oversight

Export Controls: Proposed Reforms Create Opportunities to Address Enforcement Challenges

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2012-03-27.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

             United States Government Accountability Office

GAO          Report to Congressional Committees




March 2012
             EXPORT CONTROLS

             Proposed Reforms
             Create Opportunities
             to Address
             Enforcement
             Challenges




GAO-12-246
                                            March 2012

                                            EXPORT CONTROLS
                                            Proposed Reforms Create Opportunities to Address
                                            Enforcement Challenges
Highlights of GAO-12-246, a report to
congressional committees




Why GAO Did This Study                      What GAO Found
The U.S. government controls the            Agencies use a risk-based approach, including workload and threat assessment data,
export of sensitive defense and dual-       to allocate resources, but most do not fully track those used for export control
use items (having both military and         enforcement activities. As their missions are broader than export controls, agencies
commercial use). The five agencies          can use staff resources for other activities based on need, making tracking resources
primarily responsible for export control    used solely for export control enforcement difficult. Only Commerce’s Office of Export
enforcement—the Departments of              Enforcement allocates its resources exclusively to export control enforcement as that
Commerce, Homeland Security (DHS),          is its primary mission. Other agencies, such as State and the Treasury, have
Justice, State and the Treasury—            relatively few export control enforcement staff to track. While several agencies
conduct inspections and investigations,     acknowledge the need to better track export enforcement resources and have taken
and can levy punitive actions against       steps to do so, they do not know the full extent of their use of these resources and do
violators. A challenging aspect of          not use this information in resource allocation decisions. In some cities, agencies are
export control enforcement is the           informally leveraging export enforcement resources through voluntarily created local
detection of illicit transshipments—the     task forces that bring together enforcement resources to work collectively on export
transfer of items from place of origin      control cases.
through an intermediary country to an
unauthorized destination, such as Iran.     Enforcement agencies face several challenges in investigating illicit transshipments,
In 2010, the President announced            both domestically and overseas, which potentially reduce the effectiveness of
reforms to the U.S. export control          enforcement activities and limit the identification and investigation of illicit
system to address weaknesses found          transshipments. These include:
by GAO and others. GAO was asked
to address how the export control           •   License Determination Delays. License determinations—which confirm whether
enforcement agencies allocate                   an item is controlled and requires a license, and thereby help confirm whether an
resources, as well as the challenges            export control violation has occurred—are often not timely, potentially hindering
they face and the potential impact of           investigations and prosecutions.
export control reform on enforcement        •   Limited Secure Communications and Cleared Staff. Investigators have limited
activities. GAO reviewed documents              access to secure communications and staff with high-level security clearances in
and met with enforcement agency                 several domestic field offices, limiting investigators’ ability to share timely and
officials as well as with U.S. and              important information.
foreign government and company              •   Lack of Trend Data on Illicit Transshipments. While there is a good exchange of
officials in Hong Kong, Singapore, and          intelligence between enforcement agencies and the intelligence community—to
the United Arab Emirates, which have            seize shipments and take other actions against export control violators—officials
a high volume of trade and have been            noted that no formal process or means existed for these groups to collectively
identified as potential hubs for illicit        quantify and identify statistical trends and patterns relating to information on illicit
transshipments.                                 transshipments.
                                            •   Lack of Effectiveness Measures Unique to the Complexity of Export Controls.
What GAO Recommends                             Investigative agencies lack measures of effectiveness that fully reflect the
GAO recommends that Commerce,                   complexity and qualitative benefits of export control cases.
DHS, Justice, and State take steps
individually and with other agencies        Some of these challenges may be addressed by ongoing export control reform
through the national Export                 initiatives, but reform presents both opportunities and challenges. Revising the
Enforcement Coordination Center to          control list could simplify the license determination process, but could also result in
better manage export control                the need for increased enforcement activity overseas to validate the recipient of the
enforcement resources and improve           items as fewer items may require U.S. government approval in advance of shipment.
the license determination process.          As most staff located overseas have other agency and mission-related priorities, their
Agencies agreed with GAO’s                  availability may be limited. The newly created national Export Enforcement
recommendations.                            Coordination Center is intended to help agencies coordinate their export control
                                            enforcement efforts as well as share intelligence and law enforcement information
View GAO-12-246. For more information,      related to these efforts. However, it is unclear whether the center will address all of
contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or   the challenges GAO found, as detailed plans for its operations are under
martinb@gao.gov.                            development.

                                                                                        United States Government Accountability Office
Contents


Letter                                                                                   1
               Background                                                                3
               Agencies Use a Risk-Based Approach to Allocate Resources but Do
                 Not Fully Track Those Used For Export Control Enforcement               8
               Reform Initiatives May Help Address Challenges In Investigating
                 Illicit Transshipments But Detailed Plans Are Unknown                 17
               Conclusions                                                             30
               Recommendations for Executive Action                                    31
               Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                      31

Appendix I     Scope and Methodology                                                   34



Appendix II    Comments from the Department of Commerce                                36



Appendix III   Comments from the Department of Homeland Security                       37



Appendix IV    Comments from the Department of State                                   41



Appendix V     GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments                                   43



Tables
               Table 1: Export Control Enforcement Activities, by Departments
                        and Agency                                                       5
               Table 2: Key Investigative Tools for Investigative Export Control
                        Enforcement Activities                                           7
               Table 3: Primary Missions of the Agencies with Export Control
                        Enforcement Responsibility                                       9
               Table 4: Enforcement Agency Total Staff and Staff Allocated for
                        Domestic Export Control Enforcement, Fiscal Year 2010          10
               Table 5: Average License Determination Response Times (in Days)         19
               Table 6: ICE Number of Arrests, Indictments and Convictions for
                        Defense and Dual-Use Items, Fiscal Years 2006 through
                        2010                                                           24



               Page i                                            GAO-12-246 Export Controls
         Table 7: OEE Number of Arrests, Indictments, and Convictions for
                  Dual-Use Items, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010                                   24


Figure
         Figure 1: Location of Export Control Enforcement Investigative
                  Agency Major Field Offices and Task Forces (as of 2011)                          15




         Abbreviations

         AECA              Arms Export Control Act
         CBP               Customs and Border Protection
         DDTC              Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
         DHS               Department of Homeland Security
         DOD               Department of Defense
         DTSA              Defense Technology Security Administration
         EAA               Export Administration Act
         EAGLE             Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement
         FBI               Federal Bureau of Investigation
         GPRA              Government Performance Results Act
         ICE               Immigration and Customs Enforcement
         OEE               Office of Export Enforcement
         OFAC              Office of Foreign Assets Control
         UAE               United Arab Emirates




         This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
         United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
         without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
         copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
         necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.




         Page ii                                                        GAO-12-246 Export Controls
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548




                                   March 27, 2012

                                   The Honorable Susan M. Collins
                                   Ranking Member
                                   Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
                                   United States Senate

                                   The Honorable Jon Kyl
                                   Ranking Member
                                   Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism
                                   Committee on the Judiciary
                                   United States Senate

                                   Each year, billions of dollars in defense and “dual-use” items—items that
                                   have both commercial and military applications—are exported to U.S.
                                   allies and strategic partners to further national security, foreign policy, and
                                   economic interests. 1 The U.S. government protects these items through
                                   its export control system to ensure that they are transferred to foreign
                                   parties in a manner consistent with U.S. interests. The current system is
                                   governed by a complex set of laws, regulations, and processes and is
                                   implemented by multiple agencies, some with overlapping jurisdiction.
                                   Enforcement, a key function in the system, strives to prevent or deter the
                                   illegal export of defense and dual-use items such as controlled
                                   components that were shipped to countries like Iran, which were later
                                   found in weapons and devices used against U.S. forces in Iraq. Export
                                   control enforcement activities include inspecting items to be exported,
                                   investigating potential export control violations, and pursuing and
                                   imposing criminal and administrative penalties against violators. These
                                   activities also seek to keep defense and dual-use items from being illicitly
                                   transshipped through intermediary countries or locations, such as the
                                   United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, 2 Singapore, and Malaysia,
                                   where a high volume of trade provides potential opportunities for the illicit
                                   transshipment of export-controlled items to an unauthorized final



                                   1
                                    For the purposes of this report, the term defense items refers to defense articles, defense
                                   services, and related technical data, as specified in 22 U.S.C. § 2778, and the term dual-
                                   use refers to items that have both commercial and military applications, such as
                                   computers, radars, and telecommunication equipment.
                                   2
                                    Hong Kong is a special administrative region of China.




                                   Page 1                                                         GAO-12-246 Export Controls
destination, such as Iran. 3 For the purposes of this report, illicit
transshipment is the transfer of merchandise from its place of origin
through an intermediary country to an unauthorized destination. For
example, in September 2011, a Pakistani citizen pleaded guilty to
conspiring to commit export violations in connection with a scheme to
illegally export U.S. nuclear-related materials, by exporting these
materials from the United States through the UAE, to several restricted
entities in Pakistan. The Department of State and other federal agencies
have recognized illicit transshipment as a major weakness in trade and
national security.

In 2006, we found that U.S. export control enforcement agencies faced
considerable challenges and made several recommendations to improve
interagency coordination, and we continue to include the U.S. export
control system as a key component of a GAO high risk area on protecting
technologies critical to U.S. national security interests. 4 Noting challenges
in the entire U.S. export control system, in April 2010, the President
announced a reform strategy that included the creation of a single export
enforcement coordination agency as a primary forum where agencies can
coordinate and enhance export control enforcement efforts and resolve
conflicts. However, some members of Congress have raised questions
about existing export control activities including resources agencies are
devoting to these activities. Moreover, they have expressed concerns that
without addressing existing enforcement problems, reform of the export
control system could exacerbate current shortfalls in the system designed
to prevent countries and entities of concern from obtaining sensitive U.S.
defense and dual-use items. In response to your request, we identified (1)
how agencies allocate staff resources for export control enforcement
activities, and (2) challenges that agencies face in investigating illicit
transshipments and the potential impact of export control reform initiatives
on enforcement activities.

To conduct our work, we reviewed laws, regulations, and guidelines
relating to the enforcement of U.S. export controls on defense and dual-


3
 U.S. exports to Iran, including defense and dual-use items are severely restricted by U.S.
laws and regulations. Current sanctions on Iran, which are administered by the
Department of the Treasury, ban almost all U.S. exports to that country.
4
 GAO, Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an Inherently Complex
System, GAO-07-265 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2006); and GAO’s 2011 High-Risk
Series, An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 2011).




Page 2                                                         GAO-12-246 Export Controls
             use items and interviewed officials from the Departments of Commerce,
             Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, State, and the
             Treasury as well as private industry and foreign government officials. We
             also visited agency headquarters as well as three domestic and three
             international locations to obtain and analyze information on resources,
             knowledge of illicit transshipments, and challenges in investigating export
             controls for criminal violations. We corroborated information on resources
             with agency budget and other documents where possible. The domestic
             locations, Baltimore, MD; Los Angeles, CA; and San Francisco, CA;
             represent one or more of the following: a large percentage of the
             investigative caseload, ports with a high volume of trade of U.S.
             commodities, and a large presence of aerospace, electronics, and
             software industries and geographic dispersion. The international
             locations, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the UAE, represent three of the top
             10 ports in the world for trade volume and have been identified by federal
             agency officials as potential hubs for illicit transshipments of defense and
             dual-use items. We also met with cognizant agency officials to discuss
             progress, opportunities, and challenges of the President’s current export
             control reform initiatives. (See appendix I for more details.) 5

             We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 through March
             2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
             standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
             obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
             our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
             that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
             and conclusions based on our audit objectives.


             The U.S. government’s control over the export of defense and dual-use
Background   items is intended to ensure that U.S. interests are protected in
             accordance with the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export




             5
              In March 2012, we reported on export control compliance and monitoring activities.
             However, the details were deemed sensitive, but unclassified by the agencies, and so are
             not described more fully in this report.




             Page 3                                                       GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Administration Act (EAA). 6 Defense items can include tanks, fighter
aircraft, submarines, firearms, satellites, missiles, and training; while dual-
use items can include computers, radars, and telecommunication
equipment. Jurisdiction over the export of defense and dual-use items is
primarily divided between State and Commerce. Generally, unless an
exemption applies, exporters submit a license application to State if their
items are controlled on the U.S. Munitions List 7 or to Commerce if their
items are controlled on the Commerce Control List pursuant to the Export
Administration Regulations to receive export approval. As part of the
application review process, State and Commerce consult with other
departments, including DOD and with Treasury in the case of sanctioned
countries. Offices within Commerce, DHS, Justice, and State conduct
enforcement activities. Treasury and Commerce administer the current
sanctions program for designated countries.

Export control enforcement actions consist of three primary functions—
inspecting and seizing goods, investigating potential violators, and levying
punitive actions against violators of export control laws. 8 As shown in
table 1, these functions are largely conducted by various agencies within
Commerce, DHS, Justice, State, and the Treasury depending on the facts
and circumstances of the case. 9 Multiple laws, regulations, and directives
provide differing enforcement authority for U.S. agencies to inspect,


6
 22 U.S.C. § §2751-2799aa-2 and 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420. The Export
Administration Act is not permanent legislation. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419. Authority granted
under the act lapsed in August 2001. However, Executive Order 13,222, Continuation of
Export Control Regulations, which was issued in August 2001 under the authority provided
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707.),
continues the controls established under the act, and the implementing Export
Administration Regulations. Executive Order 13,222 requires an annual extension and
was recently renewed by Presidential Notice on August 12, 2011. 76 Fed. Reg. 50,661
(Aug. 16, 2011).
7
 U.S. defense items are also sold and exported to foreign governments through the U.S.
government’s Foreign Military Sales program.
8
 Actions can also include compliance and monitoring, such as reviewing disclosures by
exporters of possible export control violations, prelicense checks, and postshipment
verifications. See GAO, Export Controls: Post-Shipment Verification Provides Limited
Assurance That Dual-use Items Are Being Properly Used, GAO-04-357 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 12, 2004); and Defense Trade: Arms Export Control System in the Post 9/11
Environment, GAO-05-234 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2005).
9
  Other departments, including Defense and Energy, may provide technical expertise on
items to enforcement agencies. Also, Defense and the military services have investigative
units that may provide support to the enforcement agencies.




Page 4                                                        GAO-12-246 Export Controls
investigate, and take punitive action against potential violators of U.S.
export control laws. These authorities provide the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and customs Enforcement (ICE) with
overlapping jurisdiction to investigate defense potential violations, and
FBI, ICE, and Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) with
overlapping jurisdiction to investigate dual-use potential violations.

Table 1: Export Control Enforcement Activities, by Departments and Agency

                                                                                                         Punitive
                                                                                       a                       b
                                                                      Inspection           Investigation action
    Commerce
    Bureau of Industry and Security
    Office of Chief Counsel                                                                                   
                                                        c
    Office of Export Enforcement (OEE)P                                                                
    DHS
                                                                                                                 d
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)                                                                
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement                                                           
    (ICE)
    Justice
    U.S. Attorneys’ Offices                                                                                   
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)                                                              
    State
    Directorate of Defense Trade Controls                                                                     
    (DDTC)
    Office of Legal Adviser for Political-Military                                                            
    Affairs
    Treasury
    Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)                                                                   
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by each agency and export control laws and regulations.
a
 CBP and ICE both have the authority to conduct inspections at U.S. ports, but, according to CBP
officials, CBP has a primary role in this area.
b
 For purposes of this report, punitive actions can be either criminal or administrative against potential
violators of export control laws and regulations. Criminal actions taken against violators of export
control laws and regulations can result in imprisonment, fines, forfeitures, and other penalties.
Administrative actions against violators can include fines, suspension of an export license, or denial
or debarment from exporting.
c
 Commerce’s Office of Enforcement Analysis provides analytic support to OEE.
d
 CBP can seize items being exported contrary to law, including those subject to export controls, and
can also issue penalties under the Foreign Trade Regulations for false or fraudulent reporting on or
misuse of the Automated Export System.


Inspections of items scheduled for export are routinely conducted at U.S.
air, sea, and land ports, as part of the U.S. Customs and Border



Page 5                                                                                     GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Protection (CBP) officer’s responsibilities for enforcing U.S. import and
export control laws and regulations at our nation’s ports of entry. CBP’s
enforcement activities include inspection of outbound cargo through a
risk-based approach using CBP’s automated targeting systems to assess
the risk of each shipment, review and validation of documentation
presented for licensable items, detention of questionable shipments, and
seizure of shipments and issuance of monetary penalties for items that
are found to be in violation of U.S. export control laws. 10 According to
CBP officials, almost 3 million shipments per month are exported from the
United States.

Investigations of potential violations of export control laws for dual-use
items are conducted by agents from OEE, ICE, and FBI. Investigations of
potential export control violations involving defense items are conducted
by ICE and FBI agents. OEE and ICE are authorized to investigate
potential violations of dual-use items. ICE is also authorized to investigate
potential violations of defense items. The FBI has authority to investigate
any criminal violation of law not exclusively assigned to another agency,
and is mandated to investigate and oversee export control violations with
a counterintelligence concern. The investigative agencies have various
tools for investigating potential violations (see table 2) and establishing
cases for potential criminal or administrative punitive actions.




10
  According to CBP officials it refers most export seizures to ICE for potential case
development, including information on all shipments where weapons are involved or CBP
officers have some reason to believe there is a potential for criminal activity. A number of
these referrals lead to ICE investigations.




Page 6                                                          GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Table 2: Key Investigative Tools for Investigative Export Control Enforcement
Activities
                                                                                                 a
    Investigative tool                                                                    OEE           ICE   FBI
    Undercover operations                                                                                      
    Searches without warrants at the borders                                                              
    Wiretaps                                                                                                   
                                    b
    Overseas investigations                                                                                    
    Access and use of forfeiture funds                                                                         
Source: GAO analysis of export control laws and regulations and information provided by the agencies.
a
 While OEE conducts short-term undercover operations, it does not have independent authority to
use nonappropriated funds to finance such operations or to operate undercover proprietorships.
According to OEE, it is seeking additional statutory authorities in the areas of overseas investigations,
undercover operations, forfeiture authority, and wiretapping authority.
b
 Enforcement agencies can conduct overseas investigations with host government concurrence.


Punitive actions, which are either criminal or administrative, are taken
against violators of export control laws and regulations, and may involve
U.S. or foreign individuals and companies. Criminal violations are those
cases where the evidence shows that the exporter willfully violated export
control laws. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices prosecute export control
enforcement criminal cases in consultation with Justice’s National
Security Division. These cases can result in imprisonment, fines,
forfeitures, and other penalties. Punitive actions for administrative
violations can include fines, suspension of an export license, or denial or
debarment from exporting, and are imposed primarily by State or
Commerce, depending on whether the violation involves the export of a
defense or a dual-use item. For example, Commerce can impose the
administrative sanction of placing parties acting contrary to the national
security or foreign policy interests of the United State on a list that
prevents their receipt of items subject to Commerce controls. The
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and
enforces economic sanctions programs primarily against countries and
groups of individuals, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers. The
sanctions can be either comprehensive or selective, using the blocking of
assets and trade restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national
security goals. In some cases, both criminal and administrative penalties
can be levied against an export control violator. In fiscal year 2010,
Justice data showed that 56 individuals or companies were convicted of




Page 7                                                                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
                            criminal violations of export control laws. 11 State reported over $43 million
                            and Commerce reported more than $25.4 million in administrative fines
                            and penalties for fiscal year 2010. In 2011, over a third of the major U.S.
                            export control enforcement and embargo-related criminal prosecutions
                            involved the illegal transfer of U.S. military, nuclear, or technical data to
                            Iran and China.


                            Agencies use some form of a risk-based approach when allocating
Agencies Use a Risk-        resources to export control enforcement as their missions are broader
Based Approach to           than export controls. As agencies can use these resources for other
                            activities based on need, tracking resources used solely on export control
Allocate Resources          enforcement activities is difficult. Only OEE allocates all of its resources
but Do Not Fully            exclusively to export control enforcement as that is its primary mission,
Track Those Used For        and State and the Treasury have relatively few export control
                            enforcement staff to track. Agencies’ risk-based resource allocation
Export Control              approach incorporates a variety of information, including workload and
Enforcement                 threat assessment data, but has not generally included data on resources
                            used for export control enforcement activities as agencies did not
                            implement systems to fully track this information until recently. Given the
                            overlapping jurisdiction of several enforcement agencies, in some cities
                            agencies have voluntarily created local task forces that bring together
                            enforcement resources to work collectively on cases—informally
                            leveraging resources.


Most Agencies—Whose         Agencies determine their missions based on statutes, policy, and
Missions Are Broader Than   directives, and articulate their fundamental mission in their strategic
Export Controls—Have        plans. 12 Based on our review of these documents as well as discussions
                            with senior agency officials, agencies with primary export control
Limited Data on Resources
                            enforcement responsibility have multiple missions that extend beyond
Used for Export Control     export controls as shown in table 3, except for OEE. As such, these
Enforcement                 agencies are faced with balancing multiple priorities when allocating staff
                            resources.


                            11
                              Data provided by Justice for criminal convictions where 50 U.S.C. § 1705 or 22 U.S.C. §
                            2778 was charged.
                            12
                              A strategic plan, according to the Government Performance and Results Act (as
                            amended), articulates, among other things, the major functions and operations of an
                            organization, and describes its long-term general goals for implementing those functions
                            or operations, including the resources needed to reach these goals.




                            Page 8                                                        GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Table 3: Primary Missions of the Agencies with Export Control Enforcement Responsibility

Department/agency            Mission
Commerce
•  OEE                       Investigate potential violations of dual-use and commercial exports with a priority related to weapons of
                             mass destruction, terrorism, and unauthorized military use.
DHS
•  CBP                       Detect and prevent terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering U.S. ports, and inspecting items and
                             persons entering and leaving the United States.
•   ICE                      Investigate drug smuggling, human trafficking and smuggling, financial crimes, commercial fraud,
                             intellectual property rights violations, document fraud, money laundering, child exploitation, immigration
                             fraud, and potential defense and dual-use export violations.
Justice
•   U.S. Attorneys’ Office   Prosecute violations of federal criminal laws and litigate civil matters on behalf of the United States.
                             Criminal prosecutions include cases involving terrorism, counterterrorism, government contractor fraud,
                             and many others.
•   FBI                      Protect the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats and enforce criminal laws.
•   National Security        Supports export control enforcement through its technical expertise to prosecutors and law enforcement
    Division                 agencies.
State
•   DDTC                     Control the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the United
                             States Munitions List and brokering activities by U.S. and foreign persons.
Treasury
•   OFAC                     Administer and enforce economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security
                             goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those
                             engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the
                             national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.
                                             Source: GAO analysis of agency information.


                                            The agencies with export control enforcement responsibilities use some
                                            form of a risk-based approach to allocate staff resources, but several
                                            agencies, including CBP, FBI, ICE, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, did
                                            not implement systems to fully track the staff time spent on enforcement
                                            activities until recently. Only OEE allocates its entire investigative staff to
                                            this mission. As most enforcement resources are used to enforce a wide
                                            variety of laws, not just export control laws, if an important need arises,
                                            enforcement agencies have the flexibility to use these resources for other,
                                            non-export control related duties. Table 4 shows the total domestic staff,
                                            by agency that was allocated to conduct export control enforcement
                                            activities in fiscal year 2010. The number of officers, agents, and
                                            investigators who actually work on export control enforcement may be
                                            less than the number allocated for each agency.




                                            Page 9                                                            GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Table 4: Enforcement Agency Total Staff and Staff Allocated for Domestic Export
Control Enforcement, Fiscal Year 2010

                                                                            Staff allocated for
                                                                            export control
    Agency                                     Total staff                  enforcement
                                                                                             a
    Commerce: OEE                              109 investigators             95 investigators
                                                                                         b
    DHS: CBP                                   20,455 officers              658 officers
    DHS: ICE/Homeland Security                 6,700 investigators           Data not publicly
    Investigations                                                          available
                  c
    Justice: FBI                               12,092 agents                Data not publicly available
                                 d                                                                e
    Justice: U.S. Attorneys                    4,005 criminal               292 criminal attorneys
                                               attorneys
    State: DDTC                                21 specialists               10 specialists
    State: Office of Legal Adviser for         12 attorneys                 1 attorney
    Political-Military Affairs
    Commerce: Office of the Chief              12 attorneys                  9 attorneys
    Counsel, Bureau of Industry and
    Security
    Treasury: OFAC                             27 enforcement officers None
Source: GAO analysis of agency information.
a
All investigators are used solely for export control enforcement activities and, according to
Commerce, an additional 39 staff are available to provide analytic support.
b
 CBP officers conduct outbound enforcement activities which include both the passenger and cargo
environments.
c
 FBI agents are not used solely for export control enforcement activities, but generally handle these
cases through their Counterintelligence Division. The resources that FBI uses for these activities are
classified.
d
    U.S. Attorneys are not used solely for export control enforcement activities.
e
 This figure represents the number of attorneys who have been specially allocated to work on
terrorism and national security cases, which includes but is not limited to export enforcement cases.


These agencies have systems to track staff resources used for their
primary missions and several have acknowledged the need to better track
export control enforcement resources and have taken steps to do so. The
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 laid the
foundation for results-oriented agency planning, measurement, and
reporting in the federal government, highlighting the important role
performance information plays in improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of an agency. 13 The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010



13
      Pub. L. No. 103-62.




Page 10                                                                    GAO-12-246 Export Controls
reinforces these principles. 14 One key element of these principles
includes having accurate data agencies can use to allocate resources,
among other things. 15 However, most of the agencies responsible for
inspecting, investigating, and prosecuting potential export control
violations did not know the full extent of the use of staff resources on
these activities, and as such, have not used this information in resource
allocation decisions, as outlined in the examples below.

•     OEE allocates all of its investigators solely to export control
      enforcement, and as such, is the only agency that has been able to
      fully track the resources used on these activities. To formulate its
      budget and allocate its investigators, OEE conducts threat
      assessments with a priority related to weapons of mass destruction,
      terrorism, and unauthorized military use; and analyzes export control
      enforcement case workload, including the prior year’s investigative
      statistics of arrests, indictments, and convictions. OEE also recently
      completed a field office expansion study to decide which cities would
      be the best locations for additional OEE field offices. In this study,
      OEE considered the volume of licensed and unlicensed exports and
      the type of high-tech items exported from different areas of the United
      States, and concluded that Atlanta, GA; Cincinnati, OH; Phoenix, AZ;
      and Portland, OR, were optimal locations, but has not received budget
      approval for expansion.
•     CBP reemphasized outbound operations in the creation of its
      Outbound Enforcement Division in March 2009 to help prevent
      terrorist groups, rogue nations, and other criminal organizations from
      obtaining defense and dual-use commodities; enforce sanctions and
      trade embargoes; and increase exporter compliance. CBP determines
      the number of staff to allocate to outbound inspections through a risk-
      based approach based on prior workload and a quarterly threat
      matrix—which includes the volume of outbound cargo and
      passengers, port threat assessments, and the numbers and types of
      seizures and arrests at the ports for items such as firearms and
      currency. As of fiscal year 2010, CBP had allocated approximately
      660 officers for outbound enforcement activities, but these officers can
      be used for other than export control-related activities at any time,


14
    Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011).
15
 GAO, National Export Initiative: U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service Should Improve
Performance and Resource Allocation Management, GAO-11-909 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 29, 2011).




Page 11                                                    GAO-12-246 Export Controls
    when needed. For example, the Port of Baltimore has officers
    assigned to perform outbound activities at both the airport and
    seaport, some of which focus on the enforcement of controlled
    shipments in the seaport environment. According to the Port Director,
    any of these officers can be redirected at any time and often are
    assigned to the airport during the busy airline arrival times, to perform
    inbound inspection duties—based on priorities. Further, CBP does not
    track the hours that its officers across the country spend on export
    control enforcement activities, but is in the process of implementing a
    system to do so. CBP officials stated that determining the right mix of
    officers is complex and changes to its tracking system should allow for
    better planning and accounting for resources used for outbound
    activities in the future.
•   ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations, Counter-Proliferation
    Investigations Unit focuses on preventing sensitive U.S. technologies
    and weapons from reaching the hands of adversaries and conducts
    export control investigations. To determine how many investigators it
    should allocate to this unit, ICE uses information including operational
    threat assessments and case data from the previous year, by field
    office, on total numbers of arrests, indictments, convictions, seizures,
    and investigative hours expended on export control investigations. For
    example, it assigns a tier level for each of its 70 field offices, based on
    threat assessments—ranging from 1 for the highest threat, resulting in
    a larger number of agents assigned to these offices; to 5 for the
    lowest threat, with a lower number of agents assigned. To further
    prioritize resources, in 2010, ICE established Counter Proliferation
    Investigations Centers in selected cities throughout the United States,
    with staff focused solely on combating illegal exports and illicit
    procurement networks seeking to acquire vital U.S. technology. ICE
    concluded that it needed to form these centers to combat the
    specialized nature of complex export control cases and determined
    that its previous method of distributing resources needed refinement,
    noting that some ICE field office managers had difficulty in balancing
    numerous competing programmatic priorities and initiatives.
    According to ICE officials, they plan to mitigate these concerns by
    having staff and facilities focused solely on export control enforcement
    cases, which will allow ICE to track and use this information to better
    determine future resource needs.
•   The FBI, with both an investigative and intelligence mission, does not
    allocate resources solely for export control enforcement and officials
    told us they view these activities as a tool to gain intelligence that may
    lead to more robust cases. Nevertheless, cases involving export
    controls are primarily led by agents within the Counterintelligence
    Division. To determine the number of agents to allocate to this


Page 12                                               GAO-12-246 Export Controls
    division, the FBI uses a risk management process and threat
    assessments. Several years ago, the FBI established at least one
    Counterintelligence squad in each of its 56 field offices. In July 2011,
    the FBI established a Counterproliferation Center, merging its
    Counterintelligence Division and its Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Directorate to better focus their efforts and resources. The FBI is in
    the process of implementing new codes within its resource tracking
    system to obtain better information on agents’ distribution of work,
    which will include time spent on investigations of defense and dual-
    use items.
•   U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have discretion to determine the resources
    that they will allocate to export control enforcement cases, based on
    national priorities and the individual priorities of the 94 districts. These
    priorities include law enforcement concerns for their district and leads
    from investigative agencies. In response to the risk associated with
    national security, which includes export control enforcement cases,
    staffing for national security activities has increased and several
    districts have created national security sections within their office. In
    2008, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys provided codes for
    charging time and labeling cases to obtain better information on the
    U.S. Attorneys’ Office distribution of work and those resources used
    for export control enforcement. However, some Assistant U.S.
    Attorneys told us that the time-keeping system is complicated as there
    are multiple codes and sub-categories in the tracking system and
    determining the correct codes is often subjective, making it difficult to
    track time spent on export control enforcement cases. Senior agency
    officials acknowledged this concern and are working with the U.S.
    Attorneys’ Offices to provide better guidance to improve the accuracy
    of attorney time charges.
•   Other offices, such as State’s Office of the Legal Adviser for Political-
    Military Affairs and Commerce’s Office of the Chief Counsel for the
    Bureau of Industry and Security assist the enforcement agencies by
    providing legal support. For example, Commerce’s Office of the Chief
    Counsel pursues administrative enforcement actions against
    individuals and entities, but also reviews and advises on OEE
    recommendations for other administrative actions, such as temporary
    denials of licenses. In addition, DDTC and OFAC pursue
    administrative enforcement actions against violators. For example,
    OFAC administers and enforces U.S. economic and trade sanctions
    against designated foreign countries. While not all of staff in these
    offices are allocated to export control enforcement, these offices have
    relatively few staff to track.




Page 13                                                GAO-12-246 Export Controls
                          In addition to a domestic presence, most export control enforcement
                          agencies also allocate resources overseas, but only Commerce allocates
                          resources exclusively to export control enforcement. For example,
                          Commerce maintains Export Control Officers in six locations abroad;
                          Beijing and Hong Kong, China; Abu Dhabi, UAE; New Delhi, India;
                          Moscow, Russia; and Singapore, to support its dual-use export control
                          enforcement activities. Given that these officers have regional
                          responsibilities, they cover additional locations. For example, the Export
                          Control Officer assigned to Singapore also covers Malaysia and
                          Indonesia. While other agencies have field locations in many overseas
                          locations, these resources are to support the agencies’ broader missions
                          and can be used for other duties based on the overseas mission
                          priorities. For example, ICE has 70 offices in 47 foreign countries with
                          more than 380 government and contract personnel which support all ICE
                          enforcement activities, including export control. They can also be called
                          upon to support various other DHS mission priorities. Specifically, the ICE
                          agents we met with at the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi also conduct
                          activities in support of the full DHS mission and a great portion of their
                          time is spent on visa security and a lesser amount on export control
                          enforcement activities.


Agencies Informally       The export control enforcement investigative agencies often have offices
Leverage Enforcement      located in the same cities or geographic areas. In many of these cities,
Resources through Local   agencies’ officials said that they informally leverage each others’ tools,
                          authorities, and resources to coordinate investigations and share
Task Forces               intelligence through local task forces allowing them to use resources
                          more efficiently and avoid duplicating efforts or interfering with each
                          other’s cases. In 2007, Justice’s National Export Enforcement Initiative
                          encouraged local field offices with a significant export control threat to
                          create task forces or other alternatives to coordinate enforcement efforts
                          in their area. Since then, almost 20 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have created
                          task forces of their own initiative or in conjunction with another
                          enforcement agency, primarily in cities where these agencies are co-
                          located to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of export control
                          cases. Figure 1 shows the location of investigative agencies’ major field
                          offices, as well as the location of export control enforcement task forces.




                          Page 14                                              GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Figure 1: Location of Export Control Enforcement Investigative Agency Major Field Offices and Task Forces (as of 2011)




                                         Page 15                                                  GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Most of the task force members we met with in Baltimore, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco stated that they see benefits beyond the coordination
of cases, including investigating cases together and sharing resources.

Baltimore’s Counterproliferation Task Force: ICE and the U.S. Attorneys’
Office created this Task Force in 2010 and it has representatives from
each of the enforcement agencies located in the area, as well as the
defense and intelligence communities. Task force officials stated that they
develop and investigate export control cases together and, to enhance
interagency collaboration, ICE has supplied work space, allowing agents
from other agencies to work side-by-side to pursue leads and conduct
investigations. Officials emphasized that the task force enables smaller
agencies with fewer resources to leverage the work and expertise of the
others to further their investigations and seek prosecutions. Sometimes
the task force structures reap benefits that individual agencies cannot
reach on their own, as exemplified by the Baltimore Counterproliferation
Task Force. Among successes was a Maryland man sentenced to 8
months in prison followed by 3 years of supervised release for illegally
exporting export-controlled night vision equipment.

Los Angeles’ Export and Anti-proliferation Global Law Enforcement
(EAGLE) Task Force: The U.S. Attorney established this Task Force in
2008 as a result of Justice’s counter-proliferation initiatives. Its purpose is
to coordinate and develop expertise in export control investigations.
Currently, there are over 80 members from 17 Los Angeles-based federal
agencies. According to a task force official, the EAGLE task force has
resulted in increased priority on export control investigations and
improved interagency cooperation since it was established. For instance,
the enforcement agencies are now more effectively sharing information in
their respective databases. A task force official noted that enhanced
access to these databases allows agencies to reduce duplication of
license determination requests and to easily retrieve information on a
particular person or commodity’s history using the search options.
Additionally, through the task force structure, ICE and OEE agents have
worked together to conduct additional outreach to industry affiliates.

San Francisco’s Strategic Technology Task Force: According to officials,
this task force was formed by FBI in 2004, with a primary focus on
conducting joint export control outreach activities to academia and
industry with the other investigative agencies (ICE and OEE). This task
force also includes participation by the military service intelligence units
and other law enforcement agencies. FBI task force leaders stated that
this task force has helped to coordinate outreach activities as well as to


Page 16                                                GAO-12-246 Export Controls
                              generate investigative leads. According to an agent from the FBI’s San
                              Jose field office, that office has a performance goal to conduct 90 percent
                              of their export control-related investigations jointly with investigative
                              agencies at ICE and Commerce.

                              Although successful cases of joint collaboration among agencies can
                              yield positive enforcement outcomes, as reported by the offices in the
                              three cities we visited, the extent to which these alliances are effective is
                              primarily dependent on personal dynamics of a given region, agency, and
                              law enforcement culture. In addition, these local agency task forces for
                              export control enforcement vary in structure, are voluntary, and do not
                              exist nationwide. For example, while multiple investigative agencies have
                              local offices in Chicago and Dallas with export control enforcement
                              agents, agencies do not have a local task force in these cities to regularly
                              coordinate on export control cases. While agency officials shared
                              examples of agencies informally leveraging each other’s resources,
                              officials told us that they do not factor in such resources when planning
                              their own agency allocations for a variety of reasons, including each
                              agency’s separate budgets and missions, which do not generally consider
                              those of other agencies.


                              Enforcement agencies face several challenges in investigating illicit
Reform Initiatives            transshipments, both domestically and overseas—including license
May Help Address              determination delays; limited access in some overseas locations; and a
                              lack of effectiveness measures that reflect the complexity and qualitative
Challenges In                 benefits of export control cases. Recognizing broader challenges in
Investigating Illicit         export control enforcement, the President announced the creation of a
Transshipments But            national export enforcement coordination center, which may help
                              agencies address some of the challenges described below, but detailed
Detailed Plans Are            plans to do so have yet to be developed.
Unknown
Investigators Face Several    The current export control enforcement system poses several challenges
Challenges in Investigating   that potentially reduce the effectiveness of activities and limit the
Illicit Transshipments—       identification and investigation of illicit transshipments. Export control
                              enforcement agencies seek to keep defense and dual-use items from
Both Domestically and         being illegally exported through intermediary countries or locations to an
Overseas                      unauthorized final destination, such as Iran, but agencies face challenges
                              that can impact their ability to investigate export control violations, both
                              domestically and overseas. First, license determinations—which confirm
                              whether an item is controlled and requires a license, and thereby help
                              confirm whether an export control violation has occurred—can sometimes


                              Page 17                                              GAO-12-246 Export Controls
be delayed, potentially hindering investigations and prosecutions.
Second, investigators have limited access to secure communications and
cleared staff in several domestic field offices, which can limit their ability
to share timely and important information. Third, agencies have limited
access to ports and facilities overseas. Fourth, agencies lack consistent
data to quantify and identify trends and patterns in illicit transshipments of
U.S. export-controlled items. Lastly, investigative agencies lack measures
of effectiveness that fully reflect the complexity and qualitative benefits of
export control cases.

License Determination Delays. To confirm whether a defense or dual-use
item is controlled and requires a license, inspectors, investigators, and
prosecutors request license determinations from the licensing agencies of
State and Commerce. 16 These license determinations are integral to
enforcement agencies’ ability to seize items, pursue investigations, or
seek prosecutions. DHS’s Exodus Command Center operates the Exodus
Accountability Referral System—an ICE database that initiates, tracks,
and manages enforcement agency requests for license determinations
from the licensing agencies. 17 Exodus Command Center guidance
identifies three different levels of license determinations: initial (to seize
an item or begin an investigation), pre-trial (to obtain a search warrant,
among other things), and trial (to be used during trial proceedings). The
Exodus Command Center has established internal timeliness goals for
receiving responses to requests for initial determinations within 3 days;
pre-trial certifications within 45 days; and trial certifications within 30 days.
However, as shown in table 5, these goals are often not met, which can
create barriers for enforcement agencies in seizing shipments before they
depart the United States; obtaining search warrants; and making timely
arrests.




16
  Depending on the license, the request can also go to Treasury’s OFAC for sanctioned
countries.
17
  The Exodus Command Center was established in 1982—and now is part of DHS/ICE—
as the single point of contact for investigators and officers in the field needing operational
support from export control agencies.




Page 18                                                          GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Table 5: Average License Determination Response Times (in Days)

                                                                                                      Response time
License determination (goal)                                                FY 2007                    FY 2008           FY 2009          FY 2010
Initial (3 days)
- Defense items                                                                        8                          5            7               10
- Dual-use items                                                                     19                         19           23                30
Pre-Trial (45 days)
- Defense items                                                                     126                         91           64                93
- Dual-use items                                                                     10                         18           29                81
Trial (30 days)
                                                                                        a
- Defense items                                                                   N/A                           79           64                44
                                                                                        a                          a                             a
- Dual-use items                                                                  N/A                        N/A             58              N/A
                                       Source: Data provided by the Exodus Command Center.
                                       a
                                        Exodus Command Center officials noted that this information was not available.


                                       According to State officials, they did not participate in developing the
                                       Exodus Command Center’s goals, and State has different timeframes for
                                       responding to license determination requests. State officials noted that
                                       there is no statutory or regulatory requirement for the licensing agencies
                                       to provide license determinations and they must balance these activities
                                       with their primary mission of processing license applications. State
                                       officials told us their response to initial license determinations is a quick,
                                       unofficial assessment on whether or not an item is likely on the U.S.
                                       munitions list and it established a timeliness goal of 1-day to respond
                                       these requests. In 2004, State established a 30-day goal for responding
                                       to pre-trial and trial certification requests, but due to increased caseload
                                       and difficulty in meeting this goal, it revised it to 60-days. According to
                                       State officials, the number of requests from federal law enforcement for
                                       pre-trial and trial license determinations has increased significantly over
                                       the past 5 years—from 79 in fiscal year 2006 to 219 in fiscal year 2011,
                                       an increase of over 270 percent. Officials from State attribute some of the
                                       time it takes to process license determinations to the need to request
                                       interagency review and conduct additional analysis, as well as the
                                       complexity of the determination. For example, State sends all pre-trial and
                                       trial certification cases to DOD’s Defense Technology Security
                                       Administration (DTSA) for its review, which can add to the time in
                                       responding to enforcement agencies’ requests for license determinations.
                                       DTSA officials stated that these cases are reviewed through their normal
                                       licensing process and were not aware of any established timeframe
                                       goals, but stated that they expedite review of such license determination
                                       requests, for time-sensitive cases. As for complexity, according to State



                                       Page 19                                                                           GAO-12-246 Export Controls
officials, those involving firearms, their components, and ammunition are
relatively routine requests to respond to, whereas others involving
multiple commodities, volumes of technical data, and complex services
take more time and may involve multiple meetings and consultations
among licensing agencies to make a determination. Further, State
officials noted that they continue to educate law enforcement and work
with ICE and FBI liaisons to ensure better information is provided in the
request.

Commerce officials also noted that they did not participate in developing
the Exodus Command Center’s goals. Commerce has a 30-day goal for
responding to initial license determination requests, but according to
Commerce officials, does not have a specific timeframe for responding to
pre-trial and trial certifications because they conduct an in-depth review in
their initial determination. Commerce officials noted that they do not have
a three-level system for processing license determinations and that it
processes standard and certified license determination requests. While
Commerce’s standard determinations are equivalent to State’s initial
determinations, Commerce’s approach differs from State’s in that it
conducts a more thorough review for this initial determination requiring
more time than the 3-day goal established by the Exodus Command
Center. Commerce’s certified license determinations are equivalent to
State’s pre-trial and trial certifications, but these can take less time to
complete if an initial determination was conducted. Commerce officials
noted that, while they previously tracked and reported the timeliness of
license determination requests in their annual reports, as of fiscal year
2011, they no longer track this information because they are generally
able to process these in a timely manner based on the urgency of the
request. Commerce officials also noted that the Exodus Command Center
data on Commerce’s response times do not reflect all license
determinations, as OEE investigators request license determinations
directly from Commerce licensing officers and FBI investigators can route
such requests through OEE.

Limited Secure Communications and Cleared Staff. Limited access to
secure communications, networks, facilities, and cleared staff by key
investigative agencies including OEE and ICE can cause inconveniences
and delays in the speed of export control investigations. While each of its
field offices has access to secure telephones, none of the OEE field
offices has its own secure networks or facilities—it accesses these
through other agencies. According to some investigators that we spoke
with, this limited access can sometimes create difficulties in
communicating overseas, as well as working on cases jointly with the FBI.


Page 20                                              GAO-12-246 Export Controls
This lack of immediate access to secure networks and facilities can limit
investigators’ ability to share timely and important information, according
to agency officials. A field office agent from the FBI stated that the
inability to fully communicate with investigators from other agencies can
be challenging when working jointly on cases—including a lack of high-
level security clearances that can be needed to discuss certain export
control cases. According to OEE officials, they plan to equip each of their
field offices with secure networks and facilities, and expect to complete
installation of the secure networks during 2012. In addition, OEE is
working to provide Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented Information
clearances to the remaining 37 of its 95 investigators that lack this
clearance. According to ICE officials, most of the ICE field offices have
access to secure telephones and data networks, but about half of these
offices lack secure facilities and typically use those of other agencies,
when needed.

Limited Overseas Access for Investigative Agencies. Enforcement
agencies have differing levels of access to facilities and ports overseas
when enforcing U.S. export control laws, which can limit their ability to
carry out certain investigative activities. To pursue investigations of
possible illicit transshipments, the U.S. government relies on the
cooperation of host governments. According to agency officials, the
success of enforcement activities abroad and the level of access granted
is often determined by the U.S. government’s relationship with the host
government. For example, ICE in Abu Dhabi has fostered a relationship
with the customs officials in the UAE and has worked with that
government to create an academy and to provide UAE customs officials
with various export control training sessions. According to the U.S.
Deputy Chief of Mission and ICE attaché in the UAE, this collegial
relationship has fostered better cooperation in several areas, including
export controls. U.S. enforcement agencies overseas also rely on foreign
counterparts to conduct enforcement activities. For example, the ICE
attaché in Hong Kong told us that the Hong Kong government and its
customs officials are helpful and responsive and that this relationship is
further facilitated by the existence of a Customs Mutual Assistance
Agreement, which allows direct contact and information exchange
between U.S. and Hong Kong customs officials. In addition, Commerce
has Export Control Officers stationed abroad and also has data sharing
agreements with Hong Kong and Singapore to help ensure that U.S.-
origin items are not retransferred without appropriate authorization.
According to some State Department and agency officials overseas, while
the existence of formal agreements with host governments, such as a
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty for prosecution or a Customs Mutual


Page 21                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Assistance Agreement allow for information sharing and assistance with
the United States, these formal agreements do not guarantee that U.S.
law enforcement will have access to foreign persons, ports, and facilities.
Some agency officials overseas noted that such access is often
dependent on the U.S. relationship with the host government regardless
of the existence of formal agreements.

The lack of reciprocity in export control laws can also make it difficult to
pursue export control violations abroad. The three key transshipment
locations we visited, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the UAE each had their
own national export control laws, and according to some State and
overseas agency officials, these governments were most responsive to
export control violations that fell under the international legal framework of
United Nations’ sanctions and major multilateral export control lists.
Nevertheless, State officials noted that Hong Kong has had an extensive
export and transshipment control system in place for over a decade.
These officials also noted that they have identified and shared
transshipment “best practices” that countries or locations can adopt to
provide key legal authorities to better position them to enforce U.S. export
control laws. In addition, investigators overseas told us that the lack of
extradition treaties has limited their ability to pursue export control
violators. The United States does not have an extradition treaty with the
UAE, but it does have one with Hong Kong. While the United States has
an extradition treaty with Singapore, it went into force over 70 years ago
and, according to Singapore Embassy officials, it does not reflect current
types of crimes and its renewal is unlikely. Despite these challenges,
according to State, positive action relating to extradition has and
continues to be achieved on a case-by-case basis.

Lack of Trend Data on Illicit Transshipments. No formal process exists
between the investigative export control enforcement community and the
intelligence community to share data or quantify and identify statistical
trends and patterns relating to information on illicit transshipments.
Although the total universe of items being illicitly transshipped is
unknown, intelligence and law enforcement information is collected by the
intelligence community, attaches in overseas posts, and the domestic
export control enforcement agencies. 18 According to an OEE official,



18
  Transshipment can occur anywhere in the world, but is more likely to occur in ports with
high volumes of trade activity.




Page 22                                                        GAO-12-246 Export Controls
there is a good exchange of actionable intelligence between the export
control enforcement agencies and the intelligence community to seize
shipments and take other actions against export control violators
overseas. However, according to some enforcement and intelligence
officials, intelligence leads are typically transmitted to either individual
enforcement agencies or the enforcement community. Further,
enforcement agencies maintain separate data related to their export
control enforcement activities, which can include a variety of information
such as shipment declarations listing countries of final destination and
end-use or end-users and inspection and investigation results. Because
the enforcement agencies have varying mission priorities in export
controls, the availability and maintenance of data by the various agencies
that can be used to identify illicit transshipments are not necessarily
consistent or harmonized with each other.

Lack of Effectiveness Measures Unique to Complexity of Export Controls.
The investigative enforcement agencies typically measure their
effectiveness based on outcomes of enforcement activities, but these do
not necessarily reflect the complexities involved with export control
enforcement cases. 19 Specifically, ICE has a primary performance
measure of the percentage of closed investigations that result in a law
enforcement consequence—arrests, indictments, convictions, and
seizures as shown in table 6. 20 OEE has similar enforcement metrics, and
assesses impacts of their investigations by number of arrests,
indictments, and convictions, as shown in table 7. 21 The numbers of
arrests, indictments, and convictions for export control violation cases




19
 FBI is omitted as its measures of effectiveness include its intelligence function and these
metrics are classified in nature.
20
  ICE now has a performance system that measures the percentage of high-impact or
significant investigations that result in a transnational criminal disruption and/or
dismantlement, and is applying this measure to its export control investigations. In
addition, ICE is tracking systemic vulnerabilities nationally and within its respective field
offices to prioritize efforts.
21
  OEE also measures effectiveness of headquarters’ and field office performance and
accomplishment on investigative actions that result in a prevention or deterrence of export
violations; percentage of open cases focusing on OEE’s export enforcement priorities; and
administrative case results including the total dollar fines and other actions, such as denial
orders.




Page 23                                                           GAO-12-246 Export Controls
have generally increased from fiscal years 2006 to 2010 for ICE and
OEE. 22

Table 6: ICE Number of Arrests, Indictments and Convictions for Defense and Dual-
Use Items, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010

 Fiscal year                    Arrests     Indictments        Convictions            Total
 FY 2006                           151                153                116            420
 FY 2007                           197                200                153            550
 FY 2008                           213                210                150            573
 FY 2009                           432                285                219            936
 FY 2010                           505                329                221           1055
 Total                            1498              1177                 859           3534
Source: Data provided by ICE.




Table 7: OEE Number of Arrests, Indictments, and Convictions for Dual-Use Items,
Fiscal Years 2006 through 2010

 Fiscal year                    Arrests      Indictments       Convictions             Total
 FY 2006                             11                17                 36              64
 FY 2007                             26                17                 16              59
 FY 2008                             20                57                 40             117
 FY 2009                             37                69                 33             139
 FY 2010                             22                62                 31             115
 Total                              116               222                156             494
Source: Data provided by OEE.


While these numbers provide quantifiable performance assessments for
the agencies’ workload related to export control violations, they do not
necessarily reflect the complex nature of these cases or measure
agencies progress in achieving their goals. GPRA, as amended, requires
federal agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in
achieving their goals and to communicate their availability to Congress.
Under this act, agencies are to develop measures that are objective,
quantifiable, measurable, and to establish performance measures that
define the level of progress to be achieved using these goals. However,



22
  It is likely that the data provided by ICE in table 6 also include some of the same cases
provided by OEE in table 7, thus may contain double-counting.




Page 24                                                         GAO-12-246 Export Controls
current measures used by the enforcement agencies do not fully capture
these elements. According to ICE documentation, export control
investigations often take an average of 2 to 3 years to complete, and
although significant to national security, these investigations result in
enforcement statistics that are low in comparison with other law
enforcement disciplines. The performance measures used by ICE and
OEE during the period of this review emphasized quantifiable outcomes
of enforcement actions and they are working towards developing
measures that take into account the length of time and effort for
investigators to gather intelligence that could potentially reveal a larger
group of violators and to collect evidence from a wide variety of sources,
including those located overseas. Although quantitative law enforcement
metrics may be useful for the enforcement community in understanding
the volume of activities that investigative agencies are processing, they
may encourage agents to pursue less significant investigations in order to
meet these performance standards. Measuring arrests does not indicate
success at impeding criminal operations or whether the vulnerabilities
present within export control enforcement system have been minimized.
While developing measures of effectiveness that adequately capture the
time and resources spent on such activities as intelligence gathering may
be difficult and not easily quantifiable failure to consider broader
measures may run counter to the overall goal of preventing or deterring
illegal exports. According to ICE officials, its new performance measures,
as well as its system to measure and track vulnerabilities nationally and in
its field locations, will improve its ability to measure outcomes of
enforcement actions.

In 2010, we recommended that ICE establish performance measures for
its investigative resources in a way to fully assess progress and better
identify and decrease vulnerabilities. 23 ICE officials told us that they have
made progress toward this goal by implementing new performance
measures for investigations, including those relating to export control
enforcement. For example, ICE in Los Angeles is in the process of
creating performance measures which include: one or more arrests,
indictments, convictions and/or quantifiable disruption of an illicit
procurement network in defense and dual-use items. It also plans to
factor in special interest countries known to contain entities that post a


23
  In September 2010, we reported on ICE’s allocation of investigative resources.
However, the details were deemed sensitive, but unclassified, by the agency, and so are
not described more fully in this report.




Page 25                                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
                           credible public safety or national security threat, and have determined ten
                           country destination codes that will be counted in measuring performance
                           of its export control investigations.


Reform Initiatives Offer   Our past work highlighted the need for export control reform. Over the
Opportunities to Address   past 10 years, we issued 22 reports with key findings and
Some Export Control        recommendations directed at State, Commerce, DOD, DHS, Justice, and
                           Treasury, to improve the U.S. export control system, including
Enforcement Challenges     enforcement activities. 24 In April 2010, the President announced a reform
but May Present Others     initiative to strengthen and streamline U.S. export controls by creating a
                           single control list, licensing agency, information technology system, and
                           enforcement coordination agency, aimed at addressing weaknesses in
                           the system. The President is in the process of implementing several
                           reform efforts. To coordinate export control enforcement activities, given
                           that agencies have overlapping and duplicative authorities, in November
                           2010, the President announced the formation of a federal Export
                           Enforcement Coordination Center to be established within DHS for
                           administrative purposes. The corresponding Executive Order stated that
                           to enhance enforcement efforts and minimize enforcement conflicts,
                           executive departments and agencies must coordinate their efforts to
                           detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute violations of U.S.
                           export control laws, and must share intelligence and law enforcement
                           information related to these efforts to the maximum extent possible
                           consistent with national security and applicable law. 25 The Export
                           Enforcement Coordination Center, which became operational in March
                           2012, is to:

                           •     serve as the primary forum within the federal government for
                                 executive departments and agencies to coordinate and enhance their
                                 export control enforcement efforts and identify and resolve conflicts
                                 that have not been otherwise resolved in criminal and administrative
                                 investigations and actions involving violations of U.S. export control
                                 laws;




                           24
                             GAO, Export Controls: Agency Actions and Proposed Reform Initiatives May Address
                           Previously Identified Weaknesses, but Challenges Remain, GAO-11-135R (Washington,
                           D.C.: Nov. 16, 2010).
                           25
                               Exec. Order No.13,558, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,573 (Nov. 9, 2010).




                           Page 26                                                          GAO-12-246 Export Controls
•    serve as a conduit between federal law enforcement agencies and the
     U.S. intelligence community for the exchange of information related to
     potential U.S. export control violations;
•    serve as a primary point of contact between enforcement authorities
     and agencies engaged in export licensing;
•    coordinate law enforcement public outreach activities related to U.S.
     export controls; and
•    establish government-wide statistical tracking capabilities for U.S.
     criminal and administrative export control enforcement activities, to be
     conducted by DHS with information provided by and shared with all
     relevant departments and agencies participating in the center.

To date, a Director from ICE and Deputy Directors from the FBI and OEE
have been appointed to lead the Export Enforcement Coordination Center
and FBI, ICE, and OEE officials stated that they have agreed to a general
interagency Concept of Operations, and are in the process of developing
standard operating procedures. However, the center opened in March
2012—a delay of 9 months due to problems with completing the building
on time as well as some difficulty in reaching interagency agreement on
the Concept of Operations.

While the center may improve agency coordination, it is unclear whether it
will address some of the specific challenges in investigating export control
cases and illicit transshipments, as identified in this report. In our recently
issued overview of government performance issues, we noted that many
federal program efforts generally require the effective collaboration of
more than one agency and that the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010
calls for a more coordinated and crosscutting approach, using outcome-
oriented goals to identify and reduce unnecessary duplication, overlap,
and fragmentation. 26 GPRA requires each agency to submit a strategic
plan at least every 4 years, to include a description of how the agency is
working with other agencies to achieve its strategic goals as well as the
strategies to be used and resources needed to achieve these goals.
However, it is not clear to what extent the Export Enforcement
Coordination Center will coordinate efforts to increase efficiencies across
enforcement agencies. In November 2010, we reported that co-location of
the export control agencies in a single headquarters’-based facility may



26
 GAO, Managing for Results: Opportunities for Congress to Address Government
Performance Issues, GAO-12-215R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 2011).




Page 27                                                  GAO-12-246 Export Controls
help agencies share information, but further action may be needed to fully
coordinate export control enforcement cases throughout the country. 27
For example, agencies are unsure whether the center’s yet-to-be-
developed standard operating procedures will encourage enforcement
agencies to fully leverage resources, as local level offices are informally
doing in some cities, or develop combined measures of effectiveness for
export control enforcement.

In addition, the Export Enforcement Coordination Center is to serve as a
conduit between federal law enforcement agencies and the U.S.
intelligence community. As noted in this report, no formal process or
means exists between the investigative export control enforcement
community and the intelligence community to quantify and identify
statistical trends and patterns relating to information on illicit
transshipments. While one of the goals of the center is to facilitate
intelligence sharing, it has not yet been determined if this sharing of
intelligence will go beyond specific investigative leads to obtain better
information on trends and patterns relating to illicit transshipments of U.S.
export-controlled items. However, an intelligence community liaison will
be assigned to the center, which may allow for a better exchange of
information between the enforcement and intelligence communities.

Beyond the creation of the Export Enforcement Coordination Center,
other reforms are underway which could impact enforcement. As many of
these reforms are in their infancy and detailed plans have not been
released, enforcement agency officials shared their views that the
planned reform initiatives for export control enforcement present both
opportunities and challenges. For example, we also reported in
November 2010, that one of the reform initiatives involves major revisions
to the Commerce and State lists of dual-use and defense items that are
controlled for export from the United States. This initiative was intended to
clarify regulations for companies seeking to export arms and dual-use
items to more easily determine whether items are regulated by State or
Commerce. According to a State Department official, the revision of the
control lists and the goal of clearer adjudication of the items controlled
could reduce the time required to review the license determinations—
allowing investigators to better focus their limited resources on those
items critical to national security. However, as we previously reported, the



27
     GAO-11-135R.




Page 28                                              GAO-12-246 Export Controls
review and possible removal of items controlled under the arms control
list is taking longer than the agencies had originally anticipated. Some
enforcement agency officials have raised concerns about changes to the
control list, believing that as the U.S. Munitions List and Commerce
Control List are revised, it could result in a decreased visibility of exports,
requiring increased targeting by CBP to inspect items before they are
exported overseas. Agency officials also stated that, as a result,
increased enforcement activities may be needed overseas to validate the
recipient of the item as fewer items would need U.S. government
approval in advance of shipment. 28 As staff located overseas have other
agency and mission-related priorities, their availability for increased
enforcement and compliance activities may be limited. Commerce
officials stated that their Export Control Officers stationed abroad allows
them to dedicate resources to providing compliance and investigative
activities for items impacted by export control reform. In addition, staffing
changes may require an approval process involving the agency, State
Department, and the Chief of Mission. 29 Also, some of the U.S. Attorneys
we met with were concerned about the possible lack of a license with
reform efforts, which they indicated is often relied upon in court to meet
the high standards of evidence needed to prosecute export control cases.
Other U.S. Attorneys stated that they were not as concerned, noting that
cases involving non-licensable items have been successfully prosecuted.
Further, as major changes to the State and Commerce control lists are
made, investigators may need to increase outreach efforts to companies
to provide education on U.S. export control laws. Specifically, in its fiscal
year 2011 Performance and Accountability Report, Commerce stated that
it will need to increase its outreach efforts to educate exporters about
changes in export control regulations and provide the necessary guidance
to ensure compliance with new regulations. 30




28
  According to State, as long as the applicant meets the exemption criteria, the export is
considered approved by the U.S. Government.
29
  National Security Decision Directive 38: Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their
Overseas Constituent Posts and GAO, Overseas Staffing: Rightsizing Approaches Slowly
Taking Hold, But More Action Needed to Coordinate and Carry Out Efforts, GAO-06-737
(Washington, D.C., June 30, 2006).
30
  U.S. Department of Commerce: Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year
2011.




Page 29                                                         GAO-12-246 Export Controls
              Another potential challenge with planned reform efforts includes the
              potential for separating criminal and administration enforcement functions
              currently administered by OEE. While this effort would require legislation,
              it could result in the transfer of OEE enforcement personnel to ICE and
              the administrative enforcement functions to a single licensing agency.
              According to OEE officials, by separating the criminal and administrative
              functions which are often linked in export control cases, civil fines and
              penalties levied in the current system may not be as actively pursued.
              Senior enforcement agency officials acknowledged that this and other
              enforcement challenges may be resolved through the Export Enforcement
              Coordination Center.


              Given the wide-ranging mission of most of the agencies involved in export
Conclusions   control enforcement, it is essential that agencies track resources
              expended on export control inspections, investigations, and prosecutions
              to assess how these resources are contributing to fulfilling their missions
              and are focused on the highest priorities in export control enforcement.
              While agencies, such as DHS and Justice, have recognized the need to
              better track their resources, a more comprehensive approach, including
              enhanced measures of effectiveness, could help these and other
              enforcement agencies assess workload and efficiency in making resource
              allocations and in determining whether changes are warranted. The
              creation of the Export Enforcement Coordination Center presents such an
              opportunity for the entire export control enforcement community. The
              center has the potential to become more than a co-location of
              enforcement agencies, but can be a conduit to more effectively manage
              export control resources. As the center’s operation progresses, it has the
              opportunity to address ongoing challenges in export control enforcement,
              including reducing potential overlap in investigations, and help agencies
              to work as efficiently as possible, maximize available intelligence and
              agency investigative data, and measure the effectiveness of U.S. export
              control enforcement activities. Challenges presented by delays in license
              determinations can affect the inspection, investigation, and prosecution of
              export control cases but may be outside of the mission of the center since
              they primarily involve the licensing agencies. Having goals for processing
              license determinations can help establish transparency and accountability
              in the process. Given that the licensing agencies and the Exodus
              Command Center have not agreed to timeliness goals for responding to
              such requests, these agencies may benefit from collaborating to help
              improve the effectiveness of the process.




              Page 30                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
                      To better inform management and resource allocation decisions,
Recommendations for   effectively manage limited export control enforcement resources, and
Executive Action      improve the license determination process, we are making the following
                      four recommendations:

                      We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
                      General, as they implement efforts to track resources expended on export
                      control enforcement activities, use such data to make resource allocation
                      decisions.

                      We recommend that the Secretaries of Commerce and Homeland
                      Security as they develop and implement qualitative measures of
                      effectiveness, ensure that these assess progress towards their overall
                      goal of preventing or deterring illegal exports.

                      We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
                      with the departmental representatives of the Export Enforcement
                      Coordination Center, including Commerce, Justice, State, and the
                      Treasury

                      •   leverage export control enforcement resources across agencies by
                          building on existing agency efforts to track resources expended, as
                          well as existing agency coordination at the local level;
                      •   establish procedures to facilitate data sharing between the
                          enforcement agencies and intelligence community to measure illicit
                          transshipment activity; and
                      •   develop qualitative and quantitative measures of effectiveness for the
                          entire enforcement community to baseline and trend this data.
                      We recommend that the Secretaries of Commerce and State, in
                      consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney
                      General, and other agencies as appropriate, establish agreed upon
                      timeliness goals for responding to license determination requests
                      considering agency resources, the level of determination, the complexity
                      of the request, and other associated factors.


                      We provided a draft copy of this report to Commerce, DHS, DOD, Justice,
Agency Comments       State, and Treasury for their review and comment. Commerce, DHS,
and Our Evaluation    Justice, and State concurred with the report’s recommendations and,
                      along with DOD, provided technical comments which we incorporated as
                      appropriate. Treasury did not provide any comments on the report.




                      Page 31                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
As multiple agencies have responsibilities for export control enforcement,
several of our recommendations call for these agencies to work together
to effectively manage limited export control enforcement resources and to
improve the license determination process. In their comments, Commerce
and State agreed to work in consultation with DHS and Justice to
establish timeliness goals for license determinations. In its comments,
DHS stated its intent to work with the other agencies to improve the
license determination process as well as take steps to deploy its
resources in the most effective and efficient manner and provided target
dates for completing these actions. In particular, DHS noted that ongoing
tracking efforts by CBP and ICE will be used to improve their knowledge
of resources expended on export control enforcement activities and that
they will periodically review this information to determine the overall
direction of the export control program. Additionally, DHS stated its intent
to establish a working group with other agencies to develop performance
measures related to export control enforcement to help estimate the
effectiveness of all associated law enforcement activity. Written
comments from Commerce, DHS, and State are reprinted in appendixes
II, III, and IV, respectively.


We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, as well as the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense,
Homeland Security, State, and Treasury as well as the Attorney General.
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.




Page 32                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
If you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made key
contributions to this report is listed in appendix V.




Belva M. Martin
Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management




Page 33                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
             Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




             To determine how agencies allocate staff resources for export control
             enforcement activities, we interviewed cognizant officials and examined
             relevant documents such as agencies’ budgets, strategic plans,
             memorandum, and other documentation on resources. We interviewed
             officials about their resources at the headquarters of Commerce, DHS,
             Justice, State, and the Treasury. We also discussed with DOD officials
             their role in providing investigative support to agencies responsible for
             export control enforcement. We developed and used a set of structured
             questions to interview each agency’s resource planners to determine how
             they allocate resources, what information and factors they consider in
             resource allocation decisions, what their enforcement priorities are,
             whether they track resources expended on enforcement, if they had
             conducted an analysis of their resource need, and if they consider or
             leverage other agencies’ resources. We obtained applicable criteria
             including the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 and
             departmental guidance on resource allocation and tracking. We also
             reviewed previous GAO and inspector general reports regarding the
             Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), as amended, and
             resource management for enforcement programs. To determine current
             resource levels, we obtained geographic locations of all domestic staff
             conducting export control enforcement, actual expenditures on export
             control enforcement activities, and information on staffing levels from
             each agency for fiscal years 2006 through 2010. We did not
             independently verify the accuracy of agency information on expenditures
             and staffing levels obtained, but we corroborated this information with
             cognizant agency officials. We considered agencies’ overall resources for
             the broad enforcement authorities and the resources allocated to export
             control enforcement specifically. Finally, we analyzed agencies’ budget
             requests, expenditures, and staff hours to determine agencies current
             resource commitment and how agencies have allocated resources to
             export control enforcement activities.

             To determine challenges that agencies face in investigating illicit
             transshipments and the potential impact of export control reform initiatives
             on enforcement activities, we interviewed cognizant officials, examined
             and analyzed relevant export control documents and statutes, and
             conducted sites visits both domestically and overseas. We interviewed
             officials about their enforcement priorities at the headquarters of
             Commerce, DHS, Justice, and State. We also discussed with DOD
             officials their role in providing license determination support to agencies
             responsible for export control enforcement. We developed and used a set
             of structured questions to interview enforcement agency officials in
             selected domestic and overseas locations and observed export


             Page 34                                             GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology




enforcement operations at those locations that had air, land, and
seaports. We selected sites to visit based on various factors, including
geographical areas where all enforcement agencies were represented
with a large percentage of investigative caseload; areas with a mix of
defense and high-tech companies represented; ports with a high volume
of trade of U.S. commodities; a large presence of aerospace, electronics,
and software industries, and based on headquarters officials’
recommendations on key areas of export control enforcement activities
both domestically and abroad. On the basis of these factors, we visited
Irvine, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose,
CA; Washington, D.C.; and Baltimore, MD domestically. Internationally,
we interviewed United States Embassy and Consulate officials and host
government authorities in Hong Kong, Singapore, and in Abu Dhabi and
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We received briefings on the
export control systems from the Hong Kong Government’s Trade and
Industry Department, Customs and Excise Tax Department, from
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore’s Immigration and
Customs Authority; as well as toured ports at these locations. We also
received a briefing from the Hong Kong Customs Airport Command on air
cargo and air-to-air transshipment of strategic commodities and visited
the DHL Hub at the Hong Kong International Airport. In the UAE, we
visited the Government of Sharjah, Department of Seaports & Customs,
Hamriyah Free Zone Authority and met with the Director and Security and
Safety Manager to discuss the Hamriyah Free Zone. We reviewed the
findings and recommendations of past GAO reports, documentation from
enforcement agencies, and interviewed U.S. government officials from
these agencies as well as their field offices. We also met with several
agency representatives of the Export Control Reform Task Force and
reviewed recent White House press releases on the export reform
initiatives. Further, we examined Federal Register notices on changing
regulations related to the export control reform initiative.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2011 through March
2012, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.




Page 35                                            GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix II: Comments from the Department
             Appendix II: Comments from the Department
             of Commerce



of Commerce




             Page 36                                     GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the
             Appendix III: Comments from the Department
             of Homeland Security



Department of Homeland Security




             Page 37                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security




Page 38                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security




Page 39                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of Homeland Security




Page 40                                      GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix IV: Comments from the
             Appendix IV: Comments from the Department
             of State



Department of State




             Page 41                                     GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department
of State




Page 42                                     GAO-12-246 Export Controls
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
                  Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
                  Acknowledgments



Acknowledgments

                  Belva Martin, (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov.
GAO Contact
                  In addition to the contact names above, John Neumann, Assistant
Staff             Director; Lisa Gardner; Desiree Cunningham; Jungjin Park; Marie Ahearn;
Acknowledgments   Roxanna Sun; Robert Swierczek; and Hai Tran made key contributions to
                  this report.




(120966)
                  Page 43                                            GAO-12-246 Export Controls
GAO’s Mission         The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and
                      investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its
                      constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and
                      accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO
                      examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
                      policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
                      to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions.
                      GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of
                      accountability, integrity, and reliability.

                      The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
Obtaining Copies of   cost is through GAO’s website (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon,
GAO Reports and       GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and
                      correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products,
Testimony             go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

Order by Phone        The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
                      production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
                      publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
                      white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website,
                      http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
                      Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
                      TDD (202) 512-2537.
                      Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
                      MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.
                      Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.
Connect with GAO      Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
                      Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.
                      Contact:
To Report Fraud,
Waste, and Abuse in   Website: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
                      E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Federal Programs      Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

                      Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-
Congressional         4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room
Relations             7125, Washington, DC 20548

                      Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
Public Affairs        U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
                      Washington, DC 20548




                        Please Print on Recycled Paper.