oversight

Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-07-15.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

             United States General Accounting Office

GAO          Report to Congressional Committees




July 2003
             DEFENSE
             INFRASTRUCTURE
             Basing Uncertainties
             Necessitate
             Reevaluation of
             U.S. Construction
             Plans in South Korea




GAO-03-643
                                           July 2003


                                           DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

                                           Basing Uncertainties Necessitate
Highlights of GAO-03-643, a report to      Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans
congressional committees
                                           in South Korea



The U.S.-South Korean Land                 Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all
Partnership Plan (LPP), signed             U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to
in March 2002, was designed to             resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea.
consolidate U.S. installations,            Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant,
improve combat readiness,                  complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of
enhance public safety, and
strengthen the U.S.-South Korean
                                           U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan
alliance by addressing some of             area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the
the causes of periodic tension             $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in
associated with the U.S. presence          South Korea over the next 10 years.
in South Korea. The Senate
report on military construction            Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements
appropriations for fiscal year 2003        could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction
directed GAO to review the LPP.            projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those
GAO adjusted its review to also            unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned
address the effect of ongoing              construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan
reassessments of U.S. overseas             Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul—areas where
presence upon the LPP and other
infrastructure needs.
                                           there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence—has recently been put on
                                           hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul.
In this report, GAO assessed
(1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the          GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the
implications on the LPP and other          implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects
construction projects of proposals         throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources,
to change basing in South Korea,           including funding realized through land sales from property returned by
and (3) implementation challenges          the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be
associated with the LPP that               required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear.
could affect future U.S. military          Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction
construction projects in                   to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea.
South Korea.
                                           Ongoing and Planned Construction on U.S. Installations in South Korea, as of March 2003

GAO recommends (1) a
reassessment of construction
projects planned or under way in
South Korea as ongoing studies of
overseas presence and basing are
finalized and (2) the development
of a detailed South Korea-wide
infrastructure master plan to
guide future construction planning.
DOD agreed with GAO’s
recommendations and indicated
actions it is taking to address them.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-643.

To view the full product, including the
scope and methodology, click on the link
above. For more information, contact
Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5581 or
holmanb@gao.gov.
Contents


Letter                                                                                      1
               Results in Brief                                                             2
               Background                                                                   5
               Korea Land Partnership Plan                                                  7
               Land Partnership Plan as Originally Approved Addressed a Portion
                 of Previously Existing U.S. Military Infrastructure Needs in
                 South Korea                                                              14
               Ongoing Studies Are Expected to Alter Previously Planned
                 LPP Construction Projects                                                15
               Challenges to Completing Land Partnership Plan and Other
                 Planned Construction Projects throughout South Korea                     17
               Conclusions                                                                21
               Recommendations for Executive Action                                       21
               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                         22

Appendix I     Scope and Methodology                                                      24



Appendix II    Summary of the Land Partnership Plan                                       26



Appendix III   Comments from the Department of Defense                                    34



Tables
               Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States                29
               Table 2: Temporary Grants                                                  30
               Table 3: Training Area Easements                                           30
               Table 4: Total Release of U.S. Training Areas                              30
               Table 5: Partial Release of Grants                                         31
               Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities
                        and Areas                                                         31
               Table 7: Upper Tier Easements                                              33
               Table 8: Middle Tier Easements                                             33
               Table 9: Lower Tier Easements                                              33




               Page i                                       GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Figures
          Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves                                    6
          Figure 2: U.S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area                        7
          Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan                                           9
          Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure
                   Construction Costs in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002-2011                        10
          Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years
                   2002-2011                                                                        11
          Figure 6: U.S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under
                   the Land Partnership Plan                                                        16
          Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land
                   Partnership Plan                                                                 19
          Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land
                   Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year                                               28




          Abbreviations

          DOD               Department of Defense
          LPP               Land Partnership Plan



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          Page ii                                               GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548



                                   July 15, 2003

                                   Congressional Committees

                                   Military officials from the United States and the Republic of Korea
                                   (hereafter referred to as South Korea) signed an agreement known as the
                                   Land Partnership Plan (LPP) on March 29, 2002. The LPP was described
                                   by the parties to the agreement as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean effort
                                   to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat
                                   readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean
                                   alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension and
                                   discontent among South Koreans regarding the U.S. presence in South
                                   Korea. The LPP, as originally approved, promised to reduce the number
                                   of U.S. military troop installations from 41 to 23 and to consolidate many
                                   U.S. facilities north of Seoul (the capital of South Korea), along with other
                                   facilities south of Seoul. Under the plan, financing of new construction to
                                   support consolidations and relocations of U.S. forces in South Korea was
                                   expected to rely on revenue generated from land sales following U.S.
                                   return of selected facilities and training lands to South Korea, on host
                                   nation funding, and on U.S. military construction funding. The LPP was
                                   predicated on continuing to maintain U.S. bases and facilities north of
                                   Seoul (near the demilitarized zone that separates North Korea from South
                                   Korea). Since passage of the LPP by the South Korea National Assembly
                                   on October 30, 2002, there have been various indications that the United
                                   States is re-examining how and where it may want to station its forces
                                   overseas in the future. Prominent among them have been statements by
                                   U.S. officials that the United States is considering a range of options for its
                                   troops in South Korea, including repositioning them away from Seoul and
                                   from areas north of Seoul (near the demilitarized zone).

                                   The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year
                                   20031 directed us to review the LPP to provide the Congress with a better
                                   understanding of the plan, associated costs, burden-sharing implications,
                                   and other related factors that the plan may not address. In light of
                                   ongoing reassessments of the U.S. presence overseas, which could
                                   affect basing requirements, we adjusted our review to also address the
                                   effect of potential basing changes upon the LPP and the U.S. military’s
                                   infrastructure in South Korea. This report assesses (1) the scope and cost
                                   of the LPP in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, (2) the


                                   1
                                       S. Rpt. No. 107-202, at 26 (2002).



                                   Page 1                                         GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                   implications on the LPP and other construction projects in South Korea
                   of recent proposals to reposition U.S. forces in South Korea, and (3) the
                   implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect
                   future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea. Briefings were
                   provided to various congressional defense committee staffs regarding
                   our preliminary findings during our review. This report updates that
                   information and provides our final analysis.

                   In conducting this review, we met with officials responsible for developing
                   and managing the LPP and military construction projects throughout
                   South Korea, and we analyzed projected costs and funding streams. We
                   visited 16 U.S. military installations and facilities in South Korea that
                   would be affected by the plan, including sites that will be closed, partially
                   closed, or expanded. We also visited land transfer sites that remain
                   unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the
                   plan, and we met with officials from the Department of Defense and the
                   Department of State to identify challenges that could also affect future
                   military construction projects throughout South Korea. In addition, we
                   interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Department of
                   Defense, which provided perspective on the department’s studies
                   concerning a potential change to the role, size, and basing of U.S. forces in
                   South Korea. More information on the scope and methodology of our work
                   is presented in appendix I.


                   Although broad in scope, the Land Partnership Plan, as approved, was
Results in Brief   not designed to entirely resolve U.S. military infrastructure issues, and it
                   did not address some of the more challenging land disputes, such as the
                   relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area. However, the
                   LPP represented a step forward in addressing U.S. military infrastructure
                   issues in South Korea related to improving servicemembers’ quality of life,
                   combat readiness, and relations between South Korea and U.S. forces.
                   From a cost standpoint, the LPP encompassed about $2 billion of the
                   $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to
                   improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through
                   2011. The LPP was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes
                   (55 percent) that were pending in South Korea in January 2003. Of the land
                   disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex,
                   and expensive dispute involving the potential relocation of U.S. forces




                   Page 2                                        GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area.2
A previous agreement between the United States and South Korea in
1991 called for the relocation of U.S. troops stationed there and the
return of garrison lands and facilities to South Korea. The South Korean
government had agreed to pay for the costs of the relocation; however,
the relocation did not occur due to its anticipated high cost.

Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements
are expected to change U.S. basing in South Korea significantly beyond
that envisioned under the LPP and would diminish the need for and alter
the locations of many construction projects, both those associated with
the plan and those unrelated to it; in addition, costs could increase. The
Department of Defense is conducting multiple studies related to future
overseas presence, and available information indicates that at least
tentative decisions have been made to reposition, over time, U.S. troops
away from facilities in Seoul and away from areas north of Seoul. The full
results of these studies and related negotiations may not be available for
several months; consequently, sufficient information is not currently
available to determine the full magnitude of modifications to existing
basing arrangements that will be required. However, we were told that the
United States would likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though
larger, installations than were envisioned under the LPP. According to a
U.S. Forces Korea official, until recently there had been about $1.3 billion
of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military
infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located
north of Seoul—areas where there is uncertainty about the future U.S.
presence. However, U.S. Forces Korea officials recently announced that
they were reviewing these projects and that over $1 billion of the ongoing
and planned construction had been put on hold. Further, the Department
of Defense recently submitted a budget amendment to the Congress to
cancel about $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison
and to redirect $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and
northern installations to an installation located south of Seoul.



2
 Yongsan Army Garrison is surrounded by residential and commercial high-rises. Yongsan
Army Garrison is the headquarters for the U.S. military presence in South Korea, including
headquarters facilities for the United Nations Command, the United States-Republic of
Korea Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, and the Eighth United
States Army. Yongsan employs 2,500 U.S. military personnel, 1,000 U.S. civilians,
6,000 Korean civilians, and more than 1,000 South Korean military personnel. In addition,
3,500 military and civilian employees reside on the property or live in neighborhoods
adjacent to the garrison.




Page 3                                                GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Our review of the LPP identified some key challenges that could have
adversely affected the implementation of the LPP, as originally approved,
and which also could affect future U.S. military construction projects
throughout South Korea with the larger-scale changes now likely. First,
the plan is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea
expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United
States, host-nation-funded construction, and U.S. military construction
funds. The extent to which these sources of funding would be available
to support broader infrastructure changes is unclear, particularly the
relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. While the South Korean
government is expected to remain responsible for providing funding for
this relocation, the Yongsan Army Garrison property reportedly would be
used for municipal purposes and would not be subject to resale to provide
funding to support relocation of U.S. forces, as is the approach to basing
changes under the LPP. At this point, insufficient information is available
to determine precisely how many replacement facilities will be required
for U.S. troops moving out of Yongsan Army Garrison and facilities north
of Seoul and any difficulties that might be encountered in obtaining the
funding. The LPP also relied on using up to 50 percent of South Korea’s
host nation funding,3 which would have limited the availability of these
funds for other uses. To what extent these funds would be used for
additional troop relocations is not yet clear. Second, implementation of
the LPP involves a closely knit series of tasks to phase out some facilities
and installations while phasing in new facilities and expanding other
facilities and installations. U.S. Forces Korea was developing a master
plan to manage this complex task and control future changes to guide
its implementation of the LPP, but in light of the expected broader
repositioning of forces in South Korea much greater changes in the
numbers of affected bases and locations are anticipated. These changes,
not yet finalized, suggest the need for a revised road map to manage and
guide future facilities requirements and changes in South Korea.

We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of Defense
to (1) require a reassessment of planned construction projects in South
Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence
and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide
infrastructure master plan to manage the changing infrastructure plans


3
 The host-nation-funded construction program is part of the South Korea burden-sharing
arrangement covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the United
States and represents the largest single source of major construction funds for U.S. Forces
Korea.




Page 4                                                 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
             for South Korea. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department
             of Defense agreed with our recommendations and pointed out that it is
             taking actions to ensure that all planned construction projects support
             decisions regarding global presence and basing strategy and that all master
             plans are adjusted to support these decisions.


             U.S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic,
Background   and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to
             maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean
             War.4 Although most of the property that the United States once controlled
             has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about
             37,000 troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across
             41 troop installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites.

             According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there are
             obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the living
             and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the worst in
             the Department of Defense (DOD).5 We observed many of these conditions
             during our visits to U.S. facilities and installations in South Korea. While
             improvements have been made in recent years, U.S. military personnel still
             use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War-era Quonset huts for housing.




             4
               In 1954, the United States and South Korea agreed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between
             South Korea and the United States.
             5
              Examples of poor living and working conditions include daily electrical outages; air
             conditioning failures during the summer; inadequate heating during the winter, including
             unheated showers and latrines; and the presence of asbestos in family housing units.




             Page 5                                                GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves




Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will
require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and
urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a
greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by
U.S. forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U.S. camps and training
areas that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle
of large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local
residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U.S. forces to train
effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and
other U.S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul.




Page 6                                         GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                   Figure 2: U.S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area




                   Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel
                   assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1-year hardship tours in
                   which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied
                   by their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and
                   Air Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable
                   assignment and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea
                   by various means, including retirement and declining to accept command
                   assignments. U.S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an
                   assignment of choice by improving living and working conditions,
                   modifying assignment policies to increase accompanied tours to
                   25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-of-pocket expenses for personnel
                   to maintain a second household in South Korea.


                   To address these problems, military officials from the United States and
Korea Land         South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP,
Partnership Plan   as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean
                   effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat
                   readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean
                   alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under
                   the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However,
                   U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a


                   Page 7                                            GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
    treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that
    approval occurred on October 30, 2002.

    The three components of the plan are as follows:

•   Installations—establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the
    construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan
    calls for the number of U.S. military installations to drop from 41 to 23.
    To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some sites,
    while enlarging or creating other installations.
•   Training areas—returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on
    South Korean ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the
    consolidation and protection of remaining U.S. training areas.
•   Safety easements6—acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of
    injury or death in the event of an explosion of U.S. weapons, provides a
    prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure
    and timeline for enforcing the easements.

    The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and
    South Korea. U.S. funding is provided from the military construction and
    operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds.
    The South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding
    obtained from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United
    States. As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units
    from camps that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation
    of units from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of
    the LPP is shown on figure 3.




    6
     The LPP defines a safety easement as the distance from an explosive area that personnel
    and structures must be kept and is directly related to the quantity and types of explosives
    and ammunition present.




    Page 8                                                 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan




                                         The target date for the completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011,
                                         although the timetable and the scale could be adjusted by mutual
                                         agreement. More information on the plan as originally envisioned is
                                         included in appendix II.




                                         Page 9                                     GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Infrastructure Funding   U.S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple
                         organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United
                         States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army
                         and Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department
                         of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense
                         Commissary Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea.
                         These organizations provide funding for military construction using
                         five different sources of money—U.S. military construction funds,
                         U.S. operations and maintenance funds, U.S. nonappropriated funds,
                         South Korea-funded construction, and South Korea combined defense
                         improvement program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for
                         $5.6 billion that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction
                         costs for U.S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011
                         time frame.

                         Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure Construction Costs in
                         South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002-2011




                         Page 10                                          GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Most of the approximately $2 billion projected cost of implementing the
plan was expected to be paid for by the government of South Korea, with
much of it financed through land sales from property returned by the
United States. Figure 5 shows all planned funding sources and amounts for
the plan.

Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002-2011




More information on funding and sequencing actions associated with the
LPP, as originally approved, is included in appendix II.

A wide array of military operations-related facilities (command and
administrative offices, barracks, and maintenance facilities) and
dependent-related facilities and services (family housing units; schools;
base exchanges; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; child care
programs; and youth services) have recently been constructed or are
in the process of being constructed in South Korea. Typically, as U.S.
installations overseas are vacated and turned over to host governments,
the status of forces agreements between the United States and host
governments address any residual value remaining, at the time of release,
of construction and improvements that were financed by the United
States. The agreement in South Korea differs from the agreements used in
some other overseas locations where the United States receives residual
value for returned property—such as currently in Germany—in that South



Page 11                                         GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                       Korea is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for
                       any improvements made in facilities and areas or for the buildings and
                       structures left there.


Stationing of Troops   In recent months, political dynamics in South Korea have been changing
in South Korea May     as DOD has been reassessing future overseas basing requirements.
Be Changing            According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, there have always been groups in
                       South Korea that have criticized the U.S. presence and have claimed that
                       the U.S. presence hinders reconciliation between North and South Korea.
                       Demonstrations against American military presence increased sharply
                       during last year’s South Korean presidential election. South Koreans
                       were angered in November 2002 by a U.S. military court’s acquittal of
                       two American soldiers charged in association with a tragic training
                       accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls in
                       June 2002. The South Korean government wanted the two American
                       soldiers who had been operating the vehicle involved in the accident
                       turned over to South Korean authorities; however, they were tried in a
                       U.S. military court. As a result, South Koreans demonstrated against
                       U.S. forces in Korea, carried out isolated violence directed at U.S. soldiers,
                       and practiced discrimination against Americans (such as businesses
                       refusing to serve them). Subsequently, other groups demonstrated in
                       support of the U.S. government. At the same time, the United States and
                       South Korea were working to strengthen their alliance and to address
                       issues involving North Korea’s active nuclear weapons program and the
                       proliferation of its missile programs.

                       In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of
                       South Korea agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance study to assess the
                       roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of U.S. forces,
                       including having South Korea assume the predominant role in its defense
                       and increasing both South Korean and U.S. involvement in regional
                       security cooperation. The results of the Future of the Alliance study
                       are not expected until later this year. In February 2003, the Secretary
                       of Defense testified before the Congress that the United States was
                       considering the relocation of U.S. troops now based within and north of
                       Seoul, including those near the demilitarized zone. Consideration of such
                       a move would be in keeping with a broader reassessment of U.S. presence
                       overseas that is now underway. In April 2003, the Deputy Assistant
                       Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and other U.S. officials
                       met with officials of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense to
                       discuss redeploying U.S. troops and relocating key military bases in South
                       Korea. Following these discussions, the U.S. and Korean press reported


                       Page 12                                       GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
that the United States would relocate from Yongsan Army Garrison in
Seoul to an area located south of Seoul. According to the U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, both
South Korea and the United States have decided that this is an issue that
cannot wait any longer for resolution. U.S. and South Korean officials
are expected to hold more discussions to finalize the realignment of
U.S. troops by fall 2003.

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed acceleration
on work that began during the development of the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review, related to the global positioning of U.S. forces and their
supporting infrastructure outside the United States. In March 2003, the
Secretary of Defense requested that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive
and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. An
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will build upon multiple
DOD studies, including the Overseas Basing and Requirements Study, the
Overseas Presence Study, and the U.S. Global Posture Study. In addition,
the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will use information
from the combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location
of the infrastructure necessary to execute U.S. defense strategy. The
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy is not expected to be
completed until the summer of 2003. However, we were recently told by
DOD officials that the United States will likely concentrate its forces in
South Korea in far fewer, though larger, installations than were initially
envisioned under the LPP, and that over time the forces now located
north of Seoul will be relocated south of Seoul.




Page 13                                      GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                       Although the Land Partnership Plan as approved was broad in scope, it
Land Partnership       was designed to address only a portion of the U.S. military’s previously
Plan as Originally     existing infrastructure needs in South Korea, and it left unresolved a
                       number of significant land disputes. Specifically, the LPP covered about
Approved Addressed     37 percent of the construction costs planned at U.S. military installations
a Portion of           in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2 billion of
                       the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to
Previously Existing    improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through
U.S. Military          2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or 49, of the 89 separate land
Infrastructure Needs   disputes that were pending in South Korea in January 2003,7 which was
                       considered a significant step forward. One example of a land dispute that
in South Korea         would be resolved under the LPP involves Camp Hialeah, located on the
                       southern tip of the Korean peninsula in the port city of Pusan, South
                       Korea’s second largest city. According to press reports, South Korea
                       wanted this base returned because of its proximity to the port and the
                       impediments it posed to urban redevelopment. However, no relocation
                       agreement could be reached until the LPP included an agreement to begin
                       relocating Camp Hialeah’s functions to a new site in Noksan, South Korea,
                       in 2008 and to close Camp Hialeah in 2011. According to press reports
                       attributed to an official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                       and Trade, relocating in-city bases like Camp Hialeah would help lessen
                       the potential tension between U.S. forces and neighboring communities.

                       Although the plan was considered a major step forward, it was not
                       designed to resolve a number of significant land disputes. As far back as
                       far as 1982, negotiations over some land returns have been deadlocked
                       and left unresolved. For example, the relocation of Yongsan Army
                       Garrison8 remained unresolved because of its projected financial cost to
                       South Korea. The relocation of the garrison has been and continues to be a
                       politically sensitive, complex, and expensive issue for U.S. Forces Korea
                       and the South Korean government. In 1991, the governments of the United
                       States and South Korea signed an agreement to relocate the garrison by
                       1996. In 1993, the plan was suspended, largely because of the anticipated



                       7
                        Since 1969, U.S. Forces Korea has reportedly returned 87 percent of the land it once
                       controlled. During this time, additional land returns have been attempted, but these were
                       stalled when disputes arose involving ownership and future use.
                       8
                        In addition to traditional military facilities, Yongsan Army Garrison includes support
                       facilities associated with a small city, for example, a hospital, a fire station, a police force,
                       commissary and exchange facilities, schools, theaters, restaurants, a hotel, sports and
                       recreational facilities, and water and sewage treatment plants.




                       Page 14                                                    GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                        high cost9 and the lack of alternative locations for the garrison. More than
                        a decade later, the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing, contentious
                        issue. Since the 1990s, U.S. military and South Korean officials have
                        held discussions on moving the military base out of the city, including
                        screening various suburb locations. In December 2002, the United States
                        and South Korea agreed on the need to find a mutually acceptable way to
                        relocate U.S. forces outside the city of Seoul as a result of the Future of
                        the Alliance Study.


                        DOD has had many construction projects underway in South Korea, both
Ongoing Studies         within and outside of the LPP. However, DOD-sponsored studies now
Are Expected to Alter   underway examining future overseas presence requirements are likely to
                        significantly change the number and locations for U.S. military bases in
Previously Planned      South Korea. As noted, we were recently told that the United States will
LPP Construction        likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger, installations than
                        were envisioned under the LPP and that, over time, the forces would be
Projects                relocated south of Seoul.10 Therefore, a number of sites and facilities
                        retained under the LPP are likely to be affected. Figure 6 shows the
                        locations of U.S. troop installations in South Korea under the LPP, as
                        originally approved.




                        9
                         There have been various indications that the cost of relocating Yongsan Army Garrison
                        could have been from $1.7 billion to $9.5 billion (in 1993 dollars). According to DOD, there
                        has never been a detailed or agreed upon cost estimate for the relocation of Yongsan Army
                        Garrison.
                        10
                          According to press reports, the relocations would occur in two phases. During phase one,
                        U.S. forces located north of Seoul would consolidate on a smaller number of bases. During
                        phase two, these forces and forces in the Seoul metropolitan area would move to key hubs
                        south of Seoul.




                        Page 15                                                GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Figure 6: U.S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under the Land
Partnership Plan




Except as otherwise provided by the LPP, South Korea is not obliged to
compensate the United States for any improvements made in facilities
and areas or for the buildings and structures left behind. This could be
particularly important because of military infrastructure projects planned
or underway in areas from which the United States is considering
relocating its troops, including Seoul’s Yongsan Army Garrison and
U.S. installations located north of Seoul, which, according to a U.S. Forces
Korea official, had recently represented $1.3 billion in ongoing or planned


Page 16                                          GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                          construction projects.11 For example, construction projects in Yongsan
                          included apartment high-rises for unaccompanied soldiers, a hospital,
                          a sports and recreation complex, a mini-mall, and an overpass between
                          Yongsan’s main and south posts. We discussed with U.S. Forces Korea
                          officials the need to reassess construction projects under way or planned
                          in South Korea and to delay the execution of some projects until better
                          decision-making information becomes available. Subsequently,
                          U.S. Forces Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all
                          projects and that over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had
                          been put on hold. Further, DOD recently submitted an amendment to
                          the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget to the Congress to cancel about
                          $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect
                          $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern
                          installations to an installation located south of Seoul.


                          During the initial phase of our review we identified funding and other
Challenges to             management challenges that could adversely affect the implementation
Completing Land           of the Land Partnership Plan. As we considered these issues in light of the
                          potential for even greater basing changes, we recognized that they could
Partnership Plan          also affect the associated U.S. military construction projects throughout
and Other Planned         South Korea. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of
                          funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from
Construction              property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction,
Projects throughout       and U.S. military construction funds. While U.S. Forces Korea officials
South Korea               expect to build on this LPP framework for likely additional basing
                          changes, the details have not been finalized for the broader changes. As
                          U.S. Forces Korea revises its plans, competition for limited funding for
                          other priorities could become an issue. Second, U.S. Forces Korea does
                          not have a detailed road map to manage current and future facilities
                          requirements in South Korea.


Funding Sources and       The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on substantial amounts of
Competition for Funding   South Korean funding to be realized through land sales, host-nation-
Are Challenges            funded construction, and U.S. military construction funds. The extent to
                          which these sources of funding would be required and available for
                          broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the



                          11
                            According to a U.S. Forces Korea official, of the $1.3 billion in construction projects,
                          $491 million was for ongoing or planned for Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul.




                          Page 17                                                 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. While U.S. officials expect the South
Korean government to fund much of the cost of these additional basing
changes, details have not yet been finalized. The South Korean
government is also expected to remain responsible for providing funding
for the relocation of forces now based at the Yongsan Army Garrison
property, although those costs could be reduced by the fact that a residual
number of U.S. and United Nations personnel are expected to remain at
Yongsan. It should also be noted that the Yongsan Garrison property is
expected to be used for municipal purposes and is not subject to resale to
provide funding to support relocation of U.S. forces. At this point,
insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many
replacement facilities will be required for U.S. troops moving out of
Yongsan Garrison and to anticipate any difficulties that might be
encountered in obtaining the funding. However, if South Korea encounters
problems or delays in acquiring needed lands and providing replacement
facilities, future projects could be delayed. Figure 7 presents the amount
of funding, as of May 2003, that the United States and South Korean
governments expected to pay for the LPP—as originally approved—by
fiscal year. The funding amounts for fiscal year 2004 and beyond are
subject to revision.




Page 18                                     GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land Partnership Plan




The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on designating up to
50 percent of South Korea’s host nation funding for construction.
Historically, the stability of host nation funding from South Korea has
been subject to some uncertainty because international economic factors
have played a part in determining the level of funding.12 South Korea host
nation payments are paid in both South Korean won and U.S. dollars;
consequently, a downturn in the South Korean economy or a sharp
fluctuation in the South Korean currency could affect the South Korean
government’s payments. For example, during South Korea’s economic
downturn in 1998, host nation payments were less than expected (the
United States received from South Korea $314.2 million of the $399 million
that had been agreed to).


12
  The annual level of host-nation-funded construction is determined between the
U.S. Department of State and the South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is
negotiated for a 3-year time frame.




Page 19                                               GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                        Designating up to 50 percent of host nation funding for the LPP would also
                        limit funding for readiness and other needs. Non-LPP readiness-related
                        infrastructure funding shortages previously identified in readiness reports
                        at the time of our visit to South Korea in November 2002 were estimated
                        to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars and represented competing
                        requirements for limited funding. Such needs included Air Force facilities
                        at Osan and Kunsan ($338.2 million), Navy facilities at Pohang and
                        Chinhae ($10.3 million), and Army facilities at Humphreys, Carroll, and
                        Tango ($25.2 million). Recently, U.S. Forces Korea officials have also
                        expressed the desire to increase from 10 percent to 25 percent the number
                        of servicemembers in South Korea who are permitted to be accompanied
                        by their families. While these expressions have not been finalized, such an
                        increase could be expected to cause a significant increase in the demand
                        for housing, schools, and other support services and could result in greater
                        competition for U.S. and Korean funding. For example, U.S. Forces Korea
                        officials estimated that the increased demand for housing alone would
                        cost $900 million in traditional military construction funding and, to
                        reduce costs, officials were exploring a build-to-lease program using
                        Korean private-sector funding and host-nation-funded construction,
                        where possible.

                        In the past, funding from U.S. military construction accounts, which
                        represent 13 percent of funding for the LPP as originally approved, has
                        fluctuated. From 1990 through 1994, U.S. forces in South Korea did not
                        receive any military construction funds, resulting in a significant backlog
                        of construction projects.


Managing Current        Implementation of the LPP was expected to involve a closely knit series
and Future Facilities   of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in
Requirements Is Also    new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U.S. Forces
                        Korea was developing an implementation plan for each installation
a Challenge             encompassed by the LPP and, at the time of our visit there, was developing
                        a detailed, overarching implementation plan capable of integrating and
                        controlling the multiple, sometimes simultaneous, actions needed to
                        relocate U.S. forces and support their missions. According to U.S. Forces
                        Korea officials, such a master plan is needed to accomplish training,
                        maintain readiness, and control future changes.

                        During our visits to U.S. installations in South Korea, we found that, in
                        the absence of a completed master plan for implementation, installation
                        commanders had varying interpretations of what infrastructure changes
                        were to occur. U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that this was not


                        Page 20                                       GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                      unusual, given that detailed implementation plans were still being
                      developed. At the same time, these officials emphasized the need for
                      a detailed plan to guide future projects and to help minimize the costly
                      changes that can occur when subsequent commanders have a different
                      vision of the installations’ needs than their predecessors, which could
                      lead to new interpretations of the LPP and more changes. In light of the
                      potentially broader repositioning of forces in South Korea, the master plan
                      under development could be substantially changed; thus, a significantly
                      revised road map will be needed to manage future facilities requirements
                      and changes in South Korea.


                      As approved, the Land Partnership Plan represented an important step
Conclusions           to reduce the size of the U.S. footprint in South Korea by leveraging the
                      return of facilities and land to South Korea in order to obtain replacement
                      facilities in consolidated locations. However, subsequent events suggest
                      the LPP, as originally outlined, will require significant modification.
                      Available data indicate that changes in the U.S. basing structure in
                      South Korea are likely; therefore, a significant portion of the $5.6 billion in
                      construction projects planned over the next 10 years is being reassessed
                      based on currently expected basing changes and may need to be further
                      reassessed when the results of ongoing overseas presence and basing
                      studies are completed.

                      The LPP was to require 10 years of intensive management to ensure
                      implementation progressed as planned. The master plan U.S. Forces Korea
                      officials are developing to guide its implementation will require significant
                      revision to accommodate the more comprehensive changes in basing now
                      anticipated and to identify funding requirements and division of funding
                      responsibilities between the United States and South Korea.


                      We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Commander,
Recommendations for   U.S. Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South
Executive Action      Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence
                      and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide
                      infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U.S. military
                      facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed, and
                      identifying funding requirements and division of funding responsibilities
                      between the United States and South Korea.




                      Page 21                                        GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                     The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs
Agency Comments      provided written comments to a draft of this report. DOD agreed with our
and Our Evaluation   recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions that address our
                     recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation to reassess
                     planned construction projects in South Korea, DOD stated that U.S. Forces
                     Korea is already reassessing all planned construction in South Korea and
                     will ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions
                     regarding global presence and basing strategy. In commenting on our
                     recommendation for a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master
                     plan, DOD stated that U.S. Forces Korea is already developing master
                     plans for all enduring installations and, once decisions have been reached
                     on global presence and basing strategy, they will ensure that all master
                     plans are adjusted to support these decisions. DOD’s comments are
                     reprinted in appendix IV. DOD also provided a separate technical
                     comment, and we revised the report to reflect it.


                     We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
                     committees, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, and the Director, Office
                     of Management and Budget. The report is also available at no charge on
                     GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

                     If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this
                     report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581. Key contributors to this report
                     were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan Woodward,
                     and Ken Patton.




                     Barry W. Holman
                     Director, Defense Capabilities and Management




                     Page 22                                      GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner, Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, Chairman
The Honorable Diane Feinstein
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg, Chairman
The Honorable Chet Edwards
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Construction
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives




Page 23                                   GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
             Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology


             To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total
             infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the
             Land Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction
             projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP
             construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects
             in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure
             issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U.S. troops from
             Yongsan Army Garrison. We met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of
             Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy Division); Under Secretary of
             Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs); Deputy Under Secretary
             of Defense (Installations and Environment); U.S. Pacific Command,
             Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific,
             U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Forces Korea, Eighth U.S. Army and 7th Air Force;
             U.S. Department of State; U.S. Embassy (South Korea); and South Korea’s
             Defense Ministry to document their input to the plan. We visited 16 U.S.
             military installations and facilities in South Korea that are affected by the
             plan. We selected these installations and facilities because they provided a
             cross-section of the activities that are covered by the plan (i.e., some that
             will be closed, some that will be scaled back, some that will be expanded,
             some where new construction will take place, and some possible new
             installation locations). We also visited land transfer sites that remain
             unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the
             plan to gain an understanding and perspective on the wide range of
             infrastructure issues affecting U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

             To determine the implications of potential basing changes on the plan
             and other construction projects in South Korea, we obtained the views of
             officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy
             Division); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific
             Affairs); and U.S. Forces Korea on the potential impact of changing
             defense policies. We conducted a literature review of U.S. and South
             Korean publications to collect information on the LPP and possible basing
             changes in South Korea. We also attended various congressional hearings,
             which discussed funding for U.S. Forces Korea construction projects and
             potential basing changes. We used this information to identify the costs
             of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving
             military infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future
             U.S. presence—such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations
             located north of Seoul. We did not verify the accuracy and completeness
             of this information.

             To identify implementation challenges associated with the plan that could
             affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea, we met


             Page 24                                       GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




with officials from the above organizations and reviewed the Status of
Forces Agreement, an agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense
Treaty between South Korea and the United States, and other related
agreements and defense guidance. We discussed challenges that must be
addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues
associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects
throughout South Korea.

We performed our review from September 2002 through May 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




Page 25                                    GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
                Partnership Plan



Partnership Plan

                The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provides a comprehensive plan for
                more efficient and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in South Korea. The
                LPP is intended to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance, improve the
                readiness posture of combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land
                granted for U.S. Forces Korea use, and enhance public support for both
                the South Korean government and U.S. Forces Korea, while positioning
                U.S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future.

                According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, LPP imperatives are as follows:

            •   The agreement should be based on readiness and security, not the amount
                of land involved.
            •   The agreement should be comprehensive, allowing for land issues that
                cannot be resolved independently to be resolved as part of a package and
                ensuring stationing decisions that fit into a comprehensive vision for the
                disposition of U.S. forces.
            •   When new land and facilities are ready for use, U.S. Forces Korea can
                release old land and facilities. U.S. Forces Korea needs all existing
                facilities and areas and can only return them when replacement facilities
                are available or the requirement is met in another manner.
            •   The agreement should be binding under the Status of Forces Agreement.
                The LPP is not just an “agreement in principle” but also a commitment to
                take action, and it operates within the Status of Forces Agreement—which
                means there are no new rules.
            •   The agreement should be self-financing—the costs of the LPP must be
                shared between the United States and South Korea. U.S. funding is
                provided from the military construction account. The South Korean
                government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales
                of property returned to South Korea by the United States.

                As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from
                camps the United States wishes to close, and South Korea funds the
                relocation of units from camps that South Korea has asked the United
                States to close. The execution of the LPP is shown in figure 1.

                The LPP has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee
                under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement
                gives the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine
                the facilities and areas required for U.S. use in support of the United
                States/South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee
                established the Ad-hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage
                the LPP. The LPP components address installations, training areas, and
                safety easements.



                Page 26                                      GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




Installations: The LPP reduces the number of U.S. installations from
41 to 23 and consolidates U.S. forces onto enduring installations. The LPP
establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new
facilities, and the closure of installations. Figure 8 illustrates the sequence
in which new lands are to be granted to the United States and their
relationship to facilities that will be returned to South Korea from calendar
years 2002 through 2011.




Page 27                                        GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
                                         Appendix II: Summary of the Land
                                         Partnership Plan




Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year




                                         Page 28                                          GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




Training Areas: The LPP returns U.S. training areas in exchange for
guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. To ensure
the continued readiness of U.S. Forces Korea, the United States agrees
to return certain granted facilities and areas and to accept the grant of
joint use of certain South Korea military facilities and areas on a limited
time-share basis as determined by the Status of Forces Agreement Joint
Committee. The United States is expected to return approximately
32,186 acres, or 39,396,618 pyong,1 of granted training areas. Table 1
shows the exclusive use of existing grants retained by U.S. Forces Korea.

Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States

    Facility                                                                        Acres
    Rodriquez Local Training Area #1                                                   1.0
    Story Range                                                                    1,756.0
    New Mexico Range                                                                 116.0
    Warrior Training Base                                                             19.0
    Warrior Training Base Ammunition Holding Area                                      1.2
    Dagmar North                                                                   1,391.0
    Mike–November                                                                  3,008.0
    Papa–Oscar–Romeo                                                               3,353.4
    North Star                                                                        30.2
    Chaparral Local Training Area                                                    115.1
    Local Training Area 130                                                           63.7
    Local Training Area 140                                                            6.4
    Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #1                                              17.5
    Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #2                                               8.3
    Rodriguez Gun Local Training Area #3                                               7.6
    Humphreys Range                                                                    6.0
    Training Areas                                                                    79.0
    Bayonne Signal Training Area                                                      19.8
    Rodriguez Watkins Local Training Area                                             45.1
    Rodriquez Live Fire Complex                                                    3,343.0
    Masan Range                                                                      372.0
    Koon-ni                                                                          438.3
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




1
    Korean unit of measure, 1 pyong = 3.3 square meters or 35 square feet.




Page 29                                                  GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




Table 2 shows training areas that will be provided on a temporary basis to
U.S. Forces Korea.

Table 2: Temporary Grants

 Facility                                                                      Acres
 Local Training Area 320                                                       247.0
 Drop Zone Cory                                                                186.0
 Non Commissioned Officer Academy Training Area                                364.0
 Drop Zone Rigger                                                              619.8
 Pilsung Strafing Range                                                            0
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Table 3 shows new safety easements to be designated for training areas.

Table 3: Training Area Easements

 Facility                                                                     Acres
 New Mexico Restrictive Easement                                                128
 Warrior Training Ammunition Holding Area Easement                            2619.3
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Table 4 shows training areas that will be returned to South Korea under
the LPP.

Table 4: Total Release of U.S. Training Areas

 Facility                                                                      Acres
 Rodriquez Local Training Area #3                                                 3.0
 Rodriquez Local Training Area #2                                               100.0
 Rodriquez Local Training Area #4                                                10.0
 Kansas Range                                                                    71.0
 Oklahoma Range                                                                  15.0
 North Carolina, Air Mobile, Edwards Local Training Area, TA-504/520          1,302.0
 Dagmar & S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma                                   16,747.0
 River Crossing                                                                  16.0
 Camp Page Local Training Area                                                  302.0
 Tango                                                                        2,952.0
 KCT-43, Yankee, Whiskey N.(actual) (written record)                          8,920.0
                                                                              2,761.0
 Stanton Local Training Area                                                     15.0
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Page 30                                             GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




Table 5 shows training areas where parts of the land will be returned to
South Korea.

Table 5: Partial Release of Grants

 Facility                                                                     Acres
 Texas Local Training Area and Zulu LA                                       1,133.0
 Mike-A                                                                        480.0
 Romeo                                                                         120.0
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Table 6 shows training facilities and areas that the South Korean
government is expected to grant to the U.S. for joint use for the
time specified.

Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas

 Facility                                         Weeks                        Days
 Typhoon Range                                    1 week per quarter             24
 Chungyong Range                                  2 weeks per year               12
 Bisung Range                                     1.5 weeks per year              9
 St. Barbara Range–MLRS Live Fire                 4 weeks per year               24
 St. Barbara Range–Paladin Live Fire              4 weeks per year               24
 Korea Training Area/Twin Bridges Training Area   13 weeks per year              91
 Seung-Jin Nightmare Range                        8 weeks per year               48
 Capital Defense Command Bangpae Range            2 weeks per quarter            48
 Jungpyung M16                                    8 weeks per year               48
 Jungpyung 40MM Grenade Launcher Range            4 weeks per year               24
 Jungpyung Hand Grenade                           2 weeks per year               12
 Chochiwon Range                                  1 week per quarter             24
 Sokung (Seogok) Range                            5 weeks per year               30
 Angang Range                                     1 week per quarter             24
 Kumi Range                                       4 weeks per year               24
 Susan-ri Range                                   6 weeks per year               36
 R-222                                            1 week per quarter             24
 R-227                                            4 weeks per quarter            96
 R-233                                            6 weeks per quarter           144
 R-228                                            6 weeks per quarter           144
 Han River Cross Site                             2 weeks per quarter            48
 Training Area Jerry                              2 weeks per quarter            48
 Training Area Nightmare                          2 weeks per quarter            48
 Training Area Tom                                2 weeks per quarter            48
 Saetue Field Training Area                       2 weeks per quarter            48
 TAA No Name (Munmak)                             2 weeks per quarter            48




Page 31                                            GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




 Facility                                   Weeks                         Days
 Kaup Mountain Training Area (H-710)        1 week per quarter              24
 Kumdan Mountain Training Area              1 week per quarter              24
 Puksung Mountain Training Area             1 week per quarter              24
 Sung Mountain Training Area (H-471)        1 week per quarter              24
 Taeki Mountain Training Area               1 week per quarter              24
 Yongmun Mountain Training Area             1 week per quarter              24
 Hwangyong Park Tactical Training Area      1 week per quarter              24
 Hampyong Tactical Training Area            1 week per quarter              24
 Jinwon Tank Tactical Training Area         2 weeks per quarter             48
 Mu Juk Training Area                       26 weeks per year              182
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Safety Easements: According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, a safety
easement is a defined distance from an explosive area that personnel and
structures must be kept away from and is directly related to the quantity
and types of explosives and ammunition present. The presence of Korean
citizens in areas requiring explosive safety easements has placed them at
risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show
the various tiers of easements established under the LPP at U.S. military
installations. Upper tier easements are those required at enduring
installations; middle tier easements are required during armistice, but will
not be required after a change in the armistice condition; and lower tier
easements are those required at closing installations. U.S. Forces Korea
shall enforce safety easements inside U.S. installations, while South Korea
will enforce safety easements outside U.S. installations.




Page 32                                       GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix II: Summary of the Land
Partnership Plan




Table 7: Upper Tier Easements

 Installation                      Explosive site
 Osan Air Force Base               Munitions storage area (Delta site)
                                   Patriot Batteries on Chin Wi River
                                   Hot cargo pad easement extension
 Kunsan Air Force Base             2 Munitions storage areas
                                   Hot cargo pad and patriot battery
 Camp Humphreys                    Rearm point
 Camp Casey                        Ammunition storage area 21
                                   Ammunition storage area 25
 Camp Stanley                      Ammunition storage area 18 (tunnel)
                                   Ammunition storage area 9
 Camp Walker                       Ammunition storage area
 Camp Hovey                        Ammunition storage area
 Yongsan                           Ammunition storage area
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Table 8: Middle Tier Easements

 Installation                      Explosive site
 Camp Bonifas                      Ammunition storage area (main post)
                                   Ammunition storage area (east)
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




Table 9: Lower Tier Easements

 Installation                      Explosive site
 Camp LaGuardia                    Ammunition storage area
 Camp Howze                        Ammunition storage area
 Camp Edwards                      Ammunition storage area
 Camp Essayons                     Ammunition storage area
 Camp Colbern                      Ammunition storage area
 Camp Stanton                      Ammunition storage area
 Camp Greaves                      Ammunition storage area
 Camp Garry Owen                   Ammunition storage area
 Camp Eagle                        Ammunition storage area
Source: U.S. Forces Korea.




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              Appendix III: Comments from the Department
Appendix III: Comments from the
              of Defense



Department of Defense




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