oversight

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control Systems

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2003-10-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                             United States General Accounting Office

GAO                          Testimony
                             Before the Subcommittee on Technology,
                             Information Policy, Intergovernmental
                             Relations, and the Census, House
                             Committee on Government Reform
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, October 1, 2003   CRITICAL
                             INFRASTRUCTURE
                             PROTECTION
                             Challenges in Securing
                             Control Systems
                             Statement of Robert F. Dacey,
                             Director, Information Security Issues




GAO-04-140T 

                                                October 1, 2003


                                                CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
                                                PROTECTION

Highlights of GAO-04-140T, testimony            Challenges in Securing Control Systems
before the Subcommittee on Technology,
Information Policy, Intergovernmental
Relations, and the Census, House
Committee on Government Reform




Computerized control systems                    In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing,
perform vital functions across                  several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber
many of our nation’s critical                   attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized
infrastructures. For example, in                technologies with known vulnerabilities, the increased connectivity of
natural gas distribution, they can              control systems to other systems, constraints on the use of existing security
monitor and control the pressure
                                                technologies for control systems, and the wealth of information about them
and flow of gas through pipelines;
in the electric power industry, they            that is publicly available. Common control system components are
can monitor and control the                     illustrated in the graphic below.
current and voltage of electricity              Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, examples of which
through relays and circuit breakers;            have already occurred. Successful attacks on control systems could have
and in water treatment facilities,
                                                devastating consequences, such as endangering public health and safety;
they can monitor and adjust water
levels, pressure, and chemicals                 damaging the environment; or causing a loss of production, generation, or
used for purification.                          distribution of public utilities.
                                                Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including technical
In October 1997, the President’s                limitations, perceived lack of economic justification, and conflicting
Commission on Critical
                                                organizational priorities. However, several steps can be taken now and in the
Infrastructure Protection
emphasized the increasing                       future to promote better security in control systems, such as implementing
vulnerability of control systems to             effective security management programs and researching and developing
cyber attacks. The House                        new technologies. The government and private industry have initiated
Committee on Government                         several efforts intended to improve the security of control systems.
Reform, Subcommittee on
Technology, Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations, and
the Census asked GAO to testify on
potential cyber vulnerabilities.

GAO’s testimony focused on
(1) significant cybersecurity risks
associated with control systems;
(2) potential and reported cyber
attacks against these systems;
(3) key challenges to securing
control systems; and (4) steps that
can be taken to strengthen the
security of control systems,
including current federal and
private-sector initiatives.




www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-140T.

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Robert F.
Dacey at (202) 512-3317 or daceyr@gao.gov.
                   Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

                   I am pleased to be here today to participate in the Subcommittee’s hearing
                   on the security of control systems. Control systems—which include
                   supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and distributed
                   control systems—perform vital functions across many of our nation’s
                   critical infrastructures, including electric power generation, transmission,
                   and distribution; oil and gas refining and pipelines; water treatment and
                   distribution; chemical production and processing; railroads and mass
                   transit; and manufacturing. In October 1997, the President’s Commission
                   on Critical Infrastructure Protection highlighted cyber attacks as specific
                   points of vulnerability, stating that “the widespread and increasing use of
                   SCADA systems for control of energy systems provides increasing ability
                   to cause serious damage and disruption by cyber means.”

                   In my testimony today I will discuss the (1) significant cybersecurity risks
                   associated with control systems; (2) potential and reported cyber attacks
                   against these systems; (3) key challenges to securing control systems; and
                   (4) steps that can be taken to strengthen the security of control systems,
                   including current federal and private-sector initiatives.

                   In preparing for this testimony, we conducted a literature search and
                   analyzed research studies and reports about the vulnerabilities of control
                   systems. We met with private-sector and federal officials with expertise in
                   control systems and their security. Finally, we relied on prior GAO reports
                   and testimonies on critical infrastructure protection, information security,
                   and national preparedness, among others. Our work was performed from
                   July to September 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government
                   auditing standards.


                   For several years, security risks have been reported in control systems,
Results in Brief   upon which many of the nation’s critical infrastructures rely to monitor
                   and control sensitive processes and physical functions. In addition to
                   general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing, several factors
                   have contributed to the escalation of risks specific to control systems,
                   including the (1) adoption of standardized technologies with known
                   vulnerabilities, (2) connectivity of control systems to other networks,
                   (3) constraints on the use of existing security technologies and practices,
                   (4) insecure remote connections, and (5) widespread availability of
                   technical information about control systems.




                   Page 1                                                          GAO-04-140T
                              Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks. These attacks
                              could have devastating consequences, such as endangering public health
                              and safety; damaging the environment; or causing a loss of production,
                              generation, or distribution of public utilities. Control systems have already
                              been subject to a number of cyber attacks, including attacks on a sewage
                              treatment system in Australia in 2000 and, more recently, on a nuclear
                              power plant in Ohio.

                              Several challenges must be addressed in order to effectively secure control
                              systems. These include: the limitations of current security technologies in
                              securing control systems, the perception that securing control systems
                              may not be economically justifiable, and conflicting priorities within
                              organizations regarding the security of control systems.

                              Several steps can be considered when addressing potential threats to
                              control systems, including (1) researching and developing new security
                              technologies to protect control systems; (2) developing security policies,
                              guidance, and standards for control systems; (3) increasing security
                              awareness and sharing information about implementing more secure
                              architectures and existing security technologies, for example, by
                              segmenting process control networks with robust firewalls and strong
                              authentication; (4) implementing effective security management programs
                              that include consideration of control system security; and (5) developing
                              and testing continuity plans within organizations and industries, to ensure
                              safe and continued operation in the event of an interruption, such as a
                              power outage or cyber attack on control systems. Government and private
                              industry have initiated several efforts intended to improve the security of
                              control systems. These initiatives include efforts to promote research and
                              development activities, form information sharing and analysis centers, and
                              develop new standards. In addition, we have made several
                              recommendations for improving the federal government’s critical
                              infrastructure protection efforts, which include control systems.



Background 

Cyberspace Introduces         Dramatic increases in computer interconnectivity, especially in the use of
Risks for Control Systems 	   the Internet, continue to revolutionize the way our government, our
                              nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. The
                              benefits have been enormous. Vast amounts of information are now
                              literally at our fingertips, facilitating research on virtually every topic
                              imaginable; financial and other business transactions can be executed
                              almost instantaneously, often 24 hours a day; and electronic mail, Internet

                              Page 2                                                           GAO-04-140T
Web sites, and computer bulletin boards allow us to communicate quickly
and easily with a virtually unlimited number of individuals and groups.

However, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to the
government’s and our nation’s computer systems and, more important, to
the critical operations and infrastructures they support. For example,
telecommunications, power distribution, water supply, public health
services, national defense (including the military’s warfighting capability),
law enforcement, government services, and emergency services all depend
on the security of their computer operations. The speed and accessibility
that create the enormous benefits of the computer age, if not properly
controlled, may allow individuals and organizations to inexpensively
eavesdrop on or interfere with these operations from remote locations for
mischievous or malicious purposes, including fraud or sabotage. Table 1
summarizes the key threats to our nation’s infrastructures, as observed by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).




Page 3                                                           GAO-04-140T
Table 1: Threats to Critical Infrastructure Observed by the FBI

    Threat                                     Description
    Criminal groups                            There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by criminal
                                               groups who attack systems for purposes of monetary
                                               gain.
    Foreign intelligence services 	 Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of
                                    their information gathering and espionage activities.
    Hackers 	                                  Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of the
                                               challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community.
                                               While remote cracking once required a fair amount of skill
                                               or computer knowledge, hackers can now download
                                               attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and launch
                                               them against victim sites. Thus, while attack tools have
                                               become more sophisticated, they have also become
                                               easier to use.
    Hacktivists 	                              Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on
                                               publicly accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. These
                                               groups and individuals overload e-mail servers and hack
                                               into Web sites to send a political message.
    Information warfare 	                      Several nations are aggressively working to develop
                                               information warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities.
                                               Such capabilities enable a single entity to have a
                                               significant and serious impact by disrupting the supply,
                                               communications, and economic infrastructures that
                                               support military power—impacts that, according to the
                                               Director of Central Intelligence,a can affect the daily lives
                                               of Americans across the country.
    Insider threat 	                           The disgruntled organization insider is a principal source
                                               of computer crimes. Insiders may not need a great deal of
                                               knowledge about computer intrusions because their
                                               knowledge of a victim system often allows them to gain
                                               unrestricted access to cause damage to the system or to
                                               steal system data. The insider threat also includes
                                               outsourcing vendors.
    Virus writers 	                            Virus writers are posing an increasingly serious threat.
                                               Several destructive computer viruses and “worms” have
                                               harmed files and hard drives, including the Melissa Macro
                                               Virus, the Explore.Zip worm, the CIH (Chernobyl) Virus,
                                               Nimda, and Code Red.
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation unless otherwise indicated
a
Prepared Statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2000.


Government officials remain concerned about attacks from individuals
and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, foreign
intelligence gathering, and acts of war. According to the FBI, terrorists,
transnational criminals, and intelligence services are quickly becoming
aware of and using information exploitation tools such as computer


Page 4                                                                                        GAO-04-140T
viruses, Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs, and eavesdropping sniffers
that can destroy, intercept, degrade the integrity of, or deny access to
data.1 In addition, the disgruntled organization insider is a significant
threat, since these individuals often have knowledge that allows them to
gain unrestricted access and inflict damage or steal assets without
possessing a great deal of knowledge about computer intrusions. As
greater amounts of money and more sensitive economic and commercial
information are exchanged electronically, and as the nation’s defense and
intelligence communities increasingly rely on standardized information
technology (IT), the likelihood increases that information attacks will
threaten vital national interests.

As the number of individuals with computer skills has increased, more
intrusion or “hacking” tools have become readily available and relatively
easy to use. A hacker can literally download tools from the Internet and
“point and click” to start an attack. Experts agree that there has been a
steady advance in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack
technology. Intruders quickly develop attacks to exploit vulnerabilities
discovered in products, use these attacks to compromise computers, and
share them with other attackers. In addition, they can combine these
attacks with other forms of technology to develop programs that
automatically scan the network for vulnerable systems, attack them,
compromise them, and use them to spread the attack even further.

Between 1995 and the first half of 2003, the CERT Coordination Center2
(CERT/CC) reported 11,155 security vulnerabilities that resulted from
software flaws. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic growth in security


1
 Virus: a program that “infects” computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting a
copy of itself into the file. These copies are usually executed when the “infected” file is
loaded into memory, allowing the virus to infect other files. Unlike the computer worm, a
virus requires human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate. Trojan horse: a
computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan horse usually masquerades as a
useful program that a user would wish to execute. Worm: an independent computer
program that reproduces by copying itself from one system to another across a network.
Unlike computer viruses, worms do not require human involvement to propagate. Logic
bomb: in programming, a form of sabotage in which a programmer inserts code that causes
the program to perform a destructive action when some triggering event occurs, such as
termination of the programmer’s employment. Sniffer: synonymous with packet sniffer. A
program that intercepts routed data and examines each packet in search of specified
information, such as passwords transmitted in clear text.
2
 The CERT/CC is a center of Internet security expertise at the Software Engineering
Institute, a federally funded research and development center operated by Carnegie-Mellon
University.



Page 5                                                                        GAO-04-140T
vulnerabilities over these years. The growing number of known
vulnerabilities increases the number of potential attacks created by the
hacker community. Attacks can be launched against specific targets or
widely distributed through viruses and worms.

Figure 1: Security Vulnerabilities, 1995—first half of 2003




Along with these increasing threats, the number of computer security
incidents reported to the CERT/CC has also risen dramatically—from
9,859 in 1999 to 82,094 in 2002 and 76,404 for just the first half of 2003. And
these are only the reported attacks. The Director of CERT Centers stated
that he estimates that as much as 80 percent of actual security incidents
goes unreported, in most cases because (1) the organization was unable to
recognize that its systems had been penetrated or there were no
indications of penetration or attack or (2) the organization was reluctant
to report. Figure 2 shows the number of incidents that were reported to
the CERT/CC from 1995 through the first half of 2003.




Page 6                                                            GAO-04-140T
Figure 2: Information Security Incidents, 1995—first half of 2003




According to the National Security Agency, foreign governments already
have or are developing computer attack capabilities, and potential
adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U.S. systems and
about methods to attack these systems. The National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC) reported in January 2002 that a computer
belonging to an individual with indirect links to Osama bin Laden
contained computer programs that suggested that the individual was
interested in structural engineering as it related to dams and other water-
retaining structures. The NIPC report also stated that U.S. law
enforcement and intelligence agencies had received indications that Al
Qaeda members had sought information about control systems from
multiple Web sites, specifically on water supply and wastewater
management practices in the United States and abroad.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, warnings of the potential
for terrorist cyber attacks against our critical infrastructures have also
increased. For example, in his February 2002 statement for the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, the director of central intelligence
discussed the possibility of cyber warfare attack by terrorists.3 He stated
that the September 11 attacks demonstrated the nation’s dependence on



3
Testimony of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 6, 2002.



Page 7                                                                       GAO-04-140T
                            critical infrastructure systems that rely on electronic and computer
                            networks. Further, he noted that attacks of this nature would become an
                            increasingly viable option for terrorists as they and other foreign
                            adversaries become more familiar with these targets and the technologies
                            required to attack them.


What are control systems?   Control systems are computer-based systems that are used by many
                            infrastructures and industries to monitor and control sensitive processes
                            and physical functions. Typically, control systems collect sensor
                            measurements and operational data from the field, process and display
                            this information, and relay control commands to local or remote
                            equipment. In the electric power industry they can manage and control the
                            transmission and delivery of electric power, for example, by opening and
                            closing circuit breakers and setting thresholds for preventive shutdowns.
                            Employing integrated control systems, the oil and gas industry can control
                            the refining operations on a plant site as well as remotely monitor the
                            pressure and flow of gas pipelines and control the flow and pathways of
                            gas transmission. In water utilities, they can remotely monitor well levels
                            and control the wells’ pumps; monitor flows, tank levels, or pressure in
                            storage tanks; monitor water quality characteristics, such as pH, turbidity,
                            and chlorine residual; and control the addition of chemicals. Control
                            system functions vary from simple to complex; they can be used to simply
                            monitor processes—for example, the environmental conditions in a small
                            office building—or manage most activities in a municipal water system or
                            even a nuclear power plant.

                            In certain industries such as chemical and power generation, safety
                            systems are typically implemented to mitigate a disastrous event if control
                            and other systems fail. In addition, to guard against both physical attack
                            and system failure, organizations may establish back-up control centers
                            that include uninterruptible power supplies and backup generators.

                            There are two primary types of control systems. Distributed Control
                            Systems (DCS) typically are used within a single processing or generating
                            plant or over a small geographic area. Supervisory Control and Data
                            Acquisition (SCADA) systems typically are used for large, geographically
                            dispersed distribution operations. A utility company may use a DCS to
                            generate power and a SCADA system to distribute it.

                            Figure 3 illustrates the typical components of a control system.




                            Page 8                                                             GAO-04-140T
Figure 3: Typical Components of a Control System




                                       A control system typically consists of a “master” or central supervisory
                                       control and monitoring station consisting of one or more human-machine
                                       interfaces where an operator can view status information about the
                                       remote sites and issue commands directly to the system. Typically, this
                                       station is located at a main site along with application servers and an


                                       Page 9                                                       GAO-04-140T
                      engineering workstation that is used to configure and troubleshoot the
                      other control system components. The supervisory control and monitoring
                      station is typically connected to local controller stations through a hard-
                      wired network or to remote controller stations through a communications
                      network—which could be the Internet, a public switched telephone
                      network, or a cable or wireless (e.g. radio, microwave, or Wi-Fi4) network.
                      Each controller station has a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), a
                      Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), DCS controller, or other controller
                      that communicates with the supervisory control and monitoring station.
                      The controller stations also include sensors and control equipment that
                      connect directly with the working components of the infrastructure—for
                      example, pipelines, water towers, and power lines. The sensor takes
                      readings from the infrastructure equipment—such as water or pressure
                      levels, electrical voltage or current—and sends a message to the
                      controller. The controller may be programmed to determine a course of
                      action and send a message to the control equipment instructing it what to
                      do—for example, to turn off a valve or dispense a chemical. If the
                      controller is not programmed to determine a course of action, the
                      controller communicates with the supervisory control and monitoring
                      station before sending a command back to the control equipment. The
                      control system also can be programmed to issue alarms back to the
                      operator when certain conditions are detected. Handheld devices, such as
                      personal digital assistants, can be used to locally monitor controller
                      stations. Experts report that technologies in controller stations are
                      becoming more intelligent and automated and communicate with the
                      supervisory central monitoring and control station less frequently,
                      requiring less human intervention.


                      Historically, security concerns about control systems were related
Control Systems Are   primarily to protecting against physical attack and misuse of refining and
at Increasing Risk    processing sites or distribution and holding facilities. However, more
                      recently, there has been a growing recognition that control systems are
                      now vulnerable to cyber attacks from numerous sources, including hostile
                      governments, terrorist groups, disgruntled employees, and other malicious
                      intruders.




                      4
                       Wi-Fi (short for “wireless” fidelity) is the popular term for a high-frequency wireless local
                      area network.



                      Page 10                                                                         GAO-04-140T
                          In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
                          Protection specifically discussed the potential damaging effects on the
                          electric power and oil and gas industries of successful attacks on control
                          systems.5 Moreover, in 2002, the National Research Council identified “the
                          potential for attack on control systems” as requiring “urgent attention.”6 In
                          February 2003, the President clearly demonstrated concern about “the
                          threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption
                          to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national security,”
                          noting that “disruption of these systems can have significant consequences
                          for public health and safety” and emphasizing that the protection of
                          control systems has become “a national priority.”7

                          Several factors have contributed to the escalation of risk to control
                          systems, including (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with
                          known vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other
                          networks, (3) constraints on the implementation of existing security
                          technologies and practices, (4) insecure remote connections, and (5) the
                          widespread availability of technical information about control systems.


Control Systems Are       Historically, proprietary hardware, software, and network protocols made
Adopting Standardized     it difficult to understand how control systems operated—and therefore
Technologies with Known   how to hack into them. Today, however, to reduce costs and improve
                          performance, organizations have been transitioning from proprietary
Vulnerabilities           systems to less expensive, standardized technologies such as Microsoft’s
                          Windows and Unix-like operating systems and the common networking
                          protocols used by the Internet. These widely used standardized
                          technologies have commonly known vulnerabilities, and sophisticated and
                          effective exploitation tools are widely available and relatively easy to use.
                          As a consequence, both the number of people with the knowledge to wage
                          attacks and the number of systems subject to attack have increased. Also,
                          common communication protocols and the emerging use of Extensible
                          Markup Language (commonly referred to as XML) can make it easier for a



                          5
                           President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
                          Protecting America’s Infrastructures (Washington, D.C.: October 1997).
                          6
                           The National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: the Role of Science and
                          Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
                          7
                           The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.:
                          February 2003).



                          Page 11                                                                     GAO-04-140T
                             hacker to interpret the content of communications among the components
                             of a control system.


Control Systems Are          Enterprises often integrate their control systems with their enterprise
Connected to Other           networks. This increased connectivity has significant advantages,
Networks                     including providing decision makers with access to real-time information
                             and allowing engineers to monitor and control the process control system
                             from different points on the enterprise network. In addition, the enterprise
                             networks are often connected to the networks of strategic partners and to
                             the Internet. Furthermore, control systems are increasingly using wide
                             area networks and the Internet to transmit data to their remote or local
                             stations and individual devices. This convergence of control networks
                             with public and enterprise networks potentially exposes the control
                             systems to additional security vulnerabilities. Unless appropriate security
                             controls are deployed in the enterprise network and the control system
                             network, breaches in enterprise security can affect the operation of
                             control systems.


Use of Existing Security     According to industry experts, the use of existing security technologies, as
Technologies and Practices   well as strong user authentication and patch management practices, are
Is Constrained               generally not implemented in control systems because control systems
                             operate in real time, typically are not designed with cybersecurity in mind,
                             and usually have limited processing capabilities.

                             Existing security technologies such as authorization, authentication,
                             encryption, intrusion detection, and filtering of network traffic and
                             communications require more bandwidth, processing power, and memory
                             than control system components typically have. Because controller
                             stations are generally designed to do specific tasks, they use low-cost,
                             resource-constrained microprocessors. In fact, some devices in the
                             electrical industry still use the Intel 8088 processor, introduced in 1978.
                             Consequently, it is difficult to install existing security technologies without
                             seriously degrading the performance of the control system.

                             Further, complex passwords and other strong password practices are not
                             always used to prevent unauthorized access to control systems, in part
                             because this could hinder a rapid response to safety procedures during an
                             emergency. As a result, according to experts, weak passwords that are
                             easy to guess, shared, and infrequently changed are reportedly common in
                             control systems, including the use of default passwords or even no
                             password at all.

                             Page 12                                                           GAO-04-140T
                             In addition, although modern control systems are based on standard
                             operating systems, they are typically customized to support control system
                             applications. Consequently, vendor-provided software patches are
                             generally either incompatible or cannot be implemented without
                             compromising service by shutting down “always-on” systems or affecting
                             interdependent operations.


Insecure Connections         Potential vulnerabilities in control systems are exacerbated by insecure
Exacerbate Vulnerabilities   connections. Organizations often leave access links—such as dial-up
                             modems to equipment and control information—open for remote
                             diagnostics, maintenance, and examination of system status. Such links
                             may not be protected with authentication or encryption, which increases
                             the risk that hackers could use these insecure connections to break into
                             remotely controlled systems. Also, control systems often use wireless
                             communications systems, which are especially vulnerable to attack, or
                             leased lines that pass through commercial telecommunications facilities.
                             Without encryption to protect data as it flows through these insecure
                             connections or authentication mechanisms to limit access, there is limited
                             protection for the integrity of the information being transmitted.


Information about            Public information about infrastructures and control systems is available
Infrastructures and          to potential hackers and intruders. The availability of this infrastructure
Control Systems Is           and vulnerability data was demonstrated earlier this year by a George
                             Mason University graduate student, whose dissertation reportedly mapped
Publicly Available           every business and industrial sector in the American economy to the fiber-
                             optic network that connects them—using material that was available
                             publicly on the Internet, none of which was classified. Many of the electric
                             utility officials who were interviewed for the National Security
                             Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s Information Assurance Task
                             Force’s Electric Power Risk Assessment expressed concern over the
                             amount of information about their infrastructure that is readily available
                             to the public.

                             In the electric power industry, open sources of information—such as
                             product data and educational videotapes from engineering associations—
                             can be used to understand the basics of the electrical grid. Other publicly
                             available information—including filings of the Federal Energy Regulatory
                             Commission (FERC), industry publications, maps, and material available
                             on the Internet—is sufficient to allow someone to identify the most heavily
                             loaded transmission lines and the most critical substations in the power
                             grid.

                             Page 13                                                         GAO-04-140T
                     In addition, significant information on control systems is publicly
                     available—including design and maintenance documents, technical
                     standards for the interconnection of control systems and RTUs, and
                     standards for communication among control devices—all of which could
                     assist hackers in understanding the systems and how to attack them.
                     Moreover, there are numerous former employees, vendors, support
                     contractors, and other end users of the same equipment worldwide with
                     inside knowledge of the operation of control systems.


                     There is a general consensus—and increasing concern—among
Cyber Threats to 
   government officials and experts on control systems about potential cyber
Control Systems
     threats to the control systems that govern our critical infrastructures. As
                     components of control systems increasingly make critical decisions that
                     were once made by humans, the potential effect of a cyber threat becomes
                     more devastating. Such cyber threats could come from numerous sources,
                     ranging from hostile governments and terrorist groups to disgruntled
                     employees and other malicious intruders. Based on interviews and
                     discussions with representatives throughout the electric power industry,
                     the Information Assurance Task Force of the National Security
                     Telecommunications Advisory Committee concluded that an organization
                     with sufficient resources, such as a foreign intelligence service or a well-
                     supported terrorist group, could conduct a structured attack on the
                     electric power grid electronically, with a high degree of anonymity and
                     without having to set foot in the target nation.

                     In July 2002, NIPC reported that the potential for compound cyber and
                     physical attacks, referred to as “swarming attacks,” is an emerging threat
                     to the U.S. critical infrastructure. As NIPC reports, the effects of a
                     swarming attack include slowing or complicating the response to a
                     physical attack. For instance, a cyber attack that disabled the water supply
                     or the electrical system in conjunction with a physical attack could deny
                     emergency services the necessary resources to manage the
                     consequences—such as controlling fires, coordinating actions, and
                     generating light.

                     According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cyber
                     attacks on energy production and distribution systems—including electric,
                     oil, gas, and water treatment, as well as on chemical plants containing
                     potentially hazardous substances—could endanger public health and
                     safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial implications,
                     such as loss of production, generation, or distribution of public utilities;
                     compromise of proprietary information; or liability issues. When backups

                     Page 14                                                         GAO-04-140T
                         for damaged components are not readily available (e.g., extra-high-voltage
                         transformers for the electric power grid), such damage could have a long-
                         lasting effect.

                         Although experts in control systems report that they have substantiated
                         reports of numerous incidents affecting control systems, there is no
                         formalized process to collect and analyze information about control
                         systems incidents. CERT/CC and KEMA, Inc. have proposed establishing a
                         center that will proactively interact with industry to collect information
                         about potential cyber incidents, analyze them, assess their potential
                         impact, and make the results available to industry. I will now discuss
                         potential and reported cyber attacks on control systems.


Control Systems Can Be   Entities or individuals with malicious intent might take one or more of the
Vulnerable to Cyber      following actions to successfully attack control systems:
Attacks
                         •	   disrupt the operation of control systems by delaying or blocking the
                              flow of information through control networks, thereby denying
                              availability of the networks to control system operators;

                         •	   make unauthorized changes to programmed instructions in PLCs,
                              RTUs, or DCS controllers, change alarm thresholds, or issue
                              unauthorized commands to control equipment, which could potentially
                              result in damage to equipment (if tolerances are exceeded), premature
                              shutdown of processes (such as prematurely shutting down
                              transmission lines), or even disabling of control equipment;

                         •	   send false information to control system operators either to disguise
                              unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions by system
                              operators;

                         •	   modify the control system software, producing unpredictable results;
                              and

                         •    interfere with the operation of safety systems.

                         In addition, in control systems that cover a wide geographic area, the
                         remote sites are often unstaffed and may not be physically monitored. If
                         such remote systems are physically breached, the attackers could
                         establish a cyber connection to the control network.




                         Page 15                                                          GAO-04-140T
                           Department of Energy and industry researchers have speculated on how
                           the following potential attack scenario could affect control systems in the
                           electricity sector. Using war dialers8 to find modem phone lines that
                           connect to the programmable circuit breakers of the electric power
                           control system, hackers could crack passwords that control access to the
                           circuit breakers and could change the control settings to cause local
                           power outages and even damage equipment. A hacker could lower settings
                           from, for example, 500 amperes9 to 200 on some circuit breakers; normal
                           power usage would activate, or “trip,” the circuit breakers, taking those
                           lines out of service and diverting power to neighboring lines. If, at the
                           same time, the hacker raised the settings on these neighboring lines to 900
                           amperes, circuit breakers would fail to trip at these high settings and the
                           diverted power would overload the lines and cause significant damage to
                           transformers and other critical equipment. The damaged equipment would
                           require major repairs that could result in lengthy outages.

                           Additionally, control system researchers at the Department of Energy’s
                           national laboratories have developed systems that demonstrate the
                           feasibility of a cyber attack on a control system at an electric power
                           substation, where high-voltage electricity is transformed for local use.
                           Using tools that are readily available on the Internet, they are able to
                           modify output data from field sensors and take control of the PLC directly
                           in order to change settings and create new output. These techniques could
                           enable a hacker to cause an outage, thus incapacitating the substation.

                           The consequences of these threats could be lessened by the successful
                           operation of any safety systems, which I discussed earlier in my testimony.


Cyber Attacks to Control   There have been a number of reported exploits of control systems,
Systems Have Been          including the following:
Reported
                           •	   In 1998, during the two-week military exercise known as Eligible
                                Receiver, staff from the National Security Agency used widely available
                                tools to simulate how sections of the U.S. electric power grid’s control
                                network could be disabled through cyber attack.



                           8
                           War dialers are simple PC programs that dial consecutive phone numbers looking for
                           modems.
                           9
                           An ampere is a unit of measurement for electric current.



                           Page 16                                                                  GAO-04-140T
                          •	   In the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian company that
                               develops manufacturing software applied for a job with the local
                               government, but was rejected. The disgruntled former employee
                               reportedly used a radio transmitter on numerous occasions to remotely
                               hack into the controls of a sewage treatment system and ultimately
                               release about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and
                               parks.

                          •	   In August 2003, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in
                               January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm—otherwise known as
                               Slammer—infected a private computer network at the Davis-Besse
                               nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring
                               system for nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant’s process computer
                               failed, and it took about 6 hours for it to become available again.
                               Slammer reportedly also affected communications on the control
                               networks of other electricity sector organizations by propagating so
                               quickly that control system traffic was blocked.

                          Media reports have also indicated that the Blaster worm, which broke out
                          three days before the August blackout, might have exacerbated the
                          problems that contributed to the cascading effect of the blackout by
                          blocking communications on computers that are used to monitor the
                          power grid. FirstEnergy Corp., the Ohio utility that is the chief focus of the
                          blackout investigation, is reportedly exploring whether Blaster might have
                          caused the computer trouble that was described on telephone transcripts
                          as hampering its response to multiple line failures.


                          Several challenges must be addressed to effectively secure control
Securing Control          systems against cyber threats. These challenges include: (1) the limitations
Systems Poses             of current security technologies in securing control systems; (2) the
                          perception that securing control systems may not be economically
Significant Challenges    justifiable; and (3) the conflicting priorities within organizations regarding
                          the security of control systems.

Current Cybersecurity     A significant challenge in effectively securing control systems is the lack
Technologies Have         of specialized security technologies for these systems. As I previously
Limitations in Securing   mentioned, the computing resources in control systems that are needed to
                          perform security functions tend to be quite limited, making it very difficult
Control Systems           to use security technologies within control system networks without
                          severely hindering performance.




                          Page 17                                                           GAO-04-140T
                            Although technologies such as robust firewalls and strong authentication
                            can be employed to better segment control systems from enterprise
                            networks, research and development could help address the application of
                            security technologies to the control systems themselves. Information
                            security organizations have noted that a gap exists between current
                            security technologies and the need for additional research and
                            development to secure control systems.

                            Research and development in a wide range of areas could lead to more
                            effective technologies to secure control systems. Areas that have been
                            noted for possible research and development include identifying the types
                            of security technologies needed for different control system applications,
                            determining acceptable performance trade-offs, and recognizing attack
                            patterns for intrusion-detection systems.


Securing Control Systems    Experts and industry representatives have indicated that organizations
May Not Be Perceived as     may be reluctant to spend more money to secure control systems.
Economically Justifiable    Hardening the security of control systems would require industries to
                            expend more resources, including acquiring more personnel, providing
                            training for personnel, and potentially prematurely replacing current
                            systems that typically have a lifespan of about 20 years.

                            Several vendors suggested that since there has been no confirmed serious
                            cyber attack on U.S. control systems, industry representatives believe the
                            threat of such an attack is low. Until industry users of control systems
                            have a business case to justify why additional security is needed, there
                            may be little market incentive for vendors to fund research to develop
                            more secure control systems.


Organizational Priorities   Finally, several experts and industry representatives indicated that the
Conflict                    responsibility for securing control systems typically includes two separate
                            groups: IT security personnel and control system engineers and operators.
                            IT security personnel tend to focus on securing enterprise systems, while
                            control system engineers and operators tend to be more concerned with
                            the reliable performance of their control systems. Further, they indicate
                            that, as a result, those two groups do not always fully understand each
                            other’s requirements and collaborate to implement secure control systems.

                            These conflicting priorities may perpetuate a lack of awareness of IT
                            security strategies that could be deployed to mitigate the vulnerabilities of
                            control systems without affecting their performance. Although research

                            Page 18                                                          GAO-04-140T
                        and development will be necessary to develop technologies to secure
                        individual control system devices, IT security technologies are currently
                        available that could be implemented as part of a secure enterprise
                        architecture to protect the perimeter of, and access to, control system
                        networks. These technologies include firewalls, intrusion-detection
                        systems, encryption, authentication, and authorization.

                        Officials from one company indicated that, to reduce its control system
                        vulnerabilities, it formed a team composed of IT staff, process control
                        engineers, and manufacturing employees. This team worked
                        collaboratively to research vulnerabilities and test fixes and workarounds.


                        Several steps can be considered when addressing potential threats to
Steps Can Be Taken      control systems, including:
to Strengthen Control
                        •	   Researching and developing new security technologies to protect
System Security              control systems.

                        •	   Developing security policies, guidance, and standards for control
                             system security. For example, the use of consensus standards could be
                             considered to encourage industry to invest in stronger security for
                             control systems.

                        •	   Increasing security awareness and sharing information about
                             implementing more secure architectures and existing security
                             technologies. For example, a more secure architecture might be
                             attained by segmenting control networks with robust firewalls and
                             strong authentication. Also, organizations may benefit from educating
                             management about the cybersecurity risks related to control systems
                             and sharing successful practices related to working across
                             organizational boundaries.

                        •	   Implementing effective security management programs that include
                             consideration of control system security. We have previously reported
                             on the security management practices of leading organizations.10 Such
                             programs typically consider risk assessment, development of
                             appropriate policies and procedures, employee awareness, and regular
                             security monitoring.



                        10
                         U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security Management: Learning from
                        Leading Organizations, GAO/AIMD-98-68 (Washington, D.C.: May 1998).


                        Page 19                                                               GAO-04-140T
•	   Developing and testing continuity plans within organizations and
     industries, to ensure safe and continued operation in the event of an
     interruption, such as a power outage or cyber attack on control
     systems. Elements of continuity planning typically include
     (1) assessing the criticality of operations and identifying supporting
     resources, (2) taking steps to prevent and minimize potential damage
     and interruption, (3) developing and documenting a comprehensive
     continuity plan, and (4) periodically testing the continuity plan and
     making appropriate adjustments.11 Such plans are particularly
     important for control systems, where personnel may have lost
     familiarity with how to operate systems and processes without the use
     of control systems.

In addition, earlier this year we reviewed the federal government’s critical
infrastructure protection efforts related to selected industry sectors,
including electricity and oil and gas.12 We recommended that the federal
government assess the need for grants, tax incentives, regulation, or other
public policy tools to encourage increased critical infrastructure
protection activities by the private sector and greater sharing of
intelligence and incident information among these industry sectors and the
federal government. In addition, we have made other recommendations
related to critical infrastructure protection, including: developing a
comprehensive and coordinated plan for national critical infrastructure
protection; improving information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities
between the private sector and the federal government, as well as within
the government itself; and improving analysis and warning capabilities for
both cyber and physical threats.13 Although improvements have been
made, further efforts are needed to address these challenges in
implementing critical infrastructure protection.




11
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual,
GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
12
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for
Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors, GAO-03-233 (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2003)
and U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Efforts of the
Financial Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats, GAO-03-173 (Washington, D.C.:
January 30, 2003).
13
 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Information Sharing
Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington,
D.C.: September 17, 2003).



Page 20                                                                   GAO-04-140T
Government and private industry have taken a broad look at the
cybersecurity requirements of control systems and have initiated several
efforts to address the technical, economic, and cultural challenges that
must be addressed. These cybersecurity initiatives include efforts to
promote research and development activities; develop process control
security policies, guidance, and standards; and encourage security
awareness and information sharing. For example, several of the
Department of Energy’s national laboratories have established or plan to
establish test beds for control systems, the government and private sector
are collaborating on efforts to develop industry standards, and
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers such as the Chemical Sector
Cybersecurity Program (for the chemical sector) and the North American
Electric Reliability Council (for the electricity sector) have been
developed to coordinate communication between industries and the
federal government. Attachment I describes selected current and planned
initiatives in greater detail.


In summary, it is clear that the systems that monitor and control the
sensitive processes and physical functions of the nation’s infrastructures
are at increasing risk to threats of cyber attacks. Securing these systems
poses significant challenges. Both government and industry can help to
address these challenges by lending support to ongoing initiatives as well
as taking additional steps to overcome barriers that hinder better security.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time. Should you have any further questions about this testimony,
please contact me at (202) 512-3317 or at daceyr@gao.gov.

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Shannin
Addison, Joanne Fiorino, Alison Jacobs, Elizabeth Johnston, Steven Law,
David Noone, and Tracy Pierson.




Page 21                                                         GAO-04-140T
Appendix I: Selected Initiatives to Improve
Control System Security

                                            Research and development of new technologies is being performed to
Initiatives to Research                     provide additional security options to protect control systems. Several
and Develop Security                        federally funded entities have ongoing efforts to research, develop, and
                                            test new technologies.
Technologies for
Control Systems
Entity                                       Initiative
Sandia National Laboratories	                At Sandia’s SCADA Security Development Laboratory, industry can test and improve the
                                             security of its SCADA architectures, systems, and components.
                                             Sandia also has initiatives under way to advance technologies that strengthen control
                                             systems through the use of intrusion detection, encryption/authentication, secure
                                             protocols, system and component vulnerability analysis, secure architecture design and
                                             analysis, and intelligent self-healing infrastructure technology.
Idaho National Engineering and               Plans are under way to establish the National SCADA Test Bed, which is expected to
Environmental Laboratory, Sandia National    become a full-scale infrastructure testing facility that will allow for large-scale testing of
Laboratories, National Energy Technology     SCADA systems before actual exposure to production networks and for testing of new
Laboratory, and other entities               standards and protocols before rolling them out.
Los Alamos National Laboratory and           Los Alamos and Sandia have established a critical infrastructure modeling, simulation,
Sandia National Laboratories                 and analysis center known as the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center.
                                             The center provides modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of critical
                                             infrastructures, including the electricity, oil, and gas sectors.
National Science Foundation 	                The National Science Foundation is considering pursuing cybersecurity research and
                                             development options related to the security of control systems.




                                            Page 22                                                                           GAO-04-140T
                                             Several efforts to develop policies, guidance, and standards to assist in
Initiatives to Develop                       securing control systems are in progress. There are coordinated efforts
Process Control                              between government and industry to identify threats, assess infrastructure
                                             vulnerabilities, and develop guidelines and standards for mitigating risks
Security Policies,                           through protective measures. Actions that have been taken so far or are
Guidance, and                                under way include the following.
Standards
Entity                                        Initiative
The President’s Critical Infrastructure       In February 2003, the board released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. The
Protection Board 	                            document provides a general strategic picture, specific recommendations and policies,
                                              and the rationale for these initiatives. The strategy ranks control network security as a
                                              national priority and designates the Department of Homeland Security to be responsible
                                              for developing best practices and new technologies to increase control system security.
Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation      The Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society is composed of users, vendors,
Society                                       government, and academic participants representing the electric utilities, water,
                                              chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas, food and beverage, and pharmaceutical industries.
                                              It has been working on a proposed standard since October 2002. The new standard
                                              addresses the security of manufacturing and control systems. It is to provide users with
                                              the tools necessary to integrate a comprehensive security process. Two technical
                                              reports are planned for release in October 2003. One report, ISA-TR99.00.01, Security
                                              Technologies for Manufacturing and Control Systems, will describe electronic security
                                              technologies and discuss specific types of applications within each category, the
                                              vulnerabilities addressed by each type, suggestions for deployment, and known
                                              strengths and weaknesses. The other report, ISA-TR99.00.02, Integrating Electronic
                                              Security into the Manufacturing and Control Systems Environment, will provide a
                                              framework for developing an electronic security program for manufacturing and control
                                              systems, as well as a recommended organization and structure for the security plan.
Gas Technology Institute and Technical        Sponsored by the federal government’s Technical Support Working Group, the Gas
Support Working Group 	                       Technology Institute has researched a number of potential encryption methods to
                                              prevent hackers from accessing natural gas company control systems. This research
                                              has led to the development of an industry standard for encryption. The standard would
                                              incorporate encryption algorithms to be added to both new and existing control systems
                                              to control a wide variety of operations. This standard is outlined in the American Gas
                                              Association’s report, numbered 12-1.
National Institute of Standards and           The National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Security Agency
Technology and National Security Agency       have organized the Process Controls Security Requirements Forum to establish security
                                              specifications that can be used in procurement, development, and retrofit of industrial
                                              control systems. They have also developed a set of security standards and certification
                                              processes.
North American Energy Reliability Council	    The North American Energy Reliability Council has established a cybersecurity standard
                                              for the electricity industry. The council requires members of the electricity industry to
                                              self-certify that they are meeting the cyber-security standards. However, as currently
                                              written, the standard does not apply to control systems.
Electric Power Research Institute 	           The Electric Power Research Institute has developed the Utility Communications
                                              Architecture, a set of standardized guidelines that provides interconnectivity and
                                              interoperability for utility data communication systems for real-time information
                                              exchange.




                                             Page 23                                                                     GAO-04-140T
                                           Many efforts are under way to spread awareness about cyber threats and
Initiatives to                             control system vulnerabilities and to take proactive measures to
Encourage Security                         strengthen the security of control systems. The Federal Energy Regulatory
                                           Commission, the Department of Homeland Security and other federal
Awareness and Share                        agencies and organizations are involved in these efforts.
Information
Entity                                      Initiative
Department of Homeland Security 	           The Department of Homeland Security created a National Cyber Security Division to
                                            identify, analyze, and reduce cyber threats and vulnerabilities, disseminate threat warning
                                            information, coordinate incident response, and provide technical assistance in continuity
                                            of operations and recovery planning. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office within
                                            the Department coordinates the federal government’s initiatives on critical infrastructure
                                            assurance and promotes national outreach and awareness campaigns about critical
                                            infrastructure protection.
Sandia National Laboratories, the           Sandia National Laboratories has collaborated with the Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental Protection Agency, and        and industry groups to develop a risk assessment methodology for assessing the
industry groups 	                           vulnerability of water systems in major U.S. cities. Sandia has also conducted
                                            vulnerability assessments of control systems within the electric power, oil and gas,
                                            transportation, and manufacturing industries. Sandia is involved with various activities to
                                            address the security of our critical infrastructures, including developing best practices,
                                            providing security training, demonstrating threat scenarios, and furthering standards
                                            efforts.
North American Energy Reliability Council	 Designated by the Department of Energy as the electricity sector’s Information Sharing
                                           and Analysis Center coordinator for critical infrastructure protection, the North American
                                           Energy Reliability Council facilitates communication between the electricity sector, the
                                           federal government, and other critical infrastructure sectors. The council has formed the
                                           Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group, which guides cybersecurity activities
                                           and conducts security workshops to raise awareness of cyber and physical security in the
                                           electricity sector. The council also formed a Process Controls subcommittee within the
                                           Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group to specifically address control systems.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	       The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates interstate commerce in oil, natural
                                            gas, and electricity. The commission has published a rule to promote the capturing of
                                            critical energy infrastructure information, which may lead to increased information sharing
                                            between industry and the federal government.
Process Control Systems Cyber Security      The Process Control Systems Cyber Security Forum is a joint effort between Kema
Forum 	                                     Consulting and LogOn Consulting, Inc. The forum studies the cybersecurity issues
                                            surrounding the effective operation of control systems and focuses on issues, challenges,
                                            threats, vulnerabilities, best practices/lessons learned, solutions, and related topical areas
                                            for control systems. It currently holds workshops on control system cybersecurity.
Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Program 	     The Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Program is a forum of 13 trade associations and
                                            serves as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the chemical sector. The
                                            Chemical Industry Data Exchange is part of the Chemical Sector Cybersecurity Program
                                            and is working to establish a common security vulnerability assessment methodology and
                                            to align the chemical industry with the ongoing initiatives at the Instrumentation Systems
                                            and Automation Society, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
                                            American Chemistry Council.




                                           Page 24                                                                         GAO-04-140T
 Entity                                    Initiative
 The President’s Critical Infrastructure   The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and the Department of Energy
 Protection Board and Department of        developed 21 Steps to Improve the Cyber Security of SCADA Networks. These steps
 Energy                                    provide guidance for improving implementation and establishing underlying management
                                           processes and policies to help organizations improve the security of their control
                                           networks.
 Joint Program Office for Special          The Joint Program Office has performed vulnerability assessments on control systems,
 Technology Countermeasures                including the areas of awareness, integration, physical testing, analytic testing, and
                                           analysis.




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                                           Page 25                                                                   GAO-04-140T
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