DOCUBMET RESUME 01182 - [1051919J4b d Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities of Civil Reserve Air Fleet. LCD-77-207; -133025. April 6, 1977. 21 pp. + appendices (14 pp.). Report to Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Senate Cossittee on Appropriations; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General. Issue Area: Military Preparedness Plans: Transportation in Emergency Situations (804); Facilities and aterial Management: Federal Transportation of Things (704);Personnel Management and Compensation: All Volunteer Fcrce eeds (303). Contact: Logistics and Communications Div. Budget Function: ational Defense: Department of Defense - Military (except procurement & contracts) (051). Organization Concerned: Department of the Air arcce; Department of Defense. Congressional Relevance: Senate Coaittee on ' .ropriations. Authority: P.L. 94-286. GAO reviewed an Air Force study which concluded that its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft through military aerial ports should not be changed despite a Senate Committee on Appropriations request that the Air Force consider contributions that could be provided by the use cf commercial airport facilities. Findings/Conclusions: The Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the coasezcial terminals and the potential personnel savings resulting from their use. Use of the commercial terminal facilities for the ovement of military cargo would reduce the Military Airlift Comman4s overall staffing requirements significantly. If, during full obilization, all commercially compatible resupply cargo ere transferred to commercial aerial ports, the staffing could be reduced by several hundred persons. Any operational problems caused by the rerouting of military cargo through commercial airports could be olved through advance planning. Recommendations: The Senate Ccemittee on Appropriations should direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet cargo terminal facilities. (QM) C4J C ,.REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE 11,;\., ON APPROPRIATIONS BY THEI COMPTROLL. R GENERAL ,~tvt ?OF t'ou rX q( THE UNITED STATES Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities Of Civil Reserve Air Fleet Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers have a signifi- cant cargo processing capability which could be used during time of contingency opera- tions. Use of this capability would reduce military aerial port staffing requirements and alleviate . urrent shortage in reserve aerial port personnel. t to - exceon =coun-i AccOunting Office th bads outside reeased GQnerl .. rpc the ppvail 6y the Office of the bais ap I RelationP LCD-77-207 A P R IL C, 1 9 7 7 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON, D.C. 2054 B-133025 The Honorable John L. McClellan Chairman, Committee on Appropriations United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your request of May 26, 1976, we have evaluated the Air Force's assessment of the feasibility of ising Civil Reserve Air Fleet terminal facilities to off- set Military Airlift Command aerial port staffing require- ments. We also inquired into the extent that reserve aerial port squadrons were considered by the Air Force and the Department of Defense when Public Law 94-286 was being formulated to facilitate activating the reserves. At the request of your office we have lso included certain adjustments to staffing requirements figures in- cluded in our February 2, 1976, letter to your Committee. As specified by your office, we did not submit our report to the Department of the Air Force for formal com- ment but did discuss the results of our evaluation with Air Force officials in some detail. Their views on our evaluation are included in this report. Si el: your Comptroller General of the United States COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S AIR FORCE CONTINGENCY PLANS REPORT TO THE SENATE SHOULD INCLUDE FACILITIES COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET DIGEST The Senate Committee on Appropriations asked the Air Force to consideL contributions that could be provided by commercial airpcrt faci- lities operated by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet as a possible offset to aerial port staffing by the Military Airlift Commarnd. In its report of May 14, 1976, the Air Force concluded that its plan to operate Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft through military aerial ports should not be changed. (,See pp. 1 and 3.) However. the Genera] Accounting Office found that the Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the commercial ter- minals and the potential peLsonrel savings resulting from their use. Use of the commercial terminal facilities for the movement of military cargo would reduce the Military Airlift Command's overall staff- ing requirements significantly, helping to ease a shortfall in the reserve airport per- sonnel. It also would allow Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers to continue commercial cargo terminal operations which might otherwise be either stopped or reduced because of the Military Airlift Command's withdrawal of most of the carriers' long-range cargo aircraft for operation through mil.tary aerial ports. (See p. 3.) Data provided to GAO by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers showed that substantial com- mercial cargo processing capability could be made available to tne military during all stages of contingency operations. Public Law 94-286 was passed, however, which facilitated activating the reserves, and it appears that reservists could now be used during con- tingencies requiring part mobilization; the commercial facilities would not be needed LCD-' 7-207 IML- Sh1t. Upon removal, the report cover date should be noted hereon. i until full mobilization. If full mobiliza- tion were required, more commercial capability would be available. See p. 4.) GAO estimates that if, during full mobili- zation, all commercially compatible resupply cargo were transferred to commercial aerial ports, the Military Airlift Command's over- all staffing could be reduced by several hundred persons. This reduction would help to reduce the shortage of reserve aerial port staff, which, as of September 1976, was 900. (See pp. 5 & 8.) GAO did not obtain formal written comments on its report but did disciss the results of its evaluation in some detail with Air Force officials. These officials again expressed the opinion that the potential advantages of using commercial air ter- minals for wartime resupply cargo would be outweighed by difficulties in managing the timely movement of the crgo diverted to these civil terminals. (See p. 12.) GAO recognizes that the erouting of military cargo through commercial airports would create some oerational problems, but, after discus- sion with the military and carrier personnel who would be directly involved in such an opera- tion, it believes that such problems could be solved through advance planning. GAO reccntmends that the Committee direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet facilities. (See pp. 8 & 16,) ii Contents Page DIGEST CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 CRAF program 1 Scope of review 2 2 EVALUATION OF THE AIR FORCE'S ASSESSMENT OF CRAF CARGO TERMINAL CAPABILITY 3 CRAF cargo terminal capability 3 Aerial port personnel requirements could be met thrcugh use of CRAF terminals 5 Operational problems associated with use of CRAF ports 8 Adequacy of MAC questionnaires 12 Air Force officials' comments and GAO's evaluation 12 Conclusions 15 Recommendation 16 3 RESERVE AERIAL PORT SQUADRONS COULD BE ACTIVATED UNDER PUBLIC LAW 94-286 17 4 ADJUSTMENT TO PEACETIME STAFFING FIGURES IN EARLIER GAO REPORT 19 Additional requirements 19 APPENDIX I Schedule of carriers and aircraft com- mitted to international CRAF as of June 30, 1976 22 II Carrier estimates of their cargo terminal surge capability 25 III Comparison of methodologies used by MAC and GAO to determine the number of CRAF flights and quantities of cargo transferable to CRAF terminals 27 APPENDIX IV Comparison of MAC- and GAO-computed workloads transferable from each MAC port 29 V Comparison of cargo to be transferred from MAC aerial ports with capabili- ties of nearby CRAF ports 31 VI Comparison of Air Force- and GAO- determined requirement for liaison personnel 32 VII Air Force estimate of strategic aerial port manpower requirements at other than main aerial ports 33 VIII Air Force estimate of staffing off-station support of MAC/JCSfor exercises 34 IX Air Force estimate of staffing for increased anti-hijack and terminal security procedures at strategic aerial ports 35 ABBREVIATIONS AFB AiL Force Base CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff SAC Military Airlift Command CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION report The Senate Committee on Appropriations, in its bill, asked on the 1976 Department of Defense appropriations contributions that couldCivil be the Air Force to consider the facilities operated by the provided by civil airport Military Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) as a possible offset to On Airlift Command (MAC) aerial port staffing requirements. assessment of May 14, 1976, the Air Force reported on its dated May 26, CRAF cargo terminal capability. In a letter the Air Force 1976, the Committee requested that weto evaluate which reserve aerial study and also determine the extent by the Department port squadron activations were considered to of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force in studies relating 1976, a May 14, possible uses of Public Law 94-286, dated law facilitating the activation of reserves. CRAF PROGRAM DOD, MAC, the single agency for airlift services within meet approved Joint is responsible for providing airlift to to meet Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contingency plans. MAC plans aircraft. and CRAF this responsibility through use of its own mobilize The CRAF concept is a coordinated program to DOD requirements. the Nation's airlift resources to meet contrac- CRAF is composed of U.S. civil air carriers who and support tually commit themselves to providing operating stated personnel, facilities, and aircraft to MAC under conditions. It makes commercial airlift resources available for both peacetime and wartime augmentation CRAFof military For planning purposes is organized airlift capability. range and into Domestic, Alaskan, and International--short long range--segments. As of June 30, 1976, MostCRAF included 21 of the cargo air carriers with 316 committed aircraft. aircraft, airlift capability, including all of the long-range of the was included in the international segment. A list CRAF is carriers and aircraft included in the international shown in Appendix I. Incremental CRAF acti' on The CRAF program involves three stages of activation: 1. Stage I, committed expansion, consists of airlift capability committed by contract to 1 MAC for service when the mil itary airlift force cannot meet both deployment and other traffic requirements simultaneously. 2. Stage II, aiLlift emergency, provides additional expansion needed during a major airlift emergency not warranting national mobilization. 3. Stage III, national emergency, provides up to full CRAP capability during national emergencies declared by the President. Airlift requirements for each CRAF stage are based on JCS approved contingency plans. Senior Lodger When the CRAF program is implemented, carriers may be called upon to provide air traffic support at their commer- cial facilities. A principal air carrier, designated the senior lodger, controls this support at each civil airport and may obtain required assistance from other CRAP carriers at his station. SCOPE OF REVIEW In performing the requested evaluation of the Air Force's assessment of CRAF cargo terminal capability, we discussed the assessment with ir Force and MAC officials and reviewed the MAC data which formed the basis of the Air Force study. We discussed appropriate segments of the assessment with Army, Navy, and Air Force cfficials of shipper service control offices which are responsible for clearing shipments for air movement and for providing routing instructions for such shipments. Finally, we dis- cussed CRAF cargo terminal capability and the willingness of CRAF carriers to process DOD cargo during contingency operations with 13 of the 17 carriers in the international CRAF. These carriers, who provided us with data on their cargo terminals' processing capabilities, accounted for 253 of the 266 aircraft committed to CRAF. We discussed the question of the extent to which )OD and the Air Force included reserve aerial port squadrpns in their planning for Public Law 94-286 with official., in the Office of the Deputy Ab-istant Secretary f Defen e for Reserve Affairs, anc the Office of Air Force Reserves. 2 CHAPTER 2 EVALUATION OF THE AIR FORCE'S ASSESSMENT OF CRAF CARGO TFRIINAL CAPABILITY The Air Force concluded that use of CRAF terminal facilities would not be advantageous to the Departnent of Defense and that transfer of planned wartime workload to CRAF terminals would save only about 60 personnel spaces. They also felt that staff operational problems would arise leading to lessened aircraft utilization, shipper confu-~ sion, delays in moving cargo, and a massive new management structure. The Air Force understated both the cargo processing capability of the CRAF terminals and the potential per- sonnel savings resulting from their use. Although there would be operational problems associated with using the CRAF terminals, these problems could be resolved through advance planning. Using CRAF terminal facilities would reduce MAC's overall staffing requirements and help reduce a shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel. It also would allow the CRAF carriers to continue operating terminal facili- ties which might otherwise have to be closed because of a shortage of aircraft with which to move commercial cargo. CRAF CARGO TERMINAL CAPABILITY The Air Force concluded there would be only minimal CRAF cargo terminal capability available to MAC during a contingency prior to full obilization. However, we collected data from CRAF carriers which show that these carriers have a significant surge capability which could be available to MAC during all stages of CRAF operations. Furthermore, with the passage of Public Law 94-286, MAC would not need CRAF terminal facilities until full mobilization. Air Force posit ioI The Air Force stated that commercial airlines posserss little or no surge capability in their terminal facilities. It assumed that since the planning of civil cargo terminal 3 capability is a function of economics, commercial airlines would invest in only those facilities and equipment needed to meet current market demands. They stated the diversion of commercial aircraft o MAC use during the early stages of CRAF activation (CRAF stages I and II) would not free any terminal capability for MAC use because the carriers would continue to move the same amount of commercial cargo as before the activation by better utilizing their remaining aircraft. They concluded that only during full mobilization (CRAF stage III), when the bulk of commercial cargo aircraft would be diverted to MAC use, would any significant amount of terminal capability be available to MAC. CRAF carriers' positions Although commercial airlines invest in only those facilities and equipment needed for forecasted demands, the scheduled air carriers informed us that they must have sufficient facilities, equipment, and personnel to meet peak workloads which occur during short periods of a day and leave their facilities underutilized for other periods. Therefore, the commercial airlines possess a substantial surge capability by fully utilizing their facilities, equip- ment, and personnel, including overtime. Carrier estimates of their surge capability--based on estimated maximum processing capability with present facilities, equipment, and personnel, and current workloads--are shown in Appen- dix II. The withdrawal of aircraft from commercial operations further increases this inherent surge capability of the CRAF carriers. Several carriers informed us that MAC would require their entire cargo fleet during a Stage III activa- tion. The carriers told us that under these circumstances, a large part of their cargo terminal capability would be available to MAC. Officials of all CRAF carriers expressed a willingness to participate in cargo terminal operations to the extent possible. CRAF capability may not be needed until Stage lr A MAC official stated that since passage of Public Law 94-286 he expects reserve aerial port personnel to be avail- able during the initial stages of any contingency operation. Because of the operational problems associated with the use of CRAF terminals, he expects that MAC would call up avail- able reserves and make maximum use of their own facilities before using those of CRAF. Thus, it is possible that CRAF 4 facilities would not be needed or used until full mobili- zation. (See ch. 3 for a synopsis of MAC authority to call up reserves.) AERIAL PORT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS COULD BE MET THROUGB USE OF CRAF TERMINALS The Air Force concluded that a net reduction of 60 personnel positions would be possible during full mobiliza- tion by transferring cargo workloads from MAC aerial ports to CRAF trminals. In its study, the reduction of 394 personnel at MAC aerial ports was offset by an addition of 334 military liaison personnel at CRAF ports. In contrast, our evaluation shows a possible reduction of 573 personnel at MAC aerial ports and a need for fewer military liaisons at CRAF terminals. We estimate that the potential net savings in personnel from handling cargo at CRAF terminals instead of MAC aerial ports could be as great as 500 positions. Even though dollar savings might be reduced somewhat by the installation of additional com- puter equipment, we believe savings would still be realized and more importantly, the reduction would help to lessen an anticipated shortfall in reserve aerial port personnel during full mobilization. Reductions at the MAC aerial ports Overall, aerial port staffing requirements were derived by applying MAC's computerized personnel standards to planned wartime workloads. Personnel reductions are based upon the transfer of planned wartime workload fr)m MAC aerial ports to the CRAF terminals. A comparison of our estimate of total transferable workload and the related personnel reductions for each of the first two 30-day periods of the wartime plan with that of the Air Force is shown below. 5 First 30-day period Second 30-day pe ud ATi rce -d -Tir Force G CRAF flights transferred 836 399 1,076 665 Cargo transferred (tons) 17,295 32,060 29,406 40,741 Aerial port per- sonnel reduction a/394 479 a/636 573 a/These are the numbers shown in the Air Force study. How- ever, since preparation of the Air Force study, MAC has changed the computer program by which it determines staff- ing requirements. Application of the new program to the Air Force and GAO estimates of transferable workloads are included in app. IV. Air Force estimates of possible personnel reductions are changed to 264 fot the first 30-day period, and 406 for the second 30-day period. The above differences in transferable workload resulted from different methods of computation used by GAO and the Air Force. (See app. III.) The major reasons for differ- ences are: -- The Air Force overstated the number of trans- ferable flights by assuming that all CRAF cargo flights would be transferred from MAC aerial ports to commercial ports. It did not relate these flights to the quantity of cargo which could be transferred. Our estimate included only those flights required to trans- port transferable cargo. -- The Air Force assumed that only resupply cargo programed for CRAF aircraft could be trans- ferred to commercial ports. We assumed that all commercially compatible resupply cargo, including that programed for MAC aircraft, could be transferred to commercial ports and moved on CRAF aircraft. -- GAO included workluads from two ports not included by the Air Force. Although the transferable workload and elated reduc- tions in staff are greater during the second .3-daymobili- zation period than the first, the Air Force assumed that only the lesser number of personnel (394) could be elimi- nated from the total force. However, we found that the total workload and overall staffing requirements are 6 substantially less during the first 30-day period than during the second. Therefore, even if the .573 positions that can be eliminated from the peak overall staffing requirements during the second period were eliminated immediately, the remaining personnel would be sufficient to meet first period requirements. Requirements for military liaison The need for 334 military liaison positions cited in the Air Force study was based on a standard position- staffing formula. MAC assumed that, with minor variations at some locations, for 24-hour coverage two military aerial port management personnel to perform management liaison. functions, and nine air traffic personnel to perform liaison functions on the working level would be required for each CRAF-operated cargo terminal at each of eight civil ports MAC expected to use. In applying this formula, MAC gave little consideration to the amount of cargo that would be transferred to the civil ports or the number of carriers' terminals which would be used. MAC's application of the formula results in distor- tions. For example, MAC showed a requirement for 55 liaison personnel at Los Angeles International Airport to handle flights transferred from Norton AFB. However, we found that only four flights could be transferred during the first 60 days of the plan. In contrast, the total aerial port staff at Norton AFB during this period would be only 36. Although the above is an extreme example, we believe that liaison requirements were generally overstated. Con- sidering port capabilities and MAC requirements, MAC would not need all eight ports shown in its study. In our opinion, CRAF operations would be required at only five commercial ports. (See apps. V and VI.) Furthermore, we do not believe a liaison team would be needed at each cargo terminal within a commercial port. Since a centralized receiving point would be required at each civil port, only one liaison team per port would be required. We could not evaluate the team size because we were not able to determine the specific duties of the liaison personnel. However, assuming that the Air Force's 11-man team concept was accu- rate, the total requirement for liaison personnel would be 59. Comparing this figure to the 573 positions which we estimate could be eliminated at the MAC aerial ports indi- cates that a net saving of more than 500 positions might be possible rather than the 60 positions claimed by the Air Force. 7 Shortfall in reserve aesLal port personnel Although the MAC aerial port positions discussed in this report are generally reserve positions and do not cost as much as active duty personnel, a reduction in personnel requirements would benefit the Air Force in other ways. During our review, Air Force officials told us that they were having difficulties in recruiting reserve aerial port personnel. As of September 1976, MAC's reserve aerial port squadrons were more than 900-personnel below authorized strength. :.lthough sufficient reserve personnel should be available to meet the requirements of a nonmobili- zation contingency, MAC's present overall staff would not meet the requirements for full mobilization. We believe, however, that use of CRAF terminals would help reduce this shortfall. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH USE OF CRAF PORTS The Air Force assessment cited a number of operational problems a inefficiencies which would result from the use of CRA? ports. These problems were in the areas of: 1. Split operations between military and CRAF aerial ports. 2. Changes to established supply-distribution patterns. 3. Allocation and control of workloads at CRAF ports. 4. Interface of military and commercial docu- mentation procedures. We recognize these problems and inefficiencies, but we believe the major problems cited could be overcome with advance planning. Split operations The Air Force correctly pointed out that some wartime military cargo would require handling techniques which vary considerably from those of commercial operations. Commer- cial airlines generally lack the training, facilitiea. and equipment to handle the military's oversized and hazardous cargo which would still have to move through the MAC aerial ports. Data recently developed by MAC indicates that about 8 46 and 61 percent of the resupply and JCS-assured cargo moving durinig the first and second 30-day periods, respec- tively, of the wartime plan falls into one of these special handling categories. The remaining 54 and 39 percent would be nonhazardous, general bulk cargo which could be carried on CRAF aircraft operating through commercial ports. The Air Force also pointed out that split operations would result in inefficiency due to (1) a need for re- routing LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS operations to include the civil ports and (2) a lack of bulk cargo at MAC aerial ports to mix as filler cargo with oversized shipments. LOGAIR and QUICKTRANS are domestic contract cargo airlift systems operated by the Air Force and the Navy, respectively, between various military installations, including industrial and supply activities and MAC aerial ports. In contrast, we were told by shipper service control office personnel responsible for routing shipments into the aerial ports, that only a small portion of th total cargo introduced into the MAC system arrives at MAC ports via LOGAIR or QUICKTRANS. Most cargo is shipped to the ports by commercial service. Although our observations confirm this, we did not study it in detail. Although some loss of efficiency might occur from MAC aerial ports not having all of the bulk cargo to mix with its oversized cargo, hazardous and other special handling bulk cargo would still move through the MAC ports and be available as filler. Changes to supply distribution patterns The Air Force stated that as a result of split opera- tions, new supply distribution patterns would have to be developed, and detailed shipping and routing instructions disseminated to the many military and commercial shippers which ship cargo to the MAC aerial ports. They contended that the resulting confusion among the shippers regarding the proper port for their cargo could cause delays in delivering critical supplies to the combat zone. Officials of the Army, Navy, and Air Force shipper service control offices, who perform the air clearance function and provide routing instructions for their respective services, told us that changes which occur to the supply distribution pattern would cause some problems 9 but these problems could be overcome by advance planning. For them to do this planning, MAC would have to tell them which civilian ports to use for specific overseas destina- tions and advise them of any restrictions on cargo moving through these ports. Officials said that all necessary planning done in advance would enable them to implement these plans with a minimum of disruption. Allocation and control of work- s at CRAF ports The Air Force asserted that a central receiving point would be required at the CRAF ports because most civil airports consist of multiple cargo facilities. From this central receiving point, some of the cargo would have to be moved to other terminals for consolidating, palletizing, and loading. The Air Force contended that this multiple handling would result in inherent inefficiencies that would add to the intransit time of cargo. The Air Force also stated that allocation and control of workload within an airport would be an extensive management challenge requiring the senior lodger to establish a central cargo control and movement agency. Although it is true that civil aerial ports generally have multiple cargo facilities operated by different car- riers and a central receiving point for military cargo would be desirable, we believe the Air Force is overstating the problem of operating under such a concept. Based upon the cargo processing capacity iLpcrted to us by the CRAF carriers. and our estimates of volumes of military cargo that could be rerouted, we do not believe that all CRAF cargo terminals at each civilian aerial port would have to be used. By using only those terminal facilities which are required, the need for moving cargo within the port would be reduced. Furthermore, CRAF carrier officials informed us that the inefficiencies and delays associated with a central receiving point should be minimal because the commercial airlines now handle interline cargo transfers on a regular basis and are used to moving shipments between terminals within the airport. Documentation interface The Air Force stated that military supply and documen- tation is standardized within DOD under Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures to facilitate the delivery of cargo and provide a level of control and intransit visibility over en route cargo. CRAF carriers 10 would be receiving cargo documented under these procedures for which Lhey would be required to provide receipt, process- ing, and lift data. Under large volume operations, this can only be done efficiently with automated data processing systems. The Air Force stated that data systems and docu- mentation vary from carrier to carrier and, as presently structured, do not interface with the military system. While commercial airlines require control and intransit visibility for cargo moving in their commercial systems, not all carriers have automated systems for maintaining this control. Carrier officials informed us that their systems, as presently designed, could not directly interface with the DOD system. They believe, however, that visibility and con- trol could be maintained without a direct interface between the DOD and commercial system through cross-referencing. We recognize that documentation is an essential part of the DOD system and believe that either of two basic alternatives could resolve the military and commercial documentation interface problem. --The Air Force, in its assessment, proposed positioning two minicomputers (one as a backup) at each CRAF port with a direct link to the central computer at MAC headquarters. Several carriers also proposed that MAC posi- tion a remote terminal at each senior lodger cargo facility with direct lines to the MAC central-computer. MAC officials stated, how- ever, that this would require expansion of their central computer capability as they are presently capable of receiving data from only 10 aerial ports. -- Several CRAF airlines proposed that since commercial airlines maintain the same degree of cargo visibility and control as MAC, MAC develop a cross-referencing system between the military transportation control number and the waybill number used by airlines. Hard copies of shipment receipt and lift data could be sent to MAC headquarters or nearby MAC aerial ports for input to the MAC computer. This would provide MAC with the required shipment status data while the air- lines could retain their own responsibility and control for shipments. This approach would require additional MAC personnel to process the data received from the CRAF ports. 11 ADEQUACY OF MAC QUESTIONNAIRES At the request of the Committee, we reviewed the MAC questionnaire which was used to solicit CRA7 terminal -apa- ability information and the CRAF responses to the question- naire. Because of limitations of the questionnaire and CRAF's limited response to it, MAC was unable to "ose it to measure CRAF terminal capability. Instead of contacting all CRAF carriers, MAC sent the questionnaire to only the senior lodgers of the aerial ports they considered using. Each senior lodger was asked to provide detailed information on carrier operations, available terminal equipment, and work crews for all CRAF carriers at the aerial ports. Only four of the eight senior lodgers provided any of the requested data. Of these four, only one attempted to answer MAC's detailed questions on operations and availabi- lity of equipment and crews for all CRAF carriers at its airport. Carrier officials told us the MAC questionnaire was too detailed, would have required extensive work on their part to complete, and would not have provided MAC with data to assess their cargo processing capability. Due to the lack of CRAF officials' response, MAC used data obtained from other sources to estimate the CRAF carriers' terminal capability. AIR FORCE OFFICIALS' COMMENTS AND GAO'S EVALUATION We did not obtain formal written comments on our report but did discuss the results of our evaluation in some detail with Air Force officials. While these offi- cials did not seek to defend the specific figures in their study, they again expressed the opinion that the potential advantages of using commercial air terminals for wartime resupply cargo would be outweighed by difficulties in managing the timely movement of the cargo diverted to these civil terminals. Air Force officials expressed concern that a switch to commercial air cargo terminals in the early days of a war would create confusion which would delay the delivery of vitally needed high priority supplies. First, they stated that most of the CRAF aircraft would initially be ued for combat force deployment direct from military bases and that the timing for diverting the growing air resupply flow from the MAC aerial ports to the civil terminals would have to 12 be timed to match the changing availability of aircraft to move the cargo. Second, they were concerned that since only general bulk cargo would go to the civil terminals, with hazardous and oversize cargo continuing to go to military ports, some of this high-priority cargo would be misrouted because hundreds or thousands of shippers would be required to follow new instructions. The problem of shippers attempting to follow new instructions is greatly overstated. Each service has a shipper service control office that is responsible for cleariny shipments for air movement and for providing routing instructions for such shipments. The problem of rerouting shipments from MAC to commercial aerial ports based upon availability of aircraft or type of cargo is one of coordination between MAC and the three control offices. Although the problem of delayed deliveries resulting from misroutings was raised in the Air Force study, we found that it had not discussed the problem with shipper service control office personnel. These personnel informed us that they receive advance information on all air ship- ments before they leave the s'-per and that, if prepara- tions were made in advance, a. bhipments could be rerouted from MAC to commercial aerial ports with a minimum of disruption. Air Force officials believe that the problems of revised routings and changing priorities, inherent in any wartime resupply operation, would require considerably more military management at each civil terminal used than that which the GAO review had assumed. While the Air Force agreed that the 334 liaison figure included in their study was overstated, they maintained that a team would be required at each CRAF carrier's facility within the aerial port to perform liaison functions, including documentation process- ing. They stated that our estimate of 59 liaison personnel was too low. Although we agree there is a need for having military representatives at the commercial ports, we believe the liaison function could be carried on much more effectively by working through the central receiving points. Further- more, based on the amount of cargo transferable and the commercial capability available, it appears that only two terminal facilities would be needed at two commercial ports, and only one facility at the other three ports. Thus, even if a multiple team concept were adopted, only seven teams would be involved, with no more than 81 liaison personnel being required. 13 Air Force officials stated that as the number of airfields used for resupply increases, it will become more difficult to maintain both a high flying hour rate and high load factors for all military and civil aircraft used. As discussed earlier in our report, dividing cargo operations between MAC and commercial aerial ports could adversely affect the load factors on MAC aircraft due to the lesser amounts of bulk resupply cargo available at MAC aerial ports for use s filler on MAC flights. How- ever, some bulk resupply cargo wuld not be commercially compatible and so wou'd be moned through MAC aerial ports and be available as filler. Wi' 0sagard to flying-hour rates, contrary to the concert, essed by the Air Force, CRAF carriers believe that they would increase the flying- hour rates for their aircraft if they were operating through commercial aerial ports with readily available commercial service facilities. Purthermore, it appears that reduced congestion at the .AC aerial ports should facilitate improved utilization of MAC aircraft as well. Air Force officials believe that some of the CRAF carriers' estimates of surge capability presented in appendix II may be overstated. While we did not verify the figures supplied to us by the carriers, we reviewed them and in each case checked back with the carrier to determine their reasonableness. Furthermore, if use of CRAF terminal facilities is delayed until full mobilization, surge capability becomes largely a meaningless question as substantially more capability would be available due to withdrawing CRAF-committed air- craft from commercial cargo operations. Air Force officials doubted that withdrawal of long- range cargo aircraft committed to MAC during a full CRAF activation would curtail the carriers' commercial cargo operations. They believe that much domestic commercial cargo would continue to move in short-range aircraft or in the lower compartments of passenger aircraft. While it is true that some domestic commercial cargo would continue to .,ve, it should be noted that much of the terminal capability shown in appendix II is provided by carriers which have little or no domestic passenger traffic and have committed virtually all of their cargo aircraft to MAC. 14 Carriers who operate domestically informed us that if CRAF were activated, their commercial operations would be sharply curtailed. In summary, there appears to be little doubt that sufficient terminal capability would be available to handle any rerouted MAC cargo. CONCLUSIONS CRAF carriers possess a substantial cargo processing capability which could be made available to MAC during all stages of contingency operations. Use of the CRAF terminal. facilities and personnel during full mobilization could enable MAC to reduce its maximum aerial port staffing require- ment by several hundred personnel which would help to reduce a shortfall in reserve strength. Using CRAF facilities during full mobilization would also permit some carriers to continue operating facilities which they might otherwise have to either close or curtail because of the commitment of their cargo aircraft to CRAF. In summary, under the planning concepts presently used by MAC, all cargo for both MAC and CRAF aircraft must move through MAC aerial terminals. Under this concept, the present reserve requirements seem valid. However, we believe that MAC could reduce its reliance on reserves if it made the plans and studies necessary to use both the MAC and CRAF aerial cargo terminals. This would not only reduce the requirement for and cost of reserves but would also add the commercial cargo terminals to the military base capability of the Nation. Since there is no guarantee that a potential enemy would not attempt to neutra- lize MAC's terminals in time of conflict, planning to use the commercial terminals would give MAC alternatives not presently available. As this report points out, there are problems involved in integrating the commercial terminals into the MAC system. Documentation and computer-compatible data would have to be developed. Cargo routing instructions and patterns would have to be chanred and handling procedures between different carriers' facilities at the same terminal would have to be worked out. Procedures for assuring the best cargo mix between the MAC and commercial terminals to maximize air- craft utilization would also have to be worked out.' We believe, however, that studies and planning, proven by a live test of the use of commercial terminals, would pay off. 15 RECOMMENDAT ION In view of the above, we recommend that the Committee direct the Air Force to develop a comprehensive plan to use CRAF cargo terminal facilities. Until such plans and testing are completed, we believe that if the Congress were to reduce the current rserve authorizations, MAC, restricted by its plans to use only its own terminals, may not meet its airlift requirements for full mobilization. 16 CHAPTER 3 RESERVE AERIAL PORT SQUADRONS COULD BE ACTIVATED UNDER PUBLIC LAW 94-286 The Committee specifically asked us to inquire into the extent that reserve aerial port squadrons were considered by the Air Force and the Department of Defense when Public Law 94-286 was being formulated. Although reserve aerial port squadrons were not cited in material obtained from DOD, Air Force and DOD officials informed us that they consider re- serve aerial port squadrons available for activation under Public Law 94-286. Public Law 94-286 is an act which enables the President to activate up to 50,000 reservists for up to 90 days without declaring a national emergency. The law is an essential ele- ment in the "Total Force Policy" which dictates that all available forces--active and reserve--be considered in meet- ing future contingencies. The law enables the President to increase active forces during a crisis without the national and international implications of declaring a national emer- gency. In testimony before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense and other DOD officials stated that the augmentation of strategic airlift forces .cs a good example of the intended use of this law. A booklet, prepared in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, cited examples of the reserve forces which might be activated under this law. Among the many examples it cites strategic airlift forces and states "* * * mobilization of 2,500 Associate Unit Reser- vists (4 squadrons and maintenance personnel) would allow the C-5 force to surge to 10 hours per day. This would be a significant factor in a major re- supply effort." Reserve aerial port personnel were neither included in strategic airlift forces nor mentioned among the other examples in this booklet. However, the official who pre- pared the booklet told us the examples cited were not in- tended to be all inclusive. He and other DOD officials stated that under this law, DOD wanted and obtained complete flexibility to activate any units required to meet an emer- gency. They stated that reserve aerial port squadrons could 17 be activated under this law. A MAC official stated that, under this law, they expect reserve aerial port personnel to be available for contingency operations. Due to the availability of reserve aerial port personnel, CRAF cargo terminal facilities apparently would not be needed until full mobilization. 18 CHAPTER 4 ADJUSTMENT TO PEACETIME STAFFING FIGURES IN EARLIER GAO REPORT On February 2, 1976, we transmitted to the Commit.tee our evaluation of an Air Force study entitled Air Force nalysis of Aerial Port Manpower Requirements." We reported that the overall requirement for 7,232 active duty military and civi- lian personnel cited in the study exceeded by 1,727 the 5,505 personnel we considered sufficient to handle peacetime workload. As a result of our evaluation, the Committee elim- inated 1,700 positions from the aerial ports. Since reporting to the Committee, we have met with Air Force officials on several occasions, at their request, to further clarify differences between our requirement figures and theirs. These meetings have shown a need for certain adjustments to the peacetime staffing figure in our February 1976 report. Adjustments are necessary in order to eliminate certain positions included in the Air Force study and in our require- ment figures, which are properly chargeable to base transpor- tation management offices rather than to aerial ports, and to reinstate certain data and records processing positions which were mistakenly omitted from the aerial port at Charles- ton AFB. The required adjustments are reflected in the fol- lowing table. Peacetime staffing of 21 aerial ports per GAO report of February 2, 1976 5,505 Additio:nal data and records processing positions for Charleston AFB 33 Less transportation management office positions -432 Total adjusted staffing of 21 aerial ports 5,106 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS During our meetings Air Force officials also mentioned several peacetime staffing requirements which were not in- cluded in the Air Force study submitted to the Committee or in our evaluation. The functions and the Air Force's esti- mate of required staffing are as follows: 19 Staffing of 31 en route and other locations not re- flected in study 350 Average personnel on temporary duty away from home base in support of JCS exercises 143 Personnel required for increased anti-hijacking sur- veillance 250 743 The Air Force justification for these positions and comments follow. our Staffing of en route locations The 350 personnel, including 135 personnel at Scott Illinois, are generally stationed at locations other AFB, 21 strategic aerial ports covered by the Air Force than the our evaluation. Although there appears to be little study and that staffing is required at these locations, we were doubt that staffing standards are generally unavailable told and did not attempt to evaluate the stated requirements. so we tailed listing of positions by location was provided A de- Air Force and is included as appendix VII. by the Temporary duty personnel Air Force officials told us that during calendar 1975 an average of 143 aerial port personnel were away year their bases in support of MAC and JCS exercises. from VIII.) (See app. While we believe temporary duty demands constitute valid personnel requirement, because of the extraordinary a circumstances surrounding the fall and evacuation of Vietnam and their impact on temporary duty personnel, we question validity of 1975 as a representative period upon which the to base staffing requirements. We believe that any additional personnel intended reflect temporary duty requirements should be based to on a more representative time period. Anti-hiack personnel As a result of acts of terrorism at civil airports, as the bomb explosion incident at La Guardia Airport, such Air Force has increased terminal security at all MAC the aerial ports with a resulting increased requirement for personnel. 20 (See app. IX.) While we do not question the need for security at the aerial ports, review of readily available data indicates that the staffing requirements cited by the Air Force for some locations are unreasonably high. For example, Air Force officials told us they needed 30 positions at each of the three major passenger terminals in the United States--Travis AFB, McGuire AFB, and Charleston AFB. This level of staffing, requiring 81 additional posi- tions to the 9 positions included in the Air Force study, would be needed to operate two baggage-X-ray machines 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. However, we noted that during fiscal year 1975, each of these terminals handled the equiva- lent of only 2 or 3 originating passenger flights a day. Based on the above, we believe the Air Force should re- assess the number of positions it needs for anti-hijacking protection. 21 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I SCHEDULE OF CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT COMMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL CRAF AS OF JUNE 30, 1976 Number of aircraft Aircraft Type at -staae Carrier (note a) (note b) I III Airlift DC-8-54F V 2 2 2 International DC-8-63F V 1 2 3 3 4 5 Alaska Airlines B727C V - - 4 American B707-323C C - - 11 Airlines B707-323C V - - 3 B747-100F C - - 1 8747-100 P 6 21 Braniff Airways DC-8-62F V 1 B747A P - - 1 B727C V -- 4 Capitol Interna- tional Airways DC-8-63F V 2 2 2 Continental Air Lines DC-l-lOCF V- - Eastern Air Lines B727C V - 2 The Flying DC-8-63F V 11 11 11 Tiger Line DC-8-63F C - 6 6 B747-100F C - - 3 11 17 20 Northwest Airlines B707-351C V 2 3 3 B747-51 P 4 7 15 DC-10-40 P 2 4 12 B747F C 2 3 3 10 17 33 22 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I Number of aircraft Aircraft Type at.staqe Carrier (note a) (note b) I- I V 1 1 3 Overseas National DC-8-63F 2 DC-8-61F V 2 2 Airways 3 3 5 V 5 5 5 Pan American B707-321C 10. B707-321C C 5 10 World Airways 1 2 7 8707-321/C P P 7 13 30 B747-21 1 B747-100F C 1 1 V' - 2 B727C 19 31 55 V 1 1 1 Seaboard World DC-8-55F V 2 5 7 Airlines DC-8-63F DC-8-61 V 3 3 3 B-747-200F C 2 2 2 8 11 13 V - 2 2 Trans International DC-8-61CF V 1 3 6 Airlines DC-8-63F DC-10-30C V 3 3 3 4 8 11 C - - 15 Trans World B707-331C P. - 3 Airlines B707-331B B-747 P - 10 - ~- 28 C - - 15 United Air Lines DC-8-54F B747-22 P 7 22 B707-300C V - 1 Western Air Lines 23 APPENDIX I APPENDIX I Number of aircraft Aircraft Type at stage Carrier (note a) (note b) I II III World Airways DC-8-63F V - 3 5 B747 V 2 2 2 B727C V - - 2 2 5 9 Total 17 carriers 62 98 266 a/All aircraft shown are long range types except the B727C. b/Symbols shown for type aircraft are as follows: C = cargo; P = passenger; and V convertible. 24 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II CARRIER ESTIMATES OF THEIR CARGO TERMINAL SURGE CAPABILITY(tons per month) New San Carrier York Chicago Francisco Miami Seattle. Airlift Interna- tional Maximum capability 5,000 1,875 2,813 3,750 - Current workload 2,500 750 1,250 2,250 Surge capability 2.500 1,125 1,563 1,500 American Airlines Maximum capability 13,652 12,711 15,162 - Current workload 13,138 9,322 9,368 - - Surge capability _ 514 3,389 5,794 Continental Air Lines Maximum capability - 1,550 320 1,100 2,665 Current workload - 1,072 215- 679 1,705 Surge capability - 478 105 421 960 Eastern Air Lines Maximum capability 3,336 1,822 - 3,523 - Current workload 2,566 1,458 - 3,203 - Surge capability 770 364 - 320 - Flying Ter Maximum capability 7,176 7,688 7,161 - 4,551 Current workload 4,600 4L300 3,900 - 2,400 Surge capability 2,576 3.388 3.261 2,151 Northwest Airlines Maximum capability 8,110 4,020 950 1,180 9,800 Current workload 4,050 4,020 475 590 4,900 Surge capability 4,060 _ 0 475 590 4,900 25 APPENDIX II APPENDIX II New San Carrier York Chicago Francisco Miami Seattle Pan American World Airways Maximum capability 18,750 850 3,225 3,000 525 Current workload 10,000 750 2,150 2,400 300 Surge capability 8,750 100 1,075 600 225 Seaboard World Airlines Maximum capability 12,000 1,500 1,500 - - Current workload 8,000 376 255 - - Surge capability 4,000 1,124 1,245 - Trans World Airlines Maximum capability 7,000 6,250 5,200 - - Current workload 7,000 5,000 4,000 - Surge capability _ 0 1,250 1,200 - United Air Lines Maximum capability 7,500 24,000 10,500 - 3,520 Current workload 6,000 22,000 9,500 - 3,000 Surge capability 1,500 2,000 1,000 - 520 Total capability 82,524 62,266 46,831 12,553 21,061 Current workloads 57,854 49,048 31,113 9,122 12,305 Surge capability 24,670 13,218 15,718 3,431 8,756 26 APPENDIX III APPENDIX II COMPARISON Or METHODOLOGIES USED BY MAC AND GAO TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF CRA_ FLIGHTS AND UANTTITIES Or CARG' TRANSFERABLE TO CRAF TERMINALS The basis for both analyses was a 1974 classified MAC Wartime Aerial Port Manpowet requilements study of the JCS workloads for a conventional-type wa in Europe. From this report, the following data for each MAC aerial port was used to determine transferable workloadt total number of flights by CRAF airciaft; total number of passengers to be processedl and total quantities of cargo by ini- tial deployments, resupply. etrograde, and JSC-assured. MAC GAO Step 1. Determine the number of cargo Step 1. Determine the numbel of CRAF flights. cargo flights. a. As all pasengers ae ex- a. Same as MAC. pected to move aboard CRAF aircraft. MAC divided the total passengers fo: each polt by 337--the weighted average seating capacity for passenger air- claft committed to CRAP. This gives the numbe of flights needed to cattry passengers. b. Based on their interpretation b. Air Foice Regulation 76-2 of Ail Force Regulation (AFR) states that, for planning 76-2. MAC applied a 75-peicent pu poses, a 75-peicent utilization factor to the pas- factor will be applied senger flights and theleby in- to the maximum Aircraft creased the number of flights Cabin Load of "floor loaded tequired to carry the given cargo airc aft.' This 75 number of passengers. percent facto; was intended fol passenger flights so we did not apply it to out data. Furthermote. in this plan of mass troop movements, we cannot envision these aircraft moving with only 75 percent of thei capacity used. c. The diffelence between the c. Same as MAC except we detel- total CRAP flights scheduled mined the number of passenger fo a port and the number of flights equited by step 1. (a). passenger flights equited by step 1, (b) gives the number of CRAP cargo flights avail- able. d. MAC used this figuie for the d. As this number of flights is number of CRAP cargo flights not related to the amount of that could be tansferled. cargo to be tr ansferred we computed the CRAF flights tans- fel ed as shown in step 2. 27 APPENDIX III APPENDIX III MIAC GAO Step 2. Determine the amount of cargo Step 2. Detelmine the amcjnt of cargo that could be transferred to that could be transferred to CRAP terminals (MAC assumed that CRAP terminals. (We assumed only bulk resupply. etrograde, that only bulk resupply, etro- and JCS-assured cargo could be grade, and JCS-assured cargo could transferred). be transferred.) a. Using the aver age palletized a. To separate totals of resupply payload factors for CRAP alt- (including JCS-assuted) and craft in AFR 76-2, MAC deter- retrograde. we applied a fac- mined a weighted average pay- to, of 54 and 39 percent for load per CRAP cargo flight the first and second 30-day based on the CRAP inventory. per iods. respectively. to de- termine the amount of bulk. nonhazardous resupply cargo. ad/ This gives the amount of caqrgo that couid be transferred to the CRAP terminals. b. This weighted average multi- b. We divided the resupply cargo plied by the number of flights that could be transferred to determined in step 1, (c). -the CRAP terminals by a weighted gives the cargo capability of aver age payload per CRAF all CRAP cargo flights. flight--detetrlined in the same manner as MAC step 2. (a)-- to give the number of CRAF flights needed to carry this car go. c. MAC assumed that both AC and c. We then checked the number of CRAP aircraft would be carry- cargo flights needed against ing resupply cargo. There- the number of cargo flights fore, they applied a factor available--as etermined in (based on the percentage of step 1. (c)--to see that suf- resupply--including retrograde ficient flights were available. and JCS-assured--to total port As the total of available cargo) to the capability de- flights excVeded the total e- veloped In step 2, (b). 'Thls quired flights for transferable gave the amount. of cargo MAC cargo, we assumed that all non- assumed would .be carried on hazardous bulk resupply and CRAP aircraft and could be retrograde cargo could be transferred to CRAP ports. transferred. b/ a/These were the best estimates that MAC could provide to us and ae based on 1976 JCS planning documents which MAC is currently analyzing. b/PFo three ports during the second 30-day period only, the required flights ex- ceeded the available flights. However, as the total available exceeded the total required, we assumed that some flights could be rerouted to these ports. 28 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV 4) fu 0 mP - 443 0) C: C21 fn C4 Ln I .- 44 0· 'GiI fn r-4 M jarI Y w U4.m W0 en Lo 0IC4 0 o i 0 @1 LnU ' En I gut~~- AiU 0,-4.~~~~~~~~ - -vI %I -4 qv1 enr I ko 4-4 Vn '-4 '141 O c4 · ·- 2I ~I .O 4W 0 44 c , I a r\r'h co(n%0Ln ni ~I 7 I ( ~~~~~~w m ' nC1 Ln r(N(a r L ) r33 Ld IRA 41 N Lnon u (U to r IUCD V, 4 O co 4) E 4) e~~~~~~~~~~~VII 0,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-4 4it .cle mb 4 ) Vr n P Ec oUC W.CPC4)4)C> .uM.a C rUW 4) 4 qrco 10 4 t r-I r-j V0 - nt i 00 00 LI 44044 z Cal o CII HI e L1-4 qqr ~~~~~~~~ d) q;rD cp a ~~~~)U W he to 029 cu r I tp v 0 r-~~~~4 )v-t r. 4 U~lIO 0 1 &A 4 0 -F 4i %C% % C %0 a 4) 0 VW i 44 W 4 0 %.--S~0- 0 44i 0 c03cc CD 1 rnc, rn 4i fu 00 C: ol fn I-4 0 >wo m.0Ln 3 (U clc0n(co tn I LnI oO a a0 U) FP41 N r4 2 Al r-41 r-4 %C 00 J W0 r-4 Ln 01(V W7% rl·-e co g EfI(n a 3 m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~%W 0 4i 3 wI~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ rO .c o a o E~~~~~~~~~~~)i ~~I ON~ ~~ a% )Jd C r w -w P 4 4 E CI 4 0~U m .01 at C 3 t 1 +~~1. .4 C 4 cc 3 to m :3 en r. r 0~~~~~~~3·c Z: C4 P Co to la 4 wm a 4 0 to ) 4) ' 00 -- a a w -c o o. .4 0 &A M > U & 0E-4 W AJ 4 0 0 0 u a % c%. C OX 3acu Z C E-4 cl 81; 111L1'~OO 29 APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV m I %04'.-9M V, r C r-e4 v4 4 r. t , I o I -l I o 0o o n O Cl 0 C - OIa>r . He rn l EI4 c , ci , f o, 3 W rofa Z 'oT U c %V I I olw o 0I m c. i 1 U O1 C Q u a o - I I z m I I 4I t4)r : or-a 4 -l l fI a 41 44 34 c 4000 a 0 g0e- O 0 h i- r p &. 0 0 1 I 1U ol4 O e L sl 4 CDl alo ut1 'w1 to1 Es4 0H 0414j 0 " 4 Li '1 0 1J 4 C4 C 1 o c 40 wc m C QX Xu OU 30 APPENDIX V APPENDIX V COMPARISON OF CARGO TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM MAC AERIAL PORTS WITH CAPABILITIES OF NEARBY CRAF PORTS Cargo (tons) Cargo surge to be capability transferred CRAF port of CRAF First Sei-oid to which port (tons MAC aerial port 30_days 30 days transferred per month) Dover AFB, Delaware 14,165 23,218 New York McGuire AFB, New Jersey 564 161 New York 14,729 23,379 24,670 Norton AFB, Califor- nia 84 84 San Francisco Travis AFB, Califor- nia 1,605 3,888 San Francisco 1,689 3,972 15,718 McChord AFB, Wash- ir;ton 2,565 1,494 Seattle 8,756 Scott AFB, Illinois 4,095 7,144 Chicago 13.218 Charleston AFB, South Carolina 8,982 4,752 Miami a/3,431 a/While the surge capability of 3,431 tons per month does not equal the tonnages transferred, the maximum capability of CRAF carriers at Miami is 12,553 tons per month which ex- ceeds the tonnage transferred. 31 APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI COMPARISON OF AIR FORCE- AND GAO-DETERMINED REQUIREMENT FOR LIAISON PERSONNEL CRAF port Air Force GAO Difference New York 55 Miami 11 -44 29 11 -18 Boston 20 - -20 Dulles International, Washington 10 - -10 Seattle 66 San Francisco 11 -55 66 11 -55 Baltimore-Washington 29 Los Angeles - -29 55 - -55 Chicago - MAC (note a) 11 11 4 4 - Total 334 59 -275 a/MAC authorized two liaison positions each, for the 21st and 22d Air Forces under its cummand. 32 APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII ',R FORCE ESTIMATE OF STRATEGIC AERIAL PORT MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AT OTHER THAN MAIN AERIAL PORTS REQUIREMENT: Lsted below are locations other than main ter- strategic aerial ports where aerial port operations arid minal services furctions for movement of personnel, cargo, and equipment; aeromedtcal airlift support; and coordination of airlift operations tn Europe and the Pacific are performed. ion of Scope of functions vary from super's AC-controlled terminal services and surveillance of co:\me;cial contractsRe- to the full operation of small air terminal operations. quirements listed below are associated with peacetime readi- ness support t each location. Location Requirement Location Requirement 2 Naples 3 Addis Ababa Altus 13 Pago Pago 1 Aviano 14 Pisa 4 Beirut 2 Prestwick 12 Buckley 2 Ramstein (note a) 8 Christchurch 2 Rhein Main 32 (note a) 1 Richmond 5 Cubi Point Dhahran 5 Rota 5 Eielson 12 Scott (note b) 135 Galena 3 Shemya 5 Hickam (note a) 12 Sigonelia 2 Howard 11 Taegu 11 Johnston Island 1 Taipei 13 Kelly 2 Tehran 5 Kwan Ju 8 Kunsan 17 Total 350 Maxwell 2 a/Spaces not directly collocated with Strategic Aerial Ports at listed locations. Spaces at Hickam are assigned to the 61st Airlift Support Wing and are required for coordination of aerial port operations in the Pacific Theater. Spaces at Ramstein and Rhein Main are assigned to the 435th Air- lift Wing and are required for coordination of aerial port operations in the European Theater. b/A 24-hour air terminal operation is necessary due to basirg C-9 air evacuation and administrative support fleet at Scott. Included in the 135 staffing requirement are 65 for the passenger reservation enter, 38 for servicing the air evacuation and administrative support aircraft, and 32 in air terminal services and records. 33 APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF STAFFING FOR OFF-STATION SUPPORT OF MAC/JCS EXERCISES REQUIREMENT: During calendar year 1975, an average of 3,005 staffdays per month were used in support of Military Airlift Command and Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises. This equates to an average of 143 personnel drawn from MAC strategic aerial ports which are required for off-station support for these exercises. Location Reqirement Andersen 2 Athens 2 Charleston 11 Clark 3 Dover 13 Elmendorf 3 Hickam 3 Incirlik 4 Kadena 7 McChord 15 McGuire 12 Mildenhall 1 Norton 18 Osan 4 Ramstein 2 Rhein Main 11 Torrejon 2 Travis 22 Yokota 8 Total 143 34 APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX AIR FORCE ESTIMATE OF STAFFING FOR INCREASED ANTI-HIJACK AND TERMINAL SECURITY PROCEDURES AT STRATEGIC AERIAL PORTS REQUIREMENT: Acts of terrorism at civil terminals, such as the La Guardia incident, have prompted the Military Airlift Command to increase terminal security procedures at all MAC aerial ports. This includes more thorough passenger and baggage screening procedures at all locations to include the use of X-ray equipment at most major strategic aerial ports. Location Requirement Andersen 14 Athens 9 Charleston 28 Clark 12 Dover 4 Elmendorf 7 Hickam 11 Incirlik 9 Kadena 13 Lajes 5 McChord 14 McGuire 27 Mildenhall 8 Norton 13 Osan 9 Ramstein 10 Rhein Main 11 Torrejon 9 Travis 26 Yokota 11 Total 250 3b
Air Force Contingency Plans Should Include Facilities of Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-04-06.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)