oversight

High-Risk Series: Defense Infrastructure

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1997-02-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                United States General Accounting Office

GAO             High-Risk Series




February 1997
                Defense Infrastructure




GAO/HR-97-7
GAO   United States
      General Accounting Office
      Washington, D.C. 20548

      Comptroller General
      of the United States



      February 1997
      The President of the Senate
      The Speaker of the House of Representatives

      In 1990, the General Accounting Office began a special
      effort to review and report on the federal program areas
      its work identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities
      to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. This effort,
      which was supported by the Senate Committee on
      Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
      Government Reform and Oversight, brought a
      much-needed focus on problems that were costing the
      government billions of dollars.

      In December 1992, GAO issued a series of reports on the
      fundamental causes of problems in high-risk areas, and in
      a second series in February 1995, it reported on the status
      of efforts to improve those areas. This, GAO’s third series
      of reports, provides the current status of designated
      high-risk areas.

      This report addresses one of the five newly designated
      high-risk areas—the difficult process of reducing the
      Department of Defense’s (DOD) infrastructure. It focuses
      on the need for infrastructure reductions and obstacles
      that have hindered DOD’s ability to achieve significant cost
      savings in this area. It describes DOD’s future years
      funding plan for infrastructure and discusses areas in
      which we have identified opportunities for reductions. It
      also discusses the need for DOD to give greater structure
to its reduction efforts by developing a strategic plan and
involving the Congress.

Copies of this report series are being sent to the
President, the congressional leadership, all other
Members of the Congress, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, and the heads of major
departments and agencies.




James F. Hinchman
Acting Comptroller General
of the United States




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Page 3   GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
Contents



Overview                                                     6

Substantial                                                 12
Opportunities for
Reductions Exist
What Needs to Be                                            29
Done
Related GAO                                                 30
Products
1997 High-Risk                                              32
Series




                    Page 4   GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
Page 5   GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
Overview



              Despite the Department of Defense’s (DOD)
              actions over the last 7 to 10 years to reduce
              operations and support costs, billions of
              dollars are wasted annually on inefficient
              and unneeded activities. DOD has in recent
              years substantially downsized its force
              structure. However, it has not achieved
              commensurate reductions in operations and
              support costs. For fiscal year 1997, DOD
              estimates that about $146 billion, or almost
              two thirds of its budget, will be for
              operations and support activities. These
              activities, which DOD generally refers to as its
              support infrastructure, include maintaining
              installation facilities, providing nonunit
              training to the force, providing health care to
              military personnel and their families,
              repairing equipment, and buying and
              managing spare part inventories.


The Problem   DOD is faced with transforming its Cold War
              operating and support structure in much the
              same way it has been working to transform
              its military force structure. Making this
              transition is a complex, difficult challenge
              that will affect hundreds of thousands of
              civilian and military personnel at activities in
              many states across the nation. If DOD does
              not address this challenge now, however,
              pressing needs will go unmet, while scarce


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    Overview




    defense resources will be wasted or used
    inefficiently. For example:

•   We previously identified 13 options for
    reducing DOD’s infrastructure that could
    result in savings of $11.8 billion.
•   DOD’s laboratory infrastructure is estimated
    to have an excess capacity of 35 percent.
•   DOD’s capacity for rotary-wing aircraft
    training is double what is needed by all of
    the military services.
•   The cost to educate a physician in DOD’s
    Uniform Services University of Health
    Sciences is more than twice as much as the
    cost of providing scholarships to students in
    civilian medical schools.
•   DOD’s efforts to shift workloads to the private
    sector without downsizing overall depot
    infrastructure will exacerbate existing
    excess capacity problems.
•   DOD’s overhead costs for transportation
    services are frequently two to three times the
    basic cost of transportation.
•   Funds are being spent to operate and
    maintain aging and underutilized buildings,
    roads, and other infrastructure that will
    likely be declared excess by DOD in the near
    future.

    Reducing the cost of excess infrastructure
    activities is critical to maintaining high levels


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             Overview




             of military capabilities. Expenditures on
             wasteful or inefficient activities divert
             limited defense funds from pressing defense
             needs such as the modernization of weapon
             systems. DOD has identified net infrastructure
             savings as a funding source for
             modernization but has not, thus far, achieved
             anticipated savings. As a result, DOD has been
             unable to shift funds to modernization as
             planned.


The Causes   DOD  officials have repeatedly recognized the
             importance of using resources for the
             highest priority operational and investment
             needs rather than maintaining unneeded
             property, facilities, and overhead. However,
             DOD has found that infrastructure reductions
             are a difficult and painful process because
             achieving significant cost savings requires
             up-front investments, the closure of
             installations, and the elimination of military
             and civilian jobs. Service parochialism, a
             cultural resistance to change, and
             congressional and public concern about the
             effects on local communities and economies
             as well as the impartiality of the decisions
             have historically hindered DOD’s ability to
             close or realign bases. DOD has also
             recognized that opportunities to streamline
             and reengineer its business practices could


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Overview




result in substantial savings, but it has made
limited progress in accomplishing this.

By DOD’s count, base realignment and
closure (BRAC) rounds in 1988, 1991, and
1993 produced decisions to fully or partially
close 70 major domestic bases and resulted
in a 15-percent reduction in plant
replacement value. DOD’s goal during the
1995 BRAC round was to reduce the overall
domestic base structure by a minimum of
another 15 percent, for a total reduction of
30 percent in DOD-wide plant replacement
value. DOD’s 1995 closures and realignments
will increase the total reduction to
21 percent, or 9 percent short of its goal.

DOD has programmed reductions in
installation support funding due to base
closures and realignments; however, as
shown in table 1, overall infrastructure
funding is projected to remain relatively
constant through 2001.




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                           Overview




Table 1: DOD’s Projected
Funding Through Fiscal     Dollars in billions (constant 1997 dollars)
Year 2001                                                          Infra- Percentage
                                                   Total       structure    of budget
                                               projected          part of that is infra-
                           Fiscal year           budget          budget      structure
                           1997                     $244            $146             60
                           1998                      243             142             58
                           1999                      243             141             58
                           2000                      244             140             57
                           2001                      246             141             57



What Needs to Be To its credit, DOD has programs to identify
Done             potential infrastructure reductions in many
                           areas. However, breaking down cultural
                           resistance to change, overcoming service
                           parochialism, and setting forth a clear
                           framework for a reduced defense
                           infrastructure are key to avoiding waste and
                           inefficiency. To do this, the Secretary of
                           Defense and the service Secretaries need to
                           give greater structure to their efforts by
                           developing an overall strategic plan. The
                           plan needs to establish time frames and
                           identify organizations and personnel
                           responsible for accomplishing fiscal and
                           operational goals. This plan needs to be
                           presented to the Congress in much the same
                           way that DOD presented its plan for force
                           structure reductions in the Base Force Plan
                           and the Bottom-Up Review. This will provide


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Overview




a basis for the Congress to oversee DOD’s
plan for infrastructure reductions and allow
the affected parties to see what is going to
happen and when. In developing the plan,
the Department should consider using a
variety of means to achieve reductions,
including such things as consolidations,
privatization, outsourcing, reengineering,
and interservicing agreements. It should also
consider the need and timing for future BRAC
rounds, as suggested by the 1995 BRAC
Commission and other groups. In the
interim, we believe significant reductions
can be made in a number of areas.




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Substantial Opportunities for
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              While we have not completed an in-depth
              analysis of all the categories of
              infrastructure, our work to date has
              identified numerous areas where
              infrastructure activities can be eliminated,
              streamlined, or reengineered to be made
              more efficient. For example, we previously
              identified 13 options that the Congressional
              Budget Office estimates could result in
              savings of about $11.8 billion during fiscal
              years 1997-2001.

              The following sections discuss key
              infrastructure categories in which we have
              identified opportunities for savings. DOD
              defined the categories and allocated
              infrastructure programs to those categories
              in its Future Years Defense Program.
              However, DOD could not allocate about 20 to
              25 percent of its total infrastructure that is
              associated with the Defense Business
              Operations Fund.1 DOD officials believe the
              unallocated portion of the infrastructure is
              mostly for logistics purchases.

              1
               The 1997 Defense Authorization Act required DOD to conduct a
              comprehensive study of the Defense Business Operations Fund
              (DBOF) and to present an improvement plan to Congress for
              approval. Pending the results of this study, the Defense
              Comptroller, on December 11, 1996, dissolved DBOF and created
              four working capital funds: Army, Navy, Air Force, and
              Defense-wide. The four funds will continue to operate under the
              revolving fund concept—using the same policies, procedures, and
              systems as they did under DBOF—and charge customers the full
              costs of providing goods and services to them.

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Acquisition      The acquisition infrastructure includes
Infrastructure   activities and personnel that support the
                 research, production, and procurement of
                 weapon systems and other critical defense
                 items. During fiscal year 1997, acquisition
                 infrastructure will account for about
                 $10.2 billion, or about 7 percent, of projected
                 infrastructure expenditures.

                 In a 1993 roles and missions report, the Joint
                 Chiefs of Staff stated that each service had
                 approached training and tests and evaluation
                 from its unique perspective and had
                 developed its own infrastructures, leading to
                 DOD-wide overlap and redundancy. In our
                 analysis of this report, we noted problems in
                 achieving consolidations in the training and
                 evaluation areas and stated that DOD should
                 consider consolidations in two areas—Air
                 Force and Navy electronic warfare threat
                 testing capabilities and high performance
                 fixed-wing aircraft testing capabilities.

                 It is now 1997, BRAC 1995 is history, and
                 despite efforts to focus on test and
                 evaluation infrastructure during that
                 process, no major consolidations or
                 reductions in the test and evaluation
                 infrastructure have occurred. Further, there
                 is little to indicate that the services will
                 voluntarily agree to consolidation across


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service lines, where the greatest savings are
apt to be achieved. In fact, there are
indications that some of the services are
trying to add to their testing capabilities to
protect their infrastructure. For example, the
Navy intends to construct a large anechoic
chamber at Patuxent River, Maryland, and
the Air Force plans to add to its anechoic
capacity at Edwards Air Force Base,
California, but the existing chamber at
Edwards is underused.

Although studies of DOD’s laboratories and
centers have shown excess capacity, they
have generally recommended management
efficiencies rather than infrastructure
reductions. Despite four BRAC rounds,
reductions in laboratory infrastructure have
not kept pace with reductions in funding,
personnel, and force structure levels.
According to DOD officials, after all current
BRAC actions have been completed, DOD’s
laboratory infrastructure will still have an
excess capacity of approximately 35 percent.
DOD lost opportunities during the BRAC 1995
process to reduce laboratory infrastructure
because it split the analysis of research and
development laboratories and test and
evaluation centers and because each service
tried to protect its own facilities instead of
adopting cross-service efficiencies.


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Central Logistics   Central logistics includes maintenance
                    activities, the management of materials,
                    operation of supply systems,
                    communications, and minor construction.
                    Central logistics activities will consume at
                    least $13 billion, or about 9 percent, of
                    projected fiscal year 1997 infrastructure
                    expenditures.

                    Currently, DOD has 21 major depot
                    maintenance facilities—2 of which are
                    scheduled to close. Each of the service’s
                    depot maintenance systems have excess
                    capacity. In fact, at the time of the 1995 BRAC
                    process, the overall DOD depot system had
                    40 percent excess capacity. While each of
                    the services had actions underway, those
                    actions will neither reduce excess capacity
                    nor achieve the expected cost savings.

                    The BRAC Commission’s July 1995 report to
                    the President noted that the decision to
                    close two of the Air Force’s five air logistics
                    centers—at Sacramento, California and San
                    Antonio, Texas—was difficult to make but
                    necessary, given the Air Force’s significant
                    excess depot capacity and limited defense
                    resources. The report concluded that these
                    actions should save about $151.3 million
                    over the 6-year implementation period and
                    $3.5 billion over 20 years. When the


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President forwarded the Commission’s
recommendations to the Congress, however,
he stated that his intent was to privatize the
work in place at these two locations.
Further, he decided to delay the centers’
closures until 2001.

Our analysis indicates that delaying the
centers’ closures until 2001 could increase
net costs during the 6-year implementation
period by hundreds of millions of dollars,
primarily because it would limit the Air
Force’s ability to achieve recurring savings
to offset expected closure costs. Privatizing
defense depot activities in place could yield
savings if other public and private activities
were more fully utilizing their maintenance
repair capacity. However, because both the
public and private sectors have substantial
excess capacity, privatizing the Sacramento
and San Antonio workloads in place would
result in missed opportunities to consolidate
workloads at the remaining centers.
Consolidating workloads would allow the
Air Force to achieve annual savings of over
$200 million and reduce excess capacity
from 45 percent to about 8 percent. If, on the
other hand, the remaining centers do not
receive the additional workload, they will
continue to operate with significant excess



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    capacity, becoming more inefficient and
    expensive as their workloads dwindle.

    Our analysis of the Army depot system
    showed that the Army is not effectively
    downsizing its remaining depot maintenance
    infrastructure to reduce costly excess
    capacity. Further, plans to privatize
    workloads in place at closing facilities rather
    than transfer the workloads to remaining
    underutilized Army facilities would increase
    excess capacity in Army depots from
    42 percent to 46 percent and increase Army
    maintenance depot costs. Specifically, our
    work showed that

•   transferring ground communications and
    electronic equipment from the Sacramento
    Air Logistics Center to the Tobyhanna Army
    Depot could reduce Tobyhanna’s operating
    costs and result in annual savings of
    $24 million, and
•   consolidating the tactical missile workload
    at the Tobyhanna depot could significantly
    improve the utilization of the depot’s
    capacity and decrease costs by as much as
    $27 million annually.

    The Navy is also attempting to privatize
    workloads in place rather than transfer them
    to other facilities where excess capacity


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exists. During the 1995 BRAC process, one of
DOD’s recommendations was to close the
depot at Louisville, Kentucky. The
Commission, however, recommended that
the Navy privatize the workload in place
rather than transfer it to other Navy
facilities. We determined that the Navy’s
plan for privatizing workloads in place
would not reduce excess capacity in the
remaining public depots and might prove
more costly than transferring the workload.
Moreover, the private sector would still have
excess capacity, including facilities owned
by the two defense contractors selected to
operate and manage the privatized Louisville
depot.

We have also identified long-standing
problems and opportunities to reduce
infrastructure costs in the key area of
inventory management. While the Defense
Logistics Agency has taken steps to
reengineer its logistics practices and reduce
consumable inventories, it could do more to
achieve substantial savings. Given the
approximately $70 billion investment in
defense secondary inventory items, we have
prepared a separate high-risk report that
focuses on the need for DOD to be more
aggressive in changing its management
culture and to take advantage of new


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               Reductions Exist




               management practices so that inefficiencies
               can be eliminated.


Installation   Installation support includes personnel and
Support        activities that fund, equip, and maintain
               facilities from which defense forces operate.
               This support will consume about $25 billion,
               or about 17 percent, of projected fiscal year
               1997 infrastructure expenditures.

               Despite the recognized potential to reduce
               base operating support costs through greater
               reliance on interservice-type arrangements,
               the services have not taken sufficient
               advantage of available opportunities.
               Differing service traditions and cultures and
               concern over losing direct control of support
               assets have often caused commanders to
               resist interservicing.

               DOD has long been concerned about and has
               sought ways to reduce the cost of military
               base support. A downsized force and
               reduced defense budgets in recent years are
               causing the services to take renewed interest
               in trying to achieve greater economies,
               efficiencies, and cost savings in base
               operations. Their efforts include a more
               vigorous examination of the potential for
               greater interservice and intraservice


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arrangements involving base support as well
as partnership arrangements between
military bases and local governments and
communities. For example, service officials
in Charleston, South Carolina, reported a
1-year cost avoidance of over $1 million in
travel and per diem costs through the shared
use of video teleconferencing capabilities.
Also, service officials in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, reported that a consolidated
regional natural gas contract resulted in cost
savings of $9.5 million over a 3-year period.

DOD believes that greater economies and
savings could be achieved by further
consolidation and elimination of duplicate
support services where military bases are
located close to one another or where
similar functions are performed at multiple
locations. For example, both Fort Lewis and
McChord Air Force Base in Washington
maintain separate airfield operations
facilities. Fort Lewis personnel believe that
both bases’ airfield operations can be served
by one facility. At Fort Bragg and Pope Air
Force Base in North Carolina, both services
are maintaining separate contract
administration, supply and engineering, and
other support services that may have the
potential for consolidation.



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                       The following list includes selected base
                       support functions that could be consolidated
                       for use by all the services:

                   •   Airfield operations
                   •   Biological assessments
                   •   Bulk fuel storage
                   •   Child care services
                   •   Civilian personnel services
                   •   Communication systems maintenance
                   •   Contracting services
                   •   Facility maintenance
                   •   Housing services
                   •   Legal assistance and claims
                   •   Management and maintenance of family
                       housing
                   •   Public works management
                   •   Roads and ground maintenance
                   •   Small arms maintenance
                   •   Support services
                   •   Tactical vehicle maintenance
                   •   Training services
                   •   Vehicle transportation and maintenance


Central Training       The central training infrastructure includes
                       basic training for new personnel, aviation
                       and flight training, military academies,
                       officer training corps, other college
                       commissioning programs, and officer and
                       enlisted training schools. During fiscal year


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1997, central training will account for about
$19 billion, or about 13 percent, of projected
infrastructure expenditures.

Since 1987, the BRAC Commission has
recommended base closures and mission
realignments that, when fully implemented,
will reduce the number of locations where
the services provide formal training for
military personnel. Senior DOD officials
recognize that even after completion of the
1995 BRAC round, excess training
infrastructure will remain. In testimony
before the BRAC Commission, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited the need for
future base closure authority because of
opportunities for further cross-servicing,
particularly in the area of joint-use bases and
training facilities.

During our examination of the 1995 BRAC
recommendations, we identified several
Army training-related installations with
relatively low military value that were not
proposed for closure because of the up-front
closure costs, despite projected long-term
savings. The Navy’s analysis indicated that
its primary pilot and advanced helicopter
training requirements were 19 to 42 percent
below peak historic levels. However, the
BRAC process did little to change this



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             situation because only one Navy air training
             facility was slated for realignment, and none
             was slated for closure. Further, as a result of
             the services’ inability to consolidate
             rotary-wing training at one location, they
             were left with capacity for rotary-wing
             training that was more than twice the space
             needed.


Force        Force management provides funding,
Management   equipment, and personnel for the
             management and operation of all the major
             military command headquarters activities.
             During fiscal year 1997, force management
             will account for about $13 billion, or about
             9 percent, of projected infrastructure
             expenditures.

             In the area of transportation, DOD customers
             frequently pay double or triple the cost of
             basic transportation. The Transportation
             Command retains an outdated and
             inefficient, modally oriented organizational
             structure with many collocated facilities.
             Each separate component command incurs
             operational and support costs. Customers
             receive bills from each component command
             for each mode of transportation, rather than
             a single intermodal bill from only one
             component. Separate billing systems are


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inefficient, adding people and costs to the
process. Wages and salaries alone for the
commands in fiscal year 1994 were more
than $1 billion. Further, DOD’s guidance for
handling the cost of maintaining a
mobilization capability does not clearly state
that these costs are not to be passed on to
transportation customers.

DOD may not achieve the goals of its
reengineering efforts to improve the defense
transportation system processes and reduce
costs unless it concurrently looks at how the
organization should be restructured. Waiting
to address organizational issues until
process improvements are made will likely
impede achievement of the full benefits of
DOD’s reengineering efforts.


For temporary duty travel, DOD reported that
it spent about $3.5 billion in fiscal year 1993
and estimated that its processing costs were
as much as 30 percent of the direct travel
cost. This cost is well above the 10-percent
average reported for private companies and
the 6-percent rate that industry considers an
efficient operation. Leading companies have
been able to improve service and reduce
processing costs dramatically by
reengineering their travel management and



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implementing best practices for keeping
costs down.

Having recognized that its costs were too
high, DOD chartered a task force in July 1994
to reengineer travel management. The task
force recommended that DOD consider
applying private industry best practices as
part of its reengineering effort, and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred with
the recommendation. While a transition team
has been tasked with developing an
implementation mechanism, sustained
commitment and oversight by top
management will be critical to ensure
success.

Another area in which we have done many
evaluations in the past and that is also being
addressed in a separate high-risk report is
defense financial management. Among other
things, our work shows that DOD is planning
to spend $51 million in military construction
funds on Defense Financial Accounting
Service (DFAS) facilities that are not needed.
Further, while DFAS is considering
reengineering its financial management
systems and processes to improve
productivity, more aggressive reengineering
commensurate with private sector
companies could increase infrastructure


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                  savings. Specifically, the number of
                  employees for civilian payroll functions
                  could be reduced by an additional 470
                  persons, operating costs could be reduced
                  by $16 million, and the number of operating
                  locations needed for civilian pay functions
                  could be further reduced.


Central Medical   The central medical infrastructure includes
                  personnel and funding for medical care
                  provided to military personnel, dependents,
                  and retirees. Activities include medical
                  training, management of the military health
                  care system, and support of medical
                  installations. During fiscal year 1997,
                  medical infrastructure will account for about
                  $16 billion, or about 11 percent, of projected
                  infrastructure expenditures.

                  Each of the three military departments
                  operates its own health care system. To a
                  large extent, these systems have many of the
                  same administrative, management, and
                  operational functions. Since 1949, over 22
                  studies have reviewed the feasibility of
                  creating a health care entity within DOD to
                  centralize management and administration
                  of the three systems. Most of these studies
                  encouraged some form of organizational
                  consolidation. Consolidating the three


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military medical systems into one centrally
managed system could eliminate duplicate
administrative, management, and
operational functions. An estimate of savings
cannot be developed until numerous
variables, such as the extent of consolidation
and the impact on command and support
structures, are determined. The Army, Navy,
and Air Force have resisted any efforts to
consolidate health care operations, primarily
on the grounds that each has unique medical
activities and requirements.

Also, since 1972, DOD has obtained
physicians from two source programs: the
Health Professional Scholarship Program
and the Uniformed Services University of
Health Sciences. Under the former, DOD pays
tuition, fees, and a monthly stipend for
students enrolled in civilian medical schools.
These students are obligated to serve a year
of active duty for each year of benefits
received. Under the latter, medical students
are on active duty military service, receiving
pay and benefits, while attending medical
school; they incur a 10-year service
obligation.

Given the changes in operational scenarios
and DOD’s approach for delivering peacetime
health care, new assessments of needs for


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physicians and the means to acquire and
retain such physicians are needed. Our
analysis shows that on a per-graduate basis,
the Uniformed Services University is the
most expensive source of military
physicians. With DOD education and retention
costs of about $3.3 million, the cost of a
University graduate is more than two times
greater than the $1.5 million cost for a
regular scholarship program graduate. CBO
estimates that if the Uniformed Services
University of the Health Sciences were
closed and a steady supply of physicians
were maintained through other sources, DOD
could realize savings of $272 million during
fiscal years 1997-2001.




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What Needs to Be Done



            DOD  has programs to identify potential
            infrastructure reductions in many areas.
            However, breaking down cultural resistance
            to change, overcoming service parochialism,
            and setting forth a clear framework for a
            reduced defense infrastructure are key to
            avoiding waste and inefficiency. To do this,
            the Secretary of Defense and the service
            Secretaries need to give greater structure to
            their efforts by developing an overall
            strategic plan. The plan needs to establish
            time frames and identify organizations and
            personnel responsible for accomplishing
            fiscal and operational goals. This plan needs
            to be presented to the Congress in much the
            same way that DOD presented its plan for
            force structure reductions in the Base Force
            Plan and the Bottom-Up Review. This will
            provide a basis for Congress to oversee DOD’s
            plan for infrastructure reductions and allow
            the affected parties to see what is going to
            happen and when. In developing the plan,
            the Department should consider using a
            variety of means to achieve reductions,
            including such things as consolidations,
            privatization, outsourcing, reengineering,
            and interservicing agreements. It should also
            consider the need and timing for future BRAC
            rounds, as suggested by the 1995 BRAC
            Commission and other groups.



            Page 29           GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
Related GAO Products



            Air Force Depot Maintenance:
            Privatization-In-Place Plans Are Costly While
            Excess Capacity Exists (GAO/NSIAD-97-13,
            Dec. 31, 1996).

            Army Depot Maintenance: Privatization
            Without Further Downsizing Increases
            Costly Excess Capacity (GAO/NSIAD-96-201,
            Sept. 18, 1996).

            Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings
            Issues Related to Privatizing-in-Place at the
            Louisville, Kentucky, Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,
            Sept. 18, 1996).

            Defense Acquisition Infrastructure: Changes
            in RDT&E Laboratories and Centers
            (GAO/NSIAD-96-221BR, Sept. 13, 1996).

            Defense Infrastructure: Costs Projected to
            Increase Between 1997 and 2001
            (GAO/NSIAD-96-174, May 31, 1996).

            Military Bases: Opportunities for Savings in
            Installation Support Costs Are Being Missed
            (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23, 1996).

            Military Bases: Closure and Realignment
            Savings Are Significant, but Not Easily
            Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).



            Page 30            GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
Related GAO Products




Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for
1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for
Modernization (GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

Defense Transportation: Streamlining of the
U.S. Transportation Command Is Needed
(GAO/NSIAD-96-60, Feb. 22, 1996).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995
Process and Recommendations for Closure
and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14,
1995).




Page 31                GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
1997 High-Risk Series



             An Overview (GAO/HR-97-1)

             Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-97-2)

             Defense Financial Management (GAO/HR-97-3)

             Defense Contract Management (GAO/HR-97-4)

             Defense Inventory Management (GAO/HR-97-5)

             Defense Weapon Systems Acquisition
             (GAO/HR-97-6)

             Defense Infrastructure (GAO/HR-97-7)

             IRS Management (GAO/HR-97-8)

             Information Management and Technology
             (GAO/HR-97-9)

             Medicare (GAO/HR-97-10)

             Student Financial Aid (GAO/HR-97-11)

             Department of Housing and Urban
             Development (GAO/HR-97-12)

             Department of Energy Contract Management
             (GAO/HR-97-13)




             Page 32           GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
1997 High-Risk Series




Superfund Program Management
(GAO/HR-97-14)




The entire series of 14 high-risk reports
can be ordered using the order number
GAO/HR-97-20SET.



Page 33                 GAO/HR-97-7 Defense Infrastructure
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