oversight

Medicare: Important Steps Have Been Taken, but More Could Be Done to Deter Fraud

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 2012-04-24.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                             United States Government Accountability Office

GAO                          Testimony
                             Before the Committee on Finance, U.S.
                             Senate


                             MEDICARE
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Tuesday, April 24, 2012



                             Important Steps Have Been
                             Taken, but More Could Be
                             Done to Deter Fraud
                             Statement of Kathleen King
                             Director, Health Care




GAO-12-671T
                                             April 24, 2012

                                             MEDICARE
                                             Important Steps Have Been Taken, but More Could
                                             Be Done to Deter Fraud
Highlights of GAO-12-671T, a testimony
before the Committee on Finance, U.S.
Senate




Why GAO Did This Study                       What GAO Found
GAO has designated Medicare as a             The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that
high-risk program, in part because its       administers Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key
complexity makes it particularly             strategies GAO identified in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from
vulnerable to fraud. Fraud involves an       fraud; however, some actions that could help combat fraud remain incomplete.
intentional act or representation to
deceive with the knowledge that the          Provider Enrollment: GAO’s previous work found persistent weaknesses in
action or representation could result in     Medicare’s enrollment standards and procedures that increased the risk of
gain. The deceptive nature of fraud          enrolling entities intent on defrauding the program. CMS has strengthened
makes its extent in the Medicare             provider enrollment—for example, in February 2011, CMS designated three
program difficult to measure in a            levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with different screening procedures
reliable way, but it is clear that fraud     for categories of providers at each level. However, CMS has not completed other
contributes to Medicare’s fiscal             actions, including implementation of some relevant provisions of the Patient
problems. Reducing fraud could help          Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Specifically, CMS has not
rein in the escalating costs of the          (1) determined which providers will be required to post surety bonds to help
program.                                     ensure that payments made for fraudulent billing can be recovered,
This statement focuses on the                (2) contracted for fingerprint-based criminal background checks, (3) issued a
progress made and steps that remain          final regulation to require additional provider disclosures of information, and
to be taken by CMS to implement              (4) established core elements for provider compliance programs.
recent legislation and GAO’s past
                                             Pre- and Post-payment Claims Review: GAO had previously found that
recommendations to prevent or reduce
                                             increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can prevent payments
fraud in Medicare. It is based on
relevant GAO products issued from            from being made for potentially fraudulent claims, while improving systems used
April 2004 through April 2012 using a        to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify patterns of
variety of methodologies, such as            potentially fraudulent billing for further investigation. CMS has controls in
analyses of Medicare claims, review of       Medicare’s claims processing systems to determine if claims should be paid,
relevant policies and procedures, and        denied, or reviewed further by comparing information on claims with information
interviews with officials. In April 2012,    on providers and Medicare coverage and requirements. These controls require
GAO also received updated                    timely and accurate information about providers that GAO has previously
information from CMS on agency               recommended that CMS strengthen. GAO is currently examining CMS’s use of
actions.                                     prepayment edits to implement coverage and payment policies and CMS’s new
                                             Fraud Prevention System, which uses analytic methods to examine claims before
                                             payment. CMS could better use post-payment claims review to identify patterns
                                             of fraud by incorporating prior GAO recommendations to develop plans and
                                             timelines for fully implementing and expanding two information technology
                                             systems it developed. These systems are a central storehouse of Medicare and
                                             other data and a Web portal to the storehouse with tools for analysis.
                                             Robust Process to Address Identified Vulnerabilities: Having mechanisms in
                                             place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to erroneous payments is critical to
                                             effective program management and could help address fraud. Such
                                             vulnerabilities are service- or system-specific weaknesses that can lead to
                                             payment errors—for example, providers receiving multiple payments as a result
                                             of incorrect coding. GAO has previously identified weaknesses in this process,
                                             which resulted in vulnerabilities being left unaddressed. GAO is evaluating the
                                             current status of the process for assessing and developing corrective actions to
                                             address vulnerabilities.
View GAO-12-671T. For more information,
contact Kathleen King at (202) 512-7114 or
kingk@gao.gov.

                                                                                    United States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Other Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work regarding fraud in the
Medicare program, and provisions in recent laws and agency actions that
may help address this problem. 1 Fraud involves an intentional act or
representation to deceive with the knowledge that the action or
representation could result in gain. Although there have been convictions
for multimillion dollar schemes that defrauded the Medicare program, the
extent of the problem is unknown. There are no reliable estimates of the
extent of fraud in the Medicare program or for the health care industry as
a whole. By its very nature, fraud is difficult to detect, as those involved
are engaged in intentional deception. For example, fraud may involve
providers submitting a claim with false documentation for services not
provided, while the claim on its face may appear valid. Fraud also can
involve efforts to hide ownership of companies or kickbacks to obtain
beneficiary information. Although the full extent of the problem is
unknown, it is clear that the Medicare program is vulnerable to fraud,
which contributes to Medicare’s fiscal problems. Reducing fraud could
help rein in the escalating costs of the program.

We have repeatedly designated Medicare as a high-risk program, as its
complexity, and susceptibility to payment errors from various causes,
added to its size, have made it vulnerable to loss. 2 As one example, the
fee-for-service (FFS) portion of the Medicare program processes over a
billion claims a year from about 1.5 million providers and suppliers;
working to ensure that those payments are accurate is a complex,
ongoing task. Medicare has many individual vulnerabilities, which are
service- or system-specific weaknesses that can lead to payment errors,


1
 Medicare is the federally financed health insurance program for persons age 65 or over,
certain individuals with disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease. Medicare
Parts A and B are known as Medicare fee-for-service (FFS). Medicare Part A covers
hospital and other inpatient stays. Medicare Part B is optional, and covers hospital
outpatient, physician, and other services. Medicare beneficiaries have the option of
obtaining coverage for Medicare services from private health plans that participate in
Medicare Advantage—Medicare’s managed care program—also known as Part C. All
Medicare beneficiaries may purchase coverage for outpatient prescription drugs under
Part D, either as a stand-alone benefit or as part of a Medicare Advantage plan.
2
 In 1990, we began to report on government operations that we identified as “high risk” for
serious weaknesses in areas that involve substantial resources and provide critical
services to the public. Medicare has been included among such programs since 1990.
See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011).
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/risks/insurance/medicare_program.php.




Page 1                                                                          GAO-12-671T
including those due to fraud. 3 If the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) that administers the program, suspects that providers or
suppliers are billing fraudulently, it can take action, including suspending
claims payment, revoking billing privileges, or referring cases to law
enforcement for investigation. 4 Further, it can impose a moratorium on
new enrollment of providers or suppliers. 5 Since 1997, Congress has
provided funds specifically for activities to address fraud, as well as waste
and abuse, 6 in Medicare and other federal health care programs. In
addition, Congress created the Medicare Integrity Program to conduct
activities to reduce fraud, waste, abuse, and improper payments. 7 In
2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), which provided additional funding for such efforts and set a
number of new requirements specific to Medicare. 8 Furthermore, the
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 9 established new Medicare fee-for-


3
 CMS defines vulnerabilities to the Medicare program as issues that can lead to fraud,
waste, or abuse, which can either be specific, such as providers receiving multiple
payments as a result of incorrect coding for a service, or general and programwide, such
as weaknesses in online application processes.
4
 In this testimony, the term provider includes entities such as hospitals or physicians, and
supplier means an entity that supplies Medicare beneficiaries with durable medical
equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) such as walkers and
wheelchairs.
5
 Enrolling as a provider or supplier in Medicare allows an entity to provide services or
equipment to beneficiaries and bill for those services.
6
 Waste includes inaccurate payments for services, such as unintentional duplicate
payments. Abuse represents actions inconsistent with acceptable business or medical
practices.
7
 An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made or that was made
in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory,
contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements. This definition
includes any payment to an ineligible recipient, any payment for an ineligible good or
service, any duplicate payment, any payment for a good or service not received (except
where authorized by law), and any payment that does not account for credit for applicable
discounts. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
204, § 2(e), 124 Stat. 2224, 2227 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 note).
8
 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, which we refer
to collectively as PPACA. The provisions discussed in this statement are generally located
in sections 6401 through 6411 and 10603 and 10605 of PPACA, as well as sections 1303
and 1304 of HCERA.
9
Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 4241, 124 Stat. 2504, 2599.




Page 2                                                                          GAO-12-671T
service claims review requirements and provided funding to implement
these requirements.

My testimony today focuses on the progress made and steps that remain
to be taken by CMS to reduce fraud in Medicare. It is informed by 8 years
of our work on Medicare fraud, waste, abuse, and improper payments,
including our most recent report assessing CMS’s efforts to strengthen
the screening of providers and suppliers, which can help prevent entities
intent on committing fraud from obtaining billing privileges. 10 I will focus
on several key strategies CMS can undertake to help reduce fraud
identified in our prior work from 2004 to 2012, namely: 11

•    strengthening provider enrollment standards and procedures,

•    improving pre- and post-payment claims review, and

•    developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities.

The products on which this statement is based were developed by using
a variety of methodologies, including analyses of Medicare claims, review
of relevant policies and procedures, interviews with agency officials and
other stakeholders, and site visits. 12 We also received updated
information from CMS in April 2012 on its actions related to the laws,
regulations, guidance, and open recommendations that we discuss in this
statement. Our prior work was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.


10
 See GAO, Medicare Program Integrity: CMS Continues Efforts to Strengthen the
Screening of Providers and Suppliers, GAO-12-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2012).
11
  These strategies were among those identified in our June 2010 testimony as critical to
helping prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare. See GAO, Medicare Fraud, Waste,
and Abuse: Challenges and Strategies for Preventing Improper Payments, GAO-10-844T
(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2010). A list of related products appears at the end of this
statement.
12
 The products listed at the end of this statement contain detailed information on the
methodologies used in our work.




Page 3                                                                        GAO-12-671T
                       CMS has made progress strengthening provider enrollment to try to better
CMS Has Made           ensure that only legitimate providers and suppliers are allowed to bill
Progress in            Medicare. However, CMS has not completed other actions that could help
                       prevent individuals intent on fraud from enrolling, including
Strengthening          implementation of some relevant PPACA provisions.
Provider Enrollment,
but Further Actions
Are Needed

Past CMS efforts to    Our previous work found persistent weaknesses in Medicare’s enrollment
strengthen provider    standards and procedures that increased the risk of enrolling entities
enrollment             intent on defrauding the Medicare program. 13 We, CMS, and the HHS
                       Office of Inspector General (OIG) have previously identified two types of
                       providers whose services and items are especially vulnerable to improper
                       payments and fraud—home health agencies (HHA) and suppliers of
                       durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies
                       (DMEPOS). We found weaknesses in oversight of providers’ and
                       suppliers’ enrollment. For example, in 2008, we identified weaknesses
                       when we created two fictitious DMEPOS companies, which were
                       subsequently enrolled by CMS’s contractor and given permission to begin
                       billing Medicare. 14 In 2009, we found that CMS’s contractors were not
                       requiring HHAs to resubmit enrollment information for re-verification every
                       5 years as required by CMS. 15

                       To strengthen the Medicare enrollment process in 2006 CMS began
                       requiring all providers and suppliers—including those who order HHA
                       services or DMEPOS for beneficiaries to be enrolled in Medicare. The
                       agency also required all providers and suppliers to report their National



                       13
                         See GAO, Medicare: CMS’s Program Safeguards Did Not Deter Growth in Spending for
                       Power Wheelchairs; GAO-05-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2004); Medicare: More
                       Effective Screening and Stronger Enrollment Standards Needed for Medical Equipment
                       Suppliers, GAO-05-656 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005); Medicare: Improvements
                       Needed to Address Improper Payments for Medical Equipment and Supplies, GAO-07-59
                       (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007); and Medicare: Improvements Needed to Address
                       Improper Payments in Home Health, GAO-09-185 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2009).
                       14
                        GAO, Medicare: Covert Testing Exposes Weaknesses in the Durable Medical
                       Equipment Supplier Screening Process, GAO-08-955 (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2008).
                       15
                        GAO-09-185.




                       Page 4                                                                  GAO-12-671T
                          Provider Identifiers (NPI) on enrollment applications, which can help
                          address fraud because providers and suppliers must submit either their
                          Social Security Number or their employer identification number and state
                          licensing information to obtain an NPI. 16 In 2007, CMS initiated the first
                          phase of a Medicare competitive bidding program for DMEPOS. 17 This
                          program requires suppliers’ bids to include new financial documentation
                          for the year prior to submitting the bids. Because CMS can now disqualify
                          suppliers based in part on scrutiny of their financial new documents,
                          competitive bidding can help reduce fraud. Finally, in 2010, CMS also
                          required that all DMEPOS suppliers be accredited by a CMS-approved
                          accrediting organization to ensure that they meet certain quality
                          standards. Such accreditation also increased scrutiny of these
                          businesses.


CMS Has Taken Action on   PPACA authorized CMS to implement several actions to strengthen
Certain PPACA Provider    provider enrollment. As of April 2012, the agency has completed some of
Enrollment Provisions     these actions.

                          Screening Provider Enrollment Applications by Risk Level: CMS and OIG
                          issued a final rule with comment period in February 2011 to implement
                          some of the new screening procedures required by PPACA. 18 CMS
                          designated three levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with
                          different screening procedures for categories of Medicare providers at
                          each level. Providers in the high-risk level are subject to the most rigorous



                          16
                            HIPAA required that HHS adopt standards for unique health identifiers. CMS adopted
                          the NPI as the standard unique health identifier for its health care providers and suppliers
                          in its Final Rule: HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standard Unique Health Identifier for
                          Health Care Providers, 69 Fed. Reg. 3434 (Jan. 23, 2004). Consistent with the NPI Final
                          Rule, beginning in 2006, the Medicare program required providers and suppliers to report
                          their NPIs on their enrollment applications.
                          17
                            Competitive bidding is a process in which suppliers of medical equipment and supplies
                          compete for the right to provide their products on the basis of established criteria, such as
                          quality and price.
                          18
                            Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Additional Screening
                          Requirements, Application Fees, Temporary Enrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions
                          and Compliance Plans for Providers and Suppliers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5862 (Feb. 2, 2011). In
                          discussing the final rule, CMS noted that Medicare had already employed a number of the
                          screening practices described in PPACA to determine if a provider is in compliance with
                          federal and state requirements to enroll or to maintain enrollment in the Medicare
                          program.




                          Page 5                                                                          GAO-12-671T
screening. 19 To determine which providers to place in these risk levels,
CMS considered issues such as past occurrences of improper payments
and fraud among different categories of providers. Based in part on our
work and that of the OIG, CMS designated newly enrolling HHAs and
DMEPOS suppliers as high risk and designated other providers at lower
levels. (See table 1.) Providers at all risk levels are screened to verify that
they meet specific requirements established by Medicare such as having
current licenses or accreditation and valid Social Security numbers. 20
High- and moderate-risk providers are additionally subject to
unannounced site visits. Further, depending on the risks presented,
PPACA authorizes CMS to require fingerprint-based criminal history
checks, and the posting of surety bonds for certain providers. 21 CMS may
also provide enhanced oversight for specific periods for new providers
and for initial claims of DMEPOS suppliers.




19
  PPACA specified that the enhanced screening procedures would apply to new providers
and suppliers beginning 1 year after the date of enactment and to currently enrolled
providers and suppliers 2 years after that date.
20
  Screening may include verification of the following: Social Security number; NPI;
National Practitioner Databank licensure; whether the provider has been excluded from
federal health care programs by the OIG; taxpayer identification number; and death of an
individual practitioner, owner, authorized official, delegated official, or supervising
physician.
21
  A surety bond is a three-party agreement in which a company, known as a surety,
agrees to compensate the bondholder if the bond purchaser fails to keep a specified
promise.




Page 6                                                                      GAO-12-671T
Table 1: Categories of Medicare Providers and Suppliers Designated by Risk Level
for Enrollment Screening

    Risk level Categories of Medicare providers and suppliers
    Limited       Physician or nonphysician practitioners and medical groups or clinics, with
                  the exception of physical therapists and physical therapy groups.
                  Ambulatory surgical centers, competitive acquisition programs/Part B
                  vendors, end-stage renal disease facilities, federally qualified health centers,
                                                  a
                  histocompatibility laboratories, hospitals, including critical access hospitals,
                  Indian Health Service facilities, mammography screening centers, mass
                                              b
                  immunization roster billers, organ procurement organizations, pharmacies
                  newly enrolling or revalidating, radiation therapy centers, religious
                  nonmedical health care institutions, rural health clinics, and skilled nursing
                  facilities.
    Moderate      Ambulance suppliers, community mental health centers, comprehensive
                  outpatient rehabilitation facilities, hospice organizations, independent
                  diagnostic testing facilities, independent clinical laboratories, physical
                  therapy including physical therapy groups, portable X-ray suppliers, and
                  currently enrolled (revalidating) home health agencies.
    High          Prospective (newly enrolling) home health agencies and prospective
                  (newly enrolling) suppliers of durable medical equipment, prosthetics,
                  orthotics, and supplies.
Source: GAO analysis of CMS Final Rule with Comment Period, Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs:
Additional Screening Requirements, Applications Fees, Temporary Enrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions and Compliance Plans
for Providers and Suppliers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5862 (Feb. 2, 2011).
a
 Histocompatibility laboratories provide evaluations of certain genetic data and pertinent patient
immunologic risk factors to allow clinician and patient to make decisions about whether
transplantation is in the patient’s best interest.
b
 Mass immunization roster billers are providers and suppliers who enroll in the Medicare program to
offer influenza (flu) vaccinations to a large number of individuals, and they must be properly licensed
in the states in which they plan to operate influenza clinics.


CMS indicated that the agency will continue to review the criteria for its
screening levels on an ongoing basis and would publish changes if the
agency decided to update the assignment of screening levels for
categories of Medicare providers. This may become necessary because
fraud is not confined to HHAs and DMEPOS suppliers. We are currently
examining the types of providers involved in fraud cases investigated by
the OIG and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which may help illuminate
risk to the Medicare program from different types of providers. Further, in
their 2011 annual report on the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Program, DOJ and HHS reported convictions or other legal actions, such
as exclusions or civil monetary penalties, against several types of
Medicare providers other than DMEPOS suppliers and HHAs, including
pharmacists, orthopedic surgeons, infusion and other types of medical




Page 7                                                                                                      GAO-12-671T
clinics, and physical therapy services. 22 CMS also has established
triggers for adjustments to an individual provider’s risk level. For example,
CMS regulations state that an individual provider or supplier at the
limited- or moderate-risk level that has had its billing privileges revoked by
a Medicare contractor within the last 10 years and is attempting to re-
enroll, would move to the high-risk level for screening.

New National Enrollment Screening and Site Visit Contractors: In a
further effort to strengthen its enrollment processes, CMS contracted with
two new entities at the end of 2011 to assume centralized responsibility
for automated screening of provider and supplier enrollment and for
conducting site visits of providers.

•    Automated screening contractor. In December 2011, the new
     contractor began to establish systems to conduct automated
     screening of providers and suppliers to ensure they meet Medicare
     eligibility criteria (such as valid licensure, accreditation, a valid NPI,
     and no presence on the OIG list of providers and suppliers excluded
     from participating in federal health care programs). 23 Prior to the
     implementation of this new automated screening, such screening was
     done manually for the 30,000 enrollees each month by CMS’s
     Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC), which enroll Medicare
     providers, and the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC), which
     enrolls DMEPOS suppliers. According to CMS, the old screening
     process was neither efficient nor timely. CMS officials said that in
     2012, the automated screening contractor began automated
     screening of the licensure status of all currently enrolled Medicare
     providers and suppliers. The agency said it expects the automated
     screening contractor to begin screening newly enrolling providers and
     suppliers later this year. CMS expects that the new, national
     contractor will enable better monitoring of providers and suppliers on
     a continuous basis to help ensure they continue to meet Medicare
     enrollment requirements. The new screening contractor will also help
     the MACs and the NSC maintain enrollment information in CMS’s



22
  The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011
(Washington, D.C.: February 2012).
23
  Licensure is a mandatory process by which a state government grants permission to an
individual practitioner or health care organization to engage in an occupation or
profession.




Page 8                                                                    GAO-12-671T
                              Provider Enrollment Chain and Ownership System (PECOS)—a
                              database that contains details on enrolled providers and suppliers. In
                              addition, CMS officials said the automated screening contractor is
                              developing an individual risk score for each provider or supplier,
                              similar to a credit risk score. Although these individual scores are not
                              currently used to determine an individual provider’s placement in a
                              risk level, CMS indicated that this risk score may be used eventually
                              as additional risk criteria in the screening process.

                         •    Site visits for all providers designated as moderate and high risk.
                              Beginning in February 2012, a single national site visit contractor
                              began conducting site visits of moderate- and high-risk providers to
                              determine if sites are legitimate and the providers meet certain
                              Medicare standards. 24 The contractor collects the same information
                              from each site visit, including photographic evidence that will be
                              available electronically through a web portal accessible to CMS and
                              its other contractors. The national site visit contractor is expected to
                              validate the legitimacy of these sites. CMS officials told us that the
                              contractor will provide consistency in site visits across the country, in
                              contrast to CMS relying on different MACs to conduct any required
                              site visits.

CMS Has Not Completely   Implementation of other enrollment screening actions authorized by
Implemented Some PPACA   PPACA that could help CMS reduce the enrollment of providers and
Enrollment Provisions    suppliers intent on defrauding the Medicare program remains incomplete,
                         including:

                         •    Surety bond—PPACA authorizes CMS to require a surety bond for
                              certain types of at-risk providers, which can be helpful in recouping
                              erroneous payments. CMS officials expect to issue a proposed rule to
                              require surety bonds as conditions of enrollment for certain types of
                              providers. Extending the use of surety bonds to new entities would
                              augment a previous statutory requirement for DMEPOS suppliers to




                         24
                           Starting March 25, 2011, CMS required the MACs to conduct site visits for categories of
                         providers and suppliers designated as moderate and high risk. The national site visit
                         contractor assumed these responsibilities in 2012. The NSC continues to conduct site
                         visits related to provider enrollment of DMEPOS suppliers. In addition, CMS at times
                         exercises its authority to conduct a site visit or requests its contractors to conduct a site
                         visit for any Medicare provider or supplier.




                         Page 9                                                                          GAO-12-671T
     post a surety bond at the time of enrollment. 25 CMS issued final
     instructions to its MACs, effective February 2012, for recovering
     DMEPOS overpayments through surety bonds. CMS officials reported
     that as of April 19, 2012, they had issued notices to 20 surety bond
     companies indicating intent to collect funds, but had not collected any
     funds as of that date.

•    Fingerprint-based Criminal Background Checks—CMS officials
     told us that they are working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
     to arrange contracts to help conduct fingerprint-based criminal
     background checks of high-risk providers and suppliers. On April 13,
     2012, CMS issued a request for information regarding a contract to
     conduct Medicare provider and supplier fingerprint-based background
     checks. The agency expects to have the contract in place before the
     end of 2012.

•    Providers and Suppliers Disclosure—CMS officials said the agency
     is reviewing options for increased disclosures of prior actions taken
     against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in
     Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject
     to a payment suspension from a federal health care program. 26 In
     April 2012, agency officials indicated that they were not certain when
     the regulation would be published. CMS officials noted that the
     additional disclosure requirements are complicated by provider and
     supplier concerns about what types of information will be collected,
     what CMS will do with it, and how the privacy and security of this
     information will be maintained.




25
  42 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(16)(B). As of October 2009, DMEPOS suppliers were required to
obtain and submit a surety bond in the amount of at least $50,000. A DMEPOS surety
bond is a bond issued by an entity guaranteeing that a DMEPOS supplier will fulfill its
obligation to Medicare. If the obligation is not met, Medicare will recover its losses via the
surety bond. Medicare Program; Surety Bond Requirement for Suppliers of Durable
Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS), 74 Fed. Reg. 166
(Jan. 2, 2009).
26
  At the time of initial enrollment or revalidation of enrollment, PPACA requires providers
and suppliers to disclose any current or previous affiliation with another provider or
supplier that has uncollected debt; has been or is subject to a payment suspension under
a federal health care program; has been excluded from participation under Medicare,
Medicaid, or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program; or has had its billing
privileges denied or revoked.




Page 10                                                                          GAO-12-671T
                         •    Compliance and Ethics Program—CMS officials said that the
                              agency was studying criteria found in OIG model plans as it worked to
                              address the PPACA requirement that the agency establish the core
                              elements of compliance programs for providers and suppliers. 27 In
                              April 2012, CMS did not have a projected target date for
                              implementation.

                         Increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can better
Additional Action May    prevent payments that should not be made, while improving systems
Help Better Identify     used to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify
                         patterns of fraudulent billing for further investigation.
Potential Fraud
through Pre- and Post-
Payment Claims
Review
Additional Efforts to    Having robust controls in claims payment systems to prevent payment of
Improve Prepayment       problematic claims can help reduce loss. As claims go through
Claims Review May Help   Medicare’s electronic claims payment systems, they are subjected to
                         automated prepayment controls called “edits,” instructions programmed in
Reduce Fraud             the systems to prevent payment of incomplete or incorrect claims. Some
                         edits use provider enrollment information, while others use information on
                         coverage or payment policies, to determine if claims should be paid. Most
                         of these controls are fully automated; if a claim does not meet the criteria
                         of the edit, it is automatically denied. Other prepayment edits are manual;
                         they flag a claim for individual review by trained staff who determine if it
                         should be paid. Due to the volume of claims, CMS has reported that
                         approximately 25 in a million Medicare claims are subject to manual
                         medical record review by trained personnel.




                         27
                           A compliance program is an internal set of policies, processes, and procedures that a
                         provider organization implements to help it act ethically and lawfully. In this context, a
                         compliance program is intended to help provider and supplier organizations prevent and
                         detect violations of Medicare laws and regulations. CMS has used the phrase “compliance
                         and ethics program” and indicated it may base its program on the seven elements of
                         effective compliance and ethics programs found in the U. S. Federal Sentencing
                         Guidelines Manual.




                         Page 11                                                                      GAO-12-671T
Having effective pre-payment edits that deny claims for ineligible
providers and suppliers depends on having timely and accurate
information about them, such as whether the providers are currently
enrolled and have the appropriate license or accreditation to provide
specific services. We have previously identified flaws in the timeliness
and accuracy of PECOS—the database that maintains Medicare provider
and supplier enrollment information. We noted that weaknesses in
PECOS data may result in CMS making improper payments to ineligible
providers and suppliers. 28 These weaknesses are related to the frequency
with which CMS’s contractors update enrollment information and the
timeliness and accuracy of information obtained from outside entities,
such as state licensing boards, the OIG, and the Social Security
Administration’s Death Master File, which contains information on
deceased individuals that can be used to identify deceased providers in
order to terminate those providers’ Medicare billing privileges. These
sources vary in the ease in which CMS contractors have been able to
access their data and the frequency with which they are updated. CMS
has indicated that its new national screening contractor should improve
the timeliness and accuracy of the provider and supplier information in
PECOS by centralizing the process, increasing automation of the
process, continuously checking databases, and incorporating new
sources of data, such as financial, business, tax, and geospatial data.
However, it is too soon to tell if these efforts will better prevent payments
to ineligible providers and suppliers.

Having effective edits to implement coverage and payment policies before
payment is made can also help to deter fraud. The Medicare program has
defined categories of items and services eligible for coverage and
excludes from coverage items or services that are determined not to be
“reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness
or injury or to improve functioning of a malformed body part.” 29 CMS and
its contractors set policies regarding when and how items and services
will be covered by Medicare, as well as coding and billing requirements
for payment, which also can be implemented in the payment systems
through edits. We have previously found Medicare’s payment systems did
not have edits for items and services unlikely to be provided in the normal



28
 GAO-12-351.
29
 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).




Page 12                                                           GAO-12-671T
course of medical care. 30 CMS has since implemented edits to flag such
claims—called Medically Unlikely Edits. We are currently assessing
Medicare’s prepayment edits based on coverage and payment policies,
including the Medically Unlikely Edits, and oversight of its contractors
implementing these edits.

Additionally, suspending payments to providers suspected of fraudulent
billing can be an effective tool to prevent excess loss to the Medicare
program while suspected fraud is being investigated. For example, in
March 2011, the OIG testified that payment suspensions and pre-
payment edits on 18 providers and suppliers stopped the potential loss of
more than $1.3 million submitted in claims by these individuals.
Furthermore, HHS recently reported that it imposed payment suspensions
on 78 home health agencies in conjunction with arrests related to a
multimillion dollar health care fraud scheme. While CMS had the authority
to impose payment suspensions prior to PPACA, the law specifically
authorized CMS to suspend payments to providers pending the
investigation of credible allegations of fraud. 31 This ability would enable
CMS to suspend payments beyond the 180-day time limit established by
regulation prior to PPACA. CMS officials reported that the agency had
imposed 212 payment suspensions since the regulations implementing
the PPACA provisions took effect. Agency officials indicated that almost
half of these suspensions were imposed this calendar year, representing
about $6 million in Medicare claims.

We are currently evaluating a new CMS effort, the Fraud Prevention
System (FPS) which uses predictive analytic technologies to analyze FFS
claims on a prepayment basis. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010
requires CMS to use predictive analytic technologies both to identify and
to prevent improper payments under Medicare FFS. 32 The law requires


30
 GAO-07-59.
31
  CMS is required to consult with the HHS OIG in determining whether a credible
allegation of fraud exists. Based on how CMS used its previous payment suspension
authority, in November 2010, the OIG found weaknesses in CMS’s implementation of
payment suspensions that could lead to delays in the suspension process. Such delays
would allow payments to continue to providers suspected of fraud. Specifically, the OIG
found that CMS’s guidance to its contractors on procedures for implementing payment
suspensions was incomplete and inconsistent. Although the OIG made no
recommendations, it suggested that these weaknesses could be addressed through CMS
rulemaking pursuant to PPACA.
32
 Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 4241, 124 Stat. 2504, 2599.




Page 13                                                                    GAO-12-671T
these predictive analytic technologies to be used to review claims for
potential fraud by identifying unusual or suspicious patterns or
abnormalities in Medicare provider networks, claims billing patterns, and
beneficiary utilization. According to CMS, FPS may enhance CMS’s
ability to identify potential fraud because it analyzes large numbers of
claims from multiple data sources nationwide simultaneously before
payment is made, thus allowing CMS to examine billing patterns across
geographic regions for those that may indicate fraud. The results of FPS
could lead to the initiation of payment suspensions, implementation of
automatic claim denials, identification of additional pre-payment edits,
investigations, or the revocation of Medicare billing privileges. CMS
began using FPS to screen all FFS claims nationwide prior to payment as
of June 30, 2011. Because FPS is relatively new, and we have not
completed our work, it is too soon to determine whether FPS will improve
CMS’s ability to address fraud.

“Bust-out” fraud schemes in which providers or suppliers suddenly bill
very high volumes of claims to obtain large payments from Medicare
could be addressed by adding a prepayment edit. Such an edit would set
thresholds to stop payment for atypically rapid increases in billing thus
helping to stem losses from these schemes. In our prior work on
DMEPOS, we recommended that CMS require its contractors to develop
thresholds for unexplained increases in billing and use them to develop
pre-payment controls that could suspend these claims for further review
before payment. 33 Members of this Committee have recently requested
information from CMS about what the agency is doing to implement
payment caps to protect Medicare from “bust out” schemes. CMS officials
told us that they are currently considering analytic models in FPS that
could help them address billing practices suggestive of “bust outs.”




33
  See GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and
Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012) and GAO-07-59.




Page 14                                                                  GAO-12-671T
Actions Needed to           Further actions are needed to improve use of two CMS information
Improve Use of Systems      technology systems that could help analysts identify fraud after
Intended for Post-payment   payment. 34
Claims Review               •    The Integrated Data Repository (IDR) became operational in
                                 September 2006 as a central storehouse of Medicare and other data
                                 needed to help CMS program integrity staff and contractors prevent
                                 and detect improper payments of claims. However, we found IDR did
                                 not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by fiscal
                                 year 2010, because of technical obstacles and delays in funding.
                                 Further, as of December 2011 the agency had not finalized plans or
                                 developed reliable schedules for efforts to incorporate these data,
                                 which could lead to additional delays.

                            •    One Program Integrity (One PI) is a web portal intended to provide
                                 CMS staff and contractors with a single source of access to data
                                 contained in IDR, as well as tools for analyzing those data. While One
                                 PI is operational, we reported in December 2011 that CMS had
                                 trained few program integrity analysts and the system was not being
                                 widely used

                            GAO recommended that CMS take steps to finalize plans and reliable
                            schedules for fully implementing and expanding the use of both IDR and
                            One PI. Although the agency told us in April 2012 that it had initiated
                            activities to incorporate some additional data into IDR and expand the use
                            of One PI, such as training more CMS staff and contractors, they have
                            not fully addressed our recommendations.




                            34
                             GAO, Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to
                            Ensure More Widespread Use, GAO-11-475 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).




                            Page 15                                                                GAO-12-671T
                        Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to
A Robust Process to     improper payments is critical to effective program management and could
Address Identified      help address fraud. 35 However, our work has shown weaknesses in
Vulnerabilities Could   CMS’s processes to address such identified vulnerabilities.

Help Reduce Fraud       CMS’s Recovery Auditing Contractors (RAC) are specifically charged with
                        identifying improper payments and vulnerabilities that could lead to such
                        payment errors. However, in our March 2010 report on the RAC
                        demonstration program, we found that CMS had not established an
                        adequate process during the demonstration or in planning for the national
                        program to ensure prompt resolution of such identified vulnerabilities in
                        Medicare; further, the majority of the most significant vulnerabilities
                        identified during the demonstration were not addressed. 36 We therefore
                        recommended that CMS develop and implement a corrective action
                        process that includes policies and procedures to ensure the agency
                        promptly (1) evaluates findings of RAC audits, (2) decides on the
                        appropriate response and a time frame for taking action based on
                        established criteria, and (3) acts to correct the vulnerabilities identified. 37

                        Our recommendations will not be fully addressed until CMS has put
                        policies and procedures in place that will lead the agency to act promptly
                        to correct identified vulnerabilities. In December 2011, the OIG found that
                        CMS had not resolved or taken significant action to resolve 48
                        (77 percent) of 62 vulnerabilities reported in 2009 by CMS contractors
                        specifically charged with addressing fraud. Only 2 vulnerabilities had




                        35
                          We have reported that an agency should have policies and procedures to ensure that
                        (1) the findings of all audits and reviews are promptly evaluated, (2) decisions are made
                        about the appropriate response to these findings, and (3) actions are taken to correct or
                        resolve the issues promptly. These are all aspects of internal control, which is the
                        component of an organization’s management that provides reasonable assurance that the
                        organization achieves effective and efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and
                        compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Internal control standards provide a
                        framework for identifying and addressing major performance challenges and areas at
                        greatest risk for mismanagement. GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control
                        Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
                        36
                         GAO, Medicare Recovery Audit Contracting: Weaknesses Remain in Addressing
                        Vulnerabilities to Improper Payments, Although Improvements Made to Contractor
                        Oversight, GAO-10-143 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2010).
                        37
                         GAO-10-43.




                        Page 16                                                                       GAO-12-671T
               been fully resolved by January 2011. 38 The OIG made several
               recommendations, including that CMS have written procedures and time
               frames to assure that vulnerabilities were resolved. CMS has indicated
               that it is now tracking vulnerabilities identified by several types of
               contractors through a single vulnerability tracking process. We are
               currently examining aspects of CMS’s vulnerability tracking process and
               will be reporting on it soon.


               Although CMS has taken some important steps to identify and prevent
Concluding     fraud, including implementing provisions in PPACA and the Small
Observations   Business Jobs Act, more remains to be done to prevent making
               erroneous Medicare payments due to fraud. In particular, we have found
               that CMS could do more to strengthen provider enrollment screening to
               avoid enrolling those intent on committing fraud, improve pre- and
               post-payment claims review to identify and respond to patterns of
               suspicious billing activity more effectively, and identify and address
               vulnerabilities to reduce the ease with which fraudulent entities can obtain
               improper payments. It is critical that CMS implement and make full use of
               new authorities granted by recent legislation, as well as incorporating
               recommendations made by us, as well as the OIG. Moving from
               responding once fraud has already occurred to preventing it from
               occurring in the first place is key to ensuring that federal funds are used
               efficiently and for their intended purposes.

               As all of these new authorities and requirements become part of
               Medicare’s operations, additional evaluation and oversight will be
               necessary to determine whether they are implemented as required and
               have the desired effect. We have several studies underway that assess
               efforts to fight fraud in Medicare and that should continue to help CMS
               refine and improve its fraud detection and prevention efforts. Notably, we
               are assessing the effectiveness of different types of pre-payment edits in
               Medicare and of CMS’s oversight of its contractors in implementing those
               edits to help ensure that Medicare pays claims correctly the first time. We
               are also examining the use of predictive analytics to improve fraud
               prevention and detection. Additionally, we have work underway to identify
               the types of providers and suppliers currently under investigation and



               38
                HHS-OIG, Addressing Vulnerabilities Reported by Medicare Benefit Integrity
               Contractors, OEI-03-10-00500 (December 2011).




               Page 17                                                                   GAO-12-671T
those who have been found to have engaged in fraudulent activities.
These studies may enable us to point out additional actions for CMS that
could help the agency more systematically reduce fraud in the Medicare
program.

Due to the amount of program funding at risk, fraud will remain a
continuing threat to Medicare, so continuing vigilance to reduce
vulnerabilities will be necessary. Individuals who want to defraud
Medicare will continue to develop new approaches to try to circumvent
CMS’s safeguards and investigative and enforcement efforts. In
particular, although targeting particular types of providers whom the
agency has identified as high risk may be useful, it may allow other types
of providers committing fraud to go unnoticed. We will continue to assess
efforts to fight fraud and provide recommendations to CMS, as
appropriate, that we believe will assist the agency in this important task.
We urge CMS to continue its efforts as well.


Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may
have.

For further information about this statement, please contact Kathleen M.
King at (202) 512-7114 or kingk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Sheila Avruch, Assistant Director; Jennie Apter;
Jennel Harvey; Anne Hopewell; Lisa Rogers; and Jennifer Whitworth
were key contributors to this statement.




Page 18                                                          GAO-12-671T
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             Page 19                                                      GAO-12-671T
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Page 20                                                      GAO-12-671T
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           Page 21                                                      GAO-12-671T
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