oversight

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-07-11.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

             United States General Accounting Office

             Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
GAO          on National Security, Emerging
             Threats, and International Relations,
             Committee on Government Reform,
             House of Representatives
July 2003
             HOMELAND
             DEFENSE

             DOD Needs to
             Assess the Structure
             of U.S. Forces for
             Domestic Military
             Missions




GAO-03-670
                                                July 2003


                                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

                                                DOD Needs to Assess the Structure
Highlights of GAO-03-670, a report to           of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military
the Chairman, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats,            Missions
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives




The way in which the federal                    DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,
government views the defense of                 acceptance, and capabilities normally employed.
the United States has dramatically
changed since September 11, 2001.               The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example,
Consequently, the Department of                 as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command
Defense (DOD) has adjusted its
strategic and operational focus to
                                                orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks.
encompass not only traditional
military concerns posed by hostile              The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military
states overseas but also the                    troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the
asymmetric threats directed at our              Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use
homeland by both terrorists and                 of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents
hostile states.                                 involving weapons of mass destruction.

GAO was asked to review DOD’s                   DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command)
domestic missions, including                    and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it
(1) how DOD’s military and                      has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the
nonmilitary missions differ;
(2) how DOD’s military and
                                                adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the
nonmilitary missions have                       organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only
changed since September 11, 2001;               recently completed. DOD’s force structure is not well tailored to perform
(3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus                domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of
Act affects DOD’s nonmilitary                   operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001.
missions; and (4) the extent to                 While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain
which DOD’s organizations,                      proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice
plans, and forces are adequate for              the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training
domestic military missions and the              value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the
consequent sustainability of the                number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo
current mission approach.                       thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure
                                                may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas
                                                military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable
GAO recommends that DOD                         pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat
assess domestic military mission                missions and impact future personnel retention.
requirements and determine what
steps should be taken to structure              F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol over Washington, D.C.
U.S. forces to better accomplish
domestic military missions while
maintaining proficiency for
overseas combat missions. DOD
generally concurred with the need
to do an assessment that is
expressed in our recommendation.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact
Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512-6020 or
deckerr@gao.gov.
Contents


Letter                                                                                         1
                       Results in Brief                                                        2
                       Background                                                              5
                       Key Differences Between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions         8
                       The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations               10
                       The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian
                         Law Enforcement                                                      11
                       DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military
                         Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made         12
                       Conclusions                                                            23
                       Recommendation for Executive Action                                    23
                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                     23

Appendix I             Scope and Methodology                                                  26



Appendix II            Comments from the Department of Defense                                30



Appendix III           GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments                                  39



Related GAO Products                                                                          40



Tables
                       Table 1: Key Differences between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary
                                Missions                                                       8
                       Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD’s Usage of
                                Stop Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003                      22




                       Page i                                        GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Figures
          Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility                                   6
          Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel
                   Tempo Thresholds                                                                 19
          Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel
                   Tempo Thresholds                                                                 20




          Abbreviations

          DOD               Department of Defense
          NORAD             North American Aerospace Defense Command



          This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
          United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further
          permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials.
          Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce
          copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.




          Page ii                                                   GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548




                                   July 11, 2003

                                   The Honorable Christopher Shays
                                   Chairman
                                   Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
                                    and International Relations
                                   Committee on Government Reform
                                   House of Representatives

                                   The Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary mission is to deter and
                                   prevent aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This is
                                   accomplished through military presence and power projection. However,
                                   the federal government’s view of the defense of U.S. territory has
                                   dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. DOD has adjusted its
                                   strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military
                                   concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats
                                   directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states.

                                   You requested us to review DOD’s domestic missions. As agreed with your
                                   office, we (1) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions1
                                   differ; (2) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions have
                                   changed since September 11, 2001; (3) determined how the 1878 Posse
                                   Comitatus Act affects DOD’s nonmilitary missions; and (4) assessed the
                                   extent to which DOD’s organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for
                                   domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the
                                   current mission approach.

                                   To address these objectives we assessed key national and defense
                                   strategies; DOD plans, mission orders, documents (such as training
                                   manuals), and directives; and laws governing DOD assistance to
                                   U.S. civilian authorities. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable
                                   officials including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the
                                   services and their various commands; U.S. Northern Command; and met
                                   with units performing domestic military missions at various locations
                                   nationwide. We analyzed Army military police and other combat unit
                                   installation security deployments, Air Force fighter wing operational data,


                                   1
                                    We define domestic military missions as DOD activities to protect the U.S. sovereignty,
                                   territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure from external threats and
                                   aggression (i.e., homeland defense). We define nonmilitary missions as military assistance
                                   to U.S. civil authorities—federal, state, and local governments.



                                   Page 1                                                      GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                   and personnel tempo data.2 We also attended congressional hearings that
                   addressed the establishment of new DOD organizations and their roles
                   and responsibilities. Appendix I has a complete discussion of our scope
                   and methodology.


                   DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,
Results in Brief   acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. In military missions,
                   DOD is the lead federal agency, operates without a predefined end date,
                   can not reject the proposed mission, and uses combat and combat support
                   capabilities for their intended purposes. In nonmilitary missions, another
                   agency is generally the lead, the mission has a predefined end date, and
                   DOD has some discretion to reject the requested mission and uses military
                   capabilities in a noncombat manner to augment U.S. civil authorities’
                   capabilities. Generally, military missions are those primary warfighting
                   functions that DOD performs in defense of the nation at the direction of
                   the President functioning as the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in
                   nonmilitary missions, DOD provides military capabilities in support of
                   U.S. civil authorities.

                   Since September 11, 2001, the threat of catastrophic terrorism has altered
                   some operations of military missions. Prior to September 11, 2001, DOD
                   emphasized deterring and defeating military adversaries through power
                   projection overseas and still does. However, The National Security
                   Strategy of the United States, published in September 2002, calls for the
                   United States through its military forces, if necessary, to act preemptively
                   against terrorist threats before they materialize or reach the United States.
                   Moreover, some aspects of domestic military missions have also changed
                   since September 11, 2001. Before that day, the North American Aerospace
                   Defense Command (NORAD) had planned to order Air Force units to
                   intercept military adversaries’ bombers. NORAD still plans to do so should
                   these threats emerge in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001,
                   NORAD also orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist
                   attacks. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD’s




                   2
                    Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces is engaged
                   in their official duties at a location that makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at
                   the member’s home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers), or in the member’s civilian
                   residence (for reserve components’ personnel). We reviewed personnel tempo for
                   each of the military services and their respective reserve components for the period
                   October 1, 2000, (when DOD started collecting data) through December 31, 2002
                   (the latest data available).




                   Page 2                                                      GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
    Unified Command Plan,3 creating the new U.S. Northern Command, which
    has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States and
    other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil
    authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001.

    The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act4 prohibits the direct use of federal military
    troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by
    the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized
    the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use
    its personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian law
    enforcement to assist with drug interdiction and some terrorist incidents
    involving weapons of mass destruction.5

    DOD has made progress in creating new organizations and a plan to
    support domestic military missions, but it is too early to assess their
    adequacy. However, DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure
    to perform these missions. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001,
    the new security environment required that DOD take appropriate
    actions to defend the United States at home against terrorists, which are
    nontraditional adversaries. Nonetheless, some forces are generally not
    well tailored to perform domestic military missions. As a result, service-
    members may not be able to sustain a high personnel tempo under the
    current approach.

•   The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
    was created to provide overall supervision of DOD’s domestic military
    missions. In addition, U.S. Northern Command was created to provide
    unity of command for domestic military operations. However, neither was
    fully operational at the time of our review. Both organizations were
    identifying key staff and organizing their operations.
•   U.S. Northern Command has only recently completed its campaign plan
    for domestic military missions, and therefore the services have had little



    3
      Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and establish
    their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic area of responsibility, and
    other attributes.
    4
     18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). The act expressly prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force
    to execute the laws. As a matter of policy, DOD applies the law to the Navy and Marine
    Corps through DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law
    Enforcement Officials and Navy Instruction (SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28, 1988,
    Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
    5
        10 U.S.C. §124 (2002), and 10 U.S.C. §382 (2002).




    Page 3                                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
    time to determine what adjustments to training or equipment are required
    for these missions.
•   DOD has not tailored its force structure to perform domestic military
    missions and may not be able to sustain the high personnel tempo that
    preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. First, while on
    domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain
    proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice
    the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training
    value. Second, from September 2001 through December 2002,6 the
    number of servicemembers exceeding two established personnel tempo
    thresholds increased substantially, indicating that present force structure
    may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas
    military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an
    unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to
    perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention.

    We are making a recommendation that DOD assess domestic military
    mission requirements and determine what steps should be taken to
    structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions.
    DOD generally concurred with the need to do an assessment that is
    expressed in our recommendation. However, in its comments, DOD stated
    that it does not believe that an independent force structure assessment is
    required to better match force structure to perceived new domestic
    support requirements; rather, DOD stated, force structure changes should
    be determined through the ongoing force management processes that will
    culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD
    can incorporate a force structure assessment as part of its ongoing force
    management processes, then it would generally fulfill the intent of our
    recommendation. However, we believe that DOD should examine the
    merits of actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term. DOD’s
    comments are presented and evaluated at the end of this letter following
    our recommendation and in appendix II.




    6
     For two thresholds, DOD measures the time that servicemembers spend away from home
    in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of any month indicated. Therefore, if a
    servicemember spent time away from home that exceeded a threshold in September 2001,
    the measurement period is October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2001.




    Page 4                                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
             Every 4 years, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review,7 DOD conducts
Background   a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force
             structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and
             other elements of the defense program, and establishes a defense
             program for the next 20 years. This process helps ensure that DOD can
             effectively support the broader national security strategy of the United
             States. The 2001Quadrennial Defense Review Report was issued shortly
             after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and outlines a new defense
             strategy to (1) assure allies and friends that the United States can fulfill its
             commitments, (2) dissuade adversaries from undertaking activities that
             threaten U.S. or allied interests, (3) deter aggression and coercion, and
             (4) decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails.

             Operation Noble Eagle was an immediate response to the
             September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; is intended to directly
             defend the homeland; and is ongoing.8 Operation Noble Eagle
             missions include combat air patrols over major American cities and
             enhanced security at federal installations. A combat air patrol is an
             airborne air defense activity involving fighter aircraft patrolling a given
             area. To support fighter coverage, other military activities have included
             aerial refueling and airborne early warning; comprehensive radio and
             radar coverage of the patrolled area; and command and control centers
             to direct fighter pilots when a threatening aircraft is detected. Concerns
             about terrorist threats to federal installations increased following the
             9-11 attacks; therefore, DOD enhanced installation security to harden
             facilities against attacks and deter future attacks through the deployment
             of additional personnel (such as military police).

             In April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD’s Unified
             Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern
             Command was activated on October 1, 2002, and is scheduled to be
             fully operational on October 1, 2003. Its area of responsibility includes
             the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the
             surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, which
             includes Cuba, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos.9



             7
                 As directed by 10 U.S.C. §118 (2002).
             8
              Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint
             Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 5, 2002.
             9
              U.S. Southern Command retains certain responsibilities for contingency planning,
             operations, security cooperation, and force protection for these islands.




             Page 5                                                   GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                                        Figure 1 displays U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility as
                                        indicated by the darkened boundary line.

Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility




                                        Note: U.S. Northern Command is responsible for defending Alaska; however, U. S. forces stationed in
                                        Alaska remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.




                                        Page 6                                                         GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and maritime
defense of the continental United States. Its mission is to conduct
operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at
the United States, its territories and interests within assigned areas of
responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities, including consequence
management operations.

In June 2002, the President proposed creation of the Department of
Homeland Security and in November 2002, Congress approved legislation
consolidating 22 federal agencies within the new department. In July 2002,
the administration published the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, which defines homeland security as a “concerted national effort
to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from
attacks that do occur.”10 The National Strategy for Homeland Security
broadly defines DOD’s contributions to national homeland security efforts
to include the prosecution of military missions abroad that reduce the
terrorist threat to the United States; military missions conducted within
the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary circumstances
with support, as needed, by other agencies; and support to U.S. civil
authorities under emergency circumstances, where DOD is asked to act
quickly and provide capabilities that other agencies do not have or for
limited scope missions where other agencies have the lead.

In August 2002, DOD proposed the creation of a new Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Congress approved
it with passage of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003.11 The new office establishes a senior civilian officer
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a principal focus on the
supervision of the homeland defense activities of DOD (i.e., the assistant
secretary supervises the execution of domestic military missions and
military support to U.S. civil authorities and develops policies, conducts
analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities
as well as emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management
matters to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense).
The assistant secretary also supports the development of policy direction


10
 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 2.
11
     P.L. 107-314 (Dec. 2, 2002), §902.




Page 7                                                 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                                            to the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and guides the
                                            development and execution of U.S. Northern Command plans and
                                            activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is
                                            also responsible for representing DOD when interacting with federal,
                                            state, and local government entities.

                                            In September 2002, the President released The National Security Strategy
                                            of the United States of America.12 The strategy identifies U.S. interests,
                                            goals, and objectives vital to U.S. national security; and explains how the
                                            United States uses its political, economic, military, and other elements of
                                            national power to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals
                                            and objectives identified above.


                                            Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,
Key Differences                             acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. Generally, military
Between DOD’s                               missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in
                                            defense of the nation and at the direction of the President functioning as
Military and                                the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD
Nonmilitary Missions                        provides military capabilities in support of U.S. civil authorities as directed
                                            by the President or Secretary of Defense. Table 1 provides more details on
                                            the key differences.

Table 1: Key Differences between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions

 Military missions                                                     Nonmilitary missions
 Acts as the lead federal agency and executes orders issued by         Supports a lead federal agency as directed by the President or
 the President functioning as the Commander-in-Chief.                  the Secretary of Defense.
 Performs duties under extraordinary circumstances that do not         Provides support on a temporary or emergency basis normally
 necessarily have defined end dates.                                   with agreed upon termination dates.
 Cannot reject these missions.                                         Has some discretion to accept or reject these requests based on
                                                                       six established criteria and uses a review process guided by DOD
                                                                                           a
                                                                       Directive 3025.15.
 Applies military combat capabilities that only DOD possesses.         Augments U.S. civil authorities’ capabilities with DOD’s assets or
                                                                       capabilities, which are applied in a noncombat manner.
Source: GAO analysis.
                                            a
                                            Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997.




                                            12
                                             The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House,
                                            Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002).




                                            Page 8                                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
    Military missions involve warfighting functions, such as campaigns,
    engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services’ combat forces.
    Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples
    of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic
    military mission started on September 11, 2001, and ongoing today. In the
    latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to order combat air patrols to
    identify and intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States.
    Because this is a military mission, DOD is the lead federal agency and is
    prepared to apply its combat power, if needed.

    Requests for nonmilitary missions generally seek DOD support to help
    after the impact of natural or man-made disasters, or assist indirectly with
    law enforcement.13 These requests are evaluated against criteria contained
    in DOD’s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.14 DOD’s
    directive specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated
    against the following criteria:

•   legality (compliance with laws),
•   lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),
•   risk (safety of DOD forces),
•   cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),
•   appropriateness (whether it is in the interest of DOD to conduct the
    requested mission), and
•   readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission).

    According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over
    230 nonmilitary missions, in a variety of settings, such as assisting in
    fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing support for
    national security special events (such as the presidential inauguration and
    2002 Olympic Games), and for other purposes. According to DOD, during
    this same period, it rejected several missions based on the above criteria.
    For example, in November 2001, DOD declined a request from the
    U.S. Capitol Police to provide military medical personnel; however, DOD
    did not indicate which criteria were used to reach this decision.




    13
      DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, provides specific guidance on responding to
    requests for law enforcement assistance.
    14
      DOD Directive 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility
    for providing military assistance to civil authorities.




    Page 9                                                    GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                    Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist
The Threat of       event has altered some military operations. Before September 11, 2001,
Terrorism Altered   DOD generally emphasized deterring and defeating adversaries through
                    overseas power projection, and still does. Since then, DOD has deployed
Some Military       U.S. forces overseas to prosecute the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
Operations          elsewhere. Moreover, The National Security Strategy of the United States
                    of America, published after September 11, 2001, emphasizes preventing
                    terrorist attacks against the United States. The strategy states that the
                    immediate focus of the United States will be those terrorist groups having
                    a global reach and any terrorist or nation that sponsors terrorism which
                    attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction. Such threats may
                    now be subject to a preemptive strike by U.S. military forces if necessary,
                    to prevent these threats from materializing or reaching the United States.

                    Some operations associated with domestic military missions have
                    also changed to proactively respond to terrorist threats. Prior to
                    September 11, 2001, DOD’s strategy defended air, land, and sea
                    approaches to U.S. territory from military adversaries presumed to
                    originate outside the United States. If necessary, DOD had planned to
                    deploy U.S. military forces within the United States to counter the military
                    threats. DOD still plans to do so should these threats emerge in the future.
                    However, the current defense strategy, published in the 2001 Quadrennial
                    Defense Review Report, states that the highest priority of the U.S. military
                    is to defend the homeland from attack by any enemy, which includes
                    terrorists. An example of how domestic military operations have changed
                    to meet terrorists’ threats can be seen in NORAD operations. Before
                    September 11, 2001, NORAD primarily focused its attention on aircraft
                    approaching U.S. airspace and acted to prevent a hostile aircraft from
                    entering U.S. airspace. Since then, NORAD has expanded its focus so that
                    it now also monitors aircraft operating within the United States as well as
                    aircraft approaching U.S. airspace. Also, before September 11, 2001,
                    NORAD had planned to order Air Force units to intercept military
                    adversaries’ bombers. NORAD still plans to do so if these threats emerge
                    in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders
                    combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. In another
                    example, before the attacks of 9-11, many federal installations operated at
                    a normal force protection condition or routine security posture that
                    allowed for open access to the installations, in many cases. However, since
                    then, DOD has used additional military personnel to enhance security by
                    verifying identification of all personnel and vehicles entering the
                    installation and conducting patrols of critical infrastructure on the
                    installation. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to
                    DOD’s Unified Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command,
                    which has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States



                    Page 10                                         GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                          and other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil
                          authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001.


                          The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act15 prohibits the use of the Army and
The Posse Comitatus       Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where
Act Restricts DOD’s       authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have
                          interpreted “to execute the laws” to mean the Posse Comitatus Act
Role in Civilian          prohibits the use of federal military troops in an active role of direct
Law Enforcement           civilian law enforcement.16 Direct involvement in law enforcement
                          includes search, seizure, and arrest.17 The act does not apply to military
                          operations at home or abroad, and it does not apply to National Guard
                          personnel when under the direct command of states’ governors.

                          Congress has authorized DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a
                          number of circumstances, for example, to:

                      •   assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions
                          (10 U.S.C. §124 and 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding 375));
                      •   protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Insurrection
                          Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);18
                      •   assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes);
                      •   protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear
                          materials (18 U.S.C. §831);
                      •   assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction
                          (10 U.S.C. §382); and
                      •   assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws
                          (42 U.S.C. §§97-98).

                          The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a review
                          of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic security, which
                          would include a review of the Posse Comitatus Act. The President
                          maintained that the “threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough
                          review of the laws permitting the military to act within the United States in


                          15
                               18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002).
                          16
                               See, for example, United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975).
                          17
                               DOD Directive 5525.5 provides other examples of prohibited direct involvement.
                          18
                            DOD Directive 3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances,
                          identifies policy and responsibilities governing the planning and response by DOD for its
                          assistance to civil authorities, including law enforcement.




                          Page 11                                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                         order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts
                         would benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so,
                         how.”19 In addition to this review, Congress directed DOD to review and
                         report on the legal implications of members of the armed forces operating
                         on U.S. territory and the potential legal impediments affecting DOD’s role
                         in supporting homeland security.20 In March 2003, the Commander of
                         U.S. Northern Command stated, “We believe the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as
                         amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no
                         modification is needed at this time.”21 According to DOD, on May 29, 2003,
                         DOD informed Congress of the results of its legal review, which concluded
                         that the President has sufficient authority to order the military to provide
                         military support to civilian law enforcement authorities, when necessary.
                         DOD does not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way
                         impede the nature or timeliness of its response.


                         In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new
DOD Created              organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military
Organizations and a      missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. The
                         terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required that the nation, including
Plan for Domestic        DOD, take extraordinary actions on that day. In the new security
Military Missions, but   environment, DOD continues to defend the United States at home against
                         terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. We could not assess the
Force Structure          adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our
Adjustments Have         review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the
                         campaign plan was only recently completed. However, DOD has not
Not Been Made            evaluated its force structure for domestic operations and these forces
                         remain organized, trained, and equipped to fight overseas military
                         adversaries. Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to
                         practice varied skills required for combat and consequently offer limited
                         training value; thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their
                         domestic military missions. In addition, servicemembers are experiencing




                         19
                          National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security,
                         Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 48.
                         20
                           P.L. 107-314, (Dec. 2, 2002), §921(7) Report on Establishment of the United States
                         Northern Command and §1404(11) Report on the Role of the Department of Defense in
                         Supporting Homeland Security.
                         21
                          Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Northern
                         Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the House
                         Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 13, 2003.




                         Page 12                                                  GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                            high personnel tempo. These factors indicate that the current mission
                            approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness.

New DOD Organizations       Two new organizations—the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
to Address Domestic         for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command—together provide
                            long-term policy direction, planning, and execution capability, but were
Military Missions Were      not yet fully operational at the time of our review, because they had only
Not Yet Fully Operational   recently been established and were not fully staffed. First, the Senate
                            confirmed the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
                            for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The assistant secretary is to
                            provide overall supervision for domestic military missions and military
                            support to U.S. civil authorities. This office was not fully operational at the
                            time our review was completed, with approximately two-thirds of the staff
                            positions vacant. Second, U.S. Northern Command was activated only in
                            October 2002 and was not planned to be fully operational before
                            October 2003. As of mid-April 2003, only 46 percent of U.S. Northern
                            Command’s staff positions had been filled. According to a U.S. Northern
                            Command official, the command was grappling with the need to conduct
                            its ongoing missions while staffing the command’s remaining positions.
                            The activation of U.S. Northern Command provides unity of command for
                            military activities within the continental United States. Prior to
                            U.S. Northern Command’s activation, U.S. Joint Forces Command
                            provided military forces to defend U.S. territory from land- and sea-based
                            threats while NORAD defended the United States from airborne threats
                            (and still does). The Commander of U.S. Northern Command is also the
                            Commander of NORAD, thereby providing unity of command for air, land,
                            and sea missions.


The U.S. Northern           DOD’s planning process requires DOD and the services to staff, train, and
Command Campaign Plan       equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign plans and
                            deliberate plans22 developed by the combatant commanders, including
Was Recently Issued
                            the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command’s
                            campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is classified. Since the
                            plan was only recently completed, the services have had little time to
                            determine if training and equipment adjustments were needed to support
                            the plan.




                            22
                              Campaign plans represent the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of
                            operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate plans are designed to use forces and
                            apportion resources for potential contingencies.




                            Page 13                                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Forces Continue to Reflect      DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally
an Overseas Emphasis            remains organized, trained, and equipped to fight military adversaries
                                overseas. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic
and May Not Be Able to          military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat
Sustain Current                 units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills23 through practice
Personnel Tempo                 in normal training. Domestic missions to date generally have required only
                                basic military skills and thus offered limited training value—which can
                                have an adverse affect on unit readiness. In our review, we found that four
                                Army military police combat units guarding federal installations in the
                                United States could not train for battlefield conditions, as the Army
                                requires. Similarly, Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air
                                patrols were inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical
                                maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires. Moreover,
                                from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of personnel
                                exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased
                                substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be
                                sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military
                                missions. To prevent significant near-term attrition from the force, a key
                                concern during periods of high personnel tempo, DOD has used its stop
                                loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from
                                leaving the service. Under high personnel tempo, U.S. forces could
                                experience an unsustainable pace that may lead to an erosion of unit
                                readiness for combat if servicemembers leave the service.

Forces’ Skills Are Mismatched   While on domestic military missions, some servicemembers cannot
with Needs of Domestic          practice their primary combat training to maintain proficiency. During
Military Missions, and Some     Operation Noble Eagle, DOD provided enhanced domestic installation
Forces Lose Critical            security and combat air patrols, both of which generally require only basic
Training Opportunities          military skills but offer little opportunity to practice the varied combat
                                skills needed for wartime proficiency. As a result, military readiness
                                may erode. According to Army and Air Force officials, because combat
                                skills for these units are perishable, to maintain or regain proficiency,
                                a resumption of normal combat training may be required before
                                subsequent overseas deployment.




                                23
                                  Combat skills are critical tasks that every servicemember must be able to perform to
                                fight and win in war.




                                Page 14                                                   GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Army training focuses on combat mission performance that replicates
battlefield conditions. To acquire the skills necessary for combat, each
unit commander establishes a mission essential task list consisting of
critical tasks that the unit needs to be proficient on to perform its overseas
wartime mission. However, the four military police units that we reviewed
were often unable to train and, thus, they were unable to maintain
proficiency for their required mission essential tasks due to the long
Operation Noble Eagle deployments. For example, one unit could not
practice for two of its mission essential tasks—to establish and sustain an
internment and resettlement facility, and process and account for
internees—that it performs in combat. In another example, two military
police units could not practice their combat skills, which include providing
battlefield control of roads and logistical pipelines. Instead, the four Army
military police units from the active, reserve, and National Guard we
reviewed were generally guarding gates, checking identification,
inspecting vehicles, and conducting security patrols of critical installation
infrastructure, such as command and control centers, and housing,
shopping, and recreation areas.

Moreover, we found that some Army servicemembers on Operation
Noble Eagle deployments used skills unrelated to their normal missions.
Consequently, their units’ combat proficiency may be at risk. Specifically,
the Army provided over 8,100 Army National Guard personnel from about
100 units to provide installation security at domestic Air Force bases.
However, only one unit, a military police unit, had primary skills relevant
to the mission; the remaining units were comprised of field artillery,
engineer, and infantry personnel that have specialized combat skills such
as providing fire support to tactical combat units; rehabilitating the
combat zone to enhance lines of supply and communication; and
destroying or capturing the enemy or repelling enemy assaults by fire.
None of these units needed its combat skills on its Operation Noble Eagle
missions.

Similarly, the domestic combat air patrol mission represents another
instance where servicemembers cannot always practice their primary
combat training for proficiency. To maintain their warfighting skills,
fighter pilots perform training sorties when not deployed abroad. Training
sorties involve the employment of tactical maneuvers, and the use of
weapons or weapons simulators against other aircraft or ground targets.
For example, an offensive counterair-training sortie is designed to train for
destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats located
in enemy territory. When on a domestic combat air patrol, a pilot may gain
some training benefit by performing certain activities, such as an aerial
refueling or a night landing. However, according to several Air Force



Page 15                                           GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
officials, domestic combat air patrols do not constitute adequate training
for overseas combat missions. For example, one Air Force official said
that combat air patrols involve little more than making left turns flying in a
circle in contrast to the difficult, tactical, defensive, and offensive
maneuvers performed while on a training sortie or possibly on a
combat mission.

Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are
inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers
with the frequency that the Air Force requires to maintain proficiency for
their combat missions. For example, in one of the seven most heavily
tasked Air National Guard fighter wings,24 the average pilot was unable to
meet training requirements in 9 out of 13 months between September 2001
and September 2002.25 Another wing reported that Operation Noble Eagle
had resulted in a 5-month period when no training was performed. Even
a short-term tasking can inhibit training needed to maintain combat
proficiency. According to Air Force officials, three training sorties are
generally lost for every short-notice, 4-hour domestic combat air
patrol performed.

To mitigate the impact on pilot readiness, the Air Force rotates the
units tasked to perform domestic combat air patrols when a continuous
airborne alert posture26 is required. In doing so, the Air Force has sought
to ensure that all fighter units are able to train sufficiently for overseas
combat missions, thereby preserving flexibility in the use of these units for
both domestic combat air patrols and for combat missions overseas.
However, it is unclear whether managing the force structure in this way
fully mitigates the impact on pilot training, particularly during periods of
frequently performed domestic combat air patrol missions. According to
one Air Force official, under the current force structure, domestic
combat air patrols operating at levels experienced in the months after
September 11, 2001, would not be sustainable for more than a few weeks


24
  Seven Air National Guard fighter wings accounted for 50 percent of the Operation
Noble Eagle flying hours performed by all Air National Guard fighter wings from
September 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002.
25
  Similar data from other wings were not available. According to Air National Guard and
Air Combat Command officials, there is no requirement for wings to maintain or report this
metric to higher authorities. Moreover, Air National Guard officials said that providing us
with this metric would entail a significant undertaking by the affected units; therefore, we
did not attempt to obtain it.
26
  Airborne alert posture is a state of aircraft readiness when combat-equipped aircraft are
airborne and ready for immediate action. This posture is designed to reduce reaction time.




Page 16                                                    GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                                  before the units began suffering severe training effects and thus an erosion
                                  in military readiness.

                                  DOD is undertaking planned changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting
                                  System, which are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and
                                  civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their
                                  warfighting mission. In March 2003,27 we reported that as of January 2003,
                                  DOD had not developed an implementation plan for the Defense
                                  Readiness Reporting System that contained measurable performance
                                  goals, identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included
                                  an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system. Even
                                  though the new system may have the potential to improve readiness
                                  reporting, without an implementation plan there is little assurance that the
                                  new system will actually improve readiness assessments by the time of its
                                  expected full capability, in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also remain
                                  difficult to gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date. DOD did
                                  not agree with the recommendations from our March 2003 report that it
                                  (1) develop an implementation plan with, among other things,
                                  performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and
                                  (2) provide annual updates to Congress on the new readiness reporting
                                  system’s development. However, as stated in the March 2003 report, we
                                  retained those two recommendations because we continue to believe that
                                  it is important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge
                                  progress in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting
                                  system and to provide annual updates to Congress.

High Army and Air Force           Personnel tempo data indicate that the current mission approach is
Personnel Tempo Also              significantly stressing U.S. forces. Between September 2001 and December
Indicates a Potential Imbalance   2002, personnel tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force
in Force Structure                personnel due to ongoing missions or commitments around the world and
                                  increasing support for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.28
                                  DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away from


                                  27
                                    U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended
                                  to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456
                                  (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).
                                  28
                                    Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing military mission in Afghanistan. The data did
                                  not include the impact on personnel tempo stemming from participation in Operation Iraqi
                                  Freedom, which is not yet fully available. While the Navy and Marine Corps did not
                                  experience high levels of personnel tempo—as we measured it—during the October 2000
                                  to December 2002 time frame, their tempo may have subsequently increased due in part to
                                  deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The personnel tempo data we received from
                                  DOD did not record a servicemember’s assigned operation, for example, Operation Noble
                                  Eagle.




                                  Page 17                                                  GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
home, a risk exists that they will leave the service and that military
readiness may ultimately suffer.

Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces
is engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend off duty
time at the member’s home, home port (for Navy servicemembers), or in
the member’s civilian residence (for reserve components’ personnel). The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200029 requires that
DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member
of the armed forces is deployed, and it established two thresholds—
servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out
of the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 200130 established a third threshold, which requires that
servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the
preceding 730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high deployment per
diem allowance.31

DOD data indicate that tempo is high and increasing for active, reserve,
and National Guard personnel. For example, in September 2001, over
6,600 Army personnel had exceeded the first threshold, spending
182 to 219 days away from home during the previous 365 days. By
December 2002, that number had risen to over 13,000 (of which Army
Reserve and Army National Guard personnel represented about
20 percent). During the same period, the number exceeding the second
threshold and spending 220 to 365 days away had risen from about 800 to
over 18,000 (which was comprised of about 75 percent Army Reserve and
Army National Guard personnel), as shown in figure 2.




29
     P.L. 106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999), §586(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §991).
30
     P.L. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000), §574(c) (codified at 37 U.S.C. §436).
31
  We used the three thresholds to measure days away from home, which includes
deployments and activities such as individual training. Although the 401-day threshold
was established for high deployment per diem allowance, we analyzed data to determine
whether servicemembers exceeded this threshold for the purpose of measuring the pace
of operations. On October 8, 2001, DOD suspended the counting of deployed days for
payment purposes as permitted by law. Moreover, the additional statutory requirement
for general and flag officers to personally manage the deployment of servicemembers
exceeding the 182- and 220-day thresholds was also suspended at the same time. However,
according to DOD, as a matter of policy, the services continue to track and report
requirements as established by the acts.




Page 18                                                          GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo Thresholds




Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the
preceding 365 days counting from the last day of the month indicated.


The number of Army personnel exceeding the third threshold of 401 or
more days away from home in the preceding 730 days increased slightly,
starting at about 650 in September 2002 and rising to about 990 (of which
about 35 percent were Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel)
in December 2002.

The Air Force reported similar trends. In September 2001, about 2,100 Air
Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to 219 days, but that
had risen to about 8,300 (which were comprised of about 75 percent Air
Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel) by December 2002. Also,
as with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had
risen from about 1,600 to over 22,100 (of which Air Force Reserve and Air
National Guard personnel represented about 70 percent), as shown in
figure 3.




Page 19                                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo
Thresholds




Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the
preceding 365 days counting from the last day of the month indicated.




Page 20                                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
The number of Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo
threshold of 401 or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day
period also increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about
3,700 in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 (of which Air Force
Reserve and Air National Guard personnel represented about 65 percent)
in December 2002.

DOD believes that the potential exists for retention problems stemming
from high personnel tempo. To prevent servicemembers with key skills
from leaving the services, DOD issued 23 orders since September 11, 2001,
to prevent erosion in combat capabilities that may stem from attrition, an
action known as stop loss authority.32 These orders affected personnel
with designated individual job skills or, in some cases, all of the
individuals in specific types of units that were critical for overseas combat
and domestic military missions. However, many of the stop loss orders
had been terminated since September 11, 2001. For example, the Navy’s
individual stop loss order went into effect on April 27, 2003, and
subsequently the Navy terminated this order in mid-May 2003. Table 2
shows the estimated number of personnel affected by the stop loss orders
in effect as of April 30, 2003.




32
   Stop loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. §12305 (2002). It authorizes the President to
suspend any provision of law relating to the promotion, retirement, or separation of any
member of the armed forces when members of a reserve component are called to active
duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national security of the
United States.




Page 21                                                      GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD’s Usage of Stop Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003

                                                                                                                        Services’ estimated
                                                                                                                      numbers of additional
                                                                                                                       personnel potentially
                                                                                                               affected by stop loss orders
                                                                                                                  who could retire or whose
                                                                                                                  service contracts expire if
                                       Estimated numbers of                   Numbers of personnel               the orders remain in effect
                                       personnel under stop              involuntarily held past their           from May 1, 2003, through
                                                 loss orders                          separation date                   September 30, 2003
 Army unit orders
    Active                                              230,000                                     3,500                                17,000
                                                                                                          a                                     a
    Reserve                                              66,700
                                                                                                          a                                     a
    National Guard                                       80,100
                                 b
 Army individual job skill order
    Active                                               42,000                                     3,800                                 3,800
    Reserve                                              40,400                                    10,000                                12,300
    National Guard                                        3,200                                     1,400                                 1,600
 Air Force individual job skill
       c
 order
                                                                                                          c
    Active                                               11,000                                                                           4,700
                                                                                                          c
    Reserve                                               3,900                                                                           1,600
                                d
 Navy individual job skill order
                                                                                                          d
    Active                                               11,000                                                                           1,500
                                                                                                          d                                     d
    Reserve                                               3,000
 Marine Corps unit order
    Active                                              175,000                                     3,000                                14,400
    Reserve                                              39,600                                       500                                 1,100
Source: Military services’ data.

                                         Notes: All estimates are rounded to the nearest hundred.
                                         a
                                          The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not have information management systems that
                                         can identify these numbers.
                                         b
                                          Data on Army Reserve and Army National Guard for individual job skill and unit stop loss orders are
                                         not maintained separately. Consequently, the estimates for Army National Guard and reserve stop
                                         loss under individual job skills and unit orders may reflect double counting of individuals and we could
                                         not correct for the double counting.
                                         c
                                          We provide estimates for the Air Force stop loss order as of May 2, 2003, because the order went
                                         into effect on that date and no service member was held past their separation date on April 30, 2003.
                                         d
                                          In mid-May 2003, the Navy terminated its individual job skill stop loss order that had gone into effect
                                         on April 27, 2003. Even though the Navy terminated its stop loss order, we provide the Navy’s
                                         estimates to demonstrate the impact if the order had remained in effect. Also, if the Navy’s stop loss
                                         order had remained in effect, according to a Navy official, mobilized Navy reservists would not have
                                         had separation dates from May 2003 through September 2003 because they must be able to serve
                                         13 months on active duty, and the order went into effect on April 27, 2003.




                                         Page 22                                                              GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                     Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these
                     orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain
                     unit-level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic military
                     missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used
                     as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities
                     and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction,
                     and training of new servicemembers.


                     DOD must balance domestic and overseas missions with a renewed
Conclusions          emphasis on homeland defense. Moreover, current operations both home
                     and abroad are stressing the forces, as shown in personnel tempo data.
                     Complicating the situation is the fact that some units are not well
                     structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied skills
                     needed to maintain combat proficiency while performing domestic
                     missions, and receive little training value from their assigned domestic
                     duties. Therefore, military force readiness may erode and future personnel
                     retention problems may develop, if action is not taken to address
                     these problems.


                     We recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess domestic military
Recommendation for   mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to structure
Executive Action     U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions while
                     maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions.


                     In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred
Agency Comments      with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our
and Our Evaluation   recommendation. DOD stated that our draft report provides an accurate
                     assessment of DOD’s need to balance its domestic and overseas mission
                     with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. DOD added that our draft
                     report describes the stress that high operational tempo could have on
                     personnel. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not believe
                     that an independent force structure assessment is required to better match
                     force structure to perceived new domestic support requirements; rather,
                     DOD stated that force structure changes should be determined through the
                     ongoing force management processes that will culminate with the fiscal
                     year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD can incorporate a force
                     structure assessment as part of its ongoing force management processes,
                     then it would generally fulfill the intent or our recommendation.




                     Page 23                                          GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of taking
actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term rather than wait
until the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review because the
missions causing the stress are continuing. Based on our analysis of
personnel tempo trends through December 2002 and on discussions with
officials conducting domestic military missions, we believe that U.S.
military force readiness may erode because of the poor match between the
types of forces needed for the domestic military missions we reviewed, the
forces available, and the limited training value derived from the missions.
Moreover, future personnel retention problems may develop in the
meantime due to the pace of operations, which consequently may become
unsustainable. Additionally, current operations in Iraq, which were not
considered in our analysis of military personnel tempo data, can be
expected to impact a significant portion of the military force structure for
the foreseeable future. Lastly, homeland defense missions are another
factor of military personnel tempo because these missions are ongoing.
Therefore, we believe our recommendation is valid as originally drafted.
DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of
them. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.


We conducted our review from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we
will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies
available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the report
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.




Page 24                                            GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call me
at (202) 512-6020 or e-mail me at deckerr@gao.gov. The GAO contact and
key contributors are listed in appendix III.




Raymond J. Decker
Director, Defense Capabilities
 and Management




Page 25                                        GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
             Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology


             To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military
             and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since
             September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials from
             the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the
             Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for
             Homeland Security,1 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
             Homeland Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
             Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff’s J-3 Directorate
             for Operations and J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy;
             U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland
             Security;2 the Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve
             Command; the National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the
             Army and Air National Guard. We visited and met with officials from
             U.S. Northern Command, who also provided detailed responses to our
             written questions, which we analyzed and used to continue a dialogue with
             the officials. We also analyzed documents prepared by U.S. Northern
             Command and the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security. We
             reviewed DOD directives that govern civil support missions, including
             DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities issued
             January 15, 1993, and DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil
             Authorities issued February 18, 1997. Also, we analyzed Director of
             Military Support data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to learn about the
             types of nonmilitary support that DOD provided to federal agencies. To
             better understand DOD’s missions, we reviewed key documents such as
             the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and the
             Congress for 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The
             National Security Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial
             Defense Review Report, and the defense strategy issued as part of the 2001
             Quadrennial Defense Review Report.

             To more fully understand the legal context of DOD’s civil support missions
             in the United States, we reviewed laws and defense directives relevant to
             DOD’s civilian support activities. We also examined the 1878 Posse
             Comitatus Act and its restrictions on direct DOD assistance to civilian law
             enforcement. We identified and examined a series of statutory


             1
              During our review, the Senate confirmed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
             Homeland Defense in February 2003. The Special Assistant for Homeland Security
             became the principal deputy for the recently established assistant secretary.
             2
               During our review, the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security was transferred
             from U.S. Joint Forces Command to U.S. Northern Command when U.S. Northern
             Command reached its initial operational capability on October 1, 2002, and assumed
             responsibility for the defense the United States.




             Page 26                                                  GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




    exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In addition, we reviewed
    DOD’s directives governing civil support missions and assistance to law
    enforcement to identify DOD’s criteria for accepting or rejecting requests
    for such assistance.

    To assess whether DOD’s organizations, plans, and force structure are
    adequate to address domestic military missions, we identified DOD’s new
    organizations and responsibilities with DOD officials and visited the
    U.S. Northern Command, reviewed plans, and compared the types of
    domestic missions performed by the forces with their primary missions.
    Specifically for DOD’s organizations, we reviewed appropriate documents,
    including the U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan and the April 2002
    revision to the Unified Command Plan, and we discussed organizational
    changes with knowledgeable officials throughout DOD. We also attended
    several congressional hearings that addressed the establishment of new
    organizations and their roles and responsibilities. With respect to
    understanding how plans address DOD’s domestic missions, we reviewed
    our prior audit work related to the review of the 2001 Quadrennial
    Defense Review Report and risk management. Also, we discussed DOD’s
    planning process with an official at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and at U.S. Northern Command and we discussed the development of the
    campaign plan with U.S. Northern Command officials. To obtain an
    understanding of whether forces performing domestic military missions
    are tailored to perform these missions, we selected two Operation Noble
    Eagle missions performed in the continental United States by DOD forces
    since September 11, 2001. Specifically, we reviewed installation security
    provided by Army military police units and combat air patrols flown by Air
    Force fighter units. We selected these specific missions because: (1) Joint
    Force Headquarters for Homeland Security officials indicated that Army
    military police combat units were deploying at high rates due to the events
    of September 11, 2001, and (2) the combat air patrol mission was the first
    domestic military mission performed under Operation Noble Eagle.

•   To understand installation security missions, we interviewed officials
    at U.S. Forces Command; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and the
    U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. We also visited and
    interviewed officials at military police combat units that deployed for
    these missions, including an Army active duty combat support
    company, an Army Reserve internment and resettlement battalion, and
    an Army National Guard guard company. We also conducted a 2-day
    videoconference with command officials from an Army National Guard
    combat support company. We analyzed documentation such as briefings,
    mission orders, and training documents from the four units. We selected
    these military police units judgmentally based on the deployment data



    Page 27                                         GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
    Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




    received from U.S. Forces Command, taking into consideration the
    number of days the units had performed installation security; the number
    of personnel deployed on the missions; the type of military police unit
    involved; whether the unit was from the active Army, Army Reserve, or
    Army National Guard; and whether the unit completed its mission or
    would do so prior to the conclusion of our review. To better understand
    whether the skills required for installation security were well matched to
    the unit’s primary wartime missions, we compared the required combat
    training for these units to the types of duties they routinely performed for
    enhanced installation security. Further, we reviewed Army training
    regulations and manuals. We also analyzed data pertaining to the Army
    National Guard deployments to Air Force installations in the continental
    United States. We determined the types of units that deployed on these
    missions, including those most frequently deployed, and we examined the
    primary combat training requirements these units must perform to
    maintain combat proficiency in their particular specialties.
•   To gain first-hand information about the combat air patrols, we
    interviewed officials at active duty Air Force and Air National Guard
    units that performed combat air patrol missions, and analyzed extensive
    operational, training, and maintenance data. To gain an understanding
    about operational requirements and command and control issues for
    combat air patrol missions, we interviewed officials at the Department of
    the Air Force; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve Command;
    the Air Combat Command; the Continental United States Region,
    North American Aerospace Defense Command; and North American
    Aerospace Defense Command. We selected units to visit based on their
    participation in combat air patrols since September 11, 2001. We obtained
    and analyzed flying hours and sortie data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for
    fighter (F15 and F16) wings from Air Combat Command, the Air
    National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. We also
    obtained and reviewed Air Force training instructions and unit training
    performance reports.
•   To determine if military personnel experienced increases in time away
    from home while performing official military duties, we reviewed data for
    personnel tempo for each of the military services and their respective
    reserve components for the period October 1, 2000, through December 31,
    2002 (the latest data available). The services report their data to the
    Defense Manpower Data Center under the direction of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We obtained the
    Army’s data directly from the Army Personnel Command because at the
    time of our review, the Defense Manpower Data Center did not have the
    Army’s recent data in its information management system. To gain further
    insight into the personnel tempo data, we conducted in-depth interviews
    with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel



    Page 28                                          GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and the Departments
of the Army and the Air Force. We also reviewed DOD’s use of stop loss
authority by obtaining the stop loss orders and estimates of affected
personnel from officials in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Military Personnel Policy, and each of the military services. We discussed
the estimates with the officials to determine the most appropriate way to
demonstrate the impacts of stop loss orders.

We reviewed the data provided by the Army, Army Reserve, Army National
Guard, Air National Guard, Air Force, Defense Manpower Data Center,
and Army Personnel Command for completeness and reliability. For the
analysis of flying hours and military police deployments, we found and
corrected some errors in the data. Specifically, we found errors in the
Air Force’s flying hour records and corrected the data by incorporating
data provided by the affected unit. For military police deployments we
found duplicate deployments in some cases and eliminated the duplicate
records.

For the analysis of Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Navy personnel
tempo data, we found and corrected some errors where possible, and did
not use the data or specific fields where the data were unreliable or we
could not correct the problems. Specifically, for the Air Force data, we
eliminated duplicate records and deleted all records of personnel who had
overlapping duty dates. For all services, where the personnel tempo end
date was missing, we assumed the personnel were still away from home
and set the end date to a date after our analytic period. To the extent that
the missing date represents completed duties where the end date had not
been entered, we are overstating the number of personnel and the extent
of days away from home.

Through corroborating evidence from comparisons with other DOD data
files and our corrections, we confirmed that the data we used present a
reliable depiction of the active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard,
active Air Force, and Air National Guard units involved in Operation Noble
Eagle activities; and Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel
deployments from October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002.




Page 29                                          GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                            Appendix II: Comments from the Department
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
                            of Defense



of Defense

Note: GAO comments
supplementing those in
the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.




See comment 1.




See comment 2.




See comment 3.




                            Page 30                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                         Appendix II: Comments from the Department
                         of Defense




See agency comments
and our evaluation on
p. 23.




See comment 1.
Report language now on
p. 12.

See comment 4.



See comment 5.




                         Page 31                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                         Appendix II: Comments from the Department
                         of Defense




See comment 6.




See comment 2.




See comment 7.




See comment 3.




See comment 8.




See comment 9.
Report language now on
p. 23.




                         Page 32                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                  Appendix II: Comments from the Department
                  of Defense




See comment 10.




See comment 11.




                  Page 33                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
               Appendix II: Comments from the Department
               of Defense




               The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter
               dated June 30, 2003.


               1. DOD stated that it is now studying and implementing significant
GAO Comments      changes in the force structure to better support civil authorities during
                  domestic events. First, during our audit we were not presented with
                  evidence of such studies as they relate to either civil support or
                  homeland defense missions. Second, in our follow-up conversation
                  with a DOD official concerning this statement, the DOD official did not
                  provide specific information about the scope, content, or completion
                  dates of the studies. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its
                  strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military
                  threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and
                  asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. Our draft report
                  acknowledged the shifts for traditional military threats and the
                  asymmetric threats posed by terrorists. Based on DOD’s comment, we
                  added asymmetric threats posed by hostile states.

               2. DOD stated that it is important for the report to note that DOD military
                  forces are not first responders. Rather, DOD provides support as
                  directed by the President or Secretary of Defense using defense
                  capabilities to assist other federal, state, and local authorities in
                  response to their requests. Additionally, DOD stated that our report
                  fails to emphasize that DOD is not the long-term solution to the
                  nation’s domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements.
                  Our report clearly states that DOD assesses requests from civil
                  authorities based upon its own criteria from DOD Directive 3025.15,
                  Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, and that DOD has some
                  discretion to accept or reject these requests. Moreover, DOD suggested
                  that we use this opportunity to recommend a solution involving the
                  fostering of a more robust state and local response structure. We
                  disagree. We did not comment on such a solution in our draft report
                  because this type of assessment was outside the scope of our review.
                  Ultimately, the President and Congress will determine the future role
                  of DOD, if any, in domestic response missions.

               3. DOD commented that our draft report does not mention the planned
                  changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. According to
                  DOD, the system’s changes are designed to assess the impact of
                  homeland defense and civil support missions on the readiness of
                  forces to execute their warfighting mission. At DOD’s request, we have




               Page 34                                           GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense




    incorporated information about this system on page 17. However, in
    March 2003,1 we reported that as of January 2003, DOD had not
    developed an implementation plan for the Defense Readiness
    Reporting System that contained measurable performance goals,
    identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included an
    evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system.

4. DOD commented that our draft report used non-standard terminology,
   referring to military missions (what DOD calls homeland defense) and
   nonmilitary missions (support to civil authorities). We added language
   on page 1 (see footnote 1) to establish the meaning of the terms used
   in our report.

5. DOD stated that it believes it is not clear that homeland defense and
   support to civil authorities missions are key factors in high personnel
   tempo. On the contrary, our draft report acknowledges that overseas
   missions as well as domestic missions contribute to high personnel
   tempo. Indeed, current personnel tempo could be even higher than is
   depicted in our draft report because the data displaying high personnel
   tempo stemming from participation in homeland defense missions or
   other deployments after December 2002, or from Operation Iraqi
   Freedom, were not yet fully available at the time of our review. In
   addition, the personnel tempo data we received from DOD did not
   record a servicemember’s assigned operation—for example, Operation
   Noble Eagle. However, we added a statement to footnote 28 in our
   report that acknowledges this limitation in the personnel tempo data
   we received.

    DOD also commented that since 9/11/01, increased requirements have
    been driven more significantly by overseas operations in Afghanistan,
    Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. While DOD may be
    correct, our report discussed personnel tempo, not requirements.
    Personnel tempo refers to the amount of time during which a member
    of the armed forces is engaged in official duties at a location that
    makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at the servicemember’s
    home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers), or civilian residence
    (for reserve components’ personnel). Therefore, we stand by our
    finding that high personnel tempo is an indicator that present force
    structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and


1
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended
to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).




Page 35                                                 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense




    overseas military missions and could lead to an erosion of unit
    readiness.

    Lastly, because the assessment of rotating units to maintain combat
    readiness was outside the scope of our review, we could not evaluate
    DOD’s statements.

6. DOD commented that activities such as mobilization and
   preparation for war would almost certainly have an impact on the
   resources available to respond to homeland defense and support
   to civil authorities missions. DOD added that our draft report leaves
   the inaccurate impression that this situation is the norm. However,
   DOD did not specifically point out where the report suggested such
   an interpretation. We disagree that our report leaves an inaccurate
   impression, because it does not have statements implying this cause
   and effect. However, because servicemembers cannot be in both
   domestic and overseas locations at the same time, we believe that
   mobilization and preparation for any one mission, even including war,
   will necessarily make them unavailable for other missions.

    DOD also commented that it is important to note that, even during
    Operation Iraqi Freedom, over 200,000 soldiers and airmen were
    still available after the mobilization. We agree that a significant number
    of personnel have not been mobilized even during Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, but it is unclear what DOD’s figure means. DOD did not
    provide evidence to support this figure, and we believe that, in any
    case, it is tangential to our point—that, in general, some forces are not
    optimally suited to perform domestic military missions. We found that
    some forces’ skills are mismatched with the needs of domestic military
    missions and that these forces lose critical training opportunities.
    Thus, DOD’s statement that 200,000 servicemembers were available
    does not necessarily signify that these members are well suited for the
    missions at hand.

    Lastly, we did not discuss overseas missions at length in this report,
    because the report reviewed DOD’s domestic military missions.

7. DOD commented that when identifying Title 10 statutes that allow
   federal forces to perform domestic law enforcement missions, the
   report does not make clear that these missions are based on worst
   case scenarios and are not the norm. We agree that the use of federal
   forces to perform law enforcement missions is not the norm. As
   suggested by each of the authorized uses of federal forces in domestic
   law enforcement roles that we identified, such uses are in fact the
   exception rather than the rule. DOD is correct when it states that it


Page 36                                            GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense




    undertakes missions to support civil authorities at the direction of the
    President or the Secretary of Defense, and, as DOD has pointed out,
    these missions may be undertaken upon requests for assistance from
    civil authorities.

8. DOD disagreed with our statement on page 14 that domestic military
   missions to date have offered limited training value because these
   missions generally have required only basic military skills. DOD stated
   that basic military skills require practice, just as do the more
   sophisticated skills. We agree that basic skills also need practice, and
   our report made clear that, while performing Operation Noble Eagle
   missions (such as domestic installation security and combat air
   patrols), forces are able to employ basic military skills. However, our
   discussions with service officials revealed that servicemembers were
   inhibited from executing the full range of difficult tactical maneuvers
   or from replicating battlefield conditions while deployed on Operation
   Noble Eagle missions. Moreover, we reviewed DOD training
   requirements for all the military skills of these forces, both basic and
   advanced, as well as the DOD requirements for their frequency of
   practice in order to ensure proficiency. Also, DOD asserts that there
   will be ample opportunity to increase readiness prior to operational
   employment. However, DOD did not explain how it could predict the
   amount of time available to prepare for a future contingency. In any
   case, based on DOD’s requirements, we have concluded that overall
   combat readiness may erode.

    In addition, based on the length or frequency for Operation Noble
    Eagle deployments that we reviewed, we concluded that although
    basic military skills have been frequently practiced, combat skills have
    not generally been practiced. As a result, the combat proficiency of
    many servicemembers could be jeopardized. Moreover, because DOD
    did not provide specific criteria for what constitutes the limited scope
    and duration of domestic missions, we cannot address these
    comments. Finally, Operation Noble Eagle began on 9/11/01, is
    continuing, and has no known end in sight, which raises questions
    about whether this is a “limited duration” mission. Therefore, we stand
    by our report as originally drafted.

9. In its comments, DOD pointed out that we concluded (now on p. 23)
   that some units are not well structured for their domestic missions,
   cannot practice the varied skills needed to maintain combat
   proficiency while performing domestic missions, and receive little
   training value from their assigned domestic missions. DOD then
   asserts that a temporary reduction in a unit’s effectiveness for its



Page 37                                           GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
of Defense




    primary mission due to homeland security or peacekeeping missions is
    not necessarily a bad thing. A key DOD official explained to us that
    effectiveness refers to the extent to which a unit was successful in
    completing a mission to which it was assigned. However, we did not
    evaluate the extent to which any military units were successful in
    completing assigned missions, thus DOD’s comment missed our point.
    We believe that a unit’s readiness may erode in the future from
    performing a mission for which it was not designed. DOD also asserted
    that the ability of units to prepare for and execute a variety of missions
    with inherent capability adds flexibility. While DOD is apparently
    asserting that the missions we reviewed are adding flexibility and
    enhancing responsiveness, DOD did not explain how practicing the
    basic skills of flying aircraft and standing guard adds flexibility.
    Consequently, we stand by our conclusion.

10. DOD commented that the report confused the interpretation and
    application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of the
    military to enforce the laws of the United States. We disagree. Our
    report identified and summarized laws associated with the 1878 Posse
    Comitatus Act. We explained the laws’ impact on requests for DOD
    assistance in domestic law enforcement operations. We also reported
    that DOD does not believe the act impedes the nature or timeliness of
    its response.

11. DOD commented that our report indicated that DOD did not complete
    a congressionally directed legal review on the use of military forces in
    the United States and any legal impediments affecting DOD’s role in
    supporting homeland security. We have updated our report to reflect
    information that DOD has recently provided to us, although DOD did
    not provide this report to us.




Page 38                                            GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                  Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff
                  Acknowledgments



Acknowledgments

                  Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523
GAO Contact
                  In addition to the person named above, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K.
Acknowledgments   Geiger, Kevin L. O’Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward,
                  Michael C. Zola, Rebecca Shea, and Arthur L. James Jr. also made key
                  contributions to this report.




                  Page 39                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
             Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products


             Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and
             Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO-03-677T. Washington, D.C.:
             April 29, 2003.

             Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
             Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.

             Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
             Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.

             Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership.
             GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.

             Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to
             Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.

             Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations
             between Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.:
             June 13, 2002.

             Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but
             Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

             Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide
             Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

             Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
             Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

             Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal
             Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.

             Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and
             National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.

             Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown
             but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.:
             January 26, 2001.

             Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied
             Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.
             GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.




             Page 40                                       GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
           Related GAO Products




           Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources.
           GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.

           Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical
           and Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.:
           October 20, 1999.

           Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
           Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.
           Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.

           Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve
           Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.:
           May 13, 1999.

           Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat
           Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.

           Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues.
           GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998.

           Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
           and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:
           April 9, 1998.

           Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs
           Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.
           Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.

           Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National
           Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.:
           September 26, 1997.




(350225)
           Page 41                                     GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense
                         The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of
GAO’s Mission            Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities
                         and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal
                         government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds;
                         evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
                         recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
                         oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government
                         is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.


                         The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is
Obtaining Copies of      through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and full-
GAO Reports and          text files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older
                         products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents
Testimony                using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety,
                         including charts and other graphics.
                         Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
                         correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site
                         daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail
                         this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to daily
                         E-mail alert for newly released products” under the GAO Reports heading.


Order by Mail or Phone   The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A
                         check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents.
                         GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a
                         single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:
                         U.S. General Accounting Office
                         441 G Street NW, Room LM
                         Washington, D.C. 20548
                         To order by Phone:     Voice:    (202) 512-6000
                                                TDD:      (202) 512-2537
                                                Fax:      (202) 512-6061


                         Contact:
To Report Fraud,
                         Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
Waste, and Abuse in      E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Federal Programs         Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470


                         Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800
Public Affairs           U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
                         Washington, D.C. 20548