Computer Systems: Further Development of Navy's Source Data System Needs to Be Reassessed

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-05-08.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                           Further Development
                           of Navy’s Source Data
                           System Needs to IE3e



                   United States
                   General Accounting Office
                   Washington, D.C. 20548

                   Information Management and
                   Technology Division

                   May 81990

                   The Honorable John P. Murtha
                   Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
                   Committee on Appropriations
                   House of Representatives
                   Dear Mr. Chairman:

                   This report responds to your predecessor’sSeptember 16, 1988, request,
                   and discussionswith your office, to review the Navy’s development and
                   management of the SourceData System project (SD@.
                   Twelve years ago the Navy initiated this project, with life-cycle costs
                   initially estimated at $1 billion, to automate military pay and personnel
                   data reported by its field activities. The SDSproject automates a manual
                   processof preparing and editing data entry documents and transmitting
                   the data to the Navy’s centralized systems for pay and personnel
                   processing.These central systems are used to pay about $21 billion
                   annually to nearly 704,000 active duty and drilling reserve personnel.
                   The primary objective of the SDSproject is to increase the accuracy and
                   timeliness of the data reported to these central systems.

                   SDSwas to  be developed and deployed as three separate subsystems:one
                   for active duty personnel in the United States and overseas;a secondfor
                   active duty personnel on-board ships; and a third for reserves.’ These
                   three subsystemsand the telecommunications connecting them to the
                   Navy’s centralized pay and personnel systems were to provide a Navy-
                   wide solution to automating the manual input of pay and personnel data
                   reported by field activities. Our objectives, scope,and methodology are
                   detailed in appendix I.

Results in Brief   The Navy’s SDSproject has fallen far short of original expectations. As
                   of the end of fiscal year 1989, the Navy had spent about $174 million
                   and still had not completed the project. While SDSwas to have been com-
                   pleted in 1982, only about 64 percent of active duty personnel had been
                   converted to SDSas of February 28,199O. Active duty personnel sta-
                   tioned overseasand on-board ships are not on SDS. The Navy estimates
            v      that SDSwill be deployed Navy-wide for active duty personnel by 1994,

                   ‘The reserve subsystem was to support only the drilling reserves. Drilling reserves are defined as
                   ready reserve personnel who participate in a Na3al Reserve program in a drill pay status.

                   Page 1                                              GAO/IMTECBO-25 Navy’s Source Data System

             over 12 years later than originally planned. The Navy now estimates
             that it will cost an additional $33 million to complete development and
             deploy SDS Navy-wide. The reserve subsystem is no longer part of the
             SDSproject since its requirements are being incorporated into a sepa-
             rately developed system.
             At those locations where snsis deployed, reporting of personnel and pay
             data is considerably more accurate and timely. However, SDS does not
             meet all performance goals where deployed, nor will it achieve all the
             expected performance goals when fully deployed Navy-wide.
             The program has been characterized by unclear lines of authority and
             responsibility for developing and deploying SDS, failure to coordinate
             among Navy commands,delays, and false starts. While original SIX
             plans called for a senior-level steering committee to coordinate the
             development and deployment of SDSacrosscommands,this committee
             never convened.The authority and responsibility to develop and deploy
             SDSis still fragmented within the Navy, and there is no current Navy-
             approved plan, strategy, or economic assessmentof the overall SDS pro-
             ject. Further, the oversight provided by the Office of the Secretary of
             Defensewas both incomplete and prematurely withdrawn. Becauseof
             this project’s long history, fragmented authority, and lack of oversight,
             we were not always able to obtain complete information or identify the
             precise causesfor the problems we found. Nevertheless,it is clear that
             this project has wandered and needsto be reevaluated. We are making
             recommendations aimed at reassessingthe overall management and
             future direction of this project and curtailing further investments in it
             while a reassessmentis made.

Background   The Navy’s personnel and pay operations are split between two major
             commands.The Naval Military Personnel Command, operating under
             the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is responsible for person-
             nel management functions. The Navy Accounting and Finance Center,
             operating under the direction of the Comptroller of the Navy, is respon-
             sible for military pay functions. To carry out their respective personnel
             and pay missions, these Navy activities must share information in their
             centralized automated systems becausemany personnel actions estab-
             lish, change,or discontinue certain military pay and allowances.
             In the late 1970s the Navy primarily used mail-based, manual reporting
             systems for transmitting pay and personnel data from field activities to
             centrally located, but separate pay and personnel systems. Between

             Page 2                                GAO/IMTEG9O-26   Navy’s Source Data System

    1978 and 1986, we, the Naval Audit Service, and the Naval Inspector
    General reviewed the Navy’s field reporting and centralized pay and
    personnel systems.2The common theme of these reports was that the
    exchangeof data between field disbursing offices and the central pay
    system and between field personnel offices and the central personnel
    system was inaccurate and slow. In fact, the Navy found the central pay
    system to be inaccurate about 48 percent of the time in 1979. As a
    result, the Navy, to pay the service members accurately on payday, paid
    different amounts than the amounts shown on the central pay system.
    In 1982kwereported that the Navy’s pay system did not meet generally
    acceptedaccounting standards and recommendedthat the Navy bring
    its system into compliance with these standards.3The Navy, as required
    by the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act,* reported to the Presi-
    dent and the Congressin 1984 that its military pay accounting system
    did not conform with the principles, standards, and related require-
    ments prescribed by the Comptroller General. In fiscal year 1989, the
    Navy reported that corrective actions had been taken and the pay sys-
    tem substantially conformed to these requirements.

    To improve its military pay and personnel systems, the Navy began, in
    1977, a major program called the Pay and Personnel Administrative
    Support System (PASS) to streamline the data reporting processand
    improve communications between the personnel and disbursing field
    offices and the centrally located pay and personnel systems. This two-
    phased program was co-sponsoredby the Comptroller of the Navy and
    the Chief of Naval Operations and was to be managed and implemented
    under the direction of the PASS program manager within the Personnel
    The first phase called for merging field pay and personnel organizations.
    By 1981, approximately 3,600 personnel offices and 134 disbursing
    offices ashore were consolidated into 162 pay/personnel support offices
    The secondphase, SDS,called for developing an automated field report-
    ing and management information system to support the consolidated
    field offices as well as the ship-board offices. The field reporting system

    2Seepage 17 for a list of related GAO and Navy reports.

    3GA0 letter to the Secretary of the Navy, B-199833, Feb. 2,1982.

    *Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982,314J.S.C. 3612 (b) and(c).

    Page 3                                             GAO/IMTECBO-26 Navy’s Source Data SYStem

                        was to be developed and deployed as three separate subsystems,each
                        supporting a different personnel community-active duty personnel
                        stationed in the United States and overseas(referred to as ashore), per-
                        sonnel on-board ships (referred to as afloat), and personnel in the drill-
                        ing reserves.The managementinformation system was to provide field
                        offices accessto data in the central pay and personnel systems that
                        were not available under the manual reporting system.

                        The Navy decided to develop the ashore subsystem first, then the
                        reserve subsystem, and finally the afloat subsystem. According to SDS
                        project office officials these three subsystemswere to be developed sep-
                        arately to accommodatethe different hardware and communications
                        environments employed by each user community.

                        The SDS project was to be a joint effort of the Personnel Command and
                        the Comptroller of the Navy. An SDSproject managementoffice was
                        established within the Personnel Command to design, develop, and
                        deploy sns.

SDSProject Hindered     develop, deploy, and operate sns,but this effort has fallen far short of
by Poor Planning and    original expectations. As of February 28, 1990, only about 64 percent of
Management              active duty personnel had been converted to SDS. Active duty personnel
                        stationed overseasand on-board ships are not on SDS,and reserves are
                        no longer part of the snsproject.

Development of          The Navy spent over $13 million developing reserve and afloat subsys-
SubsystemsContinually   terns but they were not used. Also, deployment overseasof the ashore
                        subsystem was delayed becauseof a lack of funds.
                        Reserves.After spending about $1.1 million to nearly complete develop-
                        ment of a reserve subsystem, the Navy decided to satisfy the reserve’s
                        requirements with another system being developed by the Commander,
                        Naval ReserveForce. Consequently, work on the subsystem was
                        Afloat. The Navy prototyped the afloat subsystem at a cost of $12 mil-
                        lion on 12 ships for about 6 years. In September 1989, however, the
                        Navy abandonedthis effort.

                        Page 4                                GAO/IMTEGBO-25 Navy’s Source Data System


                           The SDS project office has recently prepared conceptual plans for devel-
                           oping and deploying a new afloat subsystem, which is expected to cost
                           at least $24 million. This subsystem will be developed in two modules.
                           The first module will utilize an already partially deployed scaled-down
                           interim system called the Uniform Microcomputer Disbursing System
                           (UMIDS)~ for reporting pay data. A secondmodule will be developed for
                           reporting personnel data. Over the long term the Navy plans to evolve
                           these two modules into a single integrated afloat subsystem, which they
                           plan to interface and/or operate with a new ship-board hardware plat-
                           form planned for the mid-1990s. Life-cycle costs for the new approach
                           are not yet known. The Navy expects to make a deployment decision on
                           this approach in November 1990.

                           OverseasDeployment of Ashore Subsystem.Deployment of SDS for
                           active duty personnel stationed overseasalso encountered delays and
                           redirection. An ashore subsystem was developed to support both United
                           States and overseaslocations. According to the project’s original plan,
                           deployment of SDS overseaswas to have been completed in 1982. How-
                           ever, according to the Navy, the overseasdeployment was delayed
                           becausesufficient funding was not available. In the meantime, according
                           to the project manager, the manufacturer has comeout with a new, less
                           expensive model of the hardware previously planned for deployment
                           overseas.This hardware is being used along with the already developed
                           ashore software to prototype the subsystem for overseasactivities. This
                           approach is expected to cost at least $9 million. Subject to the availabil-
                           ity of funding, the SDS project manager expects to commencedeployment
                           overseasin December 1991.

Life-Cycle Costs and       Since the inception of SDS, the Navy has had difficulty identifying life-
Benefits Have Fluctuated   cycle costs and benefits. From 1977 to 1985, the Navy prepared four
                           separate economic analyses of life-cycle cost and benefit estimates justi-
Widely                     fying the SDS project6 The life-cycle cost estimates changed significantly,
                           starting with costs estimated initially at $1.1 billion in 1977, then declin-
                           ing to $869 million 2 years later, then increasing to over $3 billion in
                           another 2 years, and most recently to $643 million 4 years later in 1986.
                           At the sametime, the Navy’s cost estimate for developing and deploying

                           ‘UMIDS was developed during 1981 and 1982 as an interim system until SDS was deployed. UMIDS
                           was designed to support only pay functions, not personnel.

                           “These economic analyses did not include estimates of costs and benefits for the afloat subsystem.
                           Also, the 1979 economic analysis did not include estimates of costs and benefits for the reserve

                           Page 6                                              GAO/IMTlKXO-26      Navy’s Source Data System
                             the ashore and reserve subsystemssteadily increased from $13.8 million
                             in 1977 to over $180 million in 1986. Estimated benefits, on the other
                             hand, remained relatively unchanged in the first three economic analy-
                             ses,but increased five-fold in the latest estimate, made in 1985. We
                             could find no evidence that the Navy had independently verified these
                             analyses. Despite these wide swings, Defenseand Navy officials allowed
                             the project to proceed. Furthermore, even though the SDS project has
                             undergone a number of delays and changesin direction since 1985, the
                             Navy has not updated its estimates of costs and benefits.

Project Management and       No single organization has been responsible for managing SDSNavy-
Control Was Not Adequate     wide. Initially, the three subsystems(ashore, afloat, and reserves) were
                             to be developed under a single project office coordinated by a senior
                             steering committee. However, at least three different offices have been
                             responsible for developing them, a fourth office developed the UMIDS
                             system, and no office was clearly responsible for ensuring a coordinated
                             approach. In fact, we had considerable difficulty getting information
                             such as cost data for all three subsystemsand the UMIDS system because
                             there was no single point of contact that was able to identify life-cycle
                             costs or actual expenditures for SDSNavy-wide.
                             The program has been characterized by unclear lines of authority and
                             responsibility for developing and deploying SDS,failure to coordinate
                             between commands, and delays. Although initial planning documents
                             called for a senior-level steering committee to coordinate the develop-
                             ment and deployment of SDSacrosscommands,we found no evidence
                             this committee ever convened.As a result, divided and ever-changing
                             organizational and project development responsibilities did not ensure a
                             focused, timely solution to the development and deployment of SDS
                             The Navy recognizedthese problems in 1989. As a result of a program
                             review of the afloat subsystem, the Navy concluded that the program
                             managementwas diffused, only part of the program was being reviewed
                             by various project managers,and coordination among the various orga-
                             nizations was lacking. The Navy also concluded that management defi-
                             ciencies were created, in part, by a June 1983 decision that relieved the
                             PASprogram manager of any responsibility for the SDSproject. The
                             Navy review made a number of recommendations that included:

                           . redefining the authority, role, and responsibility of the PASSprogram
                             manager as intended in the original functional description;

                             Page 6                               GAO/IMTEC9O-26 Navy’s Source Data System

                    . establishing a steering group or committee to provide coordination with
                      various commands;
                    l developing a memorandum of understanding to define clear lines of
                      authority and responsibility; and
                    l realigning headquarters elements and resourcesto support an effective
                      program managementorganization.
                        As of March 9,1990, the Navy had developed a memorandum of under-
                        standing to return responsibility for developing the afloat subsystem to
                        the SDS project office. Also, a project managementcharter is being
                        drafted to define lines of authority and responsibility for developing
                        and deploying the afloat subsystem.

                        The Office of the Secretary of Defense’sMajor Automated Information
SDSProject Lacked       System Review Committee (MAISRC)~ had oversight responsibility for SDS
Sustained Defense       from 1979 to 1987. During its initial review in 1982, the MAISRC stated
Program Oversight       that the Navy’s proposed development approach for the ashore subsys-
                        tem was sound and, in developing SDS, it should continue to apply sound
                        life-cycle managementprinciples and ensure the availability of adequate
                        telecommunications and acquire and upgrade, as necessary,hardware
                        and software resources.The MALSRC also directed the Navy to furnish it
                        with any future plans for developing the reserve subsystem and to
                        notify it of slippages in the project and ensure that privacy require-
                        ments and security safeguards were incorporated. However, MAISRC
                        records did not indicate that there was any concern over the estimated
                        cost or benefits of the project.
                        In 1987 the MAISRC, satisfied with the development and deployment
                        schedule of SDS for ashore and reserves,delegated its oversight responsi-
                        bility of SDS to the Navy. The MAISRC, however, did not review the afloat
                        subsystem as part of the overall SDSproject, even though it had always
                        been a major part of SDS. According to the SDS program analyst from the
                        DefenseComptroller’s Office, the MAISRC did not review the afloat sub-
                        system becauseit was being developed and funded as a separate pro-
                        gram under the Ship-board Non-Tactical ADP Program (SNAP).
                        After the MAISRC delegated oversight to the Navy, the Navy redirected
                        the afloat prototype for personnel assignedon-board ships and the

                        ‘This committee was created within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide structured
                        oversight and prudent fiscal management in acquiring major automated information systems.

                        Page7                                               GAO/I~~~TEC~O-~~N~V~'~SOU~C~DataSYfhn


                      planned utilization of the ashore portion for personnel stationed over-
                      seas.As noted earlier, the Navy is making a number of changesto its
                      conceptual approach for providing SDS to personnel assignedon-board
                      ships and overseas.
                      In mid-1988 the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Comptroller) required
                      each military service to report quarterly on all systems for which it had
                      delegated oversight review. Although the project office prepared these
                      reports, the Navy did not file the first four of the required quarterly
                      reports since the ashore subsystem had already been developed and was
                      being deployed. The Comptroller’s office initially agreed,but later
                      required the Navy to begin submitting reports as a result of our ongoing
                      audit work. The Navy submitted its first quarterly report on SDS for the
                      period ending September30,1989.

                      At those locations where SDS is deployed, reporting of personnel and pay
SDSImproves           data is considerably more accurate and timely. However, SDS does not
Accuracy and          meet all performance goals where deployed nor will it achieve all the
Timeliness but Some   expected performance goals when deployed at the remainder of the
                      intended locations. Further, certain other performance goals established
Performance Goals     for SDSare unrealistic since their achievement dependson actions
Are Not Achievable    outside the control of SDS.

                      The Navy established three primary goals for SDS:(1) error rates in data
                      used to update the central pay and personnel data baseswere to be less
                      than 3 and 1 percent respectively, (2) 99 percent of the field-generated
                      pay and personnel transactions were to be transmitted and prepared for
                      updating within 24 hours of releaseby the field offices, and (3) no more
                      than 1 percent of all centrally computed pay amounts would be overrid-
                      den at field offices within the continental United States. Prior to SDS the
                      update error rates were 9 and 13 percent for pay and personnel respec-
                      tively; on average,it took 13 days to send data, via mail, from the field
                      offices to a central office and to prepare the data for updating the cen-
                      tral pay and personnel systems; and the override rate was 48 percent.
                      At those field activities where SDS is deployed, Navy statistics show that
                      update error rates and untimely submissionsdecreasedsignificantly
                      from May through November 1989. SDS error rates of 1.3 and .Opercent
                      for pay and personnel data respectively were well within the estab-
                      lished goals. For timeliness, about 89 percent of the pay and 86 percent
                      of the personnel inputs were transmitted and ready for updating within
                      24 hours, which is short of the 99 percent goal. The Navy also reduced

                      Page 8                                GAO/IMTEG9O-25 Navy’s !3ource Data System
                  its override rate from 48 percent to about 10 percent, which is short of
                  its 1 percent goal.
                  Another goal was to reduce the annual loss resulting from overpaying
                  personnel when they leave or separate from the Navy to less than $4
                  million. Navy records showed that although the number of personnel
                  being overpaid has been reduced, these lossesrose from $6 million in
                  1979 to an estimated $16 million in 1989. The $4 million goal, however,
                  cannot be achieved unless changesunrelated to SDSare made. One major
                  source of overpayments is the payment of reenlistment bonusesto per-
                  sonnel who do not complete their commitment. While SDScan assist in
                  the identification of funds owed by service members who do not com-
                  plete their enlistment, the collection of any funds due the government,
                  which often requires a manual collection process,is outside the control
                  of SDs.

                  Clearly the Navy needsto fix its systems for field reporting of pay and
Conclusions and   personnel data-we cameto this conclusion long ago and so did the
Recommendations   Navy and its auditor and inspector general staffs. When properly
                  planned and applied, modern technology offers viable solutions to make
                  these fixes. Yet, after spending 12 years and about $174 million, the
                  Navy haa produced only a portion of the originally envisioned system.

                  Where the system has been deployed, it has produced substantial
                  improvements in the accuracy and timeliness of reported data; however,
                  the rest of the Navy is not reaping these improvements. Furthermore,
                  the Navy has not prepared realistic estimates of life-cycle costs and ben-
                  efits in the past nor have such estimates been prepared for its new strat-
                  egy for providing SDS support for personnel on ships and overseas.
                  Technology still offers potential benefits to the Navy, but until the
                  causesof SDSdelays, cost escalations, and false starts are identified and
                  corrected, the public, the Congress,and the Secretary of Defensecannot
                  be assured that further expenditures of time and funds on SDS will be
                  wisely spent. Project oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
                  and the Navy is necessaryto ensure that these problems are corrected
                  and the SDS program produces cost-effective solutions in a timely

                  We recommend the Secretary of Defensedirect the Secretary of the
                  Navy to (1) reassessthe management,plans, goals, alternative solutions,

                  Page B                               GAO/IlWEG90-25   Navy’s Source Data System

    cost, and benefits of the SDSproject and determine whether it or a por-
    tion of it should be continued, and (2) ensure that spending for SDSand
    planned solutions are held to a minimum while this reassessmentis
    If, on the basis of this reassessment,the Navy decidesto continue with
    SDS, we recommend that     the Office of the Secretary of Defensereview
    the Navy’s decision and reinstate MAISRC oversight for the entire project.
    In addition, we recommendthat the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    provide the Congresswith a revised budget forecast for SDSbased upon
    a current estimate of project and life-cycle costs.

    As requested by your office, we did not obtain official agency comments
    on this report. We discussedthe issuesin this report with officials from
    the Department of Defenseand the Department of the Navy, and have
    included their comments where appropriate.
    As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announcethe contents
    of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
    its issue date. We will then send copies of this report to the Chairmen,
    House and SenateCommittees on Appropriations, and other interested
    Members of Congress;the Secretariesof Defenseand the Navy; the
    Director, Office of Management and Budget; and others upon request.
    This work was performed under the direction of Samuel W. Bowlin,
    Director, Defenseand Security Information Systems,who can be
    reached at (202)-275-4649.Other major contributors are listed in appen-
    dix II.

    Sincerely yours,

    Ralph V, Carlone
    Assistant Comptroller General

    Page 10                               GAO/IMTEG90-26 Navy’s Source Data System
Page 11   GAO/IMTEGBO-26   Navy’s Source Data System

Appendix I
Objectives, Scopeand
Appendix II                                                                                     16
Major Contributors to
This Report
Related GAO and                                                                                20
Navy Products


                        GAO       General Accounting Office
                        IMTEC     Information Management and Technology Division
                        MAISRC    Major Automated Information System Review Committee
            Y           PASS      Pay and Personnel Administrative Support System
                        SDS       Source Data System
                        SNAP      Ship-board Non-Tactical ADP Program
                        UMIDS     Uniform Microcomputer Disbursing System

                        Page 12                           GAO/IMTECXO-25 Navy’s Source Data System

    Page 13   GAO/IMTECXO-25 Navy’s Source Data System
Appendix I

Objectives,Scopeand Methodology

              On September 16,1988, the Subcommittee on Defense,House Committee
              on Appropriations, requested that GAO review the Navy SourceData
              System (SDS). In subsequentdiscussionswith the subcommittee staff,
              our specific objectives were to determine whether the project is meeting
              expected objectives and goals and to identify any shortfalls of the pro-
              ject. We agreed to determine the original and present scope,goals, and
              objectives of SDS and identify reasonsfor any changes;to evaluate and
              measure the extent to which SDS is meeting stated goals and objectives;
               and to identify other automation initiatives being pursued by the Navy
              that may addressSDS goals and objectives.
              We examined the original project scopeas presented in the 1977 Eco-
              nomic Analysis and compared it with other life-cycle management docu-
              ments. In addition, we met with cognizant agency officials in order to
              determine the reasonsfor changesin the scopeof the project and to
              identify other automation initiatives started by the Navy and to also
              have them clarify the performance goals and objectives.
              We obtained various performance statistics from the Navy Finance
              Center and from the Naval Military Personnel Command and compared
              those statistics with the stated goals. In addition, we reviewed the pay
              and personnel operations at 10 PersonnelSupport Detachments in order
              to determine how SDS operates and determine if it is meeting its perform-
              ance objectives. We also met with agency officials to obtain their com-
              ments on our findings.

              Our review was conducted primarily at the Navy Accounting and
              Finance Center and the Naval Military Personnel Command in Washing-
              ton DC. In addition, we interviewed agency officials at the Navy
              Finance Center in Cleveland, Ohio. We also interviewed personnel
              aboard the USSO’Brien and the USSHewitt at San Diego Naval Station
              and the USSBainbridge and USSTrenton at Norfolk Naval Station.
              Our review was conducted from November 1988 to March 1990. We dis-
              cussedissuescovered in this report with officials from the Department
              of Defense,Office of the Inspector General; the Office of the Comptroller
              of the Department of Defense;Department of Navy, Naval Military Per-
              sonnel Command, and the Navy Accounting and Finance Center. In
              doing our work, we had difficulty obtaining information on certain deci-
              sions or explanations for those decisions.This difficulty arose because
              of the long history of this project, its changing and fragmented organiza-
              tion structure and its lack of central control and oversight. As you
              requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on a draft of this

              Page 14                              GAO/lMTEG90-26   Navy’s Source Data System
    Append& I
    Objecthe, Scope and Methodology

    report but did incorporate their verbal comments where appropriate.
    Our work was performed in accordancewith generally acceptedgovern-
    ment auditing standards.


    Page 16                           GAO/IMTJC90-25   Navy’s Source Data System
Appendix II

Major Contributors to This Report

                          James R. Watts, Associate Director
Information               Joseph T. McDermott, Assistant Director
Management and            Robert L. Cracker, Evaluator-in-Charge
                          Michael B. Corrado, Evaluator
Technology Division,
Washington, DC.

                          Donald A. Weisheit, Assignment Manager
Detroit Regional Office   Louis M. Ockunzzi, Site Senior
                          Lynette A. Westfall, Evaluator


                          Page 16                            GAO/IMTECXM-25 Navy’s Source Data System


        Page 17   GAOjIMTESBO-25 Navy’s Source Data System

                                         :”          .-
Page 18   GAO/IMTEC-90-25 Navy’s Source Data System

    Page 19   GAO/IMTEGQO-25 Navy’s Source Data System
RelatedGAO and Navy Products

               The Navy’s Advanced Information System - A Personnel Information
               System for the 1980-1990s(GAO/LCD-78-122, Sept. l&1978).
               The Navy’s Computerized Pay System is Unreliable and Inefficient -
               What Went Wrong? (GAOIFGMSD-80-71, Sept. 26, 1980).
               Report of the Navy Pay System Review (Naval Inspector General, 008/
               2666, Dec. 17,1982).
               Pay/Personnel Administration Support System (PASS) and Joint Military
               Entitlements Payment System (JUMPS) (Naval Audit Service, T202222,
               Nov. 29,1983).

               Survey of Actions to Correct Problems with the Navy’s Military Pay
               System (GAO/AFMD-86-05, Oct. 12, 1984).
               Navy’s ProgressIn Implementing The Federal Managers’ Financial Integ-
               rity Act (GAOINSIAD-86-160, Sept. 27, 1985).

               Debt Collection: Navy’s Efforts to Collect Debts From Former Service
               Members (GA~/AFMDSS-El-BR, May 19, 1986).
               Development of the Navy Pay and Personnel Source Data System (Naval
               Audit Service, D30006, Nov. 26, 1986).


(610346)       Page 20                             GAO/IMTECXO-26   Navy’s Source Data System
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