oversight

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Thailand: Ways to Improve Future Withdrawal Operations

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1977-11-01.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES




Withdrawal Of U.S.
Forces From Thailand:
Ways To Improve Future
Withdrawal Operations
This "'POrt is the unclassified version of
GAO's SECRET report lCD·n-402, dated
June 3, 19n.

Because of changing conditions in Southeast
Asia, the GoYernment of Thailand requested
that U.S. forces be removed from Thailand.
Actions taken by the Departments of Defense
and State to carry this out were generally
effective and millions of dollars worth of
material was successfully redistributed to fill
requirements at other U.S. activities.




LCO·77446                                  NOVEMBER 1, 1977
                                                                               ·-1




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          8-133258




          To the President of the Senate and the
          Speaker of the House of Representatives
               This report is the unclassified version of our secret
          report, dated June 3, 1977 (LCD-77-402). It discusses the
          actions taken to overcome difficulties encountered in the
          withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand and suggests ways
          to avoid similar problems in future withdrawals.
               It is one of a series of GAO-initiated reviews of the
          withdrawals of U.S. forces from foreign countries. Our
          objectives were to monitor the withdrawal operations, make
          suggestions for prompt corrective action on problems en-
          countered, and recommend ways to improve future withdrawal
          operations.
               We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting
          Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act
          of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).
               We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary
          of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the
          Air Force.




                                                         ((,.fft
                                                             II"
                                         ACTING Comptro1i'er General
                                                of the United States
COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S                      WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS                     FROM THAILAND: WAYS TO
                                           IMPROVE FUTURE WITHDRAWAL
                                           OPERATIONS
                                           Departments of Defense
                                             and State

             DIGEST
             Because of changing conditions in Southeast
             Asia. the Royal Thailand Government asked
             the United States to withdraw its combLt
             forces from Thailand. At that time. March
             1975. 27.000 military personnel were
             authorized for six bases and other facili-
             ties throughout the country. The phase-
             down resulted in U.S. force levels being
             reduced to less than 250 as of July 20.
             1976. (See p. 1.)
             Although a massive U.S. military force had
             been deployed to Thailand--about 46.300
             in 1969--agreements authorizing such a
             force were minimal. This was particu-
             larly true regarding most of the military
             facilities constructed there and the dis-
             position of the equipment assigned to them.
             Meanwhile. the Thai Government controlled
             the bases and the transportation facilities
             used by U.S. forces. Given these conditions.
             the Thai Government could have made the with-
             drawal operation much less successful. (See
             p. 4.) However. through the cooperation of
             the Thai Government and agreements reached
             during phasedown and withdrawal. the opera-
             t ion was successful. (See p. 5.)
             One of the objectives of the phasedown was
             to maintain the best possible relations
             with Thailand. This was to be achieved
             in part by leaving operable facilities
             and by withdrawing only those items for
             which a valid U.S. need existed. (See
             p. 6.)

             Items reported as excess to U.S. needs
             were turned over to the Thai Government.
             At five Royal Thailand Air Force bases

Itar sr:e.should
cover da
            Upon removal. the ,.,ort
                be noted hereon.
                                       i                    LCD-77-446
included in our review. major items trans-
ferred were valued at over $12.6 million.
and secondary items transferred were
valued at over $19 million. GAO found
that. generally. these items were excess
to U.S. requirements and could not be
economi<ally removed from Thailand. Over
$204 million (acq~isition value) in real
property improvements was left at these
five bases. (See p. 10.)
A communications system and a stoc~pile
of ammunition remain in Thailand. Some
of the communications equipment is not
exceSE to U.S. needs. However. the Thai
Government also has a requirement for
these items. Components of the communica-
tions system not excess to U.S. needs are
being left at no cost to Thailand under a
3-year bailment agreement with the Thai Govern-
ment. The Thai Government will in turn provide
communications services in Thailand to the
United States at no cost. The Thai Govern-
ment agreed to purchase the ammunition over a
3-year period. Details of the sale are cur-
rently being negotiated. (See p. 15.)
Withdrawal of U.S. material from Thailand
was generally effective. Incorporating
lessons learned in previous phasedowns.
the Department of Defense attempted to
withdraw only material for which valid
requirements existed. (See p. 17.)
Although GAO found that some improvements
are needed in planning. maraging. and
coordinating withdrawal operations. mil-
lions of dollars of material was distri-
buted to Pacific bases and to other U.S.
installations to satisfy valid requirements.
(See p. 23.)
In view of the amount of material involved
and the short amount of time available. the
withdrawal operation was commendable.




                      ii
RECOMMENDATIONS
Future withdrawals and associated programs
could be improved by applying the lessons
learned from the Thailand and prior with-
drawals.
The Secretary of Defense should:
--Direct that definite criteria for the
  peacetime withdrawal of U.S. forces from
  other countries be established. This
  should include pOlicies and pro~~dures
  for scaled as well as complete withdrawals.
--Designate a single manager responsible for
  coordinating withdrawal operations.
--Designate at each closing base a team under
  a manager with knowledg~ of overall defense
  requirements and give this team authority
  to immediately withdraw or dispose of as-
  sets.
Because of changing circumstances agreements
may have to be modified, but they do provide
a basis for mutual unierstandings, intentions,
and rights of the participating parties.
In negotiating future basing agreements, the
Secretary of Defense should, in c00peration
with the Secretary of State, include provi-
sions for protecting U.S. investments,
either through their return or appropriate
compensation for them, and for moving retro-
grade material without hindrance.
AGENCY COMMENTS
The Department of Defense concurred with the
above recommendations. Its comments have
been incorporated where appropriate through-
out the reporT, and the comments relating to
the recommendations are in appendix VII.
GAO discussAd the report with State Department
officials, and they concurred with its recom-
mendat ions. Tile i r comments i.ave al so been
include~ where appropriate.



                      iii
Although the Departments of Defense and State
concurred with the recommendations. GAO
recognizes that implementation may take some
time. GAO will therefore continue to monitor
the implementation of these recommendations.




                      iv
                         Con t e n t s

DIGEST                                                   i

CHAPTER
   1       INTRODUCTION                                  1
               Scope of review                           3

   2       IMPACT OF CHANGING POLITICAL SCENE IN
             SOUTHEAST ASIA ON PHASEDOWN AND
             WITHDRAWAL POLICIES                         4
               Agreements for withdrawal of U.S.
                 forces from Thailand                    5
               Military planning not directed to
                 complete withdrawal                     6
               Political considerations of the
                 phasedown and withdrawal                6
               Conclusions                               8
               Recommendations                           9
               Agency comments                           9

   3       TRANSFERS TO THE ROYAL THAILAND GOVERNMENT   10
               Screening procedures for disposing of
                 U.S. assets in Thailand                10
               Material turned over to Thailand         10
               Thai requirements for excess mat~rial
                 were not considered before turnover    11

   4       COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION
             REMAINING IN THAILAND                      15
               Communications equipment                 15
               Ammunition                               16

   5       RETROGRADE PROGRAM                           17
               More precise policy guidance needed to
                 improve the retrograde program         17
               Other management improvements            19
                   Requirements determinations          19
                   Information systems                  20
                   Retrograde teams                     21
               Conclusions                              23
               Recommendations                          24
               Agency comments                          24

APPENDIX
   I       GAO reports concerning phasedown and
             withdrawal operations                      25
APPENDIX
  II       Organizations and activities included
             in the review                                27
 III       Seven conditions for the United States to
             remain in Thailand                           28
  IV       Photographs of some of the material
             retrograded                                  30
      V    PACAF assets retrograded from Thailand         33
  VI       Civil engineering items retrograded from
             Thailand                                     34
 VII       Agency comments                                35
VIII       Principal officials responsible for
             administration of activities dis-
             cussed in this report                        37
                             ABBREVIATIONS
GAO        General Accounting Office
JUSMAG-T   Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group. Thailand
MACTHAI    U.S. Military Assistance Command. Thailand
PACAF      Pacific Air Force
RTG        Royal Thailand Government
                         CHAPTER 1
                       INTRODUCTION
     Because of changing conditions in Southeast Asia. the
Royal Thailand Government (RTG) stated on March 19. 1975.
that U.S. combat forces had to be removed from Thailand by
March 1976. At that time there were 27.000 U.S. military
personnel authorized for six bases and other facilities
throughout Thailand. Although the March 1976 deadline
imposed by the RTG (later extended to July 1976) was the
first definite withdrawal date. a phasedown of U.S. forces
had begun in 1969. The phasedown. accelerated around May
1975 after the fall of Cambodia and Vietnam. resulted in
U.S. troop level reductions from a high of 46.277 in 1969
to less than 250 as of July 20. 1976. (A map on the fol-
lowing page shows the five bases formerly used by U.S.
forces in Thailand that were included in our review.)
     The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand resulted
in the transfer of millions of dollars worth of facilities
and the disposition of related U.S. material. We have
previously reported II that the United States had spent
hundreds of millions-of dollars for major construction
or improvements of air bases. troop facilities. communi-
cation lines. and other facilities in Thailand since
fiscal year 1965. Title to these facilities was vested in
the RTG. The turnover of these facilities to the RTG
an( the withdrawal of U.S. forces made available for dis-
tribution to U.S. and Thai activities a large volume of
material.
     The objective of our review wal: to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the withdrawal from Thailand. Specifically.
we examined (1) the impact of the changing political
scene on U.S. withdrawal policies. (2) procedures for
identifying assets in Thailand for retrograde 21 and for
turnover to the RTG. and (3) the control and use of sup-
plies. equipment. and other assets removed trom Thailand.


I/"Restrictions on U.S. Procurement Activities in Thailand"
- (B-133258. June 5. 1974) and "U.S. Assistance and Other
  Expeditures Benefiting Thailand" (B-133258. Apr. 7. 1975).
2/Retrograde refers to the actions taken to return to the
- supply system material that has been deployed to forward
  areas.
                              1
        BASES fORMERLY USED BY U.S. FORCES
           AND INCLUDED IN OUR REVIEW


BURMA




                             UDORN •



              THAILAND


                                         • UBON

                               • KORAT




              --IE   BANGKOK




                                                  • Bases
                                                  iii Capital



                         2
      During our 1975 examination of the withdrawal from
Thailand. we saw a need for more precise policy guidance
for program managers in Thailand. Accordingly. on August 6,
1975, we issued a l~tter to the Secretary of Defense concern-
ing this issue. This and our prior reports concerning with-
drawals from France. Libya, and Vietnam are listed in ap-
pendix I.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
     Our I:eport is based on work done during base Closures
in Thailand in mid-1975 and fieldwork done during May and
June 1976 at military activities in Hawaii. Thailand, the
Philippines. and Korea. We visited. among others. the Com-
mander in Chief. Pacific; Pacific Air Forces (PACAF); U.S.
Forces. Korea; and PACAF bases. We also contacted Embassy
officials in Thailand. Our review included discussions with
responsible officials, observation of retrograde opera-
tions in Thailand, and visits to recipients of material
retrog.aded from Thailand. We concentrated on the Air Force
retrograde operations. since this service had most of the
U.S. assets in Thailand. Our evaluation was based primarily
on operations conducted between July 1975 and July 1976.
A complete list of activities visiced is included in appen-
dix II.




                              3
                           CHAPTER 2
                  IMPACT OF CHANGING POLITICAL
                   SCENE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON
                PHASEDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL POLICIES
     In 1969 the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand summed up the
u.s. agreements with the Royal Thailand Government in hear-
ings before the SUbcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. He noted that with the exception of
facilities built with Military As~istance Program funds,
a few communications facilities. and the equipment and
facilities covered by the Special Logistic Action Thailand
Agreement. the United States had no written agreements with
the RTG regarding the ownership of the military facilities
in Thailand. There were no American bases in Thailand;
instead, with the approval of the RTG. the United States
improved and expanded bases and facilities controlled by
the RTG. Land owned by the RTG was made available free
of charge. When land had to be acquired for these purposes,
the United States helped pay for it. The RTG retained title
to the land and permitted the United States to use Thai bases
and facilities rent-free. As U.S. forces were withdrawn from
Thailand. the disposition of these facilities was to be dis-
cussed and negotiated with the RTG.
     Many of the Thailand contractors working for the United
States were partly or completelY under RTG control. There-
fore. the RTG could have almost completely controlled the
withdrawal. particularly through those contractors who
handled the road transportation outside U.S. bases and load-
ing activities at the ports.
     In a 1974 report to the Congress on procurement
activities in Thailand. 11 we noted that a lack of U.S.
control over access to Thai military bases and a lack of
flexibility in selecting transportation resources had led
to excessive costs for U.S. operations in Thailand. We
recommended that the Secretaries of State and Defense
negotiate agreements with the RTG that would have resolved
the problems of access to bases and limited transportation


~/See   footnote, p. 1.

                                4
flexibility. However. attempts to reach flexible arrange-
ments were not successful beca'lse the RTG did not consider
the costs excessive.
AG~EEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF U.S. FORCES PROM THAILAND
     On September 30. 1969. the United States and Thailand
announced that about 6.000 U.S. military personnel would be
withdrawn from Thailand. Turnover of buildings and facili-
ties had begun in fiscal year 1968. The two governments
said they would continue to evaluate the size of the U.S.
force in Thailand. In 1969 the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
said that both governments agreed that there would have to
be compelling reasons for U.S. forces to remain in Thailand
following a satisfactory solution to the current hostilities.
From late 1969 to early 1915. the United States continued to
lower troop levels in Thailand and to turn over facilities
to the RTG in response to the changing U.S. military posture
in Southeast Asia.
      On March 19. 1915. the RTG announced a national policy
of seeking better relations with its neighbors by having U.S.
combat troops withdrawn from Thailand within a year. After
the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1915. the
United States and Thailand. on May 5. 1915. announced a reduc-
tion in authorized military strength from 21.000 to 19.500.
During November 1915 through March 1916 discussions. the
United States and Thailand failed to reach any understanding
on a U.S. residual force to remain in Thailand after March 20.
1976.
     On Feburary 4. 1916. the RTG informed the U.S. Ambassador
that all U.S. forces had to be withdrawn by March 20. 1976.
and that any remaining after that date could do so only on
the basis of certain agreed principles. The text of the RTG
announcement. including the seven principles. is provided in
appendix III. During the week of March 15 to 19. 1976. U.S.
and Thai officials reportedly discussed procedures to allow
a residual U.S. force to remain. After the United States
and Thailand failed to agree on the status of the residual
force. the RTG on March 20 ordered all remaining U.S. mili-
tary forces (except 210 military advisors. the Defense At-
tache Office. and Marine Corps Embassy guards) out of
Thailand by July 20. 1976. This force level was reduced to
less than 250 by this date.




                               5
MILITARY PLANNING NOT DIRECTED
TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
     Early in the negotiations. the United States considered
the March 20. 1976. withdrawal date flexible and did not key
overall phasedown policies and procedures to this date.

                     deleted

                         At the request of the Joint Chiefs
or Staff, an accelerated phasedown plan was developed by
MACTHAI. On November 14, 1975, an amended accelerated plan
was approved. Under this plan. U.S. forces would drop to
3,075 personnel and 25 aircraft by July 1976. Given these
military personnel and aircraft levels and planned phase-
downs, the closeout schedule for the remaining bases (ex-
cluding certain facilities used for intelligence operations)
was:
                                             Amended
   Base                                  accelerated plan
Ubon                                     Close 6/75
Nakhon Phanom            deleted         Close 2/76
Udorn                                    Close 3/76
Korat                                    Close 3/76
U-Tapao                                  Open indefinitely

     The approved plans were for the phasedown. not with-
drawal of U.S. forces. Pacific Command officials said that.
once approved. the accelerated plan was used for closing
bases. reducing forces. and retrograding or turning over
material. The plan was changed only when the RTG on March
20. 1976. ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from
Thailand. resulting in the closure of U-Tapao and the
intelligence bases.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF
THE PHASEOOWN AND WITHDRAWAL
      According to U.S. Embassy officials in Thailand. one
 of the objectives of the phasedown and withdrawal was to
 maintain the best possible relations with Thailand. This
 was to be achieved in part by leaving facilities operable
,and by,retrograding only items fo which there was a valid
 U.S. need. The RTG position had always been that facilities
                                   6



                                                  .""
used by U.S. military forces in Thailand were the property
of the RTG and would remain after the withdrawal of U.S.
forces.
     There were reasons for maintaining good relations with
Thailand. After more than 20 years of close political • • ili-
tary. and economic relations, the United States did not want
to give Thailand or other nations the impression that we
were abandoning Southeast Asia after the loss of Cambodia
and Vietnam. State Department officials believe reassurance
was particularly important to Thailand because developments
in Southeast Asia would cause Thai perceptions of their
national security threat to become more severe. Also. the
RTG controlled customs operations, the bases used by the
United States, and most of the transportation facilities
needed to retrograde material from Thailand.
     Pacific Command officials knew of no instances of RTG
customs officials refusing to clear retrograde material for
shipment from Thailand. They did acknowledge. however. that
there were customs and stevedore slowdowns and that le~s
RTG-controlled trucking was available. However. Pacific
Command officials did not consider these problems to be
severe.
     To demonstrate our continued support for Thailand. the
Embassy and MACTHAI transferred a communications system to
the RTG and offered to sell it an ammunition stockpile. ( See
ch. 4.) According to
                           deleted
                         and. along with the transfer of
facilities and equipment, benefited the withdrawal. Pacific
Command officials said that whatever the United States
transferred to Thailand be~efited the withdrawal.
                           deleted

     The United States left hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of facilities and facility improvements in Thailand.
Although Pacific Command officials believe that turning
these facilities over to the RTG facilitated the withdrawal.
we believe that. in the absence of written agreements cover-
ing the disposition of these facilities. there were few
alternatives.


                              7
     In negotiating ba.ing agreement., the United State.
should anticipate and e.tabli.h a firm ba.is' for the eventual
turnover of property and retrograde of ..ater ial. In, a 1972
report to the Congres., 1/ we pointed out .ome proble... the
united States was having-in reaching agreement on the value
of property returned to other governMent.. We concluded
that the failure of U.S. efforts to obtain payMents from
France for improvements to properties released in 1967 de~on­
strated the importance of establishing agreements on settling
the value of residual property. We also concluded that the
residual value problems in Germany could SUddenly be Magnified
many times if there was any large-scale withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Germany.
CONCLUSIONS
     On March 19, 1975, the RTG requested that U.S. combat
forces be removed from Thailand within a year. Early in
negotiations the United States considered the March 20,
1976, withdrawal date flexible and did not key overall phase-
down policies and procedures to this date. Although the with-
drawal was accomplished and U.S. material worth millions of
dollars was retrograded, the operation probably could have
been carried out more efficiently (see ch. 5) if the United
States had developed and followed definite criteria that pro-
vided for the complete withdrawal of U.S. combat forces by
the spec i f ied date. If lleeded, these cr iter ia and associated
policies and procedures could have been modified to meet a
changed RTG attitude.
     The United States deployed over 46,000 military person-
nel to Thailand and spent millions of dollars for equipment
and facilities to support them. Most of this was done with-
out regard to agreements authorizing such a force and pro-
tecting U.S. investments. Given that there were only minimal
agreements and the RTG controlled the bases and most of the
transportation facilities used by U.S. forces, the RTG could
have made the withdrawal much less successful. Although
Pacific Command officials did not consider the slowdown
actions to be severe problems, they could have been and
probably should have been anticipated.


l/"Efforts by the United States to Obtain Agreement on the
- Value of Improvements on Properties Returned to the Federal
  Republic of Germany· (8-156489, June 9, 1972).


                                8
      We recogni.e that becau.e of changing circum.tance••
agreement. may have to be modified. Bowever. they do pro-
vide.a basis for mutual under.tandings. intentions. and
rights of the partie. involved when ~ification. are neces-
sary.
RECOMMENDATIONS
     To effectively apply some of the lessons learned from
the Thailand withdrawal and prior withdrawals. we recom.end
that the Secretary of Defense direct that definite criteria
for the peacetime withdrawal of U.S. forces from foreign
countries be established. These criteria should include
policies and procedures for scaled as well as complete with-
drawals.
     We also reco...nd that in negotiGting future basing
agreements. the secretary of Defense. in cooperation with
the Secretary of State. include provisions for protecting
U.S. investments. either through their return or appropriate
compensation. and for moving retrograde material without
hindrance.
AGENCY COMMENTS
      The Department of Defense concurred with our recommen-
dation regarding the establishment of definite criteria for
the peacetime withdr~wal of U.S. forces from foreign
countries. The State Department and the Department of De-
fense agreed that provisions for protecting U.S. investments
and moving retrograde material are important elements of a
forei.gn basing agreement. The State Department did. however.
note that including these provisions depends on thp. host
country. According to the State Department. the RTG did not
consider agreements on these issues necessary to the purpose
for which we sought the use of Thai military bases.




                              9
                          CHAPTER 3

          TRAllSrERS TO THE ROYAL THAILAND GOVERNMENT
      A program was established to aake available to the RTG
exce •• defense articles in Th~iland. After U.S.-owned equip-
ment and supplies in Thailand were screened against U.S. re-
quirements and were deter.ined not to be needed. the itea.
were ~ade available to the RTG at no cost under Excess De-
fense Article Procedure.. At the five Royal Thailand Air
Force bases included in our review. iteMs worth about
$32 .illion were transferred without determining that the
RTG needed all the items. Generally. we found that these
items were excess to U.S. requirements or were not economi-
cal to retrograde.
SCREENING PROCEDURES POR DISPOSING
OF U.S. ASSETS IN THAILAND
      The screening procedures u.ed to transfer the excess
material were designed to make certain that all known U.S.
Government requirements for an item were filled before it
was made available to the RTG. The system allowed items
to be screened by (1) the service inventory manager for the
service requirements. (2) the Defense European Pacific
Redistribution agency for all other Department of Defense
requirements. and (3) the Defense Pr~perty Disposal Office
in Thailand for other U.S. Government needs. Screening
time was reduced from the normal 45 days to 15 days and
finally to 5 days near the end of the withdrawal. Once
an itam had been screened and no requirements for it had
been identified. it was declared an Excess Defense Article
and could be offered without charge to the RTG. After
April 15. 1976. primarily at U-Tapao Air Force Base. serv-
ice retrograde teaas were given the authority to declare
items excess on the spot. This expedited the process of
reporting items for disposition.
MATERIAL TURNED 0VER TO THAILAND
     Over $235 .illion worth of real property improvements
(buildings and other facilities' items) and personal property
(major items such as vehicles and secondary items such as re-
pair partE and furniture) was turned over to the RTG. The
following is a summary as of June 10. 1976. of the acquisi-
tion value of property turned over at five Royal Thailand
Air Force bases formerly used by the U.S. Air Force.


                              10
  Base          Real property        Mljor    Secondery     ToUl
                                        (000 omitted )
U-Tapao           $102.200      $ 5.526        $ 6.629    $114.355
Korat               36.600        2.420          4.102      43.122
Nakhon Phanom       25.500        1.953          3.463      30.916
Udorn               22.600        2.289          J.69:>     28.584
Ubon                17 .100         469          1.325      18.894
    Total         $204.000      $12.657        $19.214    $235.871
     The items turned over to the RTG were generally in poor
condition. Most major ite~s turned over were coded as re-
Quiring repairs equal to at least 26 percent of acquisition
value. Most secondary items turned over were not economical
LO r~trograde because their value was not great compared to
the cost of packing and shipping them. Photographs of some
of the vehicles and furniture accepted by the RTG are
presented on the following pages.
     Some facilities that could have been removed and that
the Defense Department could use were left in place. For
example. as U-Tapao was being closed. the RTG requested that
99 facilities be left for RTG forces after the United States
departed. These facilities included pceengineered buildings
which were retrogradable and in good condition. The United
States had identified a requirement for 37 of these buildings;
however. to comply with the RTG request. suitable replacement
buildings were obtained from U-Tapao and other bases to
satisfy U.S. requirments.
THAI REQUIREMENTS FOR EXCESS MATERIAL
WERE NOT CONSIDERED BEFORE TURNOVER
     The Pacific Command instructed military officials in
Thailand to make certain that the RTG had requirements for
items turned over under Excess Defe~se Article procedures.
According to MACTHAI officials. however. because of the
large volume of material turned over in a short period.
they did not have enough personnel to determine that all
items turned over were needed. MACTUAI officials said
they provided a list of the items available. and the RTG
selected the items it wanted. The RTG generally accepted
most of the items; the RTG need was identified only after
the items had actually been turned over. The RTG informed
the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group. Thailand (JUSMAG-T).
of its disposition of the items by service component.

                                11
VEHICLES TURNED OVER TO THE RTG AT KORAT AIR BASE




                        12
                                              ,   .
                    ,- -



EXTErJSIVELY DAMAGED OFFICE AND DORMITORY EQUIPMENT
TURNED OVER TO THE RTG AT U--TAPAO AIR FORCE BASE

                           13
JUSMAG-T personnel then identified RTG material shortages
and filled them with the excess material. In some cases.
items were turned over for which no shortages had been
identified. These items were placed into a line where
shortages of similar items existed.
     According to the records on material transfers to the
RTG. items transferred were generally of marginal service-
ability. Military officials indicated that in some case~
two or three items might be required to make one serviceable
ttem. Although the items turned over are not in good condi-
tion. JUSMAG-T will have to check the end use of these
items and see that an annual inventory is made. In addi-
tion, any items which become excess to RTG requirements
must be disposed of through JUSMAG-T channels.
     We recognize that because of the volume of material
and limited numbers of personnel. determining requirements
before release would have been difficult. We also recognize
that because the RTG controlled transportation resources.
even if an initial requirements determination had been made,
disposing of excess material in Thailand or shipping it
elsewhere for disposal or other allied use might also have
been diff'cult.
     Peal property turned over to the Thais will probably
not be fully used. As we reported !/ in April 1975. the
facilities were designed to meet U.S. requirements and RTG
defense needs, and postwar uses were not considered. We
further stated that the facilities were larger and more
sophisticated than the RTG needed or could maintain.


l/See footnote, p. 1.




                              14
                           CRAPTER 4
            COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION
                    REMAINING IN THAILAND
     To demonstrate continued support for Thailand. the
United States left a communications system and an ammunition
stockpile there. Some of the communications equipment is
not excess to U.S. needs. However. the RTG also has require-
ments for the items. The noncxcess communications material
was initially offered to Thailand through the Foreign Mili-
tary Sales Program, but they elected not to accept the offer.
The nonexcess communications equipment is being left in
Thailand under a 3-year bailment agr~ement. The Thai Govern-
ment agreed to purchase the ammunition stockpile over a 3-
year period.
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
     Thailand and the U.S. military used the U.S.-owned
Integrated Communications System in Thailand. At the time
of the U.S. withdrawal a determination was made to leave
a usable 60-channel system in Thailand.
     The value of the communications network is about
$7 million. Of this total. $1.9 million represents radios
excess to U.S. needs and about $1.8 million represents
channel equipment not excess to U.S. needs. The remaining
items include nonexcess generators and other communications
equipment.



                       deleted



     Under a proposed United States and Thailand agreement.
the communications system is being left at no cost to Thai-
land under a 3-year bailment agreement with the RTG. The
RTG will in turn provide communications services in Thailano
to the United States at no cost. The bailment agreement may
be renewed at the ena of the 3-year perioa. Components not
excess to U.S. requirements may be sold to or removed from
Thailand if the bailment agreement is not renewed.

                                 15
AMMUNITION




                         deleted




      In April 1976. after the RTG decision to have U.S.
forces completely withdraw from Thailand. the ammunition
stOCK': were offered to the RTG under the Foreign Military
Sales Program. Althou9h the RTG wanted to purchase the
stocks, they did not have the funds immediately available.
The RTG identified certain stocks they did not desire, and
these were retrograded.


                          deleted




                              16
                         CHAPTBR 5
                     RBTROGRADB PROGRAM
      Although program man.gers h.d to work within political
.nd time con.traint. and with. ch.nging ph••edown oper.tion.
the retrograde of U.S.-owned a ••et. in Th.il.nd w•• gen-
er.lly .ff.ctive. Million. of doll.r. worth of .ssets were
di.tributed to pacific Air Porce b•••••nd other Dep.rt-
ment of Defen.e recipient•• thus precl. ~ing expenditures
for simil.r item.. (App. IV shows som~ ,f the m.teri.l
retrogr.ded.)
     We believe. however. that b.sed on the lessons
le.rned fro. th~ Thail.nd experience. future phasedowns
.nd .ssociated retrogr.de progr.ms could be enh.nced by
(I) providing earlier. more precise policy guid.nce. (2)
design.ting • single m.n.ger. with .ufficient .uthority
to ••ke i . .@di.te deci.ions. to coordin.te retrograde
oper.tions. (3) giving this single m.naget retrograde
te••s .t each closing b.se with knowled~e of overall Dep.rt-
ment of Defense requirement. and .uthority to dispose of
•••ets immedi.tely ••nd (4) .ccur.tely determining require-
mentF for retrogr.de ••teri.l.
MORB PRBCISB POLICY GUIDANCB NBEDED
TO fMpROVE THE RETROGRADE PROGRAM
     Initi.lly. there w•• in.dequ.te policy guidance con-
cerning ph.sedown oper.tions .nd b.se closures after the
RTG .nnounced th.t U.S. forces h.d to be removed. Also.
the Dep.rtment of Defense did not design.te a single manager
respon.ible for coordin.ting withdrawal operations or dis-
posing of m.teri.l. Consequently. there was no overall
pl.n for coordin.ting or man.ging the retrograde operations.
      Re.pon.ibility for operations during the early stages
of the ph.sedown shifted .mong the Departments of State and
Defense. the v.rious services. the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.
elements within MACTRAI ••nd v.rious b.se program managers.
As • result ••lthough there were plans for closing bases.
these pl.n. were not integr.ted into an overall plan for
coordin.ting and directing the movement of personnel. a~­
sets ••nd supplies out of Th.il.nd.
     According to Defense Dep.rtment managers in Thailand.
their prim.ry problem during the initial phasedown was a
l.ck of policy guid.nce and decisions from higher commands.
                             17
They were concerned that delay. in deci.ion. about clo.ura.
woul~ lessen the chances of ordarly withdrawal••
     Some of the problems resulting fro. the lack of guidance
from higher commands were:
    --Udorn Air Base Officials had 4,600 short ton. of
      ammunition to move out of Thailand. The ba.e wa.
      closing down, but base .unitions personnel were not
      given advance information on the transportation plan.
      to move the ammunition because these plan. were
      developed on a daily basi. depending on the avail-
      ability of RTG-controlled transportation resource••
        --The MACTHAI Support Group wa. responsible for provid-
          ing in-country transportation but could only react
          to service requests. Under this arrange. .nt, the
          moveMent and storage of retrograde was hindered by
          the Group's inability to adequately plan require.ent••



                             deleted




    --The fall of Vietna. efiectivity eliminated the Coast
      Guard's LORAN (navigation system) mission in Thailand.
      On May 9, 1975, a week before receiving the expected
      authorization for LORAN closings, tbe E.bassy re-
      quested that no further action be taken for political
      reasons. On June 23, 1975, we found that the Coast
      Guard was still waiting for autborization to leave,
      while an Embassy official thought they were leaving.
      After we notified the E~assy of this situation, an
      Embassy official advised tbe Coast Guard that there
      were no objections to its withdrawing fro. Thailand.
    --In mid-1975, Defense Department procure.ent agencies
      in Thailand were awarding yearend con.truction con-
      tracts at several base.. At lorat Air Base, the Air
      Force Audit ~gency believed only two of several of

                                 18


                      ...
       the•• ongoing project. for tb. b••• ~.r •••••nti.l
       to oper.tion. ov.r tb. following 6 to 12 .ontb••
     In monitoring tb. e.rly pb•••down oper.tion., w.
recognized th.t more pr.ci•• policy guidanc. wa. n.ed.d.
In an Augu.t 1975 lett.r to tb. S.cr.t.ry of D.f.n•• , 1/ w.
noted that directive. w.re n••d.d to guide progr••••n:
ager. in making prudent jUdgm.nt. about the Tbail.nd r.-
trograde program.
     On November 14, 1975, • pba.edown plan wa. approved
and guidance wa. i ••u.d to offici.l. in Th.iland. In our
opinion. the.e action. improved the .itu.tion.
     Local progr... initially encounter.d by program m.nager.
included: (1) r.qui.ition. for 8-52 bomber .upport item.
were not properly c.nc.l.d after the aircr.ft were red.-
ployed. (2) ba.e .upply comput.r. were r.d.ployed b.for.
the .upply account. were clo••d, (3) it••• of que.tion.ble
value were .chedul.d for retrogr.d., and (4) retrogr.d.
material was improperly p.ck.g.d and .tored. ror the ao.t
part the.e problem. were corr.cted through the e.t.bli.b..nt
of clo.eout office. at tbe b•••• to coordinat. the pb•••down
and withdraw.l operation., ••peri.nce from oth.r ba.e clo-
sures, and re.pon.ivene•• to audit activitie.. A. a re.ult,
bases were clo.ed on ti.e and the nece••ary .aterial retro-
graded.
OTHER MANAGEMENT IMPROVIIIENTS
      In addition to the need for timely policy guidance and
a .single manager to coordinate operation., we believe that
improvement. can be made in requirem.nt. d.termination., in
information .y.tem. for managing and later evaluating the
program's .ucce.s, and in the u•• of retrograde te.ms to
help do .ctu.l r.trograde work at the individu.l b•••••
Requirement. deter.ination.

                         deleted


l/Letter report to the Secret.ry of Defen.e concerning the
- need for more pr.cis. policy guidance for program managers
  in Thail.nd (B-~5945l, Aug. 6, 1975).

                                 19
                         deleted




     After April 15. 1976. toward the end of the withdrawal.
these retrograde teams did not know about all Department of
Defense equipment and supply requirements I therefore. re-
quirements of all services were not fully considered.
     PACAF directed that equipment in Thailand would be
retrograded only to meet valid requirements. Generally.
this policy was followed I however. in some instances
equipment (vehicles. generators. test sets. etc.) and sup-
plies were retrograded to PACAF bases that did not need
the items. This happened because activities had not ac-
curately determined the requirements for retrograde material
before it was shipped.
     We found that more modular dormitories and associated
equipment were retrograded than needed for designated
projects. The Department of Defense has informed us that
it was Air Force policy to retrograde all modular dormi-
tories determine~ to be cost effective for relocation.
The Department of Defense further stated that at the time
of retrograde and our field visits receiving base offi-
cials may not have been informed of this Air Force pOlicy
and the valid requirements for the additional buildings.
     Officials did indicate that the excess material is
available for further redistribution to meet requirements
at other activities. Also. although firm requirements may
not exist for retrograde material. it might be usable in
emergencies. For example. Clark Air Base shipped several
retrograde generators to Guam to be used after Typhoon
Pamela.
Information systems
     No overall system was established for reconciling
total assets retrograded or transferred to the RTG with
total U.S. assets in Thailand. Data on all assets dis-
tributed or the requirements filled by them was not
maintained by each base or a central agency for use by
                              20
manaqera durinq the operationa or for later evaluation of
the complete proqraa.
     MACTHAI maintained liats of major items turned over to
the RTG by all services. However. except for overall statis-
tics in tons. qallons. etc. (as shown in apps. V and VI).
PACAP did not maintain data on the total dollar volume of all
material shipped to its bases or transferred to other orqani-
zations.
     The Department of Defense said that PACAF did maintain
detailed statistics on real property and real property in-
stalled equipment which. accordinq to the Department of
Defense. represented the majority of the .aterial involved.
While it may be true that real property and associated
equipment represented the bulk of the material considered.
it is still only one facet of a total retroqrade proqram.
Detailed data coverinq other material should have also been
developed. Without complete data. reconciliations and sub-
sequent evaluation of the effectiveness of the complete
retroqrade proqram by the Department of Defense will be
difficult.
Retroqrade teams
     In April 1976 a PACAF retroqrade team arrived at
U-Tapao and remained to aid in the actual retrograde work.
This was not done for any other Thailand base closure. On
April 16. 1976. Air Staff qave the teaM authority to im-
mediately dispose of equip..nt and supplies. The team could
declare items excess if they were unserviceable or uneconomi-
cal to retrograde without using screening procedures or con-
tacting the inventory managers. Some equipment was rejected
for shipment on the spot. and other equipment was challenged
and held in suspense pending communication with the int~nded
recipient. The tea. advertised by message certain high-cost
items for which no disposition instructions had been re-
ceived although the item had been screened by a retrograde
team. The pictures on the following page show some equip-
ment the retroqrade team screened for shipment.
     The PACAF retroqrade team challenged shipments to make
certain that .aterial being retrograded met serviceability
standards. that shipping priorities were based on valid
requirements. and that the movement was otherwise cost ef-
fective. The team reportedly downgraded about 25 percent
of U-Tapao retroqrade shipments from air to less costly


                              21
WATER HEATER CHALLENGED BY
RETROGRADE TEAM AND DETER-
MINEO TO BE UNECONOMICAL TO
RETROGRADE.




REFRIGERATOR BOXES CHALLENGED BY RETROGRADE TEAM. FOUND TO BE
ECONOMICAL TO SHIP AFTER CONSULTATION WITH CIVIL ENGINEER .

                              . 22
surface modes. In one instance, auxiliary automatic data
processing equipment items had been justified for air ship-
ment because they were considered too sensitive for surface
transportation. The team questioned the sensitivity of
these auxiliary items, such as key punch, sorter, and col-
lator equipment, and removed them from the more costly air
shipment category.
     The Air Force Audit Agency also helped make the retro-
grade program more successful. For example, the Agency
found that the central medical supply activity for the
Thailand bases assigned the highest priority possible to
every shipment, causing routine items to be shipped ex-
clusively by air. Based on the remaining" tonnage, this
activity saved an estimated $118,000 by following through
on the Audit Agency recommendation to use surface modes to
transport routine items.
CONCLUSIONS
      Initially, there was inadequate policy guidance
concerning withdrawal operations and base closures after
the RTG announcement that U.S. forces were to be removed
from Thailand. Also, no single manager in Thailand had
the authority to make decisions concerning the overall
phasedown and withdrawal. We believe early policy gui.dance
and a single manager are needed to provide for an orderly,
economical operation avoiding many problems encountered
earlier in the withdrawal. In November 1975 a phasedown
plan was approved and guidance was issued to officials in
Thailand. But a single manager was never designated.
     The United States attempted to maintain the best
possible relations with the RTG during the phasedown and
withdrawal. This was achieved in part by leaving the RTG
operable facilities and by removing assets only if there
were valid U.S. requirements for them.
     We believe the withdrawal of U.S. assets from Thailand
was generally effective. Incorporating lessons learned in
previous withdrawals, the Department of Defense attempted
to retrograde only material for which there were valid re-
quirements. Although in some instances retrograded material
was excess to unit needs and shipment was economically ques-
tionable, most material retrograded to activities we visited
satisfied valid requirements and improved the supply post~res
of PACAF bases and other recipients. Considering the amount

                              23
    a
of material involved and the short amount of time available,
the withdrawal operation was commendable.
     The PACAF retrograde team facilitated the ret~ograde
process. After April 16, ]976, the team had authority to
immediately dispose of supplies and equipment. Previously,
this team had visited all bases and identified items to be
retrograded but had not remained to aid in the actual retro-
grade work. We believe that in future phased own operations
a retrograde team with knowledge of overall Defense Depart-
ment requirements should remain at each base being closed
to aid in retrograde.
     We believe that the Defense Department could improve
future withdrawals and associated retrograde programs by
applying the lessons learned from the Thailand ·and prior
withdrawals.
RECOMMENDATIONS
     In addition to our recommendation in chapter 2 regarding
the establishment of.definite criteria for peacetime with-
drawals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
        --Designate a single manager responsible for coordinating
          retrograde operations.
        --Designate at each closing base a retrograde team under
          a retrograde manager with knowledge of overall Defense
          requirements and give this team authority to im-
          mediately retrograde or dispose of assets.
AGENCY COMMENTS
     The Department of Defense concurred with our recommenda-
tions. They did, however, note that the retrograde teams
will be responsive to existing systems for determining Defense
requirements and recommending changes to the system when
necessary. They added that the team's authority to dis-
pose of assets cannot be arbitrary but must be within the
limitations of Defense-approved systems. We agree; this was
within the intent of our recommendation.




                                 24
APPENDIX I                                           APPENDIX I



                     GAO REPORTS CONCERNING
               PHASEDOWN AND WITHDRAWAL OPERATIONS
FRANCE
        Letter report to the Secretary of Defense proposing that
        additional war reserve stocks be stored in the United
        Kingdom. B-162488, Sept. 26. 1967 (Classified report).
        "Movement of American Forces from France (Operation
        FRELOC)," B-161507. Aug. 7. 1968 (Unclassified report).
        "Army and Air Force Controls Over Inventories in Europe,"
        B-16l507. June 30.1969 (Unclassified report).
GERMANY
        Report to the Secretary of Defense, "Survey of United
        States Ammunition Storage Facilities in Germany."
        B-163l43, Jan. 3, 1968 (Classified report).
        Report to the Congress, "Efforts by the United States
        to Obtain Agreement on the Value of Improvements on
        Properties Returned to the Federal Republic of Germany."
        B-156489, June 9, 1972 (Classified report).
LIBYA
        Letter report on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Libya.
        B-159835, Aug. 28. 1970 (Classified report).
THAILAND
        Report to the Congress, "Restrictions on U.S. Procure-
        ment Activities in Thailand," B-1332~8, June 5. 1974
        (Classified report).
      Letter report to the Secretary of Defense concerning the
      need for more precise policy guidance for program man-
      agers in Thailand, B-159451. Aug. 6. 1975 (Classified
                                                  report).
VIETNAM
        "First Review of Phasedown of United States rHlitary
        Activities in Vietnam." B-171579, Mar. IS, 1971
        (Unclassified report).


                                 25
APPENDIX I                                        APPENDIX I



     "Second Review of Phasedown of united States Military
     Activities in Vietnam." B-17l579. Aug. 9, 1971
     (Unclassified report).
     "Logistic Aspects of Vietnamization--1969-72," B-159451.
     Jan. 31, 1973 (Unclassified report).




                             26
APPENDIX II                                          APPENDIX II


                   ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
                      INCLUDED IN THE REVIEW
HAWAII
     Commander in Chief, Pacific, Camp Smith
     Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air
       Force Base
     CINCPAC Support Group, Fort Shafter
     6th Signal Command, Fort Shafter
THAILAND
     U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, Bangkok
     Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand, Bangkok
     U-Tapao Air Base and other Defense Department activities
PHILIPPINES
        Thirteenth Air Force
        3rd Tactical Fighter Wing
        374th Tactical Airlift Wing
KOREA
        U.S. Forces, Korea, Yongsan
        Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, Yongsan
        3l4th Air Division, Osan Air Base
        51st Composite Wing. Osan Air Base
        8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base
        1st Signal Brigade. Yongsan




                                27
APPENDIX III                                       APPENDIX III


          SEVEN CONDITIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
                  TO REMAIN IN THAILAND
     {The following is a copy of a text handed by the Thai
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador at the
outset of their meetlng on February 4, 1976~
Excellency,
     I have the honour to refer to the question of future
co-operation between the Royal Thai Government and the
United States Government in the Ramasum Radio Research
Project and such other activities which would involve some
American military presence in Thailand after March 20, 1976,
and to state that before there could be any discussion and
agreement on this matter, the Royal Thai Government con-
siders it necessary to establish an understanding with the
United States Government on certain principles which ~hould
govern their future co-operation. In this connection, I
would specify that where co-operation between the Royal Thai
Government and the United States Government would involve
the presence of American military facilities and personnel
on Thai territory, the Royal Thai Government would require
the application of the following principles:
     1. American facilities and personnel shall be sUbject
to Thai jurisdication unless exempted by specific agreements
between the Royal Thai Government and the United States
Government;
     2. These facilities and personnel shall in no way be
used to threaten or interfere with the national sovereignty
of any other country;
     3. In keeping with the spirit of mutual co-operation
and interests, reports on the activities involving these
facilities including information and data derived from such
activities shall be communicated regularly to the Royal Thai
Government;
     4. On-the-job training programmes shall be launched
with the view to the rapid replacement of American person-
nel operating the facilities by Thai personnel;
     5. American personnel authorized td operate facilities
in Thailand shall not exceed the number agreed by the Royal
Thai Government;

                              28
APPENDIX III                                    APPENDIX III


     6. These author izeCl American personnel shall enj'oy
such privileges as are accorded to technical experts from
othe~ countriesl and

     7. Agreements pertaining to such co-operation shall
continue for the duration of not more than 2 years. but
shall be renewable or may be terminated earlier by either
party giving advance notice.
     It would be highly appreciated if your Excellency
could ascertain as soon as possible whether the United
States Government would be agreeable to the basis of
future co-operation outlined above. And I would emphasize
that an early positive reply to this proposal is necessary
if discussions are to be successful and agreements on
Ramasum and other such projects of co-operation concluded.
Accept. Excellency. the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.




                              29
APPENDIX IV                                            APPENDIX IV
               SOME OF THE MATERIAL RETROGRADED




    ONE OF FIVE l,250-KILOWATT GENERATORS RETROGRADED FROM
    KO KHA, THAI LAND. UNIT COST IS ABOUT S350,OOO.




    PICKUP TRUCK RETROGRADED 1'0 CLARK AIR BASE, PHILIPPINES.

                                )0
APPENDIX IV                                             APPENDIX IV'




              FORKLIFT RETROGRADED TO CLARK AIR BASE,
              PHILIPPINES, IN POOR CONDITION.




  MODULAR DORM UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT KUNSAN AIR BASE, KOREA

                                31
APPENDIX IV                                          APPENDIX IV




   PIlEENGINEERED BUILDING CONSTRUCTED AT OSAN AlP. BASE. KOREA.




        BASE EDUCATION CENTER AT OSAN AIR BASE. KOREA.
                               32
                                            E~CAF ASS~!~~!~OGRAOEO       FROM   ~HAILANO

                                                                                                                                                    Tott:ll
                                                                                                     Karat Ko J<ha              U-Tapaa            (~)

    General cargo (short tons):
        Air                                    785             2.123             2.381                 257                47]
        Surf.ce                             !.lOe              3.232             6.669                 73.              4.962
               Total                                 ~.d!93            ~.355               !.:.050             "6                     S.BS           25.129
                                                                                                                                     =              =
    Munitions (short tons)                              132            12.091              7.&54                    8                31,108          57.193
    Vehicles;
       Number                                           207               211                200                11                        '24           853
       Short tons                                       . .8           1.304               1.06-4               ]0                    1. ... 60       4.806
    Relocatable structures (number)                      37               '6                   88
                                                                                                                    ,                      55           "8
    Real property installed equipment
      (short tons)                                                                                           !!/461                   1.211          1.672

w   Fuel (gallons):
w       JP-4                                                                                                                      2,901.282       2.901.282
        JPTS                                                                                                                         68.586          68.586
                                                        388              581                 ]68               35                         431        1.80]
    ~/Similar   data for Ubon is not included because it "as not available at the time of our revie.....
    ~/H05t   of this is 1.2S0-kilo....att generators.
                                                                                     :l'
                                                                                     '1:l
                                                                                     '1:l

                                                                                     '"zt:l
                    CIVIL ENGINEERING ITEMS RETROGRADED FROM THAILAND                ....X
                                                         Bundles of     Central      ....<:
                   Modular     Preengineered   Genera-      AM-2         air
      Base       dormitories     buildings      tors       matting    conditioners
      Ubon                          55           16         2,671           64
      Nakhon
        Phanom        10            27           23         4,558           70
      Udorn                         65           18           512           57
      Korat                         45           14         1,677           79
...
w
      U-Tapao         22            57               8      1,082           85
      Ko Kha                                         5                       7
                      32          249            84        10,500         362
                      ~
                                  =              -                        --


                                                                                     :l'
                                                                                     '1:l
                                                                                     '1:l

                                                                                     '"....Z
                                                                                     t:l
                                                                                     X

                                                                                     ....<:
APPENDIX VII                                                                        APPENDIX VII


                            DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY
                                             AND
                 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SECURITY ASStsTANCEI. OASD(tsA

                                   WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301




                                                               In reply
                                                               refer to:      1-25765/77

     Hr. Fred J. Shafer
     Director, Logistics and
      Communications Division
     United States General Accounting
       Office
     \/ashington, D.C. 20548

     Dear Hr. Shafer:

     This is in reply to your 17 December 1976 letter to Secretary Rumsfeld
     regarding GAD's draft report liThe Withdrawal of US Forces from Thai land:
     Opportunitle~  to Improve Future Withdrawal Operations" (OSO Case 64490).

     We wish to express our appreciation for the opportunity to review the
     draft report which was generally found to be factual and objective.
     We do have, however, some signif'icant conments and are submitting them
     for your consideration (Incl 1). If you are unable to accommodate the
     DODls comments. request that they be incorporated into the final report
     as an ~ppendix.  l:/
     DOD is conducting the requested security classification review of the
     draft report and the results thereof will be furnished separately.

                                              Sincerely,




                                                       H. M. FISH _                      ......
                                              ll'.utlnant Oellersl, US.F.........          . .~
                                   Diroctor, 0                            "     '-
     Inclosure                                   eienStt SeCurity Assistance ......
                                                            nnd                 "&encl     ~
        als
                               O~IJUt1   A.II.tant SeCrdary ('SA) S .            ,
                                                                 I ecunty AsSistance




 l/Their comments regarding our recommendations are on the
 - following page.



                                            35
APPENDIX VII                                                                    APPENDIX VII


                                           DOD COMMENTS

            GAO DRAFT REPORT "THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM THAILAND
              OPPORTUN IT I ES TO IMPROVE FUTURE WITHORAWAL OPERATIONS"


     Cu)   Recommendation     8t ,   pages iii and    9.

           Concur with the revIsed recommendation which reads as follows:
           "Direct that defInite criteria for the peacetime withdrawal of
           US forces from foreign countries be estabLIshed. This criteria
           should include policies and procedures for scaled as well as com-
           plete \'1ithdrawa1s. 1I




                                (See GAO note below.)


     (u)   Recommendat i on   1/2,   pages iii and   24 ,   and #4. pages   iii and 9.
           Concur.

     (U)   Recommendation     #3,    pages iii and   24.
           Concur in the establ ishment of base retrograde teams. However, these
           teams will be responsive to the existing systems for determtning DOD
           requirements and recommending changes to the system when necessary.
           The team's authority to dispose of assets cannot be arbitrary but must
           be within the limitations of DOD-approved systems. The US·Air Force
           provided a retrograde team in Thailand during the withdrawal and the
           team exercised approved authority to make immediate asset dispositIon.



                                (See GAO note below.)



   GAO note:         Deleted comments pertain to matters which were
                     presented in the draft report but have been
                     revised in this final report. Recommendation
                     and page numbers have been changed to reflect
                     locations in this final report.




                                                36
 APPENDIX VIII                                        APPENDIX VIII

                 PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
                     FOR ADMINISTRATION OF
             ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

                                              Tenure of office
                                              From          To
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
     Harold Brown                          Jan.    1977   Present
     Donald H. Rumsfeld                    Nov.    1975   Jan. 1977
     James R. Schlesinger                  July    1973   Nov. 1975
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:
     John C. Stetson                       Mar.    1977   Present
     Thomas C. Reed                        Jan.    1976   Mar. 1977
     James W. Plummer (acting)             Nov.    1975   Jan. 1976
     John McLucas                          July    1973   Nov. 1975
 CHAIm4AN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
     General George S. Brown, USAF         July    1974   Present
     Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN         July    1970   July 1974
 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY
   ASSISTANCE AGENCY:
     Lt. General Howard M. Fish, USAF   Aug.       1974   Present
     Vice Admiral Raymond E. Peet,
        USN                                June    1972   Aug.   1974

                       DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 SECRETARY OF STATE:
     Cyrus R. Vance                        Jan. 1977      P~esent
     Henry A. Kissinger                    Sept. 1973     Jan.   1977

 ASSISTANT SECRETARY ,FOR EAST
   ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS:
     Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.                 June    1976   Present
      Philip C. Habib                      Sept.   1974   June 1976
      Robert S. Ingersoll                  Jan.    1974   Sept. 1974
     Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.                 May     1973   Jan. 1974
 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THAILAND:
     Char les S'. Whitehouse               May   1975     Present
     William R. Kinter                     Sept. 1973     May   1975
     Leonard Unger                         Aug. 1967      Sept. 19P
(917230)                         37