,
                             The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002, sec. 3.23.
                             10
                                According to defense acquisition system policy, the program manager is assigned the
                             single point of accountability for accomplishment of program objectives—a minimum
                             number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its
                             life cycle. Progress toward meeting these objectives is assessed at milestone decision
                             meetings and during interim senior management reviews.
                             11
                               In Navy new ship acquisitions, the front-end analysis consists of a top-down requirements
                             analysis supported by a variety of mission and functional analyses that together inform
                             designers about the human requirements for the ship under study.




                             Page 7                                               GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                             objective value. For performance, the threshold is the minimum
                             acceptable value that, in the user’s judgment, is necessary to satisfy the
                             need. For schedule and cost, the threshold is the maximum allowable
                             value. The objective value is the value desired by the user and the value
                             the program manager tries to work with the contractor(s) to obtain.

                             During our review, DOD was revising its acquisition guidance. On October
                             30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled three key DOD
                             documents governing the defense acquisition process and issued
                             interim guidance in a memorandum. DOD officials expect to issue a new
                             acquisition guidance in the near future.12 The Deputy Secretary’s interim
                             guidance retains the basic acquisition system structure and milestones,
                             emphasizes evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements
                             documents, and makes several other changes. For example, the mission
                             need statement and the operational requirements document are replaced
                             by three new documents: (1) the initial capability document replaces the
                             mission need statement at milestone A, (2) the capability development
                             document replaces the operational requirements document at milestone B,
                             and (3) the capability production document replaces the operational
                             requirements document at milestone C. (See app. III for a discussion of the
                             acquisition process and milestones.)

Human Systems                Human systems integration is a systems engineering approach to optimize
Integration Has Potential    the use of people. Optimized crewing for ships refers to the minimum
to Optimize Ship Crew Size   crew size consistent with the ship’s mission, affordability, risks, and
                             human performance and safety requirements. When initiated from the
and Reduce Costs for New     outset of a new ship acquisition (during concept exploration and prior to
Systems                      establishing key performance parameters) and continued through ship
                             design, human systems integration has the potential to reduce workload
                             leading to smaller, optimized crews; reduced operating and support costs;
                             and improved operational performance. According to human systems
                             integration experts, for Navy ship acquisitions, human systems integration
                             may begin with a top-down requirements analysis that examines the ship’s
                             functions and mission requirements and determines whether human or
                             machine performance is required for each task. By reevaluating which
                             functions humans should perform and which can be performed by


                             12
                               On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD
                             Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory Guidebook is under
                             development. Because this guidance was issued following the completion of our audit
                             work, the description of the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD’s interim
                             guidance issued on October 30, 2002.




                             Page 8                                                GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
technology, human systems integration minimizes personnel requirements
while maximizing gains from technological applications. A human systems
integration approach also ensures that a person’s workload and other
concerns, such as personnel and training requirements, safety, and health
hazards, are considered throughout the acquisition process. In a recent
memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs stated, “failure to incorporate HSI [human systems
integration] approaches can only lead to increasing manpower costs in the
future that will threaten the ability of the Department to sustain the
transformation, readiness and investment priorities we have established.”

Human systems integration has been used successfully in military and
commercial settings. MANPRINT, the Army’s human systems integration
program, reports that the Comanche helicopter program, when fielded,
will avoid $3.29 billion in operating and support costs ($2.67 billion of
which resulted from personnel reductions) due to the application of
human systems integration. Human systems integration has also been
used in airplane cockpit design, aircraft maintenance, and in rear-center
automobile brake lights design. Additionally, foreign navies’ efforts, such
as those to develop British Type 23 and Dutch M-Class Frigates, achieved a
30 to 40 percent reduction in crew size relative to the previous generation
of ships by employing a human systems integration approach.

DOD’s acquisition policy for using human systems integration is general in
nature but requires program managers to develop a human systems
integration approach early in the acquisition process to minimize total
ownership costs. The Navy’s acquisition guidance requires that human
systems integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along
with other engineering and logistics elements beginning at program
initiation, but the guidance does not provide for specific procedures and
metrics.13




13
 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, “Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for
Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information
Technology Acquisition Programs,” December 6, 1996.




Page 9                                             GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                          Despite the potential of human systems integration to optimize crew size
Navy’s Use of Human       and reduce total ownership costs, the Navy’s use of human systems
Systems Integration       integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across the
                          four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD(X)
to Optimize Crew          destroyer program used human systems integration extensively to
Size and Efforts to       optimize crewing during the concept and technology development phase
                          of the acquisition. In doing so, the program developed a comprehensive
Establish Crew            plan that describes the human systems integration objectives, strategy,
Size Goals Vary           and scope and mandated its use by means of key program documents.
Considerably Across       The T-AKE cargo ship program was required to apply human systems
                          integration principles to the ship’s design, but not to the ship’s primary
Ship Programs             mission of intership underway replenishment. In contrast, the JCC(X)
                          command ship and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship programs had not
                          emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process or
                          developed a comprehensive human systems integration approach. The
                          Navy’s crew size reduction goals for the four ships range from an
                          aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD(X) destroyer, to a lack
                          of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R)
                          amphibious assault ship. The inconsistent use of human systems
                          integration to optimize ship crews and the lack of formal crew size
                          reduction goals for three of the four programs we examined represent a
                          missed opportunity to potentially achieve significant savings in total
                          ownership costs.


DD(X) Program Has         From the inception of the program through the selection of a design agent
Aggressive Crew Size      in 2002, the DD(X) program has had a significant crew size reduction goal
Reduction Goals and       and has used human systems integration to identify potential ways to
                          achieve this goal. Requirements for using human systems integration and
Uses Human Systems        crew size goals were included in the key acquisition documents to which
Integration Extensively   program managers are held accountable. The program began human
                          systems integration activities in the first acquisition phase—concept and
                          technology development—by inviting industry to develop conceptual
                          designs to meet these goals and produce a human systems integration
                          plan. Subsequently, the Navy restructured the program in November 2001
                          and is reevaluating the ship’s operational requirements, including crew
                          size. However, the Navy’s contract with the design agent continues to
                          specify a significant crew size reduction calling for a crew of between
                          125 and 175. These revised crew size requirements still represent a
                          greater than 50 percent reduction when compared to the legacy ship it
                          is replacing.




                          Page 10                                    GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
    From the earliest stages of the program and continuing through award of
    the design agent contract, the program maintained a focus on optimizing
    crew size. For example:

•    The 1993 mission need statement directed “the ship must be automated
    to a sufficient degree to realize significant manpower reductions.” The
    document also required a human systems integration-type analysis,14 to
    recommend options to exploit technology to reduce crewing, personnel,
    and training requirements and directed that trade-offs to reduce these
    requirements be favored during design and development.
•    The 1998 cost and operational effectiveness analysis (currently known as
    the analysis of alternatives) included an analysis of the ship crew and
    personnel requirements for the various alternatives that ultimately
    influenced the Navy’s decision to initially establish an aggressive crew size
    goal of 95 and identify human systems integration requirements to be
    included in the operational requirements document. This goal represents a
    greater than 70 percent reduction in crew size from that of the Arleigh
    Burke-class destroyers developed in the 1980s.
•    In 1997, the DD(X) operational requirements document specified a crew
    size goal of between 95 and 150 as a key performance parameter.15 It also
    required that human systems integration be used to minimize life-cycle
    costs and maximize performance effectiveness, reliability, readiness, and
    safety of the ship and crew.
•    In 1997, the program also established a ship crewing/human systems
    integration integrated process team whose charter requires a top-down
    functional analysis, the analytical centerpiece of the Navy’s human
    systems integration approach, in the early phases to obtain a major
    reduction in personnel.
•    In 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
    continued to hold DD(X) destroyer program managers accountable for
    achieving an aggressive crew size reduction when he required validation
    that the DD(X) crew size will meet the key performance parameter
    threshold before ship construction begins.



    14
      The Surface Combatant for the 21st Century [DD(X)] Mission Need Statement
    recommended performing a military crewing/hardware integration (“HARDMAN”)
    analysis in accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
    Instruction 5311.7, “Determining Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT)
    Requirements for Navy Acquisitions,” August 12, 1985. HARDMAN is one type of
    human systems integration methodology.
    15
      The document specified 95 as the objective value and 150 as the threshold value. These
    values represent a 60 to 70 percent reduction from the DDG-51 class crew level of 365.




    Page 11                                              GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
•    The Phase 1 solicitation issued in 1998 for trade studies and analyses and
    development of two competitive system concept designs required that
    both contractors provide a human systems integration plan.
•    The design agent contract awarded in 2002 requires the contractor to
    develop and demonstrate a human systems integration engineering effort
    that addresses the crewing, personnel, training, human performance,
    sailor survivability, and quality of life aspects of the DD(X) design. It also
    relaxed the original crew size goal, stating that crewing requirements shall
    not exceed 175.

    To achieve the proposed reductions, the DD(X) program plans to employ
    human-centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship cleaning
    and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, and remote support from
    shore-based facilities for certain administrative and personnel services.
    For example, cleaning requirements are expected to be reduced by a ship
    design that capitalizes on commercial shipping practices such as
    cornerless spaces and maintenance-free deck coverings. The ship will also
    rely on an integrated bridge system that provides computer-based
    navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar plotting, and
    automated ship control.

    DD(X) program officials stated that their experience in using the human
    systems integration engineering approach, establishing an aggressive
    crew size reduction goal early in the acquisition process, and including
    this goal as a key performance parameter in the operational requirements
    document has been critical in maintaining a focus on reducing crew size.
    Moreover, these practices led to examining innovative approaches from
    the beginning and holding program managers accountable during program
    reviews. Program officials anticipate that the emphasis on reducing crew
    size will help to minimize DD(X) operating and support and total
    ownership costs once the ship is built and enters the fleet. For illustrative
    purposes, we calculated that the Navy could avoid personnel-related costs
    of about $600 million per ship over a 35-year service life if it achieves a
    crew of 150 sailors rather than requiring the 365 sailors needed to operate
    its legacy ship, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. This could potentially
    save more than $18 billion for a class of 32 ships (both amounts are in
    fiscal year 2002 dollars).16 See appendix V for a comparison of crew
    functions and workload on the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and
    those proposed for the DD(X).


    16
     Although the DD 21 destroyer program consisted of 32 ships, it is not yet clear how many
    DD(X)s will be purchased.




    Page 12                                             GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                           DD(X) program officials also stated that, even with sustained early
                           emphasis on crew size reduction and the use of human systems integration
                           for crew optimization, achieving such an aggressive crew size goal remains
                           a significant technological challenge as the program is relying on a number
                           of immature labor-saving technologies, such as those required to conduct
                           damage control and run the ship’s computers. Program officials stated that
                           informal goals or those established later in the acquisition process would
                           not have been nearly as effective in getting the program to focus on
                           achieving significant personnel reductions. However, in recognition of the
                           technological challenge of achieving the crew size goal and several other
                           technological challenges, the Navy restructured the DD(X) program in
                           November 2001 to better manage the program’s risk. As such, it adopted
                           an acquisition strategy consisting of multiple capability increments, or
                           “flights.” The newly restructured program relaxed the crew size goals to
                           between 125 and 175, which still represents a greater than 50 percent
                           reduction below legacy ship levels, for the first of three planned DD(X)
                           flights. While briefings prepared by Navy officials retain the original crew
                           size goals for the third DD(X) flight, it is unclear whether these goals will
                           be retained as key performance parameters in the operational
                           requirements document currently under revision.


T-AKE Cargo Ship Program   In developing the T-AKE cargo ship, which is in procurement and is
Used Human Systems         expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems
Integration in Some        integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to refine
                           the requirements for civilian mariners and active-duty personnel.
Aspects of Ship Design,    However, human systems integration was not applied to the process of
Expects Crew Size          intership underway replenishment, the transfer of cargo between ships
Reductions, but Did Not    while at sea.17 Moreover, early acquisition documents for the T-AKE cargo
Establish Specific Crew    ship program did not establish specific goals for reducing crew size,
Size Goals                 although they required the use of civilian mariners or Merchant Marines
                           instead of active-duty Navy personnel and mandated the examination of
                           cargo handling innovations to reduce crew workload. Use of Merchant
                           Marines or Military Sealift Command personnel generally results in a
                           smaller crew because these organizations employ more experienced
                           seamen, have reduced watchstanding requirements, and use a different
                           maintenance and training philosophy. The T-AKE will be operated by the



                           17
                             Underway replenishment may be accomplished via connected replenishment (in which
                           the receiving and cargo ships are alongside and connected to each other by hoses/cables)
                           or via vertical replenishment (in which a helicopter transfers solid cargo from ship to ship).




                           Page 13                                                GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
    Military Sealift Command, and its projected crew will be between 5 and
    20 percent smaller than the crew of the command’s legacy ships and about
    60 percent smaller than the legacy ships previously operated exclusively
    with Navy sailors.18

    The following examples illustrate the strengths and limitations of
    the program’s use of human systems integration early in the acquisition
    process.

•    The 1992 mission need statement lacked a direct reference to human
    systems integration, although it does indicate that the ship’s size will
    be the result of various trade-offs, including cost and crew size, and
    required that the ship’s design incorporate modern propulsion, auxiliary,
    and cargo handling systems to minimize operating and maintenance
    personnel requirements.
•    The 2001 operational requirements document stated that “human
    engineering principles and design standards shall be applied to the design
    of all compartments, spaces, systems, individual equipment, workstations
    and facilities in which there is a human interface.” However, this
    document also required the T-AKE cargo ship to use U.S. Navy standard
    underway replenishment equipment because of the need to interface with
    other U.S. Navy and allied ships, the lack of any equivalent commercial
    system, and the costs to redesign existing Navy equipment and maintain
    nonstandard equipment. As a result, human systems integration was
    not applied to one of the main drivers of crew size—the number of
    crewmembers required to perform connected replenishment at each
    replenishment station.

    Program officials indicated that, because intership underway
    replenishment involves the interface between the T-AKE cargo ship and all
    other ship classes requiring replenishment at sea, redesign of the Navy’s
    process of underway replenishment was not within their purview and,
    therefore, was not addressed in the program’s human systems integration
    analyses. Instead, the program’s focus was to ensure that the T-AKE cargo
    ship’s design met the current requirements for performing underway
    replenishment and had the flexibility for future equipment modification.
    To address underway replenishment across ship platforms, in 2000 the
    Navy established a naval operational logistics integrated product team


    18
      The Navy’s Military Sealift Command is one of three components of the
    U.S. Transportation Command, the DOD command that manages the defense
    transportation system.




    Page 14                                          GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
whose mission is to establish policy and doctrine for future operational
systems and ensure the integration of operational logistics systems
across ships.

Since reexamining intership underway replenishment was beyond the
scope of the ship program, program personnel said they focused on
identifying ways to reduce crew workload. In the first acquisition phase,
four contractors19 prepared trade studies on the integration of cargo
handling functions on the ship.20 In the second acquisition phase, one of
the contractors, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, was awarded
the contract to design and construct the ship. Ultimately, labor-saving
innovations such as item scanners; an automated, rather than paper-based,
warehouse management inventory system; and safer and easier to operate
elevator doors were adopted.21

Although the T-AKE cargo ship is expected to require fewer personnel
than its legacy ships, early acquisition documents did not establish a
specific crew size goal as a key performance parameter and thus did not
hold the program manager accountable for specific reductions. Rather, the
operational requirements document required that the T-AKE be crewed
largely by U.S. Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command civilian
mariners. The Navy currently estimates that the T-AKE will be crewed by
172 individuals: 123 civilian mariners, 13 active-duty sailors in the military
department who perform cargo management/inventory functions, and
36 active-duty sailors in the aviation detachment who perform intership
cargo transfer using a helicopter (vertical replenishment).




19
  The following four contractors were each awarded $1.5 million to complete Phase I
Ship/Cargo Integration Design studies: Avondale Industries (now Northrop Grumman Ship
Systems Avondale Operations); Halter Marine, Inc. (now Friede Goldman Halter); Litton
Ingalls Shipbuilding (now Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipbuilding); and National Steel and
Shipbuilding Company. Phase I concluded on May 5, 2000, and on October 18, 2001, the
Navy announced it had awarded National Steel and Shipbuilding Company the Phase II
Detail Design and Construction contract.
20
  The studies addressed one or more of five topic areas: (1) warehouse management
system/automation; (2) material handling equipment/cargo handling systems/cargo
elevators; (3) cargo flow studies/modeling and simulation; (4) general arrangements/cargo
hold and transfer deck design; and (5) cargo heating, ventilation, air conditioning,
and refrigeration.
21
  T-AKE officials also provided us with the titles of 16 studies involving safety, human
engineering, manpower, personnel, training, and habitability domains of human systems
integration that were included in the shipbuilding contract.




Page 15                                              GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                             The T-AKE cargo ship’s projected crew size of 172 personnel will be
                             somewhat smaller than that of its Military Sealift Command legacy ships,
                             the T-AE 26 Kilauea-class ammunition ships and the T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class
                             and Sirius-class combat stores ships, which have crews of 182-215
                             personnel and also use civilian mariners. The T-AKE’s crew size is
                             significantly smaller than when these legacy ships were crewed by
                             active-duty personnel. When crewed entirely by active Navy personnel,
                             these ships had crews of 435 and 508 sailors, respectively. Despite the
                             smaller crew size, the T-AKE will have a greater carrying capacity for dry
                             and refrigerated cargo than its legacy ships. Each T-AKE ship will be able
                             to carry at least 63 percent of the combined cargo capacity of a T-AFS 1
                             and T-AE 26.

                             Although the ship program did not perform the top-down analyses
                             recommended by human system integration experts to optimize crewing,
                             it did use elements of the approach to finalize staffing requirements.
                             To finalize the requirement for civilian mariners, program personnel
                             performed a functional analysis (which identified ship functions and their
                             crew size requirements) and ultimately determined that the initial crew
                             size estimate developed by the Navy could be reduced by 12, resulting
                             in a final requirement for 123 civilian mariners. The size of the military
                             department is based on an analysis that projects workload and personnel
                             requirements for every ship function during the most labor-intensive
                             operational scenarios and then allocates the workload and personnel
                             requirements to the minimum number of billets and skill levels.


JCC(X) Command Ship          The recently canceled JCC(X) command ship program made very limited
Program Made Limited         use of human systems integration to optimize crew size and planned to
Use of Human Systems         wait until preliminary design in the next acquisition phase to begin human
                             systems integration activities. The program also did not hold program
Integration and Had No       managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy
Formal Goals to Reduce       command ships. The following are examples.
Crew Size
                         •    The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems
                             integration. Instead, the document required that the ship “be automated
                             wherever practical to reduce workload and manpower requirements”
                             and directed that operation by Military Sealift Command personnel be
                             considered for selected functions rather than Navy personnel. However,
                             the document stated that “changes to manpower requirements are not
                             expected.”
                         •    The analysis of alternatives examined crew sizes ranging from 60 percent
                             smaller to 50 percent larger than those of current command ships and



                             Page 16                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
    using civilian mariners to perform JCC(X) crew functions to reduce crew
    size. The analysis found that using a mix of military and civilian personnel
    rather than all military personnel would reduce personnel costs by nearly
    a third, saving $2.3 billion for four ships over a 40-year service life.
    However, the analysis did not include a full human systems integration
    assessment of each design alternative.
•    At the time of its cancellation, the program had not received approval of
    its operational requirements document, which would have established key
    performance parameters.

    Program officials stated that although achieving crew size reduction was
    not included in key program documents, they expected to achieve some
    crew size reductions on the JCC(X) when compared to existing command
    ships through the use of modern, more reliable equipment, for example,
    diesel propulsion instead of steam propulsion.22 Yet, despite the program’s
    informal interest in reducing the size of the crew needed to operate the
    ship, the analysis of alternatives did not examine optimizing via human
    systems integration one of the main drivers of crew size—the size of the
    embarked command staff. The total crew size of the JCC(X) equals the
    sum of the embarked joint command staff and the crew needed to operate
    the ship and perform basic ship functions. Navy analyses show that the
    crew size needed to operate the ship depends upon the joint command
    staff size and the mission equipment that is to be maintained by the crew.
    Yet, all of the Navy analyses examined joint command staff alternatives,
    ranging from 500 to 1,500 staff, which were larger than the fleet
    commander’s staff of 285 to 449 currently embarked on existing command
    ships. None of the analyses used human systems integration to determine
    the optimal size of the joint command staff.

    The program did fund three crewing studies as part of its early industry
    involvement effort that included ship crewing, workload, and functional
    analyses. However, these analyses were performed only on the command
    ship’s crew and not on the embarked joint staff. These crewing studies,
    prepared by contractors for the JCC(X) command ship program in
    June 2002, also reiterated the importance of beginning human systems
    integration efforts at the earliest opportunity in the ship acquisition
    process and called into question the adequacy of the human systems



    22
      To achieve these reductions, the Navy would have to adopt the latest fleet work practices
    and automation, eliminate functions not relevant to the JCC(X), reduce engineering
    watchstanders, and use a centralized galley and Military Sealift Command-like food service.




    Page 17                                              GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                integration efforts to date. For example, a study by one contractor
                                stated that

                                “The HSI [human systems integration] team was not part of a larger JCC(X) System
                                Engineering effort, as would be expected in a full-up proposal or system development
                                activity. The HSI [human systems integration] team also did not have contact with potential
                                JCC(X) users or with Navy/Joint HSI [human systems integration] Team members, as
                                would be expected and desired in a normal system acquisition environment. This was due
                                to the unique nature of a very limited scope manning study with very limited funds.”

                                The study also urged the program to adopt a human systems integration
                                approach stating that “a human-centered design approach, implemented at
                                the front-end and as part of an integrated system engineering process, will
                                yield an optimal crew size.” The study also stated that the same human
                                systems integration tools could be effectively used to optimize the size for
                                the embarked command staff.

                                JCC(X) command ship program officials stated that the program planned
                                to employ human systems integration to optimize crew size in the next
                                acquisition phase by contracting with industry to perform a functional
                                analysis. However, according to Navy officials, the program was canceled
                                before these efforts began, in part because of the unacceptably high crew
                                size estimated for the program.


LHA(R) Amphibious               The LHA(R) program has not yet developed a comprehensive human
Assault Ship Made Limited       systems integration strategy to outline the program’s human systems
Use of Human Systems            integration objectives and guide its efforts. In addition, officials told us
                                that very little human systems integration work was done early in the
Integration and Had No          acquisition process because officials plan to begin human systems
Formal Goals to Reduce          integration activities during preliminary design in the next acquisition
Crew Size                       phase, called system development and demonstration. Also, early
                                acquisition documents for the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship program
                                did not establish formal goals to reduce the number of personnel required
                                to operate the ship. The following are examples.

                            •    The mission need statement required the use of human systems
                                integration to optimize manning. However, it also stated that no changes
                                to Navy personnel requirements were expected. Currently, the program
                                plans only to not exceed the crew size of the older ships that perform
                                similar missions. These legacy LHA 1 class ships have a crew of about
                                1,230 to operate the ship and can embark about 1,700 Marines.




                                Page 18                                              GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
•    The analysis of alternatives stated that in order for the LHA(R) to achieve
    major reductions in personnel, significant new technology and research
    and development funds to integrate this technology into the LHA(R)
    design would be required as well as changes in culture (organization and
    procedures) to adapt reduced crew size practices of the commercial sector
    to the naval environment.
•    At the time of our review, the operational requirements document for the
    LHA(R) had not been developed.

    The Navy’s plans for the LHA(R) are not in concert with the Chief of Naval
    Operations’ desire for major reductions in the personnel levels for all new
    shipbuilding programs. In August 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations
    commented on the size of the LHA-1 (the legacy ship that the LHA(R) is
    replacing) saying, “I don’t want any more ships like that. The more low
    technology systems that are on it, the more people we will need. And we
    will need more crewmembers for support services. It [the LHA-1’s
    replacement] will be built from the keel up to support the type of striking
    capability that you need in your aviation arm. It is going to be a totally
    different ship.”23

    Program officials offered two major reasons for not conducting human
    systems integration early in the acquisition process: (1) they believed it
    was not appropriate to start human systems integration during the very
    early phases of the acquisition program (i.e., in concept and technology
    development) and (2) the program lacked funding to conduct human
    systems integration activities in the first acquisition phase. Program
    officials plan to conduct human systems integration efforts during the
    system development and demonstration acquisition phase when the
    program begins preliminary design efforts. Some of these efforts,
    scheduled to begin in February 2003, are to include a top-down
    requirements analysis and a total ship manpower assessment.

    In contrast to the opinions of LHA(R) program officials, the Navy’s human
    systems integration experts stated that human systems integration is a
    critical part of planning and design in the early stages of acquisition,
    including the concept and technology development phase. In addition,
    experience with the DD(X) program shows that the potential personnel-
    related cost savings resulting from the application of human systems



    23
     Kauchak, Marty, “Navigating Changing Seas, Navy Chief Harbors No Illusions About the
    Challenges That Lie Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal International, August 2002.




    Page 19                                           GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                         integration early on in a program can be significant. Moreover, experts
                         stated that every program, regardless of its funding levels or its reliance on
                         legacy systems, can benefit from a comprehensive human systems
                         integration approach, especially those developing crew-intensive
                         platforms such as the LHA(R).


                         The program managers and the human systems integration experts we
Several Factors          spoke to identified four factors that inhibit the Navy’s ability to
Contribute to the        consistently implement human systems integration across programs.
                         These factors are (1) neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish
Inconsistent             specific requirements for using human systems integration, such as its
Application of Human     timing and whether the approach should be addressed in the key
                         acquisition documents; (2) funding challenges often result in decisions to
Systems Integration      defer human systems integration activities and use legacy subsystems
and May Impede the       when acquiring new ships to save near-term costs instead of investing in
Navy’s Ability to        research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD
                         and Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited and
Optimize Crew Size       the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in certifying that ships delivered to
                         the fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the Navy lacks an
                         effective process to change its long-standing culture and the extensive
                         network of policies and procedures that have institutionalized current
                         manning practices. As a result, some programs we examined set goals not
                         to exceed the crew size of 30-year old ships, waited until preliminary
                         design in the second acquisition phase to begin human systems integration
                         efforts, and excluded primary and secondary ship functions from a
                         rigorous analysis. In recognition of these impediments, the Navy has taken
                         steps to resolve some of these issues.


Lack of Specific Navy    Recent DOD and Navy acquisition guidance provides program managers
Requirements to Use      with latitude about the timing and extent of human systems integration
Human Systems            activities and whether the approach should be addressed in key
                         acquisition documents. DOD guidance on the role of human systems
Integration Results in   integration in acquisition is contained in two documents, the Defense
Inconsistent             Acquisition memorandum and the Interim Defense Acquisition
Implementation           Guidebook, issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, both dated October
Across Programs          30, 2002. Compliance with the Defense Acquisition memorandum is
                         mandatory; compliance with the Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook
                         is discretionary. Both documents state that program managers will
                         develop a human systems integration strategy early in the acquisition
                         process to minimize total ownership cost. Neither document, however,
                         specifies how early in the process these efforts should begin or requires


                         Page 20                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
that human systems integration analyses be performed on the various
alternatives considered in the formal analysis of alternatives.

The Navy’s main acquisition instruction requires that human systems
integration costs and impacts be adequately considered along with other
engineering and logistics elements beginning at program initiation but
does not provide for specific procedures.24 The Navy’s section of the
acquisition deskbook25 provides more detailed guidance on human
systems integration (such as providing a format for the human systems
integration plan and discussing the contents of a human systems
integration program). However, because these sources provide only broad
guidelines or are discretionary, a program manger can decide when, how,
and to what extent they will use human systems integration in their
acquisition program.

The Navy also has developed other guidance on using human systems
integration, but its use is also discretionary. For example, human systems
integration experts developed a guide for the Office of the Chief Naval
Operations, which states that a human systems integration assessment
and trade-off of design alternatives should be conducted during the first
acquisition phase. The Surface Warfare Program Manager’s Guide to
Human Systems Integration also states that human systems integration
cost, schedule, and design risk areas for each alternative concept should
be identified and evaluated. The guidance also recommends that human
systems integration assessments should be conducted at each milestone
decision review.

Because of the wording of DOD guidance and the discretionary nature of
some Navy guidance, new ship program managers vary in when they use
human systems integration during ship development. For example, the
DD(X) program specified using the approach in the mission need
statement and the analysis of alternatives further specified human systems
integration requirements be included in the operational requirements
document. In contrast, the program managers for both the JCC(X)


24
 Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5000.2B, “Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for
Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs and Major and Non-Major Information
Technology Acquisition Programs,” December 6, 1996.
25
  “Department of the Navy (DON) Section (Discretionary) of Defense Acquisition
Deskbook (Reference Library), Appendix XI-Acquisition Program Plans Formats,
February 12, 1997 (the “Acquisition Deskbook” is now called the “Acquisition Knowledge
Sharing System”).




Page 21                                            GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                           command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship told us that they
                           planned to begin their human systems integration efforts during
                           preliminary design after the design alternative has been selected in the
                           next acquisition phase--system development and demonstration. Neither
                           program conducted human systems integration analyses of the alternative
                           designs during the analysis of alternatives. As such, program officials
                           lacked information on how each of the alternatives compared with respect
                           to their proposed crew size and how their crew size would affect total
                           ownership costs.


Challenges in Funding      Both JCC(X) and LHA(R) program officials cited challenges in funding a
Acquisition Programs       new acquisition program as a barrier to using human systems integration
Discourage Investment in   to optimize crew size and therefore reduce total ownership cost. These
                           challenges affect whether programs conduct crew-optimizing human
Labor-Saving Technology    systems integration activities in the earliest phases of acquisition and
                           whether the program will choose to invest in labor-saving technologies.

                           JCC(X) program officials told us that achieving personnel reductions and
                           using human systems integration to optimize crew size could increase
                           acquisition costs. The Navy’s human systems integration experts stated
                           that program managers have long been incentivized to hold down
                           acquisition costs without considering how such choices may affect
                           operating and support costs, such as personnel-related costs, over the life
                           of the ship. According to the Navy’s human systems integration experts,
                           labor-saving technology may add to the acquisition cost of a ship but may
                           also reduce the operating and support costs incurred over the ship’s
                           service life. Whether to use technology or sailors to perform a function
                           should be determined by a systematic analysis of costs and capabilities
                           performed as part of the human systems integration functional analysis—
                           an effort not undertaken by the JCC(X) command ship program.

                           Similarly, at the time the LHA(R) program was initiated in 2001, the Navy
                           decided not to invest in human systems integration activities and research
                           and development on new labor-saving technologies for the ship. The
                           program plans to capitalize, where appropriate, on systems already in
                           development for other ships such as the DD(X) destroyer and the CVN(X)
                           aircraft carrier but has not yet identified any labor-saving technologies or
                           processes that might be adapted from these programs. Program officials
                           said the program was not resourced to develop new technologies, having
                           received only $20 million in research and development funds from
                           program initiation through fiscal year 2002. However, the up-front savings
                           of not investing in research and development and human systems


                           Page 22                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                             integration activities must be weighed against the higher operating and
                             support costs incurred over the life of the ship and the foregone capability
                             and quality of life improvements that can accompany new technology and
                             human-centered design. For illustrative purposes, we calculated that a
                             nominal 25 percent reduction in a 1,245-person crew could provide a
                             personnel cost avoidance of nearly $1 billion over the service life of a ship,
                             or nearly $4 billion for a 4-ship class.26 In addition, DD(X) destroyer
                             program officials were uncertain about the extent to which programs now
                             in development outside the DD(X) destroyer family of ships will be able to
                             leverage its new technology, citing the costs associated with adapting
                             technology to new platforms that perform different missions. Rather,
                             DD(X) program officials told us that it is imperative for the new ship
                             programs to use human systems integration to inform such decisions.


DOD and Navy Offices         Several offices within DOD and the Navy have an advisory role regarding
Have Limited or Unclear      the implementation of human systems integration, although they lack the
Authority to Require         authority to require that it be used to optimize crew size and that it be
                             addressed in specific acquisition documents or at each acquisition
Human Systems                milestone. The Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and
Integration Activities for   Readiness, and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division)
Ship Programs                Acquisition and Human Systems Integration Requirements Branch both
                             review new program acquisition documents and provide guidance on
                             human systems integration policy.27 Additionally, the Office of the
                             Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, assists in the development
                             of human systems integration policy and addresses policy issues at
                             meetings of defense acquisition executives. The Office of the Assistant
                             Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) Chief
                             Engineer, uses human systems integration in its “system of systems”
                             examination of capability above the individual ship level to ensure
                             that systems can function together across various ships to perform
                             the mission.28




                             26
                                  Fiscal year 2002 dollars.
                             27
                                The Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition Division) Acquisition and Human Systems
                             Integration Requirements Branch also encourages manning reductions of up to 20 percent,
                             if possible, for new acquisition programs. It has, however, no authority to require
                             such reductions.
                             28
                               This approach embodies the overarching system requirements for a broad mission need,
                             such as surveillance or missile defense.




                             Page 23                                            GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                            In recognition of the need for an organization within the ship community
                            to “lead the effort to institutionalize humans systems integration…,” the
                            Navy, in October 2002, created the Human Systems Integration Directorate
                            within the Naval Sea Systems Command whose missions include

                        •    establishing human systems integration policy and standards for the
                            Naval Sea Systems Command;
                        •    ensuring the implementation of human systems integration policy,
                            procedures, and best practices;
                        •    assisting program offices in developing and sustaining human systems
                            integration plans; and
                        •    certifying that ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize
                            ship crewing, personnel, and training and promote personnel safety,
                            survivability, and quality service.29

                            Because of its role as the certifying authority for human systems
                            integration within the Naval Sea Systems Command, the directorate
                            may have more authority than the previously mentioned organizations to
                            ensure that human systems integration is implemented. However, the
                            memorandum establishing the directorate and the instruction specifying
                            its functions do not specify how certification will be accomplished, the
                            acquisition stage at which it will be required, or consequences of
                            noncompliance.


Navy Policies and           Navy acquisition officials also identified the layers of Navy policies,
Culture May Impede          procedures, and instructions that affect ship crew levels and cultural
Introduction of             resistance to novel concepts as impediments to optimizing ship crews.
                            They told us that even when human systems integration is used in the
Labor-Saving Technologies   early stages of an acquisition program to identify ways to reduce crew
and Approaches              size, it is difficult to achieve a consensus among numerous stakeholders
                            within the Navy to change long-standing policies and practices so that
                            labor-saving approaches or technologies can be implemented. To facilitate
                            this process, the DD(X) destroyer program established a forum to evaluate
                            policy barriers to proposed innovations and facilitate needed changes.
                            However, this effort was limited to selected ships. Other programs such as
                            the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship and the JCC(X) command ship had
                            not established a similar forum to resolve the policy barriers to optimize



                            29
                              Naval Sea Systems Command Notice 5400, “Establishment of the Human Systems
                            Integration (HSI) Directorate (SEA 03),” October 15, 2002.




                            Page 24                                         GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                      crewing on these ships. As a result, the Navy currently lacks an ongoing
                      process to facilitate examination of outmoded policies and procedures
                      that may impede optimizing crewing in all new ship acquisition programs.

Policy and Cultural   Navy officials explained that changing policies and procedures is a
Impediments           complex and time-consuming task because the current way of doing
                      business has been incorporated in instructions at all levels in the Navy,
                      ranging from the Secretary of the Navy to commanders of the Atlantic and
                      Pacific Fleets, and across a number of areas, such as recruiting, retention,
                      training, quality of life, and the environment. In addition, new ways of
                      doing business, such as those envisioned for the DD(X) destroyer, will
                      affect and require modifications to Navy doctrine, tactics, and operational
                      requirements. Furthermore, proposed changes must be evaluated for
                      compliance with governing statutes in such areas as compensation,
                      occupational safety and health, and aviation. As such, any change involves
                      numerous stakeholders who must be consulted and grant approval.
                      For example, DD(X) officials told us that it took about 18 months to
                      coordinate with numerous stakeholders to change applicable policies to
                      reduce the number of crewmembers required during flight operations from
                      48 to 15. Moreover, officials told us that this change is just the beginning
                      since the DD(X) destroyer program has identified numerous Navy policies
                      and procedures across a wide spectrum of topics that need to be changed
                      in order to adopt the innovations proposed by industry to meet the
                      DD(X)’s cost and capability requirements.

                      Officials with the other programs we examined also viewed Navy policies
                      as a barrier to optimized crewing. JCC(X) command ship program officials
                      reported that current Navy policy and practice would have been a barrier
                      to implementing potential crew size reductions had this program gone
                      forward. Two examples cited by program officials are bridge
                      watchstanding and main propulsion machinery monitoring. At present,
                      Navy practice for bridge watch requires approximately 11 personnel in
                      contrast to commercial practice, which requires 1 person on watch and
                      1 on stand by. Similarly, Navy practice for machinery monitoring requires
                      personnel in the machinery space at all times to ensure that power is
                      available. This contrasts with commercial practice, which permits putting
                      machinery on automatic and using sensors with alarms routed to a
                      watchstanders’ stateroom during certain hours. Officials stated that
                      implementing these commercial practices would have required evaluating
                      their appropriateness for a Navy operating environment and, if approved,
                      would have required modifying existing policies and procedures.
                      Furthermore, the LHA(R) analysis of alternatives concluded that
                      significant changes in organization and procedures are crucial to achieving


                      Page 25                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                            a substantial reduction in crew size. Cultural change is a particular
                            challenge for the LHA(R) program because the amphibious mission is
                            complex and both Navy and Marine organizations would be involved in
                            developing and implementing changes.

                            Navy officials stated that current funding practices in which personnel
                            costs are funded from centralized accounts and not out of the operating
                            fleets’ budget do not foster an awareness of the true cost of having sailors
                            on board ships and encourage viewing sailors as a “free resource.”
                            Additionally, because traditional, time-tested methods and crewing have
                            proven successful in the past, officials told us that Navy commanders have
                            little incentive to assume the risks associated with adopting new ways of
                            accomplishing shipboard tasks with fewer crewmembers, especially when
                            they lack awareness of and accountability for personnel costs.

Navy Lacks a Process to     Because of the magnitude of changes needed to reduce and optimize
Systematically Address      crewing on the DD(X) destroyer, the program established an effort
Impediments to Innovation   to identify and resolve policy barriers to implementing labor-saving
in All New Ship Programs    approaches that conflict with current policy, statutes, or practice. This
                            effort includes (1) reaching out to Navywide personnel development and
                            training organizations and to Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commanders and
                            (2) establishing the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse Web-based tool to
                            facilitate collaboration with multiple stakeholders and resolve policy
                            impediments to implementing innovations planned for the DD(X)
                            destroyer. The DD(X) clearinghouse was recently transferred to the
                            Naval Sea Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate.
                            However, there are currently no requirements for this forum to address
                            the policy barriers to optimizing crewing encountered in all new
                            ship acquisitions.


                            Given the Navy’s recapitalization challenges, efforts to control personnel
Conclusions                 costs and minimize total ownership costs are becoming increasingly
                            important. Applying human systems integration principles to optimize
                            crew size has the potential to result in a host of cost and operational
                            benefits, including saving billions of dollars by reducing total ownership
                            costs and increasing operational performance and ship maintainability.
                            The experience to date in the DD(X) destroyer program shows that
                            requiring human systems integration from the earliest stages of a program
                            (during concept and technology development) and using the results to
                            establish a crew size reduction goal as a key performance parameter are
                            effective strategies to holding program managers accountable during
                            program reviews for making significant progress toward reducing crew


                            Page 26                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
size. The DD(X) experience also shows that even when these practices are
followed, the program will still face challenges to achieving these
goals and encounter pressures to relax the goals as the system design
progresses, thereby supporting human systems integration experts’ view
that human systems integration plans and activities should receive
continued review and focus throughout the acquisition process. In
contrast, programs such as the JCC(X) and LHA (R) that do not use human
systems integration early and do not hold program managers accountable
during program reviews for crew size reduction are less likely to achieve
the meaningful reduction in crew size. Unless the Navy more consistently
applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and
establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss
opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are
determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process.

The Navy’s varied approach to applying human systems integration has
occurred partly because Navy guidance allows program managers
considerable discretion in determining the extent to which they apply
human systems integration principles in developing new systems. In the
absence of clear requirements that human systems integration programs
will be a key feature of all future acquisition programs, efforts to optimize
crew size will continue to vary due to the competing pressures placed on
program managers, and the Navy is likely to continue to miss
opportunities to reduce personnel requirements for future ships. As a
result, the Navy’s funding challenges may be exacerbated, and it may not
be able to build or support the number of ships it believes are necessary to
support the new defense strategy. Although the Navy’s recent efforts to
establish a focal point for human systems integration policy within the
Naval Sea Systems Command is a positive step, the success of this office
will depend on its authority to influence acquisition programs in their
initial stages. Because the instruction establishing this office does not
clearly explain the process this office will use to certify that ships
delivered to the fleet will have optimized crews, there is a risk that the
office may not have sufficient leverage to influence new programs in their
early stages and that this may result in missed opportunities to reduce
crew size and achieve long-term cost savings.

Even when the Navy uses a disciplined human systems integration process
early in an acquisition program to identify ways to optimize crew size,
implementation of new technologies and procedures is often hindered by
the Navy’s culture and traditions, which are institutionalized in a wide
array of policies and procedures affecting personnel levels, maintenance
requirements, and training. In recognition of these barriers, the DD(X)


Page 27                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                      program and the operational logistics community have established
                      processes to address these barriers for their particular ship or community.
                      However, not all new ship acquisition programs have developed or have
                      access to such a forum to facilitate removing barriers to optimized
                      manning to ensure that costly outdated policies and procedures are
                      systematically reexamined as new innovations are developed.


                      To ensure that the nation’s multibillion-dollar investment in Navy ships
Recommendations for   maximizes military capability and sailor performance at the lowest
Executive Action      feasible total ownership cost, we recommend that the Secretary of the
                      Navy develop and implement mandatory policies on human systems
                      integration requirements, standards, and milestones. Specifically, for each
                      new system the Navy plans to acquire, the Secretary of the Navy should
                      require that

                  •   a human systems integration assessment be performed as concepts for the
                      system are developed and alternative concepts are evaluated;
                  •   human systems integration analyses, including trade-off studies of design
                      alternatives, be used to establish an optimized crew size goal that will
                      become a key performance parameter in the program’s requirements
                      document; and
                  •   human systems integration assessments be updated prior to all
                      subsequent milestones.

                      To strengthen the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in promoting the
                      use of human systems integration for new ship systems, we recommend
                      that the Secretary of the Navy require the command to clarify the Human
                      Systems Integration Directorate’s role in and process for certifying that
                      ships and systems delivered to the fleet optimize ship crewing.

                      To facilitate the review of possibly outdated policies and procedures as
                      new labor-saving innovations are identified through human systems
                      integration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy require
                      that the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration
                      Directorate establish a process to evaluate or revise existing policies and
                      procedures that may impede innovation in all new ship acquisitions.




                      Page 28                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                         In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our
Agency Comments          recommendations and indicated that actions were underway or planned
and Our Evaluation       to implement them. DOD stated that actions taken in response to our
                         recommendations would only enhance ongoing human systems integration
                         initiatives; ensure more consistent application of human systems
                         integration processes across all ship acquisition programs; and lead to
                         optimized ship crews, increased system performance, and reduced life-
                         cycle costs. The Navy intends to implement our recommendation that it
                         require ship programs to use human systems integration to establish crew
                         size goals and help achieve them, in part, by developing a new program
                         called SEAPRINT (Systems Engineering, Acquisition and PeRsonnel
                         INTegration), modeled after the Army’s MANPRINT program that we cite
                         in our report. The Navy’s SEAPRINT program will develop Navywide
                         policy that identifies, mandates, and establishes accountability for human
                         systems integration analyses. This policy will mandate that human systems
                         integration is to be addressed in

                     •    a specific plan before the acquisition’s earliest milestone,
                     •    the initial capabilities document (formerly called the mission needs
                         statement),
                     •    the capabilities development document (formerly called the operational
                         requirements document), and
                     •    assessments performed as part of concept exploration and development
                         and updated prior to all subsequent milestones.

                         DOD also stated that it endorses a manpower-related key performance
                         parameter for all new ship acquisition programs. In response to our
                         recommendation that the Navy clearly define human systems integration
                         certification standards for new ships, DOD stated that the Navy is
                         developing technical human systems integration criteria and metrics that
                         will be used for measuring and certifying that ships and ship systems meet
                         human systems integration standards. With regard to our recommendation
                         that the Navy formally establish a process to examine and facilitate the
                         adoption of labor-saving technologies and best practices across Navy
                         systems, DOD stated that the Navy has established a new human systems
                         integration clearinghouse, implemented a pilot study using the
                         clearinghouse, and involved stakeholders from across the Navy. DOD also
                         provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
                         DOD’s comments are included in appendix VI of this report.




                         Page 29                                    GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at
(202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key staff members that
contributed to this report were Roderick Rodgers, Jacquelyn Randolph,
Suzanne Wren, Mary Jo LaCasse, Charles Perdue, and Jane Hunt.




Janet A. St. Laurent
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities
 and Management




Page 30                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
             Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology


             To assess the Navy’s use of human systems integration principles to
             optimize crews and goals to reduce crew size on the four new ship
             programs we were asked to review, we obtained and analyzed key
             acquisition documents such as mission need statements, analyses of
             alternatives, and operational requirements documents as well as human
             systems integration plans and analyses. We also interviewed Naval Sea
             Systems Command and Military Sealift Command officials who are
             responsible for the DD(X), T-AKE, JCC(X), and LHA(R) programs to
             discuss the use of human systems integration and crew size goals. We
             obtained current ship crewing documents from the Navy’s Manpower
             Analysis Center and the Military Sealift Command and compared the crew
             size goals for the four ship programs we reviewed to the crew size levels
             for older ships that perform similar missions. We also obtained data from
             the Naval Sea Systems Command on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
             program on crew sizing and workload to compare with the contractor’s
             crew size estimate for the DD(X). To understand the extent to which the
             T-AKE’s primary mission of underway replenishment affects crew size, we
             interviewed (1) experts from the Underway Replenishment Department at
             the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Port Hueneme Division) and the
             National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (which designed and will build
             the T-AKE) and (2) a subject matter expert on Navy underway
             replenishment. To gain an understanding of operational logistics and cargo
             storage and warehousing, we interviewed officials from the Chief of Naval
             Operations (Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics) and St. Onge Company
             (a subcontractor for the T-AKE ship program) and visited the Defense
             Distribution Depot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, one of the Department of
             Defense’s (DOD) largest and most automated distribution centers. To
             obtain information on the Navy’s methods of calculating total ownership
             costs, we interviewed officials from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and
             the Center for Naval Analyses. To calculate the ship crewing cost
             avoidance potential for the DD(X) and LHA(R) programs, we used data
             from the Navy’s Cost of a Sailor study for capturing comprehensive
             personnel costs and converted the data to fiscal year 2002 dollars.

             To evaluate factors that may impede the Navy’s use of human systems
             integration principles, we obtained and analyzed DOD, Joint Staff, and
             Navy systems acquisition directives, instructions, and guidance (e.g.,
             the internet-based Defense Acquisition Deskbook and the Program




             Page 31                                    GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




Management Community of Practice).1 We reviewed the interim defense
acquisition guidance as it pertains to the acquisition process, human
systems integration, and total ownership cost. We did not assess the ship
programs’ compliance with the several prior versions of DOD and Navy
acquisition guidance, but we did evaluate the extent to which human
systems integration was applied and whether crew size goals were
established. We also obtained and reviewed numerous articles on
military and civilian applications of human systems integration. To
obtain information on the formulation and oversight of human systems
integration policy and guidance, we met with officials from the offices of
the Secretary of Defense; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research
Development and Acquisition; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Chief
Engineer; and the Chief of Naval Operations (Acquisition and Human
Systems Integration Requirements Branch). To obtain additional
information on the benefits of human systems integration and best
practices, we interviewed subject matter experts with the Naval Sea
Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate, the DD(X)
Program Office, the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT)
Directorate, Carlow International Incorporated, and the Office of Naval
Research’s Human Systems Science and Technology Department, and we
attended the American Society of Naval Engineers Conference on Human
Systems Integration. To gain insight on labor-saving technologies and
changes to policies and procedures required to implement these
innovations, we met with officials from the Naval Sea Systems Command’s
SMARTSHIP Program Office; met with officials and toured the Office of
Naval Research’s Afloat Lab in Annapolis, Maryland; and met with officials
responsible for the DD(X) Policy Clearinghouse and the Naval Sea
Systems Command’s Human Systems Integration Directorate. We
discussed the funding for human systems integration with the Naval Sea
Systems program managers for the four ship programs we reviewed.

We conducted our review from June 2002 through April 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




1
 The program management communities of practice include acquisition, systems
engineering, total ownership costs, and many other related disciplines. The communities
may be accessed at http://www.pmcop.dau.mil/.




Page 32                                             GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                      Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation
Appendix II: Ships Included in
Our Evaluation

                      In 1995, the Navy established the 21st Century Surface Combatant
DD(X) Destroyer       program to develop the next generation of surface combatants that would
                      replace retiring destroyers and frigates on a timely basis. In November
                      2001, the Navy restructured this program from one intended to develop a
                      single ship class of 32 ships into its current form known as the DD(X). The
                      new program aims to develop and acquire three new classes of surface
                      combatants to include the DD(X) as the centerpiece, a cruiser called
                      CG(X), and a smaller littoral combat ship.

                      The first DD(X) destroyer is to be procured in fiscal year 2005 and enter
                      service in fiscal year 2011. The initial DD(X) is viewed as a “test bed” for
                      the host of new technologies under development. The Navy plans to
                      employ a spiral acquisition strategy for the ship class in which new
                      technology will be phased in over three distinct ship flights.

                      Plans call for the DD(X) destroyer to have a number of new features and
                      technologies, including

                  •    an advanced electric-drive/integrated power system for propelling the ship
                      that could become the basis for applying electric-drive technology more
                      widely throughout the fleet,
                  •    labor-saving technologies that may permit the ship to be operated with a
                      crew of 125 to 175 people instead of the more than 350 needed to operate
                      current Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) destroyers,
                  •    a new hull design for reduced detectability,
                  •    two new 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems for supporting Marine forces
                      ashore, and
                  •    128 vertical-launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles and
                      other weapons.1

                      The Navy is now reevaluating many of the ship’s operational requirements
                      and cost estimates (which were determined and approved under the
                      earlier DD-21 program) and may make substantial changes to the originally
                      envisioned capabilities, including relaxing the crew size and detectability
                      goals, changing the type of gun and amount of munitions carried, and
                      reducing the number of vertical launch tubes.

                      Previously, the Navy projected the unit procurement cost for the DD-21
                      destroyer to be not more than $750 million in fiscal year 1996 dollars



                      1
                          The number of vertical-launch tubes is being reevaluated.




                      Page 33                                                GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                   Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation




                   (the equivalent of about $795 million in fiscal year 2001 dollars)—
                   somewhat less than the $950 million unit procurement cost of today’s
                   Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.2 The DD-21 was also envisioned to have an
                   operating and support cost of not more than $6,000 per hour—about
                   one-third less than that of the Arleigh Burke-class, in large part resulting
                   from the smaller crew planned for the future destroyer. In April 2002, the
                   Navy selected Northrop Grumman Ship Systems as the design agent for
                   the DD(X) and the program entered detailed design.


                   The T-AKE cargo ship is the new combat logistics force ship to be
T-AKE Cargo Ship   operated by the Military Sealift Command. The ship’s primary mission is
                   to shuttle food, ammunition, repair parts, supplies, and limited quantities
                   of fuel to station ships and combatants. The new ship will replace T-AE 26
                   Kilauea-class ammunition ships and T-AFS 1/8 Mars-class and
                   Sirius-class combat stores ships in the Military Sealift Command.
                   The ship’s secondary mission is to operate with an oiler (T-AO 187
                   Kaiser-class) to provide logistics support to a carrier battle group. In this
                   capacity, the T-AKE will replace AOE 1 Sacramento-class ships.

                   The ship program initiated development in 1995 and began procurement in
                   October 2001. The Navy has purchased 3 of the 12 planned ships for a total
                   of almost $1 billion, with delivery expected in fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
                                                        th           th
                   Current plans are to purchase the 4 through 12 ships between fiscal year
                   2003 and 2007 for delivery between fiscal year 2006 and 2010. Once all are
                   purchased and delivered, T-AKE cargo ships will represent 41 percent of
                   the recapitalized combat logistics force fleet (at full operating status).

                   Military Sealift Command officials mentioned several factors—mission
                   requirements and personnel policies—that explain why, in comparison to
                   the Navy, they are able to operate combat logistics force ships with
                   smaller crews. Logistics ships in the Military Sealift Command have fewer
                   missions and therefore can operate with smaller crews. For example,
                   unlike Navy ships, Military Sealift Command logistics ships do not carry
                   weapons and therefore their crews do not require weapon operators.
                   Military Sealift Command ships also incorporate several other crew
                   reduction practices, including an unattended engine room, minimal bridge
                   watch by use of integrated bridge system technology, self-service laundry



                   2
                    Cost estimates are for the fifth destroyer built by each shipbuilder involved in
                   the program.




                   Page 34                                                GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                 Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation




                 facilities and food service initiatives. Command officials also said that
                 because of their personnel policies, civilian mariners are more
                 experienced than their Navy counterparts. Specifically, because there are
                 no personnel policies requiring job rotation or that individuals leave the
                 service if they are not promoted (“up or out”), civilian mariners are more
                 likely to have been in their current job longer than active-duty Navy
                 personnel. Command officials said that these personnel policies result in a
                 workforce that is more experienced than their Navy counterparts.3

                 The Military Sealift Command’s operating policies also enable it to operate
                 cargo ships with smaller crews than the Navy. For example, command
                 officials said that their policy requires 9 crewmembers per underway
                 replenishment station and that the Navy requires 20 per station. The
                 Military Sealift Command also does not assign a safety officer to each
                 underway replenishment station as the Navy does.


                 In November 1999, the Navy established the Joint Command and Control
JCC(X) Command   (Experimental) or JCC(X) program to replace the Navy’s four aging
Ship             command ships built in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, the
                 JCC(X) was intended to provide an afloat platform for performing joint
                 command and control functions, such as those performed by a joint force
                 commander without the need to obtain permission from host countries to
                 establish a land-based headquarters operation.

                 By November 2001, the Navy had received the Office of the Secretary of
                 Defense’s endorsement for an afloat command capability and completed
                 its formal analysis of alternatives. This analysis showed that the assigned
                 Navy crew (the ship’s operators) would account for roughly half the
                 life-cycle cost for a JCC(X). It also showed that a mix of Navy sailors and
                 civilian mariners would be capable of performing the crew functions at



                 3
                  To confirm whether civilian mariners were more experienced than their Navy peers,
                 we compared the average age and tenure of civilian mariners to active-duty Navy
                 personnel. Relative to Navy personnel, civilian mariners were older (average age is
                 46 years, Navy average is about 29), although they had similar tenure (average tenure in
                 the Military Sealift Command is about 8 years; the Navy average is almost 9). The Military
                 Sealift Command provided data on civilian mariners. Navy age data was taken from
                 Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 2000, dated February
                 2002. Navy tenure data was calculated from Tabulations of Responses from the 1999
                 Survey of Active Duty Personnel, Volume 2: Programs and Services, Family, Economic
                 Issues, and Background, conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center, dated
                 September 2000.




                 Page 35                                               GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                    Appendix II: Ships Included in Our Evaluation




                    two-thirds of the personnel cost, saving about $2 billion for four ships over
                    a 40-year service life. The analysis further estimated that a newly designed
                    ship sized for an embarked command staff of about 800 (these people are
                    in addition to the ship’s crew) would cost about $1 billion for a lead ship in
                    fiscal year 2006 and $850 million for a follow-on ship if three were built.
                    Subsequent to this analysis, the Navy’s draft 2004 budget plan eliminated
                    funding for the JCC(X) and instead directed another ship program, the
                    Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future),4 to study developing joint
                    command and control modules or variants.


                    In 2001, the Navy established the Amphibious Assault Ship, General
LHA(R) Amphibious   Purpose (Replacement) or LHA(R) program to replace its five aging LHA 1
Assault Ship        Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships. These ships are primarily
                    designed to move large quantities of Marines, their equipment, and
Replacement         supplies onto any shore during hostilities.

                    The first LHA ship will be replaced by a Wasp-class amphibious assault
                    ship, the LHD-8,5 in approximately fiscal year 2007, and the remaining
                    ships will be replaced by a modified version of the LHD 8 no later than
                    fiscal year 2024. The modified variant will be made longer and wider to
                    accommodate the larger and heavier aircraft the Marines are developing,
                    the MV-22 Osprey and the Joint Strike Fighter.

                    The Navy estimates the cost for the first ship to be about $3 billion with
                    the three successor ships costing about $2.1 billion each.6 The ship’s
                    annual operating and support cost is estimated to be about $111 million.
                    The LHA(R) program is currently in the first acquisition phase called
                    concept technology and development.




                    4
                     The MPF(F) ships will be the Marine Corps’ civilian operated forward-deployed floating
                    equipment warehouses. The MPF(F) ships are intended to replace and update the
                    capability currently provided by 13 aging Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
                    5
                      The Wasp-class LHD is the Navy’s largest amphibious assault ship. This class is an
                    improved follow-on the to five Tarawa-class LHA ships. The LHD 8, currently under
                    construction, will incorporate improvements, including a gas-turbine propulsion system
                    and a new electrical auxiliary system that will eliminate steam service.
                    6
                        All LHD cost figures are in constant fiscal year 2003 dollars.




                    Page 36                                                   GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                       Appendix III: Defense Acquisition
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition


                       Although its regulatory structure is undergoing change, the Department of
                       Defense’s (DOD) complex process to deliver a new ship class to the
                       fleet occurs in three steps. First, the Navy’s requirements community
                       establishes requirements for a new system. Second, the Navy’s acquisition
                       organizations and contractors design and produce the ship. Finally, after
                       building the ship, the warfighter assumes responsibility for operating and
                       maintaining the ship. DOD’s policy is to acquire weapons systems using a
                       disciplined systems engineering process designed to optimize total
                       system performance and minimize total ownership costs.1 The regulation,
                       requirements, and design aspects of the acquisition process are discussed
                       below.


                       Weapons systems acquisition is governed by a complex regulatory
Defense Acquisition    structure ranging from public laws to nonmandatory policies, practices,
Regulatory Structure   and guidance. Until recently, three major DOD regulatory documents
                       guided the management of Defense acquisition: DOD Directive 5000.1,
Is Undergoing Change   “The Defense Acquisition System;” DOD Instruction 5000.2,
                       “The Operation of the Defense Acquisition System;” and DOD Regulation
                       5000.2-R, “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs
                       (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition
                       Programs.” On October 30, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
                       canceled all three documents and by memorandum issued interim
                       guidance. On an interim basis, the DOD 5000.2-R was reissued as a
                       guidebook, Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, to be used for best
                       practices, lessons learned, and expectations; but its guidance is not
                       mandatory.2 Additional, supporting, discretionary best practices; lessons
                       learned; and expectations are posted on DOD’s internet Web site, DOD
                       5000 Series Resource Center.3 The interim DOD guidance retains the basic
                       acquisition system structure (i.e., no new phases), emphasizes
                       evolutionary acquisition, modifies the requirements generation
                       documents, and makes several other changes. Policies and procedures for


                       1
                         Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1,
                       The Defense Acquisition System, October 30, 2002.
                       2
                        On May 12, 2003, DOD released a new version of DOD Directive 5000.1 and DOD
                       Instruction 5000.2. A streamlined version of the nonmandatory Guidebook is under
                       development. Because this guidance was issued following the completion of our audit
                       work, the description of the acquisition process in this report is based on DOD’s interim
                       guidance issued on October 30, 2002.
                       3
                        See http://dod5000.dau.mil/. Another internet-based aid, commonly known as “The
                       Acquisition Deskbook,” is located at http://deskbook.dau.mil/jsp/default.jsp.




                       Page 37                                               GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                      Appendix III: Defense Acquisition




                      developing and approving requirements for new systems are also
                      under revision.4

                      DOD’s acquisition process, as outlined in its interim guidance issued
The Acquisition       October 30, 2002, provides an ordered structure of tasks and activities
Process Contains      to bring a program to the next major checkpoint. These checkpoints,
                      called milestones, are the points at which a recommendation is made and
Several Checkpoints   approval sought regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program
for Assessing         into one of three phases: concept and technology development, system
                      development and demonstration, and production and deployment
Progress              (see fig. 2). The phases are intended to provide a logical means of
                      progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well defined
                      system-specific requirements and ultimately into effective systems. A
                      fourth phase, operations and support, follows the system acquisition. This
                      phase represents the ownership period of the system when a unit, in this
                      case a ship, is fielded and operated by sailors for a period of 30 to 50 years.
                      A program’s progress toward established program goals, or key
                      performance parameters, is assessed at milestones.




                      4
                       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01B, Requirements Generation
                      System, Apr. 15, 2001. The new CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 are expected to be
                      reissued in mid-2003.




                      Page 38                                            GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                        Appendix III: Defense Acquisition




Figure 2: The DOD Acquisition System Process, Phases, Milestones, and Key Activities




                                        The concept and technology development phase has two major efforts:
                                        concept exploration and technology development. This phase begins with
                                        a milestone A decision to enter concept and technology development.
                                        Entrance into this phase depends upon a validated and approved initial
                                        capability document [mission need statement]. Concept exploration
                                        typically consists of competitive, parallel, short-term concept studies
                                        guided by the initial capability document (mission need statement). The
                                        focus of these studies is to refine and evaluate the feasibility of alternative
                                        solutions to the initial concept and to provide a basis for assessing the
                                        relative merits of these solutions. Analyses of alternatives are used to
                                        facilitate comparisons. A project may enter technology development
                                        when a solution for the needed capability has been identified. This effort
                                        intends to reduce technology risk and to determine the appropriate set
                                        of technologies. A project exits technology development when an
                                        affordable increment of militarily-useful capability has been identified,
                                        the technology for that increment has been demonstrated in a relevant
                                        environment, and a system can be developed for production within a short
                                        time frame (normally less than 5 years). During technology development,
                                        the user is required to prepare the capability development document
                                        [operational requirements document] to support subsequent program
                                        initiation. An affordability determination is made in the process of



                                        Page 39                                        GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Appendix III: Defense Acquisition




addressing cost as a military requirement and included in the capability
development document [operational requirements document], using
life-cycle cost or, if available, total ownership cost.

The purpose of the system development and demonstration phase is to
develop a system. This phase has two major efforts: system integration
and system demonstration. The entrance point is milestone B, which is
also the initiation of an acquisition program. The system integration effort
intends to integrate subsystems and reduce system-level risk. The system
can enter system integration when the program manager has a technical
solution for the system, but has not yet integrated the subsystems into a
complete system. The critical design review during system development
and demonstration provides an opportunity for mid-phase assessment of
design maturity. The system demonstration effort intends to demonstrate
the ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent with the
validated key performance parameters. The program can enter system
demonstration when the program manager has demonstrated the system
with prototypes. This work effort ends when a system demonstrates
its capabilities in its intended environment using engineering development
models or integrated commercial items (in addition to several other
criteria).

The purpose of the production and deployment phase is to achieve an
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. The decision to
commit DOD to low-rate initial production takes place at milestone C.
Continuation into full-rate production results from a successful full-rate
production decision review. During this effort, units shall attain initial
operational capability.

Operations and support has two major efforts: sustainment and disposal.
The objectives of this activity are the execution of a support program that
meets operational support performance requirements and sustainment of
systems in the most cost-effective manner for the life cycle of the system.
When the system has reached the end of its useful life, it must be disposed
of in an appropriate manner.




Page 40                                      GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                         Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer
Appendix IV: Summary of DD(X) Destroyer  Gold Team Trade Studies



Gold Team Trade Studies

                                         Trade studies are required to support decisions throughout the systems
                                         engineering process. During a requirements analysis, requirements are
                                         balanced against other requirements or constraints, including cost.
                                         Requirements analysis trade studies examine and analyze alternative
                                         performance and functional requirements to resolve conflicts and satisfy
                                         customer needs. As part of the design competition for the DD(X)
                                         destroyer, the competing contractors conducted trade studies and
                                         analyses on their system concept designs and the related systems
                                         requirements. Table 1 highlights some of the 23 trade studies conducted by
                                         the winning design agent, Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and
                                         Raytheon.

Table 1: Selected DD(X) Destroyer Trade Studies Conducted by Northrop Grumman Ingalls Shipyard and Raytheon, from
1998-2002

 Study topic                         Scope of analysis
 Command center design               Incorporated analytic processes from Westinghouse Electric commercial nuclear power plant
                                     design efforts.
                                                                                            a                                        b
 Operator crewing—propulsion,        Studied processes and toured U.S.N.S. Red Cloud, operated by Maersk Line Limited, Inc, to
 electrical, and auxiliary plant     gain insight into civilian crewing of noncombat portions of ship operations.
 Food service                        Investigated commercial advanced food service program used by many hotel chains.
 Damage control                      Investigated chemical plant firefighting methods, particularly telerobotics, for inclusion in the
                                     automated fire suppression system engineering development model.
 Cognitive work analysis             This process, which was the foundation of the human systems integration effort, was
                                     developed in the Netherlands.
 Training concepts                   Investigated Ford Motor Company distance learning and “Just-in-Time” training system for their
                                     maintenance and service department personnel.
 Remote equipment monitoring         Received briefings on the Delta Airlines and Boeing Corporation remote monitoring capability
                                     of in-flight data from their commercial airline fleet.
 Facility maintenance/cleaning       Reviewed design requirements and practices of Maersk Line, Ltd., for reductions in the work
                                     required for common area cleaning and maintenance.
 Self-service laundry                Reviewed Maersk Line, Ltd., use of self-service laundry on its United States Naval Ship
                                     contract ships. Reviewed both reliability of the equipment and crew satisfaction.
 Ashore administrative, personnel,   Reviewed program provided by Northrop Grumman Information Technology to the Navy at the
 and disbursing service              precommissioning sites.
 Reduced bridge watchstanders        Investigated United States Naval Ship and commercial operations with Maersk Line, Ltd., as
                                     well as Navy Smart Ship and Sperry Integrated Bridge System programs.
 Portable computing                  Investigated wearable computers developed by Boeing in Seattle, Washington, and the
                                     Massachusetts Institute of Technology Media Lab at Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Source: Navy.
                                         a
                                         U.S.N.S. Red Cloud is a Watson-class large, medium speed, roll-on/roll-off sealift ship. The ship is
                                         operated by the Military Sealift Command and crewed by contract civilian mariners.
                                         b
                                          Maersk Sealand is one of the largest liner shipping companies in the world, serving customers all
                                         over the globe.




                                         Page 41                                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                    Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                    DD(X) Crew Sizes



DD(X) Crew Sizes

                    Plans for the DD(X) destroyer envision significant reductions when
                    compared to previous destroyer ships in the number of crewmembers
                    required to man watches, provide support functions, and perform special
                    evolutions. For example, DD(X) plans call for 20 watchstations, requiring
                    60 billets,1 a significant reduction from the DDG 51 destroyer, which has
                    61 watchstations requiring 163 billets. Similarly, DD(X) ship crew sizing
                    studies project that 833 hours will be required per week for own unit
                    support functions such as administration, messing, and supply while the
                    DDG 51 requires 5,500 for the same functions. To achieve these proposed
                    reductions, the DD(X) plans to employ a new operational crewing
                    concept, human-centered design and reasoning systems, advances in ship
                    cleaning and preservation, a new maintenance strategy, an automated
                    damage control system, and “reach back” technologies and distance
                    support. Officials emphasized that the DD(X) plans will continue to evolve
                    as the program matures. In addition, changes to the DD(X) destroyer’s
                    operational requirements, which are currently being reevaluated, will
                    likely further affect these estimates.


                    The approach to operational crewing on the DD(X) destroyer will differ
DD(X) Operational   markedly from that employed on legacy ships. The older ship classes tend
Crew Size Concept   to have legacy systems and watchstations that are “stovepiped,” meaning
                    that they maintain separate stations and databases for such things as
                    sensors, weapon systems, and logistics, which are not linked together and
                    which require people to be specially trained on these systems. This results
                    in an inflexible work environment in which commanders are unable to
                    level workload across watchstanders because they are trained in separate
                    disciplines. It requires extra people, with little increase in capability. The
                    DD(X) concept is to have watchstanders trained functionally across
                    warfare areas who can be flexibly employed as the situation demands.
                    This approach results in a more compact, flexible watch team, which
                    requires fewer augmentations and which is designed to flexibly respond to
                    a variety of tactical situations. Underpinning this concept is a strategy in
                    which crewmembers will be highly trained across multiple warfare areas
                    or maintenance tasks and advanced skills will apply across multiple
                    disciplines with specialized skills only being used periodically.




                    1
                        Watchstations are manned in three sections, or 8-hour shifts, over the course of a day.




                    Page 42                                                  GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                           Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                           DD(X) Crew Sizes




                           The DD(X) destroyer envisions reducing underway watchstanding through
Human-Centered             greater use of human-centered design and reasoning systems such as
Design and Reasoning
                    •       integrated bridge system technologies demonstrated in CG 47
Systems                    Ticonderoga-class “smart ship” and many commercial ships that provide
                           computer-based navigation, planning and monitoring, automated radar
                           plotting, and automated ship control;2
                       •    the integrated command environment that provides reduced combat
                           information center crewing by using “multi-modal watchstation” type
                           displays, the ability to monitor more than one watchstation at each
                           console, and the use of decision support systems to facilitate
                           instantaneous situational awareness;
                       •    computerized engineering control systems that are extensively used in the
                           commercial shipping industry and machinery space design that permits
                           zero underway crewing by using remote monitors and sensors; and
                       •    a flexible watch team-type organization.


                           The DD(X) destroyer plans to use advances in ship cleaning and
Advances in Cleaning       preservation to free sailors from traditional maintenance and preservation
and Preservation           duties and privatizing the preservation work that cannot be engineered
                           away. Reliability-centered maintenance3 and condition-based maintenance4
                           concepts will be employed on the DD(X) instead of the traditional planned
                           maintenance system currently used on DDG 51 destroyers. This change is
                           expected to reduce noncorrective type maintenance and significantly
                           reduce corrective maintenance induced by the planned maintenance


                           2
                            According to the Smart Ship Assessment Report, the experiment aboard a
                           Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser has reduced workload and ship crewing
                           requirements while enhancing combat readiness and improving the crew’s quality of life.
                           The experiment validated the use of cost-effective commercial technology and policy
                           changes to allow sailors to focus on their war fighting and professional skills by freeing
                           them from repetitive tasks.
                           3
                            Reliability-centered maintenance is a maintenance scheme based on the reliability of
                           the various components of the system or product in question. It requires extensive
                           knowledge about the reliability and maintainability of the system and all of its subsequent
                           components, including the mean time to repair and failure rates of the product or system.
                           Implementing this kind of preventative maintenance program can greatly reduce the cost
                           of ownership.
                           4
                            The objective of condition-based maintenance is to accurately detect the current state
                           of mechanical systems and accurately predict systems’ remaining useful lives. This
                           enables organizations to perform maintenance only when needed to prevent operational
                           deficiencies or failures, essentially eliminating costly periodic maintenance and greatly
                           reducing the likelihood of machinery failures.




                           Page 43                                               GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                        Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                        DD(X) Crew Sizes




                        system. In addition, routine maintenance on the DD(X) is projected to be
                        reduced by increased equipment reliability and a strategy of replacing
                        failed components on board instead of repairing them at sea. Lastly,
                        cleaning is expected to be reduced by better ship design that capitalizes on
                        commercial shipping industry best practices such as cornerless spaces and
                        maintenance-free deck coverings.


                        The DD(X) destroyer maintenance strategy focuses on allowing sailors
DD(X) Maintenance       to concentrate on war-fighting tasks and skills rather than on ship
Strategy                maintenance and preservation (i.e., “rust busting” skills). The DD(X)
                        maintenance strategy envisions no organizational level repair conducted
                        on the ship. As such, many repair watches have been eliminated. Three
                        key elements of the DD(X) maintenance strategy include

                    •   reducing maintenance requirements through improved system reliability
                        and redundancy and to leverage labor-saving advances in corrosion
                        control materials and technology,
                    •   improving maintenance work efficiency by conducting condition-based
                        maintenance instead of scheduled maintenance, and
                    •   using reach back and remote monitoring support while deployed.



                        The DD(X) destroyer will employ extensive automated damage
Automated Damage        control systems, integrated with an optimally manned damage control
Control System          organization to quickly suppress and extinguish fires and control
                        their spread.


                        The DD(X) destroyer plans to use “reach back” technologies and distance
Use of Reach Back       support to reduce crew workload. “Tele-systems” initiatives are being
Technologies and        studied for ship crew reduction in the areas of medicine, personnel,
                        pay, training, and maintenance. DD(X) also envisions having real-time
Distance Support        collaboration between the ship and shore, and between ships. Ships would
                        access expertise from the systems commands, industry, and other
                        deployed ships on a year round, around the clock basis.

                        Table 2 compares the workload and crew composition for the DDG 51
                        Flight IIA and those proposed for the DD(X).




                        Page 44                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                         Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                                         DD(X) Crew Sizes




Table 2: Comparison of Watchstations for the DDG 51 Flight II A and the DD(X)

  DDG51 Flight II A watchstations                  DD(X) watchstationsa
Position(s)                    No.     Position                           No.   Potential workload reduction enablers
Tactical action officer           1    Tactical action officer              1   No change anticipated
Combat systems coordinator        8    Command center warfare officer       1   • DD(X) maintenance strategy (increase
Own ship display controller                                                       reliability and replace instead of repair)
Combat systems office of the                                                      will eliminate need for on-station
  watch/combat system                                                             repairmen
                                                                                • Automated damage control system
  maintenance supervisor
Fire control supervisor
Radar repairman
Computer repairman
Display repairman
Electronics support supervisor
Combat information center         1    Watch supervisor cross warfare       1   No change anticipated
  supervisor                           area advanced
Engineering officer of the        9    Engineering officer of the watch     1   •   Use of condition-based maintenance
  watch                                                                             philosophy and reliability-centered
Propulsion/auxiliary control                                                        maintenance instead of planned
  console operator                                                                  maintenance system
                                                                                •   Increased systems reliability
Electrical plant control
                                                                                •   Use of monitors and sensors
  console operator                                                              •   System redundancy
Engine room operator                                                            •   Speedy “plug & play” repairs
Auxiliary system monitor                                                        •   Automated damage control system
Engine room operator
Propulsion system monitor
Damage control/integrated
  survivability management
  system operator
Sounding and security watch
Tactical information              2    Information dominance advanced       1   Human-centered design and reasoning
  coordinator                                                                   systems with integrated information
Local area network manager                                                      displays
Intelligence console operator     3    Cross warfare area basic             1   Human-centered design and reasoning
Intelligence console operator          (intelligence)                           systems with integrated information
                                                                                        b
Tactical intelligence operator                                                  displays
Communications supervisor         3    Cross warfare area basic             1   Human-centered design and reasoning
Communication systems                  communications                           systems with integrated information
  manager                                                                       displays
Communications systems
  operator No. 1
Electronic warfare supervisor     4    Information dominance advanced       1   •   DDG 51 workload involves electronic
Damage control console                                                              warfare “soft kill” signatures
  operator                                                                          management. Improved signatures on
Super rapid blooming off-                                                           the DD(X) will negate the need for
                                                                                    countermeasures and chaff operators.
  board chaff operator
                                                                                •   Human-centered design and reasoning
Identification supervisor                                                           systems with integrated information
                                                                                    displays
                                                                                •   Automated damage control system



                                         Page 45                                       GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                      Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                                      DD(X) Crew Sizes




 DDG51 Flight II A watchstations                DD(X) watchstationsa
Position(s)                   No.    Position                             No.   Potential workload reduction enablers
Antiair warfare coordinator      3   Cross warfare area advanced            1   • Multifunction radar provides improved
Missile system supervisor            (Antiair warfare)                            capability and reduced human anti-air
Radar system controller                                                           warfare workload
                                                                                • Human-centered design and reasoning
                                                                                  systems with integrated information
                                                                                  displays
Land attack warfare             1    Land attack warfare specialist        1    No change anticipated
              c
 coordinator
Gun fire control system         2    Cross warfare area basic (land        1    Human-centered design and reasoning
 console operator                    attack warfare)                            systems with integrated information
Tomahawk weapons system                                                         displays
 supervisor
Tomahawk weapons system         2    Cross warfare area advanced           1    Human-centered design and reasoning
 operator                                                                       systems with integrated information
Tomahawk weapons system                                                         displays
                 d
 operators (+3)
Quarter master of the watch     3    Assistant officer of the deck         1    Human-centered design and reasoning
Boatswain mate of the watch                                                     systems with integrated information
 ship control                                                                   displays
Junior officer of the deck      1    Junior officer of the deck            1    No change anticipated
Officer of the deck             8    Officer of the deck                   1    • Change to current Navy policy and
Messenger                                                                          procedures for bridge crewing
Surface detector tracker                                                        • Use of cameras
                                                                                • Electronic log keeping
Lookout starboard
                                                                                • Improved communications
Lookout port
                                                                                • Integrated bridge system
Lookout aft
Signal watch
Supervisor/operator
 recorder
Surface/subsurface/             2    Cross warfare area basic              1    Human-centered design and reasoning
 engagement control officer          integrated air/surface dominance           systems with integrated information
 warfare coordinator                                                            displays
Surface/subsurface warfare
 supervisor
Undersea warfare coordinator    2    Cross warfare area basic              1    Human-centered design and reasoning
 sonar supervisor                    undersea warfare                           systems with integrated information
                                                                                displays
Undersea warfare console        3    Undersea warfare specialist           1    Human-centered design and reasoning
 operator                                                                       systems with integrated information
Undersea warfare console                                                        displays
 operator
Undersea warfare console
 operator
Air intercept controller        3    Antisubmarine/surface tactical air    1    Human-centered design and reasoning
Antisubmarine/surface                controller                                 systems with integrated information
 tactical air controller                                                        displays
Unmanned aerial vehicle
            e
 controller




                                      Page 46                                         GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                       Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                                       DD(X) Crew Sizes




  DDG51 Flight II A watchstations                   DD(X) watchstationsa
 Position(s)                   No.    Position                                       No.         Potential workload reduction enablers
                                      Flex watchstation cross warfare                  1
                                          f
                                      area
 Total (163 watch billets over   61   Total (60 watch billets over a 3                20
 a 3 section watch)g                  section watch)
Source: Navy
                                       a
                                        This table was created by us based on data provided by Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 500).
                                       Watchstation numbers for the DDG 51 Flight II A destroyer are from the ship’s Preliminary Ship
                                       Manning Document, dated October 5, 2002, version for Flight IIA. Watchstation numbers for the
                                       DD(X) destroyer are from the design agent’s (Gold Team) Phase III working document dated
                                       September 26, 2002, which reflects a summary of the design agent’s Phase II crewing studies.
                                       Officials stated that this is the closest comparison possible from the DDG 51 to the DD(X). They
                                       noted that not all responsibilities clearly map to the new system. Officials also stated that these
                                       numbers will continue to evolve as the program matures. This table has been reviewed by PMS 500
                                       officials for accuracy and includes official comments provided to us on November 18, 2002.
                                       b
                                        Officials noted that intelligence system requirements will be dictated to DD(X) and that achieving
                                       reductions in this area relies heavily on successful software development efforts. The DD(X) design
                                       agent is currently working on this area.
                                       c
                                           This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
                                       d
                                           This is three of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
                                       e
                                           This is one of six DDG 51 watchstations for land attack.
                                       f
                                           This position provides flexibility in the event of workload surges.
                                       g
                                           Total does not equal 3 times 61 due to the fact that some watches are not always manned.


                                       In addition to the daily shipboard routine of standing watches in the
                                       various ship’s departments, designated crewmembers also have collateral
                                       duties to support special events, referred to as special evolutions. These
                                       evolutions involve activities such as underway replenishment of fuel, food
                                       and ammunition transferred from either helicopters or other ships, flight
                                       operations, small boat operations, and anchoring. The number of people
                                       required and the estimated labor hours per week for these special
                                       evolutions are other indicators of ship workload. Table 3 compares the
                                       number of billets and weekly workload required for selected special
                                       evolutions on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer with those estimated for
                                       the DD(X) destroyer. Table 3 compares the billets and labor hours
                                       required per week for special evolutions on the DDG 51 Flight IIA and
                                       those proposed for the DD(X).




                                       Page 47                                                           GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                                          Appendix V: Comparison of DDG 51 and
                                          DD(X) Crew Sizes




Table 3: Comparison of Crew Size for Selected Special Evolutions on DDG 51 Flight IIA and DD(X) Destroyers

                                    DDG 51 Flight IIA         DD(X) Gold Team Phase II
                                                 Labor                          Labor                             Percent
                                             hours per                       hours per          Change in       change in
 Evolution                          Billets       week              Billets      week              billets    labor hours
 Fueling at sea                          57          228                  9      11.61                  48            -95
 Connected replenishment                 38           19                 12       6.12                  26            -68
 Vertical replenishment                  32          7.8                 11       5.61                  21            -28
 Boat operations                         15           8.4                 6       5.67                   9            -33
 Flight operations                       41          351                 16      87.50                  25            -75
 Restricted navigation operations        12         12.2                  3        .93                   9            -92
 Towing/towed                            41          5.9                  7       3.13                  34            -47
Source: Navy.




                                          Page 48                                        GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                             Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
Appendix VI: Comments from the
                             of Defense



Department of Defense

Note: A GAO comment
supplementing those in
the report text appears at
the end of this appendix.




                             Page 49                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                 Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
                 of Defense




See comment 1.




                 Page 50                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
of Defense




Page 51                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
of Defense




Page 52                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
of Defense




Page 53                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
                Appendix VI: Comments from the Department
                of Defense




                The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Defense’s letter
                dated May 12, 2003.


                1. We disagree that the tone of our report implies a lack of interest or
GAO’s Comment      desire on the part of program managers to pursue manpower
                   reductions. Rather, our report notes that a number of factors, including
                   funding issues, create barriers that make it more difficult for program
                   managers to pursue manpower reductions and develop robust human
                   systems integration programs. Moreover, we agree that resourcing
                   human systems integration and supporting analyses at the earliest
                   stages of the program is a responsibility that does not wholly reside
                   with the program manager but is shared by the Navy staff. As our
                   report clearly points out, given the existing barriers and an absence of
                   specific requirements to implement a comprehensive human systems
                   integration approach, the JCC(X) and LHA(R) programs did not
                   identify or request resources for performing human systems
                   integration and related analyses to support the research and
                   development required to pursue advanced technology that could have
                   enabled workload and manpower reductions.




(350269)
                Page 54                                     GAO-03-520 Optimized Ship Crewing
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