oversight

Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Modernized Electricity Grid

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2012-02-28.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                             United States Government Accountability Office

GAO                          Testimony
                             Before the Subcommittee on Oversight
                             and Investigations, Committee on Energy
                             and Commerce, House of Representatives

                             CYBERSECURITY
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:15 a.m. EST
Tuesday, February 28, 2012



                             Challenges in Securing the
                             Modernized Electricity Grid
                             Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director
                             Information Security Issues

                             David C. Trimble, Director
                             Natural Resources and Environment




GAO-12-507T
                                              February 2012

                                              CYBERSECURITY
                                              Challenges in Securing the Modernized Electricity
                                              Grid
Highlights of GAO-12-507T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives



Why GAO Did This Study                        What GAO Found
The electric power industry is                The threats to systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and
increasingly incorporating information        growing. In a February 2011 testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted
technology (IT) systems and networks          that there had been a dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S.
into its existing infrastructure as part of   computers and systems in the previous year, including a more than tripling of the
nationwide efforts—commonly referred          volume of malicious software since 2009. Varying types of threats from
to as the “smart grid”—aimed at               numerous sources can adversely affect computers, software, networks,
improving reliability and efficiency and      organizations, entire industries, and the Internet itself. These include both
facilitating the use of alternative energy    unintentional and intentional threats, and may come in the form of targeted or
sources such as wind and solar. Smart
                                              untargeted attacks from criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, hostile
grid technologies include metering
                                              nations, or terrorists. The interconnectivity between information systems, the
infrastructure (“smart meters”) that
enable two-way communication
                                              Internet, and other infrastructures can amplify the impact of these threats,
between customers and electricity             potentially affecting the operations of critical infrastructures, the security of
utilities, smart components that provide      sensitive information, and the flow of commerce. Moreover, the smart grid’s
system operators with detailed data on        reliance on IT systems and networks exposes the electric grid to potential and
the conditions of transmission and            known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by attackers.
distribution systems, and advanced            As GAO reported in January 2011, securing smart grid systems and networks
methods for controlling equipment. The        presented a number of key challenges that required attention by government and
use of these systems can bring a
                                              industry. These included:
number of benefits, such as fewer and
shorter outages, lower electricity rates,     •   A lack of a coordinated approach to monitor industry compliance with
and an improved ability to respond to             voluntary standards. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
attacks on the electric grid. However,            is responsible for regulating aspects of the electric power industry, which
this increased reliance on IT systems             includes adopting cybersecurity and other standards it deems necessary to
and networks also exposes the grid to             ensure smart grid functionality and interoperability. However, FERC had not,
cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which can          in coordination with other regulators, developed an approach to monitor the
be exploited by attackers. Moreover,
                                                  extent to which industry will follow the voluntary smart grid standards it
for nearly a decade, GAO has
                                                  adopts. As a result, it would be difficult for FERC and other regulators to
identified the protection of systems
supporting our nation’s critical
                                                  know whether a voluntary approach to standards setting is effective.
infrastructure—which include the              •   A lack of security features built into smart grid devices. According to a
electric grid—as a governmentwide                 panel of experts convened by GAO, smart meters had not been designed
high-risk area.                                   with a strong security architecture and lacked important security features.
                                                  Without securely designed systems, utilities would be at risk of attacks
GAO is providing a statement                      occurring undetected.
describing (1) cyber threats facing
                                              •   A lack of an effective information-sharing mechanism within the
cyber-reliant critical infrastructures and
                                                  electricity industry. While the industry has an information-sharing center, it
(2) key challenges to securing smart
grid systems and networks. In
                                                  had not fully addressed the need for sharing cybersecurity information in a
preparing this statement, GAO relied              safe and secure way. Without quality processes for sharing information,
on its previously published work in this          utilities may lack information needed to protect their assets against attackers.
area.                                         •   A lack of metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The industry lacked
                                                  metrics for measuring the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls, making it
                                                  difficult to measure the extent to which investments in cybersecurity improve
                                                  the security of smart grid systems. Until such metrics are developed, utilities
                                                  may not invest in security in a cost-effective manner or be able to make
                                                  informed decisions about cybersecurity investments.
View GAO-12-507T. For more information,       GAO made several recommendations to FERC aimed at addressing these
contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-
6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov or David C.        challenges. The commission agreed with these recommendations and described
Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or                  steps it is taking to implement them.
trimbled@gao.gov.
                                                                                       United States Government Accountability Office
Chairman Stearns, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the
Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at today’s hearing on assessments
of security for the smart grid.

As you know, the electric power industry is increasingly incorporating
information technology (IT) systems and networks into its existing
infrastructure (e.g., electricity networks including power lines and
customer meters) as part of nationwide efforts—commonly referred to as
the “smart grid”—aimed at improving reliability and efficiency and
facilitating the use of alternative energy sources (e.g., wind and solar).
Along with these anticipated benefits, however, cybersecurity and
industry experts have expressed concern that, if not implemented
securely, smart grid systems will be vulnerable to attacks that could result
in widespread loss of electrical services essential to maintaining our
national economy and security.

In addition, since 2003 we have identified protecting systems supporting
our nation’s critical infrastructure (which includes the electric grid) as a
governmentwide high-risk area, and we continue to do so in the most
recent update to our high-risk list. 1

In our testimony today, we will describe (1) cyber threats facing cyber-
reliant critical infrastructures, which include the electric grid, 2 and (2) key
challenges to securing smart grid systems and networks. In preparing this
statement in February 2012, we relied on our previous work in this area,
including a review of efforts to secure the smart grid and associated



1
 GAO’s biennial high-risk list identifies government programs that have greater
vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or need transformation to
address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. We have designated federal
information security as a high-risk area since 1997; in 2003, we expanded this high-risk
area to include protecting systems supporting our nation’s critical infrastructure—referred
to as cyber-critical infrastructure protection, or cyber CIP. See, most recently, GAO, High-
Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011).
2
 Federal policy established 18 critical infrastructure sectors: banking and finance;
chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; dams; defense
industrial base; emergency services; energy; food and agriculture; government facilities;
health care and public health; information technology; national monuments and icons;
nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; postal and shipping; transportation systems; and
water.




Page 1                                                                          GAO-12-507T
             challenges. 3 The products upon which this statement is based contain
             detailed overviews on the scope of our reviews and the methodology we
             used. The work on which this statement is based was performed in
             accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
             Those standards require that we plan and perform audits to obtain
             sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
             findings and conclusions. We believe that the evidence obtained provided
             a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
             objectives.


             The electricity industry, as shown in figure 1, is composed of four distinct
Background   functions: generation, transmission, distribution, and system operations.
             Once electricity is generated—whether by burning fossil fuels; through
             nuclear fission; or by harnessing wind, solar, geothermal, or hydro
             energy—it is generally sent through high-voltage, high-capacity
             transmission lines to local electricity distributors. Once there, electricity is
             transformed into a lower voltage and sent through local distribution lines
             for consumption by industrial plants, businesses, and residential
             consumers. Because electric energy is generated and consumed almost
             instantaneously, the operation of an electric power system requires that a
             system operator constantly balance the generation and consumption of
             power.




             3
              GAO, Electricity Grid Modernization: Progress Being Made on Cybersecurity Guidelines,
             but Key Challenges Remain to be Addressed, GAO-11-117 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12,
             2011).




             Page 2                                                                    GAO-12-507T
Figure 1: Functions of the Electricity Industry




                                           Utilities own and operate electricity assets, which may include generation
                                           plants, transmission lines, distribution lines, and substations—structures
                                           often seen in residential and commercial areas that contain technical
                                           equipment such as switches and transformers to ensure smooth, safe
                                           flow of current and regulate voltage. Utilities may be owned by investors,
                                           municipalities, and individuals (as in cooperative utilities). System
                                           operators—sometimes affiliated with a particular utility or sometimes
                                           independent and responsible for multiple utility areas—manage the


                                           Page 3                                                          GAO-12-507T
                            electricity flows. These system operators manage and control the
                            generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power using control
                            systems—IT- and network-based systems that monitor and control
                            sensitive processes and physical functions, including opening and closing
                            circuit breakers. 4 As we have previously reported, the effective
                            functioning of the electricity industry is highly dependent on these control
                            systems. 5 However, for many years, aspects of the electricity network
                            lacked (1) adequate technologies—such as sensors—to allow system
                            operators to monitor how much electricity was flowing on distribution
                            lines, (2) communications networks to further integrate parts of the
                            electricity grid with control centers, and (3) computerized control devices
                            to automate system management and recovery.


Smart Grid Aims to          As the electricity industry has matured and technology has advanced,
Modernize the Electricity   utilities have begun taking steps to update the electricity grid—the
Infrastructure              transmission and distribution systems—by integrating new technologies
                            and additional IT systems and networks. Though utilities have regularly
                            taken such steps in the past, industry and government stakeholders have
                            begun to articulate a broader, more integrated vision for transforming the
                            electricity grid into one that is more reliable and efficient; facilitates
                            alternative forms of generation, including renewable energy; and gives
                            consumers real-time information about fluctuating energy costs.

                            This vision—the smart grid—would increase the use of IT systems and
                            networks and two-way communication to automate actions that system
                            operators formerly had to make manually. Smart grid modernization is an
                            ongoing process, and initiatives have commonly involved installing
                            advanced metering infrastructure (smart meters) on homes and
                            commercial buildings that enable two-way communication between the
                            utility and customer. Other initiatives include adding “smart” components
                            to provide the system operator with more detailed data on the conditions
                            of the transmission and distribution systems and better tools to observe
                            the overall condition of the grid (referred to as “wide-area situational
                            awareness”). These include advanced, smart switches on the distribution



                            4
                             Circuit breakers are devices used to open or close electric circuits. If a transmission or
                            distribution line is in trouble, a circuit breaker can disconnect it from the rest of the system.
                            5
                             GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are
                            Under Way, but Challenges Remain, GAO-07-1036 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2007).




                            Page 4                                                                             GAO-12-507T
                                    system that communicate with each other to reroute electricity around a
                                    troubled line and high-resolution, time-synchronized monitors—called
                                    phasor measurement units—on the transmission system. Figure 2
                                    illustrates one possible smart grid configuration, though utilities making
                                    smart grid investments may opt for alternative configurations depending
                                    on cost, customer needs, and local conditions.

Figure 2: Common Smart Grid Components




                                    According to the National Energy Technology Laboratory, a Department
                                    of Energy (DOE) national laboratory supporting smart grid efforts, smart
                                    grid systems fall into several different categories:

                                    •    Integrated communications, such as broadband over power line
                                         communication technologies or wireless communications
                                         technologies.



                                    Page 5                                                           GAO-12-507T
                       •   Advanced components, such as smart switches, transformers, cables,
                           and other devices; storage devices, such as plug-in hybrid electric
                           vehicles and advanced batteries; and grid-friendly smart home
                           appliances.

                       •   Advanced control methods, including real-time monitoring and control
                           of substation and distribution equipment.

                       •   Sensing and measurement technologies, such as smart meters and
                           phasor measurement units.

                       •   Improved interfaces and decision support, which includes software
                           tools to analyze the health of the electricity system and real-time
                           digital simulators to study and test systems.

                       The use of smart grid systems may have a number of benefits, including
                       improved reliability from fewer and shorter outages, downward pressure
                       on electricity rates resulting from the ability to shift peak demand, an
                       improved ability to shift to alternative sources of energy, and an improved
                       ability to detect and respond to potential attacks on the grid.


Regulation of the      Both the federal government and state governments have authority for
Electricity Industry   overseeing the electricity industry. For example, the Federal Energy
                       Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates rates for wholesale electricity
                       sales and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce. This includes
                       approving whether to allow utilities to recover the costs of investments
                       they make to the transmission system, such as smart grid investments.
                       Meanwhile, local distribution and retail sales of electricity are generally
                       subject to regulation by state public utility commissions.

                       State and federal authorities also play key roles in overseeing the
                       reliability of the electric grid. State regulators generally have authority to
                       oversee the reliability of the local distribution system. The North American
                       Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is the federally designated U.S.
                       Electric Reliability Organization, and is overseen by FERC. NERC has
                       responsibility for conducting reliability assessments and enforcing
                       mandatory standards to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system—
                       i.e., facilities and control systems necessary for operating the
                       transmission network and certain generation facilities needed for
                       reliability. NERC develops reliability standards collaboratively through a
                       deliberative process involving utilities and others in the industry, which
                       are then sent to FERC for approval. These standards include critical



                       Page 6                                                             GAO-12-507T
                     infrastructure protection standards for protecting electric utility-critical and
                     cyber-critical assets.


Federal Smart Grid   The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) 6 established
Activities           federal support for the modernization of the electricity grid and required
                     actions by a number of federal agencies, including the National Institute
                     of Standards and Technology (NIST), FERC, and DOE. With regard to
                     cybersecurity, the act called for NIST and FERC to take the following
                     actions:

                     •   NIST was to coordinate development of a framework that includes
                         protocols and model standards for information management to
                         achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems. As part of
                         its efforts to accomplish this, NIST planned to identify cybersecurity
                         standards for these systems and also identified the need to develop
                         guidelines for organizations such as electric companies on how to
                         securely implement smart grid systems. In January 2011, 7 we
                         reported that NIST had identified 11 standards involving cybersecurity
                         that support smart grid interoperability and had issued a first version
                         of a cybersecurity guideline. 8

                     •   FERC was to adopt standards resulting from NIST’s efforts that it
                         deemed necessary to ensure smart grid functionality and
                         interoperability.

                     The act also authorized DOE to establish two initiatives to facilitate the
                     development of industry smart grid efforts. These were the Smart Grid
                     Investment Grant Program and the Smart Grid Regional Demonstration
                     Initiative. DOE made $3.5 billion and $685 million of American Recovery
                     and Reinvestment Act (“Recovery Act”) 9 funds available for these two
                     initiatives, respectively. The Smart Grid Investment Grant Program
                     provided grant awards to utilities in multiple states to stimulate the rapid


                     6
                     Pub. L. No. 110-140 (Dec. 19, 2007).
                     7
                     GAO-11-117.
                     8
                      NIST Special Publication 1108, NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid
                     Interoperability Standards, Release 1.0, January 2010 and NIST Interagency Report 7628,
                     Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security, August 2010.
                     9
                     Pub. L. No. 111-5 (Feb. 17, 2009).




                     Page 7                                                                    GAO-12-507T
                         deployment and integration of smart grid technologies, while the Smart
                         Grid Regional Demonstration Initiative was to fund regional
                         demonstrations to verify technology viability, quantify costs and benefits,
                         and validate new business models for the smart grid at a scale that can
                         be readily adopted around the country. The federal government has also
                         undertaken various other smart-grid-related initiatives, including funding
                         technical research and development, data collection, and coordination
                         activities.

                         In January 2012, the DOE Inspector General reported that cybersecurity
                         plans submitted by Smart Grid Investment Grant Program recipients were
                         not always complete or they did not describe intended security controls in
                         sufficient detail. 10 The report also stated that DOE officials approved
                         cybersecurity plans for smart grid projects even though some of the plans
                         contained shortcomings that could result in poorly implemented controls.
                         The report recommended, among other things, that DOE ensure that
                         grantees’ cybersecurity plans were complete, including thorough
                         descriptions of potential security risks and related mitigation through
                         necessary controls. The responsible DOE office stated that it will continue
                         to ensure that the security plans are complete and are implemented
                         properly.


                         Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure—which includes the
Smart Grid Is            electricity industry and its transmission and distribution systems—are
Potentially Vulnerable   evolving and growing. In February 2011, the Director of National
                         Intelligence testified that, in the past year, there had been a dramatic
to a Variety of Cyber    increase in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and
Threats                  networks, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious
                         software since 2009. 11 Different types of cyber threats from numerous
                         sources may adversely affect computers, software, networks,
                         organizations, entire industries, or the Internet. Cyber threats can be
                         unintentional or intentional. Unintentional threats can be caused by
                         software upgrades or maintenance procedures that inadvertently disrupt


                         10
                           U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits and
                         Inspections, Audit Report: The Department’s Management of the Smart Grid Investment
                         Grant Program, OAS-RA-12-04 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2012).
                         11
                           Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
                         Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, statement before the Senate Select
                         Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 16, 2011).




                         Page 8                                                                       GAO-12-507T
                                           systems. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks
                                           from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled
                                           employees, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information
                                           warfare, and terrorists. Moreover, these groups have a wide array of
                                           cyber exploits at their disposal. Table 1 provides descriptions of common
                                           types of cyber exploits.

Table 1: Common Cyber Exploits

Type of exploit                 Description
Cross-site scripting            An attack that uses third-party web resources to run script within the victim’s web browser or
                                scriptable application. This occurs when a browser visits a malicious website or clicks a malicious
                                link. The most dangerous consequences occur when this method is used to exploit additional
                                vulnerabilities that may permit an attacker to steal cookies (data exchanged between a web server
                                and a browser), log key strokes, capture screen shots, discover and collect network information, and
                                remotely access and control the victim’s machine.
Denial-of-service               An attack that prevents or impairs the authorized use of networks, systems, or applications by
                                exhausting resources.
Distributed denial-of-service   A variant of the denial-of-service attack that uses numerous hosts to perform the attack.
Logic bomb                      A piece of programming code intentionally inserted into a software system that will cause a
                                malicious function to occur when one or more specified conditions are met.
Phishing                        A digital form of social engineering that uses authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails to request
                                information from users to direct them to a fake website that requests information.
Passive wiretapping             The monitoring or recording of data, such as passwords transmitted in clear text, while they are
                                being transmitted over a communications link. This is done without altering or affecting the data.
SQL injection                   An attack that involves the alteration of a database search in a web-based application, which can be
                                used to obtain unauthorized access to sensitive information in a database.
Trojan horse                    A computer program that appears to have a useful function but also has a hidden and potentially
                                malicious function that evades security mechanisms by, for example, masquerading as a useful
                                program that a user would likely execute.
Virus                           A computer program that can copy itself and infect a computer without the permission or knowledge
                                of the user. A virus might corrupt or delete data on a computer, use e-mail programs to spread itself
                                to other computers, or even erase everything on a hard disk. Unlike a computer worm, a virus
                                requires human involvement (usually unwitting) to propagate.
War driving                     The method of driving through cities and neighborhoods with a wireless-equipped computer—
                                sometimes with a powerful antenna—searching for unsecured wireless networks.
Worm                            A self-replicating, self-propagating, self-contained program that uses network mechanisms to spread
                                itself. Unlike computer viruses, worms do not require human involvement to propagate.
Zero-day exploit                An exploit that takes advantage of a security vulnerability previously unknown to the general public.
                                In many cases, the exploit code is written by the same person who discovered the vulnerability. By
                                writing an exploit for the previously unknown vulnerability, the attacker creates a potent threat since
                                the compressed time frame between public discoveries of both makes it difficult to defend against.
                                           Source: GAO analysis of data from NIST, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, and industry reports.




                                           Page 9                                                                                                       GAO-12-507T
The potential impact of these threats is amplified by the connectivity
between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures,
creating opportunities for attackers to disrupt critical services, including
electrical power. For example, in May 2008, we reported that the
corporate network of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)—the nation’s
largest public power company, which generates and distributes power in
an area of about 80,000 square miles in the southeastern United States—
contained security weaknesses that could lead to the disruption of control
systems networks and devices connected to that network. 12 We made 19
recommendations to improve the implementation of information security
program activities for the control systems governing TVA’s critical
infrastructures and 73 recommendations to address specific weaknesses
in security controls. TVA concurred with the recommendations and has
taken steps to implement them. As government, private sector, and
personal activities continue to move to networked operations, the threat
will continue to grow.

We have reported 13 that cyber incidents can affect the operations of
energy facilities, as the following examples illustrate:

•     Stuxnet. In July 2010, a sophisticated computer attack known as
      Stuxnet was discovered. It targeted control systems used to operate
      industrial processes in the energy, nuclear, and other critical sectors.
      It is designed to exploit a combination of vulnerabilities to gain access
      to its target and modify code to change the process.

•     Browns Ferry power plant. In August 2006, two circulation pumps at
      Unit 3 of the Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear power plant failed,
      forcing the unit to be shut down manually. The failure of the pumps
      was traced to excessive traffic on the control system network, possibly
      caused by the failure of another control system device.

•     Northeast power blackout. In August 2003, failure of the alarm
      processor in the control system of FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based electric
      utility, prevented control room operators from having adequate
      situational awareness of critical operational changes to the electrical



12
  GAO, Information Security: TVA Needs to Address Weaknesses in Control Systems and
Networks, GAO-08-526 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2008).
13
    GAO-07-1036 and GAO-12-92.




Page 10                                                                GAO-12-507T
                         grid. When several key transmission lines in northern Ohio tripped
                         due to contact with trees, they initiated a cascading failure of 508
                         generating units at 265 power plants across eight states and a
                         Canadian province.

                   •     Davis-Besse power plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                         confirmed that in January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm
                         known as Slammer infected a private computer network at the idled
                         Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a
                         safety monitoring system for nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant’s
                         process computer failed, and it took about 6 hours for it to become
                         available again.


Smart Grid Faces   While presenting significant potential benefits, the smart grid vision and
Cybersecurity      its increased reliance on IT systems and networks also expose the
Vulnerabilities    electric grid to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which
                   could be exploited by a wide array of cyber threats. This creates an
                   increased risk to the smooth and reliable operation of the grid. As we and
                   others have reported, 14 these vulnerabilities include

                   •     an increased number of entry points and paths that can be exploited
                         by potential adversaries and other unauthorized users;

                   •     the introduction of new, unknown vulnerabilities due to an increased
                         use of new system and network technologies;

                   •     wider access to systems and networks due to increased connectivity;
                         and

                   •     an increased amount of customer information being collected and
                         transmitted, providing incentives for adversaries to attack these
                         systems and potentially putting private information at risk of
                         unauthorized disclosure and use.

                   We and others have also reported that smart grid and related systems
                   have known cyber vulnerabilities. For example, cybersecurity experts
                   have demonstrated that certain smart meters can be successfully
                   attacked, possibly resulting in disruption to the electricity grid. In addition,


                   14
                       GAO-11-117.




                   Page 11                                                              GAO-12-507T
                      we have reported that control systems used in industrial settings such as
                      electricity generation have vulnerabilities that could result in serious
                      damages and disruption if exploited. 15 Further, in 2009, the Department of
                      Homeland Security, in cooperation with DOE, ran a test that
                      demonstrated that a vulnerability commonly referred to as “Aurora” had
                      the potential to allow unauthorized users to remotely control, misuse, and
                      cause damage to a small commercial electric generator. Moreover, in
                      2008, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that malicious activities
                      against IT systems and networks have caused disruption of electric power
                      capabilities in multiple regions overseas, including a case that resulted in
                      a multicity power outage. 16


                      In our January 2011 report, we identified a number of key challenges that
Securing Smart Grid   industry and government stakeholders faced in ensuring the cybersecurity
Systems and           of the systems and networks that support our nation’s electricity grid. 17
Networks Presents     Among others, these challenges included the following:

Challenges            •     Lack of a coordinated approach to monitor whether industry follows
                            voluntary standards. As mentioned above, under EISA, FERC is
                            responsible for adopting cybersecurity and other standards that it
                            deems necessary to ensure smart grid functionality and
                            interoperability. However, FERC had not developed an approach
                            coordinated with other regulators to monitor, at a high level, the extent
                            to which industry will follow the voluntary smart grid standards it
                            adopts. There had been initial efforts by regulators to share views,
                            through, for example, a collaborative dialogue between FERC and the
                            National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC),
                            which had discussed the standards-setting process in general terms.
                            Nevertheless, according to officials from FERC and NARUC, FERC
                            and the state public utility commissions had not established a joint
                            approach for monitoring how widely voluntary smart grid standards
                            are followed in the electricity industry or developed strategies for
                            addressing any gaps. Moreover, FERC had not coordinated in such a
                            way with groups representing public power or cooperative utilities,


                      15
                          GAO-07-1036.
                      16
                        The White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient
                      Information and Communications Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009).
                      17
                          GAO-11-117.




                      Page 12                                                                   GAO-12-507T
     which are not routinely subject to FERC’s or the states’ regulatory
     jurisdiction for rate setting. We noted that without a good
     understanding of whether utilities and manufacturers are following
     smart grid standards, it would be difficult for FERC and other
     regulators to know whether a voluntary approach to standards setting
     is effective or if changes are needed. 18

•    Lack of security features being built into certain smart grid systems.
     Security features had not been consistently built into smart grid
     devices. For example, according to experts from a panel convened by
     GAO, currently available smart meters had not been designed with a
     strong security architecture and lacked important security features,
     such as event logging 19 and forensics capabilities, which are needed
     to detect and analyze attacks. In addition, these experts stated that
     smart grid home area networks—used for managing the electricity
     usage of appliances and other devices in the home—did not have
     adequate security built in, thus increasing their vulnerability to attack.
     Without securely designed smart grid systems, utilities may not be
     able to detect and analyze attacks, increasing the risk that attacks
     would succeed and utilities would be unable to prevent them from
     recurring.

•    Lack of an effective mechanism for sharing cybersecurity information
     within the electricity industry. The electricity industry lacked an
     effective mechanism to disclose information about smart grid
     cybersecurity vulnerabilities, incidents, threats, lessons learned, and
     best practices in the industry. For example, experts stated that while
     the industry has an information-sharing center, it had not fully
     addressed these information needs. According to these experts,
     information regarding incidents such as both successful and


18
  In an order issued on July 19, 2011, FERC reported that it had found insufficient
consensus to institute a rulemaking proceeding to adopt Smart Grid interoperability
standards identified by NIST as ready for consideration by regulatory authorities. While
FERC dismissed the rulemaking, it encouraged utilities, smart grid product manufacturers,
regulators, and other smart grid stakeholders to actively participate in the NIST
interoperability framework process to work on the development of interoperability
standards and to refer to that process for guidance on smart grid standards. Despite this
result, we believe our recommendations to FERC in GAO-11-117, with which FERC
concurred, remain valid and should be acted upon as consensus is reached and
standards adopted.
19
  Event logging is the capability of an IT system to record events occurring within an
organization’s systems and networks, including those related to computer security.




Page 13                                                                        GAO-12-507T
     unsuccessful attacks must be able to be shared in a safe and secure
     way; this is crucial to avoid publicly revealing the reported
     organization and penalizing entities actively engaged in corrective
     action. Such information sharing across the industry could provide
     important information regarding the level of attempted attacks and
     their methods, which could help grid operators better defend against
     them. In developing an approach to cybersecurity information sharing,
     the industry could draw upon the practices and approaches of other
     industries. Without quality processes for information sharing, utilities
     may not have the information needed to adequately protect their
     assets against attackers.

•    Lack of industry metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The electricity
     industry was also challenged by a lack of cybersecurity metrics,
     making it difficult to measure the extent to which investments in
     cybersecurity improve the security of smart grid systems. Experts
     noted that while such metrics 20 are difficult to develop, they could help
     in comparing the effectiveness of competing solutions and
     determining what mix of solutions best secure systems. Further, our
     panel of experts noted that having metrics would help utilities develop
     a business case for cybersecurity by helping to show the return on a
     particular investment. Until such metrics are developed, increased risk
     exists that utilities will not invest in security in a cost-effective manner
     or be able to have the information needed to make informed decisions
     about their cybersecurity investments.

Accordingly, in our January 2011 report, we made multiple
recommendations to FERC, including that it develop an approach to
coordinating with state regulators to evaluate the extent to which utilities
and manufacturers are following voluntary smart grid standards and
develop strategies for addressing any gaps in compliance with standards
that are identified as a result. We further recommended that FERC,
working with NERC as appropriate, assess whether commission efforts
should address any of the cybersecurity challenges identified in our
report. FERC agreed with our recommendations and described steps the
commission intended to take to address them. We are currently working
with FERC officials to determine the status of their efforts to address
these recommendations.


20
  Metrics can be used for, among other things, measuring the effectiveness of
cybersecurity controls for detecting and blocking cyber attacks.




Page 14                                                                     GAO-12-507T
                  In summary, the electricity industry is in the midst of a major
                  transformation as a result of smart grid initiatives and this has led to
                  significant investments by many entities, including utilities, private
                  companies, and the federal government. While these initiatives hold the
                  promise of significant benefits, including a more resilient electric grid,
                  lower energy costs, and the ability to tap into alternative sources of
                  power, the prevalence of cyber threats aimed at the nation’s critical
                  infrastructure and the cyber vulnerabilities arising from the use of new
                  technologies highlight the importance of securing smart grid systems. In
                  particular, it will be important for federal regulators and other stakeholders
                  to work closely with the private sector to address key cybersecurity
                  challenges posed by the transition to smart grid technology. While no
                  system can be made 100 percent secure, proven security strategies could
                  help reduce risk to an acceptable level.

                  Chairman Stearns, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the
                  Subcommittee, this completes our statement. We would be happy to
                  answer any questions you have at this time.


                  If you have any questions regarding this statement, please contact
Contact and       Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov or
Acknowledgments   David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Other key
                  contributors to this statement include Michael Gilmore (Assistant
                  Director), Jon R. Ludwigson (Assistant Director), Paige Gilbreath,
                  Barbarol J. James, and Lee A. McCracken.




(311084)
                  Page 15                                                            GAO-12-507T
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