oversight

The Navy Depot Level Aircraft Maintenance Program--Is There a Serious Backlog?

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-09-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                            DOCUMENT RES U   E    W
03588 -   [AZ493619   (   .. DQ_
                               _       S.             /2
The Navy Depot level Aircraft Maintenance Program--Is There a
Serious Backlog? LCD-77-432;  -133014. September 1, 1977. 46 pp.
+ 4 appendices (9 pp.).
Report to Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Senate Committee on
Appropriations; by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General.
Issue Area: Facilities and Material Management: Supply and
    Maintenance Operations Repcrting Systems (703); Military
    Preparedness Plans: Logistic Support Planning for Major
    Equipment (801).
Contact: Logistics and Communications Div.
Budget Function: National Defense: Department of Defense -
    Military (except procurement   contracts) (051).
Organizaticn Concerned: Department of the Navy; Department of
    the Air Furce.
Congressional Relevance: Senate Committee on Appropriations.

         The Navy projected a backlog of depot level airraft
maintenance for the end of fiscal years 1976 and 1977 consisting
mainly of airframes and repairable components. Essentially, the
airframe requirement is not urgent. With improvements in the
Navy's maintenance programs, some f which are in progress, this
backlog is eing reduced as the equipment is needed. The Air
Force did not have a depot backlog. Findings/Conclusions:
Factors contri' uting to the difference between the Navy's and
the Air Force's aircraft maintenance backlogs are: (1) he Navy
schedules airframrs into the depots more frequently than the Air
Force; and (2) the Navy has not ully funded the depot level
aircraft maintenance worklcad since 1970. The Navy's intezval
between depct visits is chosen relatively arbitrarily and has
remained fairly static. The services' criteria for computing the
backlog figures also differ. Reccmmendations: The Secretary of
Defense should: require the Air Force and Navy to establish
commcn criteria fcr determining when an aircraft should receive
depot level maintenance; require that only aircraft actually in
need of depot work be reported as an unfunded backlog
requirement; require the Navy tc resolve the problems
contributing to the lengthy order-to-shipment times; and require
the Air Force and Navy to eliminate, as much as possible, the
differences in terms and acronyms used in their operational
readiness reportirg systems. (Author/SC)
*lKZTRtTIC"              -      -et   t                   .
                                                   briob*ll"   . ou, .   .   "'--   -
AcCOunii"Z Ofl"                                      oxf nots"O,~
                                                         lebmt·e
bY the Cttqie of Cons                 re      "
                                                  1 "'

      REPORTC TO THE SENATE
      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIA TONS
      BY THE COMPTR(OLLER GENERAL
      OF THE UNITED STA 7'ES
                                                         //.




                   -   '-=',-             C



      Tle Navy Depot Level
      Arcraft Maintenance Program-
      Is There A Serious Backlog?
     Department of the Navy


     The Navy projects a backlog of depot level
     aircraft maintenaice for the end cf fiscal
     years 1976 and 1977, consisting mainly of air
     frames and rep.airable components. Essential
     Iv, the airframe requirement is not urgent.
     With improvements in te Navy's mainten
     anme programs, some of which are in progress,
     this backlog is being reduc,d as the equip
     menrt ;s ;ieeded.

     Some additional funding could apparently be
     used to repair components. However, until
     management ceficiericies :e:,  corrected, it
     would be difficult to dete mine how much
     fundinq this program should eceive.




      LCD 77 4'2
                                                                     SEPTEMBER 1, 1977
                COMPTROLLER OENERAL OF THE UNITED STAT
                          WASHINGTON. D.C. oUn




B--133014



The Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

     This report presents information on the Department of
the Navy's depot level aircraft repair program, in response
to your August 2, 1976, request.  The operations of this pro-
gram affect the Navyls fund na requirements and the
                                                    reported
end of fiscal years 1976 and 1977 backlog of maintenance.,

     Essentially, most of the backlog of depot level airframe
maintenance is not a current priority requirement.
                                                     With im-
provements in the Navy's programs, some of which are
                                                      in prog-
ress, this backlog is being r duced as the equipment
                                                      is needed.
Some additional funding could  pparently be used in the com-
ponent repair progam.   However, until management deficien-
cies are corrected, it would be difficult to determine
                                                        how
much funding this program should receive and what impact
                                                          it
would ave on readiness.

     As requested, we briefed the Committee on the results
of our review. We discussed this report with Department
                                                         of
the Navy officials, but as your office directed, we did
                                                        not
obtain written comments.

     This report contains recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force
pages 34 and 46.                                          on
                  As you know, section 236 of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the hea6 of a Federal
agency to submit a written statement on actions taken
recommendations to the House Committee on Government on our
                                                      Opera-
tions, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
                                                      and the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.
8-133014


     As arranged with your office, we will distribute this
report to the Department of Defense and the interested com-
mittees 7 days after the date of the report. At that time
we will also make copies available to other interested
parties upon request,

                                 Si.nc   ely yours,



                                 Comptroller General
                                 of the United States




                             2
 COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT          THE NAVY DEPOT LEVEL
 TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE               AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM--
 ON APPROPRIATIONS                     IS THERE A SERIOUS BACKLOG?
                                       Department of the Navy
              DIGEST

              In its fiscal year 1977 appropriation re-
              quests, the Navy said that it had a $121.8
              mil'ion backlog of aircraft maintenance
              work and that repairs would be delayed be-
              yond fiscal year 1976 because of insuffi-
              cient funds. The Air Force said it did
              not have a depot backlog.
              The Senate Committee on Appropriations re-
              quested GAO to:
              -- Review differences in the Navy and Air
                 Force maintenance criteria and utiliza-
                 tion rates and determine what impact they
                 have on the depot backlog of maintenance.
                 (See cn. 2.)

              -- Analyze the Navy's reported backlog of
                 aircraft depot maintenance as of June 30,
                 1976.  (See ch. 3.)
              The Committee was also concerned that the
              Navy's operational readiness rates were
              lower than the Air Force rates and the
              Navy's own operational readiness goals.
              However, despite the depot maintenance
              backlog and a declining operational readi-
              ness rate, the Navy indicated that its
              fleet aircraft were meeting their opera-
              tional commitment.

              The Committee asked GAO also to (1) de-
              termine what the Navy and Air Force rates
              have been and why there are differences
              and (2) assess what impact the unfunded
              backlog of depot level aircraft mainte-
              nance is having on the operational readi-
              ness rate.  (See ch. 4.)



Taar   h.   Upon removal, the report
cover date should be noted hereon.                         LCD-77-432
MAINTENANCE PRACTICES
THAT CAUSE THE BACKLOG
Many factors contribute to the difference
between the Navy's and the Air Force's air-
craft maintenance backlogs. GAO did not
look at all factors but limited its work to
those specifically questioned by the Senate
Committee on Appropriations. Important fac-
tors contributing to the Navy's airframe
backlog re that
-- the Navy schedules airframes into the de-
   pots more frequently than the Air Force
   and
-- the Navy has not fully funded the depot
   level aircraft maintenance workload since
   1970.
The Navy's interval between depot visits is
chosen relatively arbitrarily and has re-
mained fairly static. The interval is chosen
soon after design, when very little reli-
ability data is available, and it is slowly,
if ever, changed. In contrast, Air Force
planes are initially maintained under a pro-
gram aimed at determining whether periodic
depot work will be necessary and, if so,
what the interval should be.   (See . 9.)
The services' criteria for computing the
backlog figures also differ. Navy a rcraft
are considered to be in a maintenance back-
log on the day the planned operating in-
terval has passed and the plane should had
been taken into the depot. The Air Force,
however, does not consider its aircraft
to be in a backlog until 3 months after
its planned operating interval and depot
induction date have passed.   (See p. 12.)
The services generally believe that, as
flying hours increase greatly, maintenance
requirements also tend to increase and
operational readiness rates will be af-
fected. However, other variables also


                     ii
            enter the picaure, and exactly what impact dif-
            ferent utilization rates have on maintenance
            and readiness is not known. (See . 13.)
            THE NAVY BACKLOG
            In the fiscal year 1977 budget presentation,
            the Navy reported an unfunded requirement of
            $121.8 million at the end of fiscal year 1976
            to do depot level maintenance on an estimated
            825 aircraft. GAO feels that the airframe
            backlog repair requiremetW is not urgent. Of
            the estimated 825 aircra . in the backlog,
            540 were scheduled for storage or were unavail-
            able for depot maintenance because of opera-
            tional commitments, uch as being on carriers
            far from the depots or being ud   in research
            and development projects.

            In addition, the backlog was not all airframe
            repairs. A breakdown of the backlog re-
            vealed the following details.  (See p. 20.)
                                          (millions)
               Engineering support          $ 2.8
               Engine repair                   6.4
               Airframe maintenance on
                 285 units                    47.3
               Component repair               41.3
                   Total                    $121.8
            OPERATIONAL READINESS
            Both the Navy and Air Force have reporting
            systems to keep management informed of the
            operational status of their aircraft. Air-
            craft are classified as either operationally
            ready or not operationally ready.  (See
            p. 36.)
            Operational readiness rates are often thought
            of as indicating combat readiness, but this
            is not completely true.  These rates indi-
            cate only equipment materiel condition,
            whereas combat readiness must also consider
            availability of personnel and other factors.
            Further, operational readiness rates give
            only an immediate picture of the aircraft

Jear Shee                       iii
condition. They do not forecast what the
condition will be tomorrow or 5 days from
tomorrow. Thus, a unit can have a favor-
able operational readiness rate and still
not be ready for combat. (See p. 38.)

During fiscal years 1972-76, the Navy
operational readiness rates averaged about
60 percent and the Air Force rates aver-
aged about 70 percent. The Navy's rate,
which is below its goal, is the result of
the logistics system problems the Navy is
having in getting equisitions processed
quickly and nces-3r- re-irs done on com-
ponents before they are needed.
In June 1976 the Navy operational readi-
ness rate was 56 percent, and the Air Force
was reporting 69 percent of its aircraft
in operational units as ready to perform
at least one of their primary missions.
(See p. 40.)
The differences between the Navy's and Air
Force's aircraft reporting systems and
between their equipment and missions de-
tract from the value of comparisons of
their readiness rates.  (See p. 41.)
it is not possible to say how much of the
differences between readiness rates is
caused by differences in the reporting
systems and how much indicates that one
service is doing a better job in maintain-
ing its aircraft.
In 19'7 the Ar Force directed a multi-
service committee to identify the dif-
ferences between the services' reporting
systems and to recommend changes to stand-
ardize the systems. The committee
concluded that the differences were ot
particularly great but suggested some
actions to require more uniformity in
operational readiness reporting.  (See
p. 41.)




                     iv
            CONCLUSIONS
            There are differences in the Navy ad Air
            Force maintenance programs which have a di-
            rect effect on the fact that the Navy has a
            backlog of airframe maintenance and the
            Air Force does not.
            the Navy schedules its airfr-.,es Lor main-
            tenance more frequently, has r.t fully
            funded the maintenance workload, and is
            very cautious in changing the frequency
            of maintenance. The Navy criterion for
            including aircraft in the backlog is
            rigid, whereas te Air Force allows its
            maintenance planners some flexibility
            before listing an aircraft in a mainte-
            nance backlog.
            Tne Navy has also adopted a practice of
            inspecting its aircraft and extending
            their use beyond the depot maintenance
            due ate when the inspections conclude
            the aircraft is still capable of meet-
            ing its mission requirements for another
            3 months. Such aircraft, however, re-
            main in the Navy's depot maintenance
            backlog.
            Through management actions to implement
            the new reliability-centered aintenance
            concept and to lengthen the interval
            between performance of depot level main-
            tenance, the maintenance backlog should
            be reduced.
            Concerning the compone.lt backlog, addi-
            tional funds have been programed into
            this area by the Navy in fiscal years
            1975 and 1977.  However, the Navy is
            still not able to repair all its com-
            ponents until they are needed.
            The Navy believes additional funds are
            necessary to reduce the component main-
            tenance backlog and improve the shelf-
            stock position of these components.

            However, GAO found no evidence that in-
            creased funding would improve the Navy's

Jear Slee                         ,v
not operational because of   sup'ly   -:-7,
(See p. 33.)
GAO questions whether additional funds
should be put into the component repair
program until all reasonable efforts have
been made to correct management deficien-
cies, which delay ordering and shipping
materials, and a better assessment can be
made as to how much funding this program
should receive.
Concerning the engines and engineering
support backlogs, the Navy has acted
to eliminate these requirements because
they are not high-priority items.
GAO believes that the differences in the
materiel readiness reporting systems of
the Navy and Air Force must be eliminated.
If this were done, comparisons of the
services' operational readiness rates
would be more useful indicators of which
service is better supporting its aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The Secretary of Defense should:
-- Require the Air Force and Navy to es-
   tablish common criteria for determin-
   ing when an aircraft should receive
   depot level maintenance and require that
   only aircraft actually in need of depot
   work be reported as an unfunded backlog
   requirement. (See p. 34.)
-- Require the Navy to resolve the problems
   contributing to the lengthy order-to-
   shipment times.  (See p. 34.)
-- Require the Air Force and Navy to eli-
   minate, as much as possible, the differ-
   ences in terms and acronyms used in their
   oearational readiness reporting systems.
   (See p. 46.)
As directed by the Committee, GAO discussed
this report with Department of the Navy
officials but did not obtain written comments.


                     vi
                       C o n t e n t s

                                                       Page
DIGEST                                                   i
CHAPTER

   1       INTRODUCTION                                 1
               Scope of review                          3
   2       DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
             PRACTICES AND UTILIZATION RATES AND THE
             EFFECT ON THE DEPOT BACKLOG                4
               Maintenance practices                    6
               Comparison of Navy and Air Force
                 utilization of F-4 and A-7
                 aircraft                               13
               Conclusions                              16
   3       ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY'S BACKLOG OF DEPOT
             LEVEL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE                 19
               Engineering support                      20
               Engines                                  21
               Airframes                                21
               Components                               26
               Management actions needed to improve
                 operational readiness                  30
               Conclusions                              33
               Recommendations                          34
   4       WHAT IS OPERATIONAL READINESS?               35
               OR reporting systems                     36
               Can the services' OR rates be
                 compared?                              41
               Conclusions                              45
               Recommendation                           46
APPENDIX

   I       Aircraft rework and maintenance program
             airframe backlog (extensions)              47
  II       GAO reports on related subjects              48
 III       Chronology of events pertaining to
             revision of F-4 aircraft maintenance
             intervals                                  50
                                                         Page

APPENDIX

     IV    Principal officials responsible for
             administering activities discussed in
             this report                                   53
                         ABBREVIATIONS

ASO        Aviation Supply Office

CLAMP      closed loop aeronautical management program
DOD        Department of Defense

GAO        General Accounting Office
MESL       mission essential subsystem listing
NAVAIR     Naval Air Systems Command
NORM       not operationally ready due to maintenance
NORS       not operationally ready due to supply
OR         operational readiness
                          CHAPTER 1

                         INTRODUCTION
     The objective of the Department of Defense's (DOD's)
annual $6 billion aircraft maintenance program is to sustain
enough aircraft in good operating condition to meet current
requirements.

     The Department of the Navy has an inventory of about
7,000 aircraft in the Regular Navy, the Marine Corps, and
the Reserves. This inventory includes fighter, attack, anti-
submarine, patrol, warning, transport, refueler, observation,
training, and rotary wing aircraft. Generally about 5,000
aircraft are in operational units, 800 are in various stages
of depot repair, and 1,200 are in storage or on loan to other
activities. The Department of the Navy spends about $1.3 bil-
lion annually at the organizational, intermediate, and depot
level maintenance facilities to maintain its aircraft.

     About half of the aircraft maintenance expenditures are
for standard depot level maintenance.  In fiscal year 1976
and 1977, the Navy depot program was budgeted at $637.5 and
$722.3 million, respectively. The $84.8 million increase in
fiscal year 1977 is for pay raises and repair of a greater
number of engines and components. About 80 percent of this
budget is used in the naval aircraft rework facilities, and
20 percent is to pay for contracting with private industry
for depot level aircraft maintenance.

     In March 1976 the Navy reported thiit at the end of fiscal
year 1976 it would need an additional $121.8 million to do
depot level maintenance on 825 aircraft. The Navy claimed it
has delayed doing this unfunded work because its budgets since
fiscal year 1970 did not provide sufficient funds.

     Whereas the Navy reported a backlog of aircraft depot
maintenance, the Air Force said it did not have a backlog in
its inventory of 9,000 aircraft.  Its depot program is
funded at about $1.2 billion per year.

     Further, the Air Force was reported to have a higher
operational readiness (OR) rate for its aircraft. For
fiscal years 1972-76 the Air Force averaged 70 percent and
the Navy 60 percent. The OR rate indicates the percentage
of the aircraft in operational units that are ready to
perform at least one of their primary missions.




                              1
     Despite the apparent need for aircraft repairs and a
declining OR rate, the Navy has said that its fleet aircraft
have met their operational commitments with a sortie comple-
tion rate of about 90 percent.

     The Senate Committee on Appropriations was concerned
about the adequacy of the funding for the Navy's aircraft
depot maintenance program.  The specific questions the Com-
mittee requested us to answer were:

     -- Are there any differences in maintenance criteria be-
        tween similar aircraft (such as the F-4 and A-7) in
        the Air Force and the Navy?  Why are the criteria
        different?  Is DOD planning to standardize the
        criteria?  If not, why not?

    -- How do utilization rates of similar Air Force and Navy
       aircraft (for example, F-4, A-7, etc.) compare?  These
       comparisons should consider at least the following
       measures of utilization rates:

         -- Hours per month per unit equipment aircraft.

         -- Hours per month per total number of aircraft of
            that type in the inventory.

         -- Hours per month per   crew.

    --What are the implications of different utilization
      rates and different aircraft status reporting criteria?

    -- What is the Navy's support for the 621 aircraft on
       maintenance extension at the end of fiscal year 1976?

    -- What is the Navy's projection of aircraft on maintenance
       extension for the end of fiscal year 1977, and how is
       this supported?

    --What are the current not operationally ready due to
      supply (NORS) and not operationally ready due to
      maintenance (NORM) rates being experienced by the Navy?

    -- How do these rates compare with those of the Air Force,
       and to what extent are any differences attributable to
       reporting criteria?  Why are the criteria different?
       Is DOD planning to standardize the criteria?  If not,
       why not?




                              2
     -- In connection with DOD's OR criteria, how and why do
        the Air Force and Navy criteria for aircraft in
        "reportable" and "nonreportable" status differ?
        Please provide comparisons for all Air Force/Navy simi-
        lar aircraft (for example, F-4, A-7, and helicopters).
SCOPE OF REVIEW

     We made our review at the DOD offices responsible for
aircraft maintenance and readiness reporting policy and at
various Departments of the Navy and the Air Force headquarters
and field activities involved in the aircraft budget, opera-
tions, and maintenance. The specific activities are:

     -- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
        Installations and Logistics, Washington, D.C.

     -- Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washinc   n, D.C.
     -- Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare),
        Washington, D.C.
     -- Naval Mterial Command, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

     -- Naval Air Systems Command, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

     -- Na al Air Systems Command Represencative, Atlantic,
        Norfolk, Va.

     --Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and
       Logistics, Washington, D.C.
     -- Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Hampton, Va.

     -- Navy Aviation Supply Office   ASO), Philadelphia, Pa.
     --Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia Beach, Va.

     Our report contains figures obtained from various Navy
and Air orce automated data processing reporting systems.
These systems are a large, complex, integral part of the
services' operations and we did not evaluate the reliability
of the data coming from them.




                              3
                          CHAPTER 2

      DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

            AND UTILIZATION RATES AND THE EFFECT

                    ON THE DEPOT BACKLOG

     There are differences between the Navy's and Air Force's
scheduled maintenance programs and utilization rates for
comparable aircraft.  Differences in maintenance prcgram
factors, such as the frequency at which depot maintenance is
desired, greatly affect the maintenance backlog.  Also,
utilization can affect both maintenance workload and opera-
tional readiness rates; however, the direct relationship is
not clear.

     The Senate Appropriations Committee's questions about
the services' maintenance programs and utilization of air-
craft were:

     --Are there any differences in maintenance criteria
       between similar aircraft (such as the F-4 and A-7)    in
       the Air Force and the Navy? Why are the criteria
       different?  Is DOD planning to standardize the
       criteria?  If not, why not?

     -- How do utilization rates of similar Air Force and
        Navy aircraft (for example, F-4, A-7, etc.) compare?
        These comparisons should consider at least the following
        measures of utilization rates?

          -- Hours per month per unit equipment aircraft.

          -- Hours per month per total number of aircraft of
             that type in the inventory.

          -- Hours per month per crew.

     -- What are the implications of different utilization rates
        and different aircraft status reporting criteria?

     We observed differences between the Navy and Air Force
maintenance programs that account for the fact that the Navy
has a backlog of depot level maintenance and the Air Force does
not.  For example, the Navy schedules its aircraft for depot
level maintenance more frequently than does the Air Force.
The Navy schedules its F-4s for  epot maintenance every 36
months, compared to the Air Force's interval of 48 months.
Further, since 1970 the Navy has not fully funded the depot


                               4
level maintenance workload. As     result, there is a backlog
of depot work.  (See p. 10.)
     The Office of the Secretary of Defense is not directly
involved in establishing the frequency of depot maintenance.
This function is delegated to the services as part of their
program of developing and maintaining the equipment they iind
necessary to fulfill their assigned missions. For example,
DOD has recently directed the services to adopt a reliability-
centered system 1/ of aircraft maintenance. However, implemen-
tation has been left up to the individual services. The DOD
aircraft maintenance policy office prefers that the services
gain some experience Inder the new concept before the develop-
ment of a DOD directive which would be more definitive about
what the reliability-centered maintenance programs, goals,
and expectations are to be.

     There was little difference between the Navy and Air
Force hours flown per month on the F-4 aircraft when we con-
sidered the entire inventory of aircraft. However, the Navy's
A-7Es were flown more than the Air Force's A-7Ds. Moreover,
when we considered only aircraft assigned to combat units,
both models of Navy aircraft were flown considerably more
than the comparable Air Force models.  (See p. 14.)
     Other variables relating to flying also affect readiness
ratings and maintenance:

     --Sortie length changes the average number of takeoffs
       and landings per hour, which affects maintenance.

     -- Level flying does not use as much of the onboard
        equipment as complex maneuvers do.

    -- Pilot experience can cause differences in maintenance
       needs.

Exactly what effect the different utilization rates have on
maintenance and readiness is not completely understood. The

1/The reliability-centered maintenance concept limits mainten-
  ance to that which is meaningful to safety, reliability,
  and economics. By analysis and data surveillance, unnecessary
  organizational and depot maintenance tasks are eliminated,
  thus reducing costs and improving safety by minimizing human
  error or part failure. It is believed Lhis concept will
  increase the interval between aircraft depot visits and
  decrease the time aircraft are in the depot.


                              5
Navy is making a study to determine the cause and effect
relationships so it can better manage its aircraft inventory.

MAINTENANCE PRACTICES
     The objective of DOD's aircraft maintenance programs is
to sustain enough operating o-rcraft to meet mission require-
ments. Both the Navy and Air Force inspect, service, repair,
and, when necessary, modify aircraft at predetermined intervals.
Such maintenance is termed "scheduled" and cntrasts with the
unscheduled maintenance done on an as-needei basis, as in the
case of crash damage repairs.

      Maintenance is also categorized as organizational, inter-
mediate, or depot, depending upon the level at which it is
done.
     -- Organizational maintenance is dine by the operating
        squadron on a day-to-dny basis to support its own
        operations. This includes servicing, preflight and
        postflight inspections, periodic inspections, and
        repairs or adjustments not requiring shop facilities.

     -- Intermediate maintenance is generally not scheduled on
        a periodic basis and is done only when repair is beyond
        the capability o capacity of the local or squadron
        level cmmands. The air stations or ships (in the
        Navy) will generally supply the necessary shop
        facilities.
     -- Depot maintenance involves major rework and supports
        lower level activities by providing technical
        assistance and doing maintenance beyond their
        capability. It is done mainly at industrial-type
        facilities and sometimes by depot field teams.
     Differences in maintenance criteria must be considered
in terms fL tche level at which the maintenance is done and
the impact on the backlog and OR rates. We observed that
organizational and intermediate maintenance practices affect
day-to-day availability of aircraft, thereby affecting OR
rates.  (See p. 7.) Depot level maintenance practices (see
p. 8) directly relate to the size of the backlog. Key issues
include
     -- length of the intervals between overhauls (see p. 9),




                              6
     -- practices relating to extending aircraft beyond
        intervals (see p. 11), and
     -- time required   o do depot work (see p. 12).
     We realize that many other factors could contribute to
the backlog, but our work concentrated on areas of specific
interest to the Senate Committee on Appropriations.

Organizational maintenance
     In addition to normal servicing and flight checks,
scheduled maintenance below the depot level involves periodic
inspections. These inspections result in many tasks that can
be done either all at one time or in segments. The intervals
between inspections can be based on either calendar time or
flight time.

     The aircraft assigned to the operating squadrons are
counted in the OR reporting systems, and for each hour they
are undergoing maintenance at the organizational level, they
are categorized as not operationally ready due to maintenance.
Maintenance practices at this level can therefore affect the
OR/NORM rates but have a less direct effect on the depot level
backlog.

     In a 1970 report, 1/ we observed that the Navy scheduled
below-depot maintenance on the basis of calendar time and had
a policy of doing all the maintenance at one time. We con-
cluded that these practices were causing Navy aircraft to remain
out of commission longer than necessary and, as a result, were
reducing the number of available aircraft.

      Since that report, the Navy has followed our recommenda-
tioi by adopting the Air Force practices of scheduling below-
depot maintenance on the basis of flight hours and using the
phased concept. The phased concept involves dividing
periodic inspections into segments that can be done during
periods when the aircraft are not scheduled to fly, thereby
reducing the time they are unavailable for day-to-day opera-
tions.

     The Navy's A-7E and the Air Force's A-7D are similar
aircraft and both are maintained under the phased concept.
The Navy schedules inspections every 75 flying hours, and


l/"Potential For Savings in Aircraft Maintenance" (B-152600,
  May 7, 1970).


                               7
six inspections constitute a complete 450-hour cycle. The
Air Force makes its A7-D inspections every 100 hours, and
three inspections constitute a complete 3 00-hour cycle. At
the end of a cycle, the periodic inspections are repeated.

     The Navy also uses the phased concept for its F-4J.
This includes inspections every 60 flying hours, with six
inspections constituting a complete 360-hour cycle. The
Navy is considering changing to a six-inspection, 480-hour
cycle, with inspections every 80 hours.

     Most Air Force aircraft are mainta:ned under the phased
concept, but the F-4E, which is similar   ) the Navy F-4J, is
an exception. At the time of our review, the Air Force
F-4E was being converted from the phased concept to periodic
inspections. Under the phased concept, the Air Force in-
spected the F-4Es after 100 flying hours, with six such
inspections constituting a 600-hour cycle. Under the peri-
odic inspection concept, the F-4E will be given an extensive
inspection of the entire aircraft after 600 flying hours.

     The effectiveness of maintenance practices at the orga-
nizational level affect the services' NORM rates. The two
services' NORM rates for fiscal years 1972-76 were about equal
at 20 to 25 percent.  (See p. 40.) The implications of this
data are that the services' organizational and intermediate
maintenance practices are having about the same impact on
the materiel readiness rates.

Depot maintenance

     Both the Navy and the Air Force have scheduled maintenance
programs that require aircraft to undergo depot rework at
certain intervals throughout their operating lives. When
aircraft are not brought into a depot at the end of an opera-
ting interval, they are said to be on extension and become part
of the maintenance backlog. Almost all Navy aircraft are
subject to this requirement. However, more than half of the
Air Force inventory does not have set intervals for depot
level maintenance. Moreover, Air Force intervals between
depot visits have general-. been longer than those for com-
parable Navy aircraft.

     The term "depot maintenance backlog" applies to (1) air-
craft that need depot maintenance regardless of time interval
and (2) those that exceed he time interval. The latter are
aircraft that have been extended in service beyond the end
of their normal depot maintenance interval because an in-
spection revealed that they do not require depot level work


                              8
to continue operating safely and reliably. The Navy's end of
fiscal year 1976 backlog includes aircraft in both categories.
(See ch. 3.)
     In contrast to aircraft undergoing organizational main-
tenance, those on depot maintenance have a less direct effect
on operational readiness because they are extra aircraft pur-
chased to fill the maintenance pipeline while most of the air-
craft inventory is assigned to operating units. The condition
of only the latter aircraft is judged and reported in the OR
reporting system. The differences in the number of aircraft
the services report in their depot maintenance backlogs are
influenced by such factors as

     -- the established time interval between depot mainten-
        ance,
    -- the services' policies for deferring scheduled depot
       maintenance, and
    -- the time required for depot rework.
Establishing the interval between
depot level maintenance visits
     Before a new model of aircraft enters the Navy's in-
ventory, it is assigned     interval based on the manufacturer's
recommendation that slr  .\, if ever, changes. A 1974 report /
by the Center for Naval   nalyses pointed out that the manul-
facturers' recommendations are usually based on the intervals
assigned to similar models, not on sound engineering data
related to the new aircraft. After the new aircraft is
accepted from the manufacturer, the Navy's Analytical Rework
Program is supposed to recommend changes in the intervals.
However, until 1974 few changes occurred as a iesult of the
program. The Center's report concluded:

    "The interval policy chosen by the Navy has been
    relatively arbitrary and rather static; that is,
    (depot) interval has been chosen soon after air-
    craft design with very little data base and then
    slowly, if ever, changed."
The chronology of events pertaining to evision of the F-4
maintenance interval shown in appendix III demonstrates how


'/"Aircraft Periodic Depot Level Maintenance Study"
   (November 1974).


                              9
long he Navy taKes to decide whether to      :tend the interval
cf an aircraft.

     In contrast, Air Force planes are not assigned a depot
interval when they first enter the inventory. Instead, they
are initially maintained under the Analytical Condition
Inspection program to determine whether periodic rework will
be required and, if so, hw often.   If an interval is assigned,
the Air Force monitors its appropriateness through its Controlled
Interval Extension program. Under this program, a selected
sample of aircraft are extended in service beyond their normal
interval to determine whether their depot intervals can be
changed.

     It should be pointed out that depot intervals are usually
based on months in service, not on flight-hours or any other
indicator of use. Consequently, aircraft become part of the
backlog when they have been in service for a given number of
months, even though their condition is judged satisfactory
to continue operating. Various studies have indicated that
maintenance requirements based on calendar time are somewhat
arbitrary and, therefore, do not accurately reflect true re-
quirements. For example, a Navy depot recently reported that
A-6 aircraft it had reworked

     "1*   * * ranged from aircraft with less time than
     two years service since last depot rework which
     are very badly degraded, to aircraft with over
     five years of service which had no major or
     critical defects requiring depot attention."

This example demonstrates that months in service is not by
itself a valid basis for determining when aircraft need depot
maintenance. In 1976 the Navy increased from 17 to 33 the
number of aircraft models that have a depot interval stated
in terms of both months in service and flying hours.

     We reviewed the services' depot intervals for two compar-
able models, the Navy's F-4J and A-7E and the Air Force's F-4E
and A-7D.  In the case of the F-4s, te Navy had a scheduled
depot interval of 36 months or 960 fligat hours, compared to
the Air Force's interval of 48 months. At the time of the
November 1974 Center for Naval Analyses report, the difference
between the services' intervals had been even greater:  30 months
for the Navy versus 4 months for the Air Force.




                               10
     In the case of the A-7s, the Navy was scheduling depot
maintenance every 30 months in 1974 and later increased the
   erval to 36 months at the time of our review. The Air
   We did not have a set interval for periodic depot visits
    its A-7s.

     The Navy contends that the effects of operating off
aircraft carriers--more structural stress and saltwater
corrosion---require that its planes receive more maintenance
than comparable Air Force planes. The scope of this review
did not permlit us to   sess the effects of the Navy and Air
Force operating environments, but the Center's report casts
doubt on the validity of the Navy's position. The report
noted that the stresses of carrier landings and takeoffs and
the corrosive effect of saltwater are quantifiable from an
engineering standpoint and that Navy aircraft are therefore
built stronger and more corrosion resistant than comparable
Air Force models. Moreover, the Navy has many non-carrier-
ha3ed aircraft for which this argument is not valid.
Extension of aircraft beyond
depot intervals

     Air Force officials have testified before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations that the Air Force has actively
pursued a policy of (1) lengthening or eliminating scheduled
depot intervals and (2) insuring that aircraft are sent to
a depot when intervals have elapsed.  In contrast, the Navy
has tended to extend aircraft beyond their scheduled
maintenance times instead of lengthening their intervals.
At any given time, as many as 10 percent of the Navy's
active operating aircraft may be on a planned extension of
their rework interval for various reasons, including un-
availability because of deployment aboard a carrier.

     The Center for Naval Analyses report concluded that
budgetary considerations can influence the Navy to grant
extensions instead of officially lengthening its depot
intervals. In the first place, the number of aircraft the
Navy is authorized to buy depends partially on anticipated
depot maintenance requirements which, in turn, are partially
based on scheduled rework intervals. Thus, the shorter the
intervals, the greater the maintenance requirements and the
more aircraft the Navy will be required to maintain in its
inventory. Secondly, there is the issue of "hard" versus
"soft" budget items. Or, as the Center's report stated:

     "'Hard' items are the ones which get approved
     and funded. They usually are those which can


                               11
     be defended by simple arithmetic and are
     keyed to authorized levels of either personnel
     or equipment. For example, i one is authorized
     1,000 aircraft and is authorized to rework them
     every two years, and each rework is standardized
     to a norm of 10,000 m-hours, then the need for
     funding 500 aircraft reworks per year for 5
     million rework man-hours is rather straight-
     forward and 'hard.' If, on the other hand, the
     Navy budget submission indicates that only some
     aircraft will require rework and this rework will
     be over a range of about 3,000 to 8,000 man-hours,
     this is a 'soft' item that is not easily defended."
     Another way that extension policies affect the depot back-
log involves exactly when a plane is classified "on extension."
The Air Force, for instance, allows its maintenance planners
to program aircraLt into a depot within 3 months of their
scheduled induction date. With this scheduling flexibility,
aircraft are not considered to be on extension until they
are more than 3 months beyono the end of their normal oper-
ating interval. Navy planes, on the other hand, are con-
sidered to be on extension the day after their operating
interval has ended. Of the more than 800 Navy aircraft on
maintenance extension at the end of fiscal year 1976, 339
(about 40 percent) would not have een so classified had
the Navy followed the Air Force criteria.

Time required for depot rework

     Much of the work to be done during a depot visit is
determined through numerous inspections after the aircraft
enters the depot and by standard depot work packages the Navy
had developed for each model. As a result, the amount of
work  -quired varies widely, even mong aircraft of the same
type, aiudel, and series.

     During fiscal years 1975 and 1976, the Navy did scheduled
depot maintenance on 107 of its 335 A-7Es. Each rework re-
quired an average of about 50 calendar days. During the same
period, scheduled depot maintenance was not required for the
Air Force's 355 A-7Ds.

     Of the Navy's 347 F-4Js, 63 required an average of about
114 calendar days each for scheduled rework in 1975-76. In
the same period, 262 of the Air Force's 615 F-4Es were reworked
at an average tme of 109 calendar days.




                             12
     The Navy's backlog of aircraft included both F-4 and A-7
aircraft. From the above data, depot turnaround times in the
Navy and Air Force maintenance facilities do not appear to
be very different.

     The services realize that their depot requirements, and
thus their backlogs, are affected by these factors. They are
adopting maintenance criteria based on reliability analysis,
which is expected to reduce the amount of depot level
maintenance required.

     Under the reliability-centered maintenance concept, only
meaningful maintenance tasks are done. By analysis and data
surveillance of items in the standard depot work packages,
new decisions are being made as to what maintenance work is
important for safety and reliability and what past tasks are
unnecessary. For example, for the Navy P-3 aircraft, the
first model to undergo this analysis, depot tasks are expected
to be reduced from 900 to 464. The result would be a reduc-
tion of 2,000 labor-hours for each aircraft processed and a
reduction of 15 days (from 51 to 36) for the depot work.

COMPARISON OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE
UTILIZATION OF F-4 AND A-7 AIRCRAFT

     We looked at the number of hours flown per month by the
Navy and Air Force F-4 and A-7 aircraft to determine if
utilization was affecting the Navy depot level maintenance
backlog.

     When we considered their entire inventories, we found
little difference in the services' utilization of comparable
F-4 models. However, the Navy's A-7Es were flown much more
than the Air Force's A-7Ds. Moreover, considering only
aircraft assigned to combat units, we found that both models
of Navy aircraft were flown much more than the comparable
Air Force models. This data is summarized in the following
table.




                             13
                Comparison of Navy and Air Force
                 Flying Hours, Flscal Year 1976

                                        Total      Flying hours
     Type of               Total        flying       per month
     aircraft            aircraft       hours      per aircraft
 Total inventory:

    F-4E (Air Force)        615        148,815         20.2
    F-4J (Navy)             347         81,035         19.5
    A-7D (Air Force)       355          86,757        20 4
    A-7E (Navy)            335         107,693        26.8
Combat units (note a):

    F-4E (Air Force)       390          97,345        20.8
    F-4J (Navy)            249          79,822        26.7
   A-7D (Air Force)        168          43,393        21.5
   A-7E (Navy)             251         106,943        35.5
a/The Air Force has F-4Es and A-7Ds assigned to training
  squadrons and A-7Ds assigned to Air National Guard units,
  resulting in a smaller percentage of the total inventory
  being available to regular combat squadrons. The Navy
  has no F-4s or A-7s assigned to training units.

     It is interesting to note that the Navy F-4J has a 36-
month/960-hour depot maintenance interval, which is consistent
with the average monthly use of about 26.7 hours. At June
1976, 37 of the 42 F-4Js on extension because the 36-month 30,
interval had expired had also exceeded the 960-hour criterion
by from 134 to 1,392 hours. As previously discussed, the
materiel condition of the aircraft was judged satisfactory
to continue operating. This suggests that the current
utilization rate supports an interval between depot level
maintenance that would be longer than 36 months or 960 hours.

     In addition, Navy F-4 and A-7 pilots flew more than their
Air Force counterparts during the year. We obtained statistics
for the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific commands, which included
most of its operating inventory. Navy F-4J pilots in the
Atlantic and Pacific commands flew an average of 19.0 and
19.9 hours a month, respectively, during the year.  In contrast,
Air Foice F-4E pilots flew an average of 15.2 hours a month
during the year. Navy A-7E pilots assigned to the Atlantic



                                  14
and Pacific commands flew an average of 24.2 hours and 19.2
hours, respectively, during the year. In the same period,
Air Force A-7D pilots were averaging 21.4 flying hours a
month.
     The number of hours flown per month by both services'
F-4 and A-7 pilots are a function of the hours allocated
through the flying hours program. As discussed in our recent
report, 1/ the services predetermine flying-hour standards
or levels of flying for specific types of aircraft. Expressed
in numbers of hours or sorties (a single flight that may vary
in length), the standards reflect what is deemed necessary
to keep aircrews combat ready. Standards are used as a control
on the amount of flying done to maintain individual and unit
military preparedness. Further, the standards'are used to
develop the overall flying-hour requirements and related
budget request for the services.

     In the Navy, the fleet commanders, the primary Navy air-
craft users, have determined, through experience, the hour
standards for each type of operational aircraft to maintain
certain levels of military preparedness. The criterion is
primary mission readiness or

     "* * * those hours required to maintain the
     average flight crew qualified and current to
     perform the primary mission of the assigned
     aircraft; to include all-weather/day/night/
     carrier operations as appropriate."

     The Air Force standards are stated in terms of number
of sorties and are therefore event oriented rather than
oriented toward a specific number of hours. They are based
on the number and the type of events historically necessary
to reach a desired capability.

     The standards for similar aircraft used by the various
services are not readily comparable because of different
mission requirements. Also, the Air Force uses sorties as
a basis for establishing requirements, while the Navy and
Marines use hours. Even using average length for a sortie
does not produce directly comparable statistics.


l/"Analysis of he Flying Hour Programs of the Military Serv-
  ices" (LCD-76-423, May 25, 1976).




                             15
     The services attempt to fly up to the standards and are
restrained only by funding levels and other outside con-
straints, such as fuel availability. The Navy and Air Force
generally contend that flying below the standards would reduce
military readiness because the standards are based on the
amount of flying needed to achieve and sustain a certain level
of readiness. However, they do not have systems that pre-
cisely measure decreases in military readiness brought about
by decreases in flying. Further, as previously pointed out,
other factors can reduce readiness.

     The concern about pilot flying hours was that significant
differences between the services may affect the depot
maintenance backlog. We believe pilot flying hours per month
is not a good management indicator to use in assessing the
Navy's backlog of depot level aircraft maintenance.

     The military services generally believed that, as air-
frame flying hours increase greatly, maintenance requirements
also tend to increase and that OR rates are affected.
However, other variables also affect the readiness rates and
the maintenance workload, making the relationships difficult
to quantify. For example:

     -- Sortie length will change the average number of take-
        offs and landings per hour, which in turn affects
        maintenance.

     -- Straight and level flying does not use as much of the
        onboard equipment as complex maneuvers do.
     -- Pilot experience can cause differences in maintenance
        needs.

However, exactly what effect different utilization rates have
on maintenance and readiness is not known. The Navy is
attempting to quantify this relationship. The Navy realizes
that utilization is one of the primary variables affecting
maintenance requirements and that a clearer picture of its
effects would help in managing the maintenance program and
improving the OR ratings.
CONCLUSIONS

     Differences exist between organizational aircraft m tin-
tenance in the Navy and the Air Force. Generally, we co-
served from our limited review that the services use the same
phased concept of maintaining aircraft at the organizational
level. However, the Navy inspects its aircraft more


                             16
frequently. Despite this the NO"iUr rates for the two
services have been about equal at 20 to 25 percent.

     Further, the Navy appears to be flying about 90 rercent
of its scheduled sorties. We therefore conclude that the
services' organizational maintenance practices, while slightly
different, have about the same impact on the materiel read-
iness rates and therefore are not the major reason for the
difference in the services' OR rates.

     Differences in depot maintenance practices which could
influence the airframe backlog include (1) length of the
interval between overhauls, (2) practices relating to ex-
tending aircraft beyond the intervals, and (3) time re-
quired to do the depot work.

     Concerning the third item, we found the Navy and Air
Force depot turnaround times for the F-4 aircraft were about
equal at an average of 114 and 109 calendar days, respectively.
We concluded, therefore, that turnaround time was not a major
reason for F-4 aircraft being in the Navy's backlog of air-
frames.

     Factors which currently influence the size of the Navy's
backlog of airframes are the time interval between overhauls
and the policy of extending aircraft beyond the depot inter-
vals. Essentially, the Navy schedules its airframes for depot
maintenance more often than the Air Force does. Further, the
Navy has been cautious about changing the frequency of the
depot maintenance intervals. The Navy also follows a strict
practice of listing its aircraft in the maintenance backlog
the day after the end of the maintenance interval. In
contrast, the Air Force allows its managers a 3-month grace
period before requiring that a airframe be reported in a
backlog status.  If the Navy had followed the Air Force
criteria, 339 (about 40 percent) of the more than 800 Navy
aircraft on maintenance extension would not have been
classified in the depot backlog.

     As an aircraft is used more, the military services
generally believed that the maintenance requirements would
also tend to increase and that OR rates would be affected.
Considering the entire inventory of F-4 aircraft in the
Navy and Air Force, we found little difference in the hours
flown per month in fiscal year 1976. However, the Navy's
A-7Es were flown a lot more than the Air Force's A-7Ds.
In addition, considering only aircraft assigned to combat
units. we found that the Navy F-4 and A-7 aircraft were



                             17
flown more hours per month than the comparable Air Force
models.

     Exactly what impact different utilization rates have on
maintenance and readiness is not known. The Navy is attempting
to quantify this relationship, but in doing so, it also must
sort out the impact of sortie length, pilot experience, and
7arious types of trenuous maneuvers.




                             18
                          CHAPTER 3
                ANALYSIS OF THE NAVY'S BACKLOG

              OF DEPOT LEVEL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
     In reporting on its fiscal year 1976 budget, the Navy
indicated a need for $637.5 million to do standard depot level
maintenance on 1,473 aircraft. The Navy also reported an un-
funded requirement of $121.8 million. Included in this was
$47 million reported to be needed to do depot level mainten-
ance on an estimated additional 825 aircraft that would have
surpassed their maintenance due date by June 30, 1976.

     The questions the Senate Committee on Appropriations
asked about this backlog were:

    -- What is the Navy's support for the 825 aircraft on
       maintenance extension at the end of fiscal year 1976?

    -- What is the Navy's projection of aircraft on mainte-
       nance exte -ion for the end of fiscal year 1977, and
       how is this supported?

     Based on the following observations, we conclude the air-
frame backlog requirement is not a current priority item.

    -- Only $47 million of the $121 P4illion requirement is
       for airframe maintenance, and $41 million is for the
       repair of components.  (See p. 20.)
    -- About 540 of the aircraft are scheduled for storage or
       loan or are not currently available and were not ex-
       pected to be repaired in the next year.  (See pp. 23.)
    -- On June 30, 1976, the aircraft on maintenance extension
       were flying and performing their missions and the
       operational readiness rates approximated the rates of
       the Navy aircraft not yet due for depot maintenance.
       (See p. 24.)

    -- Variations between the Navy and Air Force in setting
       the point at which depot maintenance becomes overdue
       and in reporting maintenance extensions can greatly
       affect the reported backlog figures. (See p. 25.)

    --The Navy is introducing a new reliability-centered
      system of aircraft maintenance which is expect to



                            19
       reduce this reported backlog of aircraft maintenance
       to e      inimum.   (See p. 25.)

     -- As of June 30, 1976, the Navy had enough operating
        aircraft to meet its operational needs. (See p. 24.)

     -- The Navy indicated that any additional funds received
        would first be applied to the component repair re-
        quirement. The airframe depot maintenance was given
        a low priority.  (See p. 24.)
     To restrict budget presentations to a reasonable length,
the data presented often does not go into much detail. This
was the case with the Navy's unfunded aircraft maintenance
workload. Analysis of the $121.8 million requirement revealed
the following breakdown.

         Estimated Navy Aircraft Depot Level Backlog
              of Maintenance Work as of June 1976

          Program                            Backlog

                                            (millions)
     Engineering support                     $ 26.8
     Engines                                    6.4
     Airframes                                 47.3
     Components                                41.3
         Total                               $121.8
ENGINEERING SUPPORT

     This portion of the program is for such items as en-
qineering support, emergency repair, aircraft preservation,
and field modification teams. Each year this requirement is
computed based on the level of effort desired. Previous
backlogs, such as the fiscal year 1976 deficit of $26.8
million, are generally not carried forward as they are in
the airframes and component area. Each new year's require-
ments are built on current needs.

     In fact, the fiscal year 1977 constrained budget was
less than the computed requirement, resulting in a deficit
of $19.9 million. However, staff to eliminate this



                                 20
deficit was not available, and therefore the $19.9 million
was not included as part of the fiscal year 1977 request.
ENGINES

     Engine work is considered a high-priority area. The
fiscal year 1977 Navy budget projected a fiscal year 1976
engine depot maintenance backlog carryover of $6.4 million.
However, the 1977 budget did not fund this deficit. This
is the result of management action to redefine the require-
ments determination. Considering such factors as the weapon
system and mission, the Navy has determined that overall
engine requirements could be reduced and not adversely affect
the OR rates. Thus, this portion of the $121.8 million back-
log for fiscal year 1976 is not significant, since it does not
carry over to fiscal year 1977.
AIRFRAMES

     Three times a year the Chief of Naval Operations fore-
casts the number of aircraft (referred to as airframes) that
will need standard depot level maintenance. These estimates
are made at times to coincide with the preparation of the
Navy's operation and maintenance budgets. The following dia-
gram shows the flow through various decision points and
classifications the Navy uses in managing its inventory.



                                       EARLY INOIUCTIONS         -               DE
                              i                                               WORKLOAD
              BefoNr
                197th         S       [DIRECT INDUCTIONS                    (1490 PER YEAR)
    NAVY            DATE      P
OPERATIONAL       AIRCRAFT    E
  AIRCRAFT         DUE FOR    C         MAINTENANCE           UNFUNDED
 INVENTORY       DEPOT WORK   T          EXTENSIONS            BACKLOG
                              O        (ABOUT 15% OF         (EST. 285 ON
                              N   i   |INVENTORY)              6/31/76)
                    FROM
                      A                                  PLANNED
                                                        EXTENSIONS
                                                  (EST. 540 on 6/31/76)
                                               (ABOUT 8-10% OF INVENTORY)


     Before 1970 the Navy had been able to do depot mainten-
ance work as the need arose. However, budget constraints



                                      21
after 1970 forced the Navy to use aircraft beyond the date
they were due for depot maintenance. This is the unfunded
backlog shown on the above diagram.

Planned extensions not
requiring immediate funding
      The actual number of aircraft on maintenance extension
that need depot maintenance is smaller than the 82! aircraft
reported as requiring, but not receiving, depot level mainten-
ance.   In separating the maintenance extension requirement,
which is based solely on the fact that a certain number of
months has expired, from the aircraft that actually need depot
work, one must keep in mind that not all aircraft on ma'nten-
ance extensions are considered by the Navy to be an unfuidced
requirement. Some of these aircraft will not be reworkec,
and funding is not a limiting factor. Many are reaching the
end of their useful life and are scheduled for retirement.
Placing these aircraft on maintenance extension extends the
useful life, but since no rework is anticipated, no funds
are needed for this purpose.

     other aircraft falling into a planned extension category
are research and development aircraft with low flying hours
and aircraft not available because of operational commitments.
The Navy will include many of the latter in later requirements
determinations. Planned extensions usually amount to 8 to
10 percent of the active operational inventory.

     As the Navy budgeting    cycle progresses, estimates are
updated to reflect current    planning factors. The end of
fiscal year 1976 projected    aircraft extensions, the actual
status of reported backlog    at June 30, 1976, and preliminary
projections for the end of    fiscal year 1977 are shown on the
following page.




                               22
                The Navy Aircraft Depot Level
                     Maintenance Backlog

                  Number of units n maintenance extension
                 End of        End o'f        End of
                 FY 1976       FY 1976        FY 1977
               (projected)    (actual)   (projected)(note a)

Planned
  extensions     540            483              376

Unfunded
  extensions     285            274              381

   Total         825            757              757

a/In prior years these figures included the number of air-
  craft that were beyond their depot maintenance due date
  and scheduled for retirement. Due to a change in accounting
  for planes, the end of FY 1977 planned and unfunded exten-
  sion figures do not include aircraft to be retired.
     The estimated cost to rework the 285 aircraft in the un-
funded extension line of the projected end of fiscal year
1976 figures was $47.3 million. Based on the estimated staff-
hours required to rework a certain class of aircraft, the Navy
assigned an average unit cost to each class to make these
calculations. (See app. I.)

     The uestion that remains is how uigent is the need for
the funds to rework the 285 aircraft in the unfunded exten-
sion category. Answering this question involves considering
many factors, such as
     -- the current operating condition of the aircraft,

     -- the pricrity for accomplishing the maintenance,

     -- the requirement for aircraft,
     -- differences between the Navy and Air Force starting
        dates in reporting aircraft on maintenance extension,
     -- the validity of the Navy's interval between perform-
        ance of the standard depot level work, and

     -- the impact of the Navy's new reliability-centered
        maintenance concept.


                              23
Current ope,-ating condition of the aircraft

      In terms of capability to fly, the materiel -oerating
condition of the aircraft on maintenance extension was equal
to the condition of the rest of the Navy aircraft inventory.
On June 30, 1976, the actual 757 aircraft on extension (see
p. 23 for difference from 825) were assigned to operating
units, were flying, and were performing their assigned
missions. They did not appear to be less capable than other
aircraft in the inventory. The OR rat. of the aircraft on
extension was equal to the rate of the other aircraft.   In
addition, no significant difference in the NORS or NORM rates
was found.   This is understandable, since it is the Navy's
practice to ir pect all aircraft at the period end date.
Aircraft in the poorest condition are sent to the depots,
and only aircraft capable of meeting their mission are
placed on extension. The 274 actual aircraft in the un-
funded maintenance category are as operationally ready as
the rest of the fleet.   When they are not capable of per-
forming their mission. they will be brought into the depot.

Airframe maintenance priority

     In establishing priorities for eliminating the mainten-
ance backlog addressed in this report, Navy officials told
us that the first priority would be for depot level repair
cf components, not airframes. The officials reasoned that
repair of components would have a direct effect on improving
the Navy's aircraft OR rate.

Operational need for aircraft

     The Navy, as of June 1976, had a need projected to the
end of fiscal year 1977 for about 4,986 aircraft to meet its
program requirements.  At the end of fiscal year 1976, the
Navy had on hand 6,618 aircraft, of which 4,931 were in
operating condition, 821 were undergoing depot repair, 610
were in storage with service life remaining, 241 were
administratively grounded, and 15 were being shipped from
the manufacturer.

     Since fiscal year 1975 the depots have been repairing
about 1,490 aircraft yearly. Our December 23, 1975,
report 1/ on Navy aircraft overhaul depots concluded that
the Navy's peacetime use of its six aeronautical depots was


1/"Navy Aircraft Overhaul Depots Could Be More Productive"
  (LCD-75-432, Dec. 23, 1975).


                                24
far below capacity. It was projected that the peacetime
workload through 1980 would remain at about the '974 work-
load level, and existing capacity at that time exceeded pro-
jected mobilization needs.

     At all times, a limited number of aircraft are awaiting
depot reDAi-.   These aircraft are not capable of meeting
their : issions. Most of these are aircraft requiring exten-
sive u.sneduled repairs, often because of crash damage.
Some are scheduled for repairs that cannot be made because
of the unavailability of long leadtime parts. These aircraft
have been placed in an inactive status until a decision is
made to bring them into tie depot. During fiscal year 1976
an average of about 98 aircraft were in this status at any
time. Since there are sufficient aircraft available to meet
the Navy's operational needs, these aircraft are not con-
sidered to be a current priority requirement for repair.
When these aircraft are needed, they will be included in the
depot requirements determination along with the other air-
craft reaching the ernd of their operating cycle.

     The above data indicates that enough aircraft are
on hand and being made available by the depots to meet Navy
needs.

Navy maintenance extension starting
dates differ from the Air Force

     Most Navy aircraft are put on at least one maintenance
extension at some time in their life cycle. The Navy's
practice is to list its aircraft on maintenance extension
immediately after the due date for depot maintenance. This
practice is rigidly applied.  For Air Force aircraft that
still have a period end date, a 3-month grace period is
allowed before the aircraft is considered on maintenance
extension. If the Navy used this approach, an aircraft on
its first extension would not appear as being on maintenance
extension and thus not show up as a maintenance requirement.
About 40 percent of the extended Navy aircraft are on their
first 3-month extension.

Impact of reliability-centered maintenance

     The Navy has recognized the potential for a change in
the maintenance criteria which would cut tiis backlog and
funding requirement. The Navy and other services are
adopting a maintenance philosophy called reliability-
centered maintenance currently used by the commercial



                             25
airlines. By analysis and surveillance of maintenance data
concerning components, unnecessary repair tasks will be
eliminated. This maintenance concept has the potential
                                                        for
reducing scheduled maintenance by 40 percent and maintenance
costs by 20 percent. This potential is discussed in more
detail in a recent GAO report. 1/

     In its initial stage of implementation, this new mainte-
nance approach will tend to lengthen the average time between
depot level maintenance; eventually, it will remove many air-
craft and components from a fixed cycle. Under this philos-
ophy, much of the current unfunded work would not be a re-
quirement. One objective of the new philosophy is to reflect
the true maintenance requirement. However, this approach
not be fully implemented for some time.                    will

COMPONENTS

     The estimated component backlog of $41.3 million is the
difference between the fiscal year 1976 requirement of
$311.3 million and the constrained budget limit of $270
million imposed by the Navy on this program. The actual
                                                         end
of fiscal year 1976 requirement was $39.4 million, and the
latest projected end of fiscal year 1977 component backlog
was valued at $53.9 million.

Computation of the requirement

     The determination of requirements for depot level
of components is based, item by item, on historical and repair
anticipated demand. The requirements are derived from such
factors as past demands, the flying hour program, stock
level objectives, and projected leadtimes. The Navy
organizations involved are shown in the following chart.


1/"Management Action Needed in the Department of Defense
                                                         to
  Realize Benefits From a New System of Aircraft Maintenance"
  (LCD-76-443, Nov. 10, 1976).




                             26
                            NAVY


                        CHIEF OF NAVAL
                          OPERATIONS


                        NAVAL MATERIAL
                           COMMAND

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS                             NAAL SUPPL
    COMMAND                                 SYSTEMS COMMAND

AIR REWORK FACILITIES                     AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE


     The component requirements are determined by the Aviation
Supply Office, under the Naval Supply Systems Command. This
data is used by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) in
preparing the budget and controlling the funds for aircraft
component rework which is done at the air rework facilities.
     In preparing the aircraft rework budget, NAVAIR is con-
strained by dollar limitations for the total aircraft program
handed down from DOD and the Chief of Naval Operations. The
amount allocated, within the limitations, for each phase of
the total depot program (that is, airframes, components,
engines, and other engineering support) is based on relative
priorities determined by NAVAIR.

Components scheduled for repair

     For scheduling purposes, the component requirements are
separated by computer into four major priority categories,
based on criticality of need by the fleeL.  Priorities 1 and
2 are to fill NORS and other backordered requisitions, and
priorities 3 and 4 are to mainta   shelf supply inventories
of ready-for-issue components.

                               27
      In addition to the mechanized system, two manual systems
are used for intensified management of certain components.
The Navy's High-Burner program is the means of managing
selected high-cost high-usage type components. The closed
loop aeronautical management program (CLAMP) is a method of
managing selected components of priority weapon systems.
All the items in the High Burner program and CLAMP are given
a high repair priority, as shown in the following chart.

                Priorities for Component Rework
Priority 1        CLAMP
                  High Burner
                  NORS requisitions
Priority 2        Backorders, non-NORS
Priority 3        Shelf supply of ready-for-issue components
Priority 4        Safety level supply for ready-for-issue
                    components
     Currently, only priorities 1 dnd 2 are fully funded, and
these items should not be included in the backlog. The back-
log figure of $41.3 million indicates the need to repair the
components for priorities 3 and 4 shelf supply and safety
level requirements.

     Under this priority system, only the CLAMP and High
Burner designated items have a regularly scheduled production
run of items being repaired and returned to the supply system.
These production runs are geared to providing enough items to
meet anticipated NORS or normal repair needs as they occur.
All other items are repaired after the need arises but only
to meet requirements, such as NORS requisitions and requisi-
tions to support normal repair of equipment. As of December
1976 the Navy's F-4 aircraft had about 1,848 family groups
of repairable items. Of these family groups, 62 were managed
under t   High Burner mode of operation. For the other 1,786
family groups, repairs were made when a requisition was
submitted indicating a need.

Management controls

     Each quarter the Naval Air Systems Command and the rework
facilities negotiate with the Aviation Supply Office on the
number of direct labor hours and associated funds to be spent
in reworking components for the CLAMP, High Burner, and NORS-
backorder requirements. The negotiated hours are then allo-
cated by NAVAIR to the shops that rework the components.
Total hours available at the shop level are further broken



                             28
down to show hours to be spent each week of the quarter.
ASO reports weekly to the rework facilities, identifying
components required by priority level.

     We have previously identified problems with the Navy's
component repair program. In an earlier report 1/ on Navy
aircraft overhaul depots, we concluded that because ASO does
not control the component rework funds and workload imbalances
exist, components not urgently needed in the supply system
are sometimes repaired while higher priority components lay
elsewhere in backlog.

     The Naval Audit Service has also pointed out recently
that ASO lacks fnding control and is not able to insure com-
pliance with the requirements. They found that the rework
facilities tend to take in too many components based on the
premise that a certain number of the items will be unworkable
for one reason or another. However, if all items turn out
to be workable, then they are reworked even though they may
exceed the requirements. In addition, no accountability by
end item is needed for billing purposes (billings are based
on staff-hours expended), and the limited funds are spent on
quantities not currently required while other requirements
go unfunded.

     The Navy argues that batch processing of the components
for repairs is the most effective way to operate. If 15 items
are inducted to fill a requirement for 14 items and all items
are workable, completing the 15th item as part of the produc-
tion run is economical. Further, the Navy believes that
the extra item will be used to meet part of the next quarter's
demand. This will allow the Navy to reduce the next quarter's
rebuild need by one item.

     The Navy's position, when explained in terms of one extra
item, appears to be reasonable. However, when this situation
occurs often when funds were not available to meet all the
Navy's repair needs, then some priority repair work will not
be completed on time to meet the need when it arises. We
believe that management needs to control this practice to
assure proper component support.


l/See note, p, 24.




                             29
      In our December 1975 report, we cited other problems
 that inhibited the Navy in effectively using the existing
 funding.  For example, components were routinely re',,ted
 from aircraft undergoing depot overhaul and reworkEd simul-
 taneously with the aircraft while high-priority systewide
 components are backlogged.

     The Navy said at that time that this concurrent rework
woild not continue under the current maintenance concepts.
However, the Naval Audit Service found in 1977 that these
components were still being routinely taken in for rework
without a determination of supply system availability.
                                                        Com-
ponents are inducted for concurrent rework without a deter-
mination by ASO that the concurrent rework components are
                                                           of
a higher priority than systemwide requirements that are
                                                        not
being satisfied because of staffing limitations or shop
                                                        capa-
city at the facility.

Impact of reliability-centered
maintenance on components

      We pointed out in our November 1976 report 1/ that,
through use of the new maintenance philosophy, savings can
also be realized in the cost of zomponents.   Analytical main-
tenance programs extend the life of many components because
 (1) components previously removed automatically from replace-
ment or rework after a specified period of operation can
                                                           be
used longer and (2) design changes may increase component
reliability (data analysis identifies high-failure-rate parts
and points out the need to increase their reliability by
                                                           re-
designing them).   As a result, part requirements could be
adjusted and inventories could be reduced.   Investment in
spare parts in the Navy is 20 percent of the aircraft costs;
the commercial airlines have been able to limit their invest-
ment to 10 percent.

MANAGEMENT ACTIONS NEEDED TO
IMPROVE OPERATIONAL READINESS

      As in the airframe portion of the aircraft rework program,
the examples in the previous section illustrate that factors
 ther
  ..   thar increased funding could affect the stated com-
ponent backlog and that increased funding alone is not the
solution to the component backlog problems. More efficient
                                                             use
of existing component funds appears to be at least part
                                                         of
the solution to the backlog of ready-for-issue components.


1/ See note.   p. 26.


                                '0
     In our 1974 report 1/ on the Air Force NORS rates, we
concluded that there was no predictable relationship between
the amount of funds spent on component repair and the NORS
rate. We further concluded that a lack of funds to repair
oxchangeables was not a major cause of NORS and that the
effects of the level of component funding on operational
readiness could not &'e measured. The common, recurring
logistics problems cited in this report were

     -- unexpected part failures,

     -- lengthy order-to-shipment times,

     -- late repair of parts,

     -- modification or updating of parts, and

     -- long contract administration.
We observed similar situations at all levels of the Navy's
aircraft component supply sy3tem.

     The DOD standard for elapsed time between order, shipment,
and receipt of high-priority material is 8 days. However, the
average response time in January 1977 for over 6,000 Navy
priority requisitions, not satisfied from on-station inven-
tories, was 28.4 days for consumable items and 30.5 days for
repairable items; the median times were 15 and 19 days, respec-
tively.

     Examples of the delays that we observed during different
phnaus of the requisition process were:

     -- At the squadron level, improperly completed requisi-
        tion forms caused unnecessary delays in processing
        the requisition.

    -- Poor communication between the squadron, supply, and
       intermediate maintenance caused unnecessary delays in
       determining the need to pass the requisition on to ASO.

    -- After the item is declared unrepairable on station,
       excessive delays occurred in processing the paperwork
       necessary to send the requisition to ASO.


1/"An Analysis of Air Force Rates of Aircraft Not Operation-
  ally Ready Due to Supply" (B-179294, Mar. 29, 1974).



                                31
     -- ASO had excessive administrative leadtime in making
        a buy for replacement items.
     -- A 5-day, one-shift workweek can account for several
        days of delay. For example, requisitions going to ASO
        are placed in the system once every workday. Require-
        ments generated late Friday or on the weekend are not
        processed until Monday. Also, ASO acts on requisitions
        on a one-shift basis. Requisitions received after
        hours are held until the next regular workday.
     --At one naval air station, items shipped to the squadron
       are not accepted between Friday night anc Monday
       morning.
     We also observed ASO taking priority action on NORS
requisitions when the NORS condition no longer existed.

     -- In one case, ASO was not notified that the NORS was
        satisfied through shipment by another activity.

     -- In another case, after initiating a NORS requisition,
        the squadron obtained the part from base supply
        sources. However, the repairable part was processed
        under the NORS rquisition, creating a false priority
        at ASO.
     Regarding the use of readiness data for budgetary pur-
poses, there is no identifiable direct correlation between
funding levels and OR, NORM, or NORS rates. This data mea-
sures maintenance and logistic systems performance and is
designed as an indicator of areas requiring intensified manage-
ment action. For example, there is evidence that reduced
funding levels may drive NORS rates up; however, there is no
evidence that increased funding will drive NORS rates down.

     The Navy and Air Force have both had shortages in ready-
for-issue stocks, yet the Air Force has maintained a higher
OR rate, indicating that shelf stock does not account for all
the differences in OR rates.  (See ch. 4.)
     The Navy, however, considers the component backlog to
be a more realistic requirement than the airframe backlog.
Navy officials have said that funding to reduce the backlog
in priorities 3 and 4 would increase the inventory of
ready-for-.issue components and therefore offer a potential
increase in aircraft OR rates. The Navy is moving in this
direction. In fiscal year 1975 $6 million was shifted from


                             32
airframe repair to component repair.  However, as shown on
page 40, the Navy's operational readiness from fiscal year
1975 to tiscal year 1976 decreased 2 percent. Also the fis-
cal year 1977 budget for Navy aircraft rework included an
$84.8 million increase over fiscal year 1976. About
$60.2 million of the increase was to repair an estimated
50,000 components and 900 engines.

CONCLUSIONS
     The Navy has an airframe backlog while the Air Force
does not partly because the services use different criteria
in classifying aircraft as being in need of depot maintenance.
The Navy's backlog of depot level airframe maintenance does
not indicate an urgent need for additional funding. The back-
log does not appear to have impeded the Navy's operational
readiness. Further, management actions to implement the new
reliability-centered maintenance concept and to lengthen
the interval between performance of depot level maintenance
could greatly change the reported backlog figure.

     Where possible, change! should be made to eliminate
the differences in the services' methods of classifying
airframes as backlogged. The congressional committeec who
make the budget decisions and assess defense needs would
benefit from having the military services' aircraft require-
ments developed and presented in a similar manner.

     The Navy programed additional funds for component repair
in fiscal years 1975 and 1977. However, the Navy is still
not able to repair all its needed components in a timely
manner. Many components are not repaired until a need arises.
The Navy maintains that additinal funds are needed to reduce
the component maintenance backlog and improve the ready-for-
issue shelf stock position of the components despite the lack
of evidence as to what impact increased funding will have on
the Navy's NORS rates.

     Because of the continuing management problems in this
area, we question whether additional funds should be put
into the program until reasonable efforts have been made to
correct known deficiencies and a better assessment can be
made as to how much funding this program should receive.

     Concerning the engines and engineering support backlogs,
these items are not a high priority and the Navy has acted to
eliminate the requirements.




                            33
RECOMMENDATIONS

    We recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

    -- Require the Navy and Air Force to establish common
       criteria for determining when an aircraft should re-
       ceive depot level maintenance and require that only
       aircraft actually in need of depot work be reported
       as an unfunded backlog requirement.

    -- Require the Navy to resolve the problems contributing
       to the lengthy order-to-shipment times.




                           34
                          CHAPTER 4
                WHAT IS OPERATIONAL READINESS?

     Because the Navy was reporting an unfunded backlog of
depot level aircraft maintenance and a declining operational
readiness rate, the Senate Committee on Appropriations wanted
to determine if there was a cause and effect relationship.
Several of the Committee's questions were aimed at clarifying
the Navy's and Air Force's OR rates and how the reporting
systems work. The questions asked were:

    -- What are the current not operationally ready due to
       supply and not operationally ready due to maintenance
       rates being experienced by the Navy?

    -- How do these rates compare with those -f the Air Force,
       and to what extent are any differences attributable to
       reporting criteria? Why are the criteria different? Is
       DOD planning to standardize the criteria? If not, why
       not?
    -- In connection with DOD's OR criteria, how and why do
       thf Air Force's and Navy's criteria for aircraft in
       "reportable" and "nonreportable" status differ.
       Please provide comparisons for all Air Force/Navy
       similar aircraft (for example, F-4, A-7, and heli-
       copters).

     During fiscal years 1972-76, the Navy's OR rates aver-
aged about 60 percent and the Air Force's averaged about
70 percent. Each service's reports included its jet fighters,
transports, etc., that are located in units which operate the
aircraft to achieve their mission. The Navy and Air Force
criteria for determining when an aircraft will be reported
and when it will be excluded from the OR reporting sstem
are similar. The OR rates reflect the materiel condition
of those Navy and Air Force aircraft assigned to operating
units.  (See p. 37.)

     There are differences between the materiel readiness
reporting systems of the Navy and Air Force. These differ-
erces had been believed great enough to negate the value of
comparing some of the services' reported rates. A recent
study by the military services, however, found that the dif-
ferences are not as great as previously believed. Unfor-
tunately, many terms associated with these reporting systems
are confusing. In some cases they seem to overlap, while in



                             35
others their usage varies between the services. Attempts are
being made to standarize the reporting system for aircraft.
(See p. 41.)

     It was also our observation that the aircraft the Navy
was considering to be part of its unfunded depot maintenance
backlog were flying and performing their missions as well as
other Navy aircraft. Therefore, these aircraft were not
lowering the Navy's operational readiness.  (See p. 24.)
OR REPORTING SYSTEMS

     In the management of Navy and Air Force aircraft, various
data is accumulated and used in making management and mainten-
ance decisions. This information is frequently brought into
the budget process to demonstrate a program's progress or
to explain a problem in order to justify the need for funds.
A frequently used indicator is the OR rate. DOD set the objec-
tives for the OR reporting system, but left the implementation
up to the individual services.

     Readiness rates keep management informed of the operational
status of aircraft in the inventory. The Navy and Air Force
established the Navy Maintenance and Materiel Management System
(3-M) and the Air Force Standard Aerospace Vehicle and Equip-
ment Inventory, Status, and Utilization Reporting System.
Under these daily reporting systems, aircraft are classified
hourly into one of the following categories.

     -- Operationally ready--capable of performing at least
        one of their primary missions.
     -- Not operationally ready due to maintenance of aircraft.

     -- Not operationally ready due to supply problems.

     Aircraft are assumed to be operationally ready unless
reported in one of the not operationally ready categories.
In the not ready categories the number of hours the aircraft
are in these conditions are reported. Each of the three
categories is expressed as a percentage of the total time
the aircraft is possessed.   hen totaled, the categories equal
100 percent of available operational time. For example, on
a given day a base assigned a squadron of F-4s might report
the operational status of these aircraft as 73 percent opera-
tionally ready, 21 percent NORM, and 6 percent NORS. The
reporting system averages this data on a daily, weekly,
monthly, and yearly basis.



                             36
     Like the acronyms used in many jobs, the understanding of
these categories' true meaning varies widely. Marginal dif-
ferences among the services make comparison of aircraft status
difficult and analysis at least potentially confusing. For
example, in the Air Force, the reporting system divides the
NORS and NORM figures to show the percent of aircraft grounded
(NORS-G/NORM-G) and flyable (NORS-F/NORM-F). It is the NORS-G/
NORM-G figures that are comparable to the Navy NORS/NORM
figures. Use of more standard criteria, along with a clearer
understanding of what the OR system is and is not designed to
measure, could help the system become more meaningful than it
has been.
What does operational
readiness measure?
     The objective of the maintenance program is to maintain as
many aircraft assigned to operational units as possible in a
full systems capability status, ready to perform any mission
for which designed.
     OR reporting systems measure the materiel condition of
aircraft in the physical possession of each operational unit.
A safe flyable aircraft that has on board and operable the
equipment it needs to perform one of its primary missions is
considered by the Navy and Air Force to be operationally ready.
Most aircraft are assigned two or three missions.
     Aircraft in operating units which are not capable of
performing any of their primary missions are reported as not
operationally ready. Also reported for management purposes
is the problem causing the degradation of readiness.
     For example, the reporting systems identify aircraft that
cannot perform any of their primary missions because they need
organizational or intermediate level maintenance as being in a
NORM condition. On the other hand, aircraft that cannot per-
form any of their primary missions because repair parts or
components needed to make the aircraft operational are inopera-
tive or missing are reported in a NORS condition. Only one
category can be used to cover a specific interval.

Reportable aircraft
     The Navy OR rates reflects the materiel condition of the
4,842 aircraft assigned to operating uits of the Regular Navy,
the Marine Corps, and their Reserves. The Air Force OR rates
cover the 7,681 aircraft of the Regular Air Force, the Reserves,
and the Air National Guard. For both services this includes



                             37
jet fighters, attack aircraft, patrol planes, trainers,
transports, and helicopters. The criteria the services use
in determining which aircraft will be considered in computing
the readiness rates are similar.  Excluded from the OR report-
ing system figures are Navy and Air Force aircraft undergoing
depot maintenance, in storage, or in research and development
projects and those which have suffered extersive damage and
have not had a decision made on their disposition.

Operational readiness is
not combat readiness

     The OR rates for equipment are often thought f as indi-
cating the combat readiness of a unit. This is not completely
true. The OR reporting system only judges the materiel condi-
tion of equipment and gives only an immediate picture of this
condition. It does not forecast what the condition will be
tomorrow or 5 days from tomorrow.

     A unit's combat readiness is measured through a separate
system, DOD's force status and identity reporting system.
This system indicates the availability of the basic resources
required to operate combat units (that is, personnel, train-
ing, equipment and supplies on hand, and equipment readiness).
In addition to measurements of these resources, the unit com-
mander's judgment of his organization's ability to perform
its mission is used to determine combat readiness.

Standards for operational readiness

     The DOD guidelines on materiel readiness reporting re-
quire the military services to establish minimum standards.
The standards represent objectives for operational perform-
ance, and large deviations from the standards indicate po-
tential problems.

     The Navy has established minimum standards of materiel
readiness. These standards differ slightly by model of air-
craft and status of the reporting units. Generally the Navy
standards are 70 percent operationally ready, 20 percent
NORM, and 10 percent NORS.

      Instead of setting standards, Air Force headquarters
currently emphasizes establishing an orderly flow of main-
tenance, which it believes will continue to make enough air-
craft available to support its mission. Standards are,
however, set by some commands. For example, the Tactical
Air Command has established OR standards to aid managers



                             38
at all levels. These standards, which vary slightly for
certain aircraft, generally are 71 percent operationally ready,
24 percent NORM-G, and 5 percent NORS-G.

Current Navy and Air Force
OR, NORM, and NORS rates
     The yearly average worldwide Navy and Air Force OR, NORM,
and NORS rates for fiscal years 1972-76 for all types of air-
craft are shown in the following tables.

     It can be seen that the Navy's average OR rate is much
below its goal of 70 percent and below the Air Force rates
throughout the period. One factor behind the Navy's declining
readiness rate is the NORS area. To counter the rising NORS
rate, the Navy has increased its component and engine repair
programs by $60 million in fiscal year 1977. No precise
measurement method is known to calculate the increase in readi-
ness the additional funds will bring. The Navy, however, is
hoping for a 4-percent increase in fiscal year 1977.




                             39
                                                              NAVY AND AIR FORCE
                                                         AIRCRAFT MATERIAL READINESS
                                                                            "OR"
                                       s_



                           NAVY                                      AR IORC
                           GOAlt      70




                                      65



                                                                      NAVY




                                   55
                                   Y 72                  73            74              15          t6            77
                            AIHIIRI
                                [
                                IIP    74F                             014            68%          69%
                            NAYV       hiS'              6.           59s             568          56%




                      NAVY AND AIR FORCE                                                                          NAVY AND AIR FORCE
                  AIRCRAfT MAfERIAL READINESS                                                                AIRCRAFT MATERIAL READINt   .
                          NORM RATES                                                                                  NORS RATES
                                                                                            20




                                 AiR iRC[NORM
                                            i




                   15                                                                                                                        I   I




      [Y ;2       73        74              7S       ,                  7'                 Y 72          73           14      1S         I7,     16
AIRIORCI   20%     1-                       /    ,            ' AV              3?             2
                                                                                              !2         :
NAVY       2 3%   2I       .                                                   AlR lfRl[    t  .




1/In the Air Force, the reporting system divides the NORS
  and NORM figures to show the percent of aircraft grounded
  and flyable.
  G--indicates the aircraft is grounded.
  F--indicates the aircraft is flyable, but needs maintenance
     or a part.
  Therefore, the Navy NORS and NORM figures are compared to
  the Air Force NORS-G and NORM-G figures.


                                                                             40
Aircraft not included in the OR computation

     The OR rates shown for Navy and Air Force aircraft do
not indicate the materiel condition of the total aircraft
inventory of the services.  Generally, about 27 percent of
the Navy's total program aircraft inventory and 16 percent
of the Air Force's active inventory are in various stages of
a major repair cycle, are being modified or updated, are
being used in testing or research projects, or are administra-
tively grounded. The materiel condition of these 1,776 Navy
aircraft and 1,455 Air Force aircraft is not included in the
reporting index discussed in this chapter.

CAN THE SERVICES' OR
RATES BE COMPARED?

     The DOD guidelines on the materiel readiness reporting
system point out that the objective is to measure what OR
rating is expected on a sustained basis.  This rating repre-
sents a target of achieved performance for materiel support
activities. Performance below these standards indicates that
the logistic support is insufficient or the operational mis-
sion the equipment is to perform is in jeopardy.

     Both the Navy and Air Force stress that comparisons
of their OR/NORS/NORM rates are not valid indicators of which
service is doing a better job.  Basically, they believe that
the OR rates will differ because of (1) differences in the
reporting systems accumulating the data and (2) equipment
and mission differences.  It is logical that these two cate-
gories may affect their OR rates, but there is no consensus
that they are either the sole or main contributors.

     We believe a third category, effectiveness of logistics
management, plays a major role in explaining the differences
in the readiness rates.  That part of the difference in opera-
tional readiness attributed to effective logistics management
can be compazed between services.

Differences in the reporting systems

     With regard to that portion of the OR rate affected by
differences in the methods used in computing OR rates, the
Air Force recently directed a multiservice committee to iden-
tify these differences between the services' reporting systems
and recommend changes to standardize the systems.  The com-
mittee concluded hat although the services are using varying
terms and acronyms leading to confusion in interpreting



                             41
results, actual definitions and applications of these terms
do not differ much. For example:

    I--Primary mission definition. The services do not differ
       greatly in designating primary missions. Each Navy
       aircraft type has multiple primary missions, which
       are defined at Navy headquarters. A mission essential
       subsystem listing (MESL) is established for each type,
       model, and series of aircraft. These subsystems are
       necessary for the aircraft to perform its missions
       and are he systems judged in formulating the OR
       rating. Each type of Air Force aircraft may have
       multiple primary missions which are assigned by the
       major command, such as the Tactical Air Command.
       MESLs are established for each aircraft and primary
       mission.

   II--Condition status categories. The capability of the
       aircraft o meet its primary mission (or one of its
       primary missions) is indicated by condition status
       categories. Terms vary between t    services, but
       categories have virtually identical definitions and
       applications.
       Navy Terms

       OR (FSC) Full Systems Capable--the aircraft is safe
       to fly and all subsystems on the MESL are operating.

       OR (RMC)--Reduced Materiel Condition--the aircraft
       if safe to fly and capable of performing at least
       one of its primary missions but at least one of the
       MESL subsystems is not operating.

       NORM/NORS--the aircraft is not capable of performing
       at least one of its primary missions because of
       maintenance/supply problems.

       Air Force Terms

       OR--the aircraft is safe to fly and all subsystems
       on the MESL for any of the primary missions are
       operational.

       NORM/NORS-F--the aircraft is safe to fly but at least
       one of the subsystems required for at least one of
       the primary missions is inoperative.




                             42
        NORM/NORS-G--the aircraft is unsafe for flight because
        of maintenance or supply problems.

   III--NORS start time. Navy NORS time starts when the ini-
         iT'al demand is placed on the supply system (unless
        the demand is satisfied within 1 hour), thus prohibi-
        ting further maintenance. Air Force NORS time starts
        when maintenance and supply verify that the parts
        requirement cannot be satisfied on station and that
        no further maintenance can be done on the aircraft.
        A maximum of 4 hours is allowed for verification.

    IV--Schedule inspection start time (NORM). When Navy
        inspection requirements do not require a major dis-
        assembly of the aircraft and thus do not affect the
        aircraft's mission performance, it will remain in an
        OR status during all of the inspection phase. An
        aircraft will be considered not mission capable only
        if panels and equipment removed cannot be replaced
        in 2 hours. The Air Force places aircraft in NORM
        status during scheduled inspections at the time of
        induction.

    V--NORS/NORM stop time.   The services' terms are the same.

     The committee further believes that use of the term
"operationally ready" to report the materiel condition of
equipment could cause confusion with the readiness statistics
used in the force status and identity reporting system. They
suggested that a new DOD instruction be prepared for use
only by aviation units, with the following terms designed to
depict only the materiel condition of airzraft.

Mission capable (MC)                     rather   than   (OR)
Not mission capable (NMC)                rather   than   (NOR)
Not mission capable maintenance (NMCM)   rather   than   (NORM)
Not mission capable supply (NMCS)        rather   than   (NORS)
     The multiservice committee believes that the services
have the capability to reconcile differences associated with
NORS and NOR start times. The amount of differences caused
by the different start times is not quantified. However,
the committee suggested that NORS start times begin when a
NORS requisition is made above unit level, or 4 hours after
the demand is initiated, whichever occurs first, and mainten-
ance work stops as a result. This 4 hours would allow for
normal delays in delivery time because of routine adminis-
trative procedures and distant locations of the parts bins or
warehouses.


                              43
     The committee also recommended that an aircraft not be
considered NORM during an inspection for removal of such
parts as cowlings and inspection plates when these parts can
be reinstalled and the aircraft made flyable within 2 hours.
This 2-hour criterion for disassembly and reassembly of air-
craft being inspected more accurately portrays materiel readi-
ness in consonance with such routine maintenance actions as
preflight and postflight inspections.

Equipment and mission differences

     The Navy and Air Force do have differing mission assign-
ments, resulting in different operating environments and needs
for different subsystems on aircraft. The most obvious dif-
ference is between the Navy's aircraft carrier operations
and the Air Force land-based operations.

     The Center for Naval Analyses has studied the differences
between the Navy and Air Force missions, operating environ-
ments, and equipment used.   It concluded that, for an aircraft
and its subsystems, the mission and environmental differences
are generally quantifiable and taken into account during
equipment design.  For example, Navy aircraft are designed
for carrier operations and are much stronger and more corro-
sion resistant in many areas than are similar Air Force air-
craft.  As a result, Navy and Air Force F-4 and A-7 aircraft
are slightly different.  Although the study did not specifi-
cally say so, it would seem reasonable to conclude that taking
equipment and mission differences into account in designing
aircraft would tend to minimize the effect of such differences
on the services' OR rates.   The study did conclude that the
shipboard environment may ultimately limit the length of
time an aircraft can spend on a carrier before it will need
depot level maintenance.   On the other hand, the study pointed
out that there was no indication that to date the limit o
the safe extension of the depot maintenance intervals has
been reached.  Moreover, the Navy has many non-carrier-based
aircraft, which are not subject to the shipboard environment.

Management inefficiencies which
affect the OR rate

     As shown in the tables on page 40, the Navy's OR rate
is lower that that of the Air Force. The OR rate is depen-
dent on the NORM and NORS rates.  The tables show that the
NORM rates of the services are about equal, but that the
Navy's NORS rate is higher than that of the Air Force. We



                             44
therefore did some work in the Navy's logistic support system
for aircraft to determine reasons for the high NORS rate.

     Essertially we found that various logistics system prob-
lems lowered the Navy's OR rate. For example:

     -- At the squadron level, improperly completed requisi-
        tions caused delays in getting supplies in a timely
        manner.

     -- The Aviation Supply Office had excessive administra-
        tive leadtime in making a buy for replacement items,
        which were later not available when needed.

     -- Premature depot repair of items in excess of the
        immediate requirement is tying up limited funds so
        that other priority component repairs are not being
        made. (See p. 31.)

CONCLUSIONS

     During fiscal years 1972-76 the Navy's operational
readiness rates averaged about 60 percent and the Air Force's
averaged about 70 percent. The Navy's rate is below its goal
of 70 percent principally because of logistics system prob-
lems it encounters in getting requisitions processed in a
timely manner and getting the necessary repairs made on com-
ponents before they are needed. The aircraft the Navy was
considering to be a part of its unfunded maintenance backlog
were not lowering the Navy's operational readiness.

     There are differences between the materiel readiness
reporting systems of the Navy and Air Force. The services
believe these differences to be great enough to negate the
value of comparisons of their readiness rates. However,
a service-directed study found these differences to be
not as great as previously believed.   e believe that the
difference between services' OR rates is affected by manage-
ment of the logistics system and would be an indicator that
one service is supporting its aircraft better than the other.
This information should be helpful to both congressional and
DOD planners assessing the military services' plane and bud-
gets. Since each service is given the authority and respon-
sibility to plan and organize its resources for both equip-
ment design and subsequent logistics support, the OR rate
is an indicator of the overall ranking of the two services'
success in maintaining their total aircraft inventory. This
ranking could be an important data element in making the
costly and far-reaching decisions expected of our military


                             45
planners. Further standardization of the servize systems and
a clearer understanding of what the data represents would
help make the system's data and reports more meaningful to
all users.

RECOMMENDATION

     We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require
the Navy and Air Force to eliminate, as much as possible,
the differences between their operational readiness reporting
systems. Desirable changes would include standardizing
the condition status terms and the start times for the
NORS and NORM conditions.




                            46
APPENDIX I                                                                                                                                      APPFNDIX I



                                                   O.                c        oO                   N            o         UI            (I
                                             4j    0% '"             I                                 4N 0%
                                                                                                           c-4w                         N

                                     X4            orn          I %o V                         I                N         en       -   N
                                                                                                                                       V
                                     c            o       w              Vo o                                    m        0                 n



                                      30          F-1



                                                  t-     e           fN'fl oO                                   c         M t
                                                  : l)O              OO..-
                                                                      i   4-                 ,.             n

                                                       ".r               "4                                     ONo
                                                  ( 4                        D ao                  ^        r   a




                                    *r9..;             olN     I     OOr                      I N1 n                 o                 col
                                    :3       o    oH                                               s                oo                 (1




                  zo

         ,-I     ,-
                               O'        0




             0    V
                  _)                                                                                                                   co




                  42                     0
                  Hr'
                  '-1               W
                                    .J C                 DN'
                                                          O                                             NO
                                                                                                        4o            .        J
                                    144.)                                                                       - h(
                                                                                                                cr




                      Es ~ I( §~-. c0Otl
                      14W
                                                  cu 6 r 1 00 4o aD -,.4
                                                                     I 4                           >0
                                                                                                        _-                              I
                                                               4



                                                               :1
                                                               L Y       c-                             h        J oLi) n


                                                   c W0            4                J- ILI              · e           0 )O
                                                  *O C              u           0    C r.4                Nv          O

                                                  400LiA                                     Li0)Li                                    0




                                                                   47
APPENDIX II                                        APPENDIX II

               GAO REPORTS ON RELATED SUBJECTS
1.   "Management Action Needed in the Department of Defense
     to Realize Benefits From a New System of Aircraft
     Maintenance" (LCD-76-443, Nov. 10, 1976)

     -- Aircraft maintenance requirements and cost can be
        reduced without degrading safe operation.

     -- Requirements for spare parts inventories can be
        reduced.
2.   "Navy Aircraft Overhaul Depots Could Be More Productive"
     (LCD-75-432, Dec. 23, 1975)

     -- Aircraft components routinely are removed and reworked
        simultaneously with aircraft while high-priority sys-
        temwide components are backlogged.
     -- Opportunities for productivity gains through economic-
        lot batch processing are lost.
     -- Because of scheduling and production problems, scarce
        resources are consumed on components which cannot be
        repaired.
     -- Components are retained in production shops longer
        than necessary, causing lengthy turnaround time and
        scheduling and shop backlog problems.
3.   "An Analysis of Air Force Rates of Aircraft Not Opera-
     tionally Ready Due to Supply" (B-179264, Mar. 29, 1974)
     -- Lack of funds not primary cause of NORS.

     --Major NORS causes include unexpected part failure,
       late repair of parts, and modification of parts.
     --No direct correlation exists between funds to repair
       spares and NORS rates.
4.   "Potential for Savings in Aircraft Maintenance"
     (B-152600, May 7, 1970)

     --The Navy could save money by adopting the Air Force
       practice of using flight hours, rather than elapsed
       days, as a basis for performing organizational inspec-
       tions and maintenance.




                             48
APPENDIX II                                       APPENDIX II

     -- The Navk does the entire scheduled maintenance at
        one time, whereas the Air Force does the maintenance
        on a cycle or phased basis that can be accomplished
        between periods of use to reduce downtime.
5.   "Analysis of the Flying-Hour Programs of the Military
     Services" (LCD-76-427, May 25, 1976)
     -- Flying-hour standards are not comparable between
        services.
     -- The services do not have systems to measure decreases
        in readiness caused by decreases in flying.




                              49
APPENDIX III                                         APPENDIX III

                       CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
                     PERTAINING TO REVISION OF
                F-4 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE INTERVALS
January 1961      F-4 depot maintenance interval set at 15
                  months.
November 1963     Navy officials concluded that extension of
                  F-4 service tours from 15 to 20 months
                  was feasible.
March 1964        McDonnell Aircraft Corporation (now McDonnell
                  Douglas Corporation) recommended tour exten-
                  sion from 15 to 24 months.
April 1964        The Navy reviewed McDonnell's recommendation
                  and suggested that a conference be held to
                  consider adopting the 24-month tour period.
May 1964          NAVAIR requested comments and recommendations
                  from various Navy organizations on the pro-
                  posed 24-month interval.
June 1964         The Cherry Point, North Carolina, facility
                  recommended a 24-month tour period provided
                  that the aircraft operator would have the
                  option of requesting earlier depot maintenance
                  for aircraft in poor condition.
June 1964         The North Island, California, facility recom-
                  mended a tour period of 21 months based on
                  condition of aircraft processed in the F-4
                  program up to that time.
June 1964         NAVAIR's Pacific representative recommended
                  a 21-month tour period based, in part, on the
                  following factors:  (1) usage required strin-
                  gent corrosion control and (2) the deployment
                  cycle of the F-4 aircraft was estimated at
                  21] months.




                               50
APPENDIX III                                     APPENDIX III

August 1964     Maintenance conference discussion by all
                attendees, except the Commander, Naval Air
                Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet representative,
                indicated that, based on the materiel condi-
                tion of aircraft arriving for maintenance,
                an increase in the tour period from 15 to
                21 months was justified providing that the
                calendar inspection requirements were real-
                igned, particularly in the area of corrosion
                detection.
October 1964    The Commander of the Atlantic Fleet advised
                NAVAIR that recent depot findings of cracked
                and fatigued structural members did not seem
                to warrant the extension of the F-4 tour
                period.
December 1964   In a message to NAVAIR, the Chief of Naval
                Operations stated that, based in part on the
                recommendation of the Atlantic Fleet Commander
                in October 1964, the 15-month tour period
                would continue. At the same time, the Chief
                recommended that the tour period be reviewed
                at a January 1965 maintenance conference.

May 166         Maintenance conference was held and the North
                Island and Cherry Point facilities were
                assigned responsibility for evaluating the
                feasibility of extending the tour period to
                24 months before the next type commander
                meeting. A North Island engineering division
                head told us that North Island made no study
                in; response to this assignment; however, he
                could not recall specifically why the study
                was not made.
July 1966       McDonnell Aircraft Corporation reiterated its
                March 1964 recommendation that the tour
                period be increased to 24 months.
March 1967      At a maintenance review conference, McDonnell
                Aircraft Corporation presented two alternate
                tour period extension proposals--one to 18
                months, the other to 20 months. The conferees
                recommended that the extension to 20 months
                be deferred pending a materiel condition
                analysis of F-4B aircraft operating under an
                interim 20-month tour period criterion imple-
                mented the same month.



                             51
APPENDIX III                                      APPENDIX III

August 1967      North Island recommended that the tour period
                 be permanently extended to 20 months on the
                 basis of a materiel condition analysis.
December 1967    Cherry Point recommended that the tour period
                 be established at 20 months. It recommended
                 also that the feasibility of further exten-
                 sions be studied.
April 1968       The tour period was permanently extended to
                 20 months.
March 1969       Air Force study stated that a 36 to 40 main-
                 tenance cycle for F-4 is warranted.
April 1970       F-4B and F-4J interval extended to 24 months.
September 1971   Interim Navy study recommended retaining
                 24-month interval for F-4B and going to
                 30-month interval for F-4J.
September 1972   F-4J interval extended to 30 months (directed
                 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense)
                 F-4B, F-4G, F-4N, RF-4B interval maintained
                 at 24 months.
January 1973     F-4Bs start to be converted to F-4Ns, after
                 service life extension maintenance interval
                 is 24 months.
March 1976       F-4J interval extended to 36 months or 960
                 flight hours.




                             52
APPENDIX IV                                           APPENDIX IV



                      PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

                 RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING

              ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT


                                             Tenure of office
                                             From          To

                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
    Dr. Harold Brown                    Jan. 1977     Present
    Donald H. Rumsfeld                  Nov. 1975     Jan. 1977
    James R. Schlesinger                July 1973     Nov. 1975
    William P. Clements, Jr.
       (acting)                         Apr. 1973     July 1973
    Elliott L. Richardson               Jan. 1973     Apr. 1973
    Melvin R. Laird                     Jan. 1969     Jan. 1973
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
    Charles W. Duncan, Jr.              Jan.   1977   Present
    William P. Clements, Jr.            Feb.   1973   Jan. 1977
    Kenneth Rush                        Feb.   1972   Jan. 1973
    Vacant                              Jan.   1972   Feb. 1972
    David Packard                       Jan.   1969   Dec. 1971

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND
  LOGISTICS):
    Dr. John P. White                   May 1977      Present
    Carl W. Clewlow (acting)            Apr. 1977     May 1977

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
  (note a):
    Dale R. Babione (acting)            Jan.   1977   Apr.   1977
    Frank A. Shrontz                    Feb.   1976   Jan.   1977
    John J. Bennett (acting)            Apr.   1975   Feb.   1976
    Arthur I. Mendolia                  Apr.   1973   Mar.   1975
    Hugh McCullough (acting)            Jan.   1973   Rpr.   1973
    Barry Shillito                      Feb.   1969     n.   1973




                               53
APPENDIX IV                                             APPENDIX IV


                                             Tenure of office
                                             From          To

                    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
    W. Graham Claytor, Jr.              Feb.     1977    Present
    Gary D. Penisten (acting)           Feb.     1977    Feb.  1977
    Joseph T. McCullum (acting)         Feb.     1977    Feb.  1977
    David R. MacDonald (acting)         -an.     1977    Feb.  1977
    J. William Middendorf               June     1974    Jan.  1977
    J. William Middendorf (acting)      Apr.     1974    June  1974
    John W. Warner (acting)             May      1972    Apr.  1974

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:
    R. James Woolsey                   Mar.     1977     Present
    Vacant                             Feb.     1977     Mar.  1977
    David R. MacDonald                 Sept.    1976     Feb.  1977
    John Bowers (acting)               July     1976     Aug.  1976
    Vacant                             Mar.     1976     June  1976
    David S. Potter                    Aug.     1974     Mar.  1976
    Vacant                             June     1974     Aug.  1974
    J. William Middendorf              June     1973     June  1974

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):
    Vacant                             Apr.     1977     Present
    Dr. John J. Eennett                Sept.    1976     Apr.  1977
    Jack L. Bowers                     June     1973     Sept. 1976

                 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:
     John C. Stetson                    Apr.     1977     Present
     Thomas C. Reed                     Jan.     1976     Apr.  1977
     James W. Plummer (acting)          Nov.     1975     Jan.  1976
     John L. McLucas                    July     1973     Nov.  1975
     John L. McLucas (acting)           May      1973     July  1973
     Robert C. Seamans, Jr.             Feb.     1969     May   1973

UNDER SECRETARY OF' THE AIR FORCE:
     John J. Martin (acting)            Apr.     1977     Present
     Vacant                             Nov.     1976     Apr.  1977
     James W. pl mmer                   Dec.     1973     Nov.  1976
     Vacant                             July     1973     Dec.  1973
     John L. McLucas                    Mar.     1969     July 1973




                               54
 APPENDIX IV                                         APPENDIX   V

                                           Tenure of office
                                           From          To

 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
   (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS, AND
   INSTALLATIONS):
     Joe Meis (acting)                  July 1977    Present
     James P. Goode (acting)            Jan. 1977    July 1977
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AR FORCE
  (ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS):
    John J. Martin                      July 1977    Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
  (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS) (note b):
    Vacant                             May    1977   July    1977
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)         Jan.   1977   May     1377
    J. Gordon Knapp                    Mar.   1976   Jan.    1977
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)         Feb.   1976   Mar.    1976
    Frar.k A. Shrontz                  Oct.   1973   Feb.    1976
    Richard J. Keegan (acting)         Aug.   1973   Oct.    1973
    Lewis E. Turner (acting)           Oct.   1972   Aug.    1973
    Philip N. Whittaker                May    1969   Sept.   1972
a/As of April 1977, this area became the responsibility of
  the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve
  Affairs and Logistics).
b/As of July 1977, this area became the responsibility of
  the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition and
  Logistics).




(947256)


                             55