Using Aviation Resources in the United States More Efficiently

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-03-31.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         DeCUBE#T REBSUE

00099 - [A1051832]
Using Aviation Resources in the United States Bore Efficiently.
LCD-76-445; B-164497(1). March 31, 1977. 65 pp. + appendices (28
pp.) .
Report to the Congress; by BElmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.

Issue Area: Facilities and Material Management (700).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -
    Military (except procurement S contracts) (051).
Organization Concerned: Department of Defense; Department of the
    Army; Department of the Navy; Federal Aviaticn
    Administration; Department of Camerce; Department of
    Transportation; Department of the Air Force.
congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services;
    Senate Committee on Armed Services; Congress.
Authority: P.L. 87-843, sec. 304; ORB Circular A-62. Federal
    Aviation Administration Act of 1958. P.L. 85-726, sec. 803.
         There are 12,000 airfields in the United St tes, of
which more than 4,000 serve the general public and the military
community. To promote safety, manage airspace and resources, and
provide the required logistics for these functions, the Federal
Government has invested more than $1.6 billion tc support
aviation. Findings/Conclusions: The Departments of Ccumerce,
Defense, and Transportation provide overlapping services,
including weather informadtion dissemination and airspace
management, such of which could be more efficiently managed and
coordinated. The military services and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) unnecessarily operate radar approach
control facilities independently in adjoining airspace sectors.
All three departments operate duplicating weather fatrlities in
some areas, which leads to excessive personnel requirements. FAA
and the military developed navigational aids independently, and
the military departments are maintaining rarely used
navigational equipment. in addition, sole military airfields
operate when air traffic is virtually nonexistent. Legislation
delegated the principal responsibility for aviation functions
and air safety to Transportation and Commerce, and permitted the
necessary latitude for the Defense Department to fulfill its
national defense responsibilities. Lack of coordination among
the three departments has resulted in inefficient use of
facilities and personnel. Recommendations: The departments
involved should support a high level effort to develop ways in
which aviation requirements can be planned and coordinated to
assure economy and efficiency. Collectively, civilian and
military aviation support functions should be reviewed; services
that can be consolidated, eliminated, or curtailed should be
identified; and similar services within the agencies and
departments should be taken advantage of. (Author/SSj


          Using Aviation Resources
          In The United States
          Mnore Efficiently
          There are 12,000 airfields in the United States
          and over 4,000 of these serve the general
          pubiic and military community. The Federal
          Government spends millions annually to pro-
          mote safety in the Nation's airspc--
          A high concentration of feder3lly operated
          airfields in some parts of the country such as
          California, Hawaii, and Virginia offer excel-
          lent potential to consolidate and share func-
          tions and facilities, make better use of Federal
          support of aviation, and reduce cost:.

          L.D-76445                                          MARI, - 31, 1 9 77
                            WASHINGTON, UC.C.   .0546

B-164497 ( 1 )

To the President of tne Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

      The Federal Government spends millions of dollars
annually to promote safe operation of aircraft in the Nation's
airspace.    This re'ort identifies opportunities available to
Goverin.-ent agencies to consolidate and share functions and
facilit.as and to reduce Government investment and expendi-
tures for Federal support of aviati    ..

     In view of the number of airfields in operation and the
similarity in supporting activities, we reviewed selected
civilian and military airfields to see if any effort is
being made to avoid unnecessary duplication and to limit
the Government's investment in aviation support.

     We made cur review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act
of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

     Copies of this report are being sent to the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Commerce;
the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of Transportation.

                                    Comptroller General
                                    of the United States


           There are 12,000 airfields in the United
           States, of which over 4,000 serve the gen-
           eral public and the military community. Tc
           promote safety, manage airspace and resources,
           and provide the required logistics for these
           functions, the Federal Government has invested
           over $1.6 billion and spends about $865 mil-
           lion annually to support aviation in the
           United States.

           It makes its investment and carries out its
           support through the Departments of Commerce,
           Defense, and Transportation.
           The three departments provide overlapping
           services.  For example,
           --Each is involved in disseminating weather
           -- Defense and Transportation, through its
              Federal Aviation Administration, are in-
              volved in airspace management requiring
              large investments in similar navigational
              aid equipment and personnel skills.

           In sum, American civilian and military
           activities--providing weather information
           facilities, flight planning and airspace
           management facilities, navigational aids,
           fire departments, maintenance facilities,
           ground support equipment, ground transporta-
           tion, food service, fuel, runways and ramps--
           could be reduced or in some cases eliminated.
           The result would be more effective management
           and coordination of these activities.

            --The military services and the Federal Avia-
              tion Administration are operating radar
 Ter Sheet. Upon removal, the report
 cover date should be noted hereon.                    LCD-7
 approach control facilities independently
 in adjoining airspace sectors even though
 a single facility could manage the combined
 area. At Norfolk Regional Airport in
 Virginia, a Federal Aviation Administration-
 operated facility has the capability to cover
 the Norfolk area and reduce the need for the
 Navy ' facility 11 miles away at Oceana Naval
 Air Station.   (See pp. 6 and 59.)

-- Defense, Commerce, and the Federal Aviation
  Administration operate many weather facili-
   ties which, in many arceas, become duplicate
   support capabilities.   (See p. 42.)

-- In cent. al California the agencies are fore-
   casting weather, preparing flight briefings,
   and performing other tasks whicih overlap.
   Civilian and military personnel skills are
   extensive and can be merged in some areas.
   (See p. 43.)

-- The Federal Aviation Administration and the
   military developed navigational aids in-
   dependently of each other (p. 27), and the
   military departments are maintaining rarely
   used navigational equipmernt (p. 36). Some
   military bases operate with as many as four
   navigational aid systems unnecessarily.
   (See p. 29.)
-- Military airfields are operating and/or pro-
   viding support services when air traffic is
   virtually nonexistent.   In the Norfolk area,
   military installations  operate transient
   maintenance, ground  controlled approach
   radar systems, and  weather facilities
   24 hours a day even though late night and
   early morning hours air traffic activity
   is low and services could be obtained from
   nearby commercial facilities.   (See p. 58.)

The Congress enacted laws placing overall man-
agement responsibility for aviation functions
and air safety under Transportation and Com-
merce. These laws delegate this responsibil-
ity to the military only where the military
must support unique operational requirements.
              This permits the Secretary of Defense the
              necessary latitude to fulfill his national
              defense responsibilities.

             The absence of effective coordination between
             these departments is resulting in inefficient
             use of facilities and personnel which are a
             considerable drain on Federal resources.

             Existing procedures do not require that civil
             agencies and the military review aviation
             support functions on a collective basis.
             (See pp. 11 and 15.)

             GAO recommends that the Administrator of the
             Federal Aviation Administration, the Secretary
             of Defense, and the Secretary of Commerce sup-
             port a high leve_-effoLt emphasizing the de-
             velopment of ways by which the three agencies
             can plan and coordinate aviation requirements
             to assure economy and efficiency and reduce
             cost.  They should collectively

             -- review civilian and military aviation sup-
                port functions;

             -- identify services that can be consolidated,
                eliminated, or curtailed; and

             -- take advantage of similar services avail-
                able within or between the agencies and
                departments.  (See pp. 20, 37, 52, and 62.)

             Defense and Transportation agree that in-
             creased planning and coordinating of avia-
             tion support functions is needed.  (See
             pp. 66 and 88.)

             The Administrator, National Oceanic and
             Atmospheric Administration, commenting for
             the Secretary of Commerce, was willing to
             work with Defense and Transportation to make
             weather services more economical and effi-
             cient.   (See D.   89.)

             Defense and Transportation state that these
             problems can be dealt with effe tively t~hrough

Tear Sheet                             i i i
existing activities in the three departments.
But it is Transportation's belief that since
the Defense Department has long assumed the
position that at many locations military pro-
vision of aviation support is vital to defense
needs, the Federal Aviation Administration
should not question the validity of Defense's
GAO believes that top-level managers in these
agencies should reassess their aviation re-
quirements and resources and study ways for
further coordination and reliance on the capa-
bilities available in both the civilian and
military aviation communities.


DIGEST                                                    i
   1      INTRODUCTION                                    1
              Scope of review                             2
              The Government's investment in civilian
                and military airports is extensive        4
              The military-civil relationship             5
              Aviation resources can be shared           11
            FACILITIES                                   12
              Control of aircraft in airspace            12
              Consolidating approach control opera-
                tions can result in savings              17
              Conclusion                                 20
              Recommendation                             20
              Agency comments and our evaluation         21
            AT MILITARY AIRFIELDS                        23
              Categories and functions of navigational
                aids                                     23
              Potential for standardization of civil
                and military equipments                  27
              Effective management of navigacional
                aids can reduce duplication              29
              Conclusions                                36
              Recommendations                            37
              Agency comments and our evaluation         37
            IS FEASIBLE                                  40
              Public laws provide for efficient Fed-
                eral weather support    aviation         40
              Duplication among neig,    .ng weather
                stations                                 42
              Integrating aviation weather support
                without harming defense preparedness     50
              Conclusion                                 52
              Recommendation                             52
              Agency comments and our evaluation         53


             OPERATIONS                                     55
               Determining operation hours                  55
               Potential to reduce services                 56
               Installations having potential to reduce
                 operations                                 58
               Actions to reduce airport activities         61
               Conclusion                                   61
               Recommendation                               62
               Agency comments and our evaluation           62

               Recommendation                               64
               Agency comments and our evaluation           64


      I    Letter dated November 1, 1976, from Assist-
             ant Secretary of Defense (Installations
             and Logistics) with attachments                66

  II       Letter dated November 9, 1976, from Assist-
             ant Secretary for Administration, Depart-
             ment of Tran.portation with enclosures         86

 III       Letter dated September 15, 1976, from Admin-
             i.strator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
             Administrations Department of Commerce         89

  IV       Principal officials responsible for adminis-
             tering activities discussed in this report     90


DOD        Department of Defense

FAA        Federal Aviation Administration

GAO        General Accounting Office

GCA        ground controlled approach

VHF        very high frequency
                         CHAPTER I


     Both the Federal Governmert and private citizens operate
numerous airfields in the United States. These airfields use
many support services to insure safe and economical flights
and to protect the environment. Over 170,000 aircraft, rang-
ing from small propelleL-driven craft to high performance
military and commercial jetliners, operate in U.S. airspace.
Supporting an aircraft from takeoff to landing requires a
vast amount of information, service, and logistic support,
such as communications, weather information, navigational
support, maintenance, fueling services, personnel needs, and
flight route information designed and controlled to insure
safe departures and arrivals.
     The Federal Government plays a major role in operating
the Nation's airways and airports. This is vitally important
from a control and safety standpoint. The movement of
20,000 military, 2,600 commercial, and 150,000 private air-
craft under uncontrolled conditions would be disastrous.
Therefore, the Congress has authorized certain Federal agen-
cies to establish rules, provide necessary service, and co-
ordinate air requirements.
     The Federal AviaCion Administration (FAA) is responsible
for safeguarding flying aircraft and does so through enroute
air radar traffic control centers. FAA centers control air-
craft flying under Instrument Flight Rules in assigned air-
spaces.   (An airspace is typically a circular area of about
25 nautical miles from an airfield up to an altitude cf about
12,000 feet.)   However, controlling an aircraft as it ap-
proaches an airfield can be the responsibility of FAA or the
military services.
     While FAA is mandated to manage airspace, it can dele-
gate control of air traffic in some areas to the military
services. The Department of Defense (DOD), therefore, has
considerable investment in airport operations in the United

     The Department of Commerce is responsible for providing
U.S. weather information for safety of air operations. It
provides weather forecast services and maintains a weather
gathering network plus forecast offices. DOD also operates
weather information systems throughout the world.

     In view if the number of airfields in operation and the
similarity ii supporting activities, we reviewed selected
civilian and military airfields to see if any effort is being
made to avoid unnecessary duplication and to limit the Gov-
ernment's investment in aviation support.

     DOD policy encourages using other Federal agencies'
support services when advantageous to the Government. 1/
This reduces unnecessary duplication of Government resources
and helps the military services achieve economy and effective-
ness by using interservice support.
     Several GAC reports 2/ have been issued addressing the
opportunities to economize and maximize the use of existing
Government facilities through consolidation and interservice
     GAO is now studying increased use of commercial air cargo
facilities for moving military freight. In sur. ace transpor-
tation, military freight has long moved by carrier personnel.
The Department of Defense is phasing out its ocean terminals
for military ocean freight and relying increasingly on com-
mercial facilities; and under the provision of Office of Man-
agement and Budget Circular A-76, support services are in-
creasingly being contracted to the commercial sector.

     We reviewed public laws and FAA, DOD, Army, Navy, and
Air Force regulations, procedures, and documents concerning
airport support services. We discussed requirements and
capabilities with Government officials at the various agency
headquarters and installations.

1/Prescribed in DOD Directive 4000.19, entitled "Basic Poli-
  cies and Principles for Iintereervice, Interdepartmental and
  Interagency Support."
2/"Potential for Greater Consolidation of the Maintenance
  Workload in the Military Services" (July 6, 1973, B-178736).
  "Opportunities to Consolidate Support Functions in the
  Pacific to Reduce Military Cost" (May 11, 1972, B-160683).
 "Productivity of Military Below-Depot Maintenance--Repair
 Less Complex Than Provided at Depots--Can Be Improved"
 (Aug. 28, 1975, LCD-75-422).

The principal installations visited were:
    Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia.
    Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia.
    Moffett Field Naval Air Station, California.
    Lemoore Naval Air Station, California.
    McClellan Air Force Base, California.
    Mather Air Forcet Base, California.
    Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
    Fort Eustis, Virginia.
    FAA regional office, Los Angeles, California.
    Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii.
    Wheeler Army Activity, Wheeler Air Force Base,
    Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii.
    Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.
    Norfolk Regional Airport, Virginia.
    Patrick Henry Airport, Virginia.
    Sacramento Metropolitan Airport, California.
    Sacramento Executive Airport, California.
    Honolulu International Airport, Hawaii.
    Alameda Naval Air Station, California.
    Caatle Air Force Base, California.
    Fort Ord, California.
    San Francisco International Airport, California.
    Metropolitan Oakland International Airport,
    Weather Service Forecast Office, California.
    Flight Service Station, Oakland, California.
    Flight Service Station, Sacramento, California.
    Flight Service Station, Virginia.
    Flight Service Station, Hawaii.

                                                  CHAPTER 2


     Over 12,000 airports are operating in the United States.
Many of these airports are small landing strips used only by
the general aviation community for landings, takeoffs, and
limited service to private (business and pleasure) air
traffic. However, about 4,000 airports serve the needs of
the general public and the military services. The Government
has invested almost $1.7 billion in facilities to support
domestic air traffic control and aircraft weather require-
ments, and it spends millions of dollars a year to operate
and maintain these facilities.
     Airport operation requires a considerable investment be-
cause of the numerous services necessary, such as weather infor-
mation facilities, flight planning and airspace managemer.t fa-
cilities, air traffic control, navigational aids, fire depart-
ments, maintenance, ground support equipment, ground transpor-
tation, food, fuel, runways, and ramps. The support require-
ments of an operational airport are shown graphically below.

                                           AIRPORT SUPPORT SERVICES

                          Sg    f   tvi~               RTcnNllwtio
                                                  Air4artrutrr             S   Wt

           L                                  \                  /    CJ

           Raw v:                                                                   Vek ~:_m' *

          Ironi                                                                   Aiehrc
                                                                                 nm_          '

                    Avk    ia                                                  Commeedmmlem


     The Government's investment to support air traffic
control and weather operations and its annual operating
budget for this investment are shown below:
                     Estimated           Estimated operating
                       value                    budget
                     of capital          Fiscal        Fiscal
                     equipment           year 75       year 76
                                       (millions)           -

    Air Force        $     187.7          $141.9      $145.1
    Navy/Marine            112.3            41.8        41.8
    Army                    40.0            15.9        27.9
    FAA                  1,353.0           591.2       650.2

        Total        $1,693.0             $790.8      $865.0


     To promote economy and efficiency, the Congress enacted
laws which placed overall management responsibility for avia-
tion functions under the Departments of Transportation and
Commerce. This responsibility can be delegated to the mili-
tary in cases where it must support unique operational re-
quirements. This gives the Secretary of Defense the necessary
latitude to fulfill his national defense responsibilities.
     Our study suggests that military assumption of respon-
sibility for aviation support has in many cases gone beyond
unique requirements to the point of virtual self-sufficiency
of military airports. Operating under a self-sufficient
concept, military airports require resources to meet the
needs of all likely users under all possible contingencies,
thus we have such duplicating services:
     -- Weather stations, even though civilian weather agencies
        or other nearby military activities can often provide
        required information.

     -- Infrequently used approach and landing navigational
        aids and backup systems, although neighboring civil
        or military airports could provide an alternate or
        backup capability.

     -- Around-the-clock operations, even though neighboring
        airports are always open and could handle all flying
        activity during certain periods.
     Coordinating requirements between military and civilian
departments having air management responsibil.ty has been
primarily a matter of resolving conflicts between aviation
support facilities. As long as military support services do
not interfere with the civil Algencies' management of their
aviation support activities, the military seems to move for
full control of its airfields and services.

     In the Norfolk area, for e.ample, the military and FAA
operate approach control facilities. The FAA facility,
located at the Norfolk Regional Airport, provides approach
control services for the Norfolk Regional Airport, Langley
Air Force Base, Norfolk Naval Air Station, Felker Army Air-
field, Fort Eustis, and Patrick Henry Airport. These airports
are located within 30 miles of the FAA facility. The Navy,
however, operates its own approach control facility at the
Oceana Naval Air Station to serve only the Oceana area. Since
it is only 11 miles away, the Oceana facility could be served
by the FAA facility. (See p. 59.)
     A similar situation exists in California where an FAA-
operated approach contrJl facility at McClellan Air Force Base
and an Air Force facility at Travis Air Force Base manage ad-
jacent airspace. According to FAA officials, the airspace of
both facilities could be managed by its McClellan facility at
substantial savings. (See p. 18.) However, the Air Force has
been reluctant to rely on FAA support at Travis and nothing
has been done to implement such an economy measure.
DOD policy encourages
interagency cooperation

     DOD policy Directive 4000.19, entitled "Basic Policies
and Principles for Interservice, Interdepartmental and Inter-
agency Support," provides guidance for the se::vices to achieve
efficiency and economies through interservice and interagency
support arrangements.

     The Secretary of Defense in his annual report for fiscal
year 1975 stated that:
     "The notion that each of the services should be
     independent of the others so that it doesn't have
     to rely, as it were, on external sources of sup-
     port is outdated. We can no longer afford it.
     We have to now think in terms of Total Force
     structure as opposed to separate interests."

     Also in his fiscal year 1976 report, the Secretary
pointed out that applying the principle of mutual support
and force interdependence is completely feasible and desir-
able. Although the Secretary was addressing air defense
forces, the principle of interdependence is applicable to a
wide range of support requirements and capabilities.
     Military officials justify self-sufficiency for each
military airfield because of requirements, such as providing
a trained force to meet wartime contingencies, stateside
assignments for personnel rotatinj from overseas, and sup-
port to meet unique military requirements.

     The basic question, therefore, is what constitutes uni-
que military operational requirements.  It must be remembered
that the civil logistics base of the country, including air
terminals and ocean terminals and their accessories, is a po-
tentially powerful military resource. Therefore, the broads
problem is to maximize the use or potential use of this re-
source for military support. To the extent the civil infra-
structure necessary to the Nation in peacetime can be used for
military support, the less military support will be required
and more military resources will be released for direct combat
uses. As pointed out in chapter 1, there is a gradual shift
by the military to greater use of civil resources for support
     The following chapters discuss in detail some of tie
areas that we feel could be consolidated.
     Duplications identified during this review (as listed on
p. 8) pertain to:
     --Management of airspace used for aircraft approaches
       and departures.

     -- Multiple navigational aid systems that assist pilots
        to locate airfields and land aircraft.

     -- The development and dissemination of weather informa-
        tion to flyers by local weather stations.
     -- Military around-the-clock support at airfields located
        near other civilian or military airfields during
        periods of reduced activity.


                                      Report        Annual
        Types of activities          reference

                                                 (000 omitted)
1. Curtailing night operations:
       Naval Air Station, Norfolk     p. 60         $      40
       Langley Air Force Base         p. 58                70
2. Consolidating approach control
       McClellan/Travis Air Force
         Base                          p. 19              450
       Naval Air Station Lemoore/
         FAA Fresno/Castle Air
         Force Base                   p. 19               338
       Marine Corps Air Station
         Kaneohe Bay Oahu Island      p. 20             3,600
       FAA Air Route Traffic Con-
         trol Facility/Honolulu
         Approach Control Center      p. 20             1,500
3. Coordination requirements for
     navigational aid equipment:
       Mather Air Force Base          p. 31               650
4. Potential elimination of non-
     essential NAVAIDS:
       VHF Omnidirectional Range
         (VOR)                        p. 36             1,600
       Nondirectional Beacons
         (NDB?                        p. 36               135
5. Coordinating military and
     civilian weather require-
       Sacramento Area                p. 45               600
       Hawaii                         p. 47/48            632

                        NiKRFOLK, VIRGINIA AREA AIRPORTS
                                                         *   MAJOR CIVILIAN AIRPORTS
                                                         O AIR FORCE BASES
                                                         O ARMY AIRFIELD INSTALLATIONS
                                                         * NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRFIELDS


                       , /- -JF"E ~--          LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE

                         "   -**AMPON V

                                         NAVAL AIR S)'ATION NORFOLX

                                                     OROL    REGIONAL AIRPOR

                                         ~ v    .NORFQLK V            NAVAL AIR STATION
                             o       /          wS               are OCEANA

                                 o                               VIRGINIA BEACH VA

       SUFOLK VA                 CHESAPEAKE VA
                                                   CALIFORNIA AIRPORTS
                                                                                                  *    MAJOR CIVILIAN AIRPORTS
                                                                                                  *    NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRFIELDS
                                                                                                  O    ARMY AIRFIELD INSTALLATIONS
                                                                                                  O    AIR FORCE BASES
                                                                                                  I    CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS WHERE
                                                                                                       AIR NATIONAL GUARD FLYING
       APRC AYT A                                                                                      ACTIVIT!ES ARE BASED.

                                                                                                      IAIRPORTS HAVING AN INSTRUMENT
                                                                                                        LANDING SYSTEM ON AT LEAST ONI
                                                                                                        RUNWAY DIRECTION (EXCEPT WHERE
                                                                                                        AIR HATIONAL GUARD UNITS ARE
                                                                                                                     AREAIIREVIEWED MY GAO

                                                                         rALE APB

                                                                 SACRAMENTO METROPOLITAN

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                                                      -   -          SAC*AMENTO EXECUTIVE                        AIRPORT

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                                                     IA ACHRYL LAND.
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                                        NAVAL      AUXILIARY   LANDING FIELDO                                                          NAVAL AIR

     Because many services at military and civilian airfields
are similar, the greater the concentration of airfields in
one vicinity, the greater the potential for sharing resources.
The concentration of airports in two geographical areas is
illustrated by the maps on pages 9 and 10. Some aviation
services are already controlled by a single agency; for ex-
ample, the responsibility for enroute navigational aid systems
belongs to FAA for both the civilian and military communities.
On the other hand, radar approach control, which must be pro-
vided to safely position aircraft for final landing approach,
is provided by both the military services and FAA. Operating
under delegation from FAA, the military services operate this
approach service at some military airfields as though they are
isolated from the rest of the aviation community, even if
sharing this service is possible. The approach control fa-
cilities operated by the different military services and FAA
perform identical functions; although the techniques may vary
and the systems are referred to by different names.
Agency/department           Approach control   -cility

    FAA                Terminal Radar Approach Control
    Air Force          Radar Approach Control
    Navy               Radar Approach Traffic Control Center
    Army               Army Radar Apprcach Control

      At some locations local agreements have been made for
civilian operated facilities to provide approach control and
other services for nearby military bases during periods of
light military traffic. FAA, however, has no procedure that
we could pinpoint for systematic review of delegated airspace
to determine when consolidating approach control facilities
might result in lower cost or improved safety and effective-

                           CHAPTER 3


     Under the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1958,
the Federal Aviation Administration is authorized to provide
facilities and establish procedures for regulating air traffic
for efficient use of the Nation's airspace. FAA may assign
air traffic control authoritv and related airspace to the
military services when it is mutui1ly agL.~:ble.   According
to FAA officials, in some cases, deleoatir     zspace to the?
military is not efficient or economical.        ),   FAA officials
told us that the agency has no procedures fcc determining when
consolidating adjacent approach control facilities may result
in lower costs or improved effectiveness.

     FAA has divided air traffic operations into three func-
tions: enroute control, approach control, and airport
traffic/terminal control.  (See p. 13.)
Enroute traffic

     Enroute control is handled by 21 FAA Air Route Traffic
Control centers that monitor all aircraft operating under
instrument flight rules within their space. When flying in
airspace controlled by the centers, a pilot files a flight
plan and is assured separation from other planes flying
under instrument flight rules but not from planes flying
under visual flight rules.

     The centers operate with an array of sophisticated
electronic radar, communication, and computer equipment.
Enroute centers are responsible for airspace covering many
thousands of square miles, from 5,000 feet upward. They
also delegate airspace and monitoring responsibility to
terminal radar approach control facilities.
Radar approach control facil. ies

     These facilities handle traffic in airspace delegated by
the enroute centers. Radar approach control facilities pro-
vide air traffic control for arriving and departing aircraft
and are the vital air traffic control link between the tower
and the enroute control centers. They are generally associated


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with a primary airport but also serve satellite or seccndary
airports. Each facility (see p. 14) has surveillance radars
and controls traffic in a rather large airspace. The airspace
delegated to a center varies depending on the location, but it
usuz   t covers about 25 nautical miles, up to an elevation of
12,   feet. (See p. 13.)

     At the time of our review, FAA operated about 158 such
facilities in the United States and the Defense Department
operated 57. Based on Navy estimates, the annual operating
cost for each DOD facility averaged about $1.4 million. The
facilities operated by the military also serve civilian air-
ports located in their areas of responsibility.
Airport traffic/
terminal control
     Once an aircraft is on a final approach, about 5 nautical
miles from the tower, up to an altitude of approximately
2,500 feet, monitoring responsibility is transferred to con-
trollers at the airport. This is called terminal control.
(See p. 16.)  Pilots land their aircraft with or without the
aid of the controller, depending on the capability of the
airport's navigational aid systemL.

Delegation of approach control function

      By formal agreement, FAA delegates approach control
authority to the military when it is mutually agreeable.
According to one FAA official, this is usually done whenever
the military requests control of a given airspace, provided
such control does not conflict with FAA's overall air traffic
management. The official said the arrangement is based par-
tially on the belief that it is more reasonable for the mili-
tary to control air traffic in some areas (for example, where
military aircraft are predominant) and partially on the mili-
tary's need to use controllers who have returned from overseas

     Recommendations concerning delegation of approach control
authority are made at the local level between militatv instal-
lation commanders and the appropriate enroute control center.
However, approval and withdrawal of this authority must be
approved by FAA and the military services at the national
level. Also, local differences must be resolved through ap-
propriate channels at the national level. But, according to
FAA officials, no procedures exist for systematically review-
ing the operational or cost effectiveness of delegated ap-
proach control authority, even in disputed cases.

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     Within the continental United States, there are
20 enroute control centers and 208 approach control facili-
ties. Fifty-seven of the approach control facilities are
operated by the military, 133 by FAA, and 18 jointly.


     The delegation of approach control authority to the mili-
tary departments without periodic review by FAA to assess con-
tinued need has resulted in duplicate operations in localities
where a single approach control would seem both feasible and
cost effective. Since approach control facilities generally
have the capability to monitor and control traffic in a large
area, the need to operate facilities where airspace can be
covered by a nearby facility is questionable. We visited FAA
and military facilities near Norfolk, Virginia; the Central
Valley of California; and on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.
Norfolk area approach
control operations

     Both FAA and the military opera-e approach control fa-
cilities in the Norfolk area. The FPA-operated facility,
located at the Norfolk Regional Airport, serves Langley Air
Force Base, the Norfolk Naval Air Station, Felker Army Air-
field, and Patrick Henry Airport. The Navy's radar approach
traffic control center located at the Oceana Naval Air Sta-
tion, is responsible only for traffic in that area.   (See
map on p. 59.)

     Military and FAA officials disagree over the Navy's need
to operate the Oceana center. Navy officials contend that the
Oceana center is justified because of

     --the high volume of military jet traffic at the air
       station and

     --the military's unique flight rules (for example, air-
       craft separation needs to be controlled but does not
       have to conform to the FAA standard).
However, a local FAA official pointed out that aircraft
separation criteria could be adjusted to accommodate the
Navy's needs, as they are for the military jet traffic at
nearby Langley Air Force Base.

     FAA officials in Norfclk emphasized that a detailed
study would be required to determine the effect of merging
the two facilities, but they said they believe a consolidated
approach control facility would result in lower operating
costs and more efficient use of the airspace. In fact, in a
recent FAA-sponsored study by a joint military and civilian
group, local FAA officials recommended that their facility
assume the Oceana approach control responsibility within
3 years. The study group, however, disagreed and stated that
the Oceana requirement is best served by military controllers
because of the type of aircraft and mission involved.

     The chairman of the study group told us the group did
not actually investigate the recommendation that the centers
be consolidated. He said that the group's disagreement was
based on its hesitancy to add another military airfield to
FAA facility's already heavy workload. He did acknowledge
that there are enough potential advantages to warrant a review
of consolidation, but he pointed out that FAA has no program
for periodically conducting such reviews. A local FAA offi-
cial did not believe Oceana's mission or the type of aircraft
which used the airfield would prevent a consolidation.
Approach control operations in
Central Valley
     Two locations in the Central Valley of California offer
the potential for consolidated approach control facilities.
One of these locations includes separate facilities at the
Lemoore Naval Air Station, Fresno Air Terminal, and Castle
Air Force Base, and the other includes adjacent facilities
at McClellan and Travis Air force Bases. In discussing these
arrangements with local FAA ard military officials, we found
that consolidating control at two locations would dramatically
lower operating costs.
     The FAA terminal radar approach control for the Sacramento
area is located at McClellan and is the product of an earlier
merger involving McClellan, Mather, and Beale Air Force Bases.
The Sacramento facility's assumption of approach control re-
sponsibility for the Beale area was made possible by relaying
a radar signal between the two bases. According to an FAA
official, a similar system could be installed between McClellan
and Travis, thus enabling the Sacramento facility to assume
control of the Travis airspace. We were told the system would
cost about $876,000, including site acquisition, engineering,
procurement, and other support items. The resulting merger of
McClellan and Travis would eliminate the need for about

32 controllers, lower operating costs by an estimated
$450,000 1/ a year, and eliminate the need for the $2.7 mil-
lion Travis facility. In addition to reduced operating cost,
an FAA official said that consolidation would result in safer,
more efficient use of the available airspace.
     Until 1974, FAA also operated the approach control fa-
cility for s'he Lemoore Naval Air Station. At that time, FAA
relinquished control to the Navy and began operating a smaller
approach control facility in nearby Fresno. These two facili-
ties, plus the Air Force facility at the Castle base, employ
a total of 64 controllers.   However, an FAA official told us
that the Lemoore facility could handle all approach control
services at the three bases using only 40 controllers. The
reduction of 24 controllers would save an estimated $338,000 1/
a year in operating costs.
Approach control on Oahu Island
     Air traffic around Hawaii is monitored by FAA through a
joint use FAA and Air Force Air Route Traffic Control Center.
The center tracks aircraft until they are about 25 to 30 miles
from the island, at which time they are transferred to the ap-
proach control at Honolulu International Airport for landing
at Honolulu International Airport; Hickharm Air Force Base;
Wheeler Army Activity; Wheeler Air Force Base; and the Naval
Air Station, Barbers Point. Aircraft destined for the Marine
Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, are transferred to the Kaneohe
Approach Control Facility.
Permanent radar approach traffic
control center for Kaneohe

     The approach control center at Honolulu International
Airport does not cover the Kaneohe Bay side of the island be-
cause of nearby mountain ranges which peak at over 3,100 feet.
The Kaneohe Bay station uses radio communications to guide
aircraft into approach position or into position to be picked
up by its ground controlled approach (CCA) unit since it does
not have radar with sufficient range, to provide approach and
departure coverage.
     During the review of facilities in Hawaii, we found that
the Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, is planning to in-
stall a permanent radar air traffic control facility. The

l/Includes salaries only, not fringe benefits.

estimated cost for such a facility--not including equipment--
is estimated at about $938,000. According to Navy estimates,
a typical radar approach traffic control center's capital
equipment costs about $2.7 million. There is little traffic
in the Kaneohe airspace and only one runway is used for ar-
rivals and departures. The station operates on a 16-hour a
day basis and is generally closed on Sundays, holidays, and
some Saturdays. During the periods when it is closed, the
joint use Air Force and FAA air route traffic control center
monitors and controls the Kaneohe airspace. Few, if any,
aircraft use Kaneohe Bay during the night, and FAA rarely has
to direct aircraft to that location.
     We identified three organizations at Kaneohe which have
surveillance radar that could be used for control purposes if
properly located on tie base. We suggested possible alterna-
tives to building the proposed facility.
     Additione  v, we found that FAA had completed a study on
the feasibility f consolidating its approach control facility
at Honolulu Intetnational Airport into its air route traffic
control center. The study concluded that such a consolidation
would save approximately $1.5 million annually. Since the
center currently controls the Kaneohe airspace 8 hours daily,
it too appears to be a consolidation alternative to be con-

      T'he Navy did not find the alternatives we suggested suit-
able. Instead, the Navy plans as another alternative to up-
date the present system in lieu of constructing a new facil-
ity. They state that the new system will provide adequate air
control capability without the need for the proposed construc-

     The absence of periodic evaluatioIns of approach control
arrangements by FAA has limited its ability to insure maximum
and efficient use of the Nation's airspace and the resources
necessary to manage the airspace.

     We recommend that the Administrator of FAA, in coordina-
tion with the Secretary of Defense, establish procedures for
evaluating the potential for consolidating the management of
adjacent airspaces and consolidate where practical.

     DOD and Transportation in response to an earlier version
of this report (see apps. I and II) generally agree that in-
creased planning and coordination to assure economy, effi-
ciency, and minimum investment in aviation resources is desir-
able. The Navy and Air Force were also willing to actively
participate in evaluations of potential consolidation. DOD,
however, cites the
     -- need to operate facilities to train and maintain the
        proficiency of military air traffic controllers,

     --fear of being overly committed to a civilian controller
       force, degrading the readiness posture of the military
       services, and
     --need to operate facilities at stations with a large
       volume of high performance air traffic (jet aircraft).
     While the Navy agrees that consolidating its Oceana fa-
cility with the FAA's approach control facility at the Norfolk
Regional Airport is possible, they do not feel such a move is
viable for reasons cited above.

     Both the military services and the FAA approach control
facilities are staffed with highly trained and experienced
personnel who are performing basically the same functions.
Much larger areas than Norfolk that have more diverse aircraft
and a variety of sophisticated military operations have been
consolidated under an FAA approach control. The FAA approach
control facility for the San Francisco Bay-Oakland area, for
example, manages the airspace for two major international air-
ports and two naval air stations, handling a variety of air-
craft including high performance aircraft. The FAA Sacramento
approach control facility serves three Air Force bases and
two major civilian airports. The military aircraft include
fighters and bombers.

     We recognize the need to train military air traffic con-
trollers for combat situations. What is needed, in our view,
is a determination of the minimum number of military con-
trollers needed to operate military facilities in a conbat
situation and the assurance that these individuals are prop-
erly trained. Staffing should not be based on the number
needed to operate facilities in the United States.

     We are proposing that the opportunities for consolidation
be independently examined from a total resource standpoint and
that the most appropriate action be taken to increase effi-
ciency. In the San Joaquin Valley, for example, the most ap-
propriate action may be to expand the Navy facility. The Navy
indicates that this would be necessary if they assume the re-
sponsibility for the FAA facility.

     We believe that the activities discussed in this chapter
offer an excellent potential, because of their geographical
location, for using resources more efficiently through inter-
serviLe/interagency coordination and cooperation.

     The Air Force, in responding to our suggestion that the
Central Valley offers potential for consolidation, agrees that
such a venture, in some cases, permits more efficient use of
airspace and resources. The Air Force will not accept that
our suggestion offers valid economic and operational advan-
tages until a detailed evaluation is made. They are willing
to participate in such as evaluation.

     DOD's willingness to actively participate in evaluations
of potential consolidations or mergers i's constructive and
will result, we believe, in more efficient use of the Nation's
aviation resources and a broader national logistics base for
support of military opertions.

                           CHAPTER 4


     Better coordination between the military and civil
aviation sectors, as well as within the military itself,
could provide operational safety and result in more effi-
cient use of navigational aids at airfields.
     Pilots use navigational aids to help locate airports
and land aircraft. Generally, these aids fall into one of
two categories, 4precision or nonprecision, depending on the
kind of information they provide.
     A precision system provides information about the direc-
tion of flight and angle of descent once the aircraft is
within about 8 miles of the runway. The two kinds of preci-
sion aids are:

     --The instrument landing system which automatically
       relays the approach information to cockpit instru-
       ments enabling the pilot to read the data and to
       make landing decisions based on this information.

     --The precision approach radar which is operated by a
       radar technician on the ground.  In a precision ap-
       proach radar system, the technician obtains the data,
       interprets it, and relays the information to the pilot.
       When used with a nonprecision airport surveillance
       radar, the combination is known as the ground con-
       trolled approach radar system.  (See pp. 24 and 25.)
     Nonprecision aids provide directional guidance and some-
times distance measurement but no angle of descent informa-
tion. However, these devices emit radio signals which air-
craft can pick up sometimes as far as 200 miles from the air-
port. They also can aline the aircraft with the airport run-
way, sometimes before the approach control facility has the
aircraft under surveillance. In good weather, a pilot can
bring the aircraft down using nonprecision navigational aids
(without an instrument landing system or precision approach
radar). The common nonprecision radio aids are the very high
frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range system, the tactical air
navigation (TACAN) system, and nondirectional beacons.

                                                 SOURCE:   U.S. ARMY


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     Whether or not precision or nonprecision aids are
required for landing aircraft depends generally on visibility
and prevailing wind conditions.
Military and civilian use of
navigational aids

     The military services and civilian aviation use several
different types of navigational aids. For example, the Army
uses ground controlled approach radar as its precision system.
The VHF omnidirectional range system is used as the Army non-
precision system; however, it lacks mobility.  (See p. 34.)
Therefore, the Army uses nondirectional beacons for deployment
purposes.  The Army also uses the instrument landing system at
a few installations to keep pilots proficient in instrumenta-
tion procedures.

     The Navy uses GCA radar and the nonprecision tactical
air navigation system (see p. 35! at naval air stations.
Both systems are suited to deployed operations. The Navy
also uses the less precise nondirectional beacon as a backup
or alternative tactical system. And, at five naval air sta-
tions, the automatic carrier landing system is used as a pre-
cision system for aircraft carrier landing training.

     The Air Force uses the instrument landing system as its
primary precision navigational aid and the tactical air navi-
gation system for nonprecision purposes. Since the instrument
landing system is not suited to operations under deployed con-
ditions, a GCA radar system is also used at Air Force instal-
lations. The GCA system acts as a backup for the instrument
landing system and provides precision capability on runways
without instrument landing systems.

     In summary, navigational aids are used at military and
civilian airfields throughout the Nation as follows:

    Navigational aids             Army   Navy    Force     Civilian

Precision approaches:
    Precision approach radar   a/X      a/X      a/X
    Instrument landing
      systems                limited b/limited     X          X

Nonprecision approaches:
    Tactical air navigation         -      X       X     c/limited
    VHF omnidirectional
      range                         X      -       X          X
   Nondirectional beacons           X      X       X          X
   Loc.llizer portion of
      instrument landing
      systems                 limited      -       X          X
    Airport surveillance
      radar                       a/X    a/X     a/X        d/X

a/Part of the ground control approach.
b/Automatic carrier landing system.

c/Distance measurement portion.

d/Very rare in occurrence.

     Due to the lack cf navigational aid standardization,
military airfields, particularly those of the Air Force, pro-
vide multiple systems, some which accommodate few users.   For
example, the VHF omnidirectional range system was initially
developed by the civil aviation community.  Later the mili-
tary developed the tactical air navigation system which pro-
vides the basic functions of the VHF omnidirectional range
system (to emit radio signals long distances to aircraft
instruments). The tactical air navigation system, however,
has an additional capability of distance measurement not
available from the VHF omnidirectional range system.

     Because the VHF omnidirectional range and tactical air
navigation systems use different frequency ranges (very high
frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency, respectively),
they require different equipment on the ground as well as in
the air. While civil aviation continues to use the VHF omni-
directional range system, they developed a modification to
aircraft instrumentation which permits them to uise the
distance measurement portion of the tactical air navigation
system. Thus our National Airways System requires both sys-
tems. The ground equipment is often combined and is called
     In that the tactical air navigation system was developed
to support military requirements, Navy and Air Force aircraft
are equipped with that system's instrumentation. The Air
Force, however, also equips its aircraft with the older VHF
omnidirectional range capability. For some Air Force air-
craft (particularly certain trainers), VHF omnidirectional
range rather than tactical air navigation is the nonprecision
system. As a result, Air Force airfields tend to be equipped
with both systems.
     Nineteen Air Force and three other military installations
have invested over a half million dollars in VHF omnidirec-
tional range systems to support the T-37 training aircraft.
This is 1 of 3 types of _ircraft out of 37 in the Air Force
inventory equipped for the VHF omnidirectional range system
but not the tactical air navigation system. Additionally some
bases require the VHF omnidirectional range system for con-
tractor aircraft or aircraft of other military services or
nonmilitary Federal agencies.
     Navigational aid systems are expensive to install and
operate and therefore proliferation of such aids should be
avoided where possible. Based on a June 1974 Air Force study
of flight facilities at a sample of 47 installations, average
staffing and investment and operating costs per unit were as
                                                                   Average number
                                Average initial   Average annual    of personnel
                                investment cost   operating and    authorized for
                                   per unit        maintenance      each type of
        Naviaational aid           (note a)       cost per unit       facility

   Ground controlled approach
     (airport surveillance
     radar plus precision
     approach radar)              $1,637,325        $431,087            18
   Precision approach radar          810,835         339,314            13
   Instrument landing system          66,478           :5,954            2
   Tactica) air navigation
     system                           18,831          31,005              2
   VHF omnidirectional range
     system                           23,776          20,892             1

   a/Represents cost for equipment only.  Military construction and installa-
     tion cost not included.  Equipment has been in operation over 15 years.

     Navigational aids provide a variety of capabilities.
Some of the bases visited operate multiple aids. McClellan
and Travis Air Force Bases, for example, operate instrument
landing, VHF omnidirectional range, precision approach radar,
and tactical air navigational systems and nondirectional
beacons. Considering their use, some of the various naviga-
tional aids at military airfields could be eliminated without
reducing safety.
Reducing requirements for
 recision na atona     aids
at Air Force bases

     The instrument landing system based on the Air Force
regulation 100-11 and implemented by the "Terminal Precision
Approach Control Program," is the primary Air Force precision
approach system. The precision approach radar acts as a
backup capability.

     As of August 1975, the Air Force had 143 precision ap-
proach radar systems operating at an estimated $48.6 million
annually. At the same time 107 instrument landing systems
were operating at about $5 million annually. The reason
precision approach radar is so much more expensive is that
each system requires about 13 people to operate and maintain
it, while an instrument landing system requires only 2 main-
tenance people.

     In the past the Air Force has operated many airfields
with only one instrument landing system servicing one runway
direction. To allow use of the other runway direction, the
Air Force provided precision approach radar capability which
actually could serve both runway directions.

     Ultimately, precision approach radar and Instrument
landing systems are to be replaced by a microwave landing
system. While initial installation of the microwave system
at Air Force bases will begin after 1980, full implementation
is not expected until sometime between 1991 and 1995.

      Meanwhile the Air Force is renovating its instrument
landing systems by replacing older tube-type systems with
more reliable solid stats systems. These solid state systems
are being installed at many airfields and will cover both run-
way directions. This will permit the Air Force to phase out
som.e 66 approach radar systems by about 1981.

     The Air Force plans to keep about 77 precision approach
systems operational beyond 1981 for (1) tactical deployment
in contingency situations since no suitable mobile instrument
landing system exists, (2) overseas locations where foreign
military aircraft not equipped to use the instrument landing
system must be accommodated, (3) locations where terrain,
excessive site prepar: .ion costs, or airspace restrictions
prevent instrument landing system installations, (4) geograph-
ically remote bases where no practical alternate base exists,
(5) bases with mission requirements of such sensitivity that
duplicate approach aids are warranted, and (6) locations where
pilot training is the primary mission.
Savings from adjusting the instrument
landing system renovation schedule
     While the Air Force program will apparently save the
Government millions of dollars, we believe additional savings
are available from

     -- eliminating precision approach radar systems earlier,

     -- forgoing installation of instrument landing systems
        for seldom used runway directions, and
     --forgoing the installation of instrument landing systems
       at airfields which are to continue using precision ap-
       proach radar until full microwave landing system imple-

     Under the program, the precision approach radars to be
eliminated will be removed when both runway directions of
airfields are covered by instrument landing systems. The Air
Force is first replacing the older tube-type instrument land-
ing systems with solid state systems.  In subsequent years it
will install the new solid state system for runway directions
not previously covered. If this procedure were reversed,
however, the costly precision approach radars could be re-
moved sooner because runways would have complete coverage by
using the old instrument landing system for one direction and
the new system for the other.

     To illustrate, Mather Air Force Base, California, has an
instrument landiig system on one of its runways. Its first
solid state syzt'm was scheduled for 1976 installation with
the second following in 1978. The 1976 installation will re-
place the existing system and thus the airfield's precision
approach radar will continue until 1978 for coverage of both

runway directions. By installing the first solid state
instrument landing system on the runway direction that does
not have the system, the precision approach radar could
probably be eliminated 2 years early saving the Government
about $650,000 in operating costs. Additionally, the base
operates VHF omnidirectional range and tactical air naviga-
tional systems.
     We noted many such cases where the expensive Precision
approach radar operation could apparently be eliminated
earlier. An Air Force official said the tube-type instrument
landing systems are being replaced first because funds are
available for replacement but not for new construction, which
is required for runway directions not previously covered.
     Coordinating the need for
     seldom used navigational aids
     The program generally calls for an instrument landing
system for both runway d:irections at its airfields. Weather
conditions at some Air Force bases, however, are such that
the instrument ·landing system or precision approach radar
would seldom be required for both runway directions.   For
example, at McClellan Air Force Base the weather is charac-
teristically clear when tile less frequently used runway direc-
tion is in operation. In fact, Air Force weather analyses
showed that the instrument landing syztrn on that runway di-
rection should be required, due to weacher conditions, only
about 9 hours per year. Yet both runway directions are sched-
uled to receive new solid state systems.
     The nearby Sacramento Metropolitan Airport commissioned
a new instrument landing system in January 1977 which enables
aircraft to land in either direction. This runway has the
same alinement as McClellan's, and military aircraft making
instrument landings during emergency conditions could be ac-
commodated. Three other Air Force bases are scheduled to
receive multiple instrument landing systems.
     Air Force officials said that the Air Force had not
established frequency-of-need criteria for justifying instru-
ment landing systems; any need could be sufficient justifica-
tion. We question, however, the need for multiple instrument
landing systems at many Air Force bases, especially those
     -- in areas which have prolonged periods of ciear weather
        and one direction landings predominate and

                                                    is nearby
     --where another military or civilian airport
       and can provide emergency support during unusual
       weather situations.
                                                    to install
     We also noted that the Air Force is planning
                                                   even though
a second instrument landing system at some basestraining and
precision approach radar is to be  retained for
                                                systems at the
other contingencies. Operating both of these
same installations is unnecessary.
     Many major civilian airports do not use multiple units
                                 of air  reserve  flying
ment landing systems. A number                         operate
are based at such civilian airports and apparently available
without duplicate precision approach  capabilities
                                             Navy rely on only
at Air Force bases. Further, the Army and
one precision approach aid.
                                                        a safe
     To ascertain if weather conditions will permit
                                                are briefed
approach at the destination airfield, pilotsinclude suitable
before flying. Additionally,   flight plans
                                                weather condi-
alternate airfields for landing in the event         at the
                                    pilot  to  land
tions ultimately do not permit the                    to estab-
planned destination. This is another    alternative
                                               aid  systems at
lishing functionally duplicate navigational
military airfields.

Duplicate precision navigational aids
at Navy installations
                                                 carrier land-
     Five naval air stations use the automatic
                                     aid  which  can provide
ing system, a precision navigational       also  operates preci-
varying services. Each of these  stations
                                                landing  systems.
sion approach radar systems and/or instrument     are also  pro-
However, the services provided by these  systems
                                      The  necessity  of  this
vided by the carrier landing system.
costly duplication is questionable.
      Oceana Naval Air Station, for example, has precision
 approach radar that is used for approaches    to all four pri-
                                            A  carrier   landing
 maty and two of four secondary runways.            Plans   have
 system is used on one of the primary  runways.
                                          system    to  all  primary
 been made to expand the carrier landing          type  of  preci-
 and secondary runways. Furthermore,   another
                                                 system, is also
 sion aid, similar to the instrument landing
                                        plans    have  been carried
 planned for one runway. When all the         of  precision   naviga-
 out, Oceana will have the following  types
 tional aid coverage on its eight runways:

       Precision navigational               Priar      Secon  y
            aid coverage                     23    4   I     3 A

Precision approach radar (existing)     x   x   x   x     x   x
Automatic carrier landing system
  (existing) (note a)                   x
Automatic carrier landing system
   'planned) (note a)                       x   x   x     x   x   x   x
Type of instrument landing system
   [RN-28]                              x

a/Under this   :-rangement, the oldcer, traditional precision
  approach radar appartus could '.    eiiminated.       However, Navy
  officials disagreed about whether the automatic carrier
  landing system would be an acceptable replacement for the
  existing precision approach radar system.
     Our analysis indicates elimination of precision approach
radar at Oceana could reduce staffing by five positions and
save about $52,000 a year in personnel costs alone.
Duplicate VHF omnidirectional ran e
capability at Air Force installations
     The VHF omnidirectional range system (see p. 34) is a
radio facility used extensively for departure, enroute, and
approach navigation. Its reception is limited to line-cf-
sight, and its usable range varies according to aircraft
     Air Force regulations state that, because of the in-
frequent need for airfield VHF omnidirectional range capa-
bility, the omnidirectional facilities will be operated only
under exceptional circumstances. Two circumstances specified
as acceptable are
     -- area navigational assistance for training aircraft not
        equipped with the tactical air navigational system and

     -- unique requirements essential to flying safety.
These circumstances can apparently be used to justify the need
for a VHF omnidirectional range capability at most Air Force
bases. In October 1975, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, ques-
tioned its subordinate commands regarding the need for VHF
omnidirectional range and VHF omnidirectional range tactical
air navigational facilities at 53 installations (36 VOR and
17 VORTAC). One command listed 81 Air Force installations
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 frequently visited by the T-37 aircraft involved in instrument
 and approach training requiring VHF omnidirectional range sup-
 port. This would represent an investment of over $1.9 mil-
 lion, plus an annual operating cost of over $1.6 million.

      Other justifications included the need to support other
 aircraft not equipped with the tactical air navigational sys-
 tem anid the need to provide a backup for the tactical air
 navigational system.

      At the time of our review 38 responses had been received
 indicating some achievement had been made toward reducing VHF
 omnidirectional range levels; only 4 responses recommended
 decommissioning. Six systems were subsequently decommis-

     In light of other precision and nonprecision navigational
aid systems available to nontactical air navigational system
ccmpatible aircraft, including FAA and military radar approach
control centers, extensive use of VHF omnidirectional equip-
ment at Air Force airfields and in aircraft is questionable.

Little used nondirectional beacons

     The Navy and the Air Force have recognized the infrequent
use of nondirectional beacons and are taking action to elimi-
nate these aids when no longer necessary for mission accom-
plishment. For example, at Moffett and Alameda Naval Air
Stations, nondirectional beacons, which had been in operation
early in our review, have been decommissioned.

     An Air Force message to various commands stated that bud-
get constraints, congressional investigate'nns, and our reviews
require that redundant navigational aids be minimized and that
certain nondirectional beacons be decommissioned. It pointed
out that the primary reason for retaining the beacons had been
proficiency training, but tactical air navigation systems and
radar service were now available as alternative aids at all
bases. The message addressed 14 of about 50 beacons.    Accord-
ing to Air Force estimates, decommissioning the 14 will save
about $135,000 in annual operating and maintenance costs.

     Military and civilian aviation administrators have not
established effective procedures for coordinating their
navigational aid equipment requirements. Further, DOD is
not controlling the authorization and use of navigational
aids to avoid duplication and assure use only where there is
a valid requirement.


     We recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of FAA establish effective procedures to coordi-
nate requirements for navigational aid systems and promote
equipment standardization. We recommend that the Secretary
of Defense develop effective criteria and standards for the
authorization and use of navigational aid systems at military
airfields and take action to decommission those navigational
aids that are not necessary for safe aircraft opertion.


     DOD, in its response to our draft report, recognizes the
need to avoid proliferation of redundant equipment. The Navy
and Air Force are willing to meet with the Federal Aviation
Administrator and actively participate in efforts to improve
coordination procedures, establish standards, and eliminate
     The Secretary of Transportation pointed out that DOD has
historically taken the position that at many locations avia-
tion facilities and support services are vital to defense
needs. He did not feel that FAA is in a position to make
judgment on matters involving DOD's determination of national
defense interest.
     While FAA is not in a position to make final defense
determinations, we believe they have the capability and ex-
pertise to assist DOD in assuring that there is a minimum of
duplication and investment in equipment and personnel at Fed-
eral airfields. The Navy recognizes this in referring to the
lack of coordination in the past. They point out that the
recent coordination between DOD and FAA on next generation
navigational aids (i.e., Global Positioning System and Micro-
wave Landing System) is expected to result in development of
systems which will meet the needs of both the military and
the civil aviation community. This should reduce the number
of systems in use. We believe this is indicative of the co-
ordination efforts to be emphasized in planning requirements
for current and future systems and for identifying potential
approaches to reduce investment in equipment and personnel
resources through the means of effective interagency/inter-
departmental coordination and support.

     The Navy fully supports our recommendation to decommis-
sion navigational aids not absolutely necessary for safe

aircraft operation. They agree to thoroughly explore the
feasibility of eliminating the older precision approach radar
apparatus with the expansion of the automatic carrier landing
system at the five air stations. Also, they state that con-
sideration is being given to authorizing the automatic carrier
landing system as a shore-based system, once certain technical
and support problems are resolved. We believe this proposed
action will result in considerable savings.

     T'>e Air Force also states that they will continue to de-
commission those systems not absolutely necessary, and after
January 1377, will only operate three nondirectional beacons
in the United States.

      The Air Force does not agree with our suggestion to in-
stall the new solid state instrument landing system instead
of first replacing the old tube-type system. This would
permit earlier removal of the costly precision approach
radars. The Air Force stated that the need to replpTe the
old systems is urgent because logistical support could not
be provided beyond 1977. The Air Force's terminal precision
approach control program, however, lists several old tube-
type systems that are scheduled for replacement as late as
1980.   Provisions will have to be made for support for old
systems remaining beyond 1977; otherwise, other available
navigational aids will be required.
     The Air Force also states that all Air Force aircraft
are not equipped with instrument landing system receivers and
that precision approach radar equipment will be required until
the 1980s, when it is projected that all aircraft will be so
equipped. We recognize the requirement for precision approach
radar will continue at some bases; but, at many bases, there
will be infrequent requirements to support the few aircraft
currently not equipped with instrument landing receivers. We
believe the Air Force should consider the early elimination of
precision approach radar equipment and personnel at bases
where they are not absolutely necessary for aircraft safety,
particularly where more than one airfield can serve the same
vicinity.  Tn the Sacramento area, for example, there are
four Air Force airfields within a 50-mile radius with preci-
sion approach radar systems. One of these airfields could
provide a landing alternative for the other airfields in the
vicinity when visibility, cloud cover, and/or prevailing winds
make using the system mandatory.

     The steps taken by the Navy and Air Force are positive
actions to reduce duplications in their airport equipment.
However, we believe that the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Transportation, through FAA, should take a more
active role in coordinating navigational aid requirements and
promoting standardization.

                            CHAPTER 5
                     CONSOLIDATING AVIATION
       The objective of the Department of Commerce aviation
 weather service is to furnish weather information
 for safe and efficient flights. Though Commerce
                                                   is respon-
 sible for insuring that aviation weather information
 are met efficiently, duplications exist.               needs
                                            In many areas the
 information developed by the Defense Department's
 stations could be obtained from Federal weather
 systems supporting civilian aviation. While it
                                                  is recognized
 that the military needs to provide its own support
 overseas areas, coordination with other agencies     in many
                                                   on weather
 information in the United States could reduce the
     Under section 803, Public Law 85-726, dated August
1958, Commerce was assigned responsibility for

     -- making observations, measurements, investigations,
        and studies of atmospheric phenomena and establishing
        weather offices an' stations for information concern-
        ing probable weather conditions;
     -- preparing reports, forecasts, warnings, and
        for safety and to facilitate air navigation; and
     -- coordinating weather requirements in the United
        to maintain standard observations, promote efficient
        use of facilities, and avoid unnecessary duplication
        of services.
      Subsequently, section 304, Public Law 87-843, directed
the Bureau of the Budget (now  Office of Management and Budget)
to provide the Congress annually with a budget
                                                showing (1) the
scope of weather programs, (2) the specific program
and funding assigned to each agency, and (3) the      aspects
goals and financial requirements.                 estimated
                                    In implementing this law,
the Bureau issued Circular A-62 on November 13,
                                                 1963. This
circular directed Commerce to prepare and maintain,
assistance of other concerned agencies, a plan       with the
                                                for the effi-
cient use of Federal weather services and supporting
The circular stated "the purpose of such planning      research.
                                                   is to achieve
the maximum integration of current and future services and
research consistent with the effective and economical ac-
complishment of mission requirements."
     The Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and
Supporting Research, Commerce Department, has responsibility
for preparing the plan which is coordinated through inter-
agency committees that continuously review weather require-
ments, services, and supporting research.

     Although the Federal weather plan describes coordinated
programs for serving the public, it does not foster the inte-
gration of common requirements and functions of the military
services and civilian agencies. In addressing aviation
weather services, the fiscal year 1976 plan stated:

          "Respoasibility for the Service is shared
     among three Federal departments--Commerce, Trans-
     portation, and Defense.
          "--The Department of Commerce provides
             meteorological services used by domes-
             tic and international civil aviation,
             and is responsible for meeting the
             common requirements of other agencies.
          "--The Department of Transportation makes
             recommendations to the Department of
             Commerce on civil aviation meteoro-
             logical services, provides specialized
             equipment and surface observations at
             certain airfields, disseminates weather
             information to users, and distributes
             weather data over civil teletypewriter
          "--The Department of Defense serves the
             specialized global needs of military
             aviation and makes meteorological in-
             formation from its facilities avail-
             able to civil aviation."
     The major reason for the separate Defense system ap-
parently is the philosophy that the military must retain
self-sufficiency to support its U.S. operations during
wartime conditions. Strict adherence to this philosophy
inhibits the potential economies available from consolidat-
ing requirements and functions.

     Agencies operate many weather stations which, in many
areas of the Nation, become duplicate support capabilities.
     We believe these functions can be consolidated, result-
ing in substantial savings, within the United States without
affecting the militazy's readiness posture. Jointly operated
military-civilian weather stations could support military and
civilian requirements while reducing overhead expenses.
     As of April 1975, there were about 530 local weather ac-
tivities directly supporting civilian and military flight
operations throughout the Nation at an estimated annual cost
of about $72 million.
                                    Number of    Fiscal year 1975
          Agency                    facilities   operating budget

Department of Commerce:
    National Oceanic and Atmos-
      heric Administration            a/52            $11.0
Department of Transportation:
    Federal Aviation Adminis-
      tration                          326             28.8
        Total                          378             39.8

Department of Defense:
    Air Weather Service
       (Air Force)                     105             21.8
    Naval Weather Service
       (Navy)                         b/47              8.4

        Total                          152             30.2

TOTAL                                  530            $70.0

a/Weather support is also available from other National
  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration facilities.

b/Includes Marine Corps stations.

      While some differences in operating styles exist,
civilian and military weather stations perform essentially
the same types of functions. Generally, they (1) observe
and report weather conditions, (2) formulate short term fore-
casts, and (3) brief pilots or flight crews on anticipated
weather conditions. The information for their forecasts and
briefings is compiled from local observations and data pro-
vided by the Air Force Weather Service, Naval Weather Service,
and the National Weather Service, Department of Commerce.

     In the geographical areas reviewed, we found

     -- four Air Force weather service stations operating near
        an FAA flight service station,
     -- two Navy weather service stations operating near a
        Federal Aviation Administration flight service sta-
     --six Federal weather activities supporting aviation on
       one island, and
    -- Naval, Air Force, and FAA aviation weather stations
       operating near each other.
Civilian and military personnel skills are extensive and can
be merged in some areas.

     We believe that substantial *saings are available from
integrating military and civilian -viation weather support
requirements and capabilities. M litary requirements could
be reduced by

    -- assigning surface weather observation to base organi-
       zations such as the control tower or fire department,
       as FAA does at some civilian airfields,

    -- using the National Weather Service forecast network
       for all short range local forecasts, and
    -- merging military aviation weather briefing require-
       ments and capabilities with those of FAA flight serv-
       ice stations to create regional briefing stations.

Four Air Force weather service
stations near an FAA station
     Within 50 miles of Sacramento there are air weather
service stations at Beale, Mather, McClellan, and Travis Air
Force Bases. An FAA flight service station is in the same
area. All of these activities are considered to have siLilar
weather characteristics by the National Weather Service.
     As of June 30, 1975, the Air Force stations were assigned
98 personnel, although authorized 84. Distribution of the
authorized positions was as follows:
      Position         Beale   Mather   McClellan   Travis   Total

Administrative staff     1          1        1         1       4
Weather officers         6          4        3         7      20
Weather observers        8          4        7         8      27
Weather forecasters      5          9        3         6      23
  electronics main-
  tenance staff          4          3        -         3      10

    Total               24       21         14        25      84

During fiscal year 1975 the operating cost for these four
stations was an estimated $1 million, of which $900,000 re-
presents personnel costs.
      The FAA flight service station nearby, as of June 3C,
197T,  was assigned 22 personnel. A major difference between
the military weather stations and the FAA flight service sta-
tion is that the FAA does not forecast weatlher.  The National
Weather Service provides forecasts for majo. civilian airports
in northern California from its office at Redwood City. These
forecasts are distributed to the flight service stations to be
used by civilian aviation. The Redwood City office employs
about five personnel for this function.
     According to the meteorologist in charge, the Redwood
City forecast office could, with three more personnel, provide
aviation forecast services for the four Sacramento area mili-
tary installations plus five other northern California Inili-
tary installations. (These additional personnel could be
     Forecasting is only part of the duties of a military
forecaster; he also prepares and provides weather briefings
to flight crews. During fiscal year 1975, the four military
stations gave about 38,000 briefings.    FAA's Sacramento
flight service station during  the  same period gave some
117,000 briefings.  Although  there  are some differences in
briefing requirements, the flight   service station has the
weather information and resources needed to furnish a standard
military briefing.

     Combining the briefing workloads and calculating the
required manpower based on FAA staffing criteria, the flight
service station would require only five additional personnel
to handle the entire briefing workload.
     Each of the four military installations employs weather
observers around the clock to observe and report airfield
conditions. Under Air Force manning criteria, this results
in a minimum staffing allotment of 5 observers per installa-
tion, or 20 for the 4 installations.  Military observers per-
form other functions, generally pertaining to administrative
activities or support of the station's forecasting or brief-
ing workloads. In contrast, FAA's flight service station is
allotted one staffyear to make around-the-clock observations
at one Sacramento airport. At the Sacramento Metropolitan
Airport, FAA tower controllers make the observratinns as
secondary duties.
     Assuming complete integration of military and civilian
weather requirements and capabilities in the Sacramento area
and an allotment of one staffyear to each military installa-
tion airfield for surface observations, savings could possibly
reach 57 positions and $600,000 annually. The savings in
positions are summarized as follows:

                                    Number of positions
                             Elsting     Integraed
                            operations   operations   Savings
Weather officers                  20       a/4          16
Observers                         27       b/4          23
Forecasters                       23       c/8          15
Administrative                     4         0           4
  maintenance staff               10         10          0

    Total                         84         26         58

a/One officer for each installation to act as a command
  weather liaison for such things as exercises and classified

b/One staffyear per installation.

c/Five briefers for the flight service station plus three
  forecasters for the Redwood City office.
Two Navy weather service stations
near an FAA station
     Naval Air stations at Moffett Field and Alameda, Califor-
nia, are located in northern California about 30 miles apart,
and each has a weather station. As of late 1975, the Moffett
Field weather station had a staff of 20 to support anti-
submarine warfare operations. Across the bay the Alameda
station had 14 personnel assigned to support the Naval Air
Rework Facility, Navy Reserve, and Fleet Tactical Support
Squadron flight operations. Both stations operate around
the clock at an annual combined cost of about $421,000, of
which $363,000 is for personnel.
     These personnel observe airfield weather conditions,
forecast weather, and provide weather briefings to flight
crews. During the year ended September 1975, the two sta-
tions provided about 23,000 briefings by telephone, in face-
to-face meetings, or by recorded message. At Moffett Field
6,600 or 64 percent of the briefings were by telephone or
recorded message.

     Seven miles from Alameda and 23 miles from Moffett Field
is an FAA flight service station located at the Metropolitan
Oakland International Airport. Staffed with 43 personnel as
of June 30, 1975, this station is allotted one staffyear for

taking the weather observations for the Oakland airport and
during fiscal year 1975 provided over 215,000 pilot briefings.
The flight service station used data from the Redwood City
National Weather Service forecast office about 7 miles from
Moffett Field.
     The National Weather Service meteorologist in charge
indicated that Alameda and Moffett Field could receive fore-
cast support from the Redwood City office.
     As with the Sacramento area, opportunities are evident
for savings in northern California through integration of the
military and civilian capabilities and requirements for avia-
tion weather support.
Six aviation weather stations
on one island
     On the island of Oahu, Hawaii, there are six weather
stations: an FAA flight service station, a National Weather
Service forecast office, Air Force stations at Hickam Air
Force Base and Wheeler Army Activity, plus the Navy and
Marine Corps detachments at the Naval Air Station, Barbers
Point, and Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe. At the time
of our review the military had 63 personnel assigned to
these stations which incurred an estimated fiscal year 1975
operating cost of $734,000. About $674,000 of this cost was
for personnel.
     The National Weather Service forecast office is at the
Honolulu International Airport, where runways are also used
by Hickam Air Force Base. Since the forecast office handles
the airport weather observations and forecasts, the Hickam
Air Force Base weather station workload is primarily provid-
ing weather briefings to the departing 'ir Force flight crews
and weather advisories to military activities. The briefings,
which depict the weather conditions the military flight is
expected to encounter, are compiled in weather packets devel-
oped by the base air weather station.
     The National Weather Service forecast office prepares
long distance flight packages two to four times daily for
commercial aircraft scheduled to depart from the Honolulu
airport. Each package contains the departure airport fore-
cast and enroute and destination weather information, plus
data on possible alternate airports. The briefing packages
prepared by the National Weather Service for the FAA flight
service station contain all the data that would be necessary

to brief military pilots. Also FAA charts for long        mili-
flights are sufficient for  use in briefing transoceanic
tary flights. Thus at the same airfield, the National
Service and the Air Force  independently develop
weather briefing packages.
     Each of the three other military stations has
                                                   crew brief-
who develop airfield forecasts and provide flight
                                airfield weather conditions.
ings, and observers who report                 Honolulu air-
According to its meteorologist in charge, the          with
port National Weather Servic-' forecast office could,
                                     local forecasts  for the
5 additional personnel, provide all

     The average monthly briefing activity for the military
facilities follows:
                                    Long distance     Local
          Installation                 flights       flights

                                          1,000           500
Hickam Air Force Base                                     350
Wheeler Army Activity                         0
                                          a/150           450
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point
Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe         _b/O            /80

    Total                                 1,150         1,380

a/Half of these involve classified missions.
b/There is an occasional long distance briefing.

c/Includes only in-person briefings.    Briefings are also
  issued hourly by telewriter.
     The long distance briefings which the Navy's Barbers
Point detachment provides are prepared and given
of the Hickam station and the Honolulu forecast
     Briefings for civilian general aviation (private and FAA
noncommercial) local flights are provided by the the fore-
flight service station. These briefings   include
casts for the entire area developed by the National
                                 official advised us that the
Service forecast office. An FAAcapability
flight service station has the             to provide the
                                                    the four
weather briefings for local military flights from
military installations without increasing  the

Navy and Air Force weather stations
near an FAA flight service station
     Within 20 miles of Norfolk, Virginia, the Air Force and
Navy each operate two weather stations at an annual cost of
about $770,000. While these stations support military opera-
tions, civilian aviation in the area receives its weather
information from the FAA flight service station at Newport
News, Virginia, about 25 miles from Norfolk. The manpower
authorized for these facilities at the time of this review
was as follows:
                   Facility                  personnel

             Air Force:
                 Langley Air Force Base         21
                 Fort Eustis                    12
                 Norfolk Naval Air Station      14
                 Oceana Naval Air Station       16

                     Total                      63


             Flight service station:
                 Newport News                   18

     TOTAL                                      81

     Each military station has staff who develop short range
forecasts for their respective airfields and provide weather
briefings to pilots and flight crews. In contrast, the Na-
tional Weather Service provides the forecasts for the Newport
News and Norfolk airports from its Washington, D.C., forecast
office about 150 miles away. According to the chief meteoro-
logist from the forecast office, this office could provide the
forecasts for all of the Norfolk area military installations
with two additional personnel.

     Langley Air Force Base, Oceana and Norfolk Naval Air
Stations, and the Newport News flight service station in-
dependently provide around-the-clock weather briefings. The
Langley station acts as a regional briefing station and, as
such, provides telephone briefings to aircrews at two other
Air Force and one Army installation during their hours of
reduced operation. The two Air Force bases are located over
275 miles away.
     Eight miles from Langley the FAA flight service station
a so acts as a regional briefing station for civilian avia-
t.on operating from that location and from the Norfolk Re-
gional Airport located about 25 miles away.  The Oceana and
Norfolk Naval Air Stations' weather activities not only
provide face-to-face briefings but also use closed circuit
television systems to provide remote briefings to aircrews
located at the station but some distance from the weather
briefing facility.
     Thus, four weather stations close to one another brief
aircrews electronically and do so with virtually no coordi-
     Reasons given by weather officials for the military to
operate weather detachments in the United States included the
need to irovide
     --a trained deployable force to meet wartime contingen-
     -- stateside assignments for personnel rotating from over-
        seas or shipboard,
     -- observations of weather conditions for flight opera-
        tions and resource protection, and

     -- specialized mission support to military flights which
        sometimes involve classified information.

     We believe each of these requirements can be met while
achieving the efficiencies available through consolidation.

A trained deployable force

     The primary mission of the Air Force air weather service
is to provide a trained deployable weather information force
to support military operations overseas in the event hostili-
ties erupt. Under the Air Force plan, personnel from weather
stations in the United States would deploy to supplement the
weather force already assigned overseas. Positions vacated
in the United States would be filled from the Reserves.
     As of November 1975, the Air Force estimated it would
need 932 Reserve personnel to fill positions of deploying
weather service personnel.  In other words, approximately
900 active duty personnel are required to be trained and
ready for deployment in a contigency.  However, air weather
service stations in the United States employ approximately
2,000 personnel. The other 1,100 personnel are therefore
needed more for operating U.S. bases than for military con-
tingencies.  To the extent that the National Weather Service
can provide the weather information needs for certain air
bases, the 2,000 personnel requirement could be reduced.
Stateside military assignments

     Obviously, as long as the military requires weather per-
sonnel overseas or on ships, there will be a requirement for
positions to accommodate these people when they rotate back
to the United States. Such positions should facilitate reten-
tion of occupational proficiency. We believe, however, such
positions would not have to be sacrificed under integrated
management of local aviation weather activiti -   Civilian and
military personnel could jointly operate a weather station to
provide for all aviation users.
Observations of weather conditions

     Military weather detachments obsc-:,e weather at their
installations to provide for (1) safe use of runways, (2) ade-
quate protection of facilities during bad weather, and (3) de-
velopment of short range forecasts.   2i.US, military weather
officials contend observers are required at the installations.

     While observations are apparently necessary, assignment
of surface observing responsibility o:cother base organiza-
tions could reduce the number of observers required. FAA, for
example, assigns surface observing responsibility to such ac-
tivities as the control tower or runway fire department at
some civilian airports. In early 1975 the Air Force estimated
155 observer positions could be saved worldwide by transfer-
ring this responsibility to the airfield control tower, but
took no action to eliminate the positions.
Specialized mission support

     According to top-level military weather officers, mili-
tary flights require support not typically provided civilian
aviation because

      -- military aircraft have unique performance characteris-
      -- military missions may not follow standard aviation
      -- military missions, such as practice bombing or mid-air
         refueling, require very detailed weather data; and
      -- some weather briefings involve classified missi:ns.
      We recognize that at times military flights operate
unique situations which require specialized support.       under
respect to the standard DOD weather briefing format,
we found civilian weather stations have the capabilityhowever,
provide virtually all of the required information.      to
ample opportunity exists for eliminating redundanciesTherefore,
providing for unique military requirements. Joint      while
civilian weather stations, for example, could be responsive
the military while eliminating the existing redundancies      to
developing aviation weather information.                  in

     Weather information becomes classified when it could
veal the classified nature of a mission. In the Air
the installation weather detachment does not prepare  Force,
fied weather briefings.  Instead, a staff  weather
obtains unclassified general weather data from the officer
and then develops the classified briefing for the
This practice seems to negate the need for a resident
detachment to support classified missions.             weather


     The weather information
locations covered during this capabilities existing in the
                               review offer an excellent op-
portunity for Commerce, DOD, and FAA to pool resources.


     We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct
Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and      the
ing Research to review, in coordination with the Secretaries
of Defense and Transportation, the aviation weatner require-
ments of the military and civilian communities in
to detect those areas where duplicate capabilities an effort
                                                    can be
consolidated or provided under interservice/interdepartmental


     In response to an earlier version of this report, the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration concurred with our recommendation and was willing to
work with DOD and Transportation to achieve further improve-
ments in economy and efficiency in providing weather services.
He states that the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological
Services and Supporting Research has begun considering prob-
lems common to the National Weather Service and FAA and as a
result of our report will consider those of DOD.

     The Navy agrees that opportunities exist for exchanging
airways weather information with certain civil activities and
tactical weather information with certain military activities
in locations where the nature of supported military aviation
operations permits. They state that Navy environmental sup-
port requirements are such that they can generally provide
needed support to other agencies, but, without increased per-
sonnel education and training and an expanded environmental
data base, other agencies could not meet Navy needs.   In addi-
tion to their unique needE cited earlier, they  indicate  the
need for oceanic and atmospheric information,  magnetics,  and
     While the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion may not distribute this type of information in the format
used by the Navy, it does accumulate the data and could fur-
nish the needed information in the desired format, if required.
Regardless of the agency providing weather data, once given
the raw data, the skills, and requirements, that agency could
interpret and provide the needed weather information for
everyone. Any agency performing the mission could still pro-
vide for military training and proficiency.
     The Navy also indicated that consolidating weather fa-
cilities at the Norfolk and Oceana stations, which incur
volumes of 61,000 and 26,000 briefings per year, appears
economically disadvantageous. We note that certain FAA
flight service stations have provided substantially more
weather briefings than the combined total for both subject
facilities. The Oakland flight service station, for example,
gave some 215,000 briefings during fiscal year 1975.
     The Air Force agrees that the three regions identified
in the earlier version of this report (Norfolk, Sacramento,
and Honolulu) and others of a similar nature should be
examined in an effort to identify areas offering potential
savings of resources.  The Air Force does not agree, however,
that other base organizations should be tasked to make weather
observations.  They point out that the original Air Force
space-saving estimate of 155 spaces made in their 1975 study
(see p. 51), upon closer examination turned out to be only a
saving of 54 spaces worldwide.

     We believe, however, that there is an opportunity to
reduce personnel requirements at some locations. At civil
airports, FAA permits weather observations to be performed
by nonweather activities.

     The Air Force stated that it is embarked on an orderly
program to make its weather service more efficient by combin-
ing weather forecaster and observer career fields and auto-
mating weather sensors and short range terminal forecasts.
The automation program is not to be fully implemented until
the 1980s.  These actions, coupled with more effective co-
ordination between military and civil agencies to eliminate
the weather forecaster and observer functions at some bases,
should orovide for more effective use of resources.

     The Air Force agreed that there are opportunities to
derive manpower economies by either integrating Air Force
forecasters into the National Weather Service or by inter-
deoartmental arrangements with the National Weather Service,
particularly during normal base flying hours.   However, the
Air Force wished to be assured of a quick response with
weather assistance for efficient use of flying periods. We
believe that centralized facilities coordinated between FAA,
National Weather Service, and the military departments can
provide real time weather service using closed-circuit
television and other electronic means.   These techniques are
being used currently for across base dissemination of weather
information.   It would seem that similar means could be used
from a joint centralized coordinated facility.

     The considerations by the Federal Coordinator for Mete-
orological Services and Supporting Research of the problems
pertaining to aviation weather services involving the National
Weather Service and FAA and the extention of these considera-
tions to the needs of DOD, should eliminate some unnecessary
duplication and increase efficiency throughout the Federal
Government in meeting weather information requirements.

                          CHAPTER 6

     Certain military airfields operate 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, even though traffic during late night hours and on
weekends is very light. In some cases these airfields are
within a few miles of another military or civilian airport
which can provide adequate services during periods of low
demand. We reviewed three of the many services provided at
airfields and identified numerous opportunities to reduce
expenditures by having airfields share services.

     Military airfields usually operate around the clock, but
their operating hours may be curtailed under certain circum-
stances.  For example, the Navy permits an airfield to close
when (1) there is little traffic during recurring periods,
(2) a nearby facility can handle any aircraft arriving in the
area, and (3) the airfield's mission will not be affected.
     The Air Force criteria for an airfield to remain opera-
tional on a 24-hour basis are that the base must (1) have an
air defense commitment, (2) have a strategic air commitment,
or (3) be 1 of 11 bases designated as "queen bee."   (The
latter are selected on the basis that their locations permit
an Air Force pilot to fly any place in the United States and
be within 500 nautical miles of a base having landing and re-
fueling services.) Otherwise the local commander determines
the operating hours.

     Likewise at Army airfields, commanders have jurisdiction
over all matters concerning the operation and use of Army
aviation within their commands. They determine the airfield
functions and services and set operating hours based on the
mission, available resources, and manpower.

     Occasionally the military services have attempted to
reduce airfield costs by curtailing operations, but their
efforts have not always been successful.  In 1972, for in-
stance, the Air Force identified 57 airfields for possible
conversion from 24-hour to 16-hour a day operations, but
only 11 of these airfields actually reduced their operating


     We selected three of the many support services provided
at military airfields to assess the potential for reducing
expenditures. We looked at (1) ground controlled approach
radar, (2) weather services, and (3) transient aircraft

Ground controlled approach radar

     Numerous types of navigational aids can be used to assist
pilots in making instrument approaches; most transmit signals
directly to the aircraft, enabling pilots to navigate without
ground assistance. GCA radar systems, unlike most other types
of navigational aid systems, do not transmit signals to the
aircraft. The system consists of an Airport Surveillance
Radar and/or Precision Approach Radar and associated communi-
cation equipment and controllers. The system displays azimuth
and evaluation information on its scopes. Controllers on the
ground are required to observe and interpret radar displays
and transmit course and glide slope information by radio to
the pilot and direct him to a safe approach route.
     An FAA official told us that civilian airports do not
use GCA radar systems; they use only unmanned approach aids.
The military's requirement for GCA radar at airfields in the
United States is based on the need to

     -- train or maintain the proficiency of pilots in its use,
        since in contingency operations it may be :he only
        system available for precision approach landings;
     -- provide a backup to the instrument precision landing
        systems at remote installations or where mission
        sensitivity warrants such duplication; and

     -- provide a precision approach radar system at installa-
        tions where a precision instrument landing system is
These requirements would not in our opinion justify operating
a GCA radar system when there is little or no air traffic,
when training opportunities are minimal, and when unmanned
navigational aids are available.

Weather services
     Military installation weather stations observe and report
weather conditions at airfields to provide information for
safe runway use.  Furthermore, they brief pilots before their
flights on weather conditions they can expect to encounter.
To provide these services, some airfields employ observers
and forecasters 24 hours a day.
     Military officials generally object to obtaining weather
briefings by telephone or having ..'ther conditions recorded
by personnel as a secondary duty    they contend that telephone
briefings do not provide the free Llow of information that can
be obtained in a face-to-face situation and that weather con-
ditions may not be recorded as promptly as necessary. They
pcint out, for instance, that controllers might be able to
record weather conditions at most times but would be unable
to do so when air traffic is heavy.

     However, weather service regulations permit pilots to
obtain briefings by telephone--a practice already used by
some military and civilian pilots. Some civilian airfields
also use controllers or other employees to record weather
conditions, and it seems unlikely that military controllers
would be unable to do so during nights or weekends when air
traffic is extremely light.
Transient maintenance

     Some military airfields employ a crew 24 hours a day to
service transient aircraft, although few transient aircraft
arrive or depart during certain times.
     Military regulations do not require that all airfields
employ transient maintenance crews and, in some instances,
the regulations specify the volume of traffic needed to
justify around-the-clock operations.  In our opinion, how-
ever, these criteria are too broad and subject to wide inter-
pretation. The Air Force, for examrle, authorizes around-
the-clock maintenance crews whenever an airfield averages
more than 350 transient arrivals a month--regardless of the
time of day the aircraft arrive or depart. If an airfield
meets the numerical criteria, it is authorized to have a
crew on duty at night, even if no aircraft ever arrive or
depart at night.


Langley Air Force Base
     Transient maintenance,      radar, and weather crews are
employed 24 hours a day at Loangley despite little air traffic
between midnight and 6 a.m. For example, an average of
     --one transient aircraft a night arrived at Langley
       between midnight and 6 a.m. during fiscal year 1975,

     -- one instrument approach a night was made between
        midnight and 6 a.m. during fiscal year 1975, and

     -- one weather briefing a day was given between 7 p.m.
        and 4 a.m. during a 3-month period.
      In addition to its GCA radar, Langley has two unmanned
navigational aids for instrument approaches and nearby air-
fields offer additional aids--including GCA radar--that could
be used Dy Langley traffic in an emergency.   (See p. 59.)
Weather conditions between midnight and 6 a.m. have histori-
cally been above minimum operating conditions 95 percent of
the time for one of Langley's unmanned approach aids and
98 percent of the time for the other. In comparison, weather
conditions have also been above GCA minimum 98 percent of the
     The few wea:her briefings giver. at Langley during the
night could be easily obtained by telephone from a nearby FAA
flight service station or other military bases. Although
Langley serves as a regional w ather office for three bases
that operate less than 24 hours a day, it averages less than
one briefing a day for these bases between 7 p.m. and 4 a.m.
Since these bases receive their briefings by telephone they
could just as easily receive them from some other weather
     Although night staffing of GCA radar, weather, and tran-
sient maintenance services is normally light, we estimate that
Langley spends at least $70,000 1/ annually for these services.

1/Includes salaries only, not fringe benefits.

                        MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AIRFELDS
                         INTHE NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, AREA

                 PATRICK HENRY AIRPORT

FORT      5m1.
EUSTISQ-'                  6mi.
                                   %          tFB

                                                \         AS NORFOLK
                                                    '6a                NORFOLK
                                                           s Smlt.i    REGIONAL

                                                                        N\'            \       ~NA,

                                                                                  FENTRESS 0

Norfolk Naval Air Station
     This air station also provides GCA radar and weather
services around the clock but, like Langley, has little need
for these services during late night hours. For example,
during a 6-week period the air station averaged only eight
arrivals or departures a night between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.
About 95 percent of the time between midnight and 8 a.m.,
weather conditions at the Norfolk air station are within
the limits that allow use of the station's unmanned naviga-
tional aid. Therefore, most late night flights probably did
not need GCA radar. Also, the departing flights could have
received their weather briefings from other military and
civilian weather offices in the area.
     About a year befov our review, the station proposed to
the Chief of Naval Operations that its GC2A radar system be
closed at night due to personnel shortages.   In making the
proposal, the air station pointed out that weather conditions
at night would rarely prohibit use of the field's unmanned
approach aid--less than 4 percent of the time, according to
our computations. The Commander, Naval Air Atlartic, re-
sponded and stated that the interservice support arrangement
with the Military Airlift Commaid precluded closing the GCA at
night. A review of the agreement by the Naval air station
with the Military Airlift Command indicated that operating the
GCA on a 24-hour basis was not a required service. Neverthe-
less, the Commander, Tactical Wings Atlantic, directed the
stations to hold the proposal in abeyance.
     Consideing the unmanned navigational aids available to
the station and the little amount of time the GCA system was
needed, the Ftation's proposal to close it at night appears
feasible. This station spends more than $40,000 1/ a year
in personniel costs to operate its GCA radar and weather
services at night.
McClellan Air Force Base

     While McClellan provides various airfield support serv-
ices around the clock, the need for the airfield to remain
open continuously is questionable. Air traffic is extremely
light during the night, and virtually all of the base's users
have acknowledged that they could operate satisfactorily if
the field were closed at night. For example, one of the users

1/lIncludes salaries only, not fringe benefits.

is a rescue and recovery squadron that requires 3 hours
leadtime before its aircraft can depart--sufficient time for
on-call airfield personnel to report for duty.

     Although the military services stress self-reliance, this
does not mean that each facility has to be self-sufficient.
Moreover, the services agree that interservice support is a
management technique that should be sought whenever financially
advantageous to the Federal Government.  Military airports lo-
cated near other airports offer the potential for economy by
reducing opertions or eliminating marginally needed services.
For example, the Army operated at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a
fully instrumented airfield 16 hours a day, 7 days a week,
but the actual number of instrument landings was relatively
small. Through coordination with the Kansas City International
Airport, the Fort Leavenworth instrument landings are now
handled at the Kansas City facility, thereby making possible
the reduction of instrumentation and personnel requirements.

     We noted that, in keeping with DOD policy to reduce re-
source expenditures, the Air Force began three separate ac-
tions to
     -- reduce many airfield support services from 24 to
        16 hours a day,
     -- eliminate very high frequency omnidirectional naviga-
        tion equipment at bases where it is no longer needed,

     -- decommission nondirectional radio beacons that are
        no longer justified.
According to the Air Force, the action to decommission the
beacons was taken partially as a result of GAO's efforts and
could result in annual savings of about $135,000. These are
only illustrative of the many airport services that offer
potential for consolidation, reduction, or elimination.

     Despite recent efforts by the military services, manv
airfields provide support services during periods of little
or no air traffic. Although our review was limited to only
a few of the airfields and services provided, there are
numerous services that are operated at night and during other
periods of low use which are costly and potentially available
from other sources.

     We recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify and
curtail airport services

     --that are not required because of an insufficient
       volume of air traffic or
     -- which can be obtained through arrangements with nearby

      DOD responded to our draft report on November 1, 1976.
The Air Force cited its policy which provides for limiting
manpower based on the workload involved during reduced periods
of activity.   In other words, the manpower assigned to night
airfield activities should be commensurate with the level of
activity.   In our view this policy is good if the functions
supported are required; however, the necessity to operate,
even at a low level, the services described in this report is
questionable, particularly when there are alternatives avail-
     The Navy cited the need to maintain the capability to
support the combat readiness of each assigned operating avia-
tion unit. Nevertheless, the Navy said it will actively pur-
sue further curtailments and consolidations consistent with
the readiness requirements of their aviation installations.

     The Navy agrees that it is possible to curtail services
at the Norfolk Naval Air Station during late night hours.
However, the Navy points out that the station serves as an
aerial port for Military Airlift Command flights and invest-
ments have been made to establish equipment and facilities
in agreement with the Command to support its contract carrier
requirements. They feel these factors require that late
night hour services be retained. However, with the small
volume of traffic and the history of good weather at the
Norfolk station described' previously, it is doubtful that
the Navy needs to provide GCA radar and weather services dur-
ing late night hours on a regular basis when there are un-
manned navigational aids available at the air station and
weather briefings are available at the FAA flight service
station. Moreover, on those infrequent occasions where the
weather is below the unmanned navigational aid minimum, there
is ample notification of pending arrivals to permit activation
of the ground control approach radar.
                          CHAPTER 7

     The three Government agencies involved in aviation--
Federal Aviation Administration, Defense, and Commerce--need
to take action to effectively coordinate their aviation re-
quirements. There is presently no method by which these
agencies jointly assess their common requirements to achieve
more efficient use of the Federal Government's aviation

     Though FAA is mandated by law to manage the Nation's
airspace, it has no proceaures for systematically identify-
ing the most economical approach to accomplish this function
insofar as it involves the most effective integration of
military-civil requirements.  If, for example, FAA were to
periodically evaluate existing approach control arrangements
as described in chapter 3, it would improve its ability to
control the use of the Nation's airspace in the most efficient

     Commerce, in coordination with DOD and FAA, should
evaluate the requirements for weather information for the
aviation community as a whole to assess essential require-
ments and develop new approaches for providing this data with
a minimum of overlap. Working together FAA, Commerce, and
the military departments could work out ways to rely on each
other more extensively; to share all types of aviation support
facilities, equipment, and personnel to assure maximum use of
scarce resources; and to avoid developing and authorizing un-
needed facilities and equipment.

     Better management of DOD aviation facilities is also
essential for more efficient use of existing resources. We
also believe that a more extensive integration of military-
civil aviation management improves the Nation's total defense
     We surveyed only a few of the many airport activities
supported by the Federal Government. There are a number of
other activities which offer potential for achieving savings
through interdepartmental coordination.

     The fact that management officials in the military de-
partments have prompted the elimination of some facilities
and the consolidation of some functions is indicative of what
can be done in the furtherance of econoiry and effectiveness
in managing aviation resources.


      In view of the magnitude of the Government's investment
 in aviation support functions and the potential to achieve
greater efficiency through a coordinated Government effort,
GAO recommends that the Administrator of FAA and the Secre-
taries of Defense and Commerce support a high level effort
within their agencies emphasizing effective planning and co-
ordination of aviation requirements. They should emphasize
phasize the advantages of interdependence on the supporting
capabilities of both the military and civilian community.
This includes

     -- eliminating redundancies between aviation support
     -- developing a program for eventual standardization of
        Federal airport functions, particularly navigational
        aids, and
     --evaluating support activities in geographical areas
       having multiple T eral involvement to consolidate
       support capabilit ..s where possible.

     We brought our conclusions and recommendations to the
attention of the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and
Transportation in our August 11, 1976, report.

     DOD feels that its Advisory Committee on Federal Avia-
tion, established to carry out the exchange of information
required by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, has led to
significant coordination with FAA and can be used to effect
further coordination of the matters described in our report.

     Transportation agrees that increased emphasis needs to
he placed on more effective planning and coordination of
aviation requirements among FAA, DOD, and Commerce.

     The Secretary of Defense also stresses that DOD air-
fields are in support of national defense objectives,  and
the criteria for their operation cannot be the sa;: as that
for civil airports. The Secretary of Transportation notes
that DOD takes the position that its operation of approach
control, landing and navigation facilities, and weather se -
ices at military installations is vital to defense needs.

As a result, the Secretary does not feel that FAA is in a
position to j rle DOD's determination of national defense
     As we have already stated, we believe that the total
military-civil aviation resources are a valuable national
resource for both defense and civil requirements. To the
extent that the military and civilian personnel operating
and using these resources to develop the capacity to relate,
interoperate, and cross service, we believe the total avia-
tion resources of the Nation will be more efficiently used,
and the experience and duplication available to the military
through the civil facilities will improve the Nation's defense

     To bring these results about will require top-level
management commitment in the agencies involved to provide
both the guidance and motivation of operating personnel.

APPENDIX I                                                              APPENDIX I

                         ASSISTANT SCRETARY OF DEIENSE
                              WASMlINI1,   D.C. lSt01

Imam"om AM   wSuWR                                      November   1,    1976

      Mr. Fred J. Shafer
      Director, Logistics and
       Communications Division
      General Accounting Office
      Washington, D. C. 20548

      Dear Mr. Shafer:

      This is in reply to your letter of August 11 to Secretary Donald
      Rumrsfeld transmitting copies of your draft report entitled, "More
      Effective Use of Aviation Resources ia the United States Can Be
      Achieved., " OSD Case #4433.

      Your recommendation that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
      Administration (FAA), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
      Commerce establish a high-level task force to develop procedures for
      assuring maximum effectiveness anid minimum investment of aviation
      resources has merit.

     Within the Department of Defense (DoD) there currently exists an Advisory
     Committee on Federal Aviation which was established to carry out the
     exchange of information required by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
     This has led to significant coordination w;tI? the FA '%and can be used to
     effect further coordinations on such matt,:rs as contained in your draft
     report. We participate in the procurement of air traffic control systems
     where there is a common need and it is -ost effective. There are loca-
     tions where DoD provides air traffic control services to civil aviation
     and locations where the FAA serves the DoD, as well as several joint-
     use facilities. We will continue our efforts to achieve efficiency where
     possible, but it nlust be recognized that the DoD airfields are in support
     of national defense objectives, and most airfields must be operated 24
     hours a day to accomplish a combat readiness or wartime mission.
     Criteria and standards to authorize support systems fo- DoD airfields
     cannot be based solely on the number of air traffic ope     i.,ons and
     passenger usage as applied to civil airports.

APPENDIX I                                                      APPENDIX I

  Further, DoD manpower must be sufficient to support the most demanding
  wartime requirements as directed by National Strategies.

  Specific comments to your report are included in the enclosures.

                                                      FRANK A SHRONTZ
                                                AIlstan Secretary of Defense
  Enclosures                                     (         Sand Losio)   )
    s stated

APPENDIX I                                             APPENDIX   I

                  Department of the Navy Comments

                 GAO Draft Report of 11 August 1976


              More Effective Use of Aviation Resources
                in the United States Can Be. Achieved

                         (OSD Case No. 4433)'

   1.    Summary of GAO findings and recommendations

       The GAO report presents findings, conclusions, and
   recommendations concerning possible economies in four support
   areas related to military and civil aviation. The report
   notes apparent redundancies between military and civil support
   functions and recommends further action with the objective of
   curtailing military airfield operations, consolidating approach
   control facilities, decommissioning redundant navigation aids,
   and consolidating aviation weather facilities.      Additionally,
   the report recommends that the Administrator     of the FAA, the
   Secretary of Defense, and   the Secretary  of  Commerce establish
   a high level task force  to  identify ways  in  which the three
   agencies can plan and coordinate aviation requirements.

    2.   Summary of Department of the Navy position

        The Navy has been active in the review of the shorebased
    aviation support facilities and functions cited in the report
    and will  actively participate or assist in joint military
    efforts to review the investment in these aviation support
    functions.   Navy reviews of airfield operations and navigation
    aids have been recent and have resulted in economies in many
    areas.   The nlavy participates in several cooperative efforts
    with other Departments in the utilization of approach control
    and weather facilities.

         It is essential that each aviation installation maintain
    its capability to support the combat readiness of each of its
    assigned operating aviation units. Further curtailments and
    consolidations to achieve economy will be actively pursued,
    consistent with the requirements for mission readiness of
    each individual aviation installation. Of particular concern

    APPENDIX   I                                         APPENDIX I

     is the requirement to maintain the military training of
     air control and weather perSOnnel.  Although there are
     similarities between the functions performed by these
     sonnel and their civilian counterparts, which may lead
     conclusions concerning the ease of consolidation of approach
     control and weather facilities, the military application
     these functions is very specialized and requires that these
     perso.  1 regularly function in the military environment.
     Air control and weather personnel are not quickly or
     trained or replaced and a shortage of these personnel
     required greatly restricts the capability of air installa-
     tions or operating units to meet contingency requirements.
     The elimination of shore duty billets and the resultant
     effect on retention would further limit the ability of
    %Navy to maintain combat --
                              nd mission readiness.

         Concerning the specific recommendation to stop the
     currently proposed construction of a radar approach traffic
     control facility at MCAS Kaneohe Bay, the program to replace
     obsolete GCA's at all air installations (including MCAS
     Kaneohe Bay) will provide adequate radar air control capa-
     bility, without the need for the proposed construction.

         With regard to the GAO recommendation to establish a
     high level task force to develop procedures to assure
     maximum effectiveness and minimum investment of aviation
-    resources, the Navy would willingly participate, if requested.

     3.   Statement

        a.   Chapter 3.   Potential for Curtailing Military Airfield

          Page 22.

         Finding:  Naval Air Station Norfolk...provides ground
     control approach and weather services around the clock
     has little need for these services during the late night
         Comment:  Although it is possible to curtail night ground
    .controlled approach and weather services at NAS Norfolk,
     are other factors which require these services be retained.

         By joint directive applicable to the Air Force, the Army,
     and the Navy, NAS Norfolk has been designated as an Aerial
     Port and mcst support sustained air movement of personnel
     and material and serve as an authorized port of entry
     departure. Such airfields are designated on the basis

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

being most advantageously located for the distribution of
DOD authorized traffic by air, recognizing airlift service
requirements as well as economic considerations. Consider-
able investment has been made to establish he equipment,
facilities (including passenger and cargo terminals), and
personnel required to support Military Airlift Command (MAC),
MAC contract carrier and Navy logistic missions.  Reducing
the hours of operation of this important logistic head through
airfield closure or diminished aircraft recovery capability
could prove costly in terms of world-wide DOD logistics

     An existing Interservice Support Agreement between NAS
 Norfolk and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) specifically
,requires 24 hour, seven days per week support, including
 NAVAIDS, approach facilities and weather services. Commander
 in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) approved this
 agreement in January 1976 in recognition of NAS Norfolk as
 the focal point of a major world-wide logistic supply network
 which is and must be responsive to fleet demands on a 24 hour
    Cargo processed at NAS Norfolk runs the gamut of the
supply system and can be time sensitive, dangerous, expensive
or classified. Flights originating or terminating at NAS
Norfolk may be constrained by departure or arrival times at
origin or destination which are beyond CINCLANTFLT control.
This dictates that support facilities must be available for
aircraft arrivals and departures. To provide adequate cargo
handling and storage facilities at another site if NAS
Norfolk were below nonprecision minimums or closed, or incur
additional cost in double handling, would be uneconomical
and ineffective. Because of its importance as a logistic
head, it is inappropriate to restrict NAS Norfolk support
    Page 24.

    Conclusion:  ...many airfields remain operational or
provide support services during periods when there is little
or no air traffic...

    Recommendati.on: ...the Secretary of Defense take action
to identify and curtail airport functions and services--that
are not required...

    Comment: Navy policy specifically encourages Commanding
Officers to seek permission to reduce airfield (and airfield
services) operating hours whenever possible to achieve economy.
This policy has resulted in significant reductions in airfield

APPENDIX   I                                         APPENDIX   I

 operating hours for 39 naval air installations and restricted
 hours of availability for transient aircraft maintenance for
 44 naval air installations.   These reductions reflect the
 results of previour actions to crixtail airfield operations.
 The Navy will crntinue to emphas;ize the curtailment of airport
 services where economies can be achieved, which do not result
 in lower mission or combat readiness of the installation or
 its critical personnel.

     b.  Chapter 4.   Potential for Consolidating Approach
 Control Facilities

     Page ii, Page 33.

     Findinn:   ...the military services and FAA independently
 operating radar approach control facilities to manage airspace
 bordering on another even though each facility could have the
 capability to manage the total assigned airspace.   (NAS Oceana
 and NAS Lemoore)

        ,unent: The Navy should continue to operate the approach
 contrl-facilities   at NAS Oceana and NAS Lepnoore. Navy policy
 regarding operation of approach control facilities is based on
 the Memorandum of Agreement (i.OA) executed on 2 June 1969
 between the Departments of Transportation, Army, Navy, and Air
 Force. tinder the terms of this MOA and pursuant to the Federal
 Aviation Act of 1958, where the FAA and military mutually
 agree, the approach control authority for the military terminal
 area will be delegated to the military. Unless agreed to the
 contrary: where a military facility is located near an FAA
 approac.. control facility, the FAA will perform the approach
 control function. Approach control service should be provided
 by the Navy at Naval Air Stations with a large volume of 1 gh
 performance air traffic which does not require integration
 with civil air traffic. This service should also be provided
 by the Navy at sufficient locations to insure the combat
 readiness of an adequate number of shorebased Navy air con-
 trollers. The Navy operation of the approach controls at
 NAS Oceana and NAS Lemoore is in accordance with this rationale
 and the MOA. Without provisions for additional facilities and
 personnel, neither NAS Oceana or NAS Lemoore nor the FAA
 approach controls at Fresno and Ncrfolk have the capability
 to manage the total assigned airspace.

     Consolidating the NAS Oceana approach control with tle
 FAA's approach control at Norfolk Regional Airport, is possible
 but not recommended. The addition of more than 150,000 annual
 operations generated by NAS Oceana would require the FAA to
 make significant investments *in equipment and training to
 insure an equivalent level of safety and responsiveness to
 tactical aircraft operations.   In the Norfolk area, Navy air

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

 traffic predominates. Because NAS Oceana is located east
 of civil airways and directly adjacent to the offshore
 operating areas, ninety percent of NAS Oceana's air traffic
 remains entirely under that facility's approach control
 ,'"thority. This greatly facilitates the quick response
 capability required for fleet training effectiveness, reduces
 operating costs through the use of military handling procedures,
 and simplifies the control of other aircraft, both civil and
 military, operating in the Norfolk area. NAS Oceana air
 traffic is often continued through the night in response to
 fleet training requirements. In addition to providing the
 responsiveness required to support fl.et carrier aviation,
 the NAS Oceana facility is the single radar approach control
%faci.itJ available to Commander Naval Air Forces, U. S.
 Ptlantic Fleet, witil sufficient air traffic volume to train
 naval air traffic controllers 1n an environment simulating
 that enco ntered at sea.
     Consolidating San Joaquin Valley approach control require-
ments with the Navy at NAS Lemoore ms a means of achieving
savings ,gas studied by the FAA in 1971. This study identii.ed
the Navy as the predominant usar for the approach control
services then provided by th.a FAA from this naval f; '.lity.
Thi/ study resulted in the relocation of these FAA personnel
tr the smaller Fresno approach control facility. The personnel
zosts incurred in support of naval requirements were a signifi-
cant factor in this decision. After the departure of the FAA
from NAS Lemoore the Navy assumed approach ccntrol responsi-
bility at that station. The facility now provides the Commander
Naval Air Force, U. S. Pacilic Fleet with a radar approach
oontrol capability suitable for training naval a.r traffic
controllers in a simulated carrier environment. The NAS Lemoore
facility has been upgraded since the FAA's departure in order
to support the large volume of air traffic and meet fleet pilot
and controller training nerds    The facility is no longer
adequate in si:e or equipment so absorb FAA personnel and would
require significant facility expansion to fulfill the GAO
proposal. During CY 1975 the Fresno facility handled 61,084
operations while the Navy handled 254,818 operations at NAS
LP moore.

                  (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

                  (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

    Page 40.
    Recommendation: ...Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration, in coordination with Secretary of Defense,
establish procedures for evaluating the potential of consoli-
dating the management of adjacent...airspace...
    Comment: In keeping with the previously cited MOA and
Navy requirements to exercise approach control authority for
purposes of training and readiness, the Navy will actively
participate in future evaluations of the potential of consoli-
dating airspace management, as requested.

                  (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

    Page 54.
     Finding: Redundant precision NAVAIDS.   (Automatic
 'IAding System (ACLS) and Precision Approach Radar (PAR))
    Comment: ACLS was installed ashore to provide simulated
carrier approach training on one runway at each of the five
Master jet hases. ACLS systems have not yet been authorized
as shorebas d instrument landing systems, however, the Navy
is presently reviewing ACLS to determine its suitability as
a shorebased landing system. Of concern are indications of
shortened range in heavy percipitation and erratic signal
return frct non-ACtS equipped aircraft when used in a talk-
dowy :_ode. Further, material support levels necessary to

APPENDIX I                                             APPENDIX I

 permit full reliance upon the system ashore are being
 determined. Upon completion of this review and upon the
 establishment of all-runway capability at each of the five
 locations the Navy intends to thoroughly explore the feasi-
 bility of eliminating PAR at those locations.

                  (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

    Page 61.a
    Conclusion: Military and civilian aviation administrators
have not established effective procedures for coordinating their
navigational aid equipment requirements.
     Comment: Although lack of coordination in the past may
have contributed to the present wide variety of navigational
aids, recent coordination between DOD and FAA on next-
generation navigational aids is well organized and productive.
 She continuing dialogue on the Global Positi.oning System (GPS)
and the National Microwave Le-ding System (NMLS) is expected
to result in development of systems which fully nfeet both
civil and militdry needs and reduce the number of systems in

APPENDIX I                                          APPENDIX I

    Page 61.a
    Conclusion: The Department of Defense is not controlling
the authorization and use of navigational aids to avoid
duplication and assure use only where there is a valid require-

    Comment: Periodic reviews such as those conducted on the
MD"-by the Navy in 1974 are accomplished to eliminate
unnecessary duplication. A review of potentially redundant
 MTAN installations was completed in 1975 and at present,
requirements for airport surveillance radar (ASR) are being
reviewed to eliminate duplicate installations. Military
requirements of each service, including coordination of mission.
equipment, location, and need must be considered in the formu-
lation of requirements for navigation aids. The Navy has
established procedures within the Naval Air Traffic Control,
Air Navigational Aids, and Landing Systems (NAALS) Program
during the last year to insure comprehensive management of
these equipments.
    Page 61.a
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense and the Federal
AViation Adnistration establish effective procedures to
coordinate and avoid the proliferation of redundant equipment.
    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense develop effective
criteria and standards for the authorization and use of naviga-.
tional aid systems at military airfields.
    Conummnt: The Navy -oncurs %ith the need to avoid ths
proliferation of redundant equipment and will actively partici-
pate in the establishment of procedures and standards as
    Page 61.a
    Reccnrendatior: The Secretary should also take action to
deaco.iiion those redundant navigational aid systems...
    Comment: This recommendation is fully supported and as
nated above, the Navy has a continuing program of reevaluation
to determine excessive redundancy and will vigorously pursue
saih action in the future.
    d. Chapter 6.   Consolidation of Aviation Weather Facilities
is Feasible
    Page 70.

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDTX I

      Pinding: Navy weather stations near a Federal Aviation
 Administrationr Flight Service Station.
     Comment: Navy Weather Environmental Support Detachments
 (NWSE5T-TAA Flight Service Stations (FSS), and National
 Weather Service Forecast Offices (WSFO) perform dissimilar
 functions. FAA pilot weather briefers are not authorized
 to provide forecasts, but make local observations and provide
 pilots with current and forecast aviation weather provided by
 WSFO's. WSFO personnel provide a range of weather products,
 including aviation forecasts, to FSS's and NWSED's.

     The responsibilities of the NWSED at a naval aviation instal-
 lation are considerably broader than those of the FSS. In
'addition to airways weather, the NWSED provides several
 environmental data needs unique to naval missions not readily
 available from an FSS or a WSFO, related to ocean acoustic
 propagatir-, atmospheric refractivity, magnetics, ballistics,
 etc. To Dfectively provide these weather needs, naval
 weather personnel require specialized training beyond that
 provided for FSS personnel. To insure technical proficiency
 and shore assignment opportunity for these. skilled personnel
 it is essential that they function regularly in the military
 weather environment, Although the Navy has examined the
 possible consolidation of weather service functions at certain
 adjacent naval air installations, such consolidations, if
 accomplished, would require the resolution of problems relatea
 to prowiding graphic weather depictions, automated flight plans,
 classified weather briefs, and shipboard training requirements"
 from one station to .another. Although NAS Norfolk and NTS
 Oceana are proximate, there is a high degree of variability
 in actual weather experienced, particularly in marginal
 situations. NAS Norfolk provides 61,000 briefings per year.
 RAS Ocerna provides 26,000 briefingF per year. Because of
 this high volume consolidation of these facilities appears
 economica.ly disadvantageous.

    Pa"s   9.

     Coaclusion:  ...a lucrative opportunity for the Depart-
*mentsoFiDef-ense and C^mmerce and the FJa to pool resources...
 to enhance efficiency ;.d economy.

    Comnt: The Navy agrees that opportunities exist for
exchanging airways weather information with certain civil
activities and tactical weather information with certain
military activities, in locations where the nature of supported
military aviation operations permits. The Navy agrees that
observations should be made by Navy weather personnel at each

                                                              APPENDIX I

                                                      be achieved,
  station. Although further consolidation may                 require-
                                              the  general
  in certain cases at certain locations,                     of   the
 ment for observation and forecasting       capabilities
                                                      be   maintained.
  NWSED's at each naval air installation, must
       At the present time, extensive cooperative        efforts are
                                                  naval    air facili-
  already in being. A total of 17 domestic                        remote
                                        receive   or  provide
  ties (and others overseas) eithe£
                                   others   are  being    considered
  aviation weather support, and                                  of lrmy,
  for it. Current arrangementb include participation    Corps,    civil
  Air Force, Coast Guard, Treasury, FAA, Marine
  and state government Lem:ents, as well as other                placed
  activities. The environmental support requirementsprovide
 ,upon the NWSED's are such that    they   can  generally
  needed support to other agencies, but, without             environ-
  personnel education   and training   and  an  expanded
                      the reverse  is  not  true.    Exanpies     of
  mental data base,                                              Fleet
  special inter-agency cooperation include the
                                                       Weather Service
  Weather Central in Hawaii where two National    and  the adapting
  personnel assist   in computer  programming
                                      National   Weather     Service in
  of Navy products for use by the                  the   Navy   Fleet
   the Pacific area. At   Suitland,   Maryland,
                              operational     sea  ice   analyses    to
  Weather Facility provides                           National
  NOAA and also backup communications for the              to consoli-
   Meteorological Center. The Navy will continue
                                              but  primary     lavy
   date weather support where practical,                    fleet   environ-
                                          provision    of
   concerns must include the adequate                   and  classifica-
   mental support, aviation  weather    capability,
                                                       of which may be
   tion of certa.n naval operations, the nature
   revealed through weather information.
       Page 79.

      Recommendation:  ...The Secretary of Commerce direct the
                                                  and Support
  Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services
  Research to review in coordination with the Secretaries of
  Defense and Transportation the aviation weather requirements
  (I the military and civilian communities.
                                          of federal weather
        Comment: Coordination and review in
   activities has been  quite productive    the past. There is
                                                      future. The
   every indication that this will continue in the of military
   tIavy will actively participate in future' reviews
   and civilian weacher requirements, as requested.

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
                     (OSD CASE NO. 4433)

 Page 8:
 Reference lines four, five, and six, which refer to isolation
 of mi.itary facilities. The Air Force has worked with the FAA
 over tte years to consolidate air traffic control services to
 support the civil and Air Force communities, when such consolida-
 tion proved to be safe and economical. The result is that the
 FPAP provides approach control service at 41 Air rorce bases,
 while 38 Air Force approach controls serve some 119 satellite
 civil airports. The remoteness of many Air Force airfields
 require that they function in isolation. The Air Force is
 willing to absist the FAA in developing further consolidation
 of approach control facilities, if such studies would prove
 to be more safe and economical, and at the same time insure
 national defense commitments are met.,

 Page 191
 A.eference first paragraph that- states Transient Maintenance
 manpower is provided for night shift operation even though
 there are no transient landings. It is Air Force policy to
 provide manpower based on either workload or wartime require-
 ments, whichever is higher. For transient maintenance,
 transient landings constitute the majority of workloads.
 The manhours of actual workload determine the manpower
 required. The Air Force does not authorize Transieint
 Maintenonce manpower solely on the basis of airfield
 operating hours, although minimum manning may occasionally,
 be warranted due to team size requirements and the low
 number of Transient landings 3xperien.ced at a specific
 Shift requirements must necestarily be determined by local
 base management officials lue i-.transient landing demands.
 However, these shift requirements are taken from the manpower
 earned from the actual number of landings.

 Page 24:
 Reference recommendation that the Secretary of Defense take
 action to identify and curtail airport functions and servicpi.
 Recommendation has been previously implGmbntJd by the Air Fcrce.
 Reduction of airfield operating hours has been a continuing

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

 project since 1972; since then, 37 bases have reduced various
 support functions from 24 hours a day to 16 hours or less.
 While volume of air traffic is a reasonable criteria for
 determining operating hours of civil facilities, it is
 essential that operating hours for military air traffic
 control facilities be adequate to support the base mission.
 The Air Force is continuously striving to consolidate func-
 tions and reduce hours in the interest of cost savings, but
 the requirements to maintain a specified defense posture must
 take priority.

 Page 36:

 Reference paragraph one and two, referring to merger of
 approach control operations in the Central Valley of
 California. The consolidation of facilities does, in
 some cases, permit more efficient use of airspace and
 resources. However, any consolidation of specific
 facilities must resvlt frc'm a detailed evaluation at
 the local level. This evaluatinn rmust consider services
 required, radar/communications coverage, tiraffic volume
 and flow, space and equipment availability, etc. The
 Travis/McClellan and Castle/Lemocre recommended consolida-
 tions are not the result of such an evaluation,  In the
 case of Travis/McClellan, an official at FAA Headquarters
 stated that this consolidation had been considered several
 times in the past and rejected each time as too cumberscme.
                     (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

                    Although the consolidations mentioned
 in the report, as well as others, may be possible, the
 economics and operational advantages alluded to must be
 regarded as suspect until validated by the detailed
 evaluation process. The Air Force is willing to partici-
 pate in any evaluation pertaining to the consolidation of
 the above facilities.

  Page 40:

  Rnference recommendation pertaining to consolidating approach
  controls. The Air Force concurs with the recommendation that
  the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, in
  coordination with the Secretary of Defense, establish proce-
  dures for evaluating the potential for consolidating the
  management of adjacent approach/departure airspace and take
  action to consolidate where practical. Although this report

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

  seems to "zero in" on adjacent civil/military and military/
  military facilities and airspace, the evaluation procedures
  should address not only these, but the civil/civil situation.
  Because of the large number of civil facilities, the potential
  consolidation savings could be significant.

  The Air Force must be very cautious when studying consolida-
  tions, to insure that we do not become overly committed to a
  CONUS civilian controller force for the following reasons:
  (a) The Air Force has no control over a civil force;
  (5) The civil air traffic controllers are unionized and
  can participate in "job actions", which could preclude us
  from accomplishing our training mission; (c) The Air Force
\ must maintain an adequate, weMl-trained CONUS controller
  force and appropriate facilities to insure that we can support
  all contingency and combat situations; and (d) The civilian
  cont-oller force cannot be committed to the combat or c¢,ntin-
  gency situation.

  Page 47:

  Reference the second paragraph regarding the need for
  standardization of civil and military equipments. The
  VKF omnidirectional range (VOR) and Tactical Air Naviga-
  tion (TACAN) were not simultaneous developments. The
  TACAN followed the VOR for several significant reasons.
  The -OR could not satisfy military tactical/mobility
  requirements because of siting problems, it is unreliable
  for seaborne forces, saturation of the Very High Frequency
  (VHF) Spectrum prohibited expansion of the VOR to meet
  navigational aid requirements, and the VOR did not provide
  distance measuring equipment (DME).

  Page 48:

  Reference first paragraph which states 81 Air Force and
  three other military installations, etc. The Air Force
  maintains 32 VHF omnidirectional ranges (VOR), of which
  19 are for support of T-37 operational requirements.

  Page 51:

  Reference first paragraph referring to adjusting the
  instrument landing system (ILS) renovation schedule.
  There is an urgent need to replace the old tube type ILS's
  because of their age and lack of a capability to provide

APPENDIX I                                          APPENDIX I

 logistical support beyond calendar year 1977. These ILS's
 are being installed on the primary instrument runways.
 Secondly, one of the major controlling factors for removal
 of the precision approach radars (PAR) is the aircraft
 avionics. The PARs will be required until the installation
 of the ILS receivers in all of the aircraft, which is not
 expected to be complete until 1980.

                  (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

 Page 58:

 Reference line five referring to one command listing 81
 Air Force installations requiring the VHF omnidirectional
 range (VOR) capability. It should be noted that the Air
 Force only maintains 19 VORs for the primary support of
 the T-37 t:aininq aircraft.

 Page 61:

 Reference second paragrap!h referring to the nondirectional
 beacons (NDBs). The Air Force will operate approximately
 40 NDBs after January 1977, of which only three will be in the'
 CONUS. Air Force requirements for these beacons are primarily
 for operation in the Arctic regions and other remote areas. As
 long as the Air Force mission requires operations in these areas,
 the NDBs will be required. Air crews must maintain proficiency
 in the use of this navigational aid to respond to worldwide

 Page 61a:

 Reference recommendations. The Air Force will be happy to
 meet with the Federal Aviation Administrator (FAA) to
 further improve and refine present coordination procedures
 on support requirements. standardization of equipment, and
 eliminate redundancy, if any. There are several factors that

                                                         APPENDIX I

  must be recognized.   First, the Air Force operates airfields
  in support of the national defense and    must maintain naviga-
                                   and  recover   forces in all
  tional aids necessary to launch
                            Air Force cannot establish     criteria
  weather conditions. The
                        that  used by  the  civil  community,  i.e.,
  and standards such as                                 of  passengers
  the number of arrivals and departures, the number
  enplaning and deplaning.   It should be noted that the Air Force
                                                   two years, attempt-
  has been negotiating with the FAA for almost         the Air
  ing to get the necessary landing  aids   to support
                         hosted by civil   airports  that  do not
  National Guard forces                                   Secondly,
  meet FAA navigational aid establishment criteria. aids for training
  the Air Force must maintain some navigational
                                       combat  environment,
  only - those that may be used in a
  and other contingencies.

                     (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

                                            to decommission naviga-
  The Air Force w1ll continue its program       necessary. This
  tional aid systlcms that are not absolutely
                                                 ¢'f over forty
  program has resulted in the decommissioning       There is a
  navigational aids within the past 12   months.
                                  navigational  aids   and those
  distinction between redundant                      are
                                 navigational  aids
  aids "rarely used." Similar                               There
  sometimes located in close geographical proximity.
                                                 airfield,    and any
  may be a mixture  of landing  aids at a given
                                                       This  situation
  two of the aids may provide like capabilities.       Requirements
  does not necessarily mean there is redundancy.
                                               in  assigned   aircraft,
  are determined based on  mission,  avionics
  and training requirements. The siting of navigational
                                                    is  extremely
  to obtain the lowest weather landing minimums reach a geograph-
  critical. A navigational aid may be used
  ical area in which several   airfields are located, but it
                                                  approaches to the
  normally cannot be sited to provide landing within that area.
  multiple runways serving  all  the airfields

   Page 77:
                                               base organizations
   Reference last paragraph referring t. other
                               observer function.  Do not concur
   being tasked to perform the
                                        observations should be
   with the recommendation that weather

APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I

 made by tower controllers or other on base personnel.  As
 stated by the GAO, the concept of tower operators tb:ing
 surface weather observations was thoroughly studiej in 1975.
 It was originally estimated that a manpower savings of 155
 spaces would result; however, the study results showed only
 a 54 space savings.  The study stated, "consolidation of
 surface weather observing and tower controller duties are
 no longer considered valid.
                     (See GAO note 1, p. 85.)

                              Further, it is not practical
 for other base personnel to make weather observations for
 the same rationale as the tower people.

 Page 79:

 Refereice recommendation to eliminate redundancy and
 consoliuate functions. Agree with the recommendation
 that the three regions identified in the report (Norfolk,
 Sacramento, and Honolulu), and others of a similar nature,
 should be examined for potential savings of'weather resources.
 The Air Force will continue to work to conserve its weather
 resources, and with other agencies to avoid unnecessary
 Presently the Air Force is embarked on an orderly program
 to make its weather service more efficient. The initial
 step was to combine the weather forecaster and observer
 career fields. The change is well along, the necessary
 t-aining is being accomplished with little personnel
 tu-b-lence, and the program will be completed by 1980. The
 next step, now being readied by MAJCOM planners for Air
 Staff evaluation, is a multiphased effort to automate the
 weather sensors and short range ter-ir.al forecasts to the
 degree possible. This program is similar to FAA and
 National Weather Service (NWS) plans and will use their
 development experience and instrumentation to the degree
 possible. Full operation of this program is expected in
 the mid-80s.
 Costs of these programs will be offset by officer to enlisted
 conversions and significant manpower reductions. In the
 meantime, other efforts are underway to conserve manpower
 associated with the weather service:
      (.) The expected transfer of weather rmintenance people
 to the Air Force Communications Service will produce savings.

APPENDIX I                                             APPENDIX I

       (2) A MNlitary Airlift Command review of all Weather
 Service functions was just completed which resulted in an
 across the board reduction in weather manpower. Further
 reductions of this nature do not appear feasible.
      (3) Reduced services at Richards-Gebaur AFB are now
 being staffed by Headquarters AFCS.
       (4) Tbhe FAA plan to modernize its FAA System offers an
 opportunity to provide more remote weather services,
 be watched by the Air Force to realize economics whereand will
 It is pertinent to state that in 1973 and 1974, tests
 conducted respectively in the San Antonio and San Bernardino
 areas to determine if an around-the-clock remote forecast
 service would be adequate. The goal was to reduce manpower.
 Results of these tests showed degraded   terminal forecasts
 services, and recommended that on-base face-to-face serviceand
 be reestablished (which it was). H't ver, the tests
 "that remote briefings to aircrews "re adequate, if gooddid reveal
 nications were available, the cre 4 s educatqd, and the     commu-
 were standardized."
The primary objective for the operation of Air Force base
weather services is to serve the facility during the
a majority of the aircrew activity takes place. During
periods of low activity and when the base is closed for
flying, the residual weather service is limited to what
essential for resource protection. The occasional need is
for a briefing, and all the forecast requirements are
essentially handled from a designated remote location.
These programs are described in Air Force Weather Service
(AWS) Regulations 105-21 and 105-28. Most of the designated
reote facilities must operate around-the-clock
mission demands, e.g., facilities which support because
force.                                              SAC  alert

Air Force meteorologists might augment the Flight Service
Station (FSS); however, this would add a new function
the facility--forecasting. In such an arrangement, terminal
forecasts, weathor warning, and briefings could be provided.
However, this arrangement would duplicate the inbeing
forecast system and could result in additional manpower


                                                       economies by
 There may be an opportunity to derive manpowerinto  the  National
 either integrating Air Force forecasters              arrangements
 Weather Service (NWS), or by   interdepartmental
 with NWS.   Since remote service is now provided       during slack
                     savings could  only  be  made  during   the normal
 periods, manpower                       these  periods,    it is
 base flying hours. However, luring
 standard Air Force procedure to:
                                                   so operations
       (1) Give real time weather assistance
                                        of flying   periods.
 people can make cost effective use
                                                      that Air Force
       (2) Provide for safety of flight. Note
                                                        to airline
 personnel are relatively inexperienced compared
                                            skilled (forecast-t.er/
  The program to make weather NCOs dual manpower.
                  reduce weather  station                 Since the
  observer) will
                                       specialist    to  observe
  Air Force requires an on-the-spot          flying, this same
  environmental conditions during active          period forecasts.
  dual skilled specialist can make the short   if a NWS facility
  There would be additional manpower cost
  was also responsible for the same    forecast%

  Page 81:
                                           high level task
  Reference the GAO recommendation that a       aviation require-
  force be established to plan and coordinate
  ments to include, for example, the evaluation    of support
             in  geographical areas having multiple Federal
  activities                                          where possible.
  involvement to consolidate support capabilities
                                            (initiated in 1968) to
  However, the DOD has an ongoing program         property operations
  evaluate such support as it pertains to         to eliminate/
  and maintenance. Therefore, any   initiatives
                                facilities  should   complement the
  consolidate aviation support              savings might accrue
  current DOD efforts. Although manpower                  military
  from impl   -I.-tion of the GAO recommendation, such
                                             in  the  affected
  reductions .nu,. not reduce the Air Force
  specialti   'ow    the level required to support the National
  Strategy c. a-dversely impact operational

  GAO notes.    1. Portions of this letter  have been deleted
                   because they are no longer relevant to
                   matters discussed in  this report.
                                                    may not cor-
                2. Page references in this appendix
                   respond to pages of this final report.

APPENDIX II                                                        APPENDIX II

                           WASHINGTON, D.C.   20590

                                                  .          bomber 9, 1976

  Nr. Henry Eschwege
  Cowmunity and Economic Development Division
  U. S. General Accounting Office
  Washington, D. C. 20548
  Dear Vr. Eschwege:
  This is inresponse to your letter of August 11, 1976, requesting
  comments from the Department of Transportation on the General
  Accounting Office draft report entitled "More Effective Use of
  Aviation Resources in the United States Can Be Achieved," dated
  July 1976. We have reviewed the report in detail and prepared a
  Department as Transportation reply.
  Two copies of the reply are enclosed.

                                                  William S. Heffelfiger
APPENDIX   II                                               A 4'PENDIX    II


                      GAO DRAFT REPORT OF JULY 1976

                       SUMMARY OF GAO FINDINGS AND
 The General Accounting Office (GAO) states that many military and
 civil airports duplicate capabilities, functions and facilities. As
 a result, a potential for consolidation and/or elimination of
 unnecessary Government investment exists. The GAO found that there
 is no effective procedure for civil agencies and the militazy on a
 collective basis to systematically review requirements for the
 development and continued operation of aviation support functions.
 Examples cited by t'he GAO were: (1) the military services and the
 Federal Aviation Atministration (FAA) are each independently
 operating radar approach control facilities to manage airspace
 bordering one another even though each facility individually has the
 capability to manage the total assigned airspace, (2) the military
 aLd the FAA are independently developing redundant navigational aids,
 and the military maintains unnecessary navigational equipment, (3)
 the Department of Defense (DOD), the FAA and the Department of
 Comrce are not reviewing the potential to shbare facilities and
 capabilities of their respective weather activities in close
 geographical proximity to each other, and (4) military airfields are
 operating and/or providing support services during periods when there
 is virtually little or no air traffic.
 The GAO recommends that the FAA, DOD, and the Secretary of Commerce
 establish a high-level task force to identify ways in which the three
 agencies can plan and coordinate aviation requirements to assure
 maimnum effectiveness and minimum investment and to take advantage of
 the supporting capabilities of both the military and civilian
 aviation community. For the specific functions reviewed by the GAO,
 it recoumends that (1) the FAA and DOD establish the means for
 consolidating approach control facilities where feasible, (2) the FAA
 and DOD coordinate and standardize equipment requirements,   (3)   the
 Secretary of Commerce direct the Federal Coordinator for
 Isteorological Services and Supporting Research to review, in
 coordination with the )OD and the Secr.etarv cf Transportati.n. t-.
 aviation veathr requirements of the military and civilian
 co=nRrities to identify and eliminate redundant capabilities, (4) the
 DOD Ldentify and curtail unneeded airfield operations, develop

APPENDIX II                                                   APPENDIX II
 eafective criteria and standards for the authorization and vuse of
 aavigational aid systems at military airfields, and deccmaisvion
 redundant systems, and (5) the Secretary of the Navy step the
 currently proposed construction of a radar approach traffic control
 facility at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and instead use one of the available

                          GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
 We agree that increased emphasis needs to be placed on more effective
 planning and coordination of aviation requirements among FAA, DOD, and
 Cor.'srca. However, we do not believe that the GAO recommendatir- to
 eusL~blish yet another high-level task force is an appropriate
 soluti2n. We feel that the problems witch GAO identifies in its
  'eport can be effectively dealt with through existing mechanisms, such
 a:    (1) the DOD Advisory Committee on Federal AviAtion which reports
 on DOD requirements in aviation matters; (2) the recently issued Air
 Force Traffic Control and Landing Systems Plan which is intended to
 provide FAA with the data necessary for the development of equipment
 comon to both civil and military air traffic ;cntrol; (3) the Joint
 FAA/DOD Review Group's efforts to improve safety of operations and
 reduction of the midair collision potential; and (4) various other FAA
 and DOD coordination efforts, both formal and informal, to work
 together jointly to ensure that the National Aviation System meets
 civil and military aviation needs.

 It should be pointed out that DOD has historically taken the position
 that at many locations military provision of approach control, landing
 and navigation facilities, and weather services is vital to defense
 needs. We do not feel that the FAA is in a position to make Judgments
 on matters involving the determination of national defense interests
 by the DOD.

                           (See GAO note.)

                                Acting    uty Administrator

GAO note:   This portion of the letter has been deleted because
            it is no longer relevant to the matters discussed
            in this report.

APPENDIX III                                             APPENDIX III

                           ( '   IUNITED  STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
                                 Nationsl Oceanic and AtmospherEc Administration
                                 Rockviile. Md. 20052

    September 15, 1976

    Mr. Henry Eechwege
    Director, Co.amunity and Lconomic
      Development Division
    U.S. General Accounting Office
    Washington, D.C. 20548
    Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the
    draft report, "More Effective Use of Aviation Resources in
    tha Ur,ted States Can Be Achieved."

    Iy comments are restricted to Chapter 6, "Consolidation of
    Aviation Weather Facilities is Feasible," and Chapter 7,
    "The Need for Emphasis by Top Level Managers." I concur
    with the recommendations set forth on pages 79 and 81,
    and an willing to work with the Departments of Defense and
    Transportation to achieve further f'nrovements in economy
    and efficiency in the provision of weather services.
    Because of the existence of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
    tration (FAA) long range plan for modernization of the
    Plight Service System and for other reasons, the Federal
    Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting
    lasearch has begun to consider problems pertaining to
    aviation weather service involving the National Weather
    Service and the FAA. The advent of this GAO Report provides
    the basis for a natural extension of these considerations
    to include the Department of Defense.


APPENDIX IV                                            APPENDIX IV

                       PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS



                                             Tenure of office
                                             From          To

                      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Harold Brown                   Jan.     1977    Present
    Donald H. Rumsfeld                 Nov.     1975    Jan. 1977
    James R. Schlesinger               July     1973    Nov. 1975
    William P. Clements, Jr.
       (acting)                        Apr.     1973    July    1973

    Charles W. Duncan, Jr.             Jan.     1977    Present
    William P. Clements, Jr.           Jan.     1973    Jan. 1977

    Dale R. Babione (acting)           Jan.     1977    Present
    Frank A. Shrontz                   Feb.     1976    Jan. 1977
    John J. Bennett (acting)           Mar.     1975    Present
    Arthur I. Mendolia                 June     1973    Mar. 1975

    Fred P. Wacker                     Sept. 1976       Present
    Terence E. McClary                 June 1973        Aug. 1976

                      DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

    Martin R. Hoffman                  Aug.     1975    Present
    Howard H. Callaway                 July     1973    Aug.  1.975

APPENDIX IV                                         APPENDIX IV

                                        Tenure of office
                                        From          To

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (continued)

    Vacant                           Jan.    1977   Present
    Norman R. Augustine              May     1975   Jan. 1977
    Vacant                           Apr.    1975   May   1975
    Herman R. Staudt                 Oct.    1973   Apr.  1975

    Edwin Greiner (acting)           Dec.    1976   Present
    Harold L. Brownman               Oct.    1974   Dec. 1976
    Edwin Greiner                    Aug.    1974   Oct.  1974
    Edwin Greiner (acting)           May     1974   Aug. 1974
    Vincent P. Huggard (acting)      Apr.    1973   May   1974

    Lt. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom      July    1974   Present
    Lt. Gen. E. M. Flanagan, Jr.     Jan.    1973   July 1974

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

    Gary D. Penisten (acting)        Feb.    1977    Present
    Joseph T. McCullum               Feb.    1977    Feb. 1977
    David R. MacDonald               Jan.    1977    Feb.  1977
    J. William Middendorf            June    1974    Jan.  1977
    J. William Middendorf (acting)   Apr.    1974    June 1974
    John W. Warner (acting)          May     1972    Apr.  1974

    Vacant                           Feb.    1977    Present
    David R. MacDonald               Sept.   1976    Feb. 1977
    John Bowers (acting)             July    1976    Aug. 1976
    Vacant                           Mar.    1976    June 1976
    David S, Potter                  Aug.    1974    Mar. 1976
    Vacant                           June    1974    Aug. 1974
    J. William Middendorf            June    1973    June 1974

 APPENDIX IV                                         APPENDIX IV

                                            Tenure of office
                                            From          To

    Thomas C. Reed                    Jan.    1976   Present
    James W. Plummet (acting)         Nov.    1975   Jan. 1976
    Dr. John L. McLucas               July    1973   Nov. 1975
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)       Feb.     1977   Present
    Hon. J. Gordon Kapp              Mar.     1976   Jan. 1977
    Frank A. Shrontz                 Oct.     1973   Feb.  1976
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)       Aug.     1973   Oct. 1973
    Lewis E. Turner                  Jan.     1973   Aug.  1973
    Lt. Gen. Charles G. Buckingham   Sept. 1975      Present
    Lt. Gen. J. R. DeLuca            Oct. 1973       Sept. 1975
    Lt. Gen. D. L. Crow              Apr. 1969       Oct.  1973

    Brock Adams                      Jan.     1977   P:esent
    William T. Coleman, Jr.          Mar.     1975   Jan. 1977
    John T. Barnum (acting)          Feb.     1975   Mar.  1975
    Claude S. Brinegar               Feb.     1973   Feb. 1.975

    John L. McLucas                  Nov.    1975    Present
    James E. Dow (acting)            Apr.    1975    Nov. 1973
    Alexander P. Butterfield         Mar.    1973    Mar.  1975

                                                   APPENDIX IV

                                       Tenure of office
                                       From          To

                  DEPARTMENT Oi COMMERCE

                                    Jan.    1977    Present
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE:              Jan.    1977    Present
    Juanita M. Kreps
                                    Feb.    1976    Jan.    1977
    Elliott L. Richardion                           Feb. 1976
                                    May     1975
    Rogers C. B. Morton             Mar.    1975    Apr. 1975
    John F. Tabor (acting)          Feb.    1973    Feb. 1975
    Frederick B. Dent

                   AND SUPPORTING RESEARCH
                                     June   1975    Present
    Dr. Edward S. Epstein            July   1973    Dec.  1975
    Dr. Clayton E. Jensen