Determining Requirements for Aircraft Maintenance Personnel Could Be Improved: Peacetime and Wartime

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-05-20.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         DOCUMENT RESUME
02153 -   A1452462]

Determining Requirements for Aircraft Maintenance Personnel
Could Be Improved: Peacetime and Wartime. LCD-77-421; B-133370.
May 20, 1977. Released May 23, 1977. 65 pp.
Report to Sn. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Senate Committee on
Appropriations: Defense Subcommittee; by Elmer B. Staats,
Comptroller General.
Issue Area: Military Preparedness Plans: Mobilization-Oriented
    Industrial Maintenance Base (802).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -
    Military (except procurement & contracts) (051).
Organization Concerned: Department of Defense.
Congressional Relevance: Senate Committee on Appropriations:
    Defense Subcommittee.

         The Military Services can reduce peacetime maintenance
personnel costs by millions by improving its systems to
determine peacetime and wartime requirements and by planning
greater use of reserve personnel to meet certain wartime
maintenance workloads. Fiadings/Conclusions: The opportunity to
reduce these costs exists because the services can correct
weaklesses in their systems. Tese weaknesses cause overstated
requirements and usually attempt to staff peacetime below-depot
maintenance organizations with sufficient active duty personnel
to meet wartime mobilization needs. Recommendations: The
Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the
services to: (1) improve the manpower requirements determination
pro:ess by insisting upon evaluation of the critical assumptions
concerning the use of forces and their impact on below-depot
aircraft maintenance manpower and modifying manpower
determination systems to include current, accurate, and reliable
manpower determination factors and maintenance data; and (2)
develop alternatives for greater use of reserves while
determining the most cost-effective and appropriate mix of
forces active and reserve) to meet the below-depot-level
maintenance personnel requirements. (Author/SC)
             T WITt'CTD -    Not to be -elased outside the Qern1l
           A?(-,It    Office except on the basis of pecie4i approval
        ;~?....u Office     Congressional Relationsl

                   REPORT TO THE SENATE

                   Determining Requirements For
                   Aircraft Maintenance Personnel
                   Could Be Improved--Peacetime
                   And Wartime
                   Department of Defense

                    The military services can reduce peacetime
                    maintenance personnel costs by millions by
                    improving its systems to determine peacetime
                    and wartime requirements and by planning
                    greater use of reserve personnel to meet cer-
                    tain wartime maintenance workloads. This
                    opportunity exists because the services
                         --can correct weaknesses in their systems
                           which cause overstated requirements
                         -- usually attempt to staff peacetime
                          below-depot maintenance organizations
                          with enough active duty personnel to
                           meet wartime mobilization needs.
                    Defense should strengthen its manpower de-
                    termination systems and should strive for
                    greater use of reserves in meeting peacetime
                    and wartime maintenance personnel require-

                    LCD-77-421                                       MAY 20, 1977
                           WAHNGOT(   . D.C.


The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defensc,
  Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

     This report points out that the military services could
save millions of dollars by (1) correcting weaknesses in
their manpower requirement systems which cause overstated
requirements and (2) striving for greater use of the reserve
forces in meeting maintenance personnel requirements. You
requested this effort as a follow-on to our previous reports
on below-depot-level activities which questioned staffing
requirements at below-depot-level maintenance facilities.

     As you requested, we did not ask the Department f De-
fense to provide official written comnents on this report.
Howevet, informal comments were obtained during discussions
of the report material with Defense officials.

     We hope our report satisfies your request and will De
useful to your committee.

                                               ely your X

                                  Comptroller General
                                  of the United States
                                     PEACETIME AND WARTIME

             Defense manpower is costly (about 60 percent
             of the defense budget), and aircraft main-
             tenance manpower is a sizeable portion of
             this cost. The military services operate
             approximately 25,000 aircraft. Annual costs
             for aircraft maintenance is over $6 billion
             and about two-thirds of this cost is for
             below-depot-level maintenance. GAO conserva-
             tively estimates the services employ over
             250,000 military and civilian personnel to
             perform, this maintenance.
             The Serate Committee on Appropriations re-
             quested that GAO evaluate peacetime and war-
             time staffing criteria and dissimilarities
             among te services' systems to determine
             staffing requirements. The committee also
             asked GAO to look into the possibility of
             placing manpower authorizations that are
             in excess of peacetime requirements in the
             reserve components.
            GAO found that military activities usually
            determine below-depot aircraft maintenance
            manpower required for wartime operations,
            and within the existing budget constraints
            most activities attempt to staff for war-
            time ooerations. The military services
            have done little to develop systems to de-
            termine what staffing is required for
            Each service approaches the manpower de-
            termination process using its independently
            developed systems and assumptions, rules,
            and policies. GAO found problems within
            this process.

             -- In many cases, manpower factors and data
                used in the individual manpower deter-
                mination systems are questionable, in-
                accurate, or outdated. Refinement of
                the existing systems and information used

1oSvho1'   Uponr moval, the report
crWrS dnshould be notd nheon.        i                   LCD-77-421
  to determine maintenance manpower require-
  ments is necessary if the services are to
  determine the most appropriate level of
  maintenance manpower for both wartime and
-- Assumptions concerning the use of military
   forces underlie each service's manpower
   determination system and greatly affect
   the manpower -requirements. Reevaluating
   these critical assumptions could lead to
   reductions in manpower requirements.
For example, the services' systems generally
assume all deployable aircraft units must be
ready to deploy immediately, but some units
will not deploy during the early stages of
war. GAO believes manpower requirements
could be adjusted to reduce active duty man-
power levels during peacetime and use re-
serves to augment some of these units during
Effective use of the reserve components has
become a matter of increasing concern with-
in the Department of Defense. The reserve
components face many difficult problems in
the present all volunteer force environment.
Meanwhile, the services have. with few
exceptions, staffed their below-depot main-
tenance activities to support mobilization:
without reliance on reserves. GAO endorses
the concept of associating reserve components
with active force components, possibly
along lines similar to the Military Airlift
Cormand's Associate Reserve Program, as a
means of making greater use of the reserves.
this, in turn, can lead to reducing active
uuty manpower levels by substituting re-
serves into units not inmediately needed at
the outbreak of war and, thereby, reduce
the total defense manpower costs.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the services to:

-- Improve the manpower requirements determi-
   nation process by (1) iiisisting upon

  evaluation of the critical assumptions con-
  cerning the use of forces and their impact
  on below-depot aircraft maintenance manpower
  and (2) modifying manpower determination
  systems to include current, accurate, and
  reliable manpower determination factors and
  maintenance data.
-- Develop alternatives for greater use of
   reserves while determining the most cost
   effective and appropriate mix of forces
   (active and reserve' to meet the below-
   depot-level maintenance personnel require-
   ments. (See p. 11.)
GAO has made additional recommendations to
the Secretaries of the services regarding
specific improvements needed within the
various systems being used to determine
manpower requirements for below-depot air-
craft maintenance activities.  (See pp. 31,
40, and 54.)
At the instructions of the Subcommittee on
Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations,
GAO did not solicit official written com-
ments from the Department of Defense.


DIGEST                                                      i

   1      INTRODUCTION                                     1
              Our reports related to matters discussed
                in this report                             1
              Scope of review                              2

            DEPOT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE                      4
              Are manpower determination systems
                adequate?                                   5
              Are there alternatives to full-time
                active duty staffing?                       9
              Conclusions                                  10
              Recommendations                              11

            SYSTEMS                                        12
              Aircraft maintenance structure               12
              TAC                                          13
                  Maintenance manpower determination
                    process                                13
                  LCOM assumptions                         16
                  Questionable factors used in the
                    LCOM                                   16
                      Sortie rate                          17
                      Sensitivity analysis                 17
                      Deferred maintenance, combat
                         attrition, and wartime surge
                         factors                           17
                      TAC's worst expected war scenario
                         doesn't require all units to
                         deploy                            18
                      Alternatives for reducing manpower
                         requi ments                       19
              Military Air:      Command                   20
                  Maintenan     ,anpower determination
                    proces;                                20
                      Manpower equations are based
                         on inaccurate data                21
                      Productive direct man-hour
                         availability                      22
                      Number of aircraft                   24
CHAPTER                                                  Page
   3                    Aircraft use rate                 24
                        Deputy Commander for Main-
                          tenance authorizations          25
                        Deferred maintenance and
                          combat attrition                25
                        Wartime manpower requirements
                          exceed peacetime workloads      26
                    Alternatives for reducing manpower
                      requirements                        27
                        Increased use of reservists
                          could redure peacetime
                          manning requirements           27
              SAC                                        28
                  Maintenance manpower determination
                    process                              28
                      Preliminary phase                  29
                      Measurement phase                  29
                      Computation phase                  29
                  Assessment of SAC's manpower deter-
                    mination process                     30
              Conclusions                                30
              Recommendations                            31
            TIAL FOR REDUCING REQUIREMENTS               32
              Maintenance structure                      32
              Maintenance manpower determination
                process                                  34
              Questionable factors used in the man-
                power determination process              36
                  MACRIT factors are outdated            36
                      Flying hour factor                 36
                      Maintenance man-hours per flying
                        hour                             36
                      Density of aircraft                37
                      Productive man-hours per month     38
              Potential for reducing manpower require-
                ments                                    3P
                  Use of individual reservists           3J
              Conclusions                                #n
              Recommendations                             9
            DETERMINATION SYSTEMS                        41
              Aircraft below-depot maintenance
                structure                                41
CHAPTER                                                     Page
   5           Maintenance manpower determination
                 systems                                     42
                   Organizational level activities           43
                        Wartime requirements                 43
                        Peacetime requirements               45
                   Assessment of the Navy's manpower de--
                     termination system--organizational
                     level                                  45
                   Data accuracy is questionable            46
                   Aircraft attrition, deferred main-
                     tenance, and other maintenance
                     limiting factors are not considered    46
                   Intermediate level activities            47
                       Wartime requirements                 47
                       Peacetime requirements               48
                   Assessment of the Navy's manpower de-
                     termination system--intermediate
                     level                                  48
                       The survey method cannot predict
                          wartime needs                     48
                       Current requirements may be over-
                          sLdted                            48
                       Data accuracy in the proposed
                          method is questionable            49
                       The proposed method may not be
                          able to predict wartime needs
                          at shore-based AIMDs              49
              Alternatives for reducing manpower re-
                 quirements                                 50
                   Programed and forecasted aircraft
                     flight activity                        50
                   Maintenance organization structure       51
              Conclusions                                   53
              Recommendations                               54
       6   HOW CAN RESERVE FORCES BE USED?                  55
               Emphasis to increase use of reserve
                 forces                                     55
               Proorans making greater use of reserve
                 forces                                     57
               Conclusions                                  58

   I       Letter dated June 2, 1976, from the Chair-
             man, Committee on Appropriations, Ur 'ted
             States Senate                                  59
APPENDIX                                                   Page
      II   Principal officials responsible for the
             administration of activities discussed
             in this report                                 62

AIMD       Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments

DCM        Deputy Commander for Maintenance
DOD        Department of Defense
GAO        General Accounting Office
LCOM       Logistics Composite Model

MAC        Military Airlift Command

MACRIT     manpower authorization criteria

NAS        naval air station

SAC        Strategic Air Command
TAC        Tactical Air Command
3-M        Maintenance and Materiel Management
                          CHAPTER 1


     The military services operate nearly 25,000 aircraft.
The annual cost to maintain these aircraft is over $6 billion.
Military maintenance manpower is the largest recurring ele-
ment in this cost. Large maintenance manpower costs will
always be necessary, because manpower must be available in
adequate numbers and quality to provide the high aircraft
availability required in war. Defense manpower costs gen-
erally are great--about 60 percent of defense spending. It
is important in every manpower area, including the maintenance
area, to identify opportunities to improve manpower controls
and to realize savings wherever possible.
     Below-depot maintenance costs are about two-thirds of
total aircraft maintenance costs. Below-depot maintenance
generally includes two levels, organizational and intermedi-
ate. The two below-depot levels, in contrast to the depot
level, ar- highly user or unit oriented, perform less complex
tasks, and employ primarily military personnel. The Army,
Navy, and Air Force employ over 250,000 military and civilian
personnel to perform below-depot aircraft maintenance.
     We reviewed the systems used by the Army, Navy, and Air
Force to determine their below-depot aircraft maintenance
personnel requirements for peacetime. Also, we examined the
procedures used to project the number of such personnel re-
quired to support the increased aircraft flight activity
forecasted for wartime. Finally, we evaluated the services'
efforts to use reserves to limit active duty maintenance
staffing in peacetime, when the use of reserves would not
impair the services' ability to be potentially responsive to
the increased tempo of wartime flight operations.
     Some of our past reports related to these matters in-
clude (1) "Improving Productivity Through Better Management
of Maintenance Operations in Europe" (LCD-75-401) March 7,
1975, (2) "Productivity of Military Below-Depot Maintenance--
Repairs Less Complex Than Provided at Depots--Can Be Improved"
(LCD-75-422) July 29, 1975, (3) "Navy Aircraft Overhaul Depots
Could Be More Productive" LCD-75-432) December 23, 1975, and
(4) "Report to the Secretary of Defense on Aerial Port Staff-
ing" (LCD-75-219) March 13, 1975.

     GAO is reviewing the (1) productivity of the Navy's
intermediate maintenance for ships, (2) Navy's management of
and requirement for carrier deployed aircraft, and '3) func-
tions, resources, and workloads at defense depot-level
aircraft maintenance activities. Our reports on these areas
are scheduled for issue during 1977.

     We made our review during the period August 1976 to
January 1977. Detailed work was done at the following
     U.S. Army:
         Headquarters, Department of the Army,
           Washington, D.C.
         Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.
         Transportations School, Fort Eustis, Va.
         Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga.
         18th Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg,  .C.
         Development and Readiness Command, Alexandria, Va.
    U.S. Air Force:
        Headquarters, Department of the Air Force,
          Washington, D.C.
        Tactical Air Commard, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
        Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
        Strategic Air Command, Offut AFB, Neb.
        Travis Air Force Base, Calif.
        Mather Air Force Base, Calif.
    U.S. Navy:
        Chief of Naval Oerations, Washington, D.C.
        Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, D.C.
        Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet,
          Oceana, Va.
        Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet,
          San Diego, Calif.
        Commander, Navy Manpower and Material Analysis
          Center, Atlantic, Norfolk, Va.
        Commander, Navy Manpower and Material Analysis
          Center, Pacific, San Diego, Calif.
        Naval Air Station, Alameda, Calif.
        Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, Mountainview,
        Naval Air Station, Lemoore, Calif.

     U.S. Reserve Ccmponents'
         Army Natiotial Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C.Center,
         Army National Guard, Operations Activities
           Edqewood, Md.
         Chief of rmy Reserve, Washington, D.C.             D.C.
         Air Force National Guard Bureau, Washington, D.C.
         Chief of Air Force Reserve, Washington, D.C.
         Director of Naval Reserve, Washington,
         Chief of Naval Reserve,_ New Orleans,
                                                       of Defense
     We also did limited work at other Department
                                        of the Subcommittee on
(DOD) locations. At the instructions
                            on Appropriations,  we did not
Defense, Senate Committee                    tnis  review, how-
solicit written DOD comments. Throughoutwere developed with
ever, we discussed our findings as they their comments. At
responsible DOD officials and obtained
                        work, we held erit conferences     with
the conclusion of our services  in Washington,  D.C.
each of the military
     we limited our review to staffing of below-depot
aircraft maintenance activities.  Hwever, the basicto issues
addressed and improvements needed c uld well apply
military maintenance staffing.

                          CHAPTER 2

     The military manpower needs of the United States are
based on the force structure deemed necessary to support our
security, while accepting no more than prudent risk in the
face of the perceived threat. The manpower determination
process concerns the translation of the chosen force struc-
ture requirements into the manpower necessary to man and
support the forces.

     The military services' systems for determining below-
depot maintenance personnel requirements are the basis for
allocating tillions of dollars for active force and re-
serve personnel, and these systems are a key ingredient to
effective aircraft maintenance in peace and war.

     Below-depot-level maintenance activities for aircraft
vary widely in INature.  Maintenance activities exist on ships,
in squadrons, at mobile bases, and at foreign and United
States Army, Navy, and Air Force bases. Each type of activity
maintains aircraft that perform various kinds of missions,
such as patrol, attack, support, or training.   Further, be-
cause of deployments and other factors, the numbers and air-
craft types an activity maintains in peace may vary greatly
from that which would be maintained during war. To properly
determine manpower requirements, it is necessary to identify
assigned missions and the way they vary at peace and at war.
To clarify missions for maintenance activities, workloads
must be defined for peace and war. Further, an estimate
must be made of the speed with which an activity must be
able to adapt to wartime workloads. The need to define these
factors must be emphasized, because good definition is
necessary to properly size the forces needed and to determine
the most economical mix of active, reserve, and other personnel.

     Rising personnel costs are of continuing concern within
DOD. Accordingly, there are basic questions which should
be asked concerning the systems for determining manpower re-
quirements and the mix of forces (active, reserve, nd other
personnel) to satisfy these requirements.

     --Do sound systems exist to determine both (1) require-
       ments for peacetime personnel and (2) requirements for
       wartime personnel?

     --Has advantage been taken of opportunities to use
       reservists to meet personnel requirements for wartime
       in excess of personnel requirements for peacetime?


     Determining maintenance manpower requirements is not
a new process or static by any means.  The military services
have been developing and adjusting manpower requirements
annually for many years.  There is no one system which estab-
lishes requirements for all maintenance activities.  In fact,
each service approaches the below-depot aircraft maintenance
personnel determination process using its own systems, sets
of logic, decision rules, and policies.  The logic of the
several processes varies from precise industrial engineering
work measurement to subjective judgment.

     The Army has basically a manual system which    has been
using for several years.  This system relies almost exclusively
on extension of a formula that considers basic quantitative
factors, such as number of aircraft, maintenance man-hours per
flying hour, monthly flying hours, and productive man-hours per

     The Navy relied on a manual system for many years which
also dealt with basic quantitative factors similar to those
in t   Army system.  However, the Navy is changing to a
computer-based system which contains models that can be
adjusted to different conditions and employs the basic theory
of regression analysis.  This system is designed to compute
requirements for aircraft squadrons as well as both shore-
based and ship-based maintenance activities.

     The Air Force does not have a single system.  Each major
command has its own system--ranging from a manual system using
measured maintenance man-hours and related workload factors
to compute peacetime staffing levels, to a rather highly
sophisticated computer-based system that simulates manpower
requirements based on selected input criteria for wartime

     Although the systems differ in structure, application,
and actual results, we believe they should function for the
same basic purpose--to identify the most appropriate level
of personnel requirements to perform below-depot-level air-
craft maintenance.  Also, any system should consider a number
of factors that can have an impact on personnel levels.

     We found that several factors can logically have an
impact on the requirements for maintenance personnel and
should, therefore, be fully evaluated when establishing per-
sonnel levels.  Some of these factors are:

    -- Aircraft attrition in wartime reduces the number of
       aircraft very early during any conflict, as indicated
       by Vietnam experience.   While it is difficult to
       predict what aircraft attrition rates might be in the
       early stages of any future conflicts and, therefore,
       the impact on maintenance personnel requirements,
       this area needs to be evaluated to determine the most
       appropriate level of maintenance manpower during war-
       time.   The services are not including any adjustment
       factors to reduce maintenance personnel requirements
       resulting from aircraft attrition in tiHe early stages
       of war.

    -- During any wartime situation there are certain main-
       tenance tasks which are not essential to fly an air-
       craft and could, therefore, reduce maintenance require-
       ments.  The services plan their maintenance personnel
       needs on the basis of performing both essential and
       nonessential maintenance (total maintenance currently
       performed at a given flying hour rate) during wartime.

    -- Maintenance labor hours provide a key element in deter-
       mining maintenance personnel requir:emerts.  We have
       reported (LCD-75-422) on the systems for collecting and
       reporting' labor hours and questioned the accuracy of
       reported maintenance data. With the exception of the
       Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) the services still
       rely heavily on this data to determine maintenance man-
       power requirements.

    -- During a wartime situation there is a surge period,
       normally about 30 days, wherein maintenance personnel
       work a longer work week.  After this initial surge
       period the war reaches a level of sustained require-
       ments, werein maintenance personnel work fewer hours.
       In general, the services normally develop maintenance
       personnel requirements based on his sustained level
       of effort.  This does not consider the extra hours
       available during the surge period which might reduce
       the personnel Lequirements.  Considering that a lower
       level of personnel during the surge period may be
       possible and augmenting this level during the sustained
       wartime period with reserves might alter the theory
       for determining personnel requirements solely on the
       bdsis of sustained wartime levels.

      There are also a number of factors that affect the
individual manpower determination systems used by the serv-
ices.   For example:
    -- Logically, productivity in peacetime could vary from
       a wartime situation, if for no other reason but the
       different environments. There is no evidence showing
       precisely what the wartime productive available direct
       labor hours should be, but presumably it would be
       higher than the 60 percent used by the Air Force Mili-
       tary Airlift Command (MAC), since this is also the
       peacetime rate used by this command.
     --Since many Navy aircraft will be deployed during war-
       time, the workload at intermediate level maintenance
       activities should change, and most likely reduce,
       because there are fewer aircraft at that location.
       The Navy assumes that staffing requirements at some
       shore stations will increase by as much as 75 percent
       during wartime but they have not studied this area to
       support such an increase.

    -- The Army has regulations to update their manpower de-
       termination system every 3 years. At the time of our
       review, this system had not been updated for 6 years.
       It was relying on maintenance man-hours per flight hour
       factors, derived from a combination of actual and
       projected data from two different time periods. The
       system did not allow for differences in maintenance
       requirements among varying models of the same type
       aircraft. Other questionable factors in this system
       are detailed in chapter 4.
     Aside from the various factors used by the services that
directly affect the application and results of their individual
systems, there are outside influences that also have an impact
on the manpower levels and the systems being used. A key area
in this regard involves the planning assumptions for using
military forces. While we did not initially envision question-
ing the assumptions abcut force levels, their impact became
apparent as our work progressed, and e believe it essential
they be considered in evaluating the manner in which mainten-
ance personnel requirements are determined.
     For example, although the services each used systems
founded on assumptions concerning the number of flight hours

or sorties 1/ that would be required of each aircraft during
a "worst case" wartime scenario, we noted:

     -- The Air Force Tactical Air Command's (TAC's) system
        relies on aircraft sortie rates developed in the
        early 1970s and there have been no significant canges
        to these rates in several years.

     -- MAC's system assumes all C-141 and C-5 aircraft must
       be capable of meeting a 10 hour per day sustained
       wartime use rate.  Air Force officials have testified
       a number of times on the limited availability of air-
       craft (particularly the C-5).  Logically, some aircraft
       would always be unavailable because of maintenance or
       parts.  Also, at least one Air Force official has
       testified that it may not be possible to meet a 10
       hour per day use rate even if aircraft are available.

     --The Army's system assumes aircraft flight hour rates
       will be the same as experienced during Vietnam.  It
       is not known precisely how aircraft might be used in
       a European scenario.  However, the difference in
       terrain alone indicates that helicopters will not be
       used in the same manner as was the case in Vietnam.
       Since the Army aircraft inventory is mostly helicop-
       ters, flight hour rates could vary from the Vietnam

     -- The Army's system assumes all deployable aircraft units
        must be ready for immediate deployment at the start of
        the conflict.  As was the case in the Air orce, all
        aircraft may not be available at the outbreak of war.
        Also, in the case of the Army, some aircraft units
        are not scheduled to deploy during the early stages
        of war, which raises a question about the Army assump-

     -- The Navy's system also assumes that all squadrons must
        immediately deploy dnd begin operating aircraft at
        wartime flight rates.  This appears questionable, since
        there are not sufficient carriers to deploy all squad-
        rons immediately. Also, as was the case with the
        other services, some aircraft will not be available
        at the outbreak of war for one or more reasons.

l/The flying of an airplane on a combat mission.

     These matters and the systems used by the Air Force,
Army, and Navy are discussed in detail in chapters 3, 4,
and 5, respectively.


     Personnel available to perform maintenance missions
include active duty persons, selected reservists, individual
reservists, and others. These categories of personnel can
be used in combination or exclusively to perform various
maintenance missions. At the same time, personnel costs
can vary greatly depending on what combination of personnel
categories are deemed appropriate.

     In recent years, with the rising costs of defense man-
power, new ways are being examined to reduce such costs and
continue to provide an adequate defense capability. A full-
time active force is without doubt the most desirable but
also the most costly. Other less costly alternatives gen-
erally include making greater use of   zerve forces and reduc-
ing active forces.

     Individually, the services have considered greater use
of reserve forces, but, with the following exceptions, still
strive to man their below-depot maintenance activities with
enough people to support immediate mobilization without
reliance on reserves.
         The exceptions are:

         -- SAC staffs at the level required to meet peacetime

         -- MAC relies on reserves to support a portion of its
            increased wartime requirements, with peacetime active
            duty personnel making up the remainder of the differ-

         -- The Navy provides for reservists to augment peacetime
            needs to meet wartime needs at shore-based intermediate
            maintenance activities.

     Recognition of the impact of all factors (such as attri-
tion, deferred maintenance, and wartime surge capability),
as well as reevaluation of other factors (such as probable
timing for deployment of each element of the total force and
actual flight activity of the deployed forces), should permit
the services to reduce active duty maintenance personnel

staffing and place greater reliance on using reserves.   For
     -- TAC might substitute reservists for active duty
        personnel in those units not included in the worst
        case scenario and in those units which do not have
        to deploy at the beginning of the worst case wartime
     -- MAC might reduce active dut' staffing to give its
        existing associate reserves a more realistic share
        of the achievable wartime 1l     program.
     -- The Army might substitute reserves for active personnel
        in those units which will not deploy immediately at
        the beginning of war.
     -- The Navy might substitute reserves to augment those
        squadrons which will not be committed to battle during
        the early stages of war.
     DOD has not provided the services with strong central
guidance on how they should determine below-depot-level
aircraft maintenance personnel requirements. Each of the
services has, as a result, independently developed one or
more systems to determine such staffing requirements. The
systems vary widely in degree of sophistication, but with the
possible exception of the Air Force's SAC, each had major pro-
cedurai or data accuracy weaknesses.
     The procedural weaknesses noted can have a large impact
on the reasonableness of the services' calculations of per-
sonnel requirements. The actual impact, however, cannot be
accurately measured until the weaknesses are corrected.
     The various manpower determination systems relied
heavily and without question on service input data concerning
the probable timing, deployment, and rate of use of forces
at the outset of war. "he reasonableness of these assumed
factors can have a potentially larger impact on the computed
number of required personnel than individual procedural weak-.
ness in the systems themselves. The various assumptions can
also have a large bearing on the number of cost-effective
alternatives which can be considered for reducing peacetime
active duty staffing. We have questioned the reasonableness
of some of these operational assumptions and believe that

considerable cost savings for personnel can be realized if
the assumptions are reevaluated.
     We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretaries of the services to:
     -- Improve the personnel requirements determination
        process by (1) insisting upon evaluation of the
        assumptions concerning the use or forces and their
        impact on below-depot aircraft maintenance personnel
        and (2) modifying personnel determination systems
        to include current, accurate, and reliable personnel
        determination factors and maintenance data.
     -- Develop alternatives for greater use of reserves
        while determining the most cost effective and appro-
        priate mix of forces (active and reserves) to meet
        the below-depot-level maintenance personnel require-

                          CHAPTER 3
                    DETERMINATION SYSTEMS

     The Air Force's Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift
Command, and Strategic Air Command have the vast majority of
the approximately 9,000 aircraft in the Air Force. As of
June 1976, these commands had over 75,000 military and
civilian personnel authorized to perform below-depot-level
maintenance for these aircraft. This number includes in-
direct maintenance support personnel.

     These Air Force commands have similar aircraft mainte-
nance responsibilities, and their basic organizational struc-
ture is the same.  However, each command has developed its
own method to determine aircraft maintenance manpower re-
quirements, and these methods are considerably dissimilar.
For example: TAC's manpower requirements for major weapons
systems are determined by a computer simulation model, MAC's
requirements are based on man-hour per flight hour factors,
and SAC uses statistical standards to determine manpower re-
quirements. The methods differ because each one is related
to the commands' mission, deployment requirements, and types
of aircraft. Furthermore, TAC and MAC base their requirements
on wartime needs, while SAC's are based on peacetime.

     Some of the basic assumptions used in the MAC and TAC
manpower determination methods appear questionable, and com-
puted manpower authorizations may be considerably overstated.
In contrast, SAC's manpower determination method appears ade-
quate because it is based on valid assumptions.

     Aircraft squadrons are the basic units in the Air Force's
aviation program. Squadrons consist of a specific number and
model of aircraft, such as C-141s, B-52s, or F-15s.  The
squadrons are administratively combined to form wings which
generally consist of a number of squadrons of a particular
type of aircraft, such as bombers, fighters, and cargo

     Air Force Manual 66-1 generally requires that each major
command satisfy the organizational and intermediate aircraft
maintenance needs of its separate activities. This is ac-
complished using a standardized organization which generally
provides the following for each command at each base:

      -- A Deputy Commander for Maintenance (DCM) group is
         responsible for overall management of the command's
         maintenance complex. Basic management responcibili-
         ties include planning, scheduling, controlling, and
         directing the use of all maintenance resources to
         meet mission requirements.
      -- An organizational maintenance squadron is responsible
         for aircraft inspections, preventive maintenance, and
         other minor tasks, such as aircraft refueling and
         lubrication. Most of this work is done while aircraft
         are on the flight line, and is considered the least
         complex level of maintenance.
      -- A field maintenance squadron repairs aircraft engines,
         related components, and equipment. It also inspects
         and maintains aerospace ground equipment and, if neces-
         sary, provides for local manufacture of some parts for
         aircraft and support equipment. The squadron has both
         flight line and in-shop personnel.
      -- An avionics maintenance squadron maintains various
         electronic systems, such as communications and navi-
         gation equipment and related testing and measuring
         equipment. Maintenance work may be done on the
         flight line or in base shops.
      --A munitions maintenance squadron maintains and e-
        pairs munitions and associated handling equipment.
        This squadron is also responsible for loading and un-
        loading munitions.

     TAC's basic missions are to prevent enemy aircraft from
interfering with friendly forces, attack enemy facilities
and aircraft on the ground, provide direct air-to-ground
firepower to support ground '-rces, and provide air recon-
naissance.  TAC is assigned vrious attack, fighter, and
reconnaissance aircraft, and is generally considered to be
the Air Force's quick reaction and deploym..t force.
Maintenance manpower
determination process
     Before 1974, TAC used a man-hour per flight hour basis
to determine below-depot maintenance manpower requirements.
One reason this manpower determination process was later
judged to be unreliable was because it was based on self-
reported information, and used past workload data to project

future manpower requirements. Furthermore, the ecretary of
the Air Force directed that engineerrd manpower standards be
developed for 11 primary aircraft. A a result, TAC adopted
a computer simulation technique to determine manpower require-
     This simulation technique i called tha Logistics Com-
posite Model (LCOH) and was jointly developed by the Air
Force Logistics Command and the Rand Corporation. A of
September 1976, TAC had completed LCOM studies for six types
of aircraft.
     LCOM simulates the interaction of the expected mainte-
nance environment and required aircraft opera'ons to deter-
mine the manpower needed to support ustained wartime require-
ments. (See figure 1.) Factors used in the simulation are
based on historical experience and forecasted requirements
and includes
      Mission types           Budgetary constraints
      Mission priority        Failure rates
      Mission delay time      Direct repair time
      Number of sorties       Repair crew size
      Sortie length           Inspection frequency
      Sortie leadtime         Battle damage
      Aircraft type           Spare parts availability
      Flight size             Weather history
      Launch time
     The primary factor is the aircraft ortie rate / needed
to sustain a 30 to 90 day war under the worst xpected
scenario. If the first simulation shows that the desired
sortie rate cannot be achieved, the number of maintenance
personnel is adjusted and the simulation is repeated. This
process is continued until the desired rate is achieved. The
number of personnel identified at this point becomes the man-
power requirement.
     LCOM is used to determine productive direct manpower
requirements. Additional requirements, such as unit adminis-
tration and aerospace ground equipment authorizations, are
determined by other methods. LCOM is no" used for thes work
centers because their workload is not generated by sortie

l/The average daily combat missions required pr aircraft.


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     LCOrl's ability to redict maintenance performance and
manpower requirements was field tested at Seymour-Johnson
Air Force Base in 1973, and TAC began using LCOM to compute
manpower requirements in 1974.  The model is used for all
maintenance squadrons except munitions.

     The LCOM studies completed so far have shown an in-
crease in manpower requirements.  Actual staffing of LCOM
requirements began in July 1976, but was not expected to be
completed until March 1977.  TAC officials believe the in-
creased requirements are attributed solely to the more ac-
curate determination of wartime needs.

LCOM assumptions

     Generally, LCOM is based on TAC's deployment concept.
This concept requires that TAC's tactical fighter forces
maintain a flexible capability to rapidly deploy anywhere
in the world and operate either independently or as part of
a joint force.  TAC can deploy an entire aircraft wing from
a single location, or deploy separate squadrons and/or ele-
ments of the wing, and simultaneously conduct air operations
from more than one location.  Consequently, LCOM was designed
to compute deployed wartime manpower requirements for all
maintenance squadrons.

     Other basic assumptions used in the LCOM are:

     --Computer simulation is the best method for evaluating
       the interaction of support resources and to determine
       the optimal mix of resources needed to support a spe-
       cific flying program.

     --The required wartime flying schedule should be used
       to determine manpower requirements.  If it is held
       constant, the supportive resource reauirements can be
       ;ltered by simulation until the desired sortie rate
       can be achieved.

     -- Deferred maintenance, combat attrition, and wartime
        surge factors do not have to be considered when com-
        puting manpower requirements for sustained wartime

Questionable factors
used in the LCOM

     We believe TAC's manpower requirements may be inaccurate
because the sortie rate may not reflect the most current

requirement, and the LCOM has not been tested by sensitivity
analysis. In addition, manpower requirements may be over-
stated because:
     -- All maintenance squadrons were staffed for deployed
        wartime operations, but the war scenario did not re-
        quire all unit elements to deploy during the first
        30 days of war.
     -- The effect of deferred maintenance, the wartime surge
        period, and combat attrition were not adequately con-

     Sortie rate
     The aircraft sortie rate is the primary factor used in
the LCOM and it should reflect the best estimate of current
wartime requirements. We were told the sortie rates were
developed in the early 1970s.   However, during our exit con-
ference, Air Staff officials  said  the rates were reviewed,
evaluated, and approved each  year,  but no significant changes
have been made in several years.

     Sensitivity analysis
     LCOM is a very sophisticated simulation model.    It
evaluates the interaction of many factors  to  determine the
best mix of resources needed to support a  specific  flying
program. Sensitivity analysis is a method of determining
the influence and interrelationship of these factors, but
it has not been used extensively with LCOM.    For example,
the Air Force has not determined the extent   to which the
factors noted on page 14 have an impact on  each  other during
the simulation process.

     Deferred maintenance, combat attrition,
     and wartime surge factors
     Some maintenance tasks do not have a critical impact on
aircraft safety and mission capability and are often deferred
during wartime. For example, some scheduled inspections may
not be performed, and some specific maintenance tasks may be
deferred if they do not reduce operational capabilities.
This practice temporarily reduces maintenance man-hour
requirements, but LCOM does not consider deferred maintenance
when computing manpower requirements.

     We did not attempe to determine how much deferred main-
tenance occurs during wartime and/or how much it would reduce
manpower requirements. However, if deferred maintenance is
considered, e believe manpower requirements would he reduced.

      hcn using  6LCOI to compute maintenance manpower require-
ments, TAC assumes that flying units will have a full com-
plemenc of aircraft for sustained war operations and that
combat losses will be replaced immediately.    This assumption
does not consider the probability of high aircraft attrition
during the initial combat    eriod or recognize that immediate
replacement of such losses, and additional losses incurred
after the first 30 days of combat, is highly unlikely.

     As a result of this questionable assumption, LCOM ap-
pears to be computing maintenance requirements for aircraft
which may not be available for operations and is, in turn,
overstating manpower requirements.

        Two other factors also reduce TAC's manpower   require-
ments    for the wartime surge period.

        --The availability of maintenance repair parts is
            'rgely limited--until supply routes are established
               operational--to what the squadrons can carry with
          tr. n when they deploy.

        -- Maintenance people are expected to work longer hours
           during the surge period (up to 72 hours per week, as
           opposed to 60 hours per week during sustained wartime).

     TAC's LCOM does not consider these factors since it com-
putes personnel requirements based solely on the sustained
wartime environment--when repair parts are available and
maintenance people can no longer be expected to work produc-
tively at a suraed or exoanded workhour rate.

     TAC's worst exoected war scenario doesn't
     require all units to deploy

     LCO' is based on TAC's deployment concept; consequently,
maintenance manoower should be related to each squadron's
deployment requirements.  We found the worst expected war
scenario did not require all maintenance squadrons to deploy,
but manpower requirements were computed on the assumption
that in wartime all squadrons would deploy.

     TAC's September 1976 contingency plans showed that a
certain percentage of maintenance squadrons elements were
not expected to deploy to Europe under the worst case
scenario.  However, LCOM does not consider the deployment
requirements for individual squadron elements, but rather
computes all manning for wartime deployment needs.  Since
no distinction was made between deployable and nondeployable

squadron elements, we estimated annual maintenance manpower
requirements were overstated at least $21 million for those
units not deploying to Europe.
     This computation is based on the estimated costs (pay
and allowances excluding any fringe benefits) of maintenance
personnel in units that were not scheduled to deploy to
Europe and not necessary to meet peacetime workloads. 1/
Alternatives for reducing
manpower requirements
     TAC has not considered using individual reservists to
fill maintenance manpower requirements for sustained war-
time, and, thus, may be incurring unnecessary manpower costs.
We believe greater reliance on the reserves can reduce peace-
time manpower requirements without degrading TAC's ability
to meet its war:ime requirements. Two possible alternatives
for using reservists are discussed below.
     Active TAC squadrons, by relying on work hour surge
capability, could be staffed to meet initial 30-day wartime
requirements, and reservists could be used to fill the addi-
tional manpower requirements for sustained wartime operations.
The reservists could be integrated with active units under a
concept similar to MAC's Reserve Associate program.
     We estimate that such a program of reduced current staff-
ing and planned reserve augmentation can reduce TAC's annual
maintenance personnel costs by over $50 million. This com-
putation is based on the estimated difference in pay and
allowances (excluding fringe benefits) between active duty
personnel and reservists for the number of reservists that
would replace active duty personnel to meet the sustained
wartime requirement.
     This alternative would also coordinate staffing with
each squadron's deployment requirements. For example:
     -- Squadrons not needed during the first 30 days could
        be staffed with enough active duty personnel to meet
        peacetime needs and reservists could be used to fill
        additional positions needed for sustained wartime.
     -- Deployable squadrons could be staffed to meet the
        wartime surge requirements and reservists could be
         :sed during sustained wartime to meet additional
        manpower requirements.

l/All savings computations are based ;n classified data and,
  therefore, are not included in this report.
     --Squadrons required to deploy during the surge period
       could be staffed for a 30-day war and personnel from
       nondeoloyable squadrons could be used to provide the
       additional manpower for sustained wartime. Reservists
       could then be used to supplement the nondeployable

     Another possible alternative would be to establish re-
serve manpower ools; These reservists could be used to fill
the additional manpower requirements needed for sustained
wartime, and the active squadrons culd be staffed primarily
for the first 30 days of war.  Under this concept, the re-
servists would not be preassigned to specific squadrons.
Instead, they would be available for assignment to those
squadrons requiring wartime augmentation.

     MAC's primary mission is to provide strategic and tac-
tical airlift for the Armed Forces. The C-130, C-141, C-5A,
and Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft constitute MAC's essen-
tial resource for this mission.
Maintenance manpower determination process

     MAC, in contrast to TAC (see p. '3) and SAC (see p. 28),
is not using engineered standards to determine its maintenance
manpower requirements. Instead, it uses comparatively simple
equations to predict sustained wartime requirements based on
the relationship of historical labor hour charges to various
workload factors. We reviewed only the equations used for
the C-141 and C-5A aircraft, but the same basic process is
used for all MAC aircraft.
     The primary factors used in the manpower equations are:
(1) a man-hour per flight hour factor, (2) number of aircraft,
(3) aircraft use rate, and (4) productive direct man-hour
     These and similar factors are used in various mathema-
tical equations to determine productive direct manpower re-
quirements needed for sustained wartime. The C-141 manpower
authorizations, for example, are determined using an equation
which does nothing more than make a linear projection--based
on a worldwide historical man-hour per flight hour factor--of
the maintenance hours estimated to be required during wartime.
In contrast, the C-5A home station requirements are determined
using a program estimating equation which provides constant
authorizations for required maintenance inspection tasks,

supplemented by a variable manpower factor based on programed
flying hours.
     We also found that MAC's manpower determination process
for the C-141 and C-5A is based on several key assumptions,
including the following:
     --The Maintenance Data Collection system data used to
       develop some factors in the manpower equations is ac-
       curate, and properly reflects maintenance man-hour
     -- During peacetime and wartime 60 percent of available
        man-hours is productive direct time.
     --234 C-141s and 70 C-5As will be available for opera-
       tions during sustained wartime.
     -- The C-141 and C-5A aircraft will be able to achieve a
        10-hour use rate 1/ during sustained wartime.  It is
        further assumed tat active forces will be assigned
        60 percent of the sustained flirht program, and the
        reserves and auxiliary forces will be assigned the

     -- The DCM organization requires manpower authorizations
        equal to 10 percent of the total positions authorized
        for direct labor, aerospace ground equipment, supply
        support, and survival equipment.
     -- Deferred maintenance and combat attrition do not have
        to be considered when computing manpower requirements.
     -- Peacetime and sustained wartime manning levels for
        active duty personnel should be the same.
     As discussed in more detail below, we believe each of
these assumptions is questionable, and may be causing an
overstatement of requirements.

     Manpower equations are based
     on inaccurate data

     Several of the factors used in MAC's manpower equations
are based on labor hour charges recorded in the Air Force's

I/The average daily flight hours required per aircraft for a
  specific war scenario.

Maintenance Data Collection system.  iWe have previously
reported that such data is inaccurate and overstated because
its reporting is not adequately controlled. 1/ Several MAC
officials agreed the data is unreliable and is generally in-
flated.  Some SAC officials said the data does not provide
an accurate assessment of the man-hours used to support actual
flight hours.

     The man-hour er flight hour factor 2/ used in the C-141
manpower equation was derived from the reported man-hour data.
After consolidating the reported labor hour data, Air Force
officials review and evaluate it.  They make adjustments to
eliminate obvious errors, but gtee that all errors could
not be eliminated. Within the scope of this review, we dA
not determine the extent of overstatement in either the ad-
justed or raw man-hour data. However, the effect of any over-
statement can be easily shown.  For example:

     --If the C-141 man-hour per flight hour factor is over-
       stated 5 percent, manpower would be overstated by
       348 authorizations which cost about $3 million

     -- If the factor is overstated 20 percent, 1,393 au-
        thorizations costing about $13 million annually would
        not be needed.

     Some factors used in the C-5A equations were also
derived from questionable man-hour data. As a result, the
C-5A manpower requirements may also be overstated.

     Productive direct
     man-hour availability

     MAC assumes direct productivity is 60 percent during
both peacetime and wartime.  However, Air Force Manual 26-3
states that productivity may be expected to increase during

     MAC officials agreed productivity is 9gnerally greater
during wartime because some administrative fnct'iozns ncrmally
done during peacetime are not performed during wartime.   SAC

1/"Productivity of Military Below-Depot Maintenance--Repairs
  Less Complex Than Provided at Depots--Can Be Improved"
  (LCD-75-422), July 29, 1975.

2/The ratio of maintenance hours used to spport actual flight

officials said prc  ctivity is higher during wartime, and
even peacetime prouuctivity is often greater than 60 percent.

     MAC uses the 60 ercent productivity factor when comput-
ing manpower requirements. However, as explained above, the
productivity rate may be higher during both peacetime and
wartime. To illustrate the effect increased productivity
has on manpower needs, we assumed some maintenance personnel
were 75-percent productive and the remainder of the work-
force was 60-percent productive. As shown below, increased
productivity would create considerable manpower reductions.
                      Manpower Reductions
                                              2otal       cost
                         C-141       C-5A     reduc-     savings
   Assumption          (note a)    (note a)   tions      (note b)

1. 10 percent of
   workforce is
   productive              177         108      285    $ 2.7 millibn

2. 20 percent of
   workforce is
   productive              341         215      556      5.2 million

3. 30 percent of
   workforce is
   productive              577         309      886      8.2 million

4. 40 percent of
   workforce is
   productive              650         403    1,053      9.8 million

5. 50 percent of
   workforce is
   productive              792         494    1,286     12.0 million

6. Entire workforce
   is 75-percent
   productive            1,394         886    2,280     21.2 million

a/Calculations based on sustained wartime requirements.

b/Based on an average annual cost of $9,304 per enlisted man.

     Number of aircraft
     Manpower requirements are computed on the basis that
234 C-141s and 70 C-5As will be available for operations
during sustained wartime.  Although additional aircraft,
such as training and nonoperational active aircraft, can be
used during wartime, many aircraft may not be available.
Considering the available aircraft, for example:

     --On an average day during 1975, only 43 C-5As and
       178 C-141s were flyable.
     -- During December 1975 and January 1976, an average of
        33 C-5As were in flyable status and only 8 more (a
        total of 41) could have been made available within
        48 hours. MAC officials said it would have taken
        60 days to make as many as 52 C-5As available for
      Planned aircraft modifications and depot maintenance
requirements also reduce aircraft availability. The Air
Forc - plans to stretch the C-141 fuselage by 23 feet and
add an air refueling capability. Based on the estimated
work schedule, 34 C-141s will be undergoing stretch modifi-
cation at any one time during fiscal years 1980 through
1982.   Futhermore, another 11 C-141s are programed to be
out of service for routine depot maintenance.
     The Air Force is also planning to modify the C-5A wing
structure, and an average of about 10 C-5As will be out of
service each month until the project is completed.  In addi-
tion, some other C-5As, probably six or more, would be under-
going routine depot maintenance at any one time during the
same period.

     While these are examples of current modifications,
similar modifications could be in process at the start of a

     Aircraft use rate

     MAC plans to achieve a 12.5-hour use rate during the
wartime surge period, and a 10-hour rate during sustained
wartime. The actual fiscal year 1976 use rate for C-141s
and C-5As was 3.40 and 1.57 respectively. The fiscal year
1977 programed rate for the C-141 is 3.24 and the programed
rate for the C-5A is 1,80. These peacetime use rates are
about three to six times less than the 10-hour rate planned
for sustained wartime.

     In June 1976 we reported 1/ that the Air Force may never
be able to achieve a 12.5 use rate for all C-5A and C-141
aircraft. At that time, Air Force officials indicated that
the maximum use rates achievable may be only 5 hours for the
C-5A and 7 hours for the C-141. Consequently, the likelihood
of achieving even a 10-hour use rate appears uestionable.
     The use rate has a significant impact on manpower re-
quirements.  For example, MAC's fiscal year 1977 direct labor
authorizations for C-141 and C-5A active duty squadrons was
based on a 6- O-r rate. 2/ Annual manpower costs could have
been reduced flout $16 mllion if a 5-hour rate had been used.
     Deputy Commander for
     Maintenance authorizations
     Authorizations for the Deputy Commander for Maintenance
organization are not based on standards or reported mainte-
nance hours. The organization is simply authorized 10 percent
of the total authorizations otherwise computed for direct
labor, aerospace ground equipment, supply support, and sur-
vival equipment. We were told the 10-percent allowance was
customary and based on a past judgment formed from experience.
     No additional documentation nor more detailed explana-
tion was provided to support the 10-percent figure.
     Deferred maintenance and
     combat attrition
      teferred maintenance temporarily reduces manpower re-
quirements. A MAC official said maintenance is often de-
ferred during wartime, but we could not find any indication
that MAC's manpower determination process considered this

     We recognize that maintenance during wartime could in-
crease because of battle damage and possibly offset the de-
ferral of some maintenance. There also was no indication
that MAC provided for increased maintenance due to battle
damage when determining maintenance manpower requirements.

l/"Information on the Requirement for Strategic Airlift"
  (PSAD-76-148), June 8, 1976.

2/The remaining 4 hours (10 minus 6) of the olanned daily
  use rate are assigned to the reserves and auxiliary forces.

     Likewise, MAC does not consider combat attrition when
computing manpower requirements. Some aircraft may be lost
and/or destroyed during wartime and, since aircraft avail-
ability ffects manpower requirements, this factor should be
considered. For example, a 10-percent loss of C-141 and C-5A
aircraft during comnbat, equates to 1,127 personnel authoriza-
tions which would not be needed to support the remaining num-
ber of aircraft. The annual cost for these authorizations
is about $10.5 million.
     Wartime manpower requirements
     exceed peacetime workloads
     MAC's manpower requirements are based on estimated work-
loads for sustained wartime and the assumption that a wartime
capability must be maintained during peacetime. This assump-
tion may create excess manpower requirements for peacetime
operations.  For example:
     -- A MAC offic'al said the C-5A is authorized more man-
        power for artime than can be used during peacetime.
        Comparing the wartime and peacetime man-hour avail-
        ability shows that the same number of C-5A active
        duty personnel intended to support a 6-hour wartime
        use rate could support a 3.57 hour peacetime daily
        use rate.  However, the fiscal year 1977 programed
        C-5A peacetime use rate is only 1.80 hours daily.
        Since maintenance personnel could support a use rate
        as high as 3.57, we estimate that 1,995 authoriza-
        tions are not needed to support the peacetime flying
        program. The annual cost of these authorizations is
        about $19 million.
     -- The C-141 workforce could support a 3.65 aircraft use
        rate daily during peacetime, versus the fiscal year
        1977 programed aircraft use rate of 3.24. As a result,
        710 authorizations costing abouc $7 million annually
        are not needed for the planned peacetime workload.

     We used peacetime man-hour availability and the fiscal
year 1977 programed aircraft use rate to compute ;anpower
requirements, and compared them with MAC's fiscal year 1977
authorizations. This comparison shows that the computed
wartime authorizations exceed planned peacetime needs by
2,988 positions. These authorizations cost about $28 million

Alternatives for reducing manpower requirements

     As previously explained, some of the basic factors used
in the manpower determination process appear questionable and
manpower costs may be overstated. These factors should be
reviewed and updated to accurately reflect manpower needs.
Furthermore, other factors not currently considered should be
included in the mannower equations.

     The aircr- t u   rate should be reviewed to   determine
whether it can be achieved and maintained during   a sustained
wartime environment. As explained on page 25, a    10-hour use
rate may not be possible; consequently, manpower   requirements
should be based on reasonable use rates.
     The number of aircraft available for operations may be
less than what is planned. Is it reasonable to assume
234 C-141s and 70 C-5As will be available for operations at
the beginning of and throughout a prolonged wartime period?
We realize MAC has additional aircraft that can be used during
wartime, but it is totally unrealistic to believe that all
304 aircraft will always be flyable during wartime operations.
     Productivity factors influence manpower requirements,
and they should be based on current data and adequately docu-
mented. MAC's 60-percent productivity factor should be re-
viewed, and the differences in wartime and peacetime produc-
tivity should be recognized.
     Many officials believe reported maintenance man-hour data
is overstated. It could also be understated. The accuracy
of the reported data should be thoroughly reviewed and appro-
priate controls established so that man-hour expenditures
are properly reported.

     Deferred maintenance, wartime surge capabilities, ad
combat attrition tend to reduce manpower needs during war-
time, but the equations do not include these factors.   MAC
should determine reasonable weights to assign these  factors
and the equations should be adjusted accordingly.
     Increased use of reservists
     could reduce peacetime
     manning requirements

     MAC has an Associate Reserve program under which reserve
maintenance units are co-located with active duty squadrons.
The reserves use equipment and facilities assigned to active
duty units and fly and maintain active-force aircraft. The

program has been successful and it has inherent economical
and operational advantages.

     MAC lans to use Associate Reserves to augment active
forces during wartime, and they are expected to support a
considerable art of the wartime flying program. However,
we believe the rle of the Associate Reserve program could
be expanded and )Jacetime manning requirements reduced with-
out degrading wartime capabilities.

     As previously explained, some manpower authorizations
were not nesded to support the programed peacetime flying
program. Consequently, it may be possible to assign the
excess manpower to the Associate Reserves and staff active
duty squadrons only for peacetime operations.  This approach
would significantly reduce manpower costs and, at the same
time, allow MAC to maintain the needed wartime capability.

     SAC's basic missions are to develop and maintain the
operational capability needed to conduct strategic warfare
according to emergency war orders, perform peacetime train-
ing missions in support of alert commitments, and conduct
combat missions as required during conventional warfare.

     SAC operates and maintains B-52 bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and reconnaissance aircraft. SAC is also
the Air Force's single manager for air refueling operations,
and, therefore, operates and maintains a fleet of KC-135
Maintenance manpower determination process

     SAC determines maintenance manpower requirements by de-
veloping statistical standards for each job center within the
maintenance complex. The standards are used to compute man-
power requirements for peacetime operations and are derived
from measured maintenance man-hours and related workload

     SAC's manpower standards development process includes
three phases:  (1) reliminary--planning the study, (2) meas-
urement--conducting the study, and (3) computation--computing
the standard.

     Preliminary phase

     The preliminary phase consists of learninc the job
center functions, formulating a measurement plan, and pre-
paring for the measurement phase.  x management engineering
team is designated as the lead team to conduct and coordinate
the review. The lea.d team reviews the job center's functions,
documents the job categories and tasks performed, and develops
a detailed work center description. Specific installatiors
are then selected for review, and input teams are tasked to
perform the review at these locations.  ,ie were told seven or
eight installations are usually reviewed, but detailed ques-
tionnaires are sent to all SAC units.

    Measurement phase
     The measurement phase includes measuring the time workers
use to do required tasks and relating this data to variable
workloads. Generally, man-hours are measured by operational
audit, which consists of interviewing supervisors and workers
and analyzing workload data. Various measurement techniques
are used to determine the frequency of specific job tasks and
the time required to accomplish each task. The frequency and
accomplishment time for each task identified in the work cern-
ter description is measured and converted to monthly man-hours.
    Computation phase
     The computation phase iltcludes analyzing and reviewing
the data gathered during the measurement phase and performng
various tests with different workload factors and statistical
     The man-hour data is reviewed and job categories and
tasks are analyzed. The accomplishment times and frequencies
for each job category and task are compared to determine the
degree of variance. If a significant variance is identified,
the appropriate input team remeasures the data and explains
why the variance occurred.
     Rank correlation is then used to test the statistical
relationship between measured man-hours and potential work-
load factors. Also, the potential workload factors are
subjected to various statistical tests, such as standard
error estimate, coefficient of determination, and correla-
tion coefficient to determine which factor has the highest
degree of relatability. In many cases, aircraft sorties
and/or flight hours are selected as the appropriate workload

     The optimal statistical relationship between measured
man-hours and workloads is determined by correlation and re-
gression analysis. Regression analysis is used to determine
the relationship between workload factors and man-hours, and
correlation analysis tests the validity of this relationship.
Consequently, the resulting equation relates manpower require-
ments to rogramable workload factors, such as base popula-
tion, sorties, or.flying hours.

     The following basic assumptions are used in SAC's man-
power determination process:

     -- Systematically developed statistical standards should
        be used for determining manpower requirements.

     -- Manpower standards should be based on measured man-
        hours and related workload factors.
     -- Increased man-hour availability_ can be relied upon to
        support increased maintenance requirements during
     --Man-hour data from the Air Force's Maintenance Data
       Collection system is iaccurate and should not be
       used to compute manpower requirements..
     -- Productive direct man-hour availability should be
        measured, as opposed to using a standard productivity
        factor for all work centers.

Assessment of SAC's manpower
determination process

     We reviewed SAC's standards development process and
evaluated the assumptions, statistical tests, and models
used to develop the standards. We concluded that SAC's man-
power determination process is based upon accepted measure-
ment techniques and analyses, is statistically valid, and
produces generally reasonable estimates of the minimum main-
tenance staffing levels required to meet stated requirements.

      Each Air Force command has developed its own process for
determining   ircraft maintenance manpower requirements, and
these metids are considerably dissimilar. TAC and MAC base
their manp er requirements on sustained wartime operations,
while SAC c    utes manpower based on peacetime needs.

     Some of the basic assumptions used in the TAC and MAC
manpower systems appear questionable, and their manpower re-
quirements may be considerably overstated.  In contrast, the
basic assumptions used in SAC's manpower determination method
appear reasonable.
     We believe TAC and MAC should review their manpower
determination methods and use accurate and reasonable fac-
tors to arrive at their manpower needs.  Furthermore, each of
these commands should consider placing greater reliance upon
reservists as a means for reducing peacetime manpower require-
ments without degrading wartime capabilities.


     We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force require
TAC and MAC to:
     -- Review and evaluate the assumptions used in the man-
        power determination process.
     -- Use accurate, reasonable, and supportable factors in
        all manpower computations.
     -- Use all pertinent factors when computing manpower
     -- Evaluate the feasibility of relying upon reservists
        for the additional manpower needed during wartime and
        reduce peacetime manning requirements accordingly.

                          CHAPTER 4



     In July 1976 the active Army had over 9,000 air raft and
22,000 personnel directly performing aircraft maintenance be-
low the depot level, plus an undetermined number of irdirect
maintenance support personnel.   The system to determine man-
power requirements was basically a manual system using man--
power formulas.   Some factors used in these formulas were
outdated or inaccurate, raising a serious question about the
aviation maintenance manpower required in the Army.   Further-
more, the Army could possibly reduce maintenance manpower re-
quirements almost $20 million by using individual reservists
to fill certain positions beyond peacetime requirements with-
out degradinig a unit's ability to respond to wartime needs.


     The Army has traditionally used three levels of air-
craft maintenance below the depot.   Organizational maintenance
is the lowest, least complex form of maintenance, and is gen-
erally performed on the flight line.   It includes work such
as pre- and postflight inspection, changing tires, and clean-
ing the aircraft.  Direct support is an intermediate mainte-
nance level and includes repairing, removing, and replacing
aircraft components and subsystems.   The repair work is done
in shops and on the aircraft by deployable units attached to
Army divisions or Corps.  The highest maintenance level below
the depot is general support.  General support maintenance
is done in shops and includes maintenance such as major air-
frame structural repair, which is beyond the direct support
capability.  General support maintenance may be done by
both deployable and nondeployable units.

     The application of the various levels of maintenance
depends on the number of aircraft assigned to a unit.  (See
fig. 2.)  Maintenance for units with less than 10 aircraft
is traditionally structured in three below-depot levels.
For units with 10 or more aircraft, however, the traditional
structure is modified by combining organizational maintenance
and part of direct support maintenance.  This level is called
integrated direct support maintenance and is performed by
the aircraft using unit.

     In 1975 the Army restructured   its below-depot maintenance
from three to two levels (see fig.   2) to enhance availability

                                     UNDER DIFFERENT CONCEPTS

                                                   Tetal amount of
                                                maintenance performnned
                                                     below aepet

                                             TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES

                            orgamizational                 direct support          general support
                            malitnace                      maintenance              maintenance


                              IndividIl diret support
10 or Aner                           alinnt s      r            direct              general
  aircraft ar~~~~ircraftteac
                        (fomwly orrmilUtieal d pArt of         support
                                                              maintenance           support
                        direct tupert)

Less t     10
           1an              %rezatienal                  direct support          general support
  aircraft                  maintenance                   maintenance             maintenance

                                    TWO LEVELS BELOW DEPOT CONCEPT

 10 Or me                 aviai unit maintenance                aviation intermediate
  lircraft                                                           maintenance
                      t erly individual direct support
                      fai                                   (formerly part of direct and             Part of former
                      maintenance)                           general support)                        general support
Less tI II           aviation uit maintenance        aviation intrnmediate maintenance               transfened to
   iferaft           (ftmorly orgnizatinal       (formnnerly direct & part of general                the depot level
                     pmintenance)                 support maintenance)

                                                      FIGURE 2.

and operational readiness of Army aircraft by accomplishing
maintenance at the level where it can be most effectively and
economically performed. Army officials believed the two
level stLucture--aviation unit maintenance and aviation inter-
mediate maintenance--would enhance component repair capabil-
ity at lower levels, decrease maintenance downtime, and re-
sult in more efficient use of personnel.  However, the
otructu-e which will be implemented worldwide on a phased
basis has been adopted only for certain units in overseas
commands and has caused an increase in manpower requirements.
Also, worldwide implementation will eliminate certain units.

     Army manpower requirements are reflected in tables of
distribution and allowances for garrison-type units and
tables of organization and equipment for deployable combat
and combat support units. The garrison-type units are
staffed at current productivity levels as determined by
manpower surveys conducted by major commands at approximately
3-year intervals. Therefore, we did not include them in our
     A table of organization and equipment describes the
unit's mission and establishes a standard organization in-
cluding personnel and equipment requirements. However,
major commands may modify it to meet specific and/or unique
needs of individual units. For example, a unit may have
unique equipment for a specific mission or it may be required
to operate in a distinctly different climate or environment.
     The number of aircraft mechanics and technicians in a
unit is determined by using formulas s   n in manpower au-
thorization criteria (MACRIT) published in Army regulations.
MACRIT also includes most of the quantitative factors needed
for the formulas. The formulas used for organizational, di-
rect support, and general support maintenance requirements

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     The MACRIT used as the basis for determining manpower
requirements was outdated. The flying hour factor was
higher than that specified in the current worst expected
wartime scenario. Although we did not fully evaluate all
other MACRIT factors, we obtained evidence showing that the
validity of some of these other factors was highly question-
able. We believe potential exists for more accurately
termining aircraft maintenance personnel requirements by
updating the factors used in MACRIT to reflect current ex-
perience and wartime planning.
MACRIT factors are outdated

     The MACRIT used to develop manpower requirements should
contain factors reflecting recent experience and current
expectations for wartime to provide equitable and economical
allocation of maintenance personnel. Consequently, the
requires MACRIT to be updated at least every 3 years. At
the time of our review, the MACRIT was over 6 years old.

Flying hour factor

     The monthly flying hour factor in MACRIT greatly in-
fluences manpower requirements. If excessive flying hours
are used in the manpower formula, requirements will be
overstated. The monthly flying hours were derived from a
1967 Army study based on Vietnam experience. However, the
current wrst wartime scenario requires less flying hours
than those reflected in the 1967 study and used to compute
manpower requirements.

     A 1976 study to determine current flying hour require-
ments was being evaluated by the Army. Since the evalua-
tion was still in process at the time of our review, offi-
cials could not specify when or if the revised flying hours
would be incorporated into MACRIT.

     Maintenance man-hours
     per flyinghur
     We believe the maintenance man-hours per flying hour
factor should be computed using actual maintenance man-
hours and flying hours experienced in the same time period.
However, when computing the maintenance man-hour per flying
hour factor used in MACRIT, actual maintenance man-hours
for 1970 and proposed time flying hours for 1967 ,Iie used.
We did not evaluate the impact of using such dissimilar data,

but we believe the use of 1970 flying hours would provide a
more accurate and realistic factor.

     In addition, the 1970 maintenance man-hours used in
the maintenance man-hour per flying hour computation were
distorted because maintenance man-hours experienced for a
specific aircraft model were used as the standard for all
models despite differences in requirements for each model.
For example, maintenance man-hours for the CH47A helicopter
were used as the standard for the CH47B and CH47C. As il-
lustrated in the following table, there were distinct dif-
ferences in maintenance man-hour requirements for each model
presented in the 1970 MACRIT.
          Annual Maintenance Man-hour Requirements Per
          Aircraft Based on Reported Maintenance Hours

              Organizational   Direct support   General support
Model           maintenance     maintenance       maintenance

CH47A             8,946              7,548           5,523
CH47B             0,661              5,876           4,518
CH47C             7,942              8,652           6,220

     Further, actual maintenance man-hours used in the for-
mula appear unreliable because of inconsistencies in the
data being recorded and reported by maintenance activities.
For example, some aircraft maintenance units may not report
maintenance man-hour data at all, while thers may report
their total available maintenance time rather than the time
actually worked. This may result in both overstated and
understated direct maintenance man-hours.
     Also, indirect productive tim:e (which consists of that
part of the maintenance man-hours used for such things as
awaiting parts, setting up test equipment, and going to
and from the work area) was arbitrarily established as 40
percent of the direct productive time rather than being
based on actual needs for individual aircraft maintenance
units. A 1975 Army study concluded that indirect produc-
tive time was more closely related to unit type, location,
environment, organization, and administrative procedures,
than to the direct productive time used to perform speci-
fic tasks.

        Density of aircraft
     To Determine the staffing needed for a direct or gen-
eral support maintenance unit, it is necessary to know how
many aircraft the unit is designed to support. However,

the number of aircraft was unknown and/or unidentified for
some Army units. In these instances, an estimate is used

     Generally, the Army does not know whether the combined
capability of nondivisional direct and general support main-
tenance units meets the capacity required to support the
total number of nondivisional aircraft. Army officials
stated that a study was in process to determine if the di-
rect and general support maintenance capacity is excessive.

     Productive man-hours per month
     The productive man-hours per month factor as set forth
in MACRIT and used in the manpower requirements formula
should represent an aircraft maintenance unit's total direct
maintenance time available. The lower this factor the
higher the maintenance manpower requirement.

     When determining the productive man-hours per month
factor, a unit movement percentage was used to adjust the
total man-hours available for nonproductive time expected
to be spent while a unit is deploying. Unit movement per-
centages used to determine the productive man-hours per
month factor were developed in the early 1960s, before Army
aviation assumed its current combat role. The factors vary
between 7 and 25 percent of a unit's total available man-
hours, depending on how the unit will be used in combat.

      Army officials did not know whether the present unit
movement percentages accurately reflected current needs.
They believed, however, that the ability to move units is
greatel today because helicopters are used extensively.
Also, they said a study of unit movement percentages was
in process and the results were expected sometime in fiscal
year 1977.

     Army regulations stipulate that aircraft maintenance
manpower requirements for all deployable units should be
computed and staffed based on the maximum planned maintenance
needs during sustained wartime, regardless of the units' ex-
pected use during the early stages of war. T    Army, how-
ever, does not expect to deploy all aircraft maintenance
units during the first 30 days of war. We believe using in-
dividual reservists to fill positions beyond current

peacetime requirements offers potential for reducing the
number of active personnel.

Use of individual reservists
     Considering mission and readiness requirements, the
Army established deployment times for individual aircraft
maintenance support units and using units with 10 or more
aircraft. Based on this information, some maintenance man-
power was not required to deploy during the first 30 days
of war. Therefore, individual reservists could be used to
fill these later deploying positions and the cost for active
duty personnel could be reduced about $20 million. This
reduction is the estimated difference in pay and allowances
for active duty personnel filling the later deploying spaces
on a full-time basis and reserve personnel filling them on
a "when actually training" basis. It does not consider dif-
ferences in fringe benefits.
     Conceptually, individual reservists may be used to
fill positions not required during the first 30 days of
war by integrating them directly into active Army units. The
reservist could do his monthly and annual training in his
assigned active unit, working side-by-side with active Army
personnel. The reservist could fill an authorized position
in the active unit on a part-time basis during peacetime
but, if the unit should deploy during wartime, the reservist
could fill the position full time. The reservist may be
assigned to a reserve element for administrative control or
be placed under the direct administrative control of the ac-
tive command or unit.
     *The Army is already applying this concept with full
reserve units. One objective of the Army's Affiliation Pro-
gram is to improve response and deployment capability of
selected reserve units so that the Army can meet mobiliza-
tion contingency requirements. This program uses smaller
reserve units to fill out larger active units.   For example,
a normal Army infantry division consists of three brigades
made up of active personnel, but, under the Affiliation
Program, one brigade may consist totally of reserve units.

     This staffing concept is being tested in a military
intelligence unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The test
studied the feasibility of using reservists to fill criti-
cally needed skills in the active unit. One-half of the
reservists are located in the Fort Bragg area and do their
monthly reserve and annual active duty training by working

directly with their active duty counterparts at Fort Bragg.
The other half, located in small groups in the Eastern United
States, do their monthly training at local reserve centers and
their annual training working directly with their active duty
counterparts at Fort Bragg. The reservists are included in
evaluations of the active units' proficiency and readiness.
Test results had not been compiled at the time of our review,
but Army officials involved in the test believe the concept
is viable, although recruiting, funding, and command and con-
trol problems surfaced during the test.


     The quantitative factors in the MACRIT which were used
to determine manpower requirements were outdated. The flying
hours factor was higher than that currently expected in the
worst wartime scenario. Also, other factors were based on
experience in 1970 or before and may not reflect current
needs. The accuracy of the maintenance man-hours per flying
hour factor was questionable, the aircraft density factor for
certain units was unknown, and the unit movement percentage
appeared unrealistic.

     The Army's present practice is to staff deployable air-
craft maintenance units for wartime operations. As an al-
ternative, it may be practicable to use reservists to fill
out those units not immediately required for deployment.
This could result in a reduction in manpower requirements
of almost $20 million without degrading the active unit's
ability to respond to wartime needs. (See ch. 6 for infor-
mation on reserves.)

     We recommend the Secretary of the Army require the ap-
propriate Army commands to:

     -- Use accurate and timely data to develop the quantita-
        tive actors used in aircraft maintenance manpower
        requirements computations.
    -- Explore opportunities for incorporating individual re-
       servists into active units to fill manpower positions
       beyond those needed for immediate deployment are
       provide for their use for periods beyond the initial
       30 days of war.

                          CHAPTER 5


                     DETERMINATION    SYSTEMS

     Two approaches can be used in reviewing the Navy's
aircraft maintenance manpower requirements.  One is to
accept the current organizational structure and determine
whether manpower levels are adequately determined for that
organizational scheme.  The other is to focus on the struc-
ture itself and determine whether any organizational changes
could be made to reduce manpower without sacrificing defense

     The following discussion pertains to the Navy's systems
for determining aircraft maintenance personnel requirements
under their current structure.  Later in the chapter (see
p. 51) we discuss alternative organizational structures which
could reduce maintenance manpower requirements.


     As of August 1976 the Navy had an authorized strength of
over 6U,000 military personnel to perform below-depot-level
maintenance and indirect maintenance support on the more
than 6,000 aircraft in the Navy.

     The Navy has 13 active aircraft carriers, each of which
has a specific air wing asigned to it.   An air wing consists
of a specified mix of aircraft types.  The mix varies slightly
among wings to suit the suport capability of their assigned
carriers.  The aircraft mix includes several squadrons of
fighter, attack, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and
helicopter aircraft.

     The Navy also has numerous land-based naval air stations
(NAS).  These air stations support nondeployed carrier air-
craft, land based aircraft, and transient aircraft.

     Navy below-depot aircraft maintenance is done on two
levels--organizational and intermediate level.

     Organizational level maintenance is done by personnel
assigned to the individual operating aircraft.  For example,
an attack squadron of 12 A7E aircraft has 158 enlisted per-
sonnel assigned to do organizational level maintenance.
These people work only on that squadron's aircraft and travel
with the squadron when it deploys.

     Organizational maintenance personnel ray also be assigned
to support nonoperational groups such as NA organizational
maintenance departments, refresher training squadrons, train-
ing commands, and various special purpos- squadrons--all
possessing their own aircraft or support .-ansient aircraft
belonging to others.

     Tasks assigned to these units include inspecting; serv-
icing and lubricating equipment; and adjusting, rem ving, and
replacing parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies.   More
complex work is usually forwarded to intermediate level

     Intermediate level maintenance is done at consolidated
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMD).  There
is normally only one AIMD at each air station and aboard each
aircraft carrier.  They typically support a number of aircraft
squadrons or other organizational activities and a variety of
aircraft types and models. Assigned work includes calibrating,
repairing, or replacing damaged or unserviceable parts, com-
ponents, or assemblies; modifying material; and providing
technical assistance to user organizations.

     Both shore-based and carrier-based intermediate main-
tenance departments have an assigned nucleus maintenance
crew. The nucleus crews are augmented by intermediate
level maintenance personnel which are temporarily assigned
from each squadron or other organizational activity that
is being supported by AIMD.

      In other words, organizational activities have both
organizational level and intermediate level maintenance per-
sonnel.   The organizational level personnel physically stay
with their activity, while the intermediate level personnel
are detached to work with the nucleus crew at whatever AIMD
is providing support.   Athough the intermediate level people
are identified with their organizational activity and deploy
when it deploys, they are always in temporary assignment to
an AIMD.


     Manpower requirements for organizational and intermediate
aircraft maintenance have historically been evaluated by man-
power survey teams.  These teams periodically visited each
maintenance activity, or a representative squadron for an
aircraft type, and made detailed workload measurements.
Techniques used included interviews, work sampling measure-
ments, and audits of records.

     The Navy recognized that manpower requirements could not
be determined consistently using manpower surveys because
they involved differing human judgments. Further, consider-
able manpower was needed to staff survey teams, and mission
or organizational changes required time-consuming and expen-
sive new surveys. Finally, the survey method could not pre-
dict workloads under varying projected operating conditions,
and was, therefore, only applicable to the current situation.
     Due to these problems the Navy developed a new, systematic
approach for determining manpower requirements.
     The new approach uses regression analysis to determine
the relationship  between workload and various workload factors
based on statistics of past performance. For example, main-
tenance man-hours required for a given aircraft can be related
in an algebraic formula (or equation) to flying hours. Once
this relationship is determined, workloads for a number of
projected operating conditions can be reasonably predicted.
     The Navy has completed development of the regression
method for organizational level activities, and plans by
October 1, 1977, to have applied the method to determine
wartime manpower requirements to all aircraft squadrons.
A similar approach has been developed for intermediate level
activities, but as of January 1, 1977, the approach had not
yet been approved for use.
Organizational level activities
     Wartime requirements
     The organizational (or squadron) level methodology keys
on three basic types of information Maintenance and Materiel
Management (3-M) system data, / given wartime operating
factors, and detailed manpower survey measurements known as
operational audits.
     The 3-M system data includes preventive and corrective
maintenance man-hours. Prevention (or scheduled) maintenance
is directly related to operating factors such as flight hours,

i/Refers to the Navy Maintenance and Materiel Management
  System. This system includes a procedure for collecting
  data on all maintenance work performed (Maintenance Data
  Collection System) and a procedure for specifying preven-
  tive maintenance to be performed (Preventive Maintenance

sorties, and calendar time. Preventive maintenance can,
therefore, be predicted for any given set of wartime or
peacetime operating factors.   Corrective (or unscheduled)
maintenance is precipit; .ed by aircraft or support equipment
malfunctions, so the amo:nt that will be needed is not as
easily predicted. However, by using corrective maintenance
hours recorded in the 3-M system as input to statistical
regression analysis, the Navy has been able to develop pre-
dictive equations--by aircraft type--to relate Navy-wide
reported maintenance hours directly to historical eacetime
flight hours. Hence, total maintenance hours required for
a particular projected flight hour program can be calculated.
The total hours can then be prorated to each work center ac-
cording to the historical workload ratio derived from the
3-M data.
     Anticipated wartime operating factors are published for
each squadron type based on "at sea, at war" requirements.
These published factors for monthly flight hours, sortie
lengths, operational days per week, readiness, and number of
aircraft per squadron are used in the manpower calculations.

     Detailed operational audits are used to establish those
regression analysis data bases which cannot be extracted from
the 3-M system. Examples include the data bases needed to
compute allowance factors for indirect productive time (such
as supervision, administrative work, cleanup, and putaway
time), nonproductive time (such as awaiting parts and work
stoppages due to sea conditions), and nonavailable time (such
as leave, sick call, and training).
     After the squadron manpower documents are computed, a
survey team visits the squadron to (1) verify the various
workload factors and computed manpower needs with squadron
personnel and (2) identify any variations required by special
circumstances. Following this visit, appropriate changes
are made and the document is submitted to the squadron's
type and fleet commanders 1/ for review and comment. Un-
resolved differences between these commands and the survey
teams are resolved by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Manpower.

l/Commanders, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic and Pacific, and
  Commanders in Chief, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

     Peacetime requirements
     Although it could do so by substituting peacetime factors
for wartime factors, the Navy has not used its new system to
compute maintenance personnel needed to meet its peacetime
workload requirements. Since peacetime deployed aircraft
squadrons are assigned a forward strike force mission, the
Navy believes the wartime manpower requirements outlined in
the squadron manpower documents are appropriate for both
peace and war.
     Nevertheless, the authorized manpower level for squadrons
is generally less than the wartime level computed-for the
squadron manpower documents. This difference in levels is
due to congressional funding restrictions. Some differences
are large and others small. A P-3C squadron, for example,
is authorized only 286 of the 365 positions required for war-
time staffing, while an A-7E squadron is-authorized 229 of
the 241 positions required for full wartime staffing.
     The differences between total wartime requirements and
congressional funding levels are distributed by the Navy
among squadrons during an annual "respread conference." The
conference is attendee by representatives from the type and
fleet commanders and various representatives from appropriate
Chief of Naval Operations offices. These officials use a
combination of judgment and negotiation to decide how the
personnel shortages will be allocated among the various ac-
     Navy officials said'they recognize that the respread
conference has shortcomings and, that in the near future,
they intend to use their manpower determination methods,
with peacetime factors, as an adjunct or replacement for the
respread conference.
Assessment of the Navy's manpower
determination system--organizational level
     The Navy's new regression analysis procedure for deter-
mining organization level manpower needs appears to be a
major improvement over prior methods. Overall reliability
of the procedure, however, may be somewhat limited because
     -- depends on historical direct labor hour data of
        questionable accuracy and

     -- does not recognize and allow for aircraft combat
        attrition, deferred maintenance, and other maintenance
        limiting factors.
     Data accuracy is questionable
     The new regression analysis procedure depends heavily
on historical data accumulated through the Navy's 3-M data
collection system. As pointed out in our earlier report on
productivity of below-depot maintenance activities, the
accuracy of labor hour charges reported in the 3-M system
was not adequately controlled, labor hour charges were not
compared to engineered labor standards to test their reason-
ableness, and it was questionable whether managers had a
reasonable basis for determining how many personnel were
needed to satisfy maintenance requirements.

     Navy officials said during the current review that the
3-M data collection system errors tend to be offsetting
and, since the new manpower determination procedure uses
Navy-wide summary data for each aircraft type, overall data
accuracy is reasonably assured. They also said that their
manpower teams attempt to validate 3-M data during their
onsite visits and added that other efforts are continuously
underway to attempt to improve the quality of 3-M system
reporting. While Navy officials concede there re till
problems with 3-M data, they believe their adjustments and
validatisns do improve data quality. They also believe that
an automated, online data collection system, which is being
developed for implementation in 1979, will further improve
the acuracy of 3-M data.

     Aircraft attrition, deferred
     maintenance, and other
     maintenance limiting factors
     are not considered
      The Navy's maintenance manpower determination system
assumes that enough organization level maintenance people must
be available on the first day of war to support each and every
active aircraft operating at its forecasted wartime flying

     It appears that some aircraft may not be available to
operate at the forecasted wartime rate on the first day of
war and for some time thereafter. For example:

    -- An average of two or more aircraft carriers are always
       in a state of limited availability because they are
       undergoing repairs or major overhauls.

    -- One or more aircraft carriers, along with their
       assigned aircraft and rews, are always stationed at
       their home ports, far from a probable theatre of
     Also, during a war some aircraft will be lost or damaged
and some routine maintenance tasks will be deferred.
     However, the above factors are not considered in defin-
ing wartime operating factors for input to the manpower de-
termination system, although they should have an impact on
total organizational maintenance requirements.
Intermediate level activities
    Wartime requirements
     Navy staffing documents specify both peacetime-and war-
time requirements for intermediate level maintenance activi-
ties. For example, the manpower authorization document for
NAS offett Field shows a 75-percent increase (from 153 to
267) in AIMD nucleus personnel for mobilization. NAS Lemoore's
document also shows a 75-percent increase. Navy officials,
however, were unable to explain how the mobilization increases
were derived or what assumptions they might include.
     Apparently, these mobilization requirements were calculated
several years ago based on certain war and mobilization assump-
tions. From that time on the numbers were apparently "passed
down the line" to succeeding responsible officers and the
rationale behind the calculations was lost.
     Several Navy officials speculated that the wartime levels
were calculated by simply extending peacetime operations from
a two to a three shift operation. 'ether headquarters nor
subordinate command officials could satisfactorily explain
why the workload at shore-based intermediate activities would
expand 75 percent in wartime, when presumably many squadrons
would be deployed, leaving fewer aircraft to support. Some
said that flying rates of remaining aircraft would increase
and that reserve aircraft would replace some deployed air-
craft, but could offer no specific information about these
changing wourkloads.
     The Navy believes that implementing the new intermediate
level manpower determination system which includes specific
definitions of activities' peacetime and wartime missions and
operating factors, should resolve uncertainties about mobiliza-
tion requirements. This new system is discussed in the follow-
ing section.
     Peacetime requirements

     Currently stated peacetime requirements for intermediate
aircraft maintenance were originally determined by the old
manpower survey method. The last of these surveys was done
about 1971, when the Navy abandoned them to concentrate ef-
forts on developing new methods. Manpower requirements have
since been updated as necessary through a process of discus-
sions and negotiation among naval station commanding officers
and their superiors up to the Chief of Naval Operations level.
     The Navy has deve'oped a new method for computing peace-
time intermediate level requirements, but it has not yet been
approved for implementation. For now, the method uses regres-
sion analysis to relate recent historical workload data (from
the 3-M system) to the number of aircraft supported by type
and model for shore-based AIMD's and to the number of aircraft
supported and flyi   hours for ship-based AIMDs. For shore-
based AIMDs, the proposed method correlates workload with
numbers of aircraft rather than flying hours, because a re-
liable correlation between workload and flying hours could
not be established. This approach is acceptable in the Navy's
view because changes to work week length could be used to
offset any disparities between workload and manpower caused
by lack of precision in estimating manpower requirements.
Assessment of the Navy's manpower
system--intermediate level

     The manpower survey method, n which current manpower
levels are based, has certain shortcomings which the Navy
has recognized. The proposed new method has not yet been
officially approved or implemented and, although it appears
to promise some improvement, it also has some potential short-

     The survey method cannot
     predict wartime needs

     Intermediate level manpower requirement calculations are
based on manpower surveys. When made, these surveys measured
only the workload and manpower requirements at the time of
the survey. Consequently, this method could not predict war-
time needs.

    Current requirements
    may be overstated

     In one of our previous reports (see footnote on p. 22),
we concluded that productivity at intermediate level facili-
ties was low, indicating that intermediate level facilities
may be overstaffed.
     Officials at the Navy Manpower and Material Analysis
Center, Atlantic, who were responsible for developing the
new manpower determination methods, said that based on
their observations they also believed that intermediate
activities are overstaffed. They believed that the new
methods, once implemented, would show a need for fewer

     Since current peacetime manpower requirements were
essentially determined by manpower surveys, these observations
indicate the old system was inadequate to determine manpower
     Although we could not determine how -'rrently stated
wartime requirements (mobilization manpoweL spaces) were
predicted they also appear to be questionable.
     The stated wartime requirements have not been updated
recently and appear to be based on judgmental factors. Since
there is no obvious reason to believe workloads at stateside
intermediate maintenance departments would increase, especially
as much as 75 percent (see p. 47), and ro justification for
mobilization requirements can be   ven, we believe these re-
quirements are overstated.
     Data accuracy in the proposed
     method is questionable
     The proposed method relies heavily on 3-M system data.
Therefore, it should have the same data accuracy problem as
discussed in the analysis of the organizational level methods.
     The proposed method may not be
     able to predict wartime needs
     at shore-based AIMDs

     The proposed method does not relate workload to flying
hours for shore-based AIMDs. Instead, it relates workload
to numbers of aircraft supported. The workload equations are
based on peacetime data which is related to peacetime flying
activity. Thus, any major changes in flying activity at the

onset of a war may invalidate the workload equations if work-
load is sensitive to flying activity. The organizational
manpower determination method supports the likelihood that
the workload is sensitive to flying hours at intermediate
activities. If this is true, the Navy may not be able to
accurately predict wartime needs for shore-based AIMDs.

     This is not a significant problem if workloads at shore-
based activities do not rise considerably in wartime. How-
ever, it is a problem if they do. Since we could not deter-
mine how workloads are affected in wartime, we do not know if
this is a major problem.
     Designing a reasonable system for determining mai      nce
manpower requirements does not, in itself, guarantee o    .1
staffing. This is because the various assumptions taken
"givens" in design of the system may influence the computed
staffing numbers to a greater extent than individual weak-
nesses in the actual system methodology.

      In this review we intended to include only an evaluation
of the staffing determination methodology used and alterna-
tives available for greater use of the reserves to meet the
computed staffing objectives. As a by-product, however, we
could not avoid gaining an increased awareness of the "givens"
and an appreciation of their restrictive impact on the develop-
ment of alternatives. Two of these givens--peacetime
programed/wartime forecasted aircraft flight activity and
maintenance organizational structure--are particularly impor-

Programed and forecasted
aircraft flight activity
     The Navy at our request used their computerized staffing
program to compute how many organization level maintenance
people would be required to support the peacetime deployed
and nondeployed aircraft flight hour rates programed for
typical A-7E and P-3C squadrons. This exercise showed fewer
maintenance people are required to support a peacetime de-
ployment situation than are required for full wartime deploy-
ment. This can be explained because a peacetime deployed
squadron operates at a lower flight rate than it would in
wartime (resulting in fewer required maintenance hours), but
the maintenance people work the longer work shifts called
for in wartime (resulting in more hours available to do the
required maintenance work).

     At the same time, this exercise also showed as many
(or more) people are required to support nondeployed squadrons
in peacetime as are required in a full wartime deployment.

     This second result may seem surprising, but can be ex-
plained by the relationship between flight hours and available
work hours. A peacetime nondeployed squadron operates at a
much lower flight rate than in wartime (resulting in much
less required maintenance), but the maintenance people
in nondeployed squadrons only work a normal peacetime
workweek rather than at a wartime workweek rate (consider-
ably reducing the number of labor hours available to satisfy

     The net result of the above--that peacetime and wartime
organization level maintenance staffing needs are about
equal--severely limits the possibilities for reducing peace-
time active duty staffing through greater reliance on re-
serves.  But opportunities for greater reliance on reserve
maintenance personnel would be greatly enhanced if

     -- there is a reduction in the squadron's programed
        peacetime flight activity and/or

     -- there is a change in the basic assumption that all
        squadrons must be able at all times to support their
        forecasted wartime flight rate.

     We are not advocating that these changes be made, but
we do want to emphasize that there are alternatives available
to the Navy through such changes. Although the system now
indicates peacetime and wartime squadron staffing requirements
are about the same, a greatly different picture is possible
if the assumptions underlying the system are altered.  We
are not satisfied that the risks of changing the system's
underlying assumptions are being adequately assessed and
routinely reviewed from both a strategic and budgetary view.

Maintenance organization structure

     The number of people required to do a job can be directly
influenced by how they are organized.  Although the Navy has
consolidated intermediate level aircraft maintenance (there
is only one AIMD at each ship and shore station) each Navy
squadron continues to be responsible for doing organizational
maintenance on only its assigned aircraft.

     We reported earlier (LCD-75-422, July 29, 1975) that this
structure (1) results in underuse of maintenance equipment

and duplication of administrative and other indirect main-
tenance personnel, (2) is inconsistent with the treatment
of intermediate maintenance and Air Force's consolidated
tre-tment of all below-depot maintenance, and (3) was found
to be the inferior approach in a Navy study of the potential
for organizing all below-depot maintenance under a consolidated
wing approach similar to the Air Force's.

     The Navy has not adopted a consolidated wing approach,
but we believe there is considerable merit for adopting this
approach.  We also believe its adoption could greatly improve
Navy's opportunities to reduce peacetime staffing and place
greater reliance on the reserves.

     For example, all the aircraft, maintenance personnel,
equipment, and aircraft at each air station could be con-
solidated (pooled) and centrally controlled.

     Not only would this arrangement take advantage of
economies of scale, but it could make available the best
personnel, equipment, and aircraft for each deployment and,
if combined with a reduction in peacetime nondeployed flight
hours, it could reduce the total size of the maintenance per-
sonnel pool needed.  The reduction in active duty personnel
could then be offset by greater reliance on reserve personnel
to round out the total complement within a reasonable time
after commencement of hostilities.

     Certainly, there are many variables that would have to
be considered.  However, the benefits are potentially large,
so for this reason each of the variables should be adequately
assessed and the concept given a fair test.

     Another organizational structure change that can be
explored is the practice of having a specific air wing at-
tached to each aircraft carrier.  Since at least two carriers
are normally in shipyard overhaul (and hence unavailable for
combat for at least 30 days), it may be possible to place
one or more wings in reserve status.  The remaining wings
would rotate among the operational carriers.

     Navy officials said they have considered this alterna-
tive and concluded it is not viable because (1) wings use
ship overhaul time for training and for transition to new
aircraft, (2) not all carriers have the same aircraft support
capabilities, and (3) time in deployed status for remaining
wings would increase beyond reasonable levels.

     While these arguments may be valid, the Navy could not
provide us any specific studies of the matter. In terms of
deployed status, we compared the availability of 10 pairs
of A-7E squadrons with the 5-year deployment schedules of
the Navy's 12 1/ aircraft carriers and found that the 20
squadrons could be rotated to meet all deployment schedules
and still have a reasonable amount of time between deploy-

     We perceive weaknesses in the Navy's system for deter-
mining organization level maintenance staffing because of:

     -- The Navy's existing maintenance structure.

     -- The Navy premise that it must be prepared at all times
        to support immediate use of all aircraft at full wartime
     -- 3-M data accuracy problems noted.

     The potential inaccuracies in the 3-M data cannot be
ignored.  Unless the Navy further verifies the data accuracy:
it is questionable if the system reasonably predicts manpower
needs. The sar? conclusion about data accuracy can be made
for intermediate level maintenance staffing requirements.

     The Navy has not adequately identified AIMD wartime work-
load factors. Without this information about AIMD wartime
support requirements, it is not possible to assess whether
the proposed intermediate manpower determination methods will
work, whether AIMD wartime requirements are more or less than
peacetime, and whether the reserves can play a role in augment-
ing the AIMD wartime needs.

     The currently stated AIMD mobilization requirements appear
to have no solid justification and, therefore, are extremely

     If it is desired to reduce numbers of active personnel
and increase the role of individual reservists in augmenting
the remaining active organizations, then sonip parameters

l/The Navy will have only 12 aircraft carriers in the near

(such as flying rates) or the maintenance structure will have
to change.  For example, it appears that only by reducing
peacetime flying rates can the peacetime manpower require-
ments be reduced below wartime requirements under the current
structure and, thus, open a role for reservists.
     Other reductions in active personnel might occur with a
restructuring of the maintenance organization. For example,
changing to a maintenance wing concept may make more efficient
use of maintenance personnel.
     If the maintenance structure is changed, both the organiza-
tional and intermediate level manpower requirements determination
methods will have to be revised to accommodate the new

     We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy:

     -- Assess the accuracy of the 3-M system data and make
        appropriate adjustments to manpower requirements if
        a significant error exists.
     -- Evaluate AIMD wartime aircraft support missions and
        accordingly reevaluate AIMD mobilization requirements
        and their impact on the need for reserve forces to
        augment AIMDs.

     -- Evaluate alternative maintenance structures.
     -- Evaluate the potential of transfering some active
        squadrons, with aircraft common to all wings, to the
        reserve, and rotating the remaining active squadrons
        among the wings to meet deployment commitments.

     -- Evaluate the effect of aircraft attrition, deferred
        maintenance, and the fac. that not all aircraft will
        be deployed immediately in a war on the total wartime
        maintenance force required and on mobilization planning.

                          CHAPTER 6


     Greater use of the reserve forces has been a subject of
increasing concern in recent years. The growing size of
defense manpower costs was instrumental in the evolvement of
a total force concept to provide greater use of reserve com-
ponents in the event of oLtlization.    Better use of reserve
components could presumaoly reduce the requirentent for full
time active military for,.,s and, thus, hold down manpower
costs in peacetime since reserve forces cost considerably
less than active forces.
     The services have taken action to implement the total
force concept and effect greater use of the reserve forces.
The reserves have been assigned and have assumed greater
responsibilities in the event of full mobilization. This
has undoubtedly relieved the active forces of certain re-
quirements and helped to hold the line on increasing de-
fense manpower costs. At the same time, most of the serv-
ices' efforts have been designed to merely use the reserve
forces to supplement existing active forces during mobiliza-
tion, thereby providing a greater defense capability earl er
in the mobilization of forces.
     Little, if any, of their efforts have resulted in size-
able reductions in the size of active forces in peace'    and
particularly in the area of aviation maintenance.  Whie we
believe there is considerable potential for further effecting
reductions in active force peacetime levels through greater
use of reserve forces, we recognize there are a number of
problems which must be addressed before such a move could be

     There have been a number of studies recently completed
concerning the use and effectiveness of reserves as part of
the total force.
     --The Department of Defense study, "The Guard and Re-
       serve in the Total Force," published in 1975, dealt
       with such key issues as (1) identifying essential
       missions within the capabilities of the reserves,
        (2) improving readiness and training of reserve
        forces, (3) integrating reserve units into war plans,
        (4) manning reserve units, which are scheduled to

      deploy early, at       her level than other reserve
      units, and  (5) in,    ting the planning and manage-
      ment of active  and irserve  omponent forces into a
      coherent whole, thus simplying the transition from
      normal peacetime operations to operation of a single
      force after mobilization.
     --The Defense Manpower Commission's report to the
       President and the Congress, published in 1976, high-
       lighted many of the problems facing the reserve
       forces, such as (1) sizing the reserve components to
       meet mobilization requirements for augmenting active
       forces, (2) assuring the readiness of reserve units
       scheduled to be deployed in the event of mobilization,
       (3) providing adequate active forces to upgrade train-
       ing of reserve components, (4) providing :ecruiting
       incentives to improve potential prospects for meeting
       recruiting requirements, and (5) developing compre-
       hensive plans that will serve to avert a major short-
       fall in reserve accessions induced by unfavorable
       conditions of supply or demand.

     --We reported in January 1970 (B-148167) and again in
       October 1975 (LCD-75-402) on problems causing a low
       readiness posture in the reserve forces. Major problem
       areas in the reserve forces involved equipment short-
       ages anC inadequacies, personnel and skill imbalances,
       and training deficiencies. Another of our reports
       (FPCD-75-169), dated March 5, 1976, dealt with improv-
       ing the effectiveness and efficiency of recruiting.

These studies and the resulting initiatives are indications of
the concern exopessed for and attention directed to many of
the problems connected with reserves.
     There seems little doubt that problems still exist, par-
ticularly recruiting and maintaining reserves with the skills
necessary to assure an adequate defense capability. There-
fore, we do not have much assurance that the reserves offer
the immediate answer to reducing active force maintenance
manpower levels. However, these problems are being addressed
3nd we believe can be solved or alleviated with appropriate
attention.  For example, the Office of the eputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) is perif.rming a study
of the Reserve Compensation System. The major objective is
to select and recommend the compensation system that will
best enable the country to develop and maintain the reserve
force structure for effective future mission performance.

     We also believe the programs discussed in the following
section provide an indication of how reserves might be used
more effectively.
     While much has been written about greater use of reserve
forces, actual programs for this matter and, more specifi-
cally, the maintenance area have been rather limited.
      One program which has been in operation within the
Military Airlift Command specifically addresses greater use
of reserves in the maintenance function. This program--
Associate Reserve Program--shares some of the problems that
have been addressed earlier in this chapter.      At the same
time,  it offers the  potential for  greater use  of the re-
serves and further   demonstrates that  many of  the  problems
can Le overcome once management    is dedicated  to  the concept.

     Reserve personnel in this program train with and use
the operational equipment of an associated active unit.   This
provides personnel cost savings because the reserve unit has
a smaller management structure.  Further, no costs are in-
curred to provide or maintain additional reserve equipment.
The Associate Program provides the required manpower capa-
bility which the active force lacks. The need to fill this
shortfall has encouraged active force support for the pro-
gram. No active force reductions have resulted from the
program. However, we believe some excess peacetime mainte-
nance manpower is present. The program's success indicates
that a shift of excess peacetime manpower to the reserve
forces could reduce total costs without sacrificing combat
     The Associate Program accomplishes many desirable objec-
tives for augmenting aircraft maintenance capability.
     -- It provides people who are familiar with the specific
        aircraft to be maintained.
     -- Reservists have an existing personal relationship with
        the active personnel with whom they would mobiiize.

     -- Reservists know the specific rocedures used by the
        unit to which they are assigned.

     -- Reservists are productive both in peacetime and upon

We do not mean to imply that the Associate Program is the
only way to obtain these objectives, but all programs should
strive for similar objectives.

     The Air Force is also testing a program within the
Tactical Air Command which augments the active force with
individual reservists. Augmentation with individual re-
servists is a different approach than that of the Associate
Program, whici uses whole reserve units, complete with their
own support personnel, to augment active units. This pro-
gram promises, if successful, even more cost savings than
the Military Airlift Command Associate Program because in-
dividuals are responsible to and receive support from the
active command rather than the reserve command. This ar-
rangement reduces personnel required in the reserves.


      DOD, through more effective use of reserve's, has an
opportunity to reduce peacetime maintenance personnel costs.
The Air Force Associate Program highlights this potential.
However, serious problems with the effectiveness and avail-
ability of reserve personnel deter managers from completely
taking advantage of this potential.

APPENDIX I                                                                             APPENDIX I

                JO L. MFCLh     A_.. CHOMW
    m_    IS. MAUN.eW WAI      NILIA ms.   US           .

  SAE W. MG U.     m.            A        W    SIE ,    ASSU

  MIE    MIMILW.   M.L         ""    0.                          June 2,   1976

        T'MAS            shington,            D.       C.

                         Dear Mr. Stasts:

                                   Two recent reports by the General Accounting Office on
                         Aerial Port staffing (LCD-75-219, LCD-76-211) have been quite helpful
                         to the Committee in analyzing personnel requirements at certain
                         Force installations.  They have  also raised a question concerning
                         the peacetime staffing requirements of other Department of Defense
                         support activities, in particular, the staffing at be.ori-depot-level
                         maintenance facilities.

                                   Your reports on below-depot-level activities (LCD-75-422,
                         LCD-75-401) have identified problem areas, including lack of productivity
                         and potential overstaffing. It would be very helpful to the Committee
                         if the GAO could perform a follow-on review of below-depot-level
                         maintenance facilities staffing to ascertain the following:

                                   1. For the activities selected, ascertain whether
                         peacetime manning standards or other systematic ways of computing
                         peacetime manning requirements exist. If so, are they relatively
                         uniform service-to-service?

                                    2. Utilizing the peacetime manning standards (or other
                         criteria) ascertain how many personnel are required to meet

                                    3. Ascertain current manpower authorizations      Itthese

                                   4. Compare current manpower authorizations with the
                         peacetime manning criteria and standards.

                                              5. Explain any significant variances.

APPENDIX I                                                                APPENDIX I

              6. Ascertain how the Services develop   he manpower needs
    for these same activities for a ,.wvle mission.

              7. Has the Department of Defense (or the Military Services)
    ever examined the possibility of placing the manpower authorizations
    that are in excess of peacetime requirements in the Reserve components?

                  A.   If so, what were the results and conclusions.

                   B. If not, what would be the feasibility of placing
              the manpower authorizations in excess of peacetime requirements
              in the Reserve components? Would it be practical to
              create "associate': maintenance units that could, like existing
              associate flying units, train on the actual equipment they
              would be maintaining in wartime?

              8.  If the personnel authorizations in excess of peacetime
    requirements were placed in the Reserves, would there be a direct
    one-for-one reduction in active forces and increase in reserve forces
    strength? If not, what would be a recommended approach to this matter?

              9.  If the above sugeastion is considered to be feasible,
    what would be the estinated annual cost saving from shifting the
    personnel to the Reserves?

             10. Would it be feasible to obtain the necessary personnel
    in a reserve states (i.e., would there be recruitilg and retention

             11. Would the reserve units thereby created he able to
    respond rapidly to DoD's requirements in the event of mobilization or
    utilization without mobilization (e.g.,under the authority of PL 94-286,
    an Act which permits the President to call up to 50,000 reservists
    involuntarily without declaring a national emergency)?

             12. What would be a feasible time period from activation of
    these maintenance units until they could be available? (Aerial Port
    squadrons, the Committee was advised, have consistently met a 72-hour
    activation criteria in their readiness inspections.)

              13. Would it be feasible and advisable to consider differential
    readiness criteria; that is, having certain critical early-required
    units meet more rapid activation standards than units that are less
    critical, and for the latter, wouldn't the reserve concept be particu-
    larly suited?

              If the An could examine the above questions in connection
    with aircraft maintenance activities in all of the Servics, it would

APPENDIX I                                                               APPENDIX I

     be most helpful to the Committee. If the results indicate that the
     proposal outlined above would be cost effective, the Committee may
     consider requesting examination of other types of maintenance activities.

                A study of this type obviously will require some time to
     accomplish. It would be most helpful if the omittee could obtain a
     final report not later than June 1977.   It would also be appreciated
     if GAO would provide the Committee staff with a progress report in
     November 1976 and early February 1977.

               The Committee staff has discussed this request with Mr.
     Grosshans of the Logistics and Communications Division.

                With kind regards, I am


                                     John L. McClellan

     JLM: ljm

XPPENDIX II                                            APPENDIX Ii

                      PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS


                                             Tenure of office
                                             From          To
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    Dr. Harold Brown                   Jan.     1977   Present
    Donala . Rumsfeld                  Nov.     1975   Jan.  1977
    James R. Schlesinger               July     1973   Nov. 1975
    William P. Clements, Jr.
      (acting)                        Apr.     1973    July   1973
    Charles W. Duncan, Jr.            Jan.     1977    Present
    William P. Clei!  :s, Jr.         Jan.     1973    Jan.  1977
    Dale R. Babione (acting)          Jan.     1977    Present
    Frank A. Shrontz                  Feb.     1976    Jan. 1977
    John J. Bennett (acting)          Mar.     1975    Feb.  1976
    Arthur I. Mendolia                June     1973    Mar.  1975
    Carl W. Clewlow                   Jan. 1977        Present
    William K. Brehm                  Sept. 1973       Jan. 1977
    Carl W. Clewlow (acting)          June 1973        Aug.  1973
   Fred P. Wacker                     Sept. 1976       Present
   Terence E. McClary                 June  1973       Aug.  1976
                     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
    Clifford Alexander                Feb.     1977    Present
   Martin R. Hoffman                  Aug.     1975    Jan.   1977
   Howard H. Callaway                 July     1973    Aug    1975

APPENDIX II                                           APPENDIX II

                                        Tenure of office
                                        From          To

                  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (cont.)

    Vacant                           Jan.   1977      Present
    Norman R. Augustine              May    1975      Jan.  1977
    Vacant                           Apr.   1975      May   1975
    Herman R. Staudt                 Oct.   1973      Apr.  1975

    Edwin Greiner (acting)           Jan.   1977      Present
    Harold L. Brownman               Oct.   1974      Dec.  1976
    Edwin Greiner                    Aug.   1974      Oct. 1974
    Edwin Greiner (acting)           May    1974      Aug.  1974
    Vincent P. Huggard (acting)      Apr.   1973      May   1974

    Paul Phillips (acting)           Jan.   1977      Present
    Donald G. Brotzman               Mar.   1975      Jan.  1977
    M. David Lowe                    Feb.   1974      Jan.  1975
    Carl S. Wallace                  Mar.   1973      Jan.  1974

    Hadlai A Hull                    Mar.     1.973    Present

    Lt. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom      July     1974     Present
    Lt. Gen. E.M. Flanagan, Jr.      Jan.     1973     July 1974

                     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

    W. Graham Claytor, Jr.           Feb.     1977     Present
    Gary D. Penisten (acting)        Feb.     1977     Feb.   1977
    Joseph T. McCullum               Feb.     1977     Feb.   1977
    David R. MacDonald               Jan.     1977     Feb.   1977
    J. William Middendorf            June     1974     Jan.   1977
    J. William Middendorf (acting)   Apr.     1974     June 1974
    John W. Warner (acting)          May      1972     Apr.   1974

APPENDIX II                                          APPENDIX II

                                        Tenure of office
                                        From          To
                     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (cont.)
    R. James Woolsey                 Mar.    1977    Present
    Vacant                           Feb.    1977    Mar.  1977
    David R. MacDonald               Sept.   1976    Feb. 1977
    John Bowers (acting)             July    1976    Aug.  1976
    Vacant                           Mar.    1.976   June 1976
    David S. Potter                  Aug.    1974    Mar.  1976
    Vacant                           June    1974    Aug. 1974
    J. William Middendorf            June    1973    June 1974
    Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.          Sept. 1973      Present
    James E. Johnson                 June 1971       Sept. 1973
    Gary D. Penisten                 Oct.    1974    Present
    Vacant                           May     1974    Oct. 1974
    Robert D. Nesen                  May     1972    May   1974

                   DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
    John C. Stetson                  Apr.    1977    Present
    John C. Stetson (acting)         Jan.    1977    Apr.  1977
    Thomas C. Reed                   Jan.    1976    Jan.  1977
    James W. Plummer (acting)        Nov.    1975    Jan.  1976
    Dr. John L. McLucas              July    1973    Nov. 1975
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)       Feb.    1977    Present
    Hon. J. Gordon Kapp              Mar.    1976    Jan. 1977
    Frank A. Shrontz                 Oct.    1973    Feb.  1976
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)       Aug.    1973    Oct.  1973
    Lewis E. Turner                  Jan.    1973    Aug.  1973

APPENDIX II                                          APPENDIX II

                                            Tenure of office
                                            From          To

                 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (cont.)

    James P. Goode (acting)          Jan.     1977    Present
    Nita Ashcraft                    Aug.     1976    Jan.  1977
    James P. Goode (acting)          July     1976    Aug.  1976
    David P. Taylor                  June     1974    July 1976
    James P. Goode (acting)          June     1973    June 1974

    Everett T. Keech                 Sept.    1976    Present
    Francis Hughes                   Mar.     1976    Sept. 1976
    Arnold G. Bueter (acting)        Aug.     1975    Mar.  1976
    William W. Woodruff              Apr.     1973    July 1975

    Lt. Gen. Charles G. Buckingham   Sept. 1975       Present
    Lt. Gen. J. R. DeLuca            Oct. 1973        Sept. 1975
    Lt. Gen. D. L. Crow              Apr.  1969       Oct.   1973