oversight

Statements that Analyze Effects of Proposed Programs on Arms Control Need Improvement

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-10-20.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         DCCUMENT RESUME
03763 -   B2974227]

Statements that Analyze Effects of Proposed Prcgrams on Arms
Control Need Improvement. ID-77-41; B-156900. October 20, 1977.
29 pp. +   appendices (12 pp.).
Report to the Congress; by Elmer B. Staats, Cmptroller General.

Issue Area: International Economic and Military Programs:
    International Secuirity Through Controls Oer eapons and
    Destructive Elements (607).
Contact: International Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Atomic Energy Defense
    Activities (053); National Defense: Defense-related
    Activities (054); National Defense: Weapon Systems (057).
Organization Concerned: Arms Contrcl and Disarmament Agency;
    Department of Defense; Department of State; Energy Research
    and evelopment Administration; Natioral Security Council.
Congressional Relevance: House Ccmmittee on International
    Relations; Senate Committee on Foreign elations; Congress.
Authority: Arms Control and Disarmament Act, sec. 36, as amended
    (22 U.S.C. 2576). Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
    1975 (P.L. 94-141).

          The statements submitted to the Congress by the
executive branch analyzing the impact of proposed programs on
arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations have not
accomplished their intended objectives. Findirgs/Conclusions:
The intended objectives of the statements were: to make the
executive branch formally and systematically consider tha
possible effects of proposed programs on arms control; to
improve the quantity and quality of information submitted to the
Congress on proposed defense programs so it can better
deliberate the merits of these programs, and tc enhance the role
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the national
security policymaking process. Although these cbjectives are
laudable and the idea of having arms control ipact statements
has merit, the quality of the statements cannot be expected to
improve until the executive branch overcomes past difficulties
in implementing legislative requirements. Executive branch
compliance with the legal requirements has been hampered by
interagency disputes over such basic questions as: what programs
require arms control impact statements; what information the
statements should contain; and the role various agencies are
expected tc} play. UVcertainty over the intended use of these
statements by the Congress also appears to have inhibited full
disclosure of arms control factors. Author/SC)
        REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

,''";   BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
        OF THE UNITED STATES




        Statements That Analyze Effects
        Of Proposed Programs On Arms
        Control Need Improvement
        The executive branch has submitted to the
        Congress two sets of statements analyzing
        the effects of proposed programs on arms
        control. Neither was satisfactory. GAO
        analyzed tne process by which these state-
        rnr, 1 ts were prepared and noted that im-
        provements are needed. Theadministration is
        taking actions to improve the quality and
        usefulness of future arms control impact
        statement .




        ID-7741                                       OCTOBER 20, 1977
               COMTROLLR PMXNlAL OF THE UNITED STATE
                         WASHIITON, D.C. 148




B-156900


To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker f the House of Representatives

     Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2576), requires that arms control impact
statements be submitted to the Congress in conjunction wit'l
requests for authorization and appropriations for nuclear
weapons systems and other programs having significant impact
on arms control policy and negotiations. This report de-
scribes problems the executive branch has experienced in im-
plementing this legislative requirement.

     We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing
Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; the Secretaries of State,
Defense, Energy, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the As-
sistant to the President for National Security Affairs




                                  Comptroller General
                                  of the United States
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S              STATEMENTS THAT ANALYZE
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS             EFFECTS OF PROPOSED PROGRAMS
                                   ON ARMS CONTROL NEED
                                   IMPROVEMENT
        DIGEST
        The statements that analyze the impact of
        proposed programs on arms control and dis-
        armament policy and negotiations have not
        accomplished their intended objectives to
        -- make the executive branch formally and
           .ystematically consider the possible
           effects of proposed programs on arms
           control,
        -- improve the quantity and quality of
           information submitted to the Congress on
           proposed defense programs so it can
           better deliberate the merits of t.iese
           programs, and
        -- enhance the role of the Arms Control and
           Disarmament Agency in the national secu-
           rity policymaking process. (See p. 18.)
        These objectives are laudable, and the idea
        of having arms control impact statements
        has merit. However, the quality of the
        statements cannot be expected to improve
        until the executive branch overcomes past
        difficulties in implementing legislative
        requirements. (See p. 26.)
        Executive branch compliance with the legal
        requirements has been hampered by inter-
        agency disputes over such basic questions
        as

        -- what programs require arms control impact
           statements,
        -- what information the statements should
           contain, and
        -- the role various agencies are expected
           to play. (See pp. 5, 11, and 14.)


                                                     ID-77-41
   CoW* W    onWhro           if
 Furthermore, uncertainty over the intended
 use of the statements by the Congress appears
 ta have inhibited full disclosure of arms
 control factors. To improve the quality
 of arms control impact statements, the
 Congress and the executive branch need to
 focus on these issues.  (See p. 20.)
 While the legislation calls on the Arms
 Control and Disarmament Agency to conduct
 arms control analyses, it does not specify
 who should prepare the statements. The
 law also does not specify the Stat_ Depart-
 men:'s role in the process, despite its
 central role in foreign policy matters.
 Executive branch interpretations of what
 programs require impact statements have
 limited the process to analysis of Defense
.and Energy Research and Development
 Administration programs, when other agen-
 cies, such as the Central Intelligence
 Agency and the National Aeronautics and
 Space Administration, could be sponsoring
 programs that affect arms control.  (See
 pp. 14, 17, and 7.)

Other problems have plagued executive
branch compliance with the impact state-
mtnt requirements. For example, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency selects
programs for analysis but has not succeeded
in bringing additional programs into the
impact statement process. (See p. 6.)

Terms in the legislation, such as "signifi-
cant impact," "complete statement," and
"negotiations," have caused time-consuming
interagency debate and disagreement over
what programs should be analyzed and what
the statements should contain. Other areas
of uncertainty include

-- whether the process can be used to examine
   the arms control impact of certain civilian
   technologies that could also be used by the
   military and




                     ii
      -- at what stage in the research and
         development process should programs be
         considered for analysis. (See pp. 7 and 8.)

      The lack of common criteria to be used by
      all agencies in analyzing nrograms may have
      contributed to interagency isagreements
      over statement content. (See p. 12.)

      Has the arms control impact statement
      process improved the Arms Control and Dis-
      armament Agency's access to information as
      the Congress intended? The process has not
      dispelled Defense and Energy Research and
      Development Administration fears that the
      information revealed will be used by critics
      to attack individual programs. The result
      has been increased formality in communica-
      tion with the Arms Control and Disarmament
      Agency at the expense of expeditious day-
      to-day interagency working relationships.
      (See pp. 22 and 23.)
      Despite executive branch skepticism of the
      usefulness of the arms control impact state-
      ment process, it offers potential both for
      seeing that arms control issues are consid-
      ered formally and systematically and for
      improving the quantity and quality of
      information reaching the Congress.  (See
      pp. 27 and 28.)

      Moreover, the Arms Cntrol and Disarmament
      Agency can be a leader in the process,
      without jeopardizing working relationships
      with other agencies. The State Department,
      by virtue of its central role in foreign
      policy matters, can contribute importantly
      to the impact statement process.  (See p.
      28.)

      Even improved arms control impact state-
      ments cannot be considered conclusive
      evidence that the executive branch con-
      sidered arms control in its national se-
      curity policymaking. The arms control
      impact statement process should complement
      rather than replace existing mechanisms.
      (See p. 28.)
                           iii
jut
 Fuller sharing of information, which shows
 that the executive branch considered arms
 control aspects of programs in cther
 national security decisionmaking processes,
 is needed to reassure the Congress that
 arms control was scrutinized. (See p. 28.)
CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY COMMENTS

In a draft report sent to the involved
executive branch agencies for review and
comment, GAO suggested language to amend
section 36 of the Arms Control ad Disarma-
ment Act to spell out clearly the intended
roles and responsibilities of the involved
agencies.

GAO further suggested that the Director of
the Arms Control nd Disarmament Agency
develop

-- interagency procedures for implementing
   the arms control impact statement require-
  ments,

-- specific guidelines for selecting programs
   for analysis, and

-- specific criteria for analyzing the arms
   control impact of programs.
The National Security Council, commenting
on the report on behalf of the administra-
tion (see app. VI), stated:

     "We have no major disagreement
     with the investigative portion
     of the report, and we generally
     agree with the GAO assessment
     that past implementation of
     Section 36 of the Arms Control
     and Disarmament Act may have
     failed to satisfy the intent of
     Congress."
The Council added that the administration
is committed to guaranteeing that the pro-
visions of the Arms Coltrol and Disarmament


                     iv
            Act are fully complied with. The Council
            believes the administration can do this,
            without additional legislation, by improv-
            ing the interagency process.

            To provide the administration an opportunity
            to show that it can achieve the intended
            objectives of the arms control impact state-
            ment legislation, GAO is not making any
            recommendations to amend the legislation at
            this time. GAO will closely monitor the
            impact statement process and will propose
            amendments to the legislation later, .f
            warranted. (See pp. 28 and 29.)




Tear Shnt                       v
                        Contents


DIGEST                                            i
CHAPTER

   1      WHY ARE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATE-
            MENTS REQUIRED?                       1
              Rationale for arms control
                impact statements                 2
              Dissatisfortion with the
                statemei.:s                       3
              Scope of r.ie-                      3
   2      WHAT PROGRAMS REQUIRE ARMS CONTROL
            IMPACT STATEMPNTS?                    5
              Dollar thresholds                   5
              Discretionary selections            6
              Civil program, having arms
                control impact                    7
              Conceptual research programs        8
              Required statements not sub-
                mitted                            9
  3       WHAT SHOULD ARMS CONTROL IMPACT
            STATEMENTS CONTAiN?                  11
              Definitional problems              11
              Lack of common specific
                criteria                         12
  4       WHAT ARE THE AGENCIES' ROLES IN THE
            PROCESS?                             14
              First year of the process          14
              Second year of the process         15
              ACDA's role in the process         15
              The State Department's role        17
  5       HAS THE PROCESS FLFILLED LEGISLATIVE
            INTENT?                              1P
              Heightened consciousness of arms
                control implications             18
              Increased flow of information to
                the Congress                     19
CHAPTER                                             Page
               Enhanced role for ACDA                21
               Views of the relative burden of
                 the process                         23
               Potential alternatives to the rms
                 control inact statement process     24

      6    CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY COMMENTS           26
               Agency comments                       28



APPENDIX

      I    Section 36 of the Arms Control and
             Disarmament A,   as amended             30

  II       Data on arms control impact state-
             ments, fiscal years 1977 and 1978
             budget processes                        31
 III       Unclassified version of sample
             impact statement submitted to
             the Congress January 18, 1977           32
  IV       List of 76 programs determined to
             have no impact prima facie on
             current arms control policy and
             negotiations                            33

      V    Letter dated July 20, 1977, from the
             Staff Secretary of the National
             Security Council                        37

  VI       Letter dated August 24, 1977, from the
             Staff Secretary of the National
             Security Council                        38
                          ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA       Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CRS        Congressional Research Service
ERDA       Energy Research and Development
             Administration
GAO        General Accounting Office
                            CHAPTER 1
       WHY ARE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS REQUIRED?

       During 1974, the Subcommittee on National Security
 Policy and Scientific Developments, House Committee
                                                       on
 Foreign Affairs, subjected the U.S. Arms Control
                                                   and
 armament Agency (ACDA) to a comprehensive oversight Dis-
 The review included a detailed investigation by       review.
 mittee's staff of ACDA's functions and activitiesthe  Subcom-
                                                    as well
 as extensive hearings exploring a variety of concepts,
 tices, and changes in legislation to insure widespread prac-
 tive branch consideration of arms control and disarmamentexecu-
 issues in the formulation of U.S. national security
 foreign policy.                                      and

     The Subcommittee said this oversight review came
                                                       about
because the Congress felt that (1) ACDA's effectiveness
diminished, (2) its activities had veered away            had
its original congressional intentions, and (3) from  some  of
                                               it no longer
played as strong a role in formulating and executing
arms control policies as it once did.                 U.S.

     As a result of the oversight review, amendments
Arms Control and Disarmament Act were                to the
                                      proposed and incor-
porated in the Foreign Relations Athorization
                                               Act of 1975
(Public Law 94-141, adopted Nov. 29, 1975). Ore
                                                 nw
provision--section 6 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, as amended (22 U.S.'. 2576) (see app. I)--required
"a complete statement analyzing the impact *             that
                                             * * on arms
trol and disarmament policy and negotiations" accompany con-
                                                         re-
quests to the Congress for authorization or appropriations
the following programs:                                      for

     -- Programs of research, development, testing, engi-
        neering, construction, deployment, or modernization
        with respect to nuclear armaments, nuclear imple-
        ments of war, military facilities, or military
        vehicles designed or intended primarily for
        delivery of nuclear weapons.

     -- Programs of research, development, testing, engi-
        neering, construction, deployment or modernization
        with respect to armaments, implements of war, or
        military facilities having an estimated total pro-
        gram cost in excess of $250 million or an estimated
        annual program cost in excess of 50 million.



                              1
     -- Any other program involving weapons systems or tech-
        nology which the National Security Council believes,
        upon the advice and recommendation of the Director
        of ACDA, may have significant impact on arms control
        policy or negotiations.

     The new section also required that the Director of
ACDA be given "on a continuing basis * * * full and timely
access to detailed information" with respect to such pro-
grams that require arms control impact statements.

RATIONALE FOR ARMS CONTROL
IMPACT STATEMENTS

     The underlying assumption of this new requirement was
that the arms control implications of military programs,
whether positive or negative, should be considered together
with the nerits of the programs' defense capabilities.
Specifically, arms control impact statements were intended
to tell how a given program might enhance or detract from
attaining the primary objectives of arms control. Accord-
ing to ACDA, these objectives are to reduce the likelihood
of armed conflicts, their severity and violence if they
should occur, and the economic burden of military programs.

     ACDA states that the reduction of armaments is a major
objective of U.S. policy, but, by itself, is not an adequate
measure of progress toward arms control. Other objectives
of U.S. arms control policy are to seek a stable military
balance, reduce the possibility of accidents or miscalcula-
tions which could lead to war, and decrease the vulnerability
of forces. Current or intermittent arms control negotiations
which are attempting to deal with these and other arms con-
trol issues include the U.S.-Soviet Union strategic arms
limitation talks and multilateral discussions of mutual and
balanced force reductions in Europe, nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons, the banning of chemical and biological weap-
ons, and limitations on conventional arms transfers.

     Tc determine arms control impact, a program is reviewed
for both its positive and negative effects on arms control
policies and negotiations. Programs which increase stabil-
ity, make forces less vulnerable, increase deterrence, allow
for easy verification, and do not encourage an rms race are
examples of positive aspects of arms control.  The reverse
of these characteristics are generally considered to be nega-
tive factors. Since any given program will normally possess




                              2
both positive and negative elements, it was expected that
these elements would be weighed in the analysis to determine
the program'. overall contribution to national security.

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STATEMENTS

     Despite these expectations, the first arms control
impact statements, submitted to the Congress in August 1976
as part of the fiscal year 1977 authorization/appropriation
process, were disappointing to some Members of Congress.
The statements were judged to be too few in number, too
sparse in content, and too late to be of any use in con-
gressional deliberations over t-ie funding of major defense
programs.

     -- An ACDA official said that of an estimated 70 Defense
        programs that might legally require statements, only
        16 were submitted.

     -- Most statements were not more than a single para-
        graph and discussed overwhelmingly the positive
        aspects of the programs.

     -- The statements were submitted after the Congress had
        authorized the Defense budget for fiscal year 1977
        and just before the final vote on military appropri-
        ations.

     Other objections were that the statements lacked
analysis, dealt only at the shallowest level with the impact
on arms control and disarmament negotiations, and not at all
with the impact on policy. Congressional critics complained
to the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) 1/
that the statement did not comply with the law, were accept-
able, and should be redone.
SCOPE OF REVIEW

     Because of congressional dissatisfaction with the
initial arms control impact statements, we discussed the
process for preparing the statements with executive branch
officials to determine (1) what problems had been encoun-
tered and (2) wether the legal provisions calling for the
statements needed to be clarified or modified. As part of



1/The functions and responsibilities of ERDA were transferred
  to the newly created Department of Enery on October 1, 1977.


                              3
our review we compared executive branch procedures used to
prepare the initial.annual submissions to those used to pre-
pare the second submissions sent to the Congress on
January 18, 1977.

     Our review was limited to (1) an examination of the
legal requirements for arms control impact statements and
the legislative history and (2) executive branch procedures
to implement these requirements. During our review, we
conferred with officials of ACDA, ERDA, and the Departments
of State and Defense, and the staff of the National Security
Council.

     We did not attempt to critically evaluate the cor:ent
of the arms control impact statements since the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) was analyzing the fiscal year 1978
statements. In April 1977 this analysis was issued together
with several sample statements based on criteria CRS felt
should be used in assessing the arms control impact of given
programs. 1/




1/"Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in
  Connection with the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request,"
  Joint Committee Print, April 1977.

                              4
                         CHAPTER 2
            WHAT PROGRAMS REQUIRE ARMS CONTROL

                     IMPACT STATEMENTS?
     Executive branch agencies disagree considerably as to
what programs require impact statements. The executive
branch, questioning the appropriateness of using dollar
threshold criteria to determine if a program requires an
arms control impact statement, has not submitted all re-
quired statements to the Congress. The discretionary
authority to select programs below the dollar thresholds
has not broight additional programs into the process.
Disagreements have arisen over whether sensitive civilian
or dual-purpose technologies should be subjected to the
process as well as certain research programs in their
early stages.
DOLLA.A THRESHOLDS

     The dollar thresholds specified in the legislation to
determine whether a program requires an arms control impact
statement corresponds roughly to Defense Department defini-
tions of major weapons systems. However, strict adherence
to these thresholds would bring programs that have little
or no arms control impact (such as replenishing conven-
tioral ammunition inventories) into the arms control im-
pact statement process. Executive branch officials ques-
tioned the need to spend time and analytical resources to
prepare statements for such programs that simply do not
have significant arms control impact.

     Conversely, some programs below te dollar thresholds
could have serious arms control consequences. An Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency official said that deleteri-
ous arms control characteristics of a given weapons system
are unrelated to its cost and that development of certain
types of inexpensive weapons could have more damaging ef-
fects from an arms control standpoint (that is, impact on
stability, vulnerability, deterrence, verifiability, and
the arms race) than development of some multimillion dollar
weapons systems. For example, certain chemical and biologi-
cal weapons could be developed inexpensively, yet their use
would introduce an unacceptable method of warfare.

     The dollar threshold criteria could also invite dis-
aggregation of significant programs to evade preparing and
submitting arms control impact statements to the Congress
and to further reduce the visibility of controversial
weapons-related programs. While we noted no deliberate

                             5
evasion in this way, we did note that programs were selected
for analysis on the basis of line item budgetary data.

     Another criticism of dollar threshold criteria is that
it forces analysis of each individual program as if it were
in a vacuum, ignoring the need to examine individual weapons-
related programs in the context of other weapons-related pro-
grams and the politics and negotiating tactics of arms con-
trol. In reality, the arms control impact of a given system
could vary markedly depending on deployment schedules and
combinations of other weapons systems. Furthermore, it may
be inappropriate to isolate arms control policy considerations
of a given program from other foreign policy considerations.

     The positive benefits of a program may outweigh its
apparent negative features. By isolating arms control con-
siderations, a distorted picture of the value of programs
might result. Some critics believe it may be preferable
to assess the arms control impact of a group of related
programs rather than individual programs. It might also be
preferable to assess arms control impact with consideration
given to the comparative values of alternative systems to
both defense and arms control purposes.

     We believe the executive branch should be given some
latitude in selecting programs for impact analysis, using
the dollar thresholds as general guidelines. However, if
the executive branch was given this latitude, the adminis-
tration should then be required to report the additional
criteria it used in selecting programs for analysis.
DISCRETIONARY SELECTIONS

     The law gives discretionary authority to the ACDA Di-
rector to select programs for arms control impact analysis
which do not meet the dollar threshold criteria but which
may have significant arms control impact. However, the
law only obliges the National Security Council to submit
arms control impact statements to the Congress on discre-
tionary selections if it agrees that the programs have a
significant impact on arms cntrol and disarmament policy
or negotiations.

     Thus far, only programs which exceeded one of the
dollar thresholds specified in the legislation resulted in
impact statements being sent to the Congress. ACDA offi-
cials were reluctant to discuss what discretionary selec-
tions they proposed to the Director for impact analysis
for either year's process. For the first year, we found



                            6
that ACDA pre~dred internal analyses on several programs it
believed to have significant ams control impact but which
did not result in an arms control impact statement being
submitted.

     A National Security Council staff member said that,
because of time constraints, they decided to limit the
number of statements submitted to the Congress in the first
year. However, ACDA would not confirm nor deny this as the
reason why ACDA's analyses did not result in final impact
statements.

     We were equally unsuccessful in determining what
discretionary selections ACDA made the second year. Our
request for a list of possible discretionary selections
for the Director's consideration was denied on the grounds
that it was an internal working paper prepared solely for
the Director of ACDA and his staff to use. We do know, how-
ever, that if ACDA made discretionary selections, none has
resulted in a final impact statement.

CIVIL PROGRAMS HAVING
ARMS CONTROL IMPACT

     We also noted some disagreement over whether discre-
tionary authority to select programs for impact analysis
extends to nonmilitary technology. The law states that
discretionary selections should include

     "* * * any other program involving weapons systems
     or technology which such Government agency or the
     Director [of ACDAI believes may have a significant
     impact on arms control and disarmament policy or
     negotiations."

     Defense and the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration believe that the word "weapons" modifies not only
"systems" but also "technology" and therefore the law limits
discretionary selections to weapons-related technology.
ACDA's interpretation, however, is that "weapons" modifies
only "systems" and therefore the law does not exempt from
the process civilian or dual-purpose technology that might
have some arms control impact. Under ACDA's interpreta-
tion, ERDA's research into such areas as peaceful nuclear
explosions and laser isotope separation could be subjected
to the process. Certain programs of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and other agencies could also have arms control
implications. For example, space satellites are relevant
to arms control because of their role in verifying arms


                             7
control agreements and their close relationship to military
activities.

     According to a National Security Council staff mem-
ber, ACDA expressed an interest in having arms control im-
pact statements prepared for fiscal year 1978 to accompany
certain nuclear energy-related research programs that had
no direct relationship to weapons. This staff member said
that the National Security Council did not call for impact
statements on these programs partly because (1) it felt
the process should not include civil or dual-purpose tech-
nologies, and (2) the specific programs ACDA was concerned
about were being dealt with in other forums, including the
nonproliferation backstopping committee of the National
Security Council.

CONCEPTUAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS
     The involved agencies appear uncertain about when in the
weapons acquisition process an arms control analysis should
be made. Defense and ERDA officials told us that, in their
view, most research programs, particularly those in their
conceptual stage for which no application had yet been de-
veloped, should not be subjected to the arms control im-
pact statement process. ACDA officials believe that the
law is flexible enough to permit early analysis of research
and development programs. They contend that it is essential
to raise arms control concerns as early as possible in the
conceptual phase of a program when arms control considera-
tions could shape and direct the program.

     Whether the Congress intended for arms control impact
analyses to be performed at the conceptual stages is not
clear. For example, the House Committee on International
Relations report on the proposed legislation specified that
programs of a seminal nature which could have far-reaching
implications for arms control policy and planning should be
subjected to analysis. Yet, another part of the report ex-
pressed the Committee's desire to promote an environment
conducive to conceptual and exploratory research without
encumbering such research with overly exacting analytical
requirements.

     In our opinion, arbitrarily limiting arms control
impact analysis to those programs that have reached a
specified stage of development could eliminate some pro-
grams having significant arms control impact. Because
it is often more difficult to remedy characteristics which
are adverse to arms control objectives once they are set,
we believe that consideration should be given to the early


                               8
stages of development. While we agree that it may not be
productive to analyze some research programs in their con-
ceptual stages, we believe programs in their early stages
of development should not be arbitrarily eliminated from
consideration foL impact analysis.

REQUIRED STATEMENTS NOT SUBMITTED

     In view of the late November enactment of the arms
control impact statement requirements, the executive branch
generally concurred that it would be preferable to do
thorough impact statements on relatively few cases for fis-
cal year 1977 rather than to slight many programs require-
ing statements according to the legislated dollar threshold
criteria. A few members of the cognizant congressional com-
mittees agreed with the suggested approach, although no at-
tempt was made to reach agreement on the precise number of
statements to be submitted or the specific programs to be
analyzed.

     Ultimately, statements for 16 programs were submitted
from a list of at least 70 programs ACDA believed met the
statutory requirements. The Congress was not told why
these 16 programs were chosen for analysis, nor was any
attempt made to list those programs which rquired state-
ments but which were not submitted because of time con-
straincs. Executive branch officials said, however, that
the programs analyzed for fiscal year 1977 were selected to
represent a broad range of strategic and tactical missions
and each of the military services.   (See app. II.)

     For fiscal year 1978, he executive branch submitted
to the Congress 26 arms control impact statements and a
lis. of 76 other programs that met the statutory require-
ments but which it described as having no "prima facie"
arms control impact. (See apps. II, III, and IV.) Execu-
tive branch officials explained that the Congress did not
intend the process to be time or resource consuming and
that therefore preparation of formal statements describing
programs for which there was no arms control impact was
inappropriate.

     The Congressional Research Service challenged the
list of 76 programs which, according co the executive
branch, had no arms control impact. The CRS study in-
dicated that impact statements should have been prepared
on roughly half of the 76 programs.  CRS also identified
numerous other programs which it believed warranted impact
statements.


                             9
     We question whether the list of 76 programs with the ac-
companying description of no arms control impact is sufficient
to fulfill the legal requirement for impact statements on
these programs even if such determination is accepted as being
valid. Moreover, the CRS evaluation also pointed out that the
Congress needs to clarify what programs require arms control
impact statements.




                            10
                          CHAPTER 3
                  WHAT SHOULD ARMS CONTROL

                 IMPACT STATEMENTS CONTAIN?
     We reviewed with executive branch officials the criteria
used to aalyze the arms control impact of dfense programs.
We concluded that the statements' quality may have been ad-
versely affected by differing agency interpretations of
terms in the legislation as well as the lack of common spe-
cific criteria for analyzing programs for their arms control
impact.
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS
     Differing interpretations of such terms in the legisla--
tion as "complete statement" and "negotiations" appear to
have caused time-consuming interagency debate over the con-
tent of the arms control impact statements.

     The legislation calls for "* * * a complete statement
analyzing the impact of [each] program on arms control and
disarmament policy and negotiations." What constitutes a
complete statement has been central to the interagency de-
bate. Durina the first year of the process, ACDA officials
argued for longer, more comprehensive statements while De-
fense officials felt short statements were sufficient to
comply with legal requirements. In the end, the Defense
view appears to have prevailed as evidenced by the actual
congressional submissions. One State Department official
described the statements as the lowest common denominator.

     Disagreements also arose over the meaning of "negotia-
tions." Defense and ERDA argued that negotiations referred
only to ongoing, formal international negotiations. ACDA
and the National Security Council staff argued that it was
necessary to consider what arms control negotiating options
a program might open or foreclose in the future, in addition
to how those programs might impact on current negotiations.
Again, the Defense view apparently prevailed as evidenced
by the overuiew to the January 1977 submissions which points
out that the statements identify problems or contributions
the programs may pose for, or make to, current arms control
agreements and negotiating positions.

     To limit the analysis of arms control impact to current
negotiations appears questionable. While excessive specula-
tion of possible future arms control negotiations would not
be useful, we believe that limiting analysis of programs to
their impact on current negotiations is an overly restric-
tive view of the legislative requirements.

                            11
LACK OF COMMON SPECIFIC CRITERIA
     The lack of common specific criteria to be used by ail
agencies in assessing the arms control impact of defense and
nuclear weapons programs may have contributed to disagree-
ments over the final form and content of the statements.
Executive branch officials advised us that interagency dis-
cussions between Defense, ACDA, and ERDA yielded agreement
on three major criteria to be followed in assessing the arms
control impact of   given system:
     --Their effect on international negotiations.

     -- Their consistency with executive branch policy.
     -- Their compliance with existing international agree-
        ments.
Beyond these broad criteria, each agency was to decide if it
wished to apply more specific criteria to its analysis proc-
ess.

     According to ERDA and Defense officials, neither agency
chose to promulgate analysis criteria beyond the broad cri-
teria agreed upon. ACDA prepared a detailed set of guideline
questions for ACDA analysts to use in assessing the arms con-
trol impact. We were told that the agency never formally
adopted the guidelines, although individual analysts aid
they had used them in preparing analyses. The guidelines
pointed out that consideration should be given to whether
the proposed program would
     --be consistent with agreed arms control obligations;

     --be consistent with reaching agreement in current nego-
       tiations;

     -- reduce crisis instabilities by enhancing deterrence,
        improving warning, raising the nuclear threshold, or
        improving overall command, control, and communications;

     --be consistent with force posture requirements;
     -- reduce technological impact instabilities and uncer-
        tainties;
     -- reduce uncertainty arising from verification of de-
        ployment levels or mission identification; and

     --reduce the level of potential violence.



                             12
      In our opinion if the involved agencies had used
specific criteria to analyze programs, the analytical
teristics expected of the statements would have        charac-
                                                 improved.
Development of such criteria might also have eliminated
of the time-consuming interagency debate over            some
the statements should contain.                 what iformation




                           13
                            CHAPTER 4
        WHAT ARE THE AGENCIES' ROLES IN THE PROCESS?
     Executive branch officials said that the arms control
impact statement process is still evolving because of uncer-
tainty over what type of statement the Congress expects.
This uncertainty, fueled by congressional dissatisfaction of
the first submissions, led to a major change in the state-
ment preparation process the second year. Despite the
change, confusion persists over the precise roles of the in-
volved agencies.

FIRST YEAR OF THE PROCESS

     Shortly after enactment of the impact statement legis-
lation in November 1975, an interagency steering committee
was established to reach an agreement on how to meet the
requirements of the law. The committee was chaired by a
representative of the National Security Council and included
representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Office of Management and Budget, Department of Defense, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, and the Energy Research and Devel-
opment Administration.

     One question to be resolved was whether ACDA or the
agencies initiating the programs should prepare the required
impact statements. While the legislation calls on ACDA to
conduct arms control analyses it does not specifically state
who should prepare the statements to be submitted to the
Congress with authorization and appropriation requests. De-
fense and ERDA, the primary agencies submitting defense-
related budget requests, should be able to provide co! *,'-
hensive information on the programs in question. On the
other hand, ACDA, as statutory advisor to the President and
the Congress on arms control and disarmament, should have
the best understanding and knowledge of arms control issues.

     The agencies mutually agreed that making ACDA respon-
sible for the statements would place ACDA in an awkward posi-
tion of having to criticize Defense's and ERDA's program
proposals. Creating an adversary role for ACDA vis-a-vis
Defense and ERDA in this process might prove counterpro-
ductive and undermine ACDA's effectiveness in other arms
control activities. The agencies agreed that ACDA's effec-
tiveness depended upon the continued cooperation of other
executive branch agencies in sharing information about their
programs. ACDA officials, in particular, were not anxious
to jeopardize working relations with these agencies by
accepting too prominent a role in the impact statement
process.

                              14
     Accordingly, it was agreed that Defense and ERDA would
prepare draft impact statements for fiscal year 1977. ACDA
would not prepare statements but instead would comment on
those prepared by the agencies on the basis of their own in-
ternal analyses of the programs as a check on the complete-
ness of the statements. The Department of State, the Office
of Management and Budget, and the Central Intelligence Agency
would also review the draft statements. Finally, the Na-
tional Security Council would serve as a mediator in delib-
erations on what statements would ultimately be sent to the
Congress, as well as their form and content.
SECOND YEAR OF THE PROCESS

     Dissatisfaction with the original arms control impact
statements apparently led to consideration of new proce-
dures for preparing the statements the succeeding year.
Agreement could not be reached on new procedural guidelines,
and, by November 1976, neither DOD nor ERDA had proposed
draft impact statements. Therefore, the National ecurity
Council decided that it would edit ACDA's analyses of the
arms control impact of major defense programs which then
would be used as the basis for preparing impact statements
by an interagency working group. Defense would provide
program descriptions to accompany the arms control impact
assessments. ERDA would continue to prepare the few impact
statements required for nuclear weapons programs. Again,
the National Security Council representative would mediate
differences of opinion and finalize the statements. Another
major change in the process the second year was the addition
of an introductory overview statement prepared principally
by the State Department with input from other agencies. The
overview statement was intended to relate arms control as
one element of national security policy to other elements,
including military strategy, force posture, and diplomacy.
     Despite the agencies' changing roles in the impact
statement preparation process, we do not believe the quality
or content differed significantly from 1 year to the next.
A few more statements were submitted--from 16 to 26--but
they were still only a few paragraphs and provided little
additional information. In our opinion the only major im-
provement in the congressional submissions was the addi-
tion of the introductory overview statement which helped to
place the individual statements in context.

ACDA'S ROLE IN THE PROCESS
     The disappointing results of the process thus far may
be that the impact statement legislation did not make any

                             15
single agency primarily responsible for insuring that the
requirements of the law are met.

     Apparently, some Members of Congress believe that ACDA
should play a larger role in the process. A March 1977 let-
ter from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the ACDA
Director pointed out that in preparing the legislation it
was anticipated that ACDA would play a central role in de-
veloping the arms control impact statement program. The
Director agreed that ACDA should play a central role in the
process and pledged to insure that future statements would
comply with the letter and spirit of the law.

     So far ACDA has apparently been unable to significantly
influence the impact statement process. As discussed in
more detail in the preceding chapters, ACDA has experienced
problems in convincing other agencies as to what programs
require impact statements and what criterie should be used
in analyzing programs for their arms control impact.

     To gage the quality of the impact statements that might
be forthcoming if ACDA were given primary responsibility
for preparing the statements, we reviewed 10 of ACDA's arms
control impact analyses which had been prepared for ACDA'q
internal use but which served as the basis for the fiscal
year 1978 statements sent to the Congress. Our review showed
that although the ACDA analyses were consistently longer ad
more detailed than the corresponding final impact statements
submitted to the Congress, the statements generally appeared
to be fair representations of the factors presented in the
ACDA internal analyses.

     Based on this limited review, we concluded that if ACDA
had submitted its 10 internal analyses directly to the Con-
gress instead of the edited versions, the Congress may have
received more information on the programs in question but
not much more analysis. In only a few cases would additional
negative characteristics of the programs from an arms con-
trol standpoint have been provided to the Congress. It
should be recognized, however, that if ACDA had prepared the
analyses for submission to the Congress rather than for in-
ternal use by the Director, the content might have been
modified.

     Although our review of ACDA's internal impact analy-
ses did not lend support to an hypothesis that ACDA-
prepared statements would be better than agency-prepared
statements, we believe that ACDA can and should play a
larger role in the process because:

                             16
     -- ACDA is most experienced in and sensitive to arms
        control issues.
     --ACDA has statutory responsibility for advising the
       President and the Congress on arms control matters.
     -- ACDA can more objectively view the programs being
        analyzed than the agencies initiating these programs.
     -- Making ACDA primarily responsible for implementing
        the process might enhance the quality of the state-
        ments through increased accountability.
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE
     Although the impact statement legislation does not spec-
ify a role for the State Department in the process, the De-
partment has been involved by virtue of its membership on the
National Security Council. So far its role has been limited
to commenting on draft impact statements and, for the second
year of the process, preparing an overview statement to
accompany the individual impact statements.
     We believe that it is appropriate that the Department,
by virtue of its central role in foreign policy matters,
participate in the impact statement process. Because arms
control is only one aspect of national security policy, it
is important that arms control considerations
programs not be viewed in isolation from other of individual
                                                aspects of de-
fense and foreign policy. For this reason, we support the
Department's continued participation in the arms control
impact statement process.




                              17
                       CHAPTER 5

      HAS THE PROCESS FULFILLED LEGISLATIVE INTENT?

                                                   programs
     One standard by which legislatively mandatedin accom-
can be measured is whether the program succeeds
plishing its intended objectives. Opinions   as to how well
                                               worked va-
the arms control impact statement process has
                                              of what the
ried according to individual interpretationsto the legisla-
law was intended to accomplish. According           the
tive history, congressional intentions in enacting
                                                to
arms control impact statement legislation were
                                                systema-
     -- make the executive branch formally and
        tically consider the possible effects  of proposed
        programs on arms control.

     -- improve the quantity and quality of informa-
                                                    defense
        tion submitted to the Congress on proposed merits
                                              the         of
        programs, so it can better deliberate
        these programs.
                                      Control and Disarma-
     -- enhance the role of the Arms security
        ment Agency in the national           policymaking
       process.
                                                         of
     This chapter attempts to measure past performance
                                                 statement
                                          impact
the executive branch in the arms control
                                               what the
process against congressional expectations of       the
process should accomplish. Potential alternatives       are
Congress might explore to accomplish these objectives
                               executive branch views on
offered after a discussion of the
the relative burden posed by      impact statement process.

HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS OF
ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS
                                                      legisla-
      In enacting the arms control impact statement
                                                  executive
 tion, the Congress appeared skeptical that the implications
 branch was fully considering  the arms control
                                                       formal
 of defense and nuclear weapons programs. Requiring
                                             was  one way that
 statements to be submitted to the Congress
 the Congress might be assured that such considerations
                                                   to result
 were made systematically. It was also expected branch to the
 in heightened consciousness  of the executive
 arms control implications of these programs.



                              18
     Executive branch officials with whom we spoke, inclu-
ding thcse at ACDA, disagreed with the suggestion that arms
control considerations have not been considered fully in
past national security policymaking deliberations. They
contended that arms control considerations are discussed
in many forums at all stages of the policy process and that
by the time a decision is made to enter advanced development
and procurement, arms control aspects of defense programs
have been fully considered. Some of the forums cited were
the Nationsl Security Council, its committees and working
groups, and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council.

     Despite executive branch claims that the arms con-
trol implications of defense programs are considered as
an integral part of the policymaking process, some Defense
officials said that arms control and national security
are entirely separate matters. One official verbalized
an attitude we noted in other quarters in stating that
"ACDA has their job to do and we have ours."

     The Arms Control and Disarmament Act states that
Harms control and disarmament policy, being an important
aspect of foreign policy, must be consistent with national
security policy as a whole." ACDA officials emphasized
their views that arms control measures enhance rather than
detract from national security. Yet it appears that in the
past arms control considerations may have been made in some
cases aside from rather than as an integral part of the
national security decisionmaking process. For this reason
we believe that although the arms control impact statement
process may duplicate efforts that occur elsewhere in the
budget cycle, it is nonetheless a valuable tool to insure
formal, systematic consideration of arms control implica-
tions of defense programs.

INCREASED FLOW OF
INFORMATION   T E CONGRESS
     Despite expectations that the process would provide
the Congress valuable information to assist in its delib-
erations on the merits cf individual programs, executive
branch officials admit that the impact statements thus far
submitted have not provided much more information than
the Congress is already receiving through other channels.
Consequently, they criticized the process as redundant
and uninformative.




                             19
     Protests that the process is a paper drill" with no
real purpose appeared to us to be excuses for the inade-
quacies of the statements.  In our opinion, the Congress,
in enacting the legislation, was asking for additional
information on the programs rather than the same informa-
tion they have customarily received. The question must
be raised as to why the content of the statements was
so sparse that they were of little use to anyone.

     One apparent reason is that a certain amount of
uneasiness exists over how the information will be used.
Defense officials with whom we spoke are clearly concerned
that the impact statements will be used by critics to
attack Defense Department programs. As a result, these
officials feel compelled to disclose as little as possible
thereby limiting the damage the statements can do to
Defense or ERDA programs.

     Defense officials generally feel that the arms control
impact statements put Defense at a distinct disadvantage
in being able to make a fair, honest case for defense
programs. One official said that it was difficult and
perhaps unfair to expect program advocates tr also provide
potential critics with a range of arguments hat could
be used to criticize the advocated programs. One Defense
official put the problem forward more co'orfully--"Congress
asked us to sh' )t ourselves in the foot. Now Congress is
complaining because we aren't doing it." An ERDA official
added that the present system "asks people to stack the
deck against themselves."

     One ACDA official felt that some individuals were try-
ing to use the arms control impact statement process to
discuss subjects more appropriate to the normal defense
weapons systems acquisition decisionmaking processes. He
felt that discussions of force size and structure, for
example, were inappropriate subjects for arms control
impact analyses. Defense officials feared that the process
might be used to expand the defense and national security
decisionmaking community, particularly in the Congress,
thereby jeopardizing the national security by increasing
the possibility of classified information being publicly
leaked.

     Despite executive branch objections to the process,
we believe that it is entirely proper and reasonable to
expect the executive branch to provide the Congress with




                           20
information on the arms control impact of its programs.
In enacting the impact statement legislation, the Congress
was not asking the executive branch to provide only nega-
tive information of arms control but instead an evenhanded
discussion of how a given program impacts on arms control
policy and negotiations. In our opinion, the arms control
impact statement process offers the potential for providing
the Congress a more balanced picture of the pros and cons
of programs than it has previously received from the normal
budget process.

ENHANCED ROLE FOR ACDA
     The Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scien-
tific Developments, House Committee on Foreign Relations, 1/
in its September 1974 report stemming from a comprehensive
review of ACDA, stated that

     "* * * criticism and discontent with ACDA has
     tended to come from public and congressional
     proponents of disarmament and opponents or
     critics of U.S. ecurity and foreign policy.
     ACDA has been charged--particularly in the last
     6 years--with being too 'establishment,' too
     conventional and unimaginative in thinking, too
     timid in contesting Government policy and lobby-
     ing for its point of view."

     One objective of the arms control impact statement
legislation was to give ACDA a chance to speak out on
arms control issues and thereby enhance its stature in
the national security policymaking area.

     Thus far ACDA appears to have reluctantly accepted
its role. ACDA officials repeatedly emphasized that their
effectiveness depends upon the cooperation of other agen-
cies in sharing their information. Accordingly, they are
not anxious to jeopardize working relationships by playing



1/Now the Subcommittee on International Security and
  Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on Interna-
  tional Relations.




                           21
too forceful a role in the impact statement process. De-
fense, State, ERDA, and ACDA officials agreed that the
impact sta-   nt legislation has put ACDA in an awkward
position.
     Although the Congress has not yet asked the ACDA
Director to testify on the arms control impact statements
as provided by the legislation, it would be difficult
for the Director to testify to positions other than
those agreed to by the executive branch. Therefore, if
this provision was to provide the Congress with ACDA's
independent point of view as to the arms control impact
of the programs in question, we are skeptical that this
intent will be fulfilled.

ACDA s access to information

      A second way of enhancing ACDA's role was to require
that the Director of ACDA be granted on a continuing basis
full and timely access to detailed information on programs
requiring arms control impact statements. Various officials
with whom we spoke could not agree on whether ACDA's access
to information had improved as a result of this new require-
ment.

     One Defense official said that the new legislation
had increased Defense's incentives to provide ACDA informa-
tion. He explained that by providing ACDA with as complete
a picture as possibl      D how specific programs are in-
tended to meet idc         'efense needs, Defense can best
assure a fair appraisal -   he arms control impact of a
given program. We were told, however, that public dis-
closure of information such as quantities of articles to
be procured, phasing of procurement, and decisions of the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council could damage
national security. Therefore, Defense officials believe
that it is entirely proper to require ACDA to specifically
identify the information it wants and to establish a speci-
fic "need to know" before it releases certain information.

     One ACDA official said that the arms contro. impact
statement process may have actually reduced ACDA's ability
to obtain information it needs to support ongoing arms
control negotiations. For example, Defense officials used
to give ACDA information over the telephone, now these
officials want to meet with ACDA staff in person to discuss
in detail exactly what ACDA wants and why it wants it. In
the past, ACDA would request and be supplied copies of




                           22
Defense documents, now ACDA analysts are sometimes only
allowed to read requested Defense documents, sometimes
not even being allowed to take notes. ACDA officials at-
tributed these recent restrictions to Defense officials'
concerns that ACDA might somehow misuse the information
in critiquing defense programs as part of the ams control
impact statement process.

     ACDA may appeal working level decisions to deny ACDA's
requests for Defense information; however, one ACDA official
told us that ACDA has been reluctant to use this procedure.
He explained that the issue of information access to support
the arms control impact statement process was not important
enough to threaten access to information on more critical
issues such as international arms control negotiations.

     Clearly, the Congress intended ACDA to be given access
to enough information to be able to make fair analyses of
the programs' impact. Therefore, it is difficult to under-
stand the view of ACDA officials that the impact statement
process is not important enough to press for the informa-
tion to which it is entitled.

VIEWS OF THE RELATIVE
BURDEN OF THE PROCESS

     The House Committee on International Relations report
on the impact statement legislation noted that although
it expected impact statements to be comprehensive, omp'ete
and substantive enough for the Congress to exercise inde-
pendent appraisals, it did not want the process to result
in massive and expensive documentation which might lead
to the formation of additional bureaucracies or strain
existing analytical capabilities.

     ACDA officials felt that the arms control impact anal-
ysis and statement process had posed some burden on ACDA.
One official complained of insufficient staff to adequately
represent ACDA on interagency working groups and that the
arms control impact statement process further taxed his
staff. Another felt tat the time spent performing arms
control impact analyses detracted substantially from the
time available to support ongoing negotiations. The ACDA
Director testified at April 1977 hearings before the Sub-
committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
that his staff had spent 6,400 staff-hours on the 1978 im-
pact statement process, and that much of this time had been
spent defending ACDA interpretations of the legal require-
ments in interagency discussions.



                            23
     Defense officials expressed varying views on the rela-
tive burden imposed by the process. One official noted that
he had spent from 20 to 30 percent of his time over a 6-month
period on arms control impact statements and that others
within Defense had spent similar time in the process. He
attributed much of this time commitment to the fact that
the process of drafting arms control impact statements was
new, under revision, and that the end product was still not
fully accepted by the Congress. He believed that once an
acceptable process is achieved which can be followed each
year, the time spent preparing the statements should be re-
duced since many statements would only need to be updated
each year. Nevertheless, other Defense officials felt that
the time necessary to prepare the statements placed an ex-
cessive burden on Defense. ERDA officials agreed with De-
fense officials.
     State Department officials involved in preparing the
overview statement to accompany the 1978 impact statements
felt that the entire process was burdensome and a tremen-
dous waste of time because the process failed to attain its
objectives. It did not provide the Congress with addi-
tional information, it did not raise arms control issues
that had not been addressed earlier, and it did not en-
hance the ability of ACDA to function as a member of the
national security team.

     A National Security Council staff member felt that
the process as carried out for fiscal year 1978 was rather
burdensome for him since he had prepared all the initial
drafts of the arms control impact statements for defense
programs from ACDA's analyses. At the same time, he felt
the process provided an opportunity to air for one last
time arms control issues that might have been omitted in
other interagency forums where arms control and national
security issues are discussed.

POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE ARMS
CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENT PROCESS

     The present arms control impact statement process is
apparently based on two assumptions. The first assumeion
is that the executive branch was not fully considering the
arms control implications of its defense and nuclear weapons
programs before undertaking those programs. The second as-
sumption is that (a) the Congress needs to know the arms
control implications of U.S. defense and atomic energy pro-
grams, and (b) the executive branch has failed to inform
the Congress about the implications of these programs in
the past.


                           24
     One approach that might reduce the need to rely ex-
clusively on arms control impact statements would be for
the executive branch to make available to the Congress
documentation that conclusively demonstrates its consider-
ation of arms control problems in making decisions on U.S.
national security, defense, and nuclear energy policy.
These include interagency studies such as (1) Presidential
Review Memoranda (formerly National Security Study Memoranda)
and Presidential Directive Memoranda (formerly National
Security Decision Memoranda) produced through the National
Security Council, (2) transcripts of the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council's meetings, and (3) Defense
Concept Papers.

     The executive branch might not be anxious to make
available certain documents which have often been closely
held. However, increased communications between the
executive branch and the Congress on these matters could
be useful to more fully document the claim that arms control
issues are fully debated in important interagency forums.

     The Congress might also conduct its own independent
arms control impact analyses based on data provided by the
executive branch. Such data could include weapon system
performance characteristics, missions, alternative roles,
expected initial operating capabilities, proposed quanti-
ties, phasing of deployment, and data on current interna-
tional negotiations. Staff support to perform this func-
tion would need to be considered.

      The Congress might also mandate that federally
sored research projects which exceed certain dollar spon-
                                                     amounts
and which involve technology having potential military ap-
plications have a specified percentage of its total value
earmarked at the outset to support studies that examine
the arms control implications of such developments. The
earmarking of funds for this purpose would insure that
consideration of arms control impact is made at the earli-
est possible stage.   The difficulty with this alternative
would be designating a party to perform the analysis that
was knowledgeable of both the intricacies of the technol-
ogy being developed as well as current arms control poli-
cies, issues, and negotiations. Also, the designated
analyst would have to be somewhat detached from the re-
search project to offer an independent objective analysis.




                            25
                          CHAPTER 6

               CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY COMMENTS

       The arms control impact statement process so far has
not accomplished its intended objectives. However, we
believe that if certain obstacles are overcome the arms
control impact statement process has some potential for
assisting the Congress in its deliberations on the funding
of major defense and nuclear weapons programs as well as
other programs involving sensitive technologies.

     Fxecutive branch compliance with the legal require-
ments has been hampered by interagency disputes over
such basic questions as the role various agencies are
expected to play in the process, what programs require
arms control impact statements, and what information the
statements should contain. Furthermore, uncertainty over
how the Congress intends to use the statements appears
to have inhibited full disclosure of arms control factors.
To improve the quality of arms control impact statements,
the Congress and the executive branch need to focus on
these issues.

     The shifting roles of various agencies in the drafting
process indicate a clear lack of consensus as to what roles
the Congress intended the agencies to play. While the
legislation called on ACDA to conduct arms control analyses,
it does not specificially state who should prepare the
statements to be submitted to the Congress. The law is
silent recarding the State Department's role in the process
despite its central role in foreign policy matters. Further-
more, executive branch interpretations of what programs
require impact statements have limited the process to
analysis of Defense and ERDA programs when other agencies
such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration could be sponsoring
programs having significant arms control impact.

     Other problems have plagued executive branch compli-
ance with t.e arms control impact statement requirements.
For example, strict adherence to dollar threshold criteria
for selecting programs for arms control impact analysis
would unnecessarily bring programs into the process that
simply do not have much to do with arms control and leave
other programs out that do. Consequently, the executive
branch has not submitted arms control impact statements to
the Congress on all programs legally requiring impact
statements. Furthermore, ACDA's discretionary authority
to select programs for arms control impact analysis has

                             26
 not succeeded in bringing additional programs
 impact statement process.                     into the

     Terms in the legislation such as "significant
"complete statement," and "negotiations" have        impact,"
consuming interagency debate and disagreement  caused  time-
                                               over
programs should be analyzed and what the statements  what
contain. Other areas of uncertainty have included should
                                                     (1)
whether the process can be used to examine the
impact of certain civilian technologies that    arms  control
                                              could
later military application, and (2) at what stage have
research and development process programs should in the
sidered for impact analysis. The lack of common be con-
to be used by all agencies in analyzing programs criteria
                                                  for their
arms control impact may have contributed to interagency
disagreements over statement content.

     We also question whether the arms control impact
statement process has significantly improved
                                              ACDA's access
to nformation as the Congress intended. While
has created a set of incentives for Defense and the process
                                                 ERDA to see
that ACDA is given as complete a picture as possible
grams requiring arms control impact statements,        on pro-
has not dispelled fears that the information     the  process
                                              revealed will
be used by critics to attack individual programs.
result has been increased formality in communication The
ACDA at the expense of expeditious day-to-day          with
working relationships.                         interagency

     Uncertainty as to how the Congress plans to use
statements and what it expects the process            the
                                           to accomplish
may have inhibited full discussion of arms control
in the impact statements. The content of the        issues
also appears to have been adversely affected   statements
                                             by executive
branch views that the process is redundant and
                                                no more than
a paper drill since
     -- the Congress already receives much of the informa-
        tion contained in the impact statements as part
                                                        of
        the normal budget process and
     -- the arms control implications of programs
                                                   have
        always been made and would continue to be made
        even without the impact statement process.
     Despite executive branch skepticism of the
of the arms control impact statement process,   usefulness
                                              we believe




                            27
it offers potential both for insuring tihat arms control is-
sues are considered in a formal systematic manner and for
improving the quantity and quality of information reaching
the Congress. Moreover, we believe ACDA can exercise a
leadership role in the process without jeopardizing working
relationships with the other involved agencies and that the
State Department, by virtue of its central role in foreign
policy matters, can contribute importantly to the impact
statement process.

      It should be recognized that even improved arms control
impact statements cannot be considered in and of themselves
conclusive evidence as to executive branch consideration of
arme control aspects in its national security policymaking
deliberations. We believe the arms control impact statement
pricess should complement rather than replace existing me-
cnanisms to consider the arms control impact of programs.
Fuller sharing of information which demonstrates executive
branch consideration of arms control aspects of programs in
other national security decisionmaking processes is needed
to reassure the Congress that these aspects are being fully
scrutinized.

AGENCY COMMENTS

      In a draft report sent to the involved executive branch
agencies for review and comment, we suggested language to
amend section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2576), to spell out more clearly the in-
tended roles and responsibilities of the involved agencies.
We further suggested that the Director of ACDA develop (1)
interagency procedures for implementing the arms control im-
pact statement requirements, (2) specific guidelines for
selecting discretionary programs for analysis, and (3) spec-
ific criteria for analyzing the arms control impact of pro-
grams.

     The National Security Council, commenting on the draft
report on behalf of the administration (see app. VI),
stated,

    "We have no major disagreement with the investi-
    gative portion of the report, and we generally
    agree with the GAO assessment that past implemen-
    tation of Section 36 of the Arms Control and
    Disarmament Act may have failed to satisfy the in-
    tent of Congress."




                            28
In line with our recommendations, the National Security
Council advised that the administration is taking the
following corrective actions:
     -- ACDA will assume the bulk of the responsibilities
        for preparing the fiscal year 1979 arms control
        impact statements. An improved interagency process
        will help to resolve ACDA's past reluctance to
        assume a prominent role in the process.
     -- A National Scurity Council working group is
        developing (1) a set of criteria which will be
        used for program selection and (2) specific cri-
        teria to be applied in analyzing programs for
        their arms control impact.
     The National Security Council
the administration is committed to further commented that
                                   insuring that the pro-
visions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act are fully
complied with and believes that it can insure compliance
wJth the legal provisions of the act, without additional
legislation, through ongoing improvements to the intera-
gency process.
     To provide the administration an opportunity o
demonstrate that it can achieve the intended objectives
of the arms control impact statement legislation, we are
not making any recommendations to amend the legislation
at this time. However, we will continue to closely
monitor the impact statement process and will propose
amendments to the legislation at a later date if warranted.




                           29
APPENDIX I                                                                APPENDIX I

                   SECTION 36 OF THE ARMS CONTROL

                   AND DISARMAMENT ACT, AS AMENDED
                4"ARM8 CONTROL IMPACT INFORMATION AND ANALYSL8

         "Szc. 86. (a) In order to assist the Director in the performance of
       his duties with respect to arms control and disarmament poliey and
       negotiations, any Government agency preparing any legislative or
       budgetary proposal for-
               "(1) any program of research, development, tsting, engineer-
            ing, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to
           nuclear armaments, nuclear implements of war, military facili-
            ties or military vehicles designed or intended primarily for the
            delivery of nuclear weapons.
               "(2) any program of research, development, testing, engineer
            ing, construction, deployment, or modernization with respect to
           armaments, ammunition, implements of war, or military facilities,
           having-
                   ' (A, an estimated total program cost in excess of $20,000,-
                000, or
                   "(B) an estimated annual program cost in excess of
                 $50,000,00, or
               "(8) any other program involving weapons systems or tech-
            nology which such Government agency or the Director believes
            may have a significant impact on arms control and disarmament
            policy or negotiations,
       shall, on a continming basis, provide the Director with full and timely
       access to detailed information, in accordance with the procedures
       established pursuant to section 35 of this Act, with respect to the
       nature, scope, and purpose of such proposal.
          "(b) (1) The Director, as he deems appropriate, shall assess and
       analyze each program described in subsection (a) with respect to its
       impact on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations,
       and shall advise and make recommendations, on the basis of such
       assessment and analysis, to the Natioral Security Council, the Oflice
       of Management and Budget, and the Government agency proposing
       such program.
         "(2) Any rquest to the Congress ar authoriatiou or appropria-
      tions for-
              "(A)say program described in ubsection ()(1)      or (2), or
               (B) n pro r desibed in subsction () ( id ound
            by t Ntional Security Council, on the bis of the idvioe and
            resmmendaions received from the Director, to have, ignificant
            impact on arms control and disarmment policy or .gotiationi,
      shall include a complete statement anslying the impac of such pro-
      gram on arms control and disarmament policy and negotiations.
         "(8) Upon the request of the Committee on Armed Services of the
      Senate or the House of Representatives, the Committee on Appropria-
      tiona of the Seiste or the Houm of Represntatives, the Committee on
      .I.'n     Relation of the Senats, or the Committee on International
      Relations of the House of Representatives or the Joint Committee on
      Atomic Energy, the Director shall, after informing the Secretary of
        iata, advis so    eommittee on the arms control and diumnnamnt
      implisstio of any program with respeot to which a sttUment has
      byon subwaied to the Congrets lusurant to paragraph ().
         4(c) No court shal! have any urinction under any law to compel
      the prfomnne of any requir.emnt of this section or to review the
      adquaey of the performance of any such requirement on the part of
      any Government agency (inclhdinch g the Agency and the Director).".



                                           30
APPENDIX II
                                                                                      APPENDIX II

                                  DATA ON ARMS CONTROL IACT STATEMENTS
                                FISCAL YEARS 1977 AND 1978 BUDGET PROCESSES

                                                                                       Impact
                                              Service Branch          Mission         Statement
     DOD Weapon System                 Army     Nav Air Force     Tactc    iategtc      77 7
    8-1 Bolmber                                           X                       X        X X
    Air Launched Cruise
      Missile (ALCM)                                      X                   X            X X
    Mark 12A Reentry Vehicle                              X                   X         X
    M-X Missile Program                                   X                   X         X       X
    Ilproved Minuteman Guidance                           x                   X         X
    Maneuverable Reentry
     Vehicle (ARV)                               X        X                   X         X       X
    Trident Submarine and
      Missile                                    X                            X         X       X
    Sumari ne Launched
      Cruise Missile                             X                            X         x       X
    CAPTOR Nine                                 X                    X                  X       X
    Pershing II Missile
     Technology                         X                            X                          X
    XM-753 Nuclear
     Projectile                         x                            X            X         X
   Minuteman Squadrons                                    X                   X                 X
   Air Combat Fighter (F-16)                              X         X                           X
   A-10 Aircraft                                          X         X                           X
   Close Air Support Weapons
     System (Laser Maverick)                              X         X                           X
   HARPOON Anti-Ship Missile                    X                   X                           X
   Standard Missile                             X                                               X
   Navy Strike Fighter (F-18)                   X                   X                           X
   Ballistic Missile Defense
    (BMO) Technology                   x                                      X             X
   XM785 Improved 155mm
    Nuclear ProJectile                 X                            X                       x
   Non-Nuclear Lance                   X                            X                       X
   PATRIOT (SA-D)                      x                            x                       x
   XM-1 Tav.k                                                       X                       X
   EROA Wrhead/Associated
     DO Weapon Sstem        '
   W-76/Mark 4Trident                           X                             X        X    X
   8-77/8-52 and B-1                                   X                      X        X    X
   W-78/Mark 12A Reentry Vehicle                       X                      X        X    X
   W-79/8-nch Projectile               X                            X                  X    X
   W-80/ALCM, SLCM, Short Range
    Attack Missiles                                                 X     X X          X    X



                                                     31
APPENDIX III                                                                    APPENDIX III

            UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF SAMPLE IMPACT STATEMENT
              SUBMITTED TO THE CONSRESS JArUARY 18, 1977

                    Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
                        ARMS CONTRO       TMPACT INFORMATION

           Program Desription.-Tie ALCM is a subsonic, air-to-ground
        missile planned for deployment with the heavy bomber force. There
        are two configurations being developed. The basic AISM configura-
        tion is for internal or external carriage anl is interchangeable with
        the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) on either the SRAM rotary
        launcher or SRAM pylon. The second configuration is an adaptation
        of the basic ALCM and provides an extended range capability. The
        extended range ALCM is carried externally on the B-52 SRAM pylon.
        Both configurations are designed to carry a nuclear warhead [deleted]
        which canbe used to attack targets with minimum collateral damage.
        Simultaneously, ALCMs increase bomber survivability by providing
        area defense dilution and reduced bomber low level routing. The
         ALCM advanced development test program has demonstrated missile
        system feasibility and has verified previous cost and performance
         estimates. Maximum commonality is being pursued with ALCM and
         tle Navy Tomahawk engine, warhead, and guidance components.
         Fiscal year 1978 ALCM activity includes full-scale development and
         test activities leading to an operational capability in 1980. ERII)A is
         ,roviding the warhead in accordance with the joint AEC/DOD agree-
         ment of March 1953.
            Armns Control Im.p7iations.-The ALCM program is consistent
         with all present U.S. arms control obligations, policies and negotia-
         tions, The Interim Agreement, in particular, does not cover bombers
         or bomber weapons such as ALCMs. Limitations on cruise missiles are,
         however, uilder active consideration in the SALT II negotiations and
         the IT.S. has offered some substantial concessions on cruise missiles in
         the context of limitations on Backfire,; however, the two sides hlif(,
         not yet reached agreement on such limitations.
            Credible deterrence and continued strategic stability will be en-
         hanced bv maintaining an effective strategic bomber force as one ele-
         ment of ithe strategic TRIAD. ALCMs deployed in B-52s will main-
         tain that bomber's effectiveness against improving Soviet air defenses
         which are not constrained by any SALT limitations. A mixed bomber
         force (1B-52s with ALC.Ms and I-ls) is considered to be an effective
         way of maintaining the capability of the strategic bomber component
         of our deterrent force, and thus contributes to stability. ALCMs would
         not increase the total number of separate strategic delivery vehicles
         nor the number of weapons a bomber could carry; but they wold
         increase the number of credible penetrating targets presented to Soviet
         air defenses, thus diluting the effectiveness of area air defenses. They
         would also permit more flexible bomber routing and targeting, further
         decreasing omber exposure to defenses. ALC.Ms could also play an
         important non-strategic role in maintaining regional stability in the
         face of growing Soviet theater strike capabilities.
            Further, because of the bomber's long time of flight, ALCM's would
         not add significantly to either side's first-strike potential. The unde-
         tected and timcly arrival on target of cruise missiles could not be
         planned with high confidence, compared with ballistic reentry vehicles.
            Verification of arnms control limitations on ALCMs is a difficult
         problem. Cruise missile range, for example. is difficult to verify because
         range can be extended through non-detectable changes in flight profile
         or payload fuel ratios. Many of these uncertainties, particularly those
         in range and payload, are common to all cnruise missile limits. The
          Soviet Union already has deployed large numbers of short and inter-
         mediate-range ALCMs whose range could be difficult to verify under
         a SALT agreement.
            Cruise rmssiles represent an area in which current U.S. technologi-
         cal advantages can offset Soviet quantitative improvements The
         ALCM development program requested in the current budget will
          proceed so as to be cosistontt with any agreement reached in SALT II.

                                               32
APPENDIX IV                                                                                  APPENDIX IV

                 LIST OF 76 PROGRAMS DETERMINED TO HAVE
                     NO IMPACT PRIMA FACIE ON CURRENT
                  ARMS CONTROL POLICY ANDNEGOTIATIONS
                SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON JANUARY 18, 1977
             TO ACCOMPANY THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS

        Arm proprma
            Improved lawk. Ooutinu dt              ea    t Ird impvoemmt of th eumnitiy
        deployed Army improved Har             low
                                                 '       m     m     ir d                  to :seet
        authorised nventory objectlv.                                              '
          m
            AH-I8   4,ora    ow)), Oeamsd pe                      and Iwo            of th fto-
             ": ttack helicopter which u            the      W mells and otbei              eisenathl
        wepon&.       u arft      ispn           d..yu..utln
            OCH-47 (OGkook).      eeeamb ond desveiment to the ceurrty deployed    _o-
        dom rotor helicopter whic.h provides air mbidlit                or adtletr w eap_ 1-
         inee eqipmek umnritS                k     b      tWoeop,Lgeasl     o,'td         l.eveu-
        ation, and recovery of downed at        t.
           'UTrA (Ut Taa Tns   i        ftp)     Oontnued devdepmznt and                     m
                                                                                             IpCmof
        tramnsprt heliopter deioed t             t an intstry sqad n tactical amukta and
        related ebaet 4spport missions.                                                   . .
           Chapparral. Continued procurement and imptoremitof arL ml1,49e1ait                       s-
        nile which provides air weather, low altitude air defense for Army and Air
        Force units.
            Vulcan. Ramlr     and dvelspnmt             s'po,          dpvekoed(l        t*,Mb
        6 barrel Otang g       designed to egee         tarteb at speeds t 450 I           wo.w ~
        air dtense and grnd       s    ort oe.
           Copperhead (1P).         Coatinaus development az p"cu                     jtd       if
        cannon la-hued         edWrolpoJee      deined toattaek both rt ionmi               L
        point target, sucb        tanks, with a hgh obably of a ehrie                      t ss
        kills
          Hellre. Contiaed reaeh            af delopment of a beliooper pont-bl                  aUl-
        tank weapon; the at mkIe dadm                   speeflrea.ly for beh3eqm m.
          Roland. Oontinue ta        n1i  tafer      and ialtial procurem   t ofah l-
       weather hhly         ob4, xIr4mm       rtsble, short-range air defense sqrS   O
       provide defae n       tn sbttle area against high performance, low JP,      .T-
       eraft; will replace the OPniirm.
          Stinger. Continued develoogt and procurement of a manporble, 4laeI44
       fired, Infared bombing air defense weapon to replace the Redeye.
          Advanced Attack Helioopter (AAH1). Continued research and deveo)imet                     qt
       a hlighbly mobile and responsive aerial antitank weapons system pable of fiht-
       ing and surviving in a mid-lntenolty confict.
           Hig Energy Law (HIL) Oomponents. Continued research and developsmt
        to nvestigate the feasibility of Oing the laser as a weapon (laer outpt d
       ,directy to heat, and thereby damage or destroy, targets) In a arletS'of tri.
           Dftgon. Continued procurement of a lightweight, mtaportable antitank us
        eile weapon for the infantry platoon,
           Tow. Continued prcurem ent of a heavy antitank minsile weapon for manter
        battallons; also fired from attack helicopters.
           M11SAl APC. Con4ined procurement ad           Improvement of the basic full.
       tracked armored squad carrier for infantry and combat engineers; also used
       at a      W and reconnalsance vehicle.
           M10bA1 How. Cntinued procurement and Improvemert of alon tWbe eteund
        range version of the Btandard M100 self-propelled 155mm howitzser. Fires b0t
       conventional and nuclear rounds.
           MltIXA2 How. Continued procurement and improvement of an mproved stf-
       propelled -lnch howitzer. Fires conventional and nuclear rounds.
           Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV). Coutinued development and
       l*itOa prcbeUrement of a armored, tracked infantry combat vehicle providing a
       capability to fight-on-the-move and battlefield mobility.
           M0 eries Tank. Con tnued procGrement mprwvement and modification of
        the current U.S. main battle tank; a 105nam tank with a fodr-mn crew.
           M198. Testing and initial pocurement of a towed 155mm howltzer, air tis-
       portable by CH47C helloopter to replace the M114AI towed howitzer; provides
       Increased range and improved reliability and maintaluabillty.
          M88A1 Recovery Vehicle. (Obantnned procurement of a full tracked, armored,
        tank recovery vehicle; performs hoisting, winching, and towing needed to repair
       tanks and armored vehicles.
           Conventional Ammunition. Various Army programs cncerned with the pro-
       curement of standstd conventional ammuiiton' tnitding small arms, artillery,
        ald tank amuzition for replenishment uad inve   bullup.
           track nd Wheeled Vehicles. Continuod 4d0lepment or procurement of track
        and wheeled vehicles dgned for cormtanjaqd oaptrl, weapoas nd personnel
       carrier, logistic or engineer functions.


                                                     33
APPENDIX IV                                                                           APPENDIX IV
              AH-I (Cobra) (MOD). Continued application of a series of modifications
           to the All-I attack hellc.(pters to add the TOW missile system, larger engine,
           transmission and drive train components and other Improvements.
              UH-1 (MOD), Continued modification of the UH-1 transport helicopter to
           improve product reliability, maintainability. and safety.
              ICH-lH (MOD). Modification of H-1 electronic helicopter to provide radio
           communication intercept and Jamming capabilities.
              AN/TSQ-.      Continued development and procurement of an automated air
           defense command and control system that provides target detection, threat
          evaluation, and weapons assignment.
              Improved TOW Vehicle. Continued development and procurement of a pro-
           tected TOW system for the present M11SA TOW carrier.
              Low Altitude, Forward Area Air Defetnse System (LOFAADS). Development
           of a rapid fire, medium caliber, radar controlled air defense gun; to be mounted
           on a t k chassis with armor protection snuicilent to enable full operation on an
          armor bh. lefield; to replace Vulgan
             TACSAnOM. Continued procurement of a family of manpack and mobile
         Tactical atllite, CommunicationP (TACSATVOM) terminals to sgnlificantly
         Improve the uality, range, and reliability of tactical communications.
             AN/VRC-12 Continued procurement of the baic tamily of FM radios, used
         by Army tactical forces.
             KY-7. Continued procurement of the manpack/vehicular configuration of the
         Vinson Combat Net Radio Security Equipment, It secures VHF/UHF, AM/FM
          radios, and tactics' wirelines. It can be powered from a battery or a vehicular
         power supply.
             Tacfire. Continued procurement and improvement of an on-liue tactical com-
         puter system for Army field artillery units Tire            ncreaed artillery fire
         support, response, accuracy, and effectiveness.
             Radar Set, Mortar Loc ('I'PQ--6);   Radar et, Arty Loc (TPQ-97). Continued
         development and procurement of two target locating radars which comprie
         the Firefinder program. They will acquire incoming mortr and artillery peo-
         jectiles and provide precise location of enemy weapons for immediate counterfit.
         Na1,r Programs
              SSN-88. A high speed aingla screw, nuelar powered attack submarine. The
          FY 1978 request Is for continued procurement of thee ships under an ongoing
          authorized program.
             AD. Procurement of a destroyer tender designed to provide necessary material
          and shops for the calibration, test, and overhaul of equipment and the accom-
          lilishment of repairs and intermediate level maintenance for surface combatants
          operating from advanced sites.
             A0-177. Procurement of a eet oiler designed to operate as a unit of an under
          way replenishment group to effect rapid delivery of petroleum products to naval
          fores operating at sea.
              T-ATT-t166. Procurement of a fleet tug designed to salvage and .:keIn tow
          ships of the fleet which are attle damaged or non-operatonal.
             AIM-7E/F. Continued procurement of a eonventionally armed radar guided
          (SPARROW III) missile used in air-to-air and hip-to-air weapons systems
         now in the inventory.
             AIM-54A (Phoenix). Continued procurement of a conventionally armed air-
          to-air guided missile carried aboard the F-14 aircraft In order to replenish train.
         Ing ammunition expended and to outfit new squadrons
             MK-48 Torpedo. Continued procurement of a presently dployed coaventoan
          ally armed acoustic homing torpedo employed by submarines against submarine
         and warface ship targets.
             MK-15 CIWS (Phalanx). Procurement of a close-in, small caliber weapons
          system designed as a fast reaction, terminal defense against anti-ship misiles.
          It consists of a search/track radar. digitalized fire control system and 20mm on.
             EA-6B (Prowler). Continued procurement of a four place derivation of the
         current A-6 jet aircraft equipped to conduct electronic warfare from land or
         carrier bases.
             A-7E (Corsair II). Continued procurement of a single place currently de-
         ployed carrier based jet attack aircraft employed In the close tactical upport
         and Interdiction roles.
             F-14A (Tomcat). Continued procurement of the current two place, carrier
         h)awd air superiority/fleet air defense fighter capable of air-to-air combat and
         ai,- to-surface attack missions.
             ('i{-.3E (uper Stallion). Procurement of the current hipboard compatible
         heavy lift, multi-purpose helicopter configured for both Navy and Marine Corps
         missions to improve lift capability.
             P--C (Orion). Procurement of additional numbers of this land based, four
         e'ngine turboprop ASW patrol plane equipped to detect and destroy enemy
         qllhmarines.
           F-26 (Hawkeye). Continued procurement of carrier based, twin engine turbo-
         prop airtorne early warning aircraft which providee warning of approaching
         enemy units and vectors interceptors Into attack position.
           AV-RR. RDT&E funding to develop a improved vectored thrnst V/STOL
         aircraft.
           IAMPS MK III. Modernization of the current Light Airborne Multl-purpose
         System. a oml)uter integrated ship/helicopter sensor/weapon system designed
         to extend the offensire capabilities of surface combatants beyond the range of
         ship sensors by use of helicopter platforms with data link.


                                               34
APPENDIX II
                                                                                           APPENDIX IV

            AGM-8 HARM. RDT&E funding to develop a high seed air-to-surface
         radiation missile armed with a conventional                                       anti-
                                                        warhead. Tlhis weapon is designed
         to destroy/suppress enemy air defense radars.
            8urface Effect Ship (SES). RDT&E funding for
         which will be designed and constructed using a rigida sidewall
                                                                    multi-thousand ton ship
         cept and will be capable of open ocean operations at speeds overair cushlion con-
           CSGN. Procurement of a new class nuclear powered cruiser 80 knois.
         the AEGIS Weapon System and which will be capable of designed                 to carry
         offensive operations and operations in spport of other forcesboth Independent
         areas.                                                               in high threat
           DDG7. Procurement of a new class of gas turbine powered guided
         destroyer designed to carry the Aegis Weapon System and                        missile
         capable of operating in support of strike, ASW and amphibious which will be
           FFG-?. Continued procurement of a new class gas turbine             forces.
        missile frigate capable of suppleuenting.plapned and estingpowered guided
        protection o replenishment groups, amphibious forces and corvoys.     ecorts in the
           CGN-9. Modernization of the cruiser U.S.S. Long Beach.
           Advanced ASW Torpedo. RDT&E funding to upgrade to MK46
        to develop a lightweight torpedo for Ourfrac andajl, ASW                 torpedo and
           Test Bed Development and Demonstration. RDT&E funding        platforms.
        test high energy laser components/subsystems to validate laser weaponto develop and
        in the ASM'D role.                                                             concept
       Air Foros Programs
           Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES). A continuing DOD
                                                                                    advanced
       development program on reentry system tebhnology to improve
       of existing or future IJBM's and LBM's.                                 the efficiency
          Advanced Tanker-Cargo Aircraft (ATCA).
       wide-bodied aircraft which will provide a long Arange
                                                          program to modify off-the-shelf
                                                               air refueling capability and
       exploit the aircraft's inherent cargo carrying potential.
          F-8A, Airborne Warning and Central System (AWACS). Provides
       wide deployable and totally mobile, llble all altitude                   for a rworld-
       radar surveillance, command, control, and communications    overland and overwater
       tronics installed in a modified Boeing 7072B aircraft.          systems using elec-
          E-4, Advanced Airborne Command Pet (AABNOP). A modified
      aircraft specifically equipped with advanced command, control,             Boeing 747
       tions equipment to serve as the National Emergency Airborne and communica-
      for the National Command Authorities and as the Strategic Air Command Post
      borne Command Post.                                                    Command Air-
          F/TF15A Fighter Aircraft. Continuation of the current procurement
      ployment programs of the F-15 non-nuclear capable advanced tactical            and de-
      craft and further RDT&E efforts to complete develcpmental avionics fighter air-
      ment and flight test support anticipated follow-on tn.                     test equip-
          Satellite Data System. A multi-purpose, polar coverag a communications
      lite which will provide secure and reliable communications over                   satel-
      regions in support of the Air Force atelite Communicatior             the north polar
      mand and control communications of strategic forces.                System for com-
         Defense Support Program. Satellite system which supports the
      Military Command and Control Network.                                      Worldwide
         Defense Satellite Communications 84stem, (DSCS). Satellite Communications
     system which supports ational security communications requirements
     Worldwide Military Commrand and Control network and crisis management.          for the.
         Advanced Drone/Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV). Advanced development
     systems and subsystems for Air Force reconnaissance and electronic                    of
     drones and RPV's Including initiation of a prototype development               warfare
     fective, multi-mission drone/RPV.                                         of a cost ef-
         Tactical Air Intercept Missiles. Provides for continued development
     sition of AIM-91. Sidewinder, and AIM-7F Sparrow conventionally and acqui-
     tical air-to-air missiles.                                                 armed tac-
         Tactical Air-to-Ground Missiles. Provides for anti-radiation conventionally
     armed air-to-ground missiles (i.e.. AIM 45A/Shrike and AGM-R8)
     and destroy or suppress enemy radars, primarily surface-to-air which detect
     guidance sites.                                                         (SAM) radar
         AGM-69, Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM). A presently deployed
     gic, stand-off. air-to-surface missile launched from a B-52 C/H,                strate-
     aircraft for purposes of attacking and destroying soft and mediumFB-111 or B-I
     and urban-industrial targets defendnd by sophistleated defenses. hard military




                                                  35
APPENDIX IV                                                                    APPENDIX IV

           Modification of n-Service Aircraft. Provides for modification of in-service
        aircraft, training devices and support equipment necessary for safety, exten-
        sion of service life, and to incorporate operational improvements after an air-
        craft has entered service. Aircraft modifications include the L-62 (electronics,
        avionics, command and control), F/RF-4 (electronics avionics), F-l1 (elec-
        tronics, airframe/engine),     F-111 (electronics), C6A (structural),       -141
         (cargo stretch and aerial refueling), and C -185 (electronics, structure).
           Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts. Provides funds for centrally procured and
        managed, investment type spare components and repair parts for aircraft being
        procured, aircraft in inventory, the USAF modification program, and related
        aircraft suppc-t equipment.
           Aircraft Support Equipment and Facilities. Provides for items of aerospace
        gr"umnd support equl ment which are required to service and test aircraft and
        tixeir components; for production component improvement; for industrial ma-
        chinery, equipment and facilities required In the manufacture of l.ms.
           Modification of In-Service Missiles. Provides for updating, modification of
        missile systems and drones, direct ground support equipment, missile training
        equipment, and components ot this equipment in order to improve reliability,
        enhance performance and Increase maintainability.
           Precision Location Strike System (PLSS). Continuing engineering develop.
        ment of electronic equipment designed to locate and strike enemy tactical ur-
        face emitters and non-radiating targets.
           Space Shuttle. Assure utility to DOD of the NASA developed Space Trans-
        portation System, and the acquisition and operation of general purpose shuttle
        launch and landing facilities.




                                              36
APPENDIX V                                                   APPENDIX V



                   NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
                      WASHINTON. D.C.   05




                                             July 20. 1977



Mr. J. K. Fasick
Director
U. S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C   20548

Dear Mr. Fasick:

We are in receipt of your uly..l, 1977, request for comments
on the GAO draft report,. ILmprovements Needed in the Arms
Control Impact Statement Process. Although you have requested
individual comments from five separate Executive Branch agencies --
my staff, the Departments of State and Defense, ERDA and ACDA --
I would prefer to provide you a single Administration position on
your draft report to ere.,:that there is no confusion as to the
Executive Branch position,

Accordingly, the Adrmnistratlon ill provide you a single
coordinated set of comments by approximately August 1, 1977.

                                   Sincerely,



                                   Christine Dodson
                                   Staff Secretary


cc:   The Secretary of State
      The Secretary of Defense
      The Director, Arms Control and
        Disarmament Agency
      The Administrator, Energy Research
        and Development Administration




                                  '37
APPENDIX VI                                                APPENDIX VI



MEMORANDUM
                      NATIONAL SCU3IJm COUNCIL

                                              August 24, 1977

MEMO.ANDUM FOR:

                      1R. J. K. FASICK
                      Director, U.S. O rtal     couutt   Office
                      Washington, D.C. 2054

SUBJECT:               Response to CW  eport "Improvements Needed in
                       the Arm Control ImpAct Statement Process



I am forwarding herewith the Adtmteltiem'4 reepoMe o the GAO report
"Imp.rovements Needed in te   Aru CNmI Impt ISttwmnt Proces."




                               (rtstim  Ibs    S
                               2taff Seertauy O'




                                   38
 APPENDIX VI
                                                               APPENDIX VI


               Response to GAO Report "Improvements Needed
               in the Arms Control Impact Statement Process"



 General

The draft GAO report on Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS)
                                                               has out-
lined a number of concerns dealing with the submission of
                                                           impact state-
ments to the Congress, the content of those statements,
                                                        and the role of
the various agencies in the ACIS development process. We
                                                           have no major
disagreement with the investigative portion of the report,
                                                            and we gen-
erally agree with the GAO assessment that past implementation
                                                               of Section 36
of the Arms Control and isarmanent Act may have failed to
                                                            satisfy the
intent of Congress. Howe-er, we do not believe that additional
                                                                 legisla-
tior is necessary at this time to improve the quality and
                                                           usefulness of
futuee ACIS submitted to Congress.

This Administration is committed to insuring:   that the provisions of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act are fully complied with;
                                                               that the
Executive Branch considers the arms control aspects of weapons
                                                                systems
in developing its defense program; and that Congress is provided
                                                                  timely
and pertinent information concerning programs whose impact
                                                            on arms c-ntrol
negotiations need to be considered prior to weapon system
                                                           production and
deployment. We believe, however, that these three objectives
                                                               can be
achieved without additional legislation, through ongoing
                                                          improvements to
the interagency ACIS development process, under the aegis
                                                           of the National
Security Council (NSC).

These improvements are discussed briefly, below, in the context
                                                                of the
three general issues identified in the GAO Report:  (1) the roles of
the various agencies; (2) program selection; and (3) ACIS
                                                          content.
Roles of the Various Agencies

One of the objectives of the Arms Control and Disarmament
                                                           Act was to
enhance the role of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
                                                             (ACDA) in
the national security policymaking process. The GAO report
                                                             alleges
that Executive Branch agencies -- including ACDA - have
                                                          been confused
about their various roles and responsibilities in the ACIS
                                                            development
process, and that specific legislation is needed to define
                                                            explicitly
agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC has asked ACDA
                                                            -- and ACDA
has agreed -- to accept the responsibility for preparing
                                                         the initial
drafts of ACIS for FY 1979. However, to ensure that ACIS
                                                           reflect an
Administration -- vice a single agency -- position, the development




                                   39
APPEND1X VI                                               APPENDIX VI

oZ comprehensive ACIS requires coordinated action by a numbecr of other
agencies in the Executive Branch in additia to ACDA. We believe that
the improved NSC interagency process wi'.l result in Administration-
backed ACIS which will prove satisfactory to the Congress. The improved
NSC interagency process will also he'.p to resolve another issue out-
lined in the GAO report -- specific lly, ACDA's past reluctance to
assume a prominent role in ACIS development for fear of jeopardizing
working relationships with other agencies. We are concerned that
 ADO's proposed amendments to the legislation would generate the op-
po3ite effect by making ACDA more directly responsive to Congress,
thereby diminishing ACDA's effectiveness as a participant in the
deliberative pocess within the Executive Branch. Given the Executive
Branch's recognition of ACDA's enhanced role in ACIS development, we
do not believe that legislation formaliszing this fact is necessary or
desirable.

We agree that the Department of State, by virtue of its central role
in foreign policy matters, should continue to participate in the prepar-
ation and review of ACIS. However, we do not believe that legislation
should be enacted which would assign a specific role to the Department
since such a role can easily be accommodated within the NSC interagency
pricess.

Proaram Selection
The GAO report has identified a number of issues related to the process
by which programs requiring an ACIS are selected. The Executive Branch
is aware of these issues, and is attempting to resolve them, again
through the improved NSC interagency proess.

There has been considerable disagreement in the past within the Executive
Branch on which programs require impact statements. It is clear that
strict adherence to the dollar thresholds specified in the existing
legislation to determine whether a program requires an impact statement
is not an appropriate criterion, since such adherence brings programs
into the process that have little or no arm control impact. But we
would not recomend changing the law at this time to attack this one
point.
The selection of programs for arms control impact analysis for FY 1979
will be accomplished via the NSC interagency process. An NSC Inter-
agency Working Group is presently developing a set of criteria which
will be used for program selection; the criteria will be based on
the law, consideration of the Congressional Research Service (CIS)
recommendations, and will incorporate additional thoughts we have
had to improve the ACIS process.

ACIS Content

The lack of comnon specific criteria for analysing the arms control
impact of programs has caused much of the Congressional disillusionment

                                   40
APPENDIX VI                                               APPENDIX VI

with past ACIS. In order to preclude this in the future, the NSC
Interagency Working Group is currently addressing ti Utter of state-
ment content and is developing specific criteria to be applied in
analyzing programs for their arms control impact. The views provided
by various members of Congress and the model impact statements prepared
by the dRS have been reviewed in formulating the criteria being developed
by the interagency group. We believe, therefore, that it is unnecessary to
mandate such criteria through legislative amendment.
We are also giving consideration to the arms control impact of current
or proposed systems on existing as well as potential arms control negotia-
tions. While we feel that excessive speculation egarding possible
future arms control negotiations would not be useful, we also recognize the
necessity to analyze the possible impact of systems on those future
negotiations which may be reasonably anticipated.

Conclusion
The Administration is determined to insure that the ACIS development
process supports the substantive evaluation of the arms control impact
of defense programs. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will have
the bulk of the responsibilities for preparing ACIS which, based on in-
teragency review, should provide the Executive and Legislative Branches
with the information necessary to make defense-related programming decisions
in the arms control context. We do not believe that Section 36 should be
amended until the new Administration has had an opportunity to demonstrate
that it can satisfy the letter and spirit of the existing Arms Control and
Disarmament Act.




(46529)


                                  41