Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-03-11.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         United States General Accounting Office

GAO                      Testimony
                         Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
                         Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on
                         Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release

Expected at

1:00 p.m., EST
                         COMBATING TERRORISM

March 11, 1999

                         Observations on Federal
                         Spending to Combat
                         Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller
                         General, National Security and International Affairs

          Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

          We are pleased to be here to discuss our past and ongoing work and
          observations on federal funding of efforts to combat terrorism. As you
          know, over the past 3 years we have studied and reported on a number of
          issues concerning federal agencies’ programs and activities to combat
          terrorism for this Subcommittee and Representative Ike Skelton. (See
          app. I for a list of related GAO products.) In December 1997, we reported
          that key federal agencies with responsibilities to combat terrorism spent
          about $6.7 billion in fiscal year 1997 for unclassified activities and
          programs to combat terrorism and noted that precise funding information
          was unavailable for various reasons. 1 That report led to legislation
          requiring the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a
          system for collecting and reporting information on executive agencies’
          spending and budgets for combating terrorism. The legislation also
          required the President to annually report this information to the Congress. 2
          OMB’s most recent report identified $10 billion for programs to combat
          terrorism in the fiscal year 2000 budget. 3

          My testimony will address three issues. First, I will briefly describe the
          foreign-origin and domestic terrorism threat as we understand it from
          intelligence analyses. Second, I will provide some of our overall
          observations on program growth and other issues raised throughout our
          work on combating terrorism. Finally, I will discuss some steps the
          executive branch has taken toward improving crosscutting management
          and coordination and provide some preliminary observations on the 1998
          and 1999 OMB reports to Congress on governmentwide spending and
          budgeting to combat terrorism.

Summary   The U.S. intelligence community continuously assesses both the
          foreign-origin and the domestic terrorist threat to the United States and
          notes that conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the
          weapons of choice for terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical

           Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
          Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

              National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997).

            Of the $10 billion, $8.6 billion is for combating terrorism, including weapons of mass destruction, and
          $1.4 billion is for critical infrastructure protection.

          Page 1                                                                         GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
and biological weapons than conventional explosives, although the
possibility that they may use chemical and biological materials may
increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies.

Since our work began in 1996, the number and cost of the various programs
and initiatives to combat terrorism have grown significantly. Key agencies
involved in activities to combat terrorism reported to us that they spent
$5.7 billion in fiscal year 1996. The President’s fiscal year 2000 budget
requests $10 billion, a $3-billion increase over the $6.7 billion originally
requested for fiscal year 1999. This rapid program growth has occurred in
the absence of (1) a governmentwide strategy that includes a defined
end-state; (2) soundly established, defined, and prioritized program
requirements; and (3) crosscutting analyses of individual agencies’ budget
proposals to ensure that unnecessary duplication and waste are avoided
and existing federal, state, and local capabilities are fully leveraged.

The executive branch has taken some important steps and made progress
toward improving the way it manages and coordinates the growing,
complex array of agencies, offices, programs, activities, and capabilities.
For example, in responding to the legislative requirement, OMB has
performed two governmentwide reviews—one in 1998 and one in 1999—of
funding levels and programs to combat terrorism. In addition, in December
1998, the Attorney General issued a classified 5-year interagency plan on
counterterrorism and technology crime that includes goals, objectives, and
performance indicators and recommendations to resolve interagency
problems and issues it identified. The plan, however, does not link its
recommended actions and priorities to budget resources. The Attorney
General is also establishing a National Domestic Preparedness Office at the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 4 to reduce state and local confusion
over the many federal training and equipment programs to prepare for
terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Also, in May
1998, Presidential Decision Directive 62 further articulated U.S. policy and
established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection
and Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council.

Notwithstanding these positive steps, we continue to see opportunities to
better focus and target the nation’s investments in combating terrorism and

  Under Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI is the lead federal agency for crisis response in the
event of a terrorist incident in the United States. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
is the lead federal agency for consequence management.

Page 2                                                                      GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                       better assure that the United States is prioritizing its funding of the right
                       programs in the right amounts. OMB’s 1998 and 1999 reports provide
                       unprecedented and helpful insight into enacted funding and budget
                       requests that are for the most part not readily identifiable in the federal
                       budget and appropriations acts. The reports, however, do not clearly or
                       explicitly describe any established priorities or duplication of efforts as
                       called for in the legislation. We have not fully evaluated the executive
                       branch agencies’ processes or methodologies associated with the OMB
                       reports and cannot comment on whether they fully and accurately capture
                       the costs associated with programs and activities to combat terrorism.

The Foreign and        The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the federal building in
                       Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in 1995, along with the use of a nerve agent in
Domestic Terrorism     the Tokyo subway in 1995, have elevated concerns about terrorism in the
Threat in the United   United States—particularly terrorists’ use of chemical and biological
                       weapons. The U.S. intelligence community, which includes the Central
States                 Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the FBI and others, has
                       continuously assessed the foreign-origin and domestic terrorist threats to
                       the United States. According to intelligence agencies, conventional
                       explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for
                       terrorists. Terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons
                       at least partly because they are more difficult to weaponize and the results
                       are unpredictable. However, some groups and individuals of concern are
                       showing interest in chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and
                       biological agents are still less likely to be used than conventional
                       explosives. Figure 1 shows the number of terrorist incidents in the United
                       States during 1992-97, according to the FBI.

                       Page 3                                                 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                          Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1992-97
                          Number of Incidents







                                   1992       1993         1994         1995            1996      1997

                          Source: FBI.

Initiatives and Funding   Annual and supplemental agency appropriations have continued to fund a
                          growing number of programs, initiatives, and activities to combat
to Combat Terrorism       terrorism. For example, for fiscal year 1999, the Congress authorized
Are Increasing Rapidly    $9.7 billion for combating terrorism, including $2.1 billion in an emergency
                          supplemental following the bombings of two U.S. embassies. Included in
                          the emergency supplemental was $1.4 billion for the State Department to
                          reconstruct its embassies and upgrade embassy security. The President’s
                          fiscal year 2000 budget proposes $10 billion for counterterrorism programs,
                          domestic preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection—a $3 billion
                          increase over the requested funding of $6.7 billion for fiscal year 1999.
                          Table 1 shows the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget proposal of
                          $8.6 billion for programs to combat terrorism, excluding critical
                          infrastructure programs, by major agency.

                          Page 4                                                         GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Table 1: Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request for Combating Terrorism
Dollars in millions
Department/agency                                        Fiscal year 2000 request
National Security Community                                               $5,052
Department of Justice                                                        838
Department of Treasury                                                       838
Department of Energy                                                         648
Department of State                                                          524
Others                                                                       712
Total                                                                     $8, 613
Note: Totals may not add due to OMB rounding.
Source: OMB.

Certain individual agencies have experienced rapid increases in recent
years in funding for programs and activities to combat terrorism. For
example, the Department of Health and Human Services has increased its
spending from $7 million in fiscal year 1996 to about $160 million budgeted
for fiscal year 1999 and has requested $230 million for fiscal year 2000 for
its “bioterrorism” initiative. The initiative is intended to improve disease
surveillance and communications systems, establish regional laboratories,
continue to establish a national pharmaceutical stockpile, conduct
research into new vaccines and drugs, and expand the number of local
emergency medical teams. Figure 2 shows the increases in Health and
Human Services’ funding for efforts to combat terrorism.

Page 5                                                   GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 2: Health and Human Services Funding to Combat Terrorism, Fiscal Years
Dollars in Millions





  1995          1996         1997            1998        1999       2000       2001

                                       F isca l Ye a r

Source: OMB annual reports and GAO report.

The Office of Justice Programs in the Department of Justice has also
experienced rapid growth in funds budgeted for its state and local
domestic preparedness programs. As shown in figure 3, funds have
increased from zero allocated in fiscal year 1997, to $21 million in fiscal
year 1998, to $120 million in fiscal year 1999, to a fiscal year 2000 budget
request of $162 million to provide training and equipment to local first
responders and to fund national training centers.

Page 6                                                          GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Figure 3: Office of Justice Programs Funding for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal
Years 1997-2000
Dollars in Millions









     1996             1997            1998                     1999       2000              2001

                                             F isca l Ye a r

Source: Department of Justice.

As discussed in our November 1998 report, 5 and as shown in figure 4, the
FBI more than doubled its allocation of resources for combating terrorism,
from about $256 million in fiscal year 1995 to about $581 million in fiscal
year 1998. As of July 1998, the FBI planned to allocate about $609 million
for its counterterrorism mission in fiscal year 1999 (including about
$70 million in no-year funds carried forward from prior fiscal years). The
estimated fiscal year 2000 FBI allocation for combating terrorism totals
$498 million.

 Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs
1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Page 7                                                                  GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                       Figure 4: FBI Funding Allocations for Counterterrorism Mission, Fiscal Years 1995-
                       Dollars in Millions







                         1994                1995     1996                       1997    1998         1999

                                                             F i sc a l Ye a r

                       Source: GAO.

                       Roughly half of the FBI’s funding to combat terrorism was for related law
                       enforcement and investigative activities, while the other half involved
                       activities such as preparing for or responding to terrorist acts and
                       protecting the national infrastructure. Our work also showed that about
                       25 percent of the funds FBI allocated to counterterrorism was based on
                       statutory direction or congressional guidance.

Program Growth Areas   I would like to highlight the rapid growth in two program areas that is
                       taking place in the absence of sound threat and risk assessment to establish
Should Be Based on     program requirements and prioritize and focus the nation’s investments:
Sound Requirements     domestic preparedness programs for responding to terrorist attacks and
                       public health initiatives. We have previously reported on the benefits of
                       threat and risk assessments, both in the context of domestic preparedness

                       Page 8                                                           GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                        programs and generally. 6 Threat and risk assessments are widely
                        recognized as sound decision support tools to help define and prioritize
                        requirements and properly focus programs and investments in combating
                        terrorism. Soundly established requirements could help ensure that the
                        specific programs, initiatives, and activities—and related expenditures—
                        are justified and targeted, given the threat and risk of validated terrorist
                        attack scenarios as assessed by a multidisciplinary team of experts.

Domestic Preparedness   In the absence of sound, well-defined requirements, domestic preparedness
                        funding increased from $42.6 million, 7 provided mainly to the Department
                        of Defense under the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation 8 in fiscal year 1997,
                        to about $1.3 billion requested for a number of agencies’ preparedness
                        activities in fiscal year 2000. For example, the fiscal year 2000 budget
                        proposes an additional $611 million for training, equipping, and exercising
                        cities’ first responders in preparation for a potential terrorist attack and for
                        strengthening public health infrastructure. There are many similar
                        programs and initiatives across several agencies to train and equip local
                        emergency response personnel, such as those in fire, police, and
                        emergency medical services, to deal with the consequences of a terrorist
                        attack. We previously recommended that threat and risk assessments be
                        performed to establish training and equipment requirements for the
                        Domestic Preparedness Program. 9

                        As I mentioned earlier, the Department of Justice has sponsored training
                        programs and implemented an equipment grant program for state and local
                        responders. It also is establishing a Center for Domestic Preparedness at
                        Fort McClellan, Alabama. Other Justice-funded centers and training
                        venues related to combating terrorism are at universities, such as Texas
                        A&M and Louisiana State University, and the Department of Energy’s
                        Nevada Test Site. FEMA and its National Fire Academy have long-standing
                        resident and nonresident training programs in emergency management and

                         Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
                        Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

                          While other agencies’ domestic preparedness programs may have also received funding in fiscal
                        year 1997, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was most visible at the time.

                            Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-201).

                         See Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program
                        Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

                        Page 9                                                                        GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
hazardous materials. FEMA has requested about $31 million for fiscal year
2000—a $13-million increase over fiscal year 1999 funding. Twenty-nine
million of the $31 million is to train and equip state and local responders.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been
establishing Metropolitan Medical Response Systems with trained and
equipped local emergency teams in 27 cities that also participate in the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici domestic preparedness training and equipment
program. HHS has requested fiscal year 2000 funding to include 25 more
cities in its program.

In addition, HHS is contracting with the Department of Veteran’s Affairs
(VA) to train non-federal National Disaster Medical System hospital staffs
to deal with weapons of mass destruction situations. VA urged that
decontamination and personal protection equipment be provided to the
hospitals. VA pointed out that VA hospitals are not receiving training that is
similar to the HHS-offered training and are not budgeted for
chemical-biological equipment either, even though VA medical centers
could have a role in responding to a terrorist incident.

We also noted growth and potential overlap in federal agencies’ response
capabilities to support state or local incident commanders. National Guard
Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams 10 are being created
despite numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can perform
similar functions. For example, there are over 600 existing local and state
hazardous materials response teams that can respond to terrorist events,
including those involving highly toxic industrial chemicals. There are also
the Army’s Technical Escort Units, the Marine Corps’ Chemical-Biological
Incident Response Force, 11 military reserve components’ chemical and
medical capabilities, Environmental Protection Agency and Coast Guard
response teams, and other federal response assets organized under the
Federal Response Plan. Included in the fiscal year 1999 appropriations is
$52 million to establish, train, and equip the first 10 of potentially 54 RAID
teams and to establish RAID (Light) teams in states that do not yet have a
full RAID team. A RAID (Light) comprises four regular, drilling Army

  The RAID teams’ mission is to provide assistance to local incident commanders in the event of an
incident involving chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons. They are to (1) assess the
situation, (2) advise civilian responders as to appropriate actions, and (3) facilitate the identification
and movement of federal military assets to the incident scene.

  These are highly trained and equipped specialized military units that can provide a wide range of
support to handle, transport, identify, and provide technical and medical advice and assistance on
chemical and biological weapons and agents.

Page 10                                                                        GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                            National Guard members with a training and awareness mission and
                            limited response capabilities. The Defense Department’s fiscal year 2000
                            budget requests about $38 million to support the existing teams and to
                            create five new RAID teams. We are reviewing the roles and missions of
                            the RAID teams for this Subcommittee and other requesters and expect to
                            report on those in late May of this year.

                            In addition to the 27 locally based medical response teams (with more to be
                            established), HHS has established four specialized National Medical
                            Response Teams, three of which are deployable in the event of a terrorist
                            attack involving a chemical or biological weapon. These four special teams
                            are in addition to 24 deployable Disaster Medical Assistance Teams that are
                            to provide medical support for any type of disaster, including terrorism.

                            Another federal response element that appears to be growing is federal
                            laboratories with capability to analyze chemical and biological agents. The
                            Army, the Navy, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have
                            laboratory capabilities. In addition, HHS plans to establish regional
                            laboratories, and the FBI is establishing a mobile laboratory capability.
                            Both the FBI and the Environmental Protection Agency have forensic
                            laboratories, although there are some differences in capabilities, and the
                            FBI is looking into using existing facilities rather than creating a
                            specialized laboratory for weapons of mass destruction cases.

Public Health Initiatives   HHS has received about $160 million in fiscal year 1999 appropriations and
                            requested $230 million in fiscal year 2000 for a number of initiatives related
                            to the possibility of a terrorist event using biological or chemical agents.
                            HHS expects that creating a national stockpile of millions of doses of
                            vaccines for smallpox and anthrax, antidotes for chemical agents,
                            antibiotics for other diseases, and respirators will cost $51 million in fiscal
                            year 1999 and $52 million in fiscal year 2000. Preliminary observations
                            from our ongoing work are that HHS did not perform a formal and
                            complete threat and risk assessment to derive, prioritize, or rank—in
                            accordance with the most likely threats the nation will face—the specific
                            items it plans to have researched, developed, produced, and stockpiled. In
                            fact, several of the items HHS plans to procure do not match intelligence
                            agencies’ judgments on the more likely chemical and biological agents a
                            terrorist group or individual might use. For example, smallpox, plague, and
                            tularemia (a bacteria) are not among the intelligence agencies’ lists of
                            agents that are most likely to be used by terrorists. But HHS’s stockpile
                            initiative and plans are geared in part toward these biological threats. In

                            Page 11                                                 GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                       addition, it is unclear from HHS’ fiscal year 1999 operating plan whether
                       the Department has fully considered the long-term costs, benefits, and
                       return on investment of (1) creating and sustaining the production and
                       inventory infrastructure for such a stockpile, (2) inventory maintenance,
                       and (3) shelf-life issues. HHS estimates that research and expedited
                       regulatory review of improved drugs and vaccines, enhancing disease
                       surveillance and communications systems, and establishing regional
                       laboratories to identify and diagnose biological and chemical agents will
                       cost $139.7 million in fiscal year 2000.

                       We are currently reviewing the scientific and practical feasibility of the
                       terrorist chemical-biological threat for this Subcommittee, Senator Specter,
                       Senator Rockefeller, and Representative Skelton. We are examining the
                       ease or difficulty of obtaining chemical and biological agents and making
                       mass-casualty chemical and biological weapons outside a state actor’s
                       laboratory infrastructure and program. Such information would be among
                       the inputs to a sound threat and risk assessment by a multidisciplinary
                       team of experts.

Progress Toward        We believe that the OMB reports on governmentwide spending and
                       budgeting to combat terrorism are a significant step toward improved
Improving              management and coordination of the complex and rapidly growing
Management and         programs and activities. We recognize the challenges and difficulties of
                       discerning much of the budgeting and spending for combating terrorism,
Coordination of        which is often imbedded in larger accounts. 12 For the first time, the
Programs and           executive branch and Congress have strategic insight into the magnitude
Activities to Combat   and direction of federal funding for this priority national security and law
                       enforcement concern. The 1999 report provided additional analysis and
Terrorism              more detailed information than the 1998 report on budgeting for programs
                       to deal with weapons of mass destruction. For example, the 1999 OMB
                       report identified total funding (budget authority) for combating weapons of
                       mass destruction to be about $1.23 billion in fiscal year 1999 and
                       $1.39 billion in the fiscal year 2000 budget request.

                       Nevertheless, OMB officials told us, as we noted in our December 1997
                       report, that a critical piece of the budget and spending picture is missing—

                         See Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and
                       Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997) and Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds
                       for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO-GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

                       Page 12                                                              GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
threat and risk assessments that would suggest priorities and appropriate
countermeasures. These officials noted—and we agree—that risk
assessment is key to (1) knowing whether enough or too much is being
spent, (2) judging whether the right programs are being funded, and
(3) determining whether apparent duplication is good or bad. We have not
fully evaluated the processes or methodologies the executive branch
agencies used to derive the information in the 1998 and 1999 OMB reports.
As a result, we cannot comment on whether or to what extent the reports
reflect the best possible estimate of costs associated with programs and
activities to combat terrorism. However, absent from the report was any
discussion about established priorities or efforts to reduce or eliminate
duplicative programs or activities across the government.

Another important step toward improved interagency management and
coordination was the Attorney General’s December 1998, classified 5-year
interagency plan on counterterrorism and technology crime. The
Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998 Appropriations Act
for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies required the Attorney General to develop the plan in
coordination with several agencies. The plan includes goals, objectives,
and performance indicators and recommends that specific actions be taken
to resolve interagency problems and issues it identified and assigns relative
priorities to the actions. The classified plan represents a substantial
interagency effort and was developed and coordinated with 15 federal
agencies with counterterrorism roles. The plan generally does not link its
recommended actions and priorities to budget resources, although the
document states that the agencies hope to improve the link between the
plan and resources in subsequent updates.

Additionally, the executive branch has taken steps to reduce state and local
officials’ confusion over so many federal agencies’ programs and
capabilities intended to train, equip, and help them. The Department of
Justice is establishing within the FBI a National Domestic Preparedness
Office to coordinate the programs and other federal support for state and
local governments. The office is intended to reduce state and local
confusion over the multitude of federal training and equipment programs
and response capabilities by providing “one stop shopping” for state and
local agencies. Also, the office has commissioned a local, state, and federal
interagency board to establish, maintain, and update a standardized
equipment list for use by the interagency community in preparing state and
local jurisdictions to respond to a terrorist incident involving a weapon of
mass destruction.

Page 13                                                GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
              In Presidential Decision Directive 62, issued in May 1998, the President
              designated a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection
              and Counter-Terrorism who is not to direct agencies’ activities but is to
              integrate the government’s policies and programs on unconventional
              threats to the homeland and Americans abroad, including terrorism. The
              National Coordinator is also to provide advice in the context of the annual
              budget process regarding the budgets for counterterrorism. We understand
              he has established a number of working groups but have been unable to
              obtain any further information.

Conclusions   In the absence of well-defined requirements, we are seeing a sudden
              increase in federal funding, programs, and capabilities. Specifically, we
              observed a rapid increase in recent years in the number of federal
              programs and initiatives designed to provide training and equipment to
              local emergency responders and to add to federal capabilities to respond to
              a chemical or biological terrorist event. Although the executive branch has
              taken some steps to better manage efforts to combat terrorism, we believe
              that more needs to be done. We have recommended that the National
              Security Council, in consultation with the Director, OMB, and the other
              executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that governmentwide
              priorities to combat terrorism are established, agencies’ programs and
              requirements are analyzed in relation to the priorities, and resources are
              allocated based on the priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of
              terrorist attack. We also recommended that OMB use data on funds
              budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to, among
              other things, ensure that programs are based on analytically sound threat
              and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication. The National
              Security Council and OMB have not fully embraced or implemented our

              Mr. Chairman, that concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy
              to answer any questions at this time.

              Page 14                                              GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 15   GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 16   GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Page 17   GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Related GAO Products                                                                   ApendixI

             Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
             Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

             Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness
             Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

             Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
             Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

             Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues
             (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

             Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize
             and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

             Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires
             Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

             Combating Terrorism: Efforts to Protect U.S. Forces in Turkey and the
             Middle East (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-44, Oct. 28, 1997).

             Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National
             Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

             Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
             Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

             Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management
             Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91,
             June 11, 1997).

             State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167,
             May 20, 1997).

             Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
             (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

             Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
             Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

             Page 18                                             GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies
(GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives
and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud (GAO/NSIAD-96-99,
May 9, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27,

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89,
Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE's
Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy
(GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb. 19, 1992).

Page 19                                             GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
                   State Department: Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction
                   Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov. 29, 1991).

                   Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile
                   (GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991).

                   State Department: Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction Program
                   (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb. 20, 1991).

(701166)   Leter   Page 20                                            GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107
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