Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities of Civil Reserve Air Fleet

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-04-06.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         DOCUBMET RESUME
01182 - [1051919J4b          d
Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities of Civil
Reserve Air Fleet. LCD-77-207; -133025. April 6, 1977. 21 pp. +
appendices (14 pp.).
Report to Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Senate Cossittee on
Appropriations; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.
Issue Area: Military Preparedness Plans: Transportation in
    Emergency Situations (804); Facilities and aterial
    Management: Federal Transportation of Things (704);Personnel
    Management and Compensation: All Volunteer Fcrce eeds
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Function: ational Defense: Department of Defense -
    Military (except procurement & contracts) (051).
Organization Concerned: Department of the Air arcce; Department
    of Defense.
Congressional Relevance: Senate Coaittee on ' .ropriations.
Authority: P.L. 94-286.

           GAO reviewed an Air Force study which concluded that
its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft through
military aerial ports should not be changed despite a Senate
Committee on Appropriations request that the Air Force consider
contributions that could be provided by the use cf commercial
airport facilities. Findings/Conclusions: The Air Force
understated both the cargo processing capability of the
coasezcial terminals and the potential personnel savings
resulting from their use. Use of the commercial terminal
facilities   for the ovement of military cargo would reduce the
Military Airlift Comman4s overall staffing requirements
significantly. If, during full obilization, all commercially
compatible resupply cargo ere transferred to commercial aerial
ports, the staffing could be reduced by several hundred persons.
Any operational problems caused by the rerouting of military
cargo through commercial airports could be olved through
advance planning. Recommendations: The Senate Ccemittee on
Appropriations should direct the Air Force to develop a
comprehensive plan to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet cargo
terminal facilities. (QM)


       11,;\., ON APPROPRIATIONS
       t'ou rX
                    THE UNITED STATES

                 Air Force Contingency Plans
                 Should Include Facilities
                 Of Civil Reserve Air Fleet

                 Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers have a signifi-
                 cant cargo processing capability which could
                 be used during time of contingency opera-
                 tions. Use of this capability would reduce
                 military aerial port staffing requirements and
                 alleviate . urrent shortage in reserve aerial
                 port personnel.

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                                                     I RelationP

                 LCD-77-207                                         A P R IL   C, 1 9 7 7
                            WASHINGTON, D.C.   2054


The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Dear Mr.   Chairman:

      In response to your request of May 26, 1976, we have
evaluated the Air Force's assessment of the feasibility of
 ising Civil Reserve Air Fleet terminal facilities to off-
set Military Airlift Command aerial port staffing require-
ments.   We also inquired into the extent that reserve
aerial port squadrons were considered by the Air Force and
the Department of Defense when Public Law 94-286 was being
formulated to facilitate activating the reserves.

     At the request of your office we have  lso included
certain adjustments to staffing requirements figures in-
cluded in our February 2, 1976, letter to your Committee.

     As specified by your office, we did not submit our
report to the Department of the Air Force for formal com-
ment but did discuss the results of our evaluation with
Air Force officials in some detail.  Their views on our
evaluation are included in this report.

                                    Si         el: your

                                    Comptroller General
                                    of the United States


            The Senate Committee on Appropriations asked
            the Air Force to consideL contributions that
            could be provided by commercial airpcrt faci-
            lities operated by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
            as a possible offset to aerial port staffing
            by the Military Airlift Commarnd.  In its report
            of May 14, 1976, the Air Force concluded that
            its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet
            aircraft through military aerial ports should
            not be changed.   (,See pp. 1 and 3.)

            However. the Genera] Accounting Office found
            that the Air Force understated both the cargo
            processing capability of the commercial ter-
            minals and the potential peLsonrel savings
            resulting from their use.

            Use    of the commercial terminal facilities for
            the    movement of military cargo would reduce
            the    Military Airlift Command's overall staff-
            ing    requirements significantly, helping to
            ease a shortfall in the reserve airport per-
            sonnel.  It also would allow Civil Reserve Air
            Fleet carriers to continue commercial cargo
            terminal operations which might otherwise be
            either stopped or reduced because of the
            Military Airlift Command's withdrawal of most
            of the carriers' long-range cargo aircraft
            for operation through mil.tary aerial ports.
            (See p. 3.)
            Data provided to GAO by the Civil Reserve Air
            Fleet carriers showed that substantial com-
            mercial cargo processing capability could be
            made available to tne military during all
            stages of contingency operations.  Public Law
            94-286 was passed, however, which facilitated
            activating the reserves, and it appears that
            reservists could now be used during con-
            tingencies requiring part mobilization; the
            commercial facilities would not be needed

                                                           LCD-' 7-207
IML- Sh1t. Upon removal, the report
cover date should be noted hereon.    i
until full mobilization.   If full mobiliza-
tion were required, more commercial capability
would be available.   See p. 4.)
GAO estimates that if, during full mobili-
zation, all commercially compatible resupply
cargo were transferred to commercial aerial
ports, the Military Airlift Command's over-
all staffing could be reduced by several
hundred persons. This reduction would help
to reduce the shortage of reserve aerial port
staff, which, as of September 1976, was 900.
(See pp. 5 & 8.)
GAO did not obtain formal written comments
on its report but did disciss the results
of its evaluation in some detail with Air
Force officials. These officials again
expressed the opinion that the potential
advantages of using commercial air ter-
minals for wartime resupply cargo would be
outweighed by difficulties in managing
the timely movement of the crgo diverted
to these civil terminals. (See p. 12.)

GAO recognizes that the erouting of military
cargo through commercial airports would create
some oerational problems, but, after discus-
sion with the military and carrier personnel
who would be directly involved in such an opera-
tion, it believes that such problems could be
solved through advance planning. GAO reccntmends
that the Committee direct the Air Force to
develop a comprehensive plan to use the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet facilities. (See pp. 8 & 16,)




   1       INTRODUCTION                                 1
               CRAF program                             1
               Scope of review                          2

               CRAF cargo terminal capability           3
               Aerial port personnel requirements
                 could be met thrcugh use of CRAF
                 terminals                              5
               Operational problems associated
                 with use of CRAF ports                 8
               Adequacy of MAC questionnaires          12
               Air Force officials' comments and
                 GAO's evaluation                      12
               Conclusions                             15
               Recommendation                          16

             ACTIVATED UNDER PUBLIC LAW 94-286         17

             IN EARLIER GAO REPORT                     19
               Additional requirements                 19


    I      Schedule of carriers and aircraft com-
             mitted to international CRAF as of
             June 30, 1976                              22

   II      Carrier estimates of their cargo
             terminal surge capability                  25

  III      Comparison of methodologies used by
             MAC and GAO to determine the number
             of CRAF flights and quantities of
             cargo transferable to CRAF terminals       27

       IV    Comparison of MAC- and GAO-computed
               workloads transferable from each
               MAC port
        V    Comparison of cargo to be transferred
               from MAC aerial ports with capabili-
               ties of nearby CRAF ports
       VI    Comparison of Air Force- and GAO-
               determined requirement for liaison
      VII    Air Force estimate of strategic
               port manpower requirements at other
               than main aerial ports
  VIII      Air Force estimate of staffing
              off-station support of MAC/JCSfor
      IX    Air Force estimate of staffing
              increased anti-hijack and terminal
              security procedures at strategic
              aerial ports                            35

AFB         AiL Force Base
CRAF        Civil Reserve Air Fleet
DOD         Department of Defense
GAO         General Accounting Office
JCS         Joint Chiefs of Staff
SAC         Military Airlift Command
                           CHAPTER 1


     The Senate Committee on Appropriations, in its
                                                     bill,   asked
on the 1976 Department of Defense appropriations
                              contributions that couldCivil  be
the Air Force to consider the
                          facilities  operated   by   the
provided by civil airport
Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) as a possible offset to                 On
Airlift Command (MAC) aerial port staffing   requirements.
                                               assessment     of
May 14, 1976, the Air Force reported on its dated May 26,
CRAF cargo terminal capability. In a letter
                                                   the Air Force
1976, the Committee requested that weto evaluate
                                         which  reserve    aerial
study and also determine the extent
                                            by  the   Department
port squadron activations were considered                     to
of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force in studies relating  1976,  a
                                            May   14,
possible uses of Public Law 94-286, dated
law facilitating the activation of  reserves.

      MAC, the single agency for airlift services within
                                           meet  approved   Joint
is responsible for providing airlift to                  to meet
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contingency plans. MAC plans aircraft.
                                              and  CRAF
this responsibility through use of its own
      The CRAF concept is a coordinated program to
                                          DOD requirements.
the Nation's airlift resources to meet              contrac-
CRAF is composed of U.S. civil air carriers who and support
tually commit themselves to providing operating stated
personnel, facilities, and aircraft to MAC under
conditions.    It makes commercial airlift resources available
for both peacetime and wartime augmentation CRAFof military
                        For planning purposes        is organized
airlift capability.                                   range and
 into Domestic, Alaskan, and International--short
 long range--segments. As of June 30, 1976, MostCRAF included 21
                                                    of the cargo
 air carriers with 316 committed aircraft.                aircraft,
 airlift capability, including all of the long-range of the
 was included in the international segment. A list
                                                          CRAF is
 carriers and aircraft included in the international
 shown in Appendix   I.

 Incremental CRAF acti'      on

       The CRAF program involves three stages of activation:
       1. Stage I, committed expansion, consists of
           airlift capability committed by contract to
          MAC for service when the mil itary airlift
          force cannot meet both deployment and
          other traffic requirements simultaneously.

     2.   Stage II, aiLlift emergency, provides
          additional expansion needed during a major
          airlift emergency not warranting national

     3.   Stage III, national emergency, provides up
          to full CRAP capability during national
          emergencies declared by the President.

     Airlift requirements for each CRAF stage are based on
JCS approved contingency plans.
Senior Lodger

     When the CRAF program is implemented, carriers may be
called upon to provide air traffic support at their commer-
cial facilities. A principal air carrier, designated the
senior lodger, controls this support at each civil airport
and may obtain required assistance from other CRAP carriers
at his station.


      In performing the requested evaluation of the Air
Force's assessment of CRAF cargo terminal capability, we
discussed the assessment with ir Force and MAC officials
and reviewed the MAC data which formed the basis of the
Air Force study. We discussed appropriate segments of the
assessment with Army, Navy, and Air Force cfficials of
shipper service control offices which are responsible for
clearing shipments for air movement and for providing
routing instructions for such shipments. Finally, we dis-
cussed CRAF cargo terminal capability and the willingness
of CRAF carriers to process DOD cargo during contingency
operations with 13 of the 17 carriers in the international
CRAF.   These carriers, who provided us with data on their
cargo terminals' processing capabilities, accounted for
253 of the 266 aircraft committed to CRAF.

     We discussed the question of the extent to which )OD
and the Air Force included reserve aerial port squadrpns
in their planning for Public Law 94-286 with official., in
the Office of the Deputy Ab-istant Secretary f Defen e
for Reserve Affairs, anc the Office of Air Force Reserves.

                         CHAPTER 2



     The Air Force concluded that use of CRAF terminal
facilities would not be advantageous to the Departnent of
Defense and that transfer of planned wartime workload to
CRAF terminals would save only about 60 personnel spaces.
They also felt that staff operational problems would arise
leading to lessened aircraft utilization, shipper confu-~
sion, delays in moving cargo, and a massive new management
     The Air Force understated both the cargo processing
capability of the CRAF terminals and the potential per-
sonnel savings resulting from their use. Although there
would be operational problems associated with using the
CRAF terminals, these problems could be resolved through
advance planning.
     Using CRAF terminal facilities would reduce MAC's
overall staffing requirements and help reduce a shortfall
in reserve aerial port personnel.  It also would allow
the CRAF carriers to continue operating terminal facili-
ties which might otherwise have to be closed because of
a shortage of aircraft with which to move commercial

     The Air Force concluded there would be only minimal
CRAF cargo terminal capability available to MAC during a
contingency prior to full obilization.   However, we
collected data from CRAF carriers which show that these
carriers have a significant surge capability which could
be available to MAC during all stages of CRAF operations.
Furthermore, with the passage of Public Law 94-286,
MAC would not need CRAF terminal facilities until full
Air Force posit ioI
     The Air Force stated that commercial airlines posserss
little or no surge capability in their terminal facilities.
It assumed that since the planning of civil cargo terminal

capability is a function of economics, commercial airlines
would invest in only those facilities and equipment needed
to meet current market demands. They stated the diversion
of commercial aircraft o MAC use during the early stages
of CRAF activation (CRAF stages I and II) would not free any
terminal capability for MAC use because the carriers would
continue to move the same amount of commercial cargo as before
the activation by better utilizing their remaining aircraft.
They concluded that only during full mobilization (CRAF stage
III), when the bulk of commercial cargo aircraft would be
diverted to MAC use, would any significant amount of terminal
capability be available to MAC.

CRAF carriers' positions
     Although commercial airlines invest in only those
facilities and equipment needed for forecasted demands,
the scheduled air carriers informed us that they must have
sufficient facilities, equipment, and personnel to meet
peak workloads which occur during short periods of a day
and leave their facilities underutilized for other periods.
Therefore, the commercial airlines possess a substantial
surge capability by fully utilizing their facilities, equip-
ment, and personnel, including overtime. Carrier estimates
of their surge capability--based on estimated maximum
processing capability with present facilities, equipment,
and personnel, and current workloads--are shown in Appen-
dix II.

     The withdrawal of aircraft from commercial operations
further increases this inherent surge capability of the
CRAF carriers. Several carriers informed us that MAC would
require their entire cargo fleet during a Stage III activa-
tion. The carriers told us that under these circumstances,
a large part of their cargo terminal capability would be
available to MAC. Officials of all CRAF carriers expressed
a willingness to participate in cargo terminal operations
to the extent possible.

CRAF capability may not be needed
until Stage lr
     A MAC official stated that since passage of Public Law
94-286 he expects reserve aerial port personnel to be avail-
able during the initial stages of any contingency operation.
Because of the operational problems associated with the use
of CRAF terminals, he expects that MAC would call up avail-
able reserves and make maximum use of their own facilities
before using those of CRAF. Thus, it is possible that CRAF

facilities would not be needed or used until full mobili-
zation.  (See ch. 3 for a synopsis of MAC authority to call
up reserves.)


     The Air Force concluded that a net reduction of 60
personnel positions would be possible during full mobiliza-
tion by transferring cargo workloads from MAC aerial ports
to CRAF trminals. In its study, the reduction of 394
personnel at MAC aerial ports was offset by an addition of
334 military liaison personnel at CRAF ports.

     In contrast, our evaluation shows a possible reduction
of 573 personnel at MAC aerial ports and a need for fewer
military liaisons at CRAF terminals. We estimate that the
potential net savings in personnel from handling cargo at
CRAF terminals instead of MAC aerial ports could be as
great as 500 positions. Even though dollar savings might
be reduced somewhat by the installation of additional com-
puter equipment, we believe savings would still be realized
and more importantly, the reduction would help to lessen
an anticipated shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel
during full mobilization.

Reductions at the MAC aerial ports
     Overall, aerial port staffing requirements were derived
by applying MAC's computerized personnel standards to planned
wartime workloads. Personnel reductions are based upon the
transfer of planned wartime workload fr)m MAC aerial ports
to the CRAF terminals. A comparison of our estimate of total
transferable workload and the related personnel reductions
for each of the first two 30-day periods of the wartime plan
with that of the Air Force is shown below.

                     First 30-day period      Second 30-day pe       ud
                     ATi    rce       -d       -Tir Force        G
CRAF flights
  transferred              836          399    1,076             665
Cargo transferred
  (tons)              17,295         32,060   29,406        40,741
Aerial port per-
  sonnel reduction     a/394            479    a/636             573
a/These are the numbers shown in the Air Force study. How-
  ever, since preparation of the Air Force study, MAC has
  changed the computer program by which it determines staff-
  ing requirements. Application of the new program to the
  Air Force and GAO estimates of transferable workloads
  are included in app. IV. Air Force estimates of possible
  personnel reductions are changed to 264 fot the first
  30-day period, and 406 for the second 30-day period.
     The above differences in transferable workload resulted
from different methods of computation used by GAO and the
Air Force.  (See app. III.) The major reasons for differ-
ences are:

     -- The Air Force overstated the number of trans-
        ferable flights by assuming that all CRAF
        cargo flights would be transferred from MAC
        aerial ports to commercial ports. It did not
        relate these flights to the quantity of cargo
        which could be transferred. Our estimate
        included only those flights required to trans-
        port transferable cargo.
     -- The Air Force assumed that only resupply cargo
        programed for CRAF aircraft could be trans-
        ferred to commercial ports. We assumed that
        all commercially compatible resupply cargo,
        including that programed for MAC aircraft,
        could be transferred to commercial ports and
        moved on CRAF aircraft.
     -- GAO included workluads from two ports not
        included by the Air Force.

     Although the transferable workload and elated reduc-
tions in staff are greater during the second .3-daymobili-
zation period than the first, the Air Force assumed that
only the lesser number of personnel (394) could be elimi-
nated from the total force. However, we found that the
total workload and overall staffing requirements are

substantially less during the first 30-day period than
during the second.  Therefore, even if the .573 positions
that can be eliminated from the peak overall staffing
requirements during the second period were eliminated
immediately, the remaining personnel would be sufficient
to meet first period requirements.

Requirements for military liaison
     The need for 334 military liaison positions cited
in the Air Force study was based on a standard position-
staffing formula. MAC assumed that, with minor variations
at some locations, for 24-hour coverage two military aerial
port management personnel to perform management liaison.
functions, and nine air traffic personnel to perform liaison
functions on the working level would be required for each
CRAF-operated cargo terminal at each of eight civil ports
MAC expected to use. In applying this formula, MAC gave
little consideration to the amount of cargo that would
be transferred to the civil ports or the number of carriers'
terminals which would be used.
     MAC's application of the formula results in distor-
tions. For example, MAC showed a requirement for 55 liaison
personnel at Los Angeles International Airport to handle
flights transferred from Norton AFB. However, we found that
only four flights could be transferred during the first 60
days of the plan.  In contrast, the total aerial port staff
at Norton AFB during this period would be only 36.

     Although the above is an extreme example, we believe
that liaison requirements were generally overstated. Con-
sidering port capabilities and MAC requirements, MAC would
not need all eight ports shown in its study. In our
opinion, CRAF operations would be required at only five
commercial ports. (See apps. V and VI.)   Furthermore, we
do not believe a liaison team would be needed at each cargo
terminal within a commercial port. Since a centralized
receiving point would be required at each civil port, only
one liaison team per port would be required. We could not
evaluate the team size because we were not able to determine
the specific duties of the liaison personnel. However,
assuming that the Air Force's 11-man team concept was accu-
rate, the total requirement for liaison personnel would be
59. Comparing this figure to the 573 positions which we
estimate could be eliminated at the MAC aerial ports indi-
cates that a net saving of more than 500 positions might be
possible rather than the 60 positions claimed by the Air

Shortfall in reserve aesLal
port personnel
     Although the MAC aerial port positions discussed in
this report are generally reserve positions and do not
cost as much as active duty personnel, a reduction in
personnel requirements would benefit the Air Force in
other ways. During our review, Air Force officials told
us that they were having difficulties in recruiting reserve
aerial port personnel. As of September 1976, MAC's reserve
aerial port squadrons were more than 900-personnel below
authorized strength. :.lthough sufficient reserve personnel
should be available to meet the requirements of a nonmobili-
zation contingency, MAC's present overall staff would not
meet the requirements for full mobilization. We believe,
however, that use of CRAF terminals would help reduce this

     The Air Force assessment cited a number of operational
problems a    inefficiencies which would result from the use
of CRA? ports. These problems were in the areas of:
     1.   Split operations between military and CRAF
          aerial ports.
     2.   Changes to established supply-distribution
     3.   Allocation and control of workloads at CRAF
     4.   Interface of military and commercial docu-
          mentation procedures.
We recognize these problems and inefficiencies, but we
believe the major problems cited could be overcome with
advance planning.
Split operations

     The Air Force correctly pointed out that some wartime
military cargo would require handling techniques which vary
considerably from those of commercial operations. Commer-
cial airlines generally lack the training, facilitiea. and
equipment to handle the military's oversized and hazardous
cargo which would still have to move through the MAC aerial
ports. Data recently developed by MAC indicates that about

46 and 61 percent of the resupply and JCS-assured cargo
moving durinig the first and second 30-day periods, respec-
tively, of the wartime plan falls into one of these special
handling categories. The remaining 54 and 39 percent would
be nonhazardous, general bulk cargo which could be carried
on CRAF aircraft operating through commercial ports.
     The Air Force also pointed out that split operations
would result in inefficiency due to (1) a need for re-
routing LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS operations to include the
civil ports and (2) a lack of bulk cargo at MAC aerial
ports to mix as filler cargo with oversized shipments.
LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS are domestic contract cargo airlift
systems operated by the Air Force and the Navy, respectively,
between various military installations, including industrial
and supply activities and MAC aerial ports.

     In contrast, we were told by shipper service control
office personnel responsible for routing shipments into the
aerial ports, that only a small portion of th total cargo
introduced into the MAC system arrives at MAC ports via
LOGAIR or QUICKTRANS. Most cargo is shipped to the ports
by commercial service. Although our observations confirm
this, we did not study it in detail.
     Although some loss of efficiency might occur from MAC
aerial ports not having all of the bulk cargo to mix with
its oversized cargo, hazardous and other special handling
bulk cargo would still move through the MAC ports and be
available as filler.

Changes to supply distribution

     The Air Force stated that as a result of split opera-
tions, new supply distribution patterns would have to be
developed, and detailed shipping and routing instructions
disseminated to the many military and commercial shippers
which ship cargo to the MAC aerial ports. They contended
that the resulting confusion among the shippers regarding
the proper port for their cargo could cause delays in
delivering critical supplies to the combat zone.
     Officials of the Army, Navy, and Air Force shipper
service control offices, who perform the air clearance
function and provide routing instructions for their
respective services, told us that changes which occur to
the supply distribution pattern would cause some problems

but these problems could be overcome by advance planning.
For them to do this planning, MAC would have to tell them
which civilian ports to use for specific overseas destina-
tions and advise them of any restrictions on cargo moving
through these ports. Officials said that all necessary
planning done in advance would enable them to implement
these plans with a minimum of disruption.

Allocation and control of
work-   s at CRAF ports
     The Air Force asserted that a central receiving point
would be required at the CRAF ports because most civil
airports consist of multiple cargo facilities. From this
central receiving point, some of the cargo would have to
be moved to other terminals for consolidating, palletizing,
and loading. The Air Force contended that this multiple
handling would result in inherent inefficiencies that would
add to the intransit time of cargo. The Air Force also
stated that allocation and control of workload within an
airport would be an extensive management challenge requiring
the senior lodger to establish a central cargo control and
movement agency.

     Although it is true that civil aerial ports generally
have multiple cargo facilities operated by different car-
riers and a central receiving point for military cargo would
be desirable, we believe the Air Force is overstating the
problem of operating under such a concept. Based upon the
cargo processing capacity iLpcrted to us by the CRAF carriers.
and our estimates of volumes of military cargo that could be
rerouted, we do not believe that all CRAF cargo terminals at
each civilian aerial port would have to be used. By using
only those terminal facilities which are required, the need
for moving cargo within the port would be reduced.

     Furthermore, CRAF carrier officials informed us that
the inefficiencies and delays associated with a central
receiving point should be minimal because the commercial
airlines now handle interline cargo transfers on a regular
basis and are used to moving shipments between terminals
within the airport.

Documentation interface

     The Air Force stated that military supply and documen-
tation is standardized within DOD under Military Standard
Transportation and Movement Procedures to facilitate the
delivery of cargo and provide a level of control and
intransit visibility over en route cargo. CRAF carriers

would be receiving cargo documented under these procedures
for which Lhey would be required to provide receipt, process-
ing, and lift data. Under large volume operations, this can
only be done efficiently with automated data processing
systems. The Air Force stated that data systems and docu-
mentation vary from carrier to carrier and, as presently
structured, do not interface with the military system.
     While commercial airlines require control and intransit
visibility for cargo moving in their commercial systems, not
all carriers have automated systems for maintaining this
control. Carrier officials informed us that their systems,
as presently designed, could not directly interface with the
DOD system. They believe, however, that visibility and con-
trol could be maintained without a direct interface between
the DOD and commercial system through cross-referencing.
     We recognize that documentation is an essential part
of the DOD system and believe that either of two basic
alternatives could resolve the military and commercial
documentation interface problem.
     --The Air Force, in its assessment, proposed
       positioning two minicomputers (one as a
       backup) at each CRAF port with a direct link
       to the central computer at MAC headquarters.
       Several carriers also proposed that MAC posi-
       tion a remote terminal at each senior lodger
       cargo facility with direct lines to the MAC
       central-computer. MAC officials stated, how-
       ever, that this would require expansion of
       their central computer capability as they
       are presently capable of receiving data from
       only 10 aerial ports.
     -- Several CRAF airlines proposed that since
        commercial airlines maintain the same degree
        of cargo visibility and control as MAC, MAC
        develop a cross-referencing system between
        the military transportation control number
        and the waybill number used by airlines.
        Hard copies of shipment receipt and lift
        data could be sent to MAC headquarters or
        nearby MAC aerial ports for input to the MAC
        computer. This would provide MAC with the
        required shipment status data while the air-
        lines could retain their own responsibility
        and control for shipments. This approach
        would require additional MAC personnel to
        process the data received from the CRAF ports.

     At the request of the Committee, we reviewed the MAC
questionnaire which was used to solicit CRA7 terminal -apa-
ability information and the CRAF responses to the question-
naire. Because of limitations of the questionnaire and
CRAF's limited response to it, MAC was unable to "ose it to
measure CRAF terminal capability.

      Instead of contacting all CRAF carriers, MAC sent the
questionnaire to only the senior lodgers of the aerial ports
they considered using.   Each senior lodger was asked to
provide detailed information on carrier operations, available
terminal equipment, and work crews for all CRAF carriers at
the aerial ports.

     Only four of the eight senior lodgers provided any of
the requested data. Of these four, only one attempted to
answer MAC's detailed questions on operations and availabi-
lity of equipment and crews for all CRAF carriers at its
airport. Carrier officials told us the MAC questionnaire
was too detailed, would have required extensive work on
their part to complete, and would not have provided MAC
with data to assess their cargo processing capability.

     Due to the lack of CRAF officials' response, MAC used
data obtained from other sources to estimate the CRAF
carriers' terminal capability.


     We did not obtain formal written comments on our
report but did discuss the results of our evaluation in
some detail with Air Force officials. While these offi-
cials did not seek to defend the specific figures in their
study, they again expressed the opinion that the potential
advantages of using commercial air terminals for wartime
resupply cargo would be outweighed by difficulties in
managing the timely movement of the cargo diverted to
these civil terminals.

     Air Force officials expressed concern that a switch to
commercial air cargo terminals in the early days of a war
would create confusion which would delay the delivery of
vitally needed high priority supplies. First, they stated
that most of the CRAF aircraft would initially be ued for
combat force deployment direct from military bases and that
the timing for diverting the growing air resupply flow from
the MAC aerial ports to the civil terminals would have to

be timed to match the changing availability of aircraft
to move the cargo. Second, they were concerned that since
only general bulk cargo would go to the civil terminals,
with hazardous and oversize cargo continuing to go to
military ports, some of this high-priority cargo would be
misrouted because hundreds or thousands of shippers would
be required to follow new instructions.
     The problem of shippers attempting to follow new
instructions is greatly overstated. Each service has a
shipper service control office that is responsible for
cleariny shipments for air movement and for providing
routing instructions for such shipments. The problem of
rerouting shipments from MAC to commercial aerial ports
based upon availability of aircraft or type of cargo is
one of coordination between MAC and the three control offices.

     Although the problem of delayed deliveries resulting
from misroutings was raised in the Air Force study, we
found that it had not discussed the problem with shipper
service control office personnel. These personnel informed
us that they receive advance information on all air ship-
ments before they leave the s'-per and that, if prepara-
tions were made in advance, a.   bhipments could be rerouted
from MAC to commercial aerial ports with a minimum of

     Air Force officials believe that the problems of
revised routings and changing priorities, inherent in any
wartime resupply operation, would require considerably
more military management at each civil terminal used than
that which the GAO review had assumed. While the Air Force
agreed that the 334 liaison figure included in their study
was overstated, they maintained that a team would be required
at each CRAF carrier's facility within the aerial port to
perform liaison functions, including documentation process-
ing. They stated that our estimate of 59 liaison personnel
was too low.

     Although we agree there is a need for having military
representatives at the commercial ports, we believe the
liaison function could be carried on much more effectively
by working through the central receiving points. Further-
more, based on the amount of cargo transferable and the
commercial capability available, it appears that only two
terminal facilities would be needed at two commercial ports,
and only one facility at the other three ports. Thus, even
if a multiple team concept were adopted, only seven teams
would be involved, with no more than 81 liaison personnel
being required.

      Air Force officials stated that as the number of
airfields used for resupply increases, it will become
more difficult to maintain both a high flying hour rate
and high load factors for all military and civil aircraft

     As discussed earlier in our report, dividing cargo
operations between MAC and commercial aerial ports could
adversely affect the load factors on MAC aircraft due to
the lesser amounts of bulk resupply cargo available at
MAC aerial ports for use s filler on MAC flights. How-
ever, some bulk resupply cargo wuld not be commercially
compatible and so wou'd be moned through MAC aerial ports
and be available as filler.   Wi'   0sagard to flying-hour
rates, contrary to the concert,    essed by the Air Force,
CRAF carriers believe that they would increase the flying-
hour rates for their aircraft if they were operating
through commercial aerial ports with readily available
commercial service facilities. Purthermore, it appears
that reduced congestion at the .AC aerial ports should
facilitate improved utilization of MAC aircraft as well.

     Air Force officials believe that some of the CRAF
carriers' estimates of surge capability presented in
appendix II may be overstated.

     While we did not verify the figures supplied to us
by the carriers, we reviewed them and in each case checked
back with the carrier to determine their reasonableness.
Furthermore, if use of CRAF terminal facilities is delayed
until full mobilization, surge capability becomes largely
a meaningless question as substantially more capability
would be available due to withdrawing CRAF-committed air-
craft from commercial cargo operations.

     Air Force officials doubted that withdrawal of long-
range cargo aircraft committed to MAC during a full CRAF
activation would curtail the carriers' commercial cargo
operations. They believe that much domestic commercial
cargo would continue to move in short-range aircraft or
in the lower compartments of passenger aircraft.

     While it is true that some domestic commercial cargo
would continue to .,ve, it should be noted that much of
the terminal capability shown in appendix II is provided
by carriers which have little or no domestic passenger
traffic and have committed virtually all of their cargo
aircraft to MAC.

     Carriers who operate domestically informed us that if
CRAF were activated, their commercial operations would be
sharply curtailed. In summary, there appears to be little
doubt that sufficient terminal capability would be available
to handle any rerouted MAC cargo.
     CRAF carriers possess a substantial cargo processing
capability which could be made available to MAC during all
stages of contingency operations. Use of the CRAF terminal.
facilities and personnel during full mobilization could
enable MAC to reduce its maximum aerial port staffing require-
ment by several hundred personnel which would help to reduce
a shortfall in reserve strength.
     Using CRAF facilities during full mobilization would
also permit some carriers to continue operating facilities
which they might otherwise have to either close or curtail
because of the commitment of their cargo aircraft to CRAF.
     In   summary, under the planning concepts presently used
by MAC,   all cargo for both MAC and CRAF aircraft must move
through   MAC aerial terminals. Under this concept, the
present   reserve requirements seem valid.

     However, we believe that MAC could reduce its reliance
on reserves if it made the plans and studies necessary to
use both the MAC and CRAF aerial cargo terminals. This
would not only reduce the requirement for and cost of reserves
but would also add the commercial cargo terminals to the
military base capability of the Nation. Since there is no
guarantee that a potential enemy would not attempt to neutra-
lize MAC's terminals in time of conflict, planning to use
the commercial terminals would give MAC alternatives not
presently available.

     As this report points out, there are problems involved
in integrating the commercial terminals into the MAC system.
Documentation and computer-compatible data would have to
be developed. Cargo routing instructions and patterns would
have to be chanred and handling procedures between different
carriers' facilities at the same terminal would have to be
worked out. Procedures for assuring the best cargo mix
between the MAC and commercial terminals to maximize air-
craft utilization would also have to be worked out.' We
believe, however, that studies and planning, proven by a live
test of the use of commercial terminals, would pay off.


     In view of the above, we recommend that the Committee
direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use
CRAF cargo terminal facilities.

     Until such plans and testing are completed, we believe
that if the Congress were to reduce the current rserve
authorizations, MAC, restricted by its plans to use only
its own terminals, may not meet its airlift requirements
for full mobilization.

                          CHAPTER 3


     The Committee specifically asked us to inquire into the
extent that reserve aerial port squadrons were considered by
the Air Force and the Department of Defense when Public Law
94-286 was being formulated. Although reserve aerial port
squadrons were not cited in material obtained from DOD, Air
Force and DOD officials informed us that they consider re-
serve aerial port squadrons available for activation under
Public Law 94-286.
      Public Law 94-286 is an act which enables the President
to activate up to 50,000 reservists for up to 90 days without
declaring a national emergency. The law is an essential ele-
ment in the "Total Force Policy" which dictates that all
available forces--active and reserve--be considered in meet-
ing future contingencies. The law enables the President to
increase active forces during a crisis without the national
and international implications of declaring a national emer-

     In testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and
Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the
Secretary of Defense and other DOD officials stated that
the augmentation of strategic airlift forces .cs a good
example of the intended use of this law. A booklet, prepared
in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs, cited examples of the reserve forces
which might be activated under this law. Among the many
examples it cites strategic airlift forces and states

     "* * * mobilization of 2,500 Associate Unit Reser-
     vists (4 squadrons and maintenance personnel) would
     allow the C-5 force to surge to 10 hours per day.
     This would be a significant factor in a major re-
     supply effort."

     Reserve aerial port personnel were neither included
in strategic airlift forces nor mentioned among the other
examples in this booklet.  However, the official who pre-
pared the booklet told us the examples cited were not in-
tended to be all inclusive. He and other DOD officials
stated that under this law, DOD wanted and obtained complete
flexibility to activate any units required to meet an emer-
gency. They stated that reserve aerial port squadrons could

be activated under this law. A MAC official stated that,
under this law, they expect reserve aerial port personnel to
be available for contingency operations.
     Due to the availability of reserve aerial port personnel,
CRAF cargo terminal facilities apparently would not be needed
until full mobilization.

                          CHAPTER 4

                    IN EARLIER GAO REPORT
     On February 2, 1976, we transmitted to the Commit.tee our
evaluation of an Air Force study entitled Air Force nalysis
of Aerial Port Manpower Requirements."  We reported that the
overall requirement for 7,232 active duty military and civi-
lian personnel cited in the study exceeded by 1,727 the
5,505 personnel we considered sufficient to handle peacetime
workload. As a result of our evaluation, the Committee elim-
inated 1,700 positions from the aerial ports.
     Since reporting to the Committee, we have met with Air
Force officials on several occasions, at their request, to
further clarify differences between our requirement figures
and theirs. These meetings have shown a need for certain
adjustments to the peacetime staffing figure in our February
1976 report.
     Adjustments are necessary in order to eliminate certain
positions included in the Air Force study and in our require-
ment figures, which are properly chargeable to base transpor-
tation management offices rather than to aerial ports, and
to reinstate certain data and records processing positions
which were mistakenly omitted from the aerial port at Charles-
ton AFB. The required adjustments are reflected in the fol-
lowing table.

     Peacetime staffing of 21 aerial ports
       per GAO report of February 2, 1976         5,505
     Additio:nal data and records processing
       positions for Charleston AFB                   33
     Less transportation management office
       positions                                   -432
     Total adjusted staffing of 21 aerial
       ports                                      5,106

     During our meetings Air Force officials also mentioned
several peacetime staffing requirements which were not in-
cluded in the Air Force study submitted to the Committee or
in our evaluation. The functions and the Air Force's esti-
mate of required staffing are as follows:

Staffing of 31 en route and other locations not re-
   flected in study
 Average personnel on temporary duty away from home
   base in support of JCS exercises
 Personnel required for increased anti-hijacking sur-

      The Air Force justification for these positions and
 comments follow.                                         our

 Staffing of en route locations

      The 350 personnel, including 135 personnel at Scott
Illinois, are generally stationed at locations other        AFB,
21 strategic aerial ports covered by the Air Force     than  the
our evaluation. Although there appears to be little study   and
that staffing is required at these locations, we were doubt
that staffing standards are generally unavailable       told
did not attempt to evaluate the stated requirements.    so  we
tailed listing of positions by location was provided    A  de-
Air Force and is included as appendix VII.             by the

Temporary duty personnel

     Air Force officials told us that during calendar
1975 an average of 143 aerial port personnel were away year
their bases in support of MAC and JCS exercises.        from
VIII.)                                             (See app.
        While we believe temporary duty demands constitute
valid personnel requirement, because of the extraordinary a
circumstances surrounding the fall and evacuation
                                                  of Vietnam
and their impact on temporary duty personnel, we question
validity of 1975 as a representative period upon which      the
base staffing requirements.
     We believe that any additional personnel intended
reflect temporary duty requirements should be based    to
                                                    on a
more representative time period.

Anti-hiack personnel

     As a result of acts of terrorism at civil airports,
as the bomb explosion incident at La Guardia Airport,      such
Air Force has increased terminal security at all MAC   the
ports with a resulting increased requirement for personnel.

(See app. IX.) While we do not question the need for security
at the aerial ports, review of readily available data indicates
that the staffing requirements cited by the Air Force for some
locations are unreasonably high.
      For example, Air Force officials told us they needed 30
positions at each of the three major passenger terminals in
the United States--Travis AFB, McGuire AFB,  and Charleston
AFB.   This level of staffing, requiring 81 additional posi-
tions to the 9 positions included in the Air Force  study,
would be needed to operate two baggage-X-ray machines 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. However, we noted that during
fiscal year 1975, each of these terminals handled the equiva-
lent of only 2 or 3 originating passenger flights a day.
     Based on the above, we believe the Air Force  should re-
assess the number of positions  it needs for anti-hijacking

 APPENDIX I                                                    APPENDIX I


                        AS OF JUNE 30,     1976

                                                    Number of aircraft
                        Aircraft           Type               at -staae
    Carrier              (note a)        (note b)                     I         III
Airlift                 DC-8-54F               V         2            2        2
  International         DC-8-63F               V         1            2        3
                                                         3            4        5
Alaska Airlines         B727C                  V         -         -           4
American                B707-323C             C          -         -       11
  Airlines              B707-323C             V          -         -        3
                        B747-100F             C          -         -        1
                        8747-100              P                                6
Braniff Airways         DC-8-62F              V                               1
                        B747A                 P          -        -           1
                        B727C                 V          --                   4

Capitol Interna-
  tional Airways        DC-8-63F          V          2            2           2
Continental Air
 Lines                  DC-l-lOCF         V-                      -
Eastern Air Lines       B727C            V                        -       2
The Flying              DC-8-63F          V         11           11       11
  Tiger Line            DC-8-63F         C           -            6           6
                        B747-100F        C           -            -           3
                                                    11           17       20
Northwest Airlines      B707-351C        V           2            3         3
                        B747-51          P           4            7       15
                        DC-10-40         P           2            4       12
                        B747F            C           2            3         3
                                                    10           17       33
                                                               APPENDIX I

                                                     Number of aircraft
                       Aircraft            Type           at.staqe
   Carrier             (note a)          (note b)      I-      I
                                            V          1            1         3
Overseas National      DC-8-63F                                               2
                       DC-8-61F             V          2            2
                                                       3            3         5

                                             V         5             5        5
Pan American           B707-321C                                             10.
                       B707-321C             C         5            10
  World Airways                                        1             2        7
                       8707-321/C            P
                                             P         7            13       30
                       B747-21                                                 1
                       B747-100F             C         1             1
                                             V'                 -             2
                                                      19            31       55

                                             V         1             1        1
Seaboard World         DC-8-55F
                                             V         2             5        7
  Airlines             DC-8-63F
                       DC-8-61               V         3             3        3
                       B-747-200F            C         2             2        2

                                                       8            11       13

                                             V         -                2      2
 Trans International   DC-8-61CF
                                             V          1               3         6
   Airlines             DC-8-63F
                        DC-10-30C            V          3               3         3

                                                        4               8     11

                                              C         -               -     15
 Trans World            B707-331C
                                              P.                        -      3
   Airlines             B707-331B
                        B-747                 P                         -     10

                                                                        ~-    28

                                              C            -             -    15
 United Air Lines       DC-8-54F
                        B747-22                  P                                7

                        B707-300C                V                  -             1
 Western Air Lines

APPENDIX I                                              APPENDIX I

                                                   Number of aircraft
                        Aircraft          Type         at stage
   Carrier              (note a)        (note b)     I     II    III
World Airways           DC-8-63F           V        -       3     5
                        B747               V        2       2     2
                        B727C              V        -       -     2
                                                    2       5     9
    Total 17 carriers                              62      98   266
a/All aircraft shown are long range types except the B727C.
b/Symbols shown for type aircraft are as follows:       C = cargo;
  P = passenger; and V   convertible.

APPENDIX II                                                       APPENDIX II

               TERMINAL SURGE CAPABILITY(tons              per month)
                             New                      San
   Carrier                   York    Chicago       Francisco     Miami        Seattle.

Airlift Interna-
Maximum capability           5,000    1,875          2,813       3,750            -
Current workload             2,500      750          1,250       2,250
Surge capability             2.500    1,125          1,563       1,500
American Airlines
Maximum capability       13,652      12,711         15,162                   -
Current workload         13,138       9,322          9,368         -              -

Surge capability         _     514    3,389          5,794
Continental Air Lines
Maximum capability             -      1,550            320       1,100           2,665
Current workload               -      1,072            215-        679           1,705

Surge capability               -          478          105         421            960

Eastern Air Lines
Maximum capability           3,336    1,822            -         3,523             -
Current workload             2,566    1,458            -         3,203             -

Surge capability               770        364          -           320             -

Flying   Ter

Maximum capability           7,176    7,688          7,161         -             4,551
Current workload             4,600    4L300          3,900         -             2,400

Surge capability             2,576    3.388          3.261                       2,151

Northwest Airlines
Maximum capability           8,110    4,020            950       1,180           9,800
Current workload             4,050    4,020            475         590           4,900

Surge capability             4,060    _        0       475             590       4,900

APPENDIX II                                               APPENDIX II
                        New                    San
    Carrier             York    Chicago     Francisco    Miami   Seattle
Pan American World Airways
Maximum capability     18,750         850    3,225       3,000      525
Current workload       10,000         750    2,150       2,400      300
Surge capability        8,750         100    1,075         600      225
Seaboard World
Maximum capability     12,000    1,500       1,500         -         -
Current workload        8,000      376         255         -         -
Surge capability        4,000    1,124       1,245         -
Trans World Airlines

Maximum capability      7,000   6,250        5,200         -         -
Current workload        7,000   5,000        4,000         -
Surge capability        _   0   1,250        1,200         -
United Air Lines

Maximum capability      7,500 24,000        10,500         -      3,520
Current workload        6,000 22,000         9,500         -      3,000
Surge capability        1,500   2,000        1,000         -        520

Total capability       82,524 62,266        46,831      12,553   21,061
Current workloads      57,854 49,048        31,113      9,122    12,305
Surge capability       24,670 13,218        15,718       3,431   8,756

APPENDIX III                                                           APPENDIX II

                                  COMPARISON Or METHODOLOGIES


                              CRA_ FLIGHTS AND UANTTITIES Or CARG'
                                 TRANSFERABLE TO CRAF TERMINALS

       The basis for both analyses was a 1974 classified MAC Wartime Aerial Port
  Manpowet requilements study of the JCS workloads for a conventional-type wa   in
  Europe.  From this report, the following data for each MAC aerial port was used
  to determine transferable workloadt total number of flights by CRAF airciaft;
  total number of passengers to be processedl and total quantities of cargo by ini-
  tial deployments, resupply.  etrograde, and JSC-assured.

                        MAC                                            GAO

  Step 1.   Determine the number of cargo        Step 1.   Determine the numbel    of CRAF
            flights.                                       cargo flights.
            a. As all pasengers ae ex-                     a. Same as MAC.
               pected to move aboard
               CRAF aircraft. MAC divided
               the total passengers fo:
               each polt by 337--the
               weighted average seating
               capacity for passenger air-
               claft committed to CRAP.
               This gives the numbe of
               flights needed to cattry
            b. Based on their interpretation               b.   Air Foice Regulation 76-2
               of Ail Force Regulation (AFR)                    states that, for planning
               76-2. MAC applied a 75-peicent                   pu poses, a 75-peicent
               utilization factor to the pas-                   factor will be applied
               senger flights and theleby in-                   to the maximum Aircraft
               creased the number of flights                    Cabin Load of "floor loaded
               tequired to carry the given                      cargo airc aft.'   This 75
               number of passengers.                            percent facto; was intended
                                                                fol passenger flights so we
                                                                did not apply it to out data.
                                                                Furthermote. in this plan of
                                                                mass troop movements, we
                                                                cannot envision these aircraft
                                                                moving with only 75 percent
                                                                of thei   capacity used.
            c.   The diffelence between the                c.   Same as MAC except we detel-
                 total CRAP flights scheduled                   mined the number of passenger
                 fo a port and the number of                    flights equited by step 1. (a).
                 passenger flights equited by
                 step 1, (b) gives the number
                 of CRAP cargo flights avail-
            d.   MAC used this figuie for the              d.   As this number of flights is
                 number of CRAP cargo flights                   not related to the amount of
                 that could be tansferled.                      cargo to be tr ansferred we
                                                                computed the CRAF flights tans-
                                                                fel ed as shown in step 2.

APPENDIX          III                                                          APPENDIX III

                                 MIAC                                            GAO
   Step 2.   Determine the amount of cargo               Step 2.   Detelmine the amcjnt of cargo
             that could be transferred to                          that could be transferred to
             CRAP terminals (MAC assumed that                      CRAP terminals.   (We assumed
             only bulk resupply.  etrograde,                       that only bulk resupply,   etro-
             and JCS-assured cargo could be                        grade, and JCS-assured cargo could
             transferred).                                         be transferred.)
             a.    Using   the   aver age   palletized             a.   To separate    totals      of   resupply
                   payload factors for CRAP alt-                        (including JCS-assuted) and
                   craft in AFR 76-2, MAC deter-                        retrograde. we applied a fac-
                   mined a weighted average pay-                        to, of 54 and 39 percent for
                   load per CRAP cargo flight                           the first and second 30-day
                   based on the CRAP inventory.                         per iods. respectively. to de-
                                                                        termine the amount of bulk.
                                                                        nonhazardous resupply cargo. ad/
                                                                        This gives the amount of caqrgo
                                                                        that couid be transferred to
                                                                        the CRAP terminals.
             b.    This weighted average multi-                    b.    We divided the resupply cargo
                   plied by the number of flights                        that could be transferred to
                   determined in step 1, (c).                           -the CRAP terminals by a weighted
                   gives the cargo capability of                         aver age payload per CRAF
                   all CRAP cargo flights.                               flight--detetrlined in the same
                                                                         manner as MAC step 2. (a)--
                                                                         to give the number of CRAF
                                                                         flights needed to carry this
                                                                         car go.
             c.   MAC assumed that both AC and                     c.   We then checked the number of
                  CRAP aircraft would be carry-                         cargo flights needed against
                  ing resupply cargo.    There-                         the number of cargo flights
                  fore, they applied a factor                           available--as   etermined in
                  (based on the percentage of                           step 1. (c)--to see that suf-
                  resupply--including retrograde                        ficient flights were available.
                  and JCS-assured--to total port                        As the total of available
                  cargo) to the capability de-                          flights excVeded the total   e-
                  veloped In step 2, (b). 'Thls                         quired flights for transferable
                  gave the amount. of cargo MAC                         cargo, we assumed that all non-
                  assumed would .be carried on                          hazardous bulk resupply and
                  CRAP aircraft and could be                            retrograde cargo could be
                  transferred to CRAP ports.                            transferred. b/
   a/These were the best estimates that MAC could provide to us and ae                          based on 1976
     JCS planning documents which MAC is currently analyzing.

   b/PFo three ports during the second 30-day period only, the required flights ex-
      ceeded the available flights.  However, as the total available exceeded the total
      required, we assumed that some flights could be rerouted to these ports.

APPENDIX          IV                                                                                                                                                             APPENDIX                       IV


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APPENDIX IV                                                                                                       APPENDIX   IV

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APPENDIX V                                               APPENDIX V

                    COMPARISON OF CARGO TO BE


                           Cargo (tons)                    Cargo surge
                               to be                       capability
                           transferred    CRAF port         of CRAF
                         First    Sei-oid to which         port (tons
MAC aerial port         30_days 30 days transferred        per month)

Dover AFB, Delaware     14,165    23,218      New York
McGuire AFB, New
  Jersey                   564          161   New York

                        14,729    23,379                      24,670

Norton AFB, Califor-
  nia                       84           84   San Francisco
Travis AFB, Califor-
  nia                    1,605        3,888   San Francisco

                         1,689        3,972                    15,718

McChord AFB, Wash-
  ir;ton                 2,565        1,494   Seattle           8,756
Scott AFB, Illinois      4,095        7,144   Chicago          13.218
Charleston AFB, South
  Carolina               8,982        4,752   Miami           a/3,431

a/While the surge capability of 3,431 tons per month does not
  equal the tonnages transferred, the maximum capability of
  CRAF carriers at Miami is 12,553 tons per month which ex-
  ceeds the tonnage transferred.

                                                         APPENDIX VI


         CRAF port                     Air Force   GAO   Difference
New York                                  55
Miami                                              11       -44
                                          29       11       -18
Boston                                    20         -      -20
Dulles International,
  Washington                              10        -       -10
Seattle                                  66
San Francisco                                      11       -55
                                         66        11       -55
Baltimore-Washington                     29
Los Angeles                                         -       -29
                                         55         -       -55
Chicago                                   -
MAC (note a)
                                                   11        11
                                           4        4         -
    Total                               334        59      -275
a/MAC authorized two liaison positions each, for
                                                 the 21st
  and 22d Air Forces under its cummand.

APPENDIX VII                                        APPENDIX VII

                      ',R FORCE ESTIMATE OF


REQUIREMENT: Lsted below are locations other than main ter-
strategic aerial ports where aerial port operations arid
minal services furctions for movement of personnel, cargo,
and equipment; aeromedtcal airlift support; and coordination
of airlift operations tn Europe and the Pacific are performed.
                                   ion of
Scope of functions vary from super's          AC-controlled
terminal services and surveillance of co:\me;cial contractsRe-
to the full operation of small air terminal operations.
quirements listed below are associated with peacetime readi-
ness support t each location.

 Location         Requirement        Location           Requirement

                       2             Naples                  3
Addis Ababa
Altus                 13             Pago Pago               1
Aviano                14             Pisa                    4
Beirut                 2             Prestwick              12
Buckley                2             Ramstein (note a)       8
Christchurch           2             Rhein Main             32
                                       (note a)
                       1             Richmond                5
Cubi Point
Dhahran                5             Rota                    5
Eielson               12             Scott (note b)        135
Galena                 3             Shemya                  5
Hickam (note a)       12             Sigonelia               2
Howard                11             Taegu                  11
Johnston Island        1             Taipei                 13
Kelly                  2             Tehran                   5
Kwan Ju                8
Kunsan                17                  Total             350
Maxwell                2

a/Spaces not directly collocated with Strategic Aerial Ports
  at listed locations. Spaces at Hickam are assigned to the
  61st Airlift Support Wing and are required for coordination
  of aerial port operations in the Pacific Theater. Spaces
  at Ramstein and Rhein Main are assigned to the 435th Air-
  lift Wing and are required for coordination of aerial port
  operations in the European Theater.

b/A 24-hour air terminal operation is necessary due to basirg
  C-9 air evacuation and administrative support fleet at
  Scott. Included in the 135 staffing requirement are 65 for
  the passenger reservation enter, 38 for servicing the air
  evacuation and administrative support aircraft, and 32 in
  air terminal services and records.

APPENDIX VIII                                        APPENDIX VIII



REQUIREMENT:  During calendar year 1975, an average of 3,005
staffdays per month were used in support of Military Airlift
Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises. This equates
to an average of 143 personnel drawn from MAC strategic
aerial ports which are required for off-station support for
these exercises.

                Location              Reqirement
                Andersen                   2
                Athens                     2
                Charleston                11
                Clark                      3
                Dover                     13
                Elmendorf                  3
                Hickam                     3
                Incirlik                   4
                Kadena                     7
                McChord                   15
                McGuire                   12
                Mildenhall                 1
                Norton                    18
                Osan                       4
                Ramstein                   2
                Rhein Main                11
                Torrejon                   2
                Travis                    22
                Yokota                     8

                    Total               143

APPENDIX IX                                          APPENDIX IX


REQUIREMENT: Acts of terrorism at civil terminals, such as
the La Guardia incident, have prompted the Military Airlift
Command to increase terminal security procedures at all MAC
aerial ports. This includes more thorough passenger and
baggage screening procedures at all locations to include the
use of X-ray equipment at most major strategic aerial ports.
                  Location          Requirement

                  Andersen              14
                  Athens                 9
                  Charleston            28
                  Clark                 12
                  Dover                  4
                  Elmendorf              7
                  Hickam                11
                  Incirlik               9
                  Kadena                13
                  Lajes                  5
                  McChord               14
                  McGuire               27
                  Mildenhall             8
                  Norton                13
                  Osan                   9
                  Ramstein              10
                  Rhein Main            11
                  Torrejon               9
                  Travis                26
                  Yokota                11

                      Total            250