Safeguarding Taxpayer Information: An Evaluation of the Proposed Computerized Tax Administration System

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-01-17.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                               DOCUINIT RESUME
 00050 - [A0591tO00
 safeguarding Taxpayer Information: An Evaluation
 Coaputerized Tax Admieistration System. B-115369; of the Proposed
 January 17, 1977.                                  LCD-76-115.
                      44 pp,
Report to the Congress; by Blmer B. Staats,
                                              Comproller General.
Issue Area: Automatic Data Processing: AcquiGring
                                                   eand Using
     Resources (102); Tax Administration (2700).
Contact: Logistics and Commaunications Div.
Budget Function: iscellaneous: Autoatic
                                            Data Processing
organization Concerned: Department of tLe
                                            Treasury; Internal
    Revenue Service.
Con..essional Relevance: Congress; House
                                          Committei on ays and
    leans; Senate Committee on Appropriations:
    Service, General overnment Subcommittee; Treasury, Postal
    on Finance.                                 Senate Committee
authority: Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C.
                                          552a(e) (Supp. IV)). H.
    Rept. 90-1842. Internal Revenue Code of
    Internal Revenue Code of 1954, sec. 7213.1954, sec. 6103.
          The proposed IRS computer
 Administration System, was xamined system,  the Tax
                                     to determine safeguards for
 personal taxpayer information. ajor threats
this type are from untrustworthy users or      to a network of
access. Fadings/Conclusions: Although absoluteunauthorized
securitr is not practicable, the Tax Administration computer
provide a igh level of protection through              System will
administrative, and physical controls. Some  technical,
the present system havre weaknesses which     of the safeguards in
within the framework of existing security should    e corrected
crytographic devices will depend on an IRS  procedures.  The use of
                                             determination based
on its "risk and threat analysis," but present
indicate that the cost is warranted. Recommendations: does not
Consideration should be given to: establishing
                                                 a national data
processing security office, guarding gainst
access, controlling employee access, improvingunauthorized
and control of information media, and seeking     hysical security
                                                legal and other
means to limiting disclosure of information.
        /       REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

                OF THE UNITED STATES

                Safeguarding Taxpayer
                Information--An Evaluation Of
                The Proposed Computerized
                Tax Administration System
                Department of the Treasury
                Inrternal Revenue Service

                The proposed Tax Administration System can
                provide a high level of protection for taxpayer
                information if the system is properly designed
                and implemented and if the weaknesses in the
                safeguards cited in this report are corrected.

                LCD-76-115                                        1:'.   ,   977
                           WANIMTON. D..


To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

     This report assesses the concepts of the Internal
Revenue Service's proposed computer system known as the
Tax Administration System and its potential for providing
protection for personal information. Further, the report
evaluates the existing safeguards that have been identi-
fied for continuation under the proposed system. We made
this review because of the extensive congressional con-
cern for protection of individual privacy.

     We made our review pursuant to the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53) and the Accounting
and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of the
Treasury; the Commissioner of Internal Revenue! and the
Administrator of General Servic

                                  Comptroller General
                                  of the United States
                      C o n t e n t s

DIGEST                                                    i


   1      INTRODUCTION                                    1
              Mission and organization of the
                Internal Revenue Service                  1
              Overview of current information
                handling activities                       1
              The proposed Tax Administration
                System (TAS)                              2
              Legal Requirements                          2

            AND DATA SECURITY                             4
              The TAS operating concept                   4
              Computer security in the TAS
                environment                               6
              Analyzing the threats                       7
              Security in a realtime transaction
                system                                    8
              Conclusions                                 9

   3      TECHNICAL CONTROLS                             10
              Data terminal access controls              10
              Controls over access to tax information    11
              Controls over assignment and use of
                command codes                            13
              Computer program integrity                 14
              Data processing documentation              15
              Conclusion                                 15
              Recommendations to the Commissioner of
                Internal Revenue                         16
              Agency comments and actions                17
   4      ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS                        18
              Background investigations                  18
              Controls over information storage          20
              Conclusion                                 21
              Recommendations to the Commissioner of
                Internal Revenue                         22
              Agency comments and actions                22

             FACILITIES                                     24
               Perimeter protection                         24
               Access controls                              25
               Physical control over trash disposal         26
               Conclusion                                   27
               Recommendation to the Commissioner of
                 Internal Revenue                           27
               Agency comments and actions                  27
             ACTIVITY                                       29
               Data encryption                              29
               Batch transfer of data                       31
               Conclusion                                   32
               Recommendation to the Commissioner
                 of Internal Revenue                        32
               Agency comments and actions                  32
   7       THE IRS SECURITY PROGRAM                         34
               Conclusion                                   35
               Recommendation                               35
               Agency comments and actions                  35
             BY THE CONGRESS                                36
               Observations                                 36
               Conclusions and matters for consideration
                 by the House and Senate Committees on
                 Appropriations                             37
   9       SCOPE OF REVIEW                                  39

       I   Letter dated July 16, 1976, from the
             Commissioner of Internal Revenue               40
   II      Principal officials responsible for
             administration of activities
               discussed in this report                     44
ADP    automated data processing
GAO    General Accounting Office
IDRS   Integrated Data Retieval System
TRS    Internal Revenue Service
RPA    residert programmer-analyst
ThS    Tax Administration System
 Algorithm           A statement of the steps to be followed
                     in the solution of a problem.
 Application         A computer program designed to accom-
     program         plish a specific job or application
                     such as payroll, inventory, etc.
 Audit trail        A means of identifying and tracing actions
                    taken in processing data. It encompasses
                    the logging of selected events as tney oc-
                    cur at specified points within a system.
 Batch processing   A technique of data   = sing in which
                    jobs are collected ad grouped before
Data bse            (1) The entire collection of information
                    available to a computer system and (2) a
                    structured collection of information as an
                    entity or collection of related files
                    treated as an entity.
Data links          The interconnecting circuits operating on
                    a particular method permitting exchange of
                    information between installations.
Encryption          The transformation of data into secret
                    coded symbols.
Flowchart           A graphic representation of the defini-
                    tion. analysis, or solution of a problem
                    or situation.
Interactive         Pertaining to exchange of information and
                    control between a user and a computer
                    process, or between computer processes.
Machine             A language a computer can use without
  lr9PanS~u~.~      translation.
Memory              The storage that is considered integral,
                    internal, and primary to the computing
Object deck         A collection of punched cards representing
                    a computer program in machine language.

 Offline               Pertaining to operations that are indepen-
                       dent of the main computer.
 One-way               The transformation of data into coded
   encryption          symbols without the ability to decipher
                       or reverse the process.
Online                Pertaining to (1) equipment or devices
                      under control of the central processing
                      unit or (2) a user's ability to work
                      with a computer.
Operating_srystem     Software that controls computer operations
                      including scheduling, debugging, input and
                      and output control, accounting, storage
                      assignments, data management and related
                      services. Sometimes called the supervisor,
                      executive, monitor, or master control
Parameter             A variable that is assigned a constant
                      value for a specific purpose or process.
                      For example, parameters may determine
                      the number of characters in a field.
Realtime              Computation made while the related physi-
                      cal process is going on so that the re-
                      sults of the computation can be used in
                      guiding the process.
Source deck           A collection of punched cards representing
                      a computer program in a language designed
                      for ease and convenience of expression. A
                      generator, assembler, compiler, or trans-
                      lator must be used to transform the source
                      language to machine language.
Switching point       A center where messages are relayed or
  oL center           routed according to data contained in the
                      message or according to specific operat--
                      ing instructions or programs.
Trdnsaction-          As used herein, a transaction-oriented
  orlienteid iystem   system is one that permits a user only to
                      input and receive data. The input and
                      receipt of data is controlled by applica-
                      tion programs. The users' interaction
                      with application programs is achieved by
                      means of macroinstructions which isolate
                      the user from direct access to such pro-
                                         THE PROPOSED COMPUTERIZED TAX
                                         ADMINISTRATION SSTEM
             This report assesses the capability of
             proposed Tax Administration System of the
             Internal Revenue Service to provide appr%-
             priate technical, administrative, and
             ical safeguards on taxpayer informationph:,s-
             required by the Privacy Act of 1974 and as
             other legislation. Congress may wish
             consider restricting linking or interfacing
             of the system with other systems and pro-
             hibiting ter inals outside of the Internal
             Revenue Serv e. (See p. 38.)
             A separate report has been issued on GAO's
             evaluation of the reasonableness of the
             cost-benefit analysis for the proposed
            The Internal Revenue Service collects
            tually all Federal taxes. It has over
            thousand employees and processes approxi-
            mately 125 million returns annually. The
            Service converted to the crrent automated
            data processing system uring the 1960s
            cause the workload was increasing at suchbe-
            a rate that conventional manual and macnine
            processing could not do the job. The
            has been changed and adapted over the
            to meet frequent legislative changes, years
            load growth, and increasing program demands.
            (See p. 1.)

           According to Internal Revenue officials,
            the automated data processing system was
           based on early technology; later
           ments have been largely piecemeal.improve-
           development resulted in considerable dupli-
           cation of effort and inefficient operations.
           Consequently, in November 1973, the Commis-
           sioner of Internal Revenue advised the
           partment of the Treasury that the existing
           system needed to be completely redesigned.
           The Office of Management and Budget granted

  ITeLsart. Upon moval, the report
cover d * should be oted hereon.     i                    LCD-76-115
program approval in September 1975 to ac-
,n ire a new computer system, to be known as
the T'ax Administration System. (See p. 2.)

GAO evaluated the Tax Administration System
concept and its potential for protecting
taxpayer information. Existing technical,
administrative, and physical safeguards
were analyzed under the assumption that
they car. and should be continued. (See
p. 4.)
Absolute computer security is not now tech-
nically possible, but even if it were, the
highest level of protection attainable is
rarely practicable, considering the cost
involved. (See p. 6.)

Through proper design and implementation,
the Tax Administration System will be able
to provide a high level of protection for
taxpayer information.   (See p. 9.) How-
ever, selected technical, administrative,
and physical safeguards now used have a
number of weaknesses which should be cor-
rected within the framework of existing
security procedures, methods, and controls.

Evidence does not show a present threat to
taxpayer information that would warrant the
cost of pccuring special cryptographic de-
vices. IRS has begun a "risk and threat
analysis" which must be completed before
any decision is made as to use of crypto-
graphic technology.  (See p. 31.)
To rovide the security needed for the pro-
posed system, GAO recommends that the Com-
iiss 4 oner of Internal Revenue:
-- Establish a national data processing se-
   curity office and a similar office at
   each data processing facility responsible
   for administrative, physical, and tech-
   nical security.  (See p. 35.)
-- Consider ays and means to protect tax-
   payer data from improper access by

  non-IRS employees with access to a facil-
  ity where taxpayer information is main-
  tained.  (See p. 22.)
-- Require mandatory periodic updating of
   background investigations of employees
   using or having access to taxpayer infor-
   mation, to make sure that their activities
   warrant the Government's continued trust.
   (See p. 22.)
-- Initiate procedures to provide appropri-
   ate accountability and cozntrol of all
   magnetic tapes, microfilm, and other in-
   formation media. (See p. 22.)
-- Require periodic evaluations by the na-
   tional office (IRS headquarters) of the
   effectiveness of physical security at
   each service center and the National Com-
   puter Center. (See p. 27.)
-- Eliminate, where possible, lists of em-
   ployee identification data used to gain
   access to the computer system and use one-
   way cryptographic messages to safeguard
   the data files containing that identifi-
   cation information.  (See p. 16.)
-- Provide additional restrictions on com-
   puter terminal users, to permit them ac-
   cess r.nly to those functions and data ne-
   cessary to their duties. (See p. 16.)
-- Initiate controls over the activities of
   employees with the technical training ne-
   cesrajy to circumvent security safeguards.
   (See p. 16.)
-- SeeK lecal authority to withhold from
   public disclosure data processing docu-
   mentation that would aid illegal access
   to taxpayer information.  (See p. 16.)
-- Establish appropriate controls to make sure
   that only authorized interservice center
   activity is permitted. (See p. 32.)

-- Require supervisory approval for all out-
   of-district inquires (1) to taxpayer
   accounts by taxpayer compliance employees
   and (2) to inactive accounts by taxpayer
   service representatives.  (See p. 16.)
-- Study the feasibility of further system
   constraints such as additional require-
   ments a terminal user must meet before
   gaining access to a taxpayer's account.
   (See p. 16.)
-- Insure that communication risks and
   threats are completely analyzed before
   deciding whether to purchase sophisti-
   cated security devices. (See p, 32.)


The Commissioner of Internal Revenue gen-
erally agrees with GAO's recommendations
and has taken various actions to correct
the reported weaknesses in safeguards for
taxpayer information. (See pp. 16, 22,
27, 32, 35, and app. I.)

                          CHAPTER 1
     The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is under the Depart-
ment of Treasury with a mission of administering and enforc-
ing the internal revenue laws. The Service has the respon-
sibility of collecting virtually all Federal tax revenues.

     The IRS organizational structure is decentralized with
the national office in Washington, D.C.; the Data Center in
Detroit, Michigan; the National Computer Center in Martins-
burg, West Virginia; and seven regional offices located in
major cities across the country. The regional offices su-
pervise and coordinate the activities of 58 district offices
and 10 service centers. In addition, there are approximately
900 local offices functioning as satellites of the district

      To accomplish its mission, IRS has more than 80.000 em-
ployees and processes approximately 125 million returns annu-


     IRS converted to automated data processing (ADP) because
statistics showed that the Service's workload was increasing
beyond the capacity of conventional manual and machine proc-
essing capabilities. The Commissioner, in February 1959,
presented an ADP program to the Congress and received House
and Senate budget approval in June 1959. The system was im-
plemented during the 1960s and has been changed and adapted
over the years according to frequent legislative changes,
workload growth, and increasing program demands.

     Although the IRS organizational structure is decentral-
ized, the data processing structure within the Service is
centralized with all taxpayer master files maintained at the
National Computer Center.

     Under the current system, taxpayers file returns directly
with the service center in their geographic area. The cen-
ters put tax data on magnetic tapes and perform certain edit-
ing and verification checks. The tapes are sent to the Na-
tional Computer Center tor further processing. In addition,
substantial offline activity occurs at the centers which
includes the preparation and processing of taxpayer corre-
spondence and accounting for tax returns and moneys re-

     According to IRS officials, the original ADP system was
based on early technology, and subsequent enhancements have
consisted largely of piecemeal improvements. This develop-
ment has resulted in considerable duplication of effort and
inefficient perations. The heart of the problem, according
to IRS, lies in the master files of the present system which
prohibit ready access to tax account data equired to answer
taxpayer inquiries and meet other IRS program needs.

     Consequently, in November 1973, the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue advised the Department of the Treasury that
the ADP structure of their existing system needed complete
redesigning. Program approval to acquire a new computer sys-
tem was granted by the Office of Management and Budget in
September 1975.


     The proposed new system calls for extensive use of in-
teractive online processing and the decentralization of the
tax account master files from the National Computer Cen-
ter to the 10 existing service centers. The National Com-
puter Center is to be redesignated the National Communica-
tions Center.  It will maintain a centralized account direc-
tory and backup master files, and serve as a switching point
for transmission of data between service centers. User ter-
minals are to be located in the service centers and various
field offices.

     The Service's principal objective of the redesigned sys-
tem is to provide more responsive service to taxpayers and
IRS functional activities by accelerating return processing
and by providing increased information for taxpayer inquiries
and operational needs of the Service. An essential element
of the new service-oriented system is quicker access than in
the past to more current information by employees of more
IRS offices.


     The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes certain re-
sponsibilities upon taxpayers and others to furnish tax re-
turns and related information to the IRS.  The code requires
the Service to determine the correctness of returns and other

information received, to secure or prepare delinquent returns,
and to collect unpaid taxes.  It also imposes criminal sanc-
tions such as imprisonment and/or a fine plus dismissal of
Federal employees guilty of unauthorized disclosure of tax-
payer information.
     The Privacy Act of 1974 requires the Service to estab-
lish appropriate technical, administrative, and physical
safeguards to insure the security and confidentiality of
records and to protect against any anticipated threats or
hazards to their security or integrity which could result
in substantial harm embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfair-
ness to any individual on whom information is maintained.

                             CHAPTER 2

                      AND DATA SECURITY
     The capability of an information processing system to
protect personal data is contingent upon the use of adequate
technical, admninistrative, and physical safeguards. The pro-
tection of data must be considered from a total system per-
spective; that is, the protection of data must be considered
from its origination to its final destruction.   Since the pr,-
posed Tax Administration System has not been implemented, a
complete evaluation cannot be made as to its ability to pro-
tect the privacy of individual taxpayer information.

     What is possible is to evaluate the concepts of TAS and
their potential for providing high-level protection of per-
sonal information.  Further, the existing technical, adminis-
trative, and physical safeguards can be analyzed to identify
pertinent safeguards to be continued under TAS. This chapter
discusses the TAS operating concept and its ability, if pro-
perly designed and implemented, to protect personal informa-
tion. However, the conclusions drawn from this review should
lot be construed to apply to other computer systems operated
by IRS, such as those supporting the Service's administrative
and intelligence functions.

     The TAS concept envisions a batch and realtime transaction-
oriented computer network employing a decentralized data base.
The network will consist of over 8,000 terminals, 10 service
centers, and 1 communication center as shown in figure 1.

      Each service center will maintain selected information
pertaining to taxpayers with a primary address within the
center's geographic area of responsibility. High volume in-
put to the data base will be through the Direct Data Entry
System currently in use with approximately 5,000 terminals
b!it without access to taxpayer accounts. I:.formation from
tax returns and tax payments will be entered through the Di-
rect Data Entry System terminals and the output will be used
to post and update the master file maintained in the data

     Terminals located in the service centers and IRS re-
gional, district, and local offices will have direct access
to taxpayer information in the data base maintained for their
                 FIGURE 1


             l   'T     Ii

geographic area.  Controlled access to taxpayer data main-
tained at other service centers will e possible through
use of the communication network and the facilities of the
proposed National Communications Center. The processing
will primarily involve inquiries and transactions, such as
adjustments to taxpayer accounts.

     Mathematical verification, validity checks, balancing,
and other data controls occur prior to or during posting
operations. The accounting function will be accomplished
as the transactions are processed and files updated. Over
45 types of tax returns and more than 300 different trans-
action categories are included in this extremely complex

     The state-of-the-art in computer security is such that
absolute security has not been achieved. However, absolute
security would rarely be practicable in any environment re-
gardless of whether humans or computers are used considering
the costs that could be involved in attempting to achieve
the highest level of protection.

     Decisions on security must essentially identify and
define the level of protection which makes the cost greater
than the benefits--either in monetary or punitive terms--
of subverting a system. We believe reasonable protection
can be provided for taxpayer information by increasing the
cost to an unacceptable level of subverting the system and by
imposing heavy penalf-4 s for those who make unauthorized or
inappropriate disclosures of taxpaye: information. The
various system safeguards discussed in this report will  make
it more difficult to successfully subvert a system. Further,
there are a number of aws, not discussed in this report,
that have been enacted by various jurisdictions which pro-
vide criminal sanctions for such acts.

     In analyzing the potential for TAS to provide an ac-
ceptable level of protection for taxpayer information, it
is important to review the type and nature of the major
threats to a transaction-oriented, dedicated computer net-
work. In addition, the ability of a transaction system to
cope with these threats must also be evaluated, particularly
where the system employs a decentralized data base.


     The major threats to a dedicated computer network such
as TAS stem from two sources--(1) authorized, but untrust-
worthy users and (2) malicious penetrators. Their motives
are the same, but the Untrustworthy user is an individual
has authorized access rto the data of interest while the   who
cious penetrator, whether an employee or not, is not author-
ized access.
     The problem of the untrustworthy or dishonest employee
is not unique to automated data processing ystems. Only
the concentration of data in such systems increases the
risk over noncomputerized systems. Protection against the
untrustworthy user can be accomplished through well-designed
security safeguards which include personnel screening, ac-
tivity monitoring, and effective auditing. These and other
controls are discussed below and in subsequent chapters
this report.

     The malicious penetrator presents a different threat
than the untrustworthy employee in that technical security
measures must be circumvented. In order to place the threat
from this source in perspective, it is necessary to under-
stand how a penetrator would achieve his objective and what
skills he must possess.

     According to the technical community, a penetrator
circumvents computer security by calling on an operating
system function in a way unanticipated by the designers.
is frequently aided by the fact that designers of operatingHe
systems normally assume that users will not deliberately
attempt to force a malfunction of the system.

     The penetrator may achieve his objectives by either
(1) acquiring a list of terminal user identifiers and cor-
responding passwords or other identification and confirma-
tory information maintained within a computer file or (2)
obtaining supervisory (executive or master) control of
computer system. Using the first method, the penetrator
is able to masquerade as any of the authorized users,
use of the second method gives him direct access and control
of any file or program in the system.

     In order for a penetrator to accomplish his objective
either method it is necessary that he be moderately skilled by
in programming, expend time and effort to understand
complex operating systems, and have knowledge of the limita-
tions that occur in the design and implementation of the
systems. Such knowledge suggests to a penetrator where
 look for possible errors and design flaws.
                                             If he has access
 to system documentation, his ability
                                      is considerably enhanced.
      Against such individuals, contemporary
 systems generally fail to provide adequate computer operating
 personal or sensitive information because protection for
 ability to exploit design flaws. How      of the penetrator's
                                       then can TAS provide
 protection against such a threat?


      Generally, the risk of a succ   ,l1 penetration increases
 with the flexibility provided the    -rs of the system. The
 system user constraints needed in TAS
                                        are summarized below
 and are discussed in more detail in Chapters
 It is these constraints the penetrator        3, 4, and 5.
                                         must circumvent to
 gain access to taxpayer information.

      In order to significantly reduce the
cept sharply curtails the users' ability risk, the TAS con-
system by removing their capability to     to manipulate the
                                        enter a program over
a terminal. Such systems, if properly
                                        designed and imple-
mented, can effectively isolate the system
posed by ndividuals with programming         from the threat
                                       knowledge (i.e., the

      Under the TAS concept, a terminal
taining access to the system, may enter,operator, after ob-
data according to a limited number of      change, and retrieve
command code performs a specific function         codes. Each
information entered and the data maintained in  relation  to the
For example, one command code used in          on  the system.
                                        conjunction with ap-
propriate input data may cause a taxpayer's
be displayed while another may effect          account data to
                                        an adjustment to a
specific data element.

     The flexibility of the transaction
reduced in TAS through use of employee system is further
                                        and terminal profiles.
Such profiles can restrict terminal users
mand codes and terminals necessary for     to only those com-
                                        them to perform their
specific duties.
     By limiting the terminal user to transaction
application programs and their modifications
on the system under tightly controlled        must be placed
at the computer center. Here it is necessary         preferably
programmer from the system by requiring        to isolate  the
                                         all programs
gram changes to be submitted to an independent         and pro-
uation group. This group provides an            test and eval-
                                       interface between the
application and systems programmers and the computer opera-
tions. They review, validate, and approve all programs to
be placed on the system and therefore act as a control over
the activities of the programming function.

     As with any system, a transaction system such as TAS
must be well designed with security as an objective. Access
controls must be adequate, parameter checks should be ex-
tensive, and audit trails must be employed. Physical iden-
tification is also desirable, and under TAS, an identifica-
tion badge which can be read and validated by the computer
will be used as one step in activating a terminal and iden-
tifying the user.

     This approach provides a high level of protection to
taxpayer information by isolating the system from the pro-
grammer and reducing the risk by restricting the terminal
user to only those functions necessary to process authorized
transactions. Security of a transaction system such as TAS
is not dependent on vendor-supplied features and mechanisms
but rather on good system design, operating procedures, and
program testing.


     While absolute security is generally not achieveable
in contemporary operating systems, we have concluded that
the TAS concept is capable of providing a high level of
protection against the technical threat posed by the mali-
cious penetrator. However, providing only technical pro-
tection will not adequately safeguard taxpayer information
and thus will not comply with the Privacy Act of 1974.
Consideration must also be given to the administrative and
physical safeguards as well as the technical controls. The
following chapters in this report discuss our review of
selected technical, administrative, and physical safeguards
provided by the current IRS information system since these
constitute the environment in which TAS, also, will operate.
The improvements considered necessary under TAS will also
be discussed in those chapters.

                           CHAPTER 3
                       TECHNICAL CONTROLS

     The major elements of security in a transaction system
such as the proposed Tax Administration System lie with the
ability of the system to control access, limit user privilege,
and maintain program integrity. The capability of TAS to
adequately perform these functions cannot be conclusively
evaluated prior to system design and implementation. However,
IRS Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) is a transaction
system currently in use that has security requirements similar
to TAS.

     IDRS is a data terminal system used at each of the 10
service centers and certain field offices. This system is
intended to be replaced by TAS. IDRS, through the use of
computer terminals, provides immediate access to selected in-
formation in about 10 percent of the taxpayer master records.
The selection of records to be placed on this system is based
on the probability of taxpayer inquiry and IRS need. IDRS
also provides a user the capability to gain access to any of
the remaining taxpayer master records by having the informa-
tion extracted from the master files at the National Computer
     An evaluation of the technical security design and im-
plementation of IDRS disclosed the need for security improve-
ments that should be considered during the development of TAS.


      Access to IDRS through a data terminal is controlled
through use of terminal and employee profiles. Such profiles
are tables maintained on the computer system that contain the
specific attributes for each terminal and each authorized
user.   The terminal profiles restrict he use of a terminal
to certain functions. The employee profiles contain the in-
formation necessary to identify authorized users of the system
and to restrict those users to executing only authorized com-
man's.   One of the major elements of the identification proc-
ess is the unique employee password which is used in activa-
ting a terminal.

     A special computer program generates the passwords for
all authorized terminal users and produces a list of alternate
passwords to be used in the event a password is lost or com-
promised. Passwords are periodically changed and new pass-
words are furnished to the employees in sealed envelopes by
the security administrators at each service center.
     A master password list is maintained by the security ad-
ministrator and each employee's password is contained on the
computer system in the employee profile security file. A
backup copy of this file is maintained on magnetic tape for
recovery purposes in the event of an emergency.
     Access to an employee's name and password through either
the assignment and distribution process, master paskwor:d list,
or the employee profile security file would permit a penetra-
tor or dishonest employee to gain access to the computer system
by masquerading as that employee. It is the initial step in
gaining access to information in the system. Currently the
security administrators and their staffs, the resident
programmer-analysts (RPAs), and the computer operators either
have access to listings of this information or can readily ob-
tain such listings.

     Protection of password and other identification data can
be enhanced by IRS eliminating the ability to produce listings
of assigned employee passwords. This enhancement can be ac-
complished by fully automating the password generation, as-
signment, and distribution process, thus providing for
computer-generated passwords with the record maintained in the
computer. Further, the employee profile security file can be
protected by employing a one-way encryption scheme whereby
identification data is maintained and used by the computer
system in a form that would be unintelligible t an individual
even if purposely or inadvertently printed.

     Under the current system, an IDRS terminal user has ac-
cess to information on virtually any taxpayer in the country.
At any one time, IDRS provides online access to selected in-
formation in about 10 percent of the master file. However, a
request for tax information on almost any taxpayer can be made
through the system and the information will be extracted from
the centralized data base at the National Computer Center and
forwarded to the requesting service center.

     TAS will decentralize the data base and each service cen-
ter will maintain selected information pertaining to taxpayers
with a primary address within the center's geographic area of
responsibility. This will automatically restrict data access
without supervisory or second party intervention to addresses
in that servain center area--about 10 percent of the total in-
formation currently available through IDRS. The transfer of

 information between data bases maintained at the service cen-
 ters will require supervisory approval under TAS. This ap-
 proval process can be automated and provide even more effec-
 tive control over interservice center activity. (See p. 32.)
     In our opinion, IRS district and local office terminal
users' access to information can be further constrained under
TAS without seriously impeding operations. The two functional
areas affected by additional constraints would be taxpayer
service and taxpayer compliance. Each of these functional
areas has different information requirements and therefore
must be considered separately. The following is an example
of how each can be further limited as to the taxpayer infor-
mation they may have access to without supervisory approval.
      Taxpayer compliance includes such areas as audit and
 collecticns. The preponderance of taxpayer information needed
 by IRS employees to perform this function is confined to the
 geographic district in which they are assigned. Therelore,
 TAS can restrict employees working in the compliance area
only those taxpayer accounts with a primary address within to
 the IRS district involved. Out-of-district inquiries should
 require supervisory approval. Since there are 58 districts,
 this would limit a district or local office employee to an
average of less than 2 percent of the total taxpayer accounts.
      Taxpayer service presents a different problem as the con-
tact is normally initiated by the taxpayer. Typical inquiries
would include status of refunds or amounts due the Government.
Here, the taxpayer service representative can be restricted
to two categories of taxpayer accounts--(l) those active ac-
counts maintained by the host service centei where .   ey is
either due to or due from the taxpayer and taxpayer .latact
can reasonably be expected and (2) those inactive or zero
balance accounts with a primary address within the servicing
IRS district. Out-of-district inquiries on inactive accounts
should require supervisory approval. There are 58 districts,
and only about 10 percent of the files have been maintained
in an 'active account" status. Therefore, the taxpayer serv-
ice representative at a district or local.c ffice, within each
of the 10 service center areas, would be limited to an average
of less than 3 percent of the total taxpayer accounts.

     In those instances where supervisory approval would be
required, automation of the validation process would, in our
opinion, provide the most effective control. A supervisor
would be required to enter into a terminal the validation
data that would release each individual request, thus preclud-
ing an eployee from obtaining taxpayer information without
independent confirmation as to need.

     Command codes activate computer routines for processing
of data and inquiries. Each code performs a specific func-
tion in relation to the transaction entered and the data main-
tained in the system. The numoer and combinations of command
codes an employee is permitted to execute determines the capa-
bility of the user to process or obtain data from the system.

     One of the major elements of security in a transaction
system is the limitation of the privileges given a user. This
has been recognized by IRS and its regulations stipulate that
IDRS users possess only those command codes required by them to
perform their specific duties. Our review at the Brookhaven
and Covington Service Centers disclosed numerous instances
where employee profiles contained codes in excess of those re-
quired. For example, our review of the distribution of five
command codes at "-he Brookhaven service center disclosed 67
employees having command codes in excess of the authorized.
An interview of 21 employees at the Covington Service Center
revealed that over half did not use or need one or more of
the command codes in their profiles.

     The administrative procedures were not being followed
for authorizing changes to command codes contained in employee
profiles. IRS regulations require that all changes be docu-
mented and approved by the IDRS security administrator. Out
of 361 changes to employee profiles at the Covington Service
Center, 344 cases were rot properly documented. A similar
situation was found at the Brookhaven Service Center where
documentation was not n file with the security administrator
for over 50 percent of the changes examined. Failure to
properly implement IRS regulations in this area can result
not only in employees having excessive system privilEges hut
places the security administrator at a disadvantage :.n at-
tempting to identify those users with excessive system priv-
ileges and in initiating appropriate action to limit their
access only to those parts of the system needed to perform
their assigned duties.

     We were informed that, in part, possession of excessive
command codes by employees resulted from the operational
necessity to transfer employees from one branch to another
because of workload. This was particularly true where an
employee was temporarily loaned to another branch.  In such
situations, additional codes were often authorized without
full regard for the codes the employee already possessed.
This resulted in employees not only having excessive command

codes in their profiles but also combinations of codes that
permitted extensive access and processing capability.
     Partially automating the process can significantly en-
hance the security in this area under TAS as wtll as under
IDRS. Since the IRS employee number contains a designationbe
of the branch in which an individual works, the system can
programmed to (1) automatically delete the command codes con-
Lained in an employee profile upon change in employee number
and (2) add to the profile those command codes which are com-
mon to all employees of the new branch. Additional command
codes would require manual approval and processing. Further,
compatibility tests should be included that would prevent an
individual employee from holding certain combinations of com-
mand codts that would provide excessive system privileges.

     System and application programmere can do more damage
to a system with less chance of being caught than almost
any other person involved with data processing. It is there-
fore necessary to isolate the system from the programmer in
order to provide any degree of security.        IRS computer pro-
grams are developed   by the  national   office  and distributed
to the service  centers  and  the  National   Computer Center. RPAs
are assigned to  each  location   to  maintain  the production  pro-
grams for IDRS as well   as  other   computer  operations.  The
maintenance is in the form of corrections of program errors,
changes to program variables and constraints, and modifica-
tions to processing logic. All changes and modifications to
programs require approval of the national office.

     We found the controls exercised over the activities of
the RPAs to be practically nonexistent. For example, the
following conditions were observed at one or more of the data
processing facilities visited.

     -- RPAs had access to the computer, tape library, object
        decks, flow charts, program listing, and source decks.
     --No controls were exercised over the data an RPA could
       list or the use made of the listing.

      -- RPAs are not restricted in their ability to obtain list-
         ings of information containeJ in the computer memory.

      -- Independent reviews and evaluations of program changes
         were not conducted.

      -- A program change was made without the required approval
         from the national office.
      -- Periodic comparisons of master programs at the national
         office were not made smith those at the computer facili-
     While considerable effort has been devoted to controlling
access to the computer system through data terminals, little
attention has been given to controlling the activities of the
RPAs. Under current procedures, the RPAs have both the tech-
nical ability and the opportunity to manipulate the data sys-
tem without readily being detected.

     Proper control procedures should require that the RPAs be
isolated from the data system by (1) requiring all computer
programs and program changes to be approved, submitted for an
independent test and evaluation, and placed on the system only
under tightly controlled procedures, (2) preventing all RPAs
from handling computer-room hardware, and (3) monitoring all
programmer activity to include periodic verification of the
programs residing on the system files.


     IRS has publicly disclosed a large volume of data proc-
essing documentation in accordance with the Freedom of In-
formation Act. Included in this category are manuals on the
description and operation of the data system a   the data
elements and codes used.

     Such disclosure of the data processing documentation
permits a potential penetrator to study the system for pos-
sible flaws that could be exploited to gain unauthorized ac-
cess to taxpayer data. Further, possession of this docu-
mentation permits anyone to interpret any taxpayer information
they are able to obtain.

     The need to protect system documentation that would aid
a potential penetrator can be illustrated by the nationally
publicized case nvolving the theft of equipment from the Paci-
fic Telephone & Telegraph Company. In this case, access to
the company's computer was gained from studying an outdated
manual found in a trash container that detailed how the com-
puter inventory system worked.


     The use of terminal and employee profiles limits the
general access to the data system and permits the terminal
users to address only that data necessary to perform their
duties. The effectiveness of these controls has been dimin-
ished by weaknesses in implementation of IRS regulations
relating to limitations to be placed on user capability.
Further, the lack of control over the activities of techni-
cally trained employees and the public release of data proc-
essing documentation are major weaknesses in the overall
security of the current data processing system. The secur-
ity deficiencies and weaknesses found in the present system
and discussed in this and the two succeeding chapters are
shortcomings that, in our opinion, can be corrected within
the framework of existing security procedures, methods, and


     We recommend that all human interaction with the data
system be evaluated by IRS and appropriate controls estab-
lished in the existing system and under TAS to preclude any
individual from obtaining unlimited or excessive system capa-
bility. Specifically, eliminate, where possible, lists of
employee identification data used to gain access to the com-
puter system and use one-way cryptographic messages to safe-
guard the data files containing that identification informa-
tion. Further, the assignment and deletion of command codes
from employee profiles should be automated to the maximum
extent practical under both the present system and TAS. Ap-
propriate controls should be programmed to prevent an author-
ized user from holding certain combinations of command codes
which would, in that combination, violate the principle of
segregation of duties.
     Constraints should be imposed under TAS on the individ-
ual terminal operator's ability to gain access to taxpayer
information. A a minimum, we recommend that TAS be designed
to require supervisory approval for (1) all out-of-district
inquiries on inactive accounts by taypayer service represen-
tatives and (2) all out-of-district inquiries by taxpayer
compliance employees. The use of further constraints such
as additional information a terminal user must know in order
to gain access to an account should be studied by IRS. The
objective of such a study should be to identify practical
methods that can be used to control access to individual tax-
payer accounts.

     We further recommend that positive controls be exercised
over the activities of those employees that have the techni-
cal training necessary to circumvent the security safeguards.
In addition, IRS should seek legal authority to withhold from

public disclosure those elements of system documentation that
would substantially enhance the ability of unauthorized in-
dividuals to gain illegal access to taxpayer information.


     The Commissioner of Internal Reverue stated that, as a
result of their own internal audit findings and the GAO rec-
ommendations, they had eliminated the lists of employee access
identification data and were encrypting such data in the com-
puter files as a further safeguard.  In addition, they have
taken steps to automate the assignment and deletion of command
codes assigned to terminal operators. Techniques of fully
automating the password generation, assignment and distribu-
tion process, and the more secure one-way encryption of all
access data and files were being explored for possible use in
the future.
     The Commissioner agreed with the principle that terminal
users should not have access to more tax account data than is
necessary to perform their assigned duties. He stated that
IRS had initiated a study to thoroughly explore all aspects of
the subject. The objective of the study is to identify prac-
tical ways to limit access to data without adversely affecting
service to the public or productivity of the terminal users
or their supervisors. Further, IRS is t continue to evaluate
the use of additional positive identifiers of terminal users
(beyond badge, password, and employee profile controls). Also
being considered is a requirement for supervisory terminal
validations and counter authorization for access based on geo-
graphic areas or levels of account activity.

     IRS recognized the vulnerability of the ADP system to
those employees that have the technical training necessary to
circumvent security safeguards. They are considering various
methods and procedures to control the activities of such em-
ployees and balance security concerns with the need for em-
ployee efficiency.  In addition, IRS has initiated a review
of ADP documentation to identify materials which, for security
reasons, should not be publicly disclosed. The Commissioner
stated that if the Service finds that current exemptions of
the Freedom of Information Act do not offer sufficient protec-
tion to sensitive ADP material, appropriate legislation will
be sought.

                            CHAPTER 4

                   ADMINISTKTIVf    CONTROLS

     The general objective of an agency's system of cor trols
is to make sure that the duties and responsibilities imposed
by law are executed as effectively, efficiently, and economi-
cally as possible. To meet this objective, certain principles
and requirements must be observed in establshinao   ualifica-
tions and obtaining suitable employees. All otht   elements of
administrative controls are designed to control the activities
of officials and employees of the agency.

     Personnel controls should reflect the need for careful
selection of mature and trustworthy employees. Within IRS,
new employees are subjected to pre-employment screening. This
is accomplished through a routine investigation required for
all prospective Federal employees. Where sensitive positions
are involved, IRS's investigative organization is required to
conduct appropriate background checks. The extensiveness of
the screening is dependent, in part, on the sensitivity of
the positions being filled.

     Once employed, the activities of IRS employees are con-
trolled through internal checks and balances. The current
system provides:

     -- Extensive data and accounting controls to make sure
        that (1) tax returns and related documents are prop-
        erly processed, (2) tax data accuracy is maintained
        throughout the various processes, and (3) errors are
        promptly detected and corrected.

     -- Audit trails disclosing who had access to the system
        and what taxpayer records were involved.

     -- Internal reviews of operations.

     A review of selected administrative controls employed
at the IRS service centers and the National Computer Center
disclosed the following areas where improvements are con-
sidered necessary.


     IRS regulations state that the security investigation
program is designed to provide information about an individ-
ual's background commensurate with the degree of responsibil-
ity and trust imposed by the position to be held. The scope

of investigation varies from local police checks to complete
background investigations. The investigations are performed
either through the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (In-
spection) or by the Civil Service Commission.
     New employees, with the exception of those applying for
temporary employment of 90 days or less, receive a National
Agency Check and Inquiry investigation conducted by the Civil
Service Commission. This includes a check of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, civil Service Commission, military,
and other Government agency records.   IRS also verifies that
new employees  have paid their Federal taxes for the 3 years
prior to their  application.

     Applicants for specified positions and those on whom
derogatory information was uncovered receive, in addition to
the above, an extensive character investigation.  The investi-
gation covers the 10 years preceding the date of the request
for investigation or from the individual's 18th birthday,
whichever is shorter. It includes interviews with neighbors,
former employers, supervisors, co-workers, references, and ed-
ucators; a check of police and credit agencies; and foreign
travel verification through the State Department. IRS also au-
dits their income tax returns for any 2 years prior to the
date of application for which the statute of limitations has
not been invoked.

     Specified positions are defined as (1) grades GS-9 and
above--employees earning $6.78 or more per hour, (2) all com-
puter personnel, and (3) all personnel in inspection and in-
telligence. Seasonal employees holding these positions re-
ceive the same type of investigation.
     Applicants for temporary positions of 90 days or less
receive only a police and an FBI name check. This involves a
search by local police and FBI for arrest records of incidents
that should be known to IRS.
     While the above procedures appear to be adequate, peri-
odic reinvestigations are not conducted on any service center
or National Computer Center employee after the initial inves-
tigation. We believe such updates should be made to insure
that the activities of the individual employees have been such
as to warrant the Government's continued trust. Such periodic
updating is required by many agencies for employees handling
national security information.

     The major discrepancy in the personnel screening process
does not lie with the background investigations afforded IRS
employees but rather with the absence of security investiga-
tion for non-IRS employees such as the computer equipment
maintenance personnel. Many of these individuals are per-
mitted unescorted access to the service centers and the Na-
tional Computer Center and have the same, or possibly greater,
opport sty as the IRS employees working in the facilities to
extrac-   nsitive taxpayer information.
     We were informed that IRS had addressed, on several oc-
casions, the lack of security clearance for non-IRS employees.
They presently take no position as to whether or not they have
the authority to require background investigations for non-
federal employees. We believe that the Privacy Act of 1974
and the statutes limiting disclosure of taxpayer information
and returns provide sufficient authorization for IRS to in-
clude provisions in their contracts requiring appropriate
background investigations of contractor employees having ac-
cess to facilities where taxpayer information is maintained.
The authority for such nvestigations is found in sections
6103 and 7213 of the Inteinal Revenue Code of 1954, as well
as provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)
(supp. IV, 1974).


     IRS information is stored in various ways--documents,
magnetic tapes, magnetic disks, and microfilm.  TAS will use
these same types of storage. Controls exercised over such
storage need improvement at several of the locations visited.

      The master       -nd associated records are maintained
on over 100,00. e,     -  magnetic tape at the National Com-
puter Center. To rea,. the possibility of loss or com-
promise, it is necessary that strict accountability be main-
tained at all times.  The National Computer Center maintains
a computer inventory list for this purpose which included all
reels at the Center. However, under current procedures, the
Center cannot prepare an inventory of tapes by location such
as the tape library, storage vault, etc. Thus, when a search
for a tape is made, all possible locations must be checked
until the tape is located. Such a system does not permit
positive control over magnetic tapes as evidenced by the Cen-
ter's May 1975 physical inventory which disclosed 33 missing

     In addition, we found that tape library operations at
some of the service centers were deficient. Computer branch
personnel had virtually unlimited access to the tape library
and the library was not locked on the weekends when the li-
brarians were not on duty. In a test of tape library controls
at the Covjington Service Center, we found that tapes could be
removed with little or no possibility of detection. Further,
inventories on magnetic tapes in the library were not con-
ducted on a semiannual basis as required by the Library Opera-
tions Handbook. For example, the Chamblee Service Center did
not inventory tapes between December 1972 and July 1974.
     Selected information from each taxpayer's return i con-
verted to microfilm at the National Computer Center and ur-
nished to the service centers for their use. Additional
copies of the microfilm are produced at the service centers
according to need. Appropriate procedures have not been im-
plemented to account fully for the microfilm cartridges at
all service centers.
     We conducted an inventory of microfilm cartridges in
the input perfection branch of the Covington Service Center
and compared our count with the records maintained by the
branch. The results were as follows:

        Category                   GAO            IRS
  Business Master File              735            738
  Individual Master File          2,691          2,802
  Federal Tax Deposits              256            127
  Residual Master File               21             21
      Total                       3,703          3 688
An examination by IRS disclosed errors in the records that
accounted for the discrepancies between the totals but did
not resolve the discrepancies within categories. The differ-
ences in the ctegory may have been due to misclassification,
but it is indicative of poor accounting procedures. Further,
the number of cartridges that should have been on hand within
the input perfection branch could not be independently veri-
fied by reference to records other than those of the branch.
This was because no master record was maintained by the center
of the microfilm cartridges reproduced, distributed, and des-
     The controls for document and information flow were con-
sidered generally adequate to insure the proper processing
of tax returns and related documents and should be continued
under TAS. However, improvements are needed in the areas of
personnel screening and information storage.

     We recommend that IRS:

     -- Consider ways and means to protect taxpayer data from
        improper access by non-IRS employees having access to
        a facility where taxpayer information is maintained.
        This would include contractual provisions requiring
        either appropriate background investigations or escort
        service to non-IRS employees without a current back-
        ground investigation.

     -- Require mandatory periodic updating of personnel in-

     -- Initiate procedures to provide appropriate account-
        ability and control of all magnetic tapes, microfilms,
        and othez information media.


      The Commissioner of Internal Revenue expressed the Serv-
ice's concerr about protection of taxpayer data from improper
access by non-IRS employees working in the data processing
facilities. With regard to appropriate background investiga-
tions on these individuals, the Commissioner is requesting
advice from the IRS chief counsel. If the Service has statu-
tory authority, it will determine the type of investigations
that are appropriate, based on the degree to which non-IRS
employees have access and other risk factors, as well as the
cost of conducting the investigations. He further stated
that internal controls which limit the access and movement of
non-IRS employees are presently prescribed, including a manda-
tory provision for escorting all nonfederal personnel in
restricted areas. A small number of nonfederal personnel who
have a clearance of confidential or higher, issued under aus-
pices of the DefenFe Industrial Security program, are allowed
unescorted access to some restricted areas. The use of es-
corts in nonrestricted areas is left to the discretion of the
center directors. The adequacy of these safeguards is being
measured by ongoing security tests performed by the organiza-
tional elements under IRS Assistant Commissioner for inspec-

     The Commissioner agreed that background investigations
of some IRS employees who use or have access to taxpayer in-
formation should be updated periodically. The Service is
studying which positions require full-scale investigations
due to their sensitivity.
     The Commissioner indicated that the IRS internal auditors
had also noted weaknesses n the accountability and control of
information and stated that the Service had taken specific
corrective action which included issuance of revised proce-
dures providing for tighter controls on magnetic tes, discs,
and-printouts as well as on access to tape libraries.

                            CHAPTER 5

                       PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF

                       IRS COMPUTER FACILITIES

     Physical protection of an automated data processing
facility involves permitting access to the facility by author-
ized individuals while denying access to others.  In order to
accomplish this objective, Internal Revenue Service computer
facilities are equipped with electronic .ntrusion detection
devices, silent trouble alarms, and related industrial protec-
tion systems, that are monitored at protection consoles. All
but one of the service centers have a perimeter security fence.
Guard services are either furnished by the General Services
Administration or on a contract basis.  Exterior security
lighting is provided for buildings, parking lots, and the
perimeter fence.

     Within the data processing facilities, physical security
of tax data is further provided by a system of restricted and
secured areas as part of the IRS physical and document secur-
ity program. Access to a facility and the designated re-
stricted areas is controlled through the use of a personnel
identification system. Under this system color coded photo-
graph badges are used to control the movement of IRS person-
nel, contract support personnel, and visitors. The system
is intended to limit access to those persons who have need to
enter a given area in the performance of their duties.

     We consider the above physical protective measures em-
ployed by the Service to be generally adequate in safeguard-
ing their computer facilities. However, the effectiveness of
the measures has been diminished by a lack of proper implemen-
tation and maintenance. This chapter discusses those areas
where improvements are considered necessary in order to meet
the overall physical security objective.
     In addition to the physical safeguards covered by this
review, special procedures relating to the transportation,
storage, and disposal of IRS records, including tax returns,
have been developed jointly with the National Archives and
Records Service of the General Services Administration and
the U.S. Postal Service.

     IRS' perimeter protection at its computer facilities is
designed to deter trespassing and to direct employees and

visitors to selected entrances. Our examination of the
cal protection features used disclosed the following deficien-
cies resulting from improper maintenance.

     Perimeter fencing at the Brookhaven Service Center was
in need of repair and strengthening.   Spaces
existed that would permit unauthorized access under fencing
                                               and numerous
areas were found where barbed wire strands at the top of
fence were broken. In addition, locks to perimeter doors the
the Center had not been changed since the facility was opened
in October 1S92. While officials said that there was no
quirement to periodically change locks on access doors, we
believe that good security practices necessitate such
This procedure would help maintain an appropriate levelactions.
facility protection when the employees given access to peri-
meter door keys are changed.

     It is essential that IRS provide for the
spection and maintenance of protective devices continuous in-
                                                to insure that
they fulfill their intended purpose.  Improper maintenance
can significantly reduce their effectiveness and impede the
overall security of the facility.


     Access to computer facilities is con;tolled through use
of identification badges. Employees must show their badges
to a security guard upon entering and display them at all
times in the facility. Visitors are issued badges and gen-
erally require escort by IRS personnel.

     Certain critical areas within each service cnter have
been designated as "restricted" with access limited to au-
thorized individuals. Access to a restricted area is con-
trolled through use of identification badges that are dis-
tinctive in color. For example, the normal badge for an
employee may be yellow, a visitor's red, and a restricted IRS
area badge such as the computer room may be brown.
     The effectiveness of the badge contro. system is depend-
ent upon the willingness of security guards and IRS employees
to challenge any individual not displaying a proper identifi-
cation badge while in the facility. Further, it is necessary
that all badges be properly accounted for and controlled
they not only represent the principal means of identification
but under TAS will e used as one step in activating computer

       In a test of the badge system at the Covington
 Center, access was gained to several restricted areasService
 displaying a "visitor's escort only" badge. Such a
 not authorize access to any of the restricted areas  badge  did
                                                      within the
 Center.   During a further test, movement was permitted
 challenged without badge or escort through many of the un-
 ter's work areas.                                        Cen-

     Administrative controls over employee and visitor iden-
tification badges were ineffective at both the Brookhaven
and Chamblee Service Centers. Lost or missing badges
not always accounted for, and reconciliations were not
as required. Procedures were generally inadequate to made
that badges were collected upon furlough or termination
employment. For example at the Chamblee Service Center, of
badges had not been returned to the badge unit by mid-June
for 110 temporary employees whose employment was terminated
on May 11, 1975. In seven instances, former employees
permitted to clear the Center without surrendering theirwere
identification badges. The remaining 103 badges were
held in the branches where the tormer employees had worked.

     No form of disciplinary action was taken where employ-
ees of the Brookhaven Service Center repeatedly forgot
their identification badges. An IRS official estimated or lost
approximately 15 to 20 badges were lost and 400 instancesthat
forgotten badges occurred each month. Such laxity in       of
ministration of the badge control system has, in our   the ad-
significantly weakened the overall security of the service

     Large quantities of waste material
information must be disposed of daily andcontaining  taxpayer
                                           therefore must be
protected to prevent disclosure; within IRS, this
plished in various ways. In general, trash containingaccom-
payer information is segregated and destroyed by incinerating,
pulping, shredding, or otherwise disintegrating the
The destruction is accomplished by IRS or by contractmaterial.
IRS supervision.

      While the above process would appear to provide adequate
protection, a basic weakness exists. The effectiveness
safeguard depends on the individual IRS employee properlyof the
segregating trash containing taxpayer information
sensitive waste. During our review at the Covingtonfrom non-
Center, taxpayer information was found in general
                                                   use waste-
baskets and trash containers. At the National Computer

taxpayer information was found exposed at a sanitary landfill.
These findings point to a need to review the disposal process
and to consider requiring all trash to be destroyed in the
same manner, thus eliminating the segregation process.


     The physical protection measures and procedures employed
by IRS are considered adequate, in concept, to properly pro-
tect taxpayer data maintained by IRS ADP facilities. However,
the lack of proper implementation and pplication has resulted
in several of the controls being less tn   effective. These
conditions should be corrected in the present system and the
controls continued in TAS.

     We recommend that the national office exercise respon-
sibility for periodically evaluating the effectiveness of
physical security at each of the 10 service centers and the
National Computer Center. While all aspects of physical pro-
tection should be evaluated, particular attention should be
given to correcting tne discrepancies cited herein with em-
phasis on obtaining proper implementation of effective badge
control and trash disrosal systems. The results of the eval-
uations should be analyzed and where warranted, uniform pro-
cedures should be developed for application at all locations
and continued under TAS.


     The Commissioner of Internal Revenue informed us that
plans are now being made to increase evaluations of physical
security and to conduct them on a systematic, regular basis.
He stated that protective programs branch has responsibility
for this program but has been unable to make frequent eval-
uations because of their small staff. Independent tests will
continue by the organizational elements under the Assistant
Commissioner for Inspection.
     According to the Commissioner, corrective action has
been nitiated regarding those protective measures which are
prescribe] but not effective because of lack of proper mai:n-
tenance o: implementation. The Service had studied its trash
disposal procedures and had issued new Service-wide guidelines
which will require all trash to be processed in the same manner
and should overcome the deficiencies noted during our review.
He further stated that administrative control over badges in

certain service centers should improve with the recent assign-
ment of new security officers who will receive strong manage-
ment support in the administration of the badge system. The
Service is testing a new photograph badge with computer read-
able encoding which, if successful, will replace the present
badge system which relies on visual checks by guards and IRS

                            CHAPTER 6

                          CENTER ACTIVITY
     The proposed Tax Administration System is envisioned as
a totally integrated data system involving processing, stor-
age, data communications, and terminal facilities. A decen-
tralized data base will be used and each service center will
process and maintain tax accounts for taxpayers in its geo-
graphic area. The National Communications Center will control
data exchange between centers and will maintain a directory
of each center's records so that a taxpayer's account will not
be maintained at more than one center.

     Data communications will be provided by a dta communica-
tion subsystem. This subsystem will link the data terminals
located i field offices with the host service center. Serv-
ice centers will be interconnected through the National Com-
munications Center. Information that must be transferred be-
tween service centers will be batch processed to the National
Communications Center for relay to the appropriate service
center. Data will be transmitted between centers and the
National Communication Center over encrypted data links.
Through this design, a local office terminal will communicate
only with its servicing center, and no direct terminal-to-
terminal or center-to-center communications will take place.

     Encryption of the data links and the batch transfer of
data were recommended by the Office of Management and Budget
and cited by IRS as data communication safeguards in their
notification of proposed system changes required by the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 and submitted to the Congress and the Office
of Management and Budget on October 15, 1975.


     The GAO report entitled, Computer-Related Crimes in Fed-
eral Programs" (FGMSD-76-27, Apr. 27, 1976), observed that most
of the cases examined did not involve sophisticated attempts
to use technology for fraudulent purposes, but rather they
were uncomplicated acts which were made easier because manage-
ment controls over the systems involved were inadequate.
While wiretapping and lectronic interception of communica-
tions are technically possible, the extent of the threat to
taxpayer data from such sources has not been established. For
example, our discussions with the Federal criminal and intel-
ligence agencies and with IRS have disclosed no known cases of

 unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information
 data communications.                            traceable to

      When a risk and threat analysis indicates
                                                   the necessity
 for safeguarding the communication links,
 be used to secure the network. An algorithmcryptography   can
 the primary technical requirements of          th  t satisfies
                                       a data encryption stan-
dard was published in the Federal Register
by the National Bureau of tandards.          of March 17, 1975,
be used by Federal agencies where encryptionalgorithm is to
ications is considered necessary. However, of data commun-
                                              the National
Bureau of Standards recommends that other
such as identification, access control,     security safeguards
be implemented before sophisticated encryptionaccess auditing
procured for the protection of personal           devices are
employing the algorithm are not generallydata.    The devices
cost has been estimated to range from       available   and their
                                       a few hundred to sev-
eral thousand dollars.

      For planning purposes, IRS is considering
of the encryption devices to be approximately the unit cost
equal amount representing maintenance            $2,500 with an
system life. Forty-two devices will    cost   over a 10-year
                                      be required to provide
partial network protection representing
tions between the service centers and    the data communica-
                                       the  National
tions Center.   Eight hundred ninety-three additionalCommunica-
would be required to provide encryption                 devices
                                         between the field of-
fice terminal control units and the service
end-to-end encryption at each field            centers. Full
approximately 3,350 devices 1/ to secure        would require
estimated incremental cost o encrypting    the  network. The
munications network is shown in the following IRS data com-

1/Of the approximately 8,000 terminals
                                        to be connected to
  the system, about 2,900 will be located
  service centers and will require use     outside he 10 IRS
                                        of commercial commun-
  ications. Devices for encryption/decryption
  quired at each of these terminals and         would be re-
  essary at the various service centers  others would be nec-
                                         to provide for full
  end-to-end encryption.

              Estimated Cost of Encryption of'IRS
                   Data Communication Network

      Estimated cost                                mediate        Full
      of encryption                  Partial        protec-       protec-
         devices                   protection        tion          tion
                                           -   000 omitted)
Between service centers and
  National Communications
  Center                              $105      $     105     $     105
Between field office terminal
  control units and host erv-
  ice center                           -            2,233
Between field office data
  terminals and host service
  centers                              -              -           8,375
    Total estimated
      equipment cost                  105           2j338         8,480
    Total estimated
      maintenance cost                105           2,338         8,480
Total estimated cost                 $210       $4,676      $16i960
     Although we recognize that a potential for wiretapping
or electronic interception exists, our inquiries disclosed
no evidence of a present threat to taxpayer information that
would warrant the cost of procuring encryption devices to
secure the communication network. A\ risk nd threat analysis
has been initiated by IRS and its completion is considered
necessary prior to any decision to employ this techno ogy.


      Under TAS, data is to be transmitted over high-speed com-
munication lines from a service center to the National  Commun-
ications center for processing or relaying to another service
center in batch form. These procedures preclude direct com-
munication between the computers located at the service cen-

     While prohibiting realtime interservice center activity
may be desirable for economy or other considerations, it does
not provide communications security and does not significantly
add to the overall security of TAS. This is due to the fact

 that batch processing delays, but does not control, the trans-
 fer of data. For example, the delay may discourage, but will
 not prevent, an IRS employee at one location from browsing
 the tax information maintained at another service center.

      Interservice center activity should be controlled at the
source through supervisory intervention. This would require
a supervisor to validate all requests for taxpayer informa-
tion maintained by another service center. While a manual
review and approval of requests as currently planned by IS
would provide a degree of control, such a procedure could be
circumvented. Automation of the validation process would, in
our opinion, provide the most effective control to prevent
unauthorized transfer of data between centers. A supervisor
would be required to enter into a terminal, validation data
that would release each individual request. Such a process
would preclude an employee from obtaining taxpayer informa-
tion from another center without independent confirmation
as to need.


     The internal threat to taxpayer information from unau-
thorized use of the communication network is considered
greater than the external threat posed by covert electronic
interception. Therefore, the need to control interservice
center activity is evident while the need to encrypt the
communication links has not been established.


     We recommend that appropriate controls be established
in the design and implementation of TAS to insure that only
authorized transfers of taxpayer information between centers
are permitted. Further, the need to provide sophisticated
communication security should be subjected to a thorough
risk and threat analysis prior to any decision to incure the
cost for encryption devices.


     The Commissioner of Internal Revenue informed us that
IRS was carefully considering the recommendation concerning
a requirement for supervisory terminal validations and counter
authorization for data that was accessed, based on geographic
areas or levels of account activity. The Commissioner stated
that a need may exist for certain exceptions in applying
graphic restraints.

     The Commissioner also stated that the Service was devel-
oping a risk analysis to reevaluate the need or communication
line encryption devices prior to any contract award and, if
not fully justified, would re-examine the issue with the Of-
fice of Management and Budget.

                          CHAPTER 7
                   THE IRS SECURITY PROGRAM
     The IRS national office has the overall responsibility
for the formulation and implementation of the security pro-
gram. Policy responsibility has been assigned to the Internal
Revenue Service Security Council.  The Council is chaired by
the Assistant Commissioner for Administration with five addi-
tional Assistant Commissioners serving as members. The chief
of the protective programs branch of the facilities management
divisior has been designated executive secretary.

     IRS regulations direct the Council to deal with all se-
curity issues within IRS.  The Council is authorized to as-
sess security status, identify important issues and problems,
and determine which items are to e referred to the Deputy
Commissioner or Commissioner for final decision. The Council
has the authority to obtain the expertise necessary to deal
with any and all security issues.  It can also recommend meth-
ods for evaluating security to insure that prescribed policies
and procedures are being followed. Similar councils exist at
several regional offices and service centers.

     The facilities management division, through its protec-
tive programs branch, oversees the Service-wide implementa-
tion of the physical and document security program at the
national level. Its counterparts at the National Computer
Center and the service center protective programs offices
are responsible for developing and carrying out the program
within their respective areas of responsibility.

     Similar responsibility for data processing security has
not been defined. At the national level, there is no single
office or organizational element responsible for the overall
implementation of the technical security measures that are
necessary and integral to the data processing operations and
programs. Each data processing project or operational func-
tion considers only those controls and security measures re-
lated to its system or subsystem. Such an organizational
approach to security does not insure uniform implementation
of the security policies established by the Internal Revenue
Service Security Council.

     A security administrator is assigned to each of the
IRS service centers. However, their area of responsibility
has been limited to the Integrated Data Retrieval System,
a subsystem of a center's operation. Overall responsibility
for data processing security has not been vested in an in-
dividual or office at the local level.

     Establishing an organizational structure to independently
monitor and evaluate data processing security would, in our
opinion, significantly contribute to oercoming the weaknesses
in controls cited in this report. Responsibility and author-
ity must be clearly defined a   a continuing program estab-
lished to insure that taxpayer data is properly safeguarded in
accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974.


     We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
establish a national data processing security office respon-
sible for technical, administrative, and physical security
to include all data processing facilities. Such an office
should be independent of those organizational elements re-
sponsible for the development and operation of the computer
systems and facilities and have authority sufficient to assure
appropriate security.

     A similar position should be established at each data
processing facility. The data process ng security officer
should be independent of day-to-day lii e operations. Such
independence can be achieved by either making this position a
field extension of the national office or placing it under
the head of the facility with direct communication authorized
with the national data processing security office.

     The Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that IRS
recognized the merits of this proposal and that a study
would be initiated to thoroughly evaluate the national se-
curity office concept and determine its organizational and
resource implications.

                           CHAPTER 8


     A widespread concern has often been expressed about the
theory that large computer projects could be expanded and
linked to other computer systems and thus pose a serious
threat to the privacy of the individuals involved in various
Government operations or programs. The first attempt to
centralize Government-held computerized information was made
in the mid-1960s with the proposal to establish a National
Data Center. This proposal met with concern over the poten-
tial misuse of a large concentration of data accumulated from
the various Federal agencies which could result in an in-
vasion of individual privacy.

     The congressional   sponse to the proposed National
Data Center was summa.   q in a 1968 report by the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations. 1/ The committee concluded
that the data center concept poses serious problems regarding
the collection, use, and security of personal information.
It strongly advised against establishing a National Data Cen-
ter until the technical feasibility of protecting automated
files could be fully explored and privacy guaranteed.

     More recently, the Joint Agriculture-GSA New Equipment
Project (commonly known as FEDNET) met similar opposition.
As a result, the scope of the project was reduced in July
1974 by canceling the telecommunications network and GSA
participation in the project. Agriculture canceled its pro-
curement action in October 1975.

      IRS' proposed Tax Administration System differs signi-
ficantly from the National Data Center and FEDNET concepts
in that direct linkage, or sharing of equipment, with other
agencies is not involved.   Further, TAS provides for the de-
centralization of the data base in contrast tc the consoli-
dation of information as was proposed for the National Data

1/House Committee on Government Operations Report, "Privacy
  and the National Data Center Concept," 90th Congress, 2nd
  sess., House Report No. 1842, (1968), p. 8.

     Under the current IRS computer system, the Service sends
and receives data by way of magnetic tapes tc other organiza-
tions to facilitate tax administration. This practice will
continue under TAS. The following are examples uf such in-
direct interfaces with other computer systems.

     -- The Service receives a substantial portion of the data
        concerning interest and dividends paid by business tax-
        payers (as required by sections 6041 and 6042, Internal
        Revenue Code of 1954) on magnetic tapes, thereby per-
        mitting the matching of such data with its master file
        accounts and avoiding the expense of transcribing and
        converting it to machine readable form.

     -- Magnetic tapes received from the Social Security Ad-
        ministration are usedl to verify the social security
        numbers required by section 6109, Internal Revenue
        Code of 1954, to be furnished on individual income
        tax returns. Such verification helps to assure the
        accuracy of the master file accounts.

     -- The Service extracts self-employment income data and
        sends this information by way of magnetic tapes to
        the Social Security Administration so that agency can
        credit the individuals' social security accounts as
        provided in 42 U.S.C. 401.

     -- The Service sends data, which is authorized by section
        6103 of the Iternal Revenue Code of 1954, cn mdgnetic
        tapes to other Government agencies such as the Bureau
        of Census for statistical purposes, and to various
        states to assist in the tax administration of their


     It is our opinion that as the user population of tax
information expands, the risk of unauthorized disclosure also
increases. Therefore, we believe the Congress may wish to
consider certain restrictions in any legislation authorizing
or funding the development and implementation of TAS. Such
legislative restrictions would involve (1) direct linkage
between TAS and any other computer systems, (2) location of
TAS input and output devices, and (3) interface of TAS with
other systems.

     Although the current IRS computer system is not directly
linked with any other system and such linkage hs not been
included in any TAS planning document we examined, we believe
the Congress may wish to consider making such direct linkage
     Another prohibition that could
clude a computer terminal, or other be considered is to pre-
                                    input or output d vices
with direct access to the tax account data base, from being
located at other than IRS operating locations unless specifi-
cally authorized by law.

     The Service currently receives data on computer media
such as magnetic tapes, from the public and private sectors
to facilitate tax administration   It sends data via computer
media to other Government agencies and to various States
authorized by law, resulting in a cost savings to both   as
Government and the taxpayer. The Congress may wish to con-
sider legislation restricting the use of such indirect inter-
faces for new purposes unless specifically authorized by

                          CHAPTER 9

                       SCOPE OF REVIEW
     This report provides our assessment of the proposed
Tax Administration System's capability to provide appro-
priate safeguards to protect taxpayer information as re-
quired by the Internal Revenue Code and the Privacy Act of
1974. A separate report is being issued on our evaluation
of the reasonableness of the cost/benefit analysis for the
proposed new system.

     We interviewed IRS officials and examined records and
documents pertaining to the proposed Tax Administration Sys-
tem. We evaluated selected technical, administrative, and
physical safeguards currently in the present system which
are planned to be retained in TAS. We plan to continue
our assessment of the privacy and security aspects o the
current system and may issue future reports if appropriate.

     Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 au-
thorizes certain Government officials, Federal agencies, and
the States access to taxpayer information maintained by IRS.
We did not review the safeguards on the taxpayer information
provided those recipients since that access is authorized by
law and has no impact on the ability of TAS to safeguard tax-
payer information. However, those officials and agencies
with statutory authority to gain access to taxpayer informa-
tion are required to safeguard that nformation against un-
authorized or inappropriate disclosure. In addition, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has stated that he will
require a review of the agreements with the States and re-
iegotiate those that do ot provide adequate safeguards
ftr taxpayer information.
     We conducted our review at the IRS (1) national office
in Washington, D.C., (2) National Computer Center at Martins-
burg, West Virginia, (3) Cincinnati, Ohio, district office,
and (4) service centers in Chamblee, Georgia; Brookhaven, New
York; and Covington, Kentucky.

APP:LDIX I                                                                    APPENDIX I

  Department of the Treasury / internal Rnue Service /         iashington, D.C. 20224

                                                              JUL     o1976
   Mr. Victor L. Iowe
   Director, General vrmwent Division
   Ulited States eneral Aounting Offioe
   Ishingon, D.C.     20548
   Dear Mr. ase:
          e appreciate the omprehsive review made by yu staff of the
   Internal iReveue Srvice's prent autmatic data processing system
   ad te proposed Tax Aiinstration System ('IS). We fald the periodic
   briefings and en discussions dhich you arranged throuht&the audit
   to be particularly helpful.   he on-line a       Eroach gave us a oorb
   to take early orrective action where needed within the esting s :ity
   system; and it allowed us to release (with yur cxnanRt) GQD's overallrit
   favorable coclusion to ose in the S clearanoe pEros.
        Our oaments n your rat               listed on pgw iii and iv in
   the draft report, "Evaluation of the Ability of the Internal    Evmu
   Service's Propoeed Cputer System to Safeguard Taxpayer Infotmtn,"
   are Oatained in ATACMEN A to this letter. We rl sted      veral diial
   changes which you may wish to nsider also.     heee are cited
   N!W B. amedial actioas have been or are being taken in thoseinaras
   whid can be corrected within the frmework of the edsting secrwity
   procedures, methods or aontrols.   caever, a f r_                will
   reauire further study.
        As stated in yo recent report omcerning the adeqcy of physioal
  security and risk unagwnt policies and practi (E(aO -76-40),
   "Perfect security is generally regarded as mattaiable; tfreore, tm
  aim of a good physical security system Should be to reduce the pdtbilty
  of loes to an acceptable low level at reasonable ost and to insure
  adequate recovery in case of loss." We strorgly adore this .e.
  You may be assured that as the TRS design effort contns and ipimita-
  tin takes place, every effort will e de to pnovide the hijst
  reasonable level of security and protection for taxpar infmtjiM, and
  thtt all of the raem datios made by the         will be carefully
       With kind regards,



APPENDIX I                                                                APPENDIX I

                                                              M'&I   M   A

              FWpOns to     (      inat &
                                 ou'              to the Cissinr~
   1.        ~tblish a natlmal data Mvoesing Musity offic- and a similar
        position at emh data         ing    ility rspqXnsai/,, for afdnistrative,
          jsice1 and _temiral security."
        lb riiuge    ti nearits of this ;prposul and, thersre,   a suy will
        be initiated to toraly     evaluate the natiral security office aonpt
        and deterMine its' rg    at    al ad rsoure iupltt ins.
   2.   "Cosider ays and m     to protec tpqer~ daca frcm iBproper ames
        by nn-MS dloym8 having ions to a facility where tpye
        infrnatian is  intainsd."
         he Service is eonoead about protection of taxpayer data frn izper
        acc      by n-6       iployee woriing in aour data processing facilitis.
        With regard to apazrita bagro            inetJ          on these irdiviuals,
        we are reqauting advia frmn the IS Chief Ounuel cn Service autlhrity
        and intigative jurisdictin . If the Service has statutory authority,
        we will detnoaLr the type of estiat         s that are aropriate, based
         an the dgee to hic rmc-IIS np1oyeas have acces and othr risk
        factrs, as wll as the cost of c&ting the intiatian . Internal
         ontrol0s which limit the access andoe m anit of na-IS plys are
        pres-atly prescribed, inclulnd     a andatory provision for eoorting
        all m-Fedecal peramnel in restricted areas.          small
                                                                nulmber of non-
        Federal permel io have a clearance of confidttial or higher,
        issued mler autpices of the Define Industrial Security Program, are
        alloaed Iusm.sd access to sae restricted areas. The use of escarts
        in nm-restricted area is left to the discretian of the center
        directors. lhe adeqcy of these safguards is being measured bty
             nhspectmo's a-going security tests.
   3.   "Require menatory periodic tpdating of b    rd    investigtions of
          Uplyees using or haviw  access to taxpayr inforMtinm to enare that
        their activities wmrrant the (rnemrrt's oontined trust."
        We agree that the backgrand investigations of ae mS sloyes wo
        use or ha aooess to taxpayer infrmation hould be updated periodically.
        Preently, we are stdying which positins require full scale investiga-
        tians due to their sansitivity, and we believe once these are clearly
        identified w can analyze and re     a final oonclusion regarding yaw
  4.    "Initiate prcedurs to provide qaprriate acmitabity and xontrol of
        all m&ast-c tapes, microfilm, and other information mia."
        Our internal auditors have also indica.d that        _ajaes exist in this
        area. W have take specific correcive actia    n hich includes the
        iuan of revised pooedures (Rvision to Handbook 12010, ecurity)
        providing for tigtr   ontrols on agnetic tape, discs and print-uts
        as wll as scam to taps libaries. As yo suje ssW, whev studied
        our trash disposl     ur.        l.hs stuy Wms taed to ireltu all
        offioe Wnd lIa resltd in Ser        -wide guidelins.

     APPENDIX I                                                                  APPENDIX I


       ..    "'aquireperiodic evaluatice of te effsctivhnes of fptsil seurity
             at each service center ar the Natimnal roputer Cnter.'
             Plans are now being nie to increase such evaluatio-s ad to 2xduact
             then on a systemtic, regular basis. our Protcti Progesa        ,nch,
              hich has responsibility for this peogp , has been uable to mks
             frquent evaluations because of their amll staff. meparEndt testa
             by Inspection will contine.
            Corrective action has been initiated with regard to tae pOtectVw
            neasures hic are prescribed, but wee not effective becum of ladc
            of prowr mainteance or ianWentation. Prcblem in             Qisetatiw
            control over bges in certain service cuters uuld be orrec by
            the recent assigmnt, of new seity     officers wd will reeive
            strong mnnagemt support in the ainitratin of the bdge systa.
            Furtherre, the Service is testing a n,       tog     badge with
            a.p-ter readable e ding. If successful, it will replae th Erment
            badge system which relis on visual- ccks by guards and S mql          -yees.
6.     7.   "Eliminate listings of e e      access ltifioation data 1Dre
            possible and employ one-way encryptin to safeguard data files
            containing sxuch info timc."
            "Provide additional restricticns on trminal users of the auttic
            data processing systen to pemt access only to ,oe functions mnd
            related data that are necessary to perfom their duties."
            As a result of Inspection's internal audit findings and your reoinda-
            tions, e have eliminated the listings of employese acre idtifimtin
            data, and we are enxrypting eployee acors identificaticn data as a
            further safeguard. Also, we hae taken steps to autoste the
            assignment and deletion of commnd codes assigned to terminal operators.
            Specifically, when eployees are transferred to new furcticnal units,
            their previou comman odes are deleted, and the nw codes necessary
            to perform their new duties are generated upon input of a proper "key"
            command oode.
            we believe these nmasures which have already been iplemnmtea substan-
            tially stragthen our system safeguards. The schisticated t4ehdqums
            of fully automating the paseaord generation, assignent an distribution
            process, and "one-iay" encryption of all aceass data and files is being
            explored for possible use in the future.
      8.    "Iritiate controls over the activities of those employee that have
            techmical training necessary to circumvent security safeguards."
            we recognize the vulnerability of the ADP systen in this area. hue,
            cnaideration is being given to various nmethods and procedres to
            control the activities of technical employees, particularly resident
            progrmmer analysts, and balance security concerns with the need for
            eployee efficiency.

APPENDIX I                                                                              APPENDIX I


         9. *Sk     l.gl MrL ity to Witih*ld f        pmiio disolkuS data pormsing
                 Iiato       that VA                     ane the ability to gain
               ilegal aCM to trYmer inf            -at"im*"

               a a remut of dlis      _io with GO auditors, a ocVrehnsive reim of
                -a bMitat1n     14 in YLOS to identify nterials hthi,         for
               =ascity rmmon Iuld Wt bn ptlicly disclose.             If the Service
               fins tat cuzrrt xmrip.ims of the lr,         of InoNta    im act do nt
               offe: sufficint rotsction   to umitive           qA
                                                             sytt.    mntm-al,
               ftLopriSt lagiulaticm will be sught.
1t..   & 1.     "Btablis apMopriata oontols to onae that only autrised inter-
               m 4rvioe nter activity is peaoitted."
                Isuide     enwmvisory a   wl fm all         ut-of-districtt       inquiris to
               tmw=myr amunts by tayayer oplianoe                             anrd   inctiV
               ao~ta by tap.Pyer Service       rI.IntAti"

               lb agie with the prixple implid in these r      -nraticno that
               tz    l ur n      uld not have acs to mr   tax account data than is
               IRary    to pe or    thei assied dutia. Isu, as yu   a      a      ,
               w have initiatd a study to thoaighly qrde all aspects of thi
                 tt           ject.       "
                                         *jectiw   of the        is to iantify practical
                  s tlmt
                     o      t    ~ to iata without dv            affecting sevic to the
               ptlic or pduttivity of the t            l ur     r their    eprsvisors.   hn
               additi.a, ve   will  contiueto  evaluate  the ue  of additioal   positive
               idntifiers of tranuil uses (yo           bdge, peasd, and exployee
               profile aontzovs).
                   a carefully ouide~ring yor rm         dation croerning a rure-
                    t for apsrviecry taninal validations aid eta     anriatim
               fr aooeses based on gmograhicl area or levels of acamt activity.
               Our initial reis irdicatis that w my be able toaue      the amnt
               linkag data as a control aid. oC the other hrd, ned my edst for
               crtain ,,qtlts in applying geogradcal restraints.
         12.   "In[are that o  inCaiatUM risks aid threats are capletaly analyzed
               prior to wc decisir to i=ur the cost for scetisticated security

                 io Service is d    1oping a risk amlysis to reval.uate the rd for
                 "Plc mcati' Limn an'ryption devices prior to any ontrt      aard.
                If sd    quipmat is not fully   justifLad, the Service will r-enalne
                the issue with theh ffioe of lmgnmnt and audget (CM).

APPENDIX II                                           APPENDIX II



                    DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

                                           Tenure ofcoffice
                                           From         To
    William E. Simon                     Apr. 1974      Present
    George P. Shultz                     June 1972      Apr. 1974
    Donald C. Alexander                  May   1973     Present
    James I. Owens (acting)              Aug. 1976      Present
    Robert H. Terry                      Aug. 1973      July 1976
    Anita F. Alpern                      Jan. 1975      Present
    Dean J. Barron                       Aug. 1973      Dec. 1974
    Patrick J. Ruttle                    Dec. 1975      Mar. 1976
    Donald G. Elsberry                   Nov. 1973      Dec. 1975
    Patrick J. Ruttle                    Mar. 1976      Present
Note:   In March 1976, the responsibility for TAS was trans-
        ferred from the Office of the Assistant Commissioner
        (Planning and Research) to the Assistant Commissioner
        (Accounts, Collection, and Taxpayer Service).  With
        the transfer, the Tax Systems Redesign Division was
        abolished and the Tax Administration Systems Division