Emergency Power Generators Used and Managed Inefficiently by Department of Defense

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-05-20.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                          DOCUMENT RESUME

02165 -   A14524561
Emergency Power Generators Used and Mana.ged Inefficiently 32
                                                  20, 1977.
Department of Defense. LCD-77-406; B-133361. May
Report to Secretary, Department of Defense; by Fred J. Shafer,
Director, Logistics and Communications Div.
Issue Area: Facilities and Material Managemet:' Operation
                                                      Efforts    to
    Maintenance of Facilities (708); Energy:  Federal
    Conserve Energy (1602).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.                 -
Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense
    Military (except procurement    contracts) (051).
Organization  Concerned: Department of the Navy; Department of
    the Army; Department of the Air Force.
Congressional Relevance: House Committee on Armed Services;
     senate Committee on Armed Services.
          The Department of Defense (OD) needs to make
improvements in the management and use of the emergency
generators, which provide backup power for vital   DOD  facilities,
such as hospitals, if normal power sources fai;.
Findings/Conclusions: DOD needs to provide standard guidelines
to the services on how to best manage and use emergency power
generators    ore stringent Department and service criteria on
the authorization and use of emergency power generators visited,
reduce many of the problems noted at the installations
such as generator capacities greater than required, unnecessary  and
and duplicate generators, inconsistencies in generator use,
unnecessary costs to maintain duplicate  systems.
                                                     (1) provide
Recmmendations: The Secretary of Defense should:              access
                                      should  have  priority
criteria for determining which users
                                                users  can  best  be
to emergency power and how the needs of these                     the
met; (2) strengthen the process for reviewing   and  justifying
                                                           need  for
need for all generators in order to permit the initial users
a generator to be adequately justified, to permit those
which can be serviced by smaller generators to be identified,
and to permit generators no longer necessary to be made
 available to other users; and (3) instruct  installations to
 share generators, when appropriate, as an  alternative   to buying
 or retaining unnecessary generators. (Author/SC)

           UNITED STA TES

           Emergency Power Generators
           Used And Managed Inefficiently
           By Department Of Defense
           Emrerqency generators pi wvide backup power
           for vital Department of Defense facilkt:es,
           such as hospitals, if normal power sources fail.
           This report discusses inconsistencies in the
           managerm"t and use of emergency power by
           Defense and points out how generators can be
           managed better.

                                                              MAY 20, 1977
                                      WASHINGTON, D.C. 205O


         lhe onoraole
         rne secretary of Defense

        rear          r. Secretary:
             This report discusses your Department's needed improve-
        ments in managing and using emergency power generators at
        military installations. The report identified inconsisten-
        cies and weaKnesses in the management and use of emergency
        power systems and points out opportunities for your Depart-
        ment to consolidate power needs, wnere appropriate.

             This report conta ns recommendations to you on page
        15. As you Know, section 236 of the Lecislative    organi-
        zation Act of 1970 requires the nead of a Federal agency
        to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recom-
        mendations to the House Committee on Government Operations
        and tne Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later
        than oU days after the date of the report and to tne house
        and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's
        first request for appropriations made more than 60 days
        atter ne date o the report.

              the Deoartment should provide the proper management
        emphasis to our recommendations. Otherwise tne Department
        ana the military services could later invest in new, un-
        neeoed sy;tems or retain existing systems which could be
        consolidated with other requirements or wnich could accom-
        plisn a mission with a smaller, less expensive generator.
        Tne Department should act promptly and decisively to avoid
        or minimize this situation.

            We are sending copies o tis report to the Director,
       Oftice or rlanagement and Budget; tne Secretaries of the
       Army, Navy, and Air orce; and the Chairmen, House and
       Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services,
       tne House Committee on Government Operations, and the
       Senate Comtmittee on Governmental Affairs.

                                                    Sincerely yours,

                                                    Fred J. hafer
OF DEFENSE                                  MANAGED INEFFICIENTLY BY
                                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

             Most military installations have emergency
             backup generators to keep essential equip-
             ment and activities--such as aircraft nav-
             igational aids, fire stations, command
             posts, and hospitals--operating when normal
             power source fail.
             The Department of Defense needs to provide
             standard guidelines to the services on how
             to best manage and use emergency power
             The Secretary of Defense should:
              --Providc criteria for determining which
                users should have priority access to
                emergency power and how the needs of
                these users can best be met.
              -- Strengthen the process for reviewing
                 and justifying the need for all gen-
                 erators. This will permit (1) the
                 initial need for a generator to be
                 adequately justified, (2) those users
                 which can be serviced by smaller gen-
                 erators to be identified, and (3) gen-
                 erators no longer necessary to be made
                 available to other users.

             -- Instruct installations to share gen-
                erators, when appropriate, as an alter-
                native to buying or retaining unneces-
                sary generators.   (See p. 15.)

             The Department has invested large sums
             for emergency power generators. A large
             part of this investment is in permanently
             installed, rather than mobile, generators.
             The Department also uses mobile generators
             in emergencies. Most are purchased for
             tactical purposes, but several are used
             for backup power. GAO has no information

Tear S.i     Upon removal, the report   i                 LCD-77-406
cover date should be nored hereon.
on how many mobile generators are in
use or employed for emergency power uses.

The Department's mobile generator inven-
tory is valued at about $760 million.
The cost to operate and maintain these
generators involves many millions of
dollars. Total value of permanently in-
stalled generators cannot be measured.
(See p. 1.)
Each service has regulations specifying
which users can be supported by genera-
tors, but any facility not pecified
may have generators if it is deemed
necessary. Therefore, many types of
facilities are given generators.
More stringent Department and service
criteria on the authorization and use
of emergency power generators could
reduce many of the problems noted at
installations visited. Problems in-
cluded generator capacities greater
than required, unnecessary and dupli-
cate generators, inconsistencies in
generator use, and unnecessary costs
to maintain duplicate systems.  (See
pp. 6 to 10.)

In requesting a generator, many users
submit insufficient data, mentioning
that the.generator is essential but
seldom explaining why. In addition,
although service regulations require
installations to determine whether
emergency power needs are being met,
installations do not consider whether
a continuing need exists for the
generators.   (See p. 11.)

To alleviate these problems, an ade-
quate system is needed for (1) deter-
mining whether users are properly

        justifying their nitial requests for gen-
        erators and (2) reviewing generators periodi-
        cally, to see if they are being used effi-
        ciently. Only ntobile generators are in-
        spected by command reviewers. As a result,
        only a small percentage of emergency power
        generators are reviewed.  If permanently
        installed generators were reviewed, the
        possibility of sharing generators would
        be increased and the likelihood of buying
        or retaining generators unnecessarily would
        be reduced. (See p. 12.)

        At several installations emergency power
        generators could be shared.  (See p. 12.)
        A $67,000 rehabilitation project for
        five facilities, each having a generator,
        was deferred because one had a gene:ator
        large enough to provide backup power for
        all.  (See pp. 13 to 15.)
        the Department and te services need a
        policy which requires or encourages such


        The Department believed GAO's recommenda-
        tions merited consideration and is review-
        ing criteria standardizing the authoriza-
        tion and use of emergency power for specific
        However, the Department indicated that
        GAO's report should have recognized basic
        differences between tactical mobile gen-
        erators and auxiliary electrical pwer
        systems, readiness requirement during
        mobilization or national emergencies, and
        degrees of criticality or reliability of
        these systems.

        Obviously, adequate backup power is needed
        for critical facilities during power
        failures, disasters, or national emergen-
        cies. However, the Department should have
        a management system which guarantees that

Toe!t                        iii
emergency power needs are justified, and
the Department should consolidate such
needs where appropriate.
This report clearly shows that the serv-
ices could strengthen their management
of emergency power systems. GAO stroigly
urges the Department to act decisively on
the recommendations in this report to avoid
or minimize unnecessary investments in
these systems.


DIGEST                                                      i


   1       INTRODUCTION                                     1
               Mobile Electric Power Project                2
               Review objectives                            3

             BETTER                                         5
               Criteria needed on generator authori-
                 zation and use                             5
               Need for adequate justification and
                 periodic review of generators             11
               Potential to consolidate emergency
                 power requirements                        12
               Conclusions                                 15
               Recommendations                             15
               Agency comments                             15
               Our evaluation                              17

   3       SCOPE OF REVIEW                                 20


   I       Letter dated March 16, 1977, from the Acting
             Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-
             tions and Logistics)                           21

  II       Examples of excessive emergency power
             capacity                                       28

 III       Generatcrs supporting navigational aid
             systems                                        31

   IV      principal officiels responsible for
             activities d'    ised in this report           32

                        A    VIATIONS

 DOD       Deoartment of Defense
 GAO       General Accounting Office
                          ChAPTER 1

     Primary electrical power is supplied to most military
installations within the continental United States by com-
mercial or municipal utility companies. The commercial
power is delivered over one or more separate transmission
lines to one or more substations at the installation
perimeter, where it is then fed into tne Government-owned
distribution system which supplies the installation.
where multiple delivery points are available, t.e Govern-
ment distribution systems sometimes provide a looping arrange-
ment which permits each delivery point to supply all or
part of the power requirements served by the other delivery
points, should they fail.
      The need to rely on primary power varies from instal-
lation to installation. However, even in the best systems,
such as tnose providing looping multiple primary sources,
power outages sometimes occur. Thus most installations
nave emergency bacKup generators to support activities for
whnich power is essential. Aircraft navigational aids, fire
stations, command posts, and hospitals are a few examples
of tne activities typically supported with such power systems.

     Emergency generators are classified as either fixed
(installed) or mobile. Fixed generators require special
foundations and protection from the elements to e opera-
tional. They are part of a facility and, as such, lose
their specific identity. All ther generators, including
sKid-mounted, weel-mounted, or portaole generators, are
classified as mobile. Deciding whether a mobile or installed
generator is required in riveting an emergency usually in-
volv.s determining the needed response time.   Thus the
necessity for immediate response would preclude using a
mobile emergency generator wnich, during a power outage,
would nave to be transported to and connected at the requir-
ing activity.
     Tne Department of Defense's (DOD's) current inventory
contains about 175,000 mobile generators valued at about
$760 million. We have no information on how many o these
are in use or employed for an emergency. During our review
we noted that whnile many mobile generators are purchased
for tactical reasons, many ere also being used at military
activities as emergency generators. The nvestment cost
data is unavailable for fixed generators because they are

part of the total project cost. However, the investment
in fixed generators is considerable.
     Total DGD cost of maintaining and operating this
extensive inventory of generators is also not available
but is undoubtedly substantial.      For example, at 10 of
the bases  visited, we  conservatively    estimated that the
costs to  operate and  maintain  generators    for 1 year amounted
to $548,000. At 1 Air Force     base,  46  full-time   civilian and
military personnel  maintained   and  operated   the  base's 48
emergency generators.    The fuel  tanks   for  these  generators
had a continuous requirement of about 176,000 gallons. Gen-
erators with automatic start devices had a constant require-
ment for commercial electrical energy for internal engine
heaters to keep the oil and coolant at the required starting
     Since the specific identities of fixed generators are
merged with the facilities of which they have become a part,
no DOD-wide management control is exercised over their exist-
ence and use.  Instead, responsibility for managing these
generators is assigned to the individual commands which
operate the military bases where they are located.


     Mobile generator management is more centrally assigned.
In 1967 DOD established the Project--a joint defense agency
project for managing mobile generators.    The Project's ob-
jective is to save money  by limiting  the number   and types
of generator sets used by  the three  services  and  standardiz-
ing them. There are  many  makes and  models,  and,  depending
on the specifications involved, they range in price from
a few hundred dollars to over $100,000.
     Under the Project, each service has been designated,
as shown belrw, as DOD's primary provisioning agent for a
specific power range of mobile generators.
                                      Power range


           Army                        0.5 to 60
           Air Force                   60 to 200
           Navy                        200 to 1,500

     The primary provisioning agents procure all mobile
generators within their assigned power range. They re-
distribute and dispose of all excess mobile generators.
     In establishing the Project, DOD intended that each
of its agencies would retain most of its operational re-
sponsibility. As a result, each service continues to
maintain operational and inventory control over the world-
wide use of mobile generators assigned to its organization.
The responsibility for operational control of mobile
generators has been redelegated by the services--much the
same as for fixed generators--to the individual command
where the generators are assigned. The inventory respon-
sibility for mobile generators, however, is centralized
in each service.

     Installed generator requirements are recommended by
the base engineer as part of a facility's construction
plan and are approved at the command level.  Requirements
for mobile emergency generators originate with the user and
are submitted to the base engineer for initial approval.   If
the base engineer decides that the generator is necessary,
he justifies its need to the inventory control point, which
determines the total requirement for that service.

     Because generators used for emergency purposes are
expensive to buy, operate, and maintain, we wanted to deter-
mine the extent to which installations needed them and to
evaluate how the military managed them. Chapter 3 lists the
installations visited. Photos of a 10-kW gasoline-engine-
driven generator and a 1,000-kW diesel-engine-driven generator

          Source:   Air Force photograph
   10-kW gasoline-engine-driven generator. This generator is permanently wired to the building
   and is equipped with an automatic start device activated by a commercial power failure.

          Ource     ir   orce   oOqr
1,000-kW diesel-engine-driven generator. This generator is one of two 1,000-kW generators
supporting a transmitter facility. Six persor:iel operate and maintain these generators.

                          CHAPTER 2


     The Department of Defense needs to provide definitive
guidelines to the services on the proper management and use
of emergency power generators. While the individual serv-
ices have some criteria for selected aspects of managing
emergency generators, we found specific areas needing more
     -- Criteria for authorization and use of emergency

     -- Justification for acquisition of generators and
        periodic reviews of continued need.

     -- Consolidation of emergency power requirements.

     DOD had not provided specific criteria to help instal-
lations determine which activities should have priority
for emergency power requirements, nor had it emphasized
meeting these requirements efficiently and effectively
through consolidation or other alternatives. If reasonable
criteria were provided on how installations could best con-
sider meeting emergency power needs, OD and the services
could minimize or avoid unnecessary investments in generator
     The services have regulations authorizing certain
types of activities to have emergency power generators.
For example, the Army authorizes auxiliary generators
for hospitals; fire alarm systems; communication facili-
ties; confinement facilities; automatic data processing
equipment; heliport and airfield facilities? storage and
operating facilities for nuclear weapons; ar'd legal require-
ments, such as for sewage pumping stations. The Air Force
recommends essentially the same functions, in addition
to utility plants, base weather stations, and surveillance
and warning systems. The Navy includes support for fallout
shelters, antiaircraft devices, and harbor defenses.

     However, these regulations permit any facility not
specifically listed to have generator support if deemed

necessary. Because decisions on which vital functions
should b supported are based largely on independent
judgment, many different types of facilities are provided
support, and in some cases, such facilities may not need
emergency generators.
     At McClellan Air Force Base, California, for example,
a 15-kW mobile generator was assigned to provide emergency
power to a boiler plant. This unit was justified on the
basis that the boiler provided steam to critical functions
at an aircraft paint hanger, a laboratory, a plating shop,
a technical operations squadron, and general purpose shops.
We pointed out that since none of these industrial facilities
had emergency power, they would have no use for steam during
a power blackout. Base civil engineering officials agreed.
They told us the generator would be nade available for other

     Adequate DOD and military service criteria on the
authorization and use of emergency power generators can
reduce many generator-related inefficiencies at installa-
tions, such is (1) generator capacities greater than re-
quired, (2) unnecessary and rdundant generators, (3) incon-
sistencies in generator use, and (4) unnecessary costs to
maintain redundant systems. Examples of these conditions
Generator capacity
     At many installations we visited, generator capacity
far exceeded the power load requirement. (See app. II
for examples.)
     The different generator sets listed below illustrate
that, generally, the larger models, in terms of kilowatt
capacity, cost more than the smaller ones.
        National stock   Generator                     Unit
            number         model        Capacity       cost

    6115-00-017-8240     MEP   017A          5       $ 2,600
    6115-00-118-1241     MEP   004A         15         9,900
    6115-00-118-1243     MEP   006A         60        12,700
    6115-00-133-9101     MEP   007A        100        15,100
    6115-00-689-4489     MB    15          150        32,100
    6115-00-133-9104     MEP   009A        200        35,800

Having generator capacities much greater than the load being
supported is unnecessarily costly, where a smaller, less
expensive generator could assume the same load.

     The Army, for example, does not have criteria specifying
the generator capacity for the amount of support required.
At Fort Ord, California, a facilities engineer said the
local policy requires the capacity of installed generators
to be at least three times larger than the load. This may
have resulted in the excessive capacities for 14 of 18 in-
stalled generators at Fort Ord, as described below, and in
the procurement of larger, more expensive generator units.
                                                 Percent load
    Activity             Capacity       Load      to capacity


Firing range radar           5           1.0          20
Stockade                   125          36.0          29
Boiler room                 10           2.4          24
Commissary                  25           2.0           8
Booster station             10           0.9           9
Transfer house               5           0.4           8
Military amateur radio
  service station
  facility                   5           ).7          14
Presidio headquarters       10           0.7           7
Telephone building         150          38.0          25
Federal Aviation
  Administration tower      60          16.0          27
Installation head-
  quarters                  60          14.0          23
Outer marker                10           3.3          33
Federal Aviation
  middle marker              5             0.5        10
Ground control
  approach radar            11)            1.0        10

     At Moffett Field, Naval Air Station, Sunnyvale, Califor-
nia, four activities had generators whose capacity exceeded
the load. Base engineeLing officials informed us that
no action would be taken to resize these units until they
became due 'or replacement.

 Unnecessary and redundant generators

      Under certain operational and weather
 navigational aids are essential to safety ofconditions,
 They aLe provided power sources sufficient to flight.
 1igh reliability service to user aircraft.
                                              These systems
 may nclude Radar Approach Control, Ground Controlled
 Approach Radar, Instrument Landing System, Terminal
 Omnidirectional Range, Tactical Air Navigational      VHF
 and associated equipment.                          System,

     Most Air Force bases have more tha: one landing
which backs up their primary system. Air Force        system
91-4 provides that where a combination of navigational
systems are installed, the one complete system
the lowest approach landing minima 1/ will be
                                               given high
reliability power.

      At eight installations having generators which
navigational aids, the way the generators were         support
varied widely. Most of the bases had four separate
gational aid systems in use which were backed         navi-
generators.                                    up  by
               See app. III.)  At all eight, however, the
one complete system providing the lowest aircraft
approach minima included the control tower,         landing
Controlled Approach Radar, and the Radar Approach Ground
This means that these navigational systems can      Control.
provide the necessary navigation services on
                                              a "worst
case" basis, if needed, to enable any aircraft
safely even during a power outage.               to land

     Therefore, we believe that the generators backing
up the other systems at these installations should
have heen authorized. Kelly Air Force Base,         not
example, had five unnecessary generators backing     for
additional navigational aid systems.             up  three

     Some installations also provided redundant backup
power to certain navigational aids. For example,

1/ That point on the final approach tusually
                                             100 feet
   above the ground and a quarter mile from touchdown)
   which the pilot of an aircraft being assisted        at
                                                 by Ground
   Controlled Approach Radar must abort his landing
   does not have the runway clearly in sight        if he
                                             and cannot
   land the aircraft visually.

Mather and Castle Air Force Bases, California, the glide-
slope and localizer each have battery backup systems in
addition to installed generators. At Hill Air Force
Base, Utah, the generator supporting the airfield lighting
provides prime backup for the glideslope, Ground Controlled
Approach Radar, and Tactical Air Navigational System fa-
cilities, each of which also has installed generators to
be used if the prime backup generator fails.

     Finally, the Air Force does not consider using nearby
bases as alternate landing facilities instead of supporting
navigational aids with generators.  For example, McClellan
Air Force Base--where some navigational aids are necessary
only a few days of the year--is within 40 miles of three
Air Force bases and one major metropolitan airport. If
alternate landing facilities were used where feasible,
we believe the number of generators providing emergency
backup power to navigational aids at these installations
could be reduced.

     The Air Force questioned some installations having
mobile units as a backup to authorized generators, and
it proposed to eliminate this redundancy. We noted this
variation in generator use at Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. The communications and hospital facilities there
had secondary generators backing up the primary units.   In
the event of an outage, both units were to start automat-
ically, but only one was used it the other operated satis-
factorily. At the time of our survey, the Air Force was
considering eliminating these redundancies. Subsequently,
the Air Force advised DOD that the generators involving
the hospital at Tinker were needed and that there was no
Inconsistencies at aircraft
 ueIl-dispensing facilities
     Vagueness in Air Force regulations has resulted in
instances when certain facilities at an installation are
supported with emergency power, whereas similar facilities
at other installations are not. These inconsistencies can
be costly, and they raise doubts as to whether these facili-
ties are actually essential for having generator support.

     For example, at Tinker Air Force Base, four generators
were installed at fuel-dispensing areas at a total cost
of about $71,000. However, the need for these generators
is questionable because primary commercial power has failed

only two or three times during the last 30 years. Addi-
tionally, the dispensing facility has experienced power
outages of only nine-tenths hours annually, caused by
failures within the base distribution system. These gen-
erators were justified on the basis that they were racded
in the event of a national emergency or for other .,otential
causes of power failure.
     At Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, and Hill and Kelly
Air Force Bases, Texas, outages were more frequent, but
dispensing facilities did not have installed emergency gen-

     We believe mobile generators can back up appropriate
facilities, in many cases, when outages are intermitternt
instead of investing in installed generators. In these
cases, available mobile generators having sufficient ca-
pacity could be more economical to use.

Unnecessary generator maintenance costs
     Supporting unneeded and redundant generator systems
also results in unnecessary expenditures to maintain them.
If such systems could be minimized or even avoided, DOD
activities could devote their generator maintenance pro-
grams to the more critical systems. An example follows.

     At Beale Air Force Base, California, five 650-kW
generators remained from the Semi-Automatic Ground Environ-
ment system which supported the Distant Early Warning System.
These systems were in operation from about 1958 through
1969 at this installation. These five generators, with a
total capacity of 3,250 kWs, currently support reconnaissance,
computer, and cryptographic activities.

     The base civil engineer informed us that while only two
of these units were needed to satisfy emergency backup re-
quirements, a third unit might be needed to back up the
first two. The annual cost of maintaining these unneeded
generators would be $13,000 each.
     The base civil engineer informed us that he would
determine whether the third generator was needed and the
least expensive method of removing the unneeded generators
from service. These methods range from complete removal
to decommissioning and storage in place until needed by
another installation.

     DOD does not have an adequate system for (1) determining
that potential generator users are properly justifying initial
requests and (2) reviewing generator use periodically to see
if they should be retained or removed.

     An adequate system could help DOD assure that generator
needs are accurately validated and that those no longer
necessary are removed from service and made available to
other activities. Also, it could identify generators with
excessive capacity which can be replaced by smaller, more
efficient units.
     Air Force regulations require that installations an-
nually determine whether emergency backup power require-
ments are being satisfactorily met at specified activities.
These regulations, however, do not require consideration
of whether a continuing need exists for the generators.
Neither do the Army and Navy regulations. We believe that
a periodic review by the command or service, to include
such factors, is essential.

Initial authorization review

     Mobile generators are reviewed at the major command
level only when initially requested by an installation.
Once a mobile generator has been approved, it is added
to the installation's table of distribution and allowances
or table of allowances.

     In requesting an initial authorization, installations
must submit complete justification to the command level.
We reviewed initial authorization requests to see to what
extent the need was justified. More justification data
was necessary for a proper review.   In many cases, generator
users only mention that the generator is essential to their
type of facility, but they seldom explain why. Command
level reviewers have access to more complete information
upon which to base their decisions, such as historical data
on the extent and duration of power outages, the extent
to which equipment was inoperable due to outages, and the
various generator sizes and supporting loads facilities were
carrying.  Such data was not considered before initial re-
quests for mobile generators were approved.

     Installed generators may be approved by the installation
commander as small construction projects if the cost is less

 than $60,000 for Army projects and $50,000
                                             for Air Force
 and Navy projects.  Since only the very large installed
 generators exceed the above criteria, only
 be subject to critical review beyond the   a few would
 dependent reviews could increase the chances level. In-
 consolidation f the smaller units at nearby of possible
 Periodic reviews

      Both the Army and Air
 review of table of allowance otne
                                    ozovide for the periodic
                                       nt to fully justify
 equipment acquired and retairera    ;a Army's inspection
 is conducted every 3 years at ti,. nstallation
 and the Air Force's inspection is made annually.level,

      Inspections of generators are limited to
erators. As a result, only a smtll              mobile gen-
                                     percentage of emergency
power generators are reviewed.    or example,
fornia, had 18 installed generators; McClellanFort Ord, Cali-
Base, with 48 generators, had 33 installed       Air Force
Sacramento Army Depot, California, with     generators;   and
                                         10 generators, had
6 installed generators. As po4 nted out on
solidating installed generator requirements page 13, con-
large savings without reducing the degree     can produce
both mobile and installed generators were  of  support. If
                                           adequately covered
during periodic reviews, even more could
                                          be saved.

      Determining which emergency power requirements
be consolidated could preclude the acquisition       can
needed generators and could reduce the costs    of un-
nance labor, material, fuel, arid commercial of mainte-
should establish a policy which requires     energy. DOD
                                          or encourages
consolidation of emergency power requirements
bases.                                         at individual

     Officials at several installations told us
many cases consolidation is not only feasible    that in
                                               but practicable.
At McClellan Air Po e Base we pointed out
when it would be feasible and cost effectivetwo instances
                                              to consolidate.
     In one case, consolidation could save an
$125,000 to $177,000 in annual personnel       estimated
                                         costs, depending
upon which of two facilities is retained
                                         to provide
emergency backup, in addition to undetermined
                                              savings in

tue' and maintenance costs, At both acilities, generators
are mannea 24 hours a day. Capacity and load data for the
facilities ollow.

                     Generator                     Excess generator
     auiLjing        capacity             Load         capacity
                                    (kilowatts )
         7            1,85U               200           1,650
       262             1,320              600             720
     base civil engineer officials agreed that the generators
in either building could satisfy tne requirements of both
Duildings. Based upon data provided by these officials, we
computed the following estimated benefits of consolidation.

                                            Retain generators
                                               in building

Annual personnel savings              $125,000         $177,000
Less one-time cost to
  consolidate                             39,000         81,000
First-year savings                    ;   86,000       $ 96,000
Annual recurring savings              $125,000         $177,000
A picture of one of tne building 7 generators follows on
page 14.
      Although base officials agreed that this consolidation
was feasiDle, tney told us it will be deferred pending a
Jetermination of tne power requirements for a proposed new
project wnicn as been in the planning stages for 3 years
and wnich   ill affect tne consolidation.   Installation of-
ficials nad no idsa when tis project would be finalized.
vve believe tnat, since 3 years of potential savings have
already been lost, the project power requirements should
oe quickly determined in order to achieve these substantial
     In the second instance, a generator nad excessive
capacity at one cClellan facility and could serve four
other facilities. All ive facilities are served by the

Source:   Ar Force photograph.
This generator is one of three in building 7 at McClellan. Three ,enerators with a total
capacity of 1,850 kWs satisfy an emergency power requirement of about 200 I.Ws.

same electrical  istrioution circuit, and eacn is sup-
ported y its own standDu generator.    ihe oase civil
engineer personnel said it was possible to eliminate
tour generators oy consolidating emergency power require-
ments and agreed tnat tne generator requirements for tne
five facilities could be consolidated.

      Iiney told us tat instead o a planned rehaoilitation
project involving tnese facilities, they are considering
this consolidation at a cost savings o $67,000 for the
project.    Consolidation will also save an estimated
$3,600 in annual maintenance costs, in addition to

savirgs in fuel and electric heater energy applicable
to the generators to be removed from service. Although
these four generators were classified as installci, they
can be disengaged for use elsewhere.

     DOD needs to provide the services the criteria for
determining which functions should have emergency power
and which should not. Then an adequate system for re-
viewing and justifying generators is necessary to see
whether a continuing need exists or whether current gen-
ecator capacity is excessive. DOD should emphasize to
the services that generator resources should be consoli-
dated, when appropriate, rather than buying or retaining
unnecessary generators.
     The Secretary of Defense should:

     -- Provide criteria for determining which users should
        have priority access to emergency power and how the
        needs of these users can best be met.

     -- Strengthen the process for reviewing and justifying
        the need for all generators. This will pecmit (1)
        the initial need for a generator to be adequately
        justified, (2) those users which can be serviced
        by smaller generators to be identified, and (3)
        generators no longer necessary to be made available
        to other users.

     -- Instruct installations to share generators, when
        appropriate, as an alternative to buying or retain-
        ing unnecessary generators.


     DOD's comments on our preliminary report dated Novem-
ber 22, 1976, are included as appendix I. The Acting As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics),
in his March 16, 1977. reply, stated that our recommendations
merited consideration.  He said that the Air Force recently
issued criteria standardizing the authorization and use of
emergency generators for specific facilities and that such
facilities are being reviewed in relation to the needs of the
Army, Navy, and Defense Logistics Agency.

     The Acting Assistant Secretary felt that the management
of auxiliary electrical power systems supporting fixed fa-
cilities was well defined since it was covered by construc-
tion criteria and reviews but that DOD will review and is-
sue appropriate guidance on the use of these systems. He
added, however, that the management of mobile equipment
under the installation engineer's control and used for sup-
port of fixed facilities needed improvement.

      The Acting Assistant Secretary was concerned over sev-
eral aspects of our preliminary report which, in his opinion,
tena6d to present an unbalanced account of the use of auxil-
iary electrical power systems. According to DOD, we should
have differentiated between mobile generators having tactical
applications and auxiliary electrical power systems, since
both types have somewhat different uses. Tactical mobile
generators are used to support weapons systems, radar, com-
munications, and field hospitals, while auxiliary electrical
power systems directly support fixed installations. Since
many of the nontactical mobile generators are also used for
purposes unrelated to auxiliary electrical power systems
for facilities (such as cable testing and thawing of drains),
DOD felt that these matters should have been recognized.
DOD further contended that the numerous examples of improve-
ments we identified would be completely unacceptable during
major disasters, large power failures, a national emergency,
or full mobilization.

     DOD took exception to our references to redundant gen-
erator systems. It cited instances in which the use of
two separate power sources is quite practical, especially
in critical installations such as hospitals. DOD considered
it good engineering design to use a minimum of two generators
for many critical facilities because electrical generation
equipments are not completely reliable, and problems can occur
when facilities are remotely located from primary power
sources, and severe weather problems are encountered.

     DOD believed that, during the 1965 massive power failure
in the northeastern United States, its mission essential
operations did not suffer because it had a sound policy on
using auxiliary electric power, particularly for instrument
landing systems and runway lighting of DOD airfields. DOD
said one of the lessons learned from this experience is
that there is no substitute for adequate electrical power
systems in an emergency.

     Concerning generator loading, DOD stated that, in most
cases, good engineering design would result in an auxiliary

system load ranging from 75 to 90 percent of generator
capacity. DOD pointed out, however, that load growth is
particularly difficult to evaluate, especially in the com-
munication and radar fields. Further, when a new func-
tion moves into a facility with existing generators, it
rarely matches the current mission. It concluded that
the Government's overall cost is lower through use of
existing generators rather than buying new ones, and in-
curring the cost to remove the old and install the new.
     Finally, DOD agreed in principle with the objective
of consolidating auxiliary electrical power systems. It
pointed out, however, that this objective was normally dif-
ficult to achieve since facilities entitled to the systems
were widely separated, such as hospitals, airfield runways,
and confinement areas. DOD cited other restrictions, such
as possible damage to power lines from adverse weather
conditions, accidents, or sabotage.
     DOD's cowN'ents are directed to certain specific con-
ditions where it could determine that redundant or exces-
siva power capacity is necessary for military activities
to operate satisfactorily.
     Although we fully recognize the necessity for having
adequate backup power for critical facilities during power
failures, disasters, or national emergencies, it is just
as important for DOD to have a management system which in-
sures that emergency power needs are justified. While re-
dundant backup systems certainly provide more confidence
that emergeicy power will be available, DOD should place
more emphasis on the economic considerations of providing
and managing epensive equipment for emergency power
purposes. Our intent in evaluating the management of
this equipment was to see whether DOD's policies and
criteria for authorizing and using it were adequate to
limit emergency power systems to essential requirements
and to prevent future unnecessary investments.
     Although most mobile units have tactical uses, the
services can, and do, use them for emergency power failures.
We found them, however, being used inefficiently at the
installations we visited, along with permanently installed
units. We feel management improvements can be made in
both types of generators used for emergency power purposes.

     We believe DOD, particularly the Air Force, did not have
a valid need for the gnerator equipment to the degree to
which it was being used.  The Air Force's current action
should help to reduce this condition. The examples we used
throughout this report clearly showed that all the services
can strengthen their management of emergency power systems
without suffering a loss of mission by keeping such systems
to the minimum necessary and consolidating them where appro-

     The Acting Assistant Secretary's reply did not mention
what specific actions DOD planned to take to strengthen its
criteria for authorizing and using generators for emergency
power, to improve the justification and review of such equip-
ment, or to achieve greater consolidation of emergency power
requirements. His reply seemed to be directed more toward
various factors which would inhibit DOD in fully implement-
ing our recommendations.

     For example, we questioned the need for a generator to
back up the boiler plant at McClellan Air Force Base, Cali-
fornia.  (See p. 6.) We said it was unnecessary because
the industrial activities it supported had no emergency gen-
erators for electric power failures. The Acting Assistant
Secretary's response cited the potential damage to the heat-
ing and water systems in these activities if temperatures
got below freezing levels for prolonged periods.

     The Sacramento, California, area, where McClellan is
located, has not had a history of prolonged periods in which
temperatures were consistently below freezing. Also,
McClellan has had only one multiple source commercial out-
age for longer than 6 seconds in the past 10 years, and
this outage lasted 14 minutes. Providing a backup power
system for every conceivable contingency due to adverse
weather conditions would require extensive investments in
generator equipments. The Air Force must ask itself whether
investments for these types of situations are warranted.

     Concerning DOD's nonconcurrence with some of the load
data in the report, we wish to emphasize that the data we
used was prepared and provided by base personnel during
the early part of our review. Even if the data DOD cited

in its reply were used, most of the examples would still
show excessive generator capacity. l/
     Unless it provides the proper management emphasis to
our recommendations, DOD and the services could later in-
vest in new systems they do not really need, or retain
existing systems which could be consolidated with other
requirements or which could accomplish a mission with a
smaller, less expensive generator. Therefore, we urge
DOD to act promptly and decisively on the recommendations
stated on page 15 to avoid or minimize tnis situation.

1/DOD's reference on this matter appears on pp. 26 and
  27. The examples DOD takes issue with appear on pp.
  28 and 29.  Except for the airfield lighting at Minot
  Air Force ase, North Dakota, which needed 80 percent
  of the capacity, the activities' needs were still
  40 percent or leas of capacity. With the exception
  of one generator operating at 60 percent of capacity
  and two which were turned in, the remaining activities'
  needs at Beale were 45 percent or less of capacity.

                          CHAPTER 3

                       SCOPE OF REVIEW

     We made this study to determine the extent to which
military installations needed auxiliary power-generating
capability and to evaluate their management of these
systems.   e reviewed each service's instructions and
regulations on auxiliary electrical power systems. At
each installation, we reviewed records on primary and
auxiliary power, interviewed officials, and inspected
auxiliary electrical power units. Finally, we looked
into the maintenance of auxiliary electrical power units.
     We visited the following installations:
                       AIR FORCE

          McClellan Air Force Base, California
          Mather Air Force Base, California
          Castle Air Force Base, California
          Beale Air Force Base, California
          Rosins Air Force Base, Georgia
          Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota
          Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma
          ,elly Air Force Base, Texas
          Hill Air Force Base, Utah

          Sacramento Army Depot, Sacramento, California
          Port rd, California
          Oakland Army Base, Oakland, California

          Lemoore Naval Air Station, Lemoor-, California
          Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, California
          Naval Facility Engineering Command, San Bruno,
          Moffett Field, Naval Air Station, Sunnyvale,

APPENDIX I                                                             APPENDIX I

                              ASSISTANT SCRTARY OF DIMNS
                                   WASIHNOW,   D.C. 2IDI

INIMALAIUM Ae inoeg/ug                                       1   MAR   1977

           Mr. F. . Shafer
           Director, LogiJtics and
             Communications Division
           U.S. Gerneral Accounting Office
           Washington, D. C. 20548

           Dear Mr. Shafer:

           This is in response tc your letter of November 22, 1976, to the
           Secretary of Defense requesting comments on your draft report
           entitled "Improvements Needed in the Management and Use of
           Auxiliary Electrical Power Systems," GAO Code 947207
           (OSD Case 4484).

           The DoD believes the three recommendations made in the draft
           report merit consideration. In fact, the Air Force, in June of
            1976, issued criteria standardizing the authorization and use of
           emergency generators for specific facilities. This list of facilities
           is now being reviewed in relation to the needs of the Army, Navy
           and Defense Logistics Agency. On balance, we believe that the
           management of installed auxiliary electric power systems is
           reasonably well defined since such systems are generally covered
           by construction criteria and are subject to reviews of construction
           projects. We would agree that in the case of mobile emergency
           equipment under the control of the installation engineer and used
           for the support of fixed facilities, there is need for improved
           management. The use of auxiliary electric power systems for
           installation support will be reviewed and appropriate guidance
           as required will be issued.

           We wish to point out, however, that the DoD is concerned with
           three major aspects of this draft report which tend to present a
           misleading account of the use of auxiliary electrical power systems.

GAO note:        Page number refecencing may not correspond to the
                 pages in this final report.

APPENDIX I                                                         APPENDIX I

   First, the report uses data relating to mobile generators while
   its examination is limited to emergency power generators.
   Secondly, we do not believe that the report gives sufficient
   consideration to mission readiness requirements in a period of
   full mobilization, nor to the requirements for such equipment
   during major disasters or major power failure situations.
   Lastly, the report does not appear to recognize the various
   methods used to achieve auxiliary electrical power systems,
   the degrees of criticality of such systems, or the reliability
   factor for engine-generators. A fuller statement of our position
   on these and other aspects of the draft report is enclosed.


                                    DAME R. BABIONE
                           Acthng Assistant Secretary of Defense
                                (lnstalltiono and Loiotico)

APPENDIX   I                                                     APPENDIX I

                    COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT

 1. The number and value of "emergency power generators" is stated in
a misleading manner. In the second paragraph (page i) of the Digest,
the first sentence discussed "emergency power generators" and the very
next sentence switched the subject to "generators" in such a manner that
it could be concluded that the large sums noted apply to emergency
generators which is not the case. Also, in the second paragraph (page 2)
of the Introduction, the subject is switched from "emergency generators"
to "mobile generators. " While the statement that the Army had 155, 200
nrobile generators valued at $43Z million is correct, these data are
irrelevant in a discussion of emergency generators. The data source
for the 155, 200 mobile generators identifies 171 (valued at $2, 385, 000)
of these as non-tactical units which are under the control of Facilities
Engineering. Similarly, the current Air Force inventory identifies
3, 005 mobile generators authorized for Civil Engineering and 14, 098
authorized for other functions such as flight line support for aircraft,
mobile communications facilities and war readiness material. Of the
 3, 005 units, many are used for Px.me Beef construction teams, cable
testing, thawing of drains and other uses not related to auxiliary electrical
power systems for facilities. The report is remiss in not differentiating
between tactical mobile generators numbering in the hundreds of
thousands, and used for such purposes as weapon systems, radar,
communications, and even field hospitals, and auxiliary electrical power
 systems numbering in the thousands, and used directly in support of
fixed installations.

2. The thrust of the report deals entirely with the normal peacetime
activities of the Military Departments. The report appears to give no
consideration to the basic mission of the DoD and the mandatory require-
ment to be fully operational in time of national emergency. The report
contains numerous examples of improvements needed in the use of auxiliary
electrical power systems, based on the normal peacetime situation which
would be completely unacceptable for mission accomplishment during
major natural disasters, large power failures, a national emergency or
full mobilization.

3. There are various methods used to obtain auxiliary electrical power
systems, various degrees of criticality of these systems, and a relation-
ship between the reliability of the system to the reliability of a single
engine-generator. The report does not take these factors into account.
There are many applications of auxiliary electrical power systems which
require an instantaneous response such as emergency lighting in a hospital

 APPENDIX I                                                         APPENDIX       I

  operating room. Batteries may be used for such lighting. However,
-the battery has a short life and therefore an engine-generator would be
  required to provide lighting over a long period and to recharge the battery
  system. Accordingly, the use of a battery pack and an engine-generator
  in combination may be needed for response time and may be the more
  economical solution. The use of two separate power sources in this
  case is not redundant but is a good example of an auxiliary power system.
  To illustrate, it is good design practice in critical installations to provide
  two or more generators since reliance on only one unit is impractical.
 In hospitals, for example, one generator is designed to supply the critical,
 the life support and the life safety requirements uring an emergency,
  and the second generator is desigred to supply the essential equipment
  requirements. Both are necessary see National Electric Code) and
  used in the event of a power failure. However, should the first generator
  fail to start or fail during operation, the second generator would auto-
  matically be switched over to supply the more crucial need. The report
  frequently criticizes the use of a second generator or an alternate
  auxiliary electrical power system without giving any recognition of the
  fact that electrical generation equipment is not 100% reliable. For
  example, the prime capacity of every utility generating plant in the
  United States is calculated on the basis of the largest generator being
  out of service. It is considered good engineering design practice to use
  a minimum of two generators for many critical applications such as
  hospitals, fixed radar facilities, and communication centers. Moreover,
  depending on the remoteness of the facility, the length of the electrical
 transmission lines, weather problems such as sleet, freezing rain and
 thunderstorms, and the criticality of the mission, good engineering
  practice may dictate three generators with any two ca)able of carrying
  the emergency load. As an example, the Air Force has advised this
  office regarding the case involving the hospital at Tinker AFB (page 12a
  of the report), that both generators are needed and that there is no

 4. Another example cf the need for emergency power is the boiler
 plant at McClellan AFB (discussed at page 8 c tne report). As recently
 as December 1972, the temperature at McClellan reached 19OF and any
 power failure during a prolonged period below freezing would result in
 substantial damage to both the heating and water syszems n all the
 buildings served by this boiler plant. Furthermore, an extended power
 outage during sub-freezing weather could result in the freezing of the
 boiler plants since in the typical plant all fans, pumps, burners and
 controls are electrical. It is the position of this -ffice that officials at
 McClellan were premature in agreeing that there was not a valid require-
 ment for this generator. In the criteria now being developed for
 auxiliary electric power systems, there will be a specific requirement

APPENDIX I                                                      APPENDIX I

for all boiler plants of reasonable size, located in climatic areas where
the heating design temperature is 32OF or less, to be equipped with an
emergency power source. No better example of the need for this require-
ment can be found than in the recent weather situation in the eastern half
the nation where extreme southern cities experienced record low tempera-
tures 'nd the daily news was replete with accounts of frozen aczd severely
damaged heating systems. To argue that a mobile generator could be
installed during an emergency is contrary to the point of the report to
 reduce the number of auxiliary electrical power systems.

5. One of the lessons learned by the DoD and the entire civilian sector
from the massive power failure of Novembe-s 9, 1965 is that there is no
substitute for adequate auxiliary electrical power systems in an emergency.
The thousands of these systems which were installed by the civilian commu-
nity in the wake of that great power failure is adeqluate testimony for this
point. Furthermore, during that power failure, which caused a black-out
In the entire northeastern United States, the DoD, because -'a sound
policy on the use of auxiliary electric power, did not suffer any loss of
mission essential ope rations. It is our understanding of the situation at
that time that DoD airfields, with adequate electrical standby generating
equipment for both instrument landing systems and runway lighting, were
the only fully operational airfields for large aircraft within 200 miles.
 The largest electrical generating plant of Consolidated Edison, which
 serves New York City, could not be started up again until a mobile generator
was borrowed from an outside source and moved to the plant. It appears
to this office that these examples clearly indicate the over-all wisdom of
 the Defense policy on the use of auxiliary electric power systems and the
 real danger of applying civilian criteria to the use of such systems in
 military installations.

 6. The report emphasizes the point that many auxiliary electric power
 systems have generators which do not match the load. In the majority of
 cases, good engineering design would result in an auxiliary system load in
 the range of 75% to 90% of the generator capacity. The type of load
 (resistive or inductive), the diversity factor calculations, the allowances
 for load growth, the lack of knowledge of what the customer might "plug in"
 the system are all factors affecting the judgment of the designer. The
 standard sizes offered by industry also influence the size of the unit selected
 inasmuch as normally the next largest standard size must be used. Load
 growth is particularly difficult to evaluate especially in the communications
 and radar fields. Another factor involved in the existence of partially
 loaded generators is an attempt by the DoD to use existing equipment
  rather than purchase new generators. Still further is the situation which
  results when a new function moves into a facility with existing generators
 which rarely are a proper match for the current mission. It is the opinion
  of this office that in most cases the lower over-all cost to tie Gavernrne:it

APPENDIX I                                                          APPENDIX I

would be achieved through the use of existing equipment or the existing
situation rather than incur the expense of new generators and the cost of
removing the old units and installing the new units. In sveral cases we
are not able to concur with the load data in the report. For example, a
follow-up survey by base personnel at Minot AFB and Beale AFB indicated
larger generator loads than those shown on pages 22 and 24 of the report.
The correct loading is detailed in enclosure 2.

 7. With regard to the consolidation of auxiliary electrical power systems,
this office agrees in principal with this objective. In practice, however,
this norr, ally is difficult to achieve since facilities entitled to such systems
are widely separated. For example, hospitals, airfield runways and
confinement facilities are usually far apart. In most cases emergency
power is generated at the using voltages of 120/208v and it is impractical
to transmit power more than a few hundred feet at these voltages. Other
restrictions include the possible damage to power lines from adverse
weather conditions, accidents or sabotage.

APPENDIX I                                                                                                                    APPENDIX I

                      GENERATOR LOADING FOR    -

                                              Minot AFB

      ADC Ammunition Bldg                       . .       . .          .   .         .       .        . .          40. 0 KW

      POL Pump House #1                   .     . .       .    . .         .         . .             .         .   40. 3 KW

      POL Pump House #2                   . . .                . . . . . . .                                       40.0 KW

      P   '   Bulk Storage.                           .            . . . . . . .                                   60.0 KW

     ,Airfield Lighting .         .       .    . .        .    . . .200.0
                                                                    . . .                                                KW

      Alert Area I     ....                         ...                                          .             .   25.
                                                                                                                   20    KW

      TVOR ..            .        . .          .    . .        .       .   .     . .                 ...           10.0 KW

                                              Beale AFB

      Weapon Storage Area Generator #1                                         ...                                 .45.0 KW

      Weapon Storage Area Generator #2 . . . . .                                                                   45.0 KW

      Communications Service HQ . . . .                                          . .                 Turned nto supply

      9th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing .                                        .       .           Turned into supply

      Civil Engineer Control                   ..         . . . . . .                                      .        6.0 KW

      Ceilometer #1      ..............                                                                             3.0 KW

      Ceilometer #2      ...              . . .                    .       .             . . .                      3.5 KW

APPENDIX II                                             APPENDIX II



                             Generator                 Percent load
      Activity                capacity          Load    to capacity
Air Defense Command
  ammunition building              100         -10.1        10
POL (note a) pump
  house #1                         150          40.3        27
POL pump house 2                   150          18.0        12
POL bulk storage                   150          22.8        15
Airfield lighting                  250          50.2        20
Alert Area I                        60          12.1        20
Terminal VHF Omnidi-
  rectional ange                      30         7.5        25
a/Petroleum, oil, and lubricant.

     The Deputy Chief of Operations and Maintenance at
Minot stated that the Air Defense Command ammunition
generator was oversized for current needs since the build-
ing had formerly been used for a different purpose. He
did not have information on the maximum load for the other
buildings or an explanation for the disparities.

     Also the required annual review was not being made to
determine whether essential requirements were being sup-
ported by auxiliary power generators.

                         Generator                     Percent load
     Activity            capacity              Load    to capacity
Transmitter                 30                   5.2        17
Precision approach
  radar 2                   60                  14.3        24
Aircraft communication      75                  i4.3        19
Fallout shelter             30                   0.7         2

APPENDIX II                                       APPENDIX II

     Base engineering officials informed us that these
units would not be resized until they become due for

                         Generator                Percent load
      Activitvy          capacity          Load


Weapon storage area
  generator #1             100             15.0        15
Weapon storage area
  generator #2             100             15.0        15
Communications serv-
  ice headquarters          25              5.0        20
9th Strategic
  Reconnaissance Wing        5              0.5        10
Civil Engineer Control      10              3.0        30
Ceilometer #1               10              2.5        25
Ceilometer #2               10              2.5        25
     These generators had excessive capacity. Base civil
engineering officials said they would review individual
generator requirements, perform capacity/load analyses
for each unit, and take corrective action.

     We were told that to determine whether a continu-
ing requirement exists for generators, the base civil
engineer each year verbally asks all generator users whether
their missions have changed.   In our opinion, this method
does not result in an effective determination of continu-
ing need. For example, one activity had a 3-kW requirement
supported by a 30-kW generator. We told the base civil
engineer that a 30-kW generator was meeting a 3-kW reqLire-
ment. As a result, the civil engineer told us the base
would remove the 30-kW generator and replace it with a
5-kW unit from another activity. The 30-kW generater
will be used to fill another requirement for which the
acquisition of a $4,000 generator was proposed.
     At this same installation, a 30-kW generator supported
a 7.5-kW load. However, the base civil engineering person-
nel said this generator could not be replaced with a smaller
generator without the approval of the major command user
because it supported a navigational aid facility.

 APPENDIX II                                     APPENDIX II

     Two mobile 30-KW generators provide emergency power
to two BAK-9 aircraft arresting barriers--one at each of
the north-south runway. These generators must be connected
and mnually started when needed. McClellan officials said
that C.,y are used about once each year to power the elec-
trical motors used to retract the barriers after use.

     We questioned the need for two generators. Since
e ergency power is necessary only during a primary power
failure, and then only to retract the barrier after use,
cne generator apparently could be used at either barrier as

     According to the base civil engineer, the barriers
are classified as navigational aids and are required  by
regulations to be supported with emergency power.  We re-
viewed the regulations and found no reference to arresting
barriers. Moreover, we do not believe the base civil en-
gineer's comments address the issue of whether one or
two generators are necessary.  In our opinion, one
generator can safely support the emergency power require-
ments of both arriers since its use would be necessary
only after a barrier had been used.

     At this base an activity was being supported by a
l00-Kw generator. The base civil engineer processed a
work order to replace the existing generator with a
$4,000, 30-kW unit. However, we pointed out that no cur-
rent need for the proposed 30-kW generator existed, since
the previous user which had initially justified the 100-kW
unit had relocated in 1972. As a result, base civil engineer-
ing officials informed us that the 30-KW unit would not be
installed at this activity.

     At this installation, annual reviews required under
Air Force regulations were not being made. Base civil
engineering officials informed us that as long as com-
pldints were not received, tney considered that all needs
were being satisfactorily met.

APPENDIX III                                                                                                                                            APPENDIX III


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                                                             APPENDIX IV


                                                     Tenure of office
                                                     rom           TO
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
     Dr. Harold Brown                          Jan.
     Donald H. Rumsfeld                               1977     Present
                                               Nov.   1975     Jan. 1977
     James R. Schlesinger                      July
     William P. Clements, Jr.                         1973     Nov. 1975
                                   (acting)    Apr.   1973     July 1973
     Elliott L. Richardson                     Jan.   1973     Apr. 1973
    Dale R. Babione (acting)                  Jan.    1977
    Frank A. Schrontz                                          Present
                                              Feb.    1976     Jan. 1977
    John J. Bennett (acting)                  Mar.
    Arthur I. Mendolia                                1975     Feb. 1976
                                              June    1973     Mar. 1975
    Hugh McCullough (acting)                  Jan.    1973     June 1973
                    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
    John C. Stetson                           Apr.
    John C. Stetson (acting)                          1977    Present
                                              Jan.    1977    Apr. 1977
    Thomas C. Reed                            Jan.
    James W. Plummer (acting)                         1976    Jan. 1977
    Dr. John L. McLucas                       Nov.    1975    Jan. 1976
                                              June    1973    Nov. 1975
    Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.                Jan.    1969    May 1973
                     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
    Clifford Alexander                        Feb.
    Martin R. Hoffmann                                1977    Present
                                              Aug.    1975    Jan. 1977
    Howard H. Callaway                        July
    Robert F. Froehlke                                1973    Aug. 1975
                                              Jan.    1971    Apr. 1973
                    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
    Gary D. Penisten (acting)                 Feb.   1977
    Joseph T. McCullum                                        Present
                                              Feb.   1977     Feb. 1977
     )avid R. MacDonald                       Jan.
    J. William Middendorf                            1977     Feb. 1977
                                              June   1974     Jan. 1977
    J. William Middendorf (acting)            Apr.
    John W. Warner                                   1974     June 1974
                                              May    1972     Apr. 1974