oversight

Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily Mandated Comparison

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-05-30.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

             United States General Accounting Office

GAO          Report to Congressional Committees




May 2003
             MILITARY
             TRANSFORMATION
             Army’s Evaluation of
             Stryker and M-113A3
             Infantry Carrier
             Vehicles Provided
             Sufficient Data for
             Statutorily Mandated
             Comparison




GAO-03-671
             a
                                                 May 2003


                                                 MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

                                                 Army’s Evaluation of Stryker and
Highlights of GAO-03-671, a report to            M-113A3 Infantry Carrier Vehicles
Congressional Committees
                                                 Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily
                                                 Mandated Comparison


The first step of the U.S. Army’s                The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD’s Director, Operational Test
ongoing transformation was to                    and Evaluation, that met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001 National
form two of six planned Interim,                 Defense Authorization Act. As required, the plan proposed comparing the
or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams                 operational effectiveness and cost of the Stryker and a troop-carrying
and equip the brigades with a                    medium armored vehicle selected by the Army—the M-113A3 armored
new interim armored vehicle—the
Stryker. The fiscal year 2001
                                                 personnel carrier. Regarding the operational effectiveness, the plan’s scope
National Defense Authorization Act               included the use of various data, such as that obtained during operational
required the Secretary of the Army               vignettes, for which all participants and observers received training
to develop a plan to compare the                 regarding the vehicles, and from technical testing. The plan focused on the
operational effectiveness and cost               armored vehicles’ effectiveness; suitability in support of infantry units, such
of an infantry carrier variant of                as maintenance; and survivability during operations. Regarding the cost
the Stryker and a medium Army                    comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be
armored vehicle, the Department                  conducted between the two vehicles.
of Defense’s (DOD) director of
testing and evaluation approve the               GAO determined, based on its observation and analysis of evaluation plans
plan, and the Army to conduct the                and results, that the Army’s conduct of the plan provided sufficient data to
operational effectiveness and
cost comparison. The Secretary
                                                 determine the two vehicles’ relative effectiveness. To obtain the data
of Defense was also to certify to                concerning the vehicles’ operational effectiveness, survivability, and
Congress that Stryker Brigades                   suitability, the Army conducted and evaluated operational training events
did not diminish the Army’s                      and multiple technical tests. According to the Army Test and Evaluation
combat power.                                    Command, both the Stryker and the M-113A3 enabled the infantry to
                                                 complete missions. However, the Command concluded that the Stryker
As part of a series of ongoing                   provided more advantages in force protection, support for dismounted
reviews of Army transformation,                  assault, and close fight and mobility and was more survivable against
GAO monitored the Army’s 2002                    ballistic and nonballistic threats. The Army also conducted a comprehensive
efforts to (1) assess whether the                cost analysis. GAO determined that the costs used in the analysis were
Army’s plan for the comparison                   reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the vehicles’ relative
met the legislative requirements
and (2) determine whether the
                                                 cost—with the Stryker being more expensive to acquire than the M-113A3
evaluation’s resulting data were                 but less so to operate and maintain. The Secretary of Defense, as required,
sufficient to measure the two                    certified to Congress that the Stryker Brigade Combat Team did not diminish
vehicles’ relative effectiveness.                Army combat power.

                                                 Army’s Stryker and M-113A3 Armored Vehicles Used in Comparative Evaluation

GAO is not making any
recommendations. In commenting
on a draft of this report, DOD
concurred with the findings.




www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-671.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact William M. Solis
at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.
Contents



Letter                                                                                                   1
                            Results in Brief                                                             2
                            Background                                                                   3
                            Army’s Comparative Evaluation Plan Met Legislative
                              Requirements                                                               7
                            Evaluation Provided Sufficient Data for Comparison of Vehicles              11
                            Secretary of Defense Certified to the Combat Power of the Army
                              and Released Funding for the Third Brigade’s Vehicles                     21
                            Agency Comments                                                             22
                            Scope and Methodology                                                       22


Appendixes
             Appendix I:    Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning
                            Limitations on Army Transformation Actions                                  26
             Appendix II:   Comments from the Department of Defense                                     29


Table                       Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in
                                     the Army’s Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored
                                     Vehicles (MAV)                                                      9


Figures                     Figure 1:   Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle                                 5
                            Figure 2:   M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier                                6
                            Figure 3:   Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion                      16
                            Figure 4:   M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress
                                        Excursion                                                       17




                            Page i                                       GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Contents




Abbreviations

DOD              Department of Defense
MANPRINT         Manpower and Personnel Integration
MAV              Medium Armored Vehicles
PA&E             Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate


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Page ii                                                GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
A
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548



                                    May 30, 2003                                                                              Lert




                                    Congressional Committees

                                    In early 2000, the U.S. Army began transforming its force to one that is
                                    expected to be more strategically responsive, rapidly deployable, and
                                    able to effectively operate in all types of military operations, whether
                                    small-scale contingencies or major theater wars. The first step was to form
                                    two of six planned Interim, or Stryker, Brigade Combat teams and equip the
                                    brigades with a new interim armored vehicle known as the Stryker. The
                                    first two brigades are located at Fort Lewis, Washington.

                                    Because these brigades are an entirely new organizational design, many
                                    questions have arisen as to the unit’s cost, combat effectiveness, and
                                    suitability. In the fiscal year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act,1
                                    Congress required

                                    • the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan for comparing the
                                      operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the
                                      interim armored vehicle and a medium armored vehicle currently in the
                                      Army inventory, although the legislation did not provide specifics
                                      regarding the comparison;

                                    • the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of
                                      Defense (DOD) to approve the comparison plan before the Army could
                                      carry it out;

                                    • the Army to conduct the operational effectiveness and cost
                                      comparison; and

                                    • the Secretary of Defense to certify that the Stryker brigade combat team
                                      did not diminish the Army’s combat power.

                                    The statute further provided that vehicles for the third brigade could not be
                                    acquired until 30 days after the certification.

                                    See appendix I for the full text of the law.



                                    1
                                      Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398
                                    (Oct. 30, 2000).




                                    Page 1                                                 GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                   On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored and
                   assessed the Army’s efforts during 2002 to meet the requirements of the
                   legislation. In doing so, we observed operational training events held
                   at Fort Lewis, Washington, which the Army used to collect comparison
                   data, and a vehicle survivability test at Aberdeen Proving Ground,
                   Maryland. Our objectives were to (1) assess whether the Army’s plan
                   for the comparison met the legislative requirements and (2) determine
                   whether the results of the evaluation provided the data needed to measure
                   the relative effectiveness of the two vehicles. The report also discusses the
                   Secretary of Defense’s report to Congress and certification regarding the
                   combat power of the Army. We are providing this report, our fifth in a
                   planned series related to Army transformation,2 to you because of your
                   committees’ oversight responsibility.



Results in Brief   The Army developed a plan, approved by DOD’s Director, Operational
                   Test and Evaluation, which met the requirements of the fiscal year 2001
                   National Defense Authorization Act. As contained in the congressional
                   mandate, the plan proposed comparing the operational effectiveness and
                   cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the troop-carrying medium
                   armored vehicle currently in the Army inventory—the M-113A3 armored
                   personnel carrier. With regard to operational effectiveness, the plan’s scope
                   included the use of various data, such as that obtained during operational
                   vignettes and technical testing. The plan focused on three main comparison
                   issues relating to the armored vehicles—their effectiveness, suitability in
                   support of infantry units such as vehicle employment and maintenance,
                   and survivability during operational missions. Regarding the cost
                   comparison, the plan proposed that a comprehensive cost analysis be
                   conducted between the two vehicles.




                   2
                    U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External
                   Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the
                   Army’s Operational Evaluation Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003);
                   Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future
                   Interim Brigade Combat Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002); Military
                   Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but
                   Faces Major Challenges, GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001); Defense Acquisition:
                   Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 (Washington, D.C.:
                   May 21, 2001).




                   Page 2                                                GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
             Based on our observation and analysis of evaluation plans and results, the
             Army’s implementation of the plan provided sufficient data to determine
             the relative effectiveness of the vehicles. The Army conducted and
             evaluated eight operational training events per vehicle type and data from
             technical tests to compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and
             survivability between the two vehicles. Prior to the operational vignettes,
             all participants and evaluators received training pertinent to their roles.
             The Army also conducted a comprehensive cost analysis as part of the
             plan. After analyzing the Army’s cost plan and data, we found that the costs
             used were reasonable and provided sufficient data to determine the relative
             cost of the two vehicles. Based on the results of the evaluation, the
             Secretary of Defense certified to Congress that the Stryker brigade combat
             team did not diminish the combat power of the Army. The Secretary of
             Defense also approved obligating funds for the Stryker vehicles to equip
             the third brigade.

             In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the
             report’s findings.



Background   In October 1999, the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army
             unveiled their vision to transform the U.S. Army into a more strategically
             responsive force that could dominate across the full spectrum of military
             operations—from small-scale contingencies to a major theater war. In
             testimony before the U.S. Senate in March 2000,3 the Chief of Staff of
             the Army stated that the Army had to transform to meet current and
             future strategic requirements such as the rise of sub-national and
             transnational groups, including criminal and terrorist elements that may
             pursue objectives that threaten U.S. interests. The Army believes that the
             transformation is necessary to respond more effectively to (1) the growing
             number of peacekeeping operations and small-scale contingencies and
             (2) the challenges posed by nontraditional threats such as urban operations
             in biological/chemical environments. The Army plans to transform its
             forces over a 30-year period.

             In initial efforts to meet this new vision, the Army’s Training and
             Doctrine Command developed a concept that described the capabilities,
             organization, and operations of a new brigade combat team. This brigade


             3
                 Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Mar. 1, 2000.




             Page 3                                                  GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
would provide a capability that the Army did not possess: a rapidly
deployable, early-entry combat force that is lethal, survivable, and capable
of operating in all types of military operations, from small-scale
contingencies to a major theater of war. As an early-entry force, the brigade
is expected to have sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate
combat operations upon arrival in theater if required. The brigade would be
formed around a new, medium weight, armored vehicle. The Army chose
an armored wheeled vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary
combat platform. The Army selected one light infantry brigade and one
mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington, to become the first
Stryker brigade combat teams. The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
was selected to transform first.

Congress supported the Army’s efforts to transform into a force that
not only was lethal, versatile, suitable, and survivable but could also deploy
rapidly. However, members agreed that the Army must conduct
an evaluation that compared the operational effectiveness and cost
between a medium armored vehicle currently in the Army’s inventory
and the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle planned for the brigades. The
comparative evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2001 National
Defense Authorization Act. For the comparison, the Army selected the
M-113A3 armored personnel carrier as the medium armored vehicle
currently in the inventory. Figures 1 and 2 show the Stryker Infantry Carrier
vehicle and the M-113A3, respectively. The Army began conducting the
comparison in September 2002.




Page 4                                         GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Figure 1: Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle




Source: GAO.




                                             Page 5   GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Figure 2: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier




Source: GAO.




                                        Page 6   GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Army’s Comparative               The Army-developed and the DOD Operational Test and Evaluation
                                 Director-approved plan for evaluating the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle
Evaluation Plan                  and the M-113A3 armored personnel carrier, currently in the Army’s
Met Legislative                  inventory, met legislative requirements to compare both operational
                                 effectiveness and cost. The Army developed a plan that compared
Requirements                     the operational effectiveness and cost between the two vehicles. The
                                 congressional mandate did not provide specifics regarding the comparison
                                 but specified that DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,
                                 approve the Army’s plan.4 The purpose of the plan was to (1) assess and
                                 compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
                                 survivability and (2) compare the costs of the two vehicles. As required by
                                 the statute, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, approved
                                 the operational effectiveness portion of the plan in August 2002 and the
                                 cost comparison portion in December 2002.



Army’s Plan Evaluated            The primary objective of the comparison evaluation was to assess
Operational Effectiveness,       and compare measures of operational effectiveness, suitability, and
                                 survivability for each of the vehicles. The Army Test and Evaluation
Suitability, and Survivability
                                 Command developed a detailed comparison evaluation plan that, as the
of the Two Vehicles              law required, was approved by DOD’s Director, Operational Test and
                                 Evaluation, on August 23, 2002.5 The plan’s scope included using existing
                                 data and data developed during physical examination of the vehicles,
                                 modeling and simulation, and live fire testing of vehicle-mounted weapons.
                                 Data collected from production verification tests that evaluated vehicle
                                 performance—such as braking, acceleration, traction, and sustained speed
                                 over various types of terrain—was also included. The operational portion
                                 of the comparison involved a series of platoon level tasks, including
                                 operations in complex rural terrain and urban areas under various light and
                                 weather conditions. The plan focused on 3 main comparison issues and
                                 10 sub-issues. The main comparison issues were defined as follows:




                                 4
                                   The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal advisor to the
                                 Secretary of Defense, concerning operational testing, including assessments of
                                 operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the items tested.
                                 5
                                   The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army’s independent operational
                                 test activity and is responsible for overall management of the Army test and
                                 evaluation programs.




                                 Page 7                                                  GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
• Effectiveness: How well the unit performs and what capabilities the
  vehicles provide in support of operational missions.

• Suitability: How the vehicles are deployed, operated, and logistically
  supported while performing tasks that support the infantry platoons in
  conducting their missions.

• Survivability: How well the vehicles protect the crew and infantry
  squad, vehicle system survivability, and the effect of vehicle damage on
  mission performance.

The plan included evaluating each of the issues and sub-issues (see table 1)
during various evaluation events. These events included examination,
modeling and simulation, technical testing, and operational testing.

• Examination: A review and analysis of available vehicle design and
  performance data. The vehicles would be physically examined to obtain
  specific measures and characteristics. Existing data was the primary
  source, but other appropriate data sources such as historical data were
  also used.

• Modeling and Simulation: Application of existing and collected data
  to determine the mobility characteristics of the vehicles.

• Technical Testing: The measurement of demonstrated performance
  characteristics and capabilities not available through existing data or
  modeling and simulation. Additional data were provided from events
  held during the acquisition process and ballistic survivability testing at
  the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, test center.

• Operational Testing: The Army designed operational vignettes to
  directly compare two equally organized and trained infantry platoons.
  The platoons conducted identical tasks and missions against a common
  opposing force with one platoon employing the M-113A3 and the other
  employing the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle. The opposing force
  consisted of mounted and dismounted military units, paramilitary
  forces, and civilians.




Page 8                                        GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Table 1: Data Source Matrix for the Issues and Sub-Issues in the Army’s Evaluation Plan of the Medium Armored Vehicles (MAV)

                                                              DATA SOURCE MATRIX
                                                                         Modeling and                            Operational
Evaluation Event                                        Examination      Simulation          Technical Testing   Testing
                                Issue 1. Effectiveness. Does the vehicle support infantry operations?
Sub-Issue 1-1. Mission Support
The MAV must support infantry platoon missions
and tasks.                                                                                                                X
Sub-Issue 1-2. Payload
The MAV must provide the capability to
effectively stow and transport personnel and
prescribed equipment.                                           X                                     X                   X
Sub-Issue 1-3. Tactical Mobility
At gross combat weight, the MAV must
demonstrate on-road and off-road mobility
characteristics that support the conduct of
combat missions.                                                X                  X                  X                   X
Sub-Issue 1-4. Firepower
The MAV crew must be able to employ the
primary weapon systems to acquire, identify,
engage, and defeat both point and area targets
during the day and during periods of limited
visibility.                                                 X                                          X                  X
                                Issue 2. Suitability. Is the vehicle suitable for infantry operations?
                                                                         Modeling and                            Operational
Evaluation Event                                        Examination      Simulation          Technical Testing   Testing
Sub-Issue 2-1. Transportability
The MAV must be strategically transportable and
deployable by C-17 and/or C-5 aircraft to deploy
the unit into a theater of operations. The MAV
must also be transportable by C-130 for intra-
theater deployment.                                             X                                     X
Sub-Issue 2-2. Reliability and Maintainability
The MAV must demonstrate acceptable
reliability and maintainability characteristics to
permit the brigade to complete its designated
mission.                                                        X                                     X                   X
Sub-Issue 2-3. Integrated Logistics Support
The MAV must be logistically supportable with
existing and special tools, and the specified
support and test equipment; demonstrate
detection and isolation of component failures
using its built-in test capability; and demonstrate
an adequate power management capability.                        X                                     X                   X




                                                     Page 9                                         GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
(Continued From Previous Page)
                                                                              DATA SOURCE MATRIX
                                                                                                  Modeling and                       Operational
Evaluation Event                                                      Examination                 Simulation     Technical Testing   Testing
Sub-Issue 2-4. Manpower and Personnel
Integration (MANPRINT)
The MAV must demonstrate characteristics that
address human capabilities and limitations to
enhance soldier performance and system
operational effectiveness.                                  X                                       X                                         X
                    Issue 3. Survivability. Does the vehicle provide protection for crew and system survivability?
                                                                                                  Modeling and                       Operational
Evaluation Event                                                      Examination                 Simulation     Technical Testing   Testing
Sub-Issue 3-1. Ballistic Protection
The MAV must meet the following requirements:
(1) Minimum direct fire ballistic protection levels
in terms of integral 7.62-mm armor-piercing and
14.5-mm and hand-held High Explosive Anti-
Tank weapons; (2) Overhead crew and
passenger indirect fire ballistic protection against
152-mm high explosive airburst; (3) All-around
crew and passenger protection against blast and
overpressure effects of anti-personnel mines                                       X                     X               X
Sub-Issue 3-2. Non-Ballistic Protection
The vehicle must perform its mission under
battlefield conditions, including the presence of
non-ballistic threats.                                                             X                     X               X                    X
Source: GAO analysis of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command’s comparison evaluation plan.




Army Compared Costs as                                            The Army directed its Cost and Economic Analysis Center to conduct a
Required by the Statute                                           cost comparison between the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the
                                                                  M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. The Analysis Center developed a plan
                                                                  to determine and compare the life-cycle costs of the Stryker vehicle to
                                                                  the life-cycle costs of the M-113A3 currently in the Army inventory. The
                                                                  Army directed that the Analysis Center examine the costs of equipping,
                                                                  training, fielding, and maintaining the vehicles for use in the Stryker
                                                                  brigades. To determine these costs, the Analysis Center emphasized
                                                                  the costs associated with vehicle manufacturing, military personnel,
                                                                  replenishment parts, and fuel/petroleum for each vehicle. On October 4,
                                                                  2002, the Army submitted the cost comparison portion of the plan to the
                                                                  Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, for approval. As required by the
                                                                  law, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved that
                                                                  portion on December 17, 2002, as the Secretary of the Army submitted the
                                                                  comparison evaluation report to DOD.



                                                                  Page 10                                               GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Evaluation Provided          Based on our observation of the vignettes, unit and evaluator training, and
                             a technical test and on our analysis of the test results and review of cost
Sufficient Data              comparison assumptions, the Army’s conduct of the Army Test and
for Comparison               Evaluation Command plan produced enough data to gauge the relative
                             effectiveness and cost of the Stryker Infantry Carrier vehicle and the
of Vehicles                  M-113A3 armored personnel carrier. To ensure competency during
                             evaluation events, the Army certified that the units conducting the
                             operational vignettes received comparable amounts of training in their
                             vehicles and that the evaluators were familiar with appropriate infantry
                             tactics and doctrine. The purpose of the comparison evaluation plan was to
                             collect data to measure the relative effectiveness, suitability, and
                             survivability of both vehicles. To do so, the plan consisted of operational
                             vignettes, augmented by gunnery exercises, modeling and simulations;
                             physical and other vehicle examinations; and technical testing. Comparison
                             data included surveys, results of force on force exercises, and mission
                             success and task performance ratings. The plan also assessed the costs of
                             both vehicles.



Unit and Evaluators          Prior to conducting the operational effectiveness segment of the
Certified Prior to Conduct   comparison evaluation, the two infantry platoons and the event evaluators
                             received training specific to their roles in the comparison. The two infantry
of Operational Vignettes
                             platoons received training that ensured all participating personnel were
                             proficient with the vehicles, digitized equipment, and the associated
                             support equipment. For example, one platoon trained on the Stryker
                             vehicle while the other trained on the M-113A3 vehicle. All vehicle
                             commanders were trained on the M2 .50-caliber machine gun and the MK19
                             grenade launcher—the weapon systems for the two types of vehicles. The
                             two platoons participated in a 20-day training exercise and practiced
                             incorporating the use of the two types of vehicles in missions assigned to a
                             platoon in a Stryker brigade combat team. The brigade commander
                             certified that the two platoons were trained according to doctrine and that
                             both were similarly manned and trained.

                             During the comparison evaluation, subject matter experts6 evaluated
                             the units’ performance during each operational vignette. Similar to the


                             6
                               Subject matter experts are usually noncommissioned officers who have extensive
                             experience with the studied equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a
                             trainer or in training development.




                             Page 11                                               GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                            two platoons’ personnel, the evaluators were certified as trained in current
                            Infantry doctrine and tactics. Furthermore, personnel from the Army
                            Test and Evaluation Command trained the subject matter experts in data
                            collection methods, test instrumentation, and familiarization of the vehicle
                            types and the terrain in which the vehicles were compared. Prior to
                            conducting the operational vignettes, the evaluators participated in a pilot
                            test where full data collection and test controls were rehearsed. After
                            completing the pilot test, test officials certified that the subject matter
                            experts were trained and that they complied with the established data
                            collection procedures. The subject matter experts observed each unit and
                            recorded comments on task performance and mission success by filling out
                            performance matrices. Upon completion of an event, Army Test and
                            Evaluation Command data collectors harvested and validated data
                            collected during that particular activity. All data collected and validated
                            were included in the Army’s database and analyzed by the Army Test and
                            Evaluation Command.



Vignettes, Gunnery, and     Effectiveness is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle allows
Modeling and Simulation     a unit to successfully perform tasks in support of infantry platoons
                            conducting missions in an operational environment. To determine
Used to Determine
                            effectiveness, the Army compared the two vehicles’ capability to
Operational Effectiveness   (1) support infantry platoon missions, (2) move around the battlefield,
                            (3) store and move personnel and equipment, and (4) employ their weapon
                            systems during day, night, and limited visibility conditions. Data for the
                            comparison came from operational vignettes, gunnery, physical
                            examination of the vehicles, modeling and simulation, technical testing,
                            and operational testing of the vehicles. The most visible of these data
                            sources were the operational vignettes conducted at Fort Lewis, and the
                            other data collection methods augmented those findings.

                            The Army conducted the comparison of the two types of vehicles during
                            a scheduled training event held from September 12 to October 2, 2002,
                            at Fort Lewis. The comparison, used to assess mission support, payload,
                            and mobility, included two 2-hour road marches and two platoon-level
                            training exercises designed by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry
                            Division and approved by the Army Test and Evaluation Command.
                            During each exercise, the vehicles were loaded with all unit
                            personnel and equipment according to unit procedures. The two road
                            marches—designed to demonstrate the vehicles’ ability to move on and
                            off road, store and transport personnel and equipment, and provide




                            Page 12                                       GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
human factors data—were conducted over varying terrain like paved
and gravel roads, rutted and uneven trails.

The operational vignettes required the platoons to execute selected
small-scale contingency missions such as a raid or an attack with
events lasting from 12 to 17 hours. The evaluations were conducted in
environments designed to ensure similar training and conditions for both
platoons and vehicles. For example, the missions were conducted in the
same light conditions, against the same opposing force and using the same
doctrine and tactics. Fort Lewis’ terrain is densely wooded and open and
undulating. Rocky terrain is common. During the vignettes, the vehicles
were operated over different types of terrain, including paved and gravel
roads, rutted and uneven wooded trails of varying slopes. In some
vignettes, the vehicles traversed loose soil about 3 to 6 inches in depth.
We observed that the Stryker and M-113A3 vehicles were operated over the
same terrain during the operational vignettes.

The operational comparison was divided into two exercises. To
compare how the platoons employed the vehicles, we attended the
same vignettes for both exercises. We observed varying phases of the
vignettes such as an obstacle breach, checkpoint security operations,
civilian disturbances, and a rescue of endangered indigenous personnel
to determine how the subject matter experts and the data collection
personnel documented the key actions and outcomes as each of the
platoons conducted its tactical missions.

During the first phase of the training events, we observed that the
employment of the M-113A3s and the Stryker infantry carriers was
minimal. For example, both platoon leaders used the vehicles primarily
as a troop transport and had their soldiers egress from the vehicles before
reaching the mission site. By doing so, the platoon leaders were unable to
support their mission by employing the vehicles’ weapons system. During
the second training exercise, both platoons moved closer to the mission
site and used the vehicles’ weapons system to support their specific
mission. Based on our observations and discussions with unit leadership,
we concluded that this was due to the units’ limited amount of experience
in employing either of the vehicles. Other factors that impacted the
vehicles’ employment included platoon composition and command
guidance. Both platoons were comprised of a mix of soldiers who had
and had not previously served in mechanized infantry units, and the
employment of the vehicle was entirely subjective on the part of the
platoon leadership. Neither platoon had published platoon or company



Page 13                                      GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                             standard operating procedures for the vehicles. These observations and
                             conclusions on the employment of the vehicles were validated in the test
                             team observation section of the Test and Evaluation Command’s test
                             data report.

                             Although providing data for all of the sub-issues measuring effectiveness,
                             the Army augmented data collected from the vignettes through gunnery
                             exercises and modeling and simulation. Upon completion of the vignettes,
                             the Army sent both platoons to the Yakima Training Center, Washington, to
                             conduct gunnery exercises. While at the training center, live fire of the
                             weapons provided additional data to augment observations from the
                             vignettes and the previous technical testing. To further evaluate mobility,
                             the Army used modeling and simulation at Aberdeen Proving Ground to
                             determine how well each vehicle would travel over different terrain types.
                             Measurements included movement over simulated terrain in Korea,
                             Europe, and Southwest Asia under both wet and dry weather conditions.

                             We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
                             compared the two vehicles during the operational vignettes. Subject matter
                             experts and test personnel were consistent in their data collection while
                             observing vignettes for both the Stryker and the M-113A3 vehicles.
                             Moreover, the vignettes provided sufficient data to determine the relative
                             operational effectiveness of the two vehicles, and the additional data
                             collected accentuated the findings. According to the Army Test and
                             Evaluation Command, both vehicles enabled infantry squads to complete
                             platoon missions and effectively transport personnel and prescribed
                             equipment. The Stryker infantry carrier provided advantages in employing
                             its weapon systems and mobility during most situations, and the M-113A3
                             had an advantage in off-road mobility.



Human Factors and            Suitability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle, when
Technical Data Used to       deployed to an objective area, can maneuver, be maintained, and supported
                             in combat operations. To determine suitability, the Army compared
Assess Vehicle Suitability
                             (1) transportability, (2) reliability and maintainability, (3) integrated
                             logistics support, and (4) MANPRINT7 data for the two vehicles. Primary
                             data for this comparison came from physical examination, technical
                             testing, and operational testing of the vehicles. Of the four areas used to

                             7
                               MANPRINT data measures human factors such as vehicle ride-ability, noise levels,
                             and fatigue.




                             Page 14                                               GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
compare suitability, manpower and personnel integration was the only area
that occurred during events that we directly observed. Data collected for
the other three measures of suitability combined data and information from
a variety of sources.

Data collection for manpower and personnel integration occurred during
the vignettes at Fort Lewis and was used to compare the effect of the
vehicles on soldiers performing necessary tasks. The Army’s MANPRINT
data collection team collected both quantitative and qualitative data by
interviewing soldiers and collecting soldier surveys prior to and after the
completion of certain events. The primary events used to facilitate
MANPRINT collection were road marches and performance of common
soldier tasks. Postvignette interviews with soldiers were also used to
collect data.

The road marches were used to determine the effect that riding in vehicles
had on soldiers’ stress levels. Two self-assessment questionnaires, one a list
of adjectives that soldiers checked to indicate their current feelings and the
other an individual stress rating, were administered prior to and after each
road march. In addition, data collectors took saliva samples from soldiers
before and after each road march to determine changes in soldiers’ stress
levels.8 To facilitate a comparison, soldiers rotated vehicles during the
second road march.

To determine the effect of vehicles on common soldier tasks, the Army
designed short events, entitled excursions, to collect data on the effects
of entering and exiting the vehicles during a variety of different combat
situations. After the first road march, each platoon arrived into assembly
areas and conducted several excursions, with soldiers entering and exiting
vehicles under duress, in chemical protective gear and while conducting
casualty evacuations. Data collectors measured the length of time for each
of these excursions, and upon completion of all events, soldiers filled out
questionnaires. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of these excursions, with
soldiers entering a Stryker infantry carrier and leaving a M-113A3.




8
  Within saliva, there is an enzyme called amylase. Research has shown that the
concentration of salivary amylase reflects substances produced by the body in
response to stress.




Page 15                                                GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Figure 3: Stryker Infantry Carrier Ingress Excursion




Source: GAO.




                                           Page 16     GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Figure 4: M-113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier Egress Excursion




Source: GAO.




                                        Page 17                GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                        Upon completion of each training exercise, soldiers filled out another
                        series of questionnaires designed to gauge ergonomic factors.
                        Questionnaires, again administered by MANPRINT data collectors, asked
                        soldiers about sound level, space, seat comfort, ability to communicate
                        within the vehicle, situational awareness, and other safety issues.

                        To assess transportability, reliability and maintainability, and integrated
                        logistics support, the Army relied on existing data from previous events,
                        developed projections where data was lacking, or is in the process of
                        collecting additional data during the continuing developmental testing.
                        Using existing data, the Army determined that both vehicles were
                        transportable; however, the M-113A3 was more deployable by air because
                        of its reduced weight but less deployable by road because, for longer
                        distances, it required either rail or truck support. To assess the Stryker
                        vehicle’s reliability and maintainability, the Army is continuing to collect
                        data. While the Army is able to claim that there are no specific failure
                        patterns, the relatively low number of Stryker miles prevents a statistically
                        reliable forecast. To assess the M-113A3’s reliability and maintainability, the
                        Army primarily relied on existing data. Because the system is still in
                        development, the Army used projections to determine that the Stryker
                        vehicle is more logistically supportable because the family of vehicles and
                        higher gas mileage reduce the overall size of the logistic footprint. For
                        example, the Stryker vehicles are built on a common chassis and thus
                        require fewer different parts. Moreover, the Stryker, as a wheeled-vehicle,
                        requires fewer mechanics to maintain it.

                        We did not observe any significant differences in the way the Army
                        compared suitability for both types of vehicles. According to our review
                        of the Army Test and Evaluation Command report, both vehicles are
                        transportable and both have manageable failures for maintenance and
                        reliability. In terms of human factors, the MANPRINT data indicate that
                        soldiers riding in a Stryker infantry carrier reported reduced fatigue; more
                        ability to move within, inside, and outside the vehicle; lower levels of
                        stress; less irritation; and a better ability to communicate than those riding
                        in a M-113A3.



Vehicle Survivability   Survivability is an assessment of the extent to which a vehicle survives
Assessed against a      under different threat conditions and protects the crew and the
                        equipment. The Army’s Test and Evaluation Command decided that vehicle
Variety of Threats
                        survivability would be determined through a comparison of existing test
                        data, technical data, and modeling and simulation. The vehicles had to



                        Page 18                                         GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                     demonstrate that they could provide an adequate level of protection to the
                     infantry squad and vehicle crew against threats such as small arms,
                     artillery, and mines. The M113A3 was designed to provide protection
                     against a standard 7.62mm threat. The Army intended the Stryker to have
                     an all-around 7.62mm armor-piercing protection, plus 14.5 mm protection
                     on the front, sides, and rear. The top will have 7.62 mm armor-piercing and
                     152mm high explosive airburst protection, and protection against
                     antipersonnel mines through the vehicle floor. Stryker also has an
                     embedded spall liner. Also assessed was the vehicles’ ability to support
                     missions under different battlefield conditions such as nuclear, biological,
                     and chemical environments. Most of the technical evaluation occurred at
                     the Aberdeen Proving Ground test center. The Test Command concluded
                     that the Stryker vehicle was more survivable than the M-113A3 against both
                     of these types of threats.

                     We also observed a vehicle survivability test at the Aberdeen test center.
                     Based on our observations of the testing and data collection process, we
                     determined that the test community had systems designed to collect
                     objective, technical data on the vehicles. We obtained and analyzed the Test
                     and Evaluation Command’s evaluation report; however, we are unable to
                     comment on specific test results because the results are classified and
                     technical testing remains ongoing. Our observations and analysis do allow
                     us to generally comment that the technical testing procedures appeared to
                     be objective and sufficient to provide data to determine the relative
                     survivability of the two types of vehicles.



DOD and the Army     The Army’s Cost and Economic Analysis Center and DOD’s Program
Assessed the Costs   Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PA&E) estimated the life-cycle costs
                     of equipping the brigade teams with either the Stryker or the M-113A3
of Stryker and the
                     vehicle. The Center included both investment and operating costs in its
M-113A3 Vehicles     calculations and defined the appropriate life cycle as 20 years. PA&E, using
                     the Center’s cost calculations, applied a slightly different methodology to
                     assess the costs for one Stryker brigade. Both PA&E and the Army
                     concurred that the Stryker infantry carrier is more expensive than the
                     M-113A3. However, each report had a slightly different methodology. We
                     reviewed the assumptions of the cost comparison and found they
                     conformed to cost analysis guidance provided to federal agencies by the
                     Office of Management and Budget. We found no instances in which these
                     cost assumptions seemed to favor one vehicle over another. Based on this
                     review, the magnitude of the increased costs of the Stryker vehicle
                     appeared reasonable.



                     Page 19                                       GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
The Stryker vehicle has a higher investment cost than the M-113A3.
According to both PA&E and the Army cost reports, acquiring a Stryker
vehicle is $1.42 million each. The acquisition cost for an M-113A3 depends
on how it is acquired, either through reassigning vehicles currently in the
Army inventory or upgrading existing M-113A2s.

The Army currently has 4,100 M-113A3s in its inventory, so a zero cost
investment option would be to assign these existing vehicles to the new
Stryker brigades. According to the Army, pursuing this course would
adversely affect the readiness of the losing units, which would then be
equipped with older versions of the M-113. PA&E noted that the loss
of vehicles could be accepted as an additional risk to the current force
structure, which will begin transforming to the future force in 2008.
A second option would be to upgrade existing M-113A2s. PA&E and
the Army reports agree that the cost of upgrading an M-113A2 is about
$303,000 per vehicle with an inherited value of $67,000 per vehicle, making
the total cost of upgrading at least $370,000 per vehicle.

Capabilities costs are also not reflected in the investment costs of the
M-113A3. Unlike the M-113A3, the Stryker vehicle was designed with
two significant capabilities: 14.5-mm armor protection and a Remote
Weapon Station. The M-113A3’s armor protection is less than the Stryker
vehicle’s and an upgrade package will cost about $73,000 per vehicle. The
M-113A3 does not have the Remote Weapon Station, which would cost
another $200,000 per vehicle. Not included in this estimate are the costs
of testing and integrating the Remote Weapon Station with the M-113A3,
assuming that it can be done at all. Moreover, this estimate does not include
the effect that the additional weight from the armor protection and Remote
Weapon Station would have on the M-113A3’s transportability or suitability.

PA&E and the Army agreed that the Stryker infantry carrier has lower
operating costs than the M-113A3. Over a 20-year lifespan, both agencies
estimated that each Stryker vehicle would cost $2.9 million to operate
and maintain compared to $3.1 million for the M-113A3. These cost
savings come from three main areas: fuel efficiency, replacement parts,
and training costs. Both agencies agree that the Stryker vehicle is
more fuel-efficient and requires fewer repair parts and consumables.
Additionally, training costs encompass several different areas, namely
the cost to train and staff mechanics, as well as instruct new crews on
how to operate the vehicles.




Page 20                                       GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
                          With the exception of the number of brigades used to calculate costs, the
                          methodology used by PA&E and the Army to calculate operating costs was
                          consistent. The Army based its cost calculations on equipping 6 brigades,
                          for a total of 686 vehicles. In contrast, PA&E based its calculations on
                          equipping 1 brigade, for a total of 118 vehicles. Although the two methods
                          result in different total costs for the vehicle systems, they do not change
                          the relative price difference, or the fact that the Stryker vehicle is more
                          expensive than the M-113A3.

                          The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, officially approved the
                          Army’s cost comparison on December 17, 2002. The comparison found that
                          the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle was more costly than the M-113A3.
                          Based on our review of the methodologies used, we concluded that the cost
                          comparison was reasonable.



Secretary of Defense      The Army completed the comparison evaluation and developed a report
                          that included reports from the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the
Certified to the Combat   Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center. On December 17, 2002, the
Power of the Army         Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum of certification to the
                          Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army certified that, in terms of
and Released Funding      operational effectiveness, the comparison evaluation demonstrated that
for the Third             the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more survivable and provides better
Brigade’s Vehicles        overall performance and mobility when employed in combat operations
                          than the M-113A3. The Secretary of the Army also certified that the
                          Stryker brigade combat team increased the aggregate combat power of
                          the U.S. Army.

                          However, in the report submitted to Congress, DOD’s conclusions were not
                          quite as positive. The DOD report, prepared by its PA&E Directorate,
                          summarized conclusions based on the Department of the Army report that
                          included the Army Test and Evaluation Command and the Army Cost and
                          Economic Analysis Center reports. The Director, Operational Test and
                          Evaluation, also provided comments from a draft report. The DOD report
                          stated that neither vehicle was preferred for all the criteria. The Stryker
                          vehicle was superior under some criteria, the M-113A3 was superior on
                          others, and the two vehicles were equal on yet others. However, DOD and
                          the Army both agreed that the Stryker brigade combat teams would not
                          diminish the combat power of the Army, and DOD so certified. As a result
                          of the evaluation, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved obligating the
                          funding for the Stryker vehicles to equip the third brigade.




                          Page 21                                      GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Agency Comments   In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the report’s
                  findings. DOD’s response also provided technical comments for clarifying
                  two areas in the report, which we incorporated. Appendix II contains the
                  full text of DOD’s comments.



Scope and         To determine whether the Army’s plan for the comparison was adequate to
                  satisfy legislative requirements, we focused our efforts on understanding
Methodology       the Army’s overall comparison evaluation plan. We obtained and analyzed
                  the Army’s Comparative Evaluation plan, data collection plans, and
                  technical test plans and reviewed comments of the plan provided by
                  various DOD and Army agencies. We interviewed officials and analysts
                  involved in both the design and evaluation of the plan at Office of the
                  Secretary of Defense; Office of the Secretary of the Army; Headquarters,
                  Department of the Army; Army Forces Command; Army Training
                  and Doctrine Command; Army Tank and Automotive Command; Army
                  Operational Test Command and Army Test and Evaluation
                  Command; Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center; and I Corps,
                  Fort Lewis, Washington.

                  To determine whether the comparison evaluation plan and its
                  implementation would provide the data needed to measure the relative
                  effectiveness of the vehicles, we attended the operational vignettes and
                  associated training events scheduled in the Army’s plan and reviewed the
                  results taken from those events. For example, we reviewed the training
                  procedures and attended the training sessions for the data collectors and
                  subject matter experts administering the operational vignettes held at
                  Fort Lewis, Washington. We examined the methods used by the test
                  administrators to collect, store, and process the data. To determine if the
                  conditions favored one vehicle over the other, we observed the terrain to
                  be used during the operational vignettes. We observed 8 of 16 events
                  conducted during the operational vignettes. These events included the road
                  march, loading of vehicles, and various tactical missions. In addition, we
                  rode in and drove both types of vehicles. We also interviewed the Army
                  Operational Test Command officials who were administering the test, as
                  well as representatives from the office of DOD’s Director of Operational
                  Test and Evaluation and the Institute for Defense Analysis and Army
                  commanders of the unit participating in the evaluation. Upon completion of
                  the vignettes, we interviewed soldiers who had participated in the events.
                  For technical testing, we visited Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. We
                  received briefings from the Developmental Test Command as to how the



                  Page 22                                      GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Army conducts technical tests on vehicles. We obtained and analyzed
classified and unclassified ballistic testing plans and observed a vehicle
survivability test that was comparable to other types of technical testing.
We also reviewed the reports issued by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense; Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; Secretary of
the Army; the Army Test and Evaluation Command; and the Army Cost
Economic and Analysis Center. We compared the results and conclusions
of these reports to our own observations.

We reviewed the Army’s Cost Economic and Analysis Center’s cost report
and the comments on the report made by the PA&E and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding cost comparison methodology. While we
verified the general procedures and assumptions used in these analyses, we
did not perform detailed checks of the many calculations they entailed.

Our review was performed from May 2002 to May 2003 in accordance with
generally accepted government audit standards.


We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies
available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested
parties on request. In addition, the report will be available at no cost on the
GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions
about this report, please call me at (202) 512-8365.




Page 23                                         GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Leo B. Sullivan;
Robert Ackley; Timothy A. Burke; Kenneth Daniell; M. Jane Hunt; William
McNaught; Jim Melton; and Sidney Schwartz.




William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities
 and Management




Page 24                                        GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman
The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter
Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives




Page 25                            GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Appendix I

Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning                                                    Append
                                                                                                   xeis




Limitations on Army Transformation Actions                                                     AppenIx
                                                                                                     di




              SEC. 113. REPORTS AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO ARMY
              TRANSFORMATION.

              (a) SECRETARY OF THE ARMY REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE
              DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.—The Secretary of the Army shall submit to
              the congressional defense committees a report on the process for
              developing the objective force in the transformation of the Army.

              The report shall include the following:

              (1) The operational environments envisioned for the objective force.
              (2) The threat assumptions on which research and development efforts for
              transformation of the Army into the objective force are based. (3) The
              potential operational and organizational concepts for the objective force.
              (4) The operational requirements anticipated for the operational
              requirements document of the objective force. (5) The anticipated schedule
              of Army transformation activities through fiscal year 2012, together with—
              (A) the projected funding requirements through that fiscal year for
              research and development activities and procurement activities related to
              transition to the objective force; and (B) a summary of the anticipated
              investments of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in
              programs designed to lead to the fielding of future combat systems for the
              objective force. (6) A proposed plan for the comparison referred to in sub-
              section (c).

              If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (5) is not
              available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include in
              the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that information.

              (b) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPORT ON OBJECTIVE FORCE
              DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.—Not later than March 1, 2001, the Secretary
              of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
              on the process for developing the objective force in the transformation of
              the Army. The report shall include the following:

              (1) The joint warfighting requirements that will be supported by the
              fielding of the objective force, together with a description of the
              adjustments that are planned to be made in the war plans of the
              commanders of the unified combatant commands in relation to the fielding
              of the objective force. (2) The changes in lift requirements that may result
              from the establishment and fielding of the combat brigades of the objective
              force. (3) The evaluation process that will be used to support



              Page 26                                        GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Appendix I
Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions




decisionmaking on the course of the Army transformation, including a
description of the operational evaluations and experimentation that will be
used to validate the operational requirements for the operational
requirements document of the objective force.

If any of the information required by paragraphs (1) through (3) is not
available at the time the report is submitted, the Secretary shall include in
the report the anticipated schedule for the availability of that information.

(c) COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIUM ARMORED COMBAT
VEHICLES FOR THE INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.—(1) The
Secretary of the Army shall develop a plan for comparing—(A) the costs
and operational effectiveness of the infantry carrier variant of the interim
armored vehicles selected for the infantry battalions of the interim brigade
combat teams; and (B) the costs and operational effectiveness of the troop-
carrying medium armored vehicles currently in the Army inventory for the
use of infantry battalions. (2) The Secretary of the Army may not carry out
the comparison described in paragraph (1) until the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense approves
the plan for that comparison developed under that paragraph.
(d) LIMITATION PENDING RECEIPT OF SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
REPORT.—Not more than 80 percent of the amount appropriated for fiscal
year 2001 for the procurement of armored vehicles in the family of new
medium armored vehicles may be obligated until—(1) the Secretary of the
Army submits to the congressional defense committees the report required
under subsection (a); and (2) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date
of the submittal of such report.

(e) LIMITATION PENDING COMPARISON AND CERTIFICATION.—No
funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of the
Army for any fiscal year may be obligated for acquisition of medium
armored combat vehicles to equip a third interim brigade combat team
until—(1) the plan for a comparison of costs and operational effectiveness
developed under subsection (c)(1), as approved under subsection (c)(2), is
carried out; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional
defense committees, after the completion of the comparison referred to in
paragraph (1), a certification that—(A) the Secretary approves of the
obligation of funds for that purpose; and (B) the force structure resulting
from the acquisition and subsequent operational capability of interim
brigade combat teams will not diminish the combat power of the




Page 27                                        GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Appendix I
Section from Public Law 106-398 Concerning
Limitations on Army Transformation Actions




Army; and (3) a period of 30 days has elapsed from the date of the
certification under paragraph (2).

(f ) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) The term “transformation”, with respect to the Army, means the actions
being undertaken to transform the Army, as it is constituted in terms of
organization, equipment, and doctrine in 2000, into the objective force.

(2) The term “objective force” means the Army that has the organizational
structure, the most advanced equipment that early twenty-first century
science and technology can provide, and the appropriate doctrine to ensure
that the Army is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable,
and sustainable for the full spectrum of the operations anticipated to be
required of the Army during the early years of the twenty-first century
following 2010.

(3) The term “interim brigade combat team” means an Army brigade that is
designated by the Secretary of the Army as a brigade combat team and is
reorganized and equipped with currently available equipment in a
configuration that effectuates an evolutionary advancement toward
transformation of the Army to the objective force.




Page 28                                        GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense                        AppenIx
                                                                     di




(350179)      Page 29         GAO-03-671 Military Transformation
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