United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT
Thursday, April 10, 2003 FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION
Reauthorization Provides
Opportunities to Address
Key Agency Challenges
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham
Director, Civil Aviation Issues
GAO-03-653T
April 10, 2003
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Reauthorization Provides Opportunities
Highlights of GAO-03-653T, a testimony
before the Senate Committee on to Address Key Agency Challenges
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Much has changed since the Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses several
Wendell H. Ford Aviation challenges. While airports currently receive enough funding to cover FAA’s
Investment and Reform Act for the estimate of their planned capital development costs, a declining surplus in
21st Century (AIR-21) reauthorized the trust fund that helps to support development and the need to spend up to
the Federal Aviation $5 billion over the next 5 years for security-related capital improvements
Administration’s (FAA) programs 3
years ago. At that time, air traffic
make the financial outlook for the next 5 to 8 years uncertain. Runway
was increasing, and concerns about development, the principal means of increasing capacity, is now taking 10 to
congestion and flight delays were 14 years to complete, in large part because of time-consuming environmental
paramount. Since then, the reviews and community concerns. Providing air service for small
downturn in the nation’s economy, communities is also becoming more difficult as costs increase and passenger
the terrorist attacks of September ticket revenues decline. Intermodal alternatives may hold promise.
11, 2001, and, most recently, the
war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by
on aviation. Analysts nonetheless modernizing the air traffic control system face challenges despite actions
expect the demand for air travel to taken by the Congress and the administration to eliminate the cost overruns,
rebound, and the nation’s aviation schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued FAA's
system must be ready to
accommodate the projected growth
modernization efforts. Overall, FAA is improving its management of the air
safely and securely. traffic modernization program and has implemented some systems, but key
projects continue to experience problems.
The current reauthorization of
FAA’s programs provides an To enhance aviation safety, FAA and the aviation industry have undertaken
opportunity for the Congress and an initiative to reduce the fatal accident rate, and FAA is working to
the administration to focus on strengthen its safety inspections of airlines’ operations. Interagency
challenges in increasing aviation coordination of aviation safety and aviation security activities has emerged
capacity, efficiency, and safety and as a challenge with the transfer of aviation security responsibilities from
in controlling aviation program FAA to the Transportation Security Administration.
costs.
FAA faces challenges in implementing controls over its costs. Although it
has partially implemented a new cost accounting system that enables it to
This testimony does not contain track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs, this system lacks internal
recommendations. However, GAO controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs, according to the Department of
reports containing relevant Transportation’s Inspector General. Congressional oversight is important to
recommendations are listed among ensure that FAA implements controls and spends its resources effectively.
the Related GAO Products
following the testimony.
Increasing Capacity through Runway Construction
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-653T.
To view the full report, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We are here today to discuss the reauthorization of federal aviation
programs and issues relevant to ensuring the safe and efficient operation
of the national airspace system.1 Much has changed since the Wendell H.
Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21)
reauthorized the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) programs 3
years ago. At that time, as you know, air traffic was increasing, and
concerns about congestion and flight delays were paramount. Since then,
the downturn in the nation’s economy, the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and, most recently, the war in Iraq have taken a heavy toll on
aviation. Flights that were once filled are now being canceled for lack of
business, and major air carriers are in serious financial difficulty.
Furthermore, as the federal budget deficit has increased, competition for
federal resources has intensified. Analysts nonetheless expect the demand
for air travel to rebound, and the nation’s aviation system must be ready to
accommodate the projected growth safely and securely. The current
slowdown in the economy and in the aviation industry has created a
window of opportunity to prepare for this growth without the pressures of
congestion and flight delays. My statement today focuses on the
challenges that the Congress, the administration, and FAA face in
increasing aviation capacity, efficiency, and safety, and maintaining
controls over costs. My statement is based primarily on our published
reports, as well as our ongoing work for this Committee discussed in the
scope and methodology section at the end of the statement.
In summary:
• Increasing capacity and service in the national airspace system poses
several challenges for the Congress and the administration during this
reauthorization process. Chief among them is deciding how much of
airports’ planned capital development should be funded to increase
capacity and service, as well as improve the efficiency and safety of the
national airspace system. Funds for airports’ capital development have
increased over the last 5 years, in part because of increases in the federal
grant funding provided to airports under the Airport Improvement
Program. Current funding levels are sufficient to cover much of the
estimated cost of planned capital development. However, future funding
1
See the Aviation Investment and Revitalization Vision Act, a Senate bill to reauthorize
federal aviation programs and the administration’s draft reauthorization proposal, the
Centennial of Flight Aviation Authorization Act, or “Flight 100.”
Page 1 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
levels may be affected by changes in the allocation of Airport
Improvement Program grant funds and by projected decreases in the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund, which supports the Airport Improvement
Program and other FAA accounts. Other challenges include building
runways expeditiously to increase capacity and providing air service to
small communities. Runway development now takes 10 to 14 years,
primarily because of time-consuming environmental reviews and
community concerns. Two federal programs, the Essential Air Service and
the Small Community Air Service Development Pilot programs, help bring
air service to small communities, but the costs of this service are
increasing while passenger ticket revenues are declining. The
administration is proposing an approach to streamline the environmental
reviews required for runway development, and intermodal alternatives,
such as rail or bus service, could provide access to the national air
transportation system for some small communities.
• Efforts to improve the efficiency of the national airspace system by
modernizing its principal component, the air traffic control system, face
ongoing challenges despite actions taken by the Congress and the
administration to eliminate the cost overruns, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls that have plagued FAA’s air traffic modernization
program and led us to designate this program as high risk. These actions
include granting FAA acquisition and human capital flexibilities in 1996
and creating a new, three-component structure to improve the oversight,
management, and operation of the air traffic control system in 2000. Our
work has shown that FAA has responded to these actions to varying
degrees, but more remains to be done. Overall, FAA is improving its
management of the air traffic modernization program and has
implemented some systems, but key projects continue to experience cost,
schedule, and performance problems. Additionally, FAA has used its
acquisition flexibilities to establish an acquisition management system and
its human capital flexibilities to fully or partially implement human capital
reform initiatives. The acquisition management system has provided FAA
with a structured management approach for selecting and controlling its
investments, and the human capital reform initiatives are affording
opportunities for FAA to manage its workforce more efficiently. However,
in implementing both of these reforms, FAA has not yet incorporated
important processes or elements for evaluating the results of its efforts,
modifying these efforts as necessary, and holding its managers
accountable. Finally, one of the three components of the new structure for
improving the performance of the air traffic control system has been
implemented. The oversight component, the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee, has been meeting since January 2001 and emphasizing
performance management, but without the management and operating
Page 2 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
components, the new structure is not yet functioning as intended.
Completing the implementation of, and continuing to improve, these
efforts will be important to enhancing the efficiency of the air traffic
control system.
• Important steps have been taken to enhance aviation safety, but some
challenges remain. Safer Skies, an initiative designed by FAA and the
aviation industry to reduce the nation’s fatal aviation accident rate by 80
percent by 2007, is the centerpiece of these efforts to improve aviation
safety. This initiative began in 1998, and many preventive actions are
under way but have not yet been fully implemented. Another key effort to
improve aviation safety is FAA’s Air Transportation Oversight System,
which was redesigned to provide more effective inspections of the nation’s
airline operations. In reporting on this system in 1999, we noted that it
incorporated important features to ensure that airlines have systems to
control risks and prevent accidents, but that it had encountered startup
problems with data collection and program guidance.2 Many of these
problems were not yet fully resolved when the Department of
Transportation’s Inspector General reported on the inspection system last
year.3 Finally, because of the often vital link between aviation safety and
aviation security, it will be critical for FAA to ensure that aviation safety is
maintained as the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation
Security Administration implements new security enhancements.
• With the decline in revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund—the
principal source of funding for most of FAA’s operations, facilities and
equipment, and grant programs—it is especially important that FAA
control or reduce costs, run its programs efficiently, and detect and
prevent fraudulent activities. FAA, however, faces challenges in
implementing controls over its costs. For example, during fiscal year 2000,
weaknesses in the internal controls over FAA’s purchase card program
contributed to $5.4 million in improper purchases by FAA employees and
over $630,000 in purchases that were considered wasteful or questionable.
In addition, FAA has partially implemented a new cost accounting system
that enables it to track 70 percent of its air traffic services costs; however,
according to the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, this
2
U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: FAA’s New Inspection System Offers
Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed, GAO/RCED-99-183 (Washington, D.C.: June
28, 1999).
3
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Report on the Air
Transportation Oversight System: Federal Aviation Administration, AV-2002-088
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2002).
Page 3 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
system lacks internal controls over $3.1 billion in labor costs. The
Inspector General further noted that a portion of this system, if
implemented as designed, could provide workforce data that would be
helpful in determining how many controllers are needed and where. These
data would assist FAA in planning for the anticipated retirement of large
numbers of air traffic controllers in the near and long term.
During this reauthorization period, the Congress and the administration
Efforts to Increase face several key challenges in attempting to increase the capacity of the
Aviation Capacity and national airspace system and expand service to small communities. These
challenges include determining (1) how much airport capital development
Service Face Funding is needed, (2) how that development will be funded, (3) how assistance for
and Other Challenges enhancing air service to small communities will be provided, and (4) how
the current process for enhancing capacity, particularly the runway
development process, can be expedited.
FAA and the Airport FAA and the Airport Council International (ACI), an organization
Industry Have Developed representing the airport industry, have developed two different estimates
Different Estimates of of airports’ planned capital development costs that are based on two
different sets of projects. According to FAA’s estimate, which includes
Airports’ Planned Capital only projects that are eligible for Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
Development Costs grants, such as runways, taxiways, and noise mitigation and noise
reduction efforts, the total cost of airport development will be about $46
billion, or over $9 billion per year, for 2001 through 2005. FAA’s estimate is
based on the agency’s National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems, which
FAA published in August 2002. ACI’s estimate includes all of the projects
in FAA’s estimate, plus other planned airport capital projects that may or
may not be eligible for AIP grants. Projects that are not eligible for AIP
funding include parking garages, hangars, and expansions of commercial
space in terminals. ACI estimates a total cost of almost $75 billion, or
nearly $15 billion per year, for 2002 through 2006. Neither ACI’s nor FAA’s
estimate includes funding for the terminal modification projects that are
needed to accommodate the new explosives detection systems required to
screen checked baggage. ACI estimates that these projects will cost about
$3 billion to $5 billion over the next 5 years.
Although there is a difference of $6 billion a year between FAA’s and ACI’s
estimates of planned development costs, both estimates cover projects for
every type of airport. As table 1 indicates, the estimates are identical for all
but the large- and medium-hub airports, which are responsible for
transporting about 90 percent of the traveling public. For these airports,
Page 4 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
ACI’s estimate of planned development costs is about twice as large as
FAA’s. As the Congress moves forward with reauthorizing FAA’s
programs, it will have to determine what level of planned capital
development is appropriate to increase the capacity, efficiency, and safety
of the national airspace system.
Table 1: Average Annual Planned Development Costs Estimated by FAA and ACI,
by Airport Type, 2001-2006
Dollars in millions
Estimated average annual costs
Airport type Number of airports FAA ACI
Large hub 31 $4,855 $8,554
Medium hub 37 1,073 3,109
Small hub 71 675 675
Nonhub 280 807 807
Other commercial
service 124 142 142
Reliever 260 526 526
General aviation 2,558 1,167 1,167
Total 3,364 $9,245 $14,980
Source: FAA and ACI.
Airports’ Ability to Fund Over the past 5 years, the ability of airports—especially smaller airports—
Planned Capital to fund their capital development projects has improved, in part because
Development Has AIR-21 increased both the total amount of funding for AIP grants and the
proportion of AIP funding that went to smaller airports. In 1998, we
Improved reported that large- and medium-hub airports could fund about 79 percent
of their planned capital development and smaller airports could fund
about 52 percent of their planned capital development if they continued to
receive funding at prior years’ levels. In 2003, the funding ability of both
groups of airports increased. As shown in figure 1, large- and medium-hub
airports could fund about 80 percent of their planned capital development,
an increase of 1 percentage point, while smaller airports could fund about
73 percent of their planned capital development, an increase of 21
percentage points, assuming the continuation of prior years’ funding
levels.4
4
Over the past 5 years, the amount of funding available to airports for planned capital
development ranged from about $7 billion to $13 billion annually.
Page 5 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 1: Ability of Smaller and Larger Airports to Fund Estimated Planned Capital
Development in 1998 and 2003
The primary reason why smaller airports are able to fund 73 percent of
their planned development in 2003, rather than the 52 percent we reported
in 1998, is that they have benefited significantly from the increases in AIP
grants, which are a larger source of funding for smaller airports than for
larger airports. In addition, smaller airports have received an increasing
share of AIP grants because of statutorily required changes in the
distribution of AIP grants. For example, in AIR-21, the Congress increased
the funding for two grant categories that primarily or exclusively benefit
smaller airports—the state apportionment fund and the small airport
fund—and created general aviation entitlement grants, which also benefit
smaller airports. The Senate’s and the administration’s reauthorization
proposals continue to support increases in the amount of AIP grant
funding awarded to smaller airports. In spite of the progress that has been
made, over 25 percent of planned capital development is not funded. The
Page 6 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Congress needs to be mindful of this situation as it considers
reauthorization issues.
Changes in the Use of AIP The use of AIP grants to fund new airport security requirements and
Grants and Additional additional decreases in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund’s5 revenues
Decreases in Trust Fund could affect the future ability of airports to fund their planned capital
development. In recent fiscal years, airports obtained most of their funding
Revenue Could Affect for planned capital development from bonds, AIP grants, and passenger
Airports’ Future Funding facility charges.6 Because the Trust Fund is the source of funding for AIP
Ability grants, its financial condition is important to the ability of airports to fund
capital development, and decreases in its revenues could reduce the
amount of funding for airport planned capital development. Reductions in
AIP grant funds would have the greatest effect on smaller airports, which
derive most of their planned capital development funding from AIP grants,
whereas large- and medium-hub airports derive most of their funding from
bonds.
Continued Use of AIP Grant According to FAA officials, FAA plans to allocate the same amount of AIP
Funds for Security Projects grant funds for new security projects at airports in fiscal year 2003 as it
Would Reduce Funding for allocated in fiscal year 2002—$561 million. As we reported in October
Capacity Projects 2002,7 the use of AIP grants for security projects reduced the funding
available for other airport development projects, such as projects to bring
airports up to FAA’s design standards and reconstruction projects, and
caused FAA to defer three letter-of-intent payments totaling $28 million to
three airports until fiscal year 2003 or later.8 Among the key
reauthorization issues facing the Congress are how the funding needs for
capacity and security projects will be balanced and how the new security
requirements, including the terminal modification projects that are
expected to cost $3 billion to $5 billion, will be funded.
5
The Airport and Airway Trust Fund was established by the Airport and Airway Revenue
Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-258) to aid in funding the development of a nationwide airport and
airway system and to fund FAA investments in air traffic control facilities. The Trust Fund
is supported by a number of excise taxes, including taxes on passenger tickets, fuel, and
cargo.
6
Under the Passenger Facility Charge program, airports with FAA’s approval may charge
passengers up to $4.50 for boarding airplanes at their facilities.
7
U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for
Security Projects, GAO-03-27 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002).
8
Letters of intent represent a nonbonding commitment from FAA to provide multiyear
funding to an airport beyond the current AIP authorization period.
Page 7 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Additional Declines in Airport The future ability of airports to fund planned capital development may be
and Airway Trust Fund affected by uncertainties surrounding the condition of the Trust Fund. As
Revenue Could Also Affect you know, the Trust Fund is the source of funding not only for AIP grants
Amount of AIP Grant Funds but also for other FAA accounts, including facilities and equipment;
Available for Future Capital research, engineering, and development; and most operations. Revenues
Development to the Trust Fund come from several types of taxes, including passenger
ticket and fuel taxes. Although projections made in November 2002
indicate that the Trust Fund will be able to meet its traditional obligations
over the next 10 years, the financial outlook for the next 5 to 8 years is
uncertain, in part, because passenger traffic has decreased with the
slowdown in the economy. Current estimates indicate that between fiscal
year 2003 and fiscal year 2007, the Trust Fund’s 2002 uncommitted balance
of about $4.8 billion will decline by about $4 billion, leaving a balance of
less than a billion dollars. In addition, if revenues fall short of current
projections, the Trust Fund’s uncommitted balance may be zero. Under
this scenario, AIP grants and other FAA accounts supported by the Trust
Fund could potentially receive less funding, and the Congress and the
administration would have to decide how to offset the potential decreases.
As figure 2 shows, from 1999 through 2002, revenues to the Trust Fund
have declined, while expenditures from the fund have increased. Revenues
fell from about $11 billion in 1999 to almost $10 billion in 2002, a decrease
of almost 10 percent. During the same period, expenditures increased from
about $8 billion to about $12 billion, an increase of about 47 percent. As a
result, the uncommitted balance (surplus) has fallen by nearly 35 percent,
from $7 billion in 1999 to almost $5 billion in 2002.
Page 8 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 2: Financial Condition of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
The major reason for the decline in Trust Fund revenues was a drop in
passenger ticket tax revenues, which fell by nearly $1.2 billion from 1999
to 2002. The increase in Trust Fund expenditures from 1999 through 2002,
amounting to almost $4 billion, can be attributed primarily to increases in
funding for FAA operations and AIP grants, which accounted for about 47
percent and about 34 percent of the total increase, respectively.
In addition, the administration is proposing actions that would further
reduce the Trust Fund balance over the next several years. Specifically,
the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request would increase the
percentage of FAA operations funded by the Trust Fund from 75 percent9
to 79 percent. The decrease in Trust Fund revenues and increase in Trust
Fund expenditures presents an issue that the Congress may want to
address as it moves forward with the reauthorization process.
9
This was the average for 1998 through 2002.
Page 9 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Resolving Challenges to While there is a general consensus that building runways is one of the
Runway Development most effective ways to increase capacity in the national airspace system,
Remains an Important resolving the challenges associated with planning and building runways is
an important issue that is directly related to enhancing capacity. In
Issue December 2002, FAA published the most recent version of its Operational
Evolution Plan, a 10-year plan to increase the capacity and efficiency of
the national airspace system, primarily by building runways.10 Figure 3
illustrates how capacity will be increased at one airport through runway
construction.
10
In addition to runways, the plan addresses capacity enhancements designed to make
more efficient use of the airspace.
Page 10 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 3: Increasing Airport Capacity through Runway Development
If successfully carried out, FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan would
substantially increase capacity and improve efficiency. However, FAA
faces several challenges in implementing the plan. First, the success of the
plan depends on adequate funding and on the consensus of FAA’s aviation
Page 11 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
industry partners. Yet according to the most recent version of the plan, the
timing and implementation of some activities may be in jeopardy because
of the current economic situation and the uncertain viability of some
industry participants. For example, the plan calls for the airline industry to
invest $11 billion in new equipment for aircraft. FAA is currently reviewing
the ability of the airlines to make this investment. Second, as noted, the
plan relies heavily on runway development to increase capacity, but the
most recent version of the plan reports mixed results in building new
runways. While the plan indicates that one new runway will be built during
the next 10 years, it points out that another runway has been canceled and
the construction of six additional runways has been delayed because of
local situations.
In January 2003, we reported that airports spent about 10 years planning
and building recently completed runways and expect to spend about 14
years on runways that are not yet completed.11 We also reported that
several external factors affect how much time is spent planning and
building runways, and several airports with unfinished runway projects
identified significant challenges that had delayed the completion of their
projects. While many airports believed that completing the environmental
review phase was a significant challenge and is an issue that warrants
immediate attention, airports also faced obstacles that some said were as
onerous as the environmental review phase. They identified significant
challenges in reaching agreement with community interest groups during
the planning phase and in mitigating the potential impact of aircraft noise
on the surrounding community. Although there may be no single solution
to resolving all of the issues involved in planning and building runways,
the federal government and airport authorities are taking some action. For
example, the Senate’s and the administration’s reauthorization proposals
call for streamlining the environmental review of transportation
infrastructure projects.
Recognizing that building new runways is not always a practicable way to
increase capacity at some airports, we identified three alternatives to
building runways in our December 2001 report:12
11
U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building
Runways and Actions to Address Them, GAO-03-164 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2003).
12
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Long-term Capacity
Planning Needed Despite Recent Reduction in Flight Delays, GAO-02-185 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 14, 2001).
Page 12 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
• Find ways to manage and distribute demand within the system’s existing
capacity at busy airports such as LaGuardia, by, for example, limiting the
number of takeoffs and landings during peak periods or limiting the ability
of general aviation aircraft to use especially congested airports (under
current law, all aircraft have equal access to even the largest airports).
Airports are restricted in using pricing to reflect the scarcity and
congestion of airspace.
• Add capacity by using nearby airports that have available capacity.
• Examine other modes of intercity travel, such as high-speed rail, where
metropolitan areas are relatively close, to form an integrated, intermodal
transportation network.
Accordingly, we recommended that the Department of Transportation
(DOT) begin a more extensive evaluation of initiatives, including
intermodal solutions and a dialogue with transportation stakeholders, as a
basis for developing a comprehensive blueprint for addressing the nation’s
long-term transportation needs. DOT has recognized the need for more
and better long-range planning on the potential use of such measures and
agreed with our recommendation. The Department’s evaluation efforts are
in the beginning stages. The current hiatus in air traffic growth creates an
opportunity for the development of long-term transportation plans.
Federal Programs to Help While the need for greater capacity is a vital issue for some large- and
Small Communities medium-hub airports, the primary issue at other airports that serve small
Improve Air Service Face communities is to obtain or retain commercial air service. The
reauthorization process provides an opportunity for the Congress to
Budgetary Pressures and clarify the federal strategy for helping small communities acquire the
Questions about Their commercial air service they desire. Currently, the challenges that small
Effectiveness communities have long faced in obtaining or retaining commercial air
service are increasing as many U.S. airlines try to stem unprecedented
financial losses through numerous cost-cutting measures, including
reducing or eliminating service in some markets. Small communities feel
such losses disproportionately because they may have service from only
one or two airlines. For them, reductions can mean no air service at all.
The Essential Air Service (EAS) program, authorized under the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, guarantees that small communities served
before deregulation will continue to receive a certain level of scheduled air
service. Its costs have more than tripled since fiscal year 1995, and
indications are that without changes to the program, the demand for
Page 13 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
subsidies will soon exceed the program’s $113 million appropriation for
fiscal year 2003. At the same time, aggregate passenger levels at EAS-
subsidized airports continue to fall. Often fewer than 10 percent of a
community’s potential passengers use the subsidized local service; the rest
choose to drive to their destination or drive to a larger airport that offers
lower fares or more frequent service to more destinations. In 2000, the
median number of passengers on each EAS-subsidized flight was three.
The administration’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2004 would
substantially reduce the federal subsidy for small community air service
and require communities that wish to retain the service to help subsidize
it. Specifically, the budget proposal would reduce federal EAS funding
from $133 million in 2003 to $50 million in 2004, alter the eligibility criteria
for funding, and require nonfederal matching funds. Consistent with its
budget proposal, the administration’s reauthorization proposal would
restructure the EAS program to direct its resources to the small
communities with the greatest need to maintain access to national air
transportation service. The Senate bill proposes to reauthorize funding for
the program at current levels.
The Small Community Air Service Development Pilot Program, authorized
as part of AIR-21, provides grants to communities to enhance local air
service. In fiscal year 2002, 180 communities requested over $142 million
in air service development grants, and $20 million was appropriated. In
March 2003, we reported that the program funded some innovative
approaches.13 For example, Mobile, Alabama, received about $450,000 to
provide ground-handling services to an airline, and Caspar, Wyoming,
received $500,000 to purchase and lease back an aircraft to an airline to
ensure service to the community. The program also funded the same types
of projects that many small communities have undertaken in recent years,
such as evaluations of marketing activities and the use of financial
incentives to encourage airlines to either start or enhance service.
According to our analysis of similar approaches used by about 100 small
communities, financial incentives offered the most promise for attracting
new or additional service. However, the additional service typically ended
with the incentives. The sustainability of such improvements in air service
over the longer term appeared to depend on the community’s size and
ability to demonstrate a commitment to that air service, either by
13
U.S. General Accounting Office, Commercial Aviation: Issues Regarding Federal
Assistance for Enhancing Air Service to Small Communities, GAO-03-540T (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 11, 2003).
Page 14 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
providing a profitable passenger base or through direct financial
assistance. As you know, the administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget
proposal would eliminate the funding for this pilot program. It is too soon
to determine how effective the various types of initiatives funded through
this program might prove to be. Other options for making the national air
transportation system more accessible to small communities might include
intermodal initiatives such as those we proposed as alternatives to runway
development.
Improving the efficiency of the air traffic control system will be important
Efforts to Improve the to accommodate the expected return to pre-September 11 air traffic levels.
Efficiency of the Air Efforts to achieve this improvement pose continuing challenges, as FAA
attempts to put acquisition management and human capital reforms in
Traffic Control place and establish an effective oversight and organizational structure to
System Face Ongoing help ensure that resources are spent cost-effectively and improvements
are realized.
Challenges
FAA’s Air Traffic To increase the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace
Modernization Remains system, FAA undertook a major effort in 1981 to modernize and replace
High Risk aging air traffic control equipment. This effort, which includes major
projects in such areas as communications, surveillance, navigation, and
weather, has been plagued by cost overruns, schedule delays, and
performance shortfalls. As a result, we designated FAA’s air traffic
modernization program as high risk in 1995, and we continue to designate
it as such.14 Figure 4 combines our and the DOT Inspector General’s
analysis of FAA’s progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for selected
air traffic control projects—the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS), Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS),
Next-Generation Air/Ground Communication (NEXCOM), free flight, Local
Area Augmentation System (LAAS), and Integrated Terminal Weather
System (ITWS).
14
U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 2003).
Page 15 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 4: Status of Selected FAA Air Traffic Control Projects
FAA is making progress in managing the air traffic control modernization
effort and has implemented some key projects. For example, the agency
has replaced the automated color display equipment used by air traffic
controllers to control traffic in some facilities (Display System
Replacement); installed the initial phase of the computer that receives,
processes, and tracks aircraft movement throughout the airspace system
(HOST computer); and implemented some free flight technologies that are
expected to allow for more efficient use of the system by improving
operations in various segments of flight. Figure 5 shows an FAA
representative using the Display System Replacement to monitor and
handle air traffic.
Page 16 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 5: Air Traffic Controller
However, other key projects continue to experience cost, schedule, and
performance problems. The Inspector General has reported that the costs
of five acquisitions have grown by $3 billion—the equivalent of 1 year’s
budget for the modernization program—and the delay in completing these
acquisitions has ranged from 3 to 5 years.15 Problems in implementing the
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System are indicative of the
problems that have plagued the modernization program. Since September
1996, FAA has been developing the STARS project to replace the outdated
15
These five programs are the Wide Area Augmentation System, Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System, Airport Surveillance Radar-11, Weather and Radar
Processor, and Operational, Supportability, and Implementation System. See U.S.
Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Reauthorization of the Federal
Aviation Administration, CC-2003-058 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2003).
Page 17 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
computer equipment that air traffic controllers currently use in some
facilities to control air traffic within 5 to 50 nautical miles of an airport.
The current program presently bears little resemblance to the program
envisioned in 1996. Initially FAA anticipated very little software
development, planned to install STARS in 172 facilities at a cost of $940
million, and expected implementation to begin in 1998 and end in 2005. In
1999, FAA modified its acquisition approach (from off-the-shelf software
to a combination of customized and off-the-shelf software) and increased
to 188 the number of facilities scheduled to receive STARS. Then the
agency concluded that it did not have adequate funding to deploy STARS
to 188 facilities, and in March 2002, it received approval to deploy STARS
at 74 facilities that had frequent equipment failures, were new, or had the
digital radar needed to operate STARS.
FAA does not yet know to what extent its estimate of STARS’s remaining
development costs is reliable because, as we reported in January 2003,
FAA lacks accurate, valid, current data on the STARS program’s remaining
costs and progress.16 Without such data, FAA is limited in its ability to
effectively oversee the contractor’s performance and reliably estimate
future costs. Although FAA has adopted clear procurement management
policies and procedures, it did not consistently apply this guidance in
managing the STARS contract. For example, the development cost
estimate is based on the contractor’s projections, which FAA had not yet
independently analyzed as its guidance directs. We made several
recommendations to improve the management of STARS and subsequent
terminal modernization programs and to provide the Congress with more
reliable information for oversight. FAA agreed with our recommendations
and is implementing them.
Acquisition Management As part of its procurement reforms, FAA introduced an acquisition
System Is in Place, but management system in 1996 to reduce the time and cost to deploy new
Weaknesses Limit FAA’s products and services. In 1999, we reported that this system provided a
structured management approach for selecting and controlling
Ability to Manage Its investments, but still had weaknesses, such as incomplete data on
Investments Effectively projects’ costs, schedule, benefits, performance, and risks, that limited
16
U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could
Improve FAA’s Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System,
GAO-03-343 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2003).
Page 18 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
FAA’s ability to manage its investments effectively. We made several
recommendations to address these weaknesses and FAA has made
changes to better manage its investments. We have since found that FAA is
overseeing investment risk and capturing key information from the
investment selection process in a management information system and is
also developing guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks.
However, FAA is not yet incorporating actual costs from related system
development efforts in its processes for estimating the costs of new
projects. Moreover, FAA has not yet implemented processes for evaluating
projects after implementation in order to identify lessons learned and
improve the investment management process. These weaknesses have
impeded FAA’s ability to manage its investments effectively and make
sound decisions about continuing, modifying, or canceling projects.
Because its acquisition reform effort is not complete, major projects
continue to face challenges that could affect their costs, schedule, and
performance.
Human Capital Reform In response to claims by FAA that burdensome governmentwide human
Initiatives Do Not capital rules impeded its ability to hire, train, and deploy personnel, the
Incorporate Elements Congress exempted FAA from many federal laws17 governing human
capital, and the agency began implementing sweeping human capital
Important for Effective reforms in 1996.18 These reforms addressed three broad areas: (1)
Management compensation and performance management, (2) workforce management,
and (3) labor and employee relations. Figure 6 summarizes our analysis of
FAA’s progress in implementing initiatives in each of these areas.
17
This is a result of 1995 legislation that granted FAA broad exemptions from laws
governing federal civilian personnel management found in title 5 of the United States Code.
18
U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital Management: FAA’s Reform Effort
Requires a More Strategic Approach, GAO-03-156 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2003).
Page 19 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Figure 6: Implementation Status of Selected FAA Personnel Reform Initiatives
While FAA has fully or partially implemented the initiatives in each of its
three broad reform areas, it has not fully incorporated elements that are
important to effective human capital management into its overall reform
effort. These elements include data collection and analysis, performance
goals and measures, and links between reform goals and program goals.
Furthermore, as we reported in February 2003, FAA has not developed
specific steps and time frames for building these missing elements into its
human capital management and for using these elements to evaluate the
effects of its personnel reform initiatives, make strategic improvements,
and hold the agency’s leadership accountable.
New Structure for In 2000, AIR-21 and an executive order established a new structure to
Improving the accelerate the modernization and improve the performance of the air
Performance of the Air traffic control system. This structure was to consist of (1) a five-member
board, called the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee (Subcommittee), to
Traffic Control System Has oversee the air traffic control system, (2) a chief operating officer to
Not Been Fully manage the air traffic control system, and (3) a new performance-based
Implemented organization, to be known as the Air Traffic Organization, to operate the
air traffic control system. Under the act, the Subcommittee provides
oversight by, among other things, reviewing and approving strategic plans,
large contracts, and budget requests for the air traffic control system.
The Subcommittee has been meeting since January 2001, but a chief
operating officer has not yet been appointed, and FAA is waiting for an
Page 20 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
appointment before putting the new air traffic organization in place. To
date, the Subcommittee has focused on bringing performance
management, accountability, and a more businesslike structure to the air
traffic control system, and it has taken some specific actions, including
reviewing and approving performance metrics, a budget, and three large
procurements that FAA initiated. However, without a chief operating
officer or a performance-based organization, the new structure is not
functioning as intended.
FAA and other stakeholders have suggested reasons for the difficulties in
implementing the new structure and have proposed changes to AIR-21 that
they believe would address these reasons. For example, they have noted
that the Subcommittee’s authority to approve the budget request for the
air traffic control system challenges the administration’s prerogative to
submit a budget request reflecting its priorities, and they have cited
uncertainties in the responsibilities and reporting relationships of the chief
operating officer, the FAA Administrator, and the Subcommittee that, they
say, have made it difficult to hire a chief operating officer. To address
these issues, the administration’s reauthorization proposal would (1)
eliminate the Subcommittee’s approval authority, making the
Subcommittee an advisory body, and (2) designate the FAA Administrator
as the chair of the Subcommittee, thereby strengthening the
Administrator’s authority over, and accountability for the performance of,
the chief operating officer. While these changes would eliminate the
challenge that the Subcommittee’s approval authority poses to the
administration’s prerogatives; would clarify the lines of authority between
the chief operating officer, the FAA Administrator, and the Subcommittee;
and could make it easier to hire a chief operating officer, they would also
limit the power of the Subcommittee. The Senate’s reauthorization
proposal would also designate the FAA Administrator as the chair of the
Subcommittee, but it would retain the Subcommittee’s approval authority.
The merits of these and other proposed changes depend, in large part, on
the extent to which approval authority is viewed as necessary or desirable
to bring about improvements in the performance of the air traffic control
system.
Page 21 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Safety has always been and continues to be FAA’s highest priority. FAA
FAA Is Implementing has taken a number of important steps to improve aviation safety;
Safety Initiatives and however, its planning and implementation could sometimes be more
effective. In addition, with the transfer of most aviation security
Faces New responsibilities to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FAA
Challenges in faces the challenge of maintaining close coordination with TSA to ensure
that aircraft safety is maintained as TSA implements new security
Ensuring That enhancements.
Security
Enhancements
Maintain Aircraft
Safety
FAA and Industry Have Reducing fatal aviation accidents is key to improving aviation safety.
Taken Actions to Reduce FAA’s centerpiece for reaching this goal is Safer Skies, an initiative that
the Fatal Accident Rate dates back to 1998, when FAA and aviation industry representatives
worked together to identify the major causes of fatal accidents and to
design and implement actions to prevent future accidents. Safer Skies is
intended to reduce the fatal accident rate for commercial aviation by 80
percent and to reduce the number of fatal accidents for general aviation to
350 a year by 2007.19 Because many preventive actions have not yet been
fully implemented, it may be too early to assess their effectiveness.
Achieving the initiative’s goals will require FAA to systematically
implement preventive actions, such as requiring additional safety
inspections of aircraft, and to maintain good data to monitor the progress
of these actions and evaluate their effectiveness. As of February 2003, 44
preventive actions had been undertaken—of which 16 are completed and
28 are under way, according to FAA.
19
Commercial aviation includes both large air carrier operations and smaller commuter
operations. General aviation includes a wide variety of aircraft, ranging from corporate jets
to small piston-engine aircraft as well as helicopters, gliders, and aircraft used in
operations such as firefighting and agricultural spraying.
Page 22 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
FAA’s New Safety Improving the effectiveness of FAA’s inspections of airline operations is
Inspection System Offers key to improving aviation safety. The FAA Administrator has noted that
Promise, but Problems perhaps the greatest support the agency can provide to the industry is a
robust safety oversight role that will not waver in difficult times. FAA’s
Still Need to Be Addressed new inspection program, the Air Transportation Oversight System, is
central to this oversight role. This program, which was implemented in
1998, aims to ensure not only that airlines comply with FAA’s safety
requirements but also that they have operating systems to control risks
and prevent accidents. Figure 7 shows an FAA inspector inspecting an
aircraft for compliance with FAA’s safety requirements.
Figure 7: FAA Safety Inspection in Progress
Source: FAA.
We reported in 1999 that FAA had not completed many critical steps, such
as developing guidance for inspectors and creating databases to use in
prioritizing inspection resources, before implementing the new inspection
system in 1998.20 As a result, the agency’s ability to conduct effective
20
U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Safety: FAA’s New Inspection System Offers
Promise, but Problems Need to Be Addressed, GAO/RCED-99-183 (Washington, D.C.: June
28, 1999).
Page 23 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
inspections remains limited. FAA has begun to address some of the
problems that we identified with the guidance and the databases.
However, according to a 2002 review by the DOT Inspector General, many
of the problems that we identified persist, and the program’s
implementation remains inconsistent because FAA has not established
strong oversight and accountability procedures.21 This situation limits
FAA’s ability to conduct more systematic, structured inspections; analyze
the resulting data to identify safety trends; and target its resources to the
greatest aviation safety risks.
Aviation Safety and Some key efforts under way to improve aviation security require
Security Require Close interagency coordination between FAA and TSA because they could also
Coordination between FAA affect aircraft safety. While TSA is responsible for most issues related to
aviation security, FAA retains responsibility for those related to aviation
and TSA safety, including approving the initial aircraft design, structural
modifications, and procedures for emergency evacuation and the
transportation of hazardous cargo.22 For example, strengthening cockpit
doors to increase cockpit security during flights was one of the
government’s earliest responses to the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Because the modifications could increase the weight of the doors and
change the way they are attached to the aircraft, FAA has been certifying
these modifications to ensure that they will not cause decompression
during flight or affect the aircraft’s structural integrity. In addition, new
security procedures require that the cockpit door remain locked during
flight and that access to the cockpit be restricted to the flight crew. As a
result, senior flight attendants will no longer carry keys to the cockpit, and
FAA is approving changes to the procedures for rescuing the flight crew in
an emergency.
FAA is also responsible for the safe transport of dangerous materials
onboard aircraft. Dangerous goods are chemical (including infectious)
substances (or anything containing such substances) that pose a threat to
public safety or the environment during transportation. When these goods
are properly packaged, labeled, and stowed onboard, they can be
21
U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Report on the Air
Transportation Oversight System: Federal Aviation Administration, AV-2002-088
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2002).
22
FAA has responsibility for maintaining the security of its air traffic control facilities and
computer systems.
Page 24 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
transported safely, but when they are not, they can pose significant threats
to people and property. TSA is responsible for screening all passengers
and property, including cargo, that will be carried aboard an aircraft. If,
during the screening of passengers or baggage, TSA discovers dangerous
goods that are not properly packaged or labeled, TSA will need to
coordinate and share information with FAA, which is responsible for
enforcing any regulatory violations.
In addition, aircraft crashes could fall under the jurisdiction of either FAA
or TSA, depending on whether they were the results of accidents (FAA) or
deliberate acts (TSA). It will be important for the two agencies to work
together closely during the initial stages of crash investigations. To
facilitate coordination on these and other security issues that affect
aviation safety, TSA and FAA signed a memorandum of agreement on
February 28, 2003. In addition, on March 4, 2003, the Secretary of
Transportation agreed to assign a senior official within the Office of the
Secretary to serve as DOT’s primary liaison to TSA. It is important that
both FAA and TSA remain committed to coordinating closely on safety
and security issues and that congressional oversight ensures that the
memorandum of agreement is implemented.
As the administration and the Congress focus on increasing aviation
FAA Faces Challenges capacity, efficiency, and safety, they do so in an extremely challenging
in Implementing fiscal environment—the federal budget deficit has increased and
competition for federal resources has intensified. Moreover, as we
Controls over Its mentioned previously in this statement, revenues to the aviation Trust
Costs Fund, which is the source of funding for most of FAA’s operations,
facilities and equipment, and grant programs, have declined in recent
years while outlays have increased. It is, therefore, especially important
that FAA control or reduce costs, run its programs efficiently, and detect
and prevent fraudulent activities. We and DOT’s Inspector General have
reported that improvements are needed in these areas.
For example, in March 2003, we reported that weaknesses in FAA’s
purchase card23 controls resulted in instances of improper, wasteful, and
23
As of January 2002, over 8,000 FAA employees (17 percent of its workforce) had been
issued commercial purchase cards. In fiscal year 2001, FAA made over 364,000 purchases
using these cards.
Page 25 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
questionable purchases, as well as missing and stolen assets.24 These
internal control weaknesses included inadequate segregation of duties
(i.e., the cardholder requested the purchase, placed the order, and picked
up or received the goods without any other review or approval), lax
supervisory review and approval, missing purchase documents, inadequate
training, and insufficient program monitoring activities, all of which
created an environment vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. During
fiscal year 2000, these weaknesses contributed to $5.4 million in improper
purchases by FAA employees and over $630,000 in purchases that were
considered wasteful or questionable because they were missing a receipt
to show what was actually purchased. To reduce the likelihood of
improper and wasteful purchases, we recommended a number of actions
to strengthen the internal controls over FAA’s purchase card program,
such as developing detailed procedures that specify the type and extent of
review or approval that is expected. FAA agreed with our
recommendations.
In addition, DOT’s Inspector General reported in January 2003 that FAA
needs to contain increases in its operating costs and improve its internal
controls over costs.25 Over the past 6 years, FAA’s operations budget,
which is 73 percent personnel costs, increased by over 41 percent, from
$5.3 billion in fiscal year 1998 to $7.5 billion in fiscal year 2003. The
Inspector General noted that FAA has made extensive use of its human
capital flexibilities to substantially increase salaries, but has done little to
reduce operating costs. FAA has improved its ability to track its costs by
partially implementing a new cost accounting system that the Congress
directed it to develop in 1996. The new system, which FAA expects to be
fully operational by the end of 2003, now tracks 70 percent of the
personnel, overhead, and other costs related to air traffic services.
However, DOT’s Inspector General has reported problems with the labor
distribution system, which is part of the cost accounting system and is
used to account for and distribute air traffic controller labor costs of about
$3.1 billion annually to specific facilities and functions. The Inspector
General noted that the system omitted important internal controls needed
to ensure that the time worked by air traffic controllers would be
24
U.S. General Accounting Office, FAA Purchase Cards: Weak Controls Resulted in
Instances of Improper and Wasteful Purchases and Missing Assets, GAO-03-405
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2003).
25
Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, DOT’s Top Management
Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 21, 2003).
Page 26 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
accurately recorded in the accounting system and paid from the proper
account. The Inspector General brought these deficiencies to the attention
of FAA, and the Administrator agreed to correct them. The Inspector
General further noted that the system as designed could provide
workforce data that would help determine how many controllers are
needed and where. These data would assist FAA in planning for the
anticipated retirement of large numbers of air traffic controllers in the
near and long term. 26 Congressional oversight is important to ensure that
FAA follows through and corrects the problems that we and the Inspector
General have identified so that FAA can spend its resources on projects
and services that will provide the greatest return on the public’s
investment.
This statement is based primarily on issued reports that are listed under
Scope and Related GAO Products. However, the sections on the Airport and Airway
Methodology Trust Fund and the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee reflect our ongoing
work for this Committee. As a result, the results of this work that we
discuss in this testimony are still preliminary.
To assess the current and projected financial status of the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund, we obtained financial data from FAA and interviewed
FAA officials familiar with the information. To assess the status of efforts
to implement the new structure established under AIR-21 to improve the
oversight, management, and operation of the air traffic control system, we
analyzed the legislation and related executive order, the administration’s
reauthorization proposal, and the first report of the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee. We also interviewed officials from FAA, the Air Traffic
Services Subcommittee, and aviation industry organizations. We
performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
26
U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better Prepare for
Impending Wave of Controller Attrition, GAO-02-591 (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002).
Page 27 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald
Contact Information Dillingham at (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Tammy Conquest, Howard Cott, Elizabeth Eisenstadt,
Edward Laughlin, Belva Martin, Maren McAvoy, John W. Shumann, Teresa
Spisak, and Richard Swayze.
Page 28 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Related GAO Products
FAA Purchase Cards: Weak Controls Resulted in Instances of Improper
and Wasteful Purchases and Missing Assets. GAO-03-405. Washington,
D.C.: March 21, 2003.
Commercial Aviation: Issues Regarding Federal Assistance for
Enhancing Air Service to Small Communities. GAO-03-540T.
Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2003.
National Airspace System: Reauthorizing FAA Provides Opportunities
and Options to Address Challenges. GAO-03-473T. Washington, D.C.:
February 12, 2003.
Aviation Finance: Implementation of General Aviation Entitlement
Grants. GAO-03-347. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003.
Human Capital Management: FAA’s Reform Effort Requires a More
Strategic Approach. GAO-03-156. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003.
National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could Improve FAA’s
Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement
System. GAO-03-343. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2003.
Aviation Infrastructure: Challenges Related to Building Runways and
Actions to Address Them. GAO-03-164. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT’s
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10, 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: January
2003.
Air Traffic Control: Impact of Revised Personnel Relocation Policies Is
Uncertain. GAO-03-141. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:
October 15, 2002.
Page 29 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
National Airspace System: Status of FAA’s Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System. GAO-02-1071. Washington, D.C.:
September 17, 2002.
Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the Essential Air Service
Program. GAO-02-997R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.
Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better Prepare for Impending Wave of
Controller Attrition. GAO-02-591. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002.
Aviation Finance: Distribution of Airport Grant Funds Complied with
Statutory Requirements. GAO-02-283. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002.
Department of Transportation, Transportation Security
Administration: Aviation Security Infrastructure Fees. GAO-02-484R.
Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2002.
Applying Agreed-upon Procedures: Airport and Airway Trust Fund
Excise Taxes. GAO-02-380R. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2002.
National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed
Despite Recent Reduction in Flight Delays. GAO-02-185. Washington,
D.C.: December 14, 2001.
National Airspace System: Free Flight Tools Show Promise, but
Implementation Challenges Remain. GAO-01-932. Washington, D.C.:
August 31, 2001.
Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA’s Modernization Program in Reducing
Delays and Congestion. GAO-01-725T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.
Aviation Safety: Safer Skies Initiative Has Taken Initial Steps to Reduce
Accident Rates by 2007. GAO/RCED-00-111. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2000.
National Airspace System: Problems Plaguing the Wide Area
Augmentation System and FAA’s Actions to Address Them. GAO/T-
RCED-00-229. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2000.
National Airspace System: Persistent Problems in FAA’s New
Navigation System Highlight Need for Periodic Reevaluation.
GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2000.
Page 30 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
Federal Aviation Administration: Challenges in Modernizing the
Agency. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-87. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2000.
Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA’s Implementation of the Display
System Replacement Project. GAO/T-RCED-00-19. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 1999.
Aviation Safety: FAA’s New Inspection System Offers Promise, but
Problems Need to Be Addressed. GAO/RCED-99-183. Washington, D.C.:
June 28, 1999.
General Aviation Airports: Oversight and Funding. GAO/T-RCED-99-214.
Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.
Passenger Facility Charges: Program Implementation and the Potential
Effects of Proposed Changes. GAO/RCED-99-138. Washington, D.C.: May
19, 1999.
Airport Improvement Program: Analysis of Discretionary Spending for
Fiscal Years 1996-98. GAO/RCED-99-160R. Washington, D.C.: May 18,
1999.
Air Traffic Control: FAA’s Modernization Investment Management
Approach Could Be Strengthened. GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88. Washington,
D.C.: April 30, 1999.
Air Traffic Control: Observations on FAA’s Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-99-137. Washington, D.C.:
March 25, 1999.
Federal Aviation Administration: Financial Management Issues.
GAO/T-AIMD-99-122. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1999.
Airport Financing: Smaller Airports Face Future Funding Shortfalls.
GAO/T-RCED-99-96. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 1999.
Airport Financing: Annual Funding As Much As $3 Billion Less Than
Planned Development. GAO/T-RCED-99-84. Washington, D.C.: February
10, 1999.
(540045)
Page 31 GAO-03-653T FAA Reauthorization
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Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-04-10.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)