United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science House of Representatives November 1999 EXPORT CONTROLS International Space Station Technology Transfers GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Contents Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Commodities Exported Using Individual Validated Licenses 18 Appendix II: Examples of ISS-Related Commodities Exported in 1998 Under No License Required Authority 19 Appendix III: Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 20 Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Commerce 26 Abbreviations CBM common berthing mechanism EVA extravehicular activity ISS International Space Station MOU Memorandums of Understanding MDM multiplexer/demultiplexer NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration OIG Office of the Inspector General RAM Random Access Memory Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls United States General Accounting Office National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548 International Affairs Division B-283363 Leter November 3, 1999 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The Honorable Ralph M. Hall Ranking Minority Member Committee on Science House of Representatives With 16 countries involved, the International Space Station Program is one of the largest scientific collaborations ever attempted.1 Under international agreements related to the program, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as the U.S. representative, is obligated to deliver, disclose, or transfer technology, data, and commodities necessary to meet its responsibilities in implementing the program. Concerned about the extent of safeguards to protect technology and information exported in support of the space station, you and the late Representative George Brown asked us to evaluate NASA’s implementation of federal export control regulations. Specifically, we are providing information on (1) licenses granted to NASA to export space station-related technology and commodities and plans to export encryption technology and (2) the results of internal and external assessments of NASA’s export control program and NASA’s actions to implement audit recommendations. Encryption technology provides a capability to maintain the secrecy of information and is needed to provide secure transmission of command and control instructions between ground and space elements of the space station. A significant percentage of NASA’s international activities may involve transfers of commodities, software, or technologies to foreign partners by NASA or authorized contractors. To protect national security and U.S. foreign policy interests, the export of technology and commodities to the 15 partner countries involved with NASA in the International Space Station Program is controlled through a system of licenses. The Departments of Commerce and State are responsible for granting NASA such licenses. 1 The 16 countries are the United States, as lead partner; Canada; Japan; the European countries Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; Russia; and Brazil. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 Commerce issues licenses for the export of dual-use items—those items that have both commercial and military applications—on the Commerce Control List. Similarly, State issues licenses for exports of U. S. Munitions List items—articles, services, and related technical data designated as defense articles and services. NASA’s export activities must conform to the procedures and regulations established by Commerce and State. Results in Brief Since April 1995, the Commerce Department has issued nine Individual Validated Licenses2 to export specific items and one special comprehensive license that allows NASA to export certain preapproved items without seeking Commerce’s approval each time NASA needs to export them for the International Space Station Program. Although the special comprehensive license was intended to preclude the need for individual licenses, NASA has only used it once because it has not been updated and, according to NASA officials, individual licenses are easier to obtain than updating the special comprehensive license. As new export requirements have materialized, NASA has elected to apply for individual licenses rather than amend the special comprehensive license. The State Department has not issued any licenses to NASA to export technology or commodities for the International Space Station. However, NASA erroneously authorized the export of radiation-hardened electronic parts to Russia in 1997 without first obtaining a license from State. NASA expects to export encryption technology for use in the program but has not determined whether a license is needed. NASA expects that such exports will be limited to its Japanese and European partners. Internal and external reviews of NASA’s export control activities have identified weaknesses, including a need for greater management involvement in export-related decisions and additional training to educate employees involved with technology control about export laws, regulations, and procedures. NASA has taken steps to correct these weaknesses; however, some additional actions are needed. For example, annual internal audits have not provided sufficient information to assess the effectiveness of NASA’s export controls for the International Space Station Program. Resulting reports of audits that were issued in 1997 and 2 An Individual Validated License is a written authorization from the government to export. After a license application is approved, a license is issued by Commerce bearing the license number and validation date. The license will generally be valid for a 24-month period. Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 1998 provide little detail and analyses beyond completing a required audit checklist. This report recommends improvements aimed at improving the quality of NASA’s internal audits. Background NASA had no formalized export control policy when the Space Station Program began in 1984, nor when the space station partnership was established in 1988. Although NASA issued a technical data and goods transfer control plan for the earlier Space Station Freedom Program in 1991, that plan did not include procedures for making export-licensing determinations. When Russia joined the International Space Station (ISS) Program in 1993, the need for associated export controls was heightened. Thus, NASA established a Space Station Export Control Steering Group and an Interagency Export Control Working Group early in 1994 to assist in developing an approach to controlling exports of ISS-related commodities. Chaired by NASA, the groups comprised senior policy, legal, and technical representatives from the Executive Office of the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense. Since 1994, NASA has been developing a more comprehensive technology control plan specifically for the ISS Program. The plan has remained in draft form but has been modified since its inception. NASA intends to finalize its most recent draft plan in mid-November 1999. In the meantime, NASA employees, contractors, and centers supporting the ISS Program have been instructed to use the draft control plan as guidance in implementing ISS-related export activities. In 1995, NASA published an agencywide export control program document for all programs involved in international activities. NASA based its export control program on federal laws and regulations that require licenses for exports of controlled technologies, commodities, and services. Commerce and State are responsible for granting licenses to NASA and its Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 designated contractors for the export of technologies to ISS partners.3 Under the authority of the Export Administration Act, Commerce established a licensing system for exports of dual-use items—those items that have both commercial and military applications—on the Commerce Control List. Similarly, under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act, State issues licenses for exports of defense articles and defense services that are on the U.S. Munitions List. The statutory authority to issue regulations regarding the export of dual-use items and defense articles and services is delegated to the Secretaries of Commerce and State. Commerce and State published the Export Administration Regulations and International Traffic in Arms Regulations, respectively, implementing the acts. NASA must ensure that its ISS export activities conform to these laws and regulations. NASA’s export control program document contains a step- by-step process for NASA employees and contractors to follow in determining whether technology and commodities can be exported to foreign countries, with or without a license. NASA includes the following elements in its decision to export items in support of the ISS Program: (1) the necessity of the export and its consistency with NASA’s export control program, (2) any prohibitions on the export established by federal law or regulation, (3) whether State or Commerce is responsible for authorizing the export, and (4) whether the export requires a license. The export classification process includes these elements. The line of authority for all NASA export-related activities originates at NASA headquarters and flows to the agency’s field center export administrators, program and project managers, and transportation officers. These officials share responsibility for ensuring compliance with U.S. export control regulations and NASA’s export control program. NASA’s program requires training to be conducted at least annually and covers issues and developments in export controls that impact the agency’s international activities. 3 The Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. 2401, as amended) has expired. However, Commerce carries out the Export Administration Regulations pursuant to an executive order issued under the President’s authority in the International Emergency Powers Act. The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778, as amended) authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense articles and services. The authority to issue regulations with respect to export of defense articles and services was delegated to the Secretary of State by Executive Order 11958. Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 Status of Licenses and Since April 1995, the Commerce Department has issued nine individual licenses to export specific items and one special comprehensive license. Plans to Export With one exception, NASA has not used the special comprehensive license Encryption Technology granted by Commerce to facilitate exporting the large volume of ISS- related technology and commodities that it expected to transfer to the ISS partners. State has not issued NASA any licenses to export ISS-related technologies. However, NASA inappropriately exported radiation-hardened technology without having obtained a license from State. A centralized database of exported technologies is in development and will include information on items transferred without licenses. While encryption technology has not been exported, the requirement for it is being considered by NASA and its European and Japanese partners. Licenses Issued to Export From April 1995 through May 1999, Commerce issued nine individual ISS Technologies licenses to NASA for the export of ISS-related technologies. An individual license is granted in response to an application for a specific export. Six licenses were for items shipped to Russia, two for items shipped to Italy, and one license for items shipped to Germany. Appendix I includes a description of the commodities transferred using these licenses and the countries of destination. For ISS-related exports, NASA may request an individual license or use the ISS special comprehensive license. In May 1996, Commerce issued NASA a special comprehensive license to facilitate the large volume of expected exports incidental to the ISS Program and to eliminate the need to apply for an individual license for each item it expected to export. The special comprehensive license is to be used to export only items listed in the bilaterally established exchange list and included in the license. None of the items are under State’s export control jurisdiction. The license covers certain ISS hardware, software, and technical data under the export control jurisdiction of Commerce. The license is only for the use of NASA personnel and approved related entities, such as authorized contractors and subcontractors listed in the license, and only when the entities have received specific contractual direction from NASA. With the exception of one case in which the item exported was returned following a determination that procedures were properly followed, the Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 special comprehensive license has not been used.4 NASA headquarters export officials said that technologies listed in the special comprehensive license, which was developed more than 3 years ago, need to be reevaluated and that obtaining an individual license to transfer ISS technologies is less complicated than amending the special comprehensive license. In commenting on a draft of this report, Commerce stated that, in 1999, the NASA special license was fully entered into its electronic license database, making it easier for NASA to submit changes. Commerce further stated that, to export an item not identified in the original application, NASA would need to submit one form; to export multiple items not previously identified, NASA would submit an amendment form. The special comprehensive license does not relieve NASA from its obligation to request a separate license if one is required. Because Commerce does not review each individual transaction authorized by the special comprehensive license, NASA and the entities authorized to use it must have mechanisms to ensure that each export made under it fulfills the terms and conditions of the license and applicable provisions of Commerce’s export regulations. NASA Failed to Obtain State According to NASA officials, State has not issued NASA any licenses License in One Case associated with the ISS Program to export items under the export control jurisdiction of State. However, NASA disclosed that in January 1997, radiation-hardened electronic parts were inappropriately exported to Russia without a license. This export occurred because a NASA contractor’s parts supplier had received an erroneous export classification from the manufacturer who was not aware that the parts were on State’s U.S. Munitions List, and NASA did not independently determine whether a license was needed. Additional details about this export and the resulting NASA investigation are discussed on pages 11 and 12 of this report. 4 NASA verified its internal process of effecting an export under the authority of the ISS special comprehensive license in conjunction with the export of an electrical power system to its Japanese partner. The item was returned within 30 days. Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 A Database of All ISS NASA is not required to acquire a license for all export-controlled items Export Controlled that are ISS related. Under federal export control regulations, NASA has exported numerous ISS-related technologies with license exceptions. An Technologies Is Being exception allows NASA to export, under stated conditions, items subject to Developed Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations that would otherwise require a license. As required by State’s and Commerce’s regulations, NASA’s export control program includes the requirement that records be maintained for at least 5 years on all exports and transfers. NASA’s draft ISS export control plan reiterates these requirements. Appendix II shows examples of ISS-related export controlled commodities NASA exported in 1998 without licenses. According to NASA officials, NASA’s centers have retained individual records of all ISS items that the agency has made export classification decisions on and exported since 1995. However, the records were not summarized and the ISS program office could not readily provide us with a complete list of ISS technologies exported to its partners without licenses. Although such a database is not required under export control regulations, having this information would be useful to supplement guidance and as a crosscheck in reaching future export classification decisions. Moreover, it would provide NASA, State, and Commerce with a tool to use in conducting reviews to assess NASA’s compliance with export laws and regulations. According to NASA officials, the database of exported technologies currently in development will be a centralized database and will include information on items transferred without licenses and will be available agencywide. The ISS database development is a Johnson Space Center and ISS program office initiative. Plans to Export Encryption To date, no encryption technology has been exported for use in the ISS Technology Are Being Program. The requirements for and potential export of encryption technology needed to support the ISS are being discussed by NASA, its Discussed European and Japanese partners, and agencies that have export approval authority for the technology. To date, no license has been applied for. According to NASA officials, encryption will be needed to provide secure transmission of command and control instructions between ISS ground and space elements. The Japanese and European partners and NASA have agreed to use a common U.S. standard technology as the means of encrypting command and control communications. To use U.S. encryption technology, the Japanese and European partners must agree to provide it a level of protection equal to that provided by the United States, which would Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 require them to procure hardware from the list of sources approved by Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology. NASA would provide them technical support for the hardware selection, related software development, and encryption key management, enabling them to interpret the coded instructions. The Japanese and European partners are considering a draft agreement that outlines U.S. protection requirements for the technology. If they concur with U.S. protection requirements and sign the agreement, NASA or the supporting contractor could initiate action to obtain a license to export encryption technology to the partners. NASA is collaborating with the National Security Agency and the National Institute of Standards and Technology about exporting the technology to these partners. NASA officials stated that Russia would not be included as a destination in any potential licenses for encryption technology. While Russia and the United States will use a common infrastructure to transmit data between ISS space and ground elements, the Russian Space Agency and NASA will not use a common encryption technology or share such technology. Both the United States and Russia have their own encryption systems. According to NASA officials, Russia and the United States prefer using their own systems. Reviews of NASA’s NASA’s export control program is subject to periodic internal reviews and to external reviews by Commerce and State. Moreover, investigations can Export Control be triggered by specific events requiring follow-up. The reviews and Program Have investigations conducted to date have identified some weaknesses in NASA’s export control program. NASA officials have taken steps to address Identified Some many of these weaknesses. However, further actions are needed in some Weaknesses areas, such as improving the quality of NASA’s internal audits. Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 State’s Review of In 1998, the State Department requested NASA’s review and comment on a license application involving a U.S. company affiliated with a Russian License Application company for radiation-hardened electronic parts. The license application Triggered NASA’s had also indicated that NASA had exported the parts to Russia in the past. In reviewing the application, NASA detected a potential issue of improper Investigation of export with its prior transfer of the parts to Russia. NASA initiated an Radiation-Hardened investigation and found that it had inappropriately exported radiation- Electronics Parts hardened electronics parts to Russia for use in the ISS Program. NASA had exported these parts without a license after the parts were erroneously Exported Without classified as the lowest level of controlled technology. NASA did not follow License its own policy, which is to determine the classification of material proposed for export or to ensure that its contractors have appropriately determined the material’s classification. Instead, a NASA contractor’s supplier determined that the export of the parts to Russia did not require a license and the contractor relied on that determination. NASA, in turn, relied on its contractor’s classification of these parts. The parts were exported to Russia in January 1997. According to a NASA export control official, the supplier’s and manufacturer’s regional office officials were unaware that the radiation-hardened parts were on State’s U.S. Munitions List and therefore required an export license. NASA was unaware of the error for about 18 months until the U.S. company affiliated with a Russian company applied to State for an export license for the same parts, and State referred the license application for NASA’s review in June 1998. According to a State official, the request for the license in this instance was to support activities associated with the Russian Mir space station. NASA export control officials told us that the application inaccurately stated that NASA had obtained a license for an earlier export of the same parts to Russia. In a June 1998 letter to State about the incident, NASA formally acknowledged the error and stated that it had reminded the Russian Space Agency and the Russian company that the parts were solely for use in Russian-provided components of the ISS and were not to be used for any other purpose or transferred without NASA’s written approval. The Russian company responded that it had accounted for each of the exported parts and indicated how they were being used and where they were located. NASA accepted this response in good faith. Although NASA may seek advice from the manufacturers to assist in the determination, NASA is ultimately responsible for determining the correct Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 classification and requesting a license, if required. As a result of this incident, NASA advised State in July 1999 that the ISS program office had instituted specific changes to its export procedures, requiring • a manufacturer export office, rather than a sales office, to confirm export classifications of commercially available items and • a NASA manager to be directly involved in determining export classifications before proceeding with exports. According to NASA, key features of this process include a centralized database to capture all ISS exports and backup data, an Export Control Council to review exports and resolve issues, and documented export compliance training for employees. Also, training conducted by the ISS export administrator highlights the fact that radiation-hardened parts are export controlled. We concur with the need for these steps. NASA’s Office of Inspector In March 1999, NASA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed a General Assessment review of the agency’s export activities related to controlled technologies. The report noted that NASA had not identified all export-controlled technologies related to its major programs and did not maintain a catalog of classifications for transfers of export-controlled technologies. The report further stated that agency oversight of training for personnel in the export control program needed improvement and that, as a result, NASA might not have adequate control over export-controlled technologies to preclude unauthorized or unlicensed transfers. The OIG recommended that NASA • establish a policy and procedures for cataloging controlled technology export classifications that would be available for all NASA installations; • define the qualifications of personnel that perform export program audits; • designate only qualified personnel to perform annual audits of the export control program, in accordance with established policy; • establish a policy for resolving and following up on recommendations resulting from export control audits; • enhance the current export control training program for NASA personnel, to include educating them about U.S. export laws and regulations and procedures for classifying and documenting exports; and • expand training on a recurring basis to NASA employees involved directly or indirectly with technology control. Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 NASA concurred with the OIG report, and according to NASA officials, the agency is taking actions as follows: • The agency plans to establish a central catalog of export control technologies. Each center has been requested to provide the headquarters Export Administrator copies of all classifications made for exports to facilitate the development of the catalog. • NASA is hiring additional staff to conduct training in export controls and write policy guidance. NASA officials told us that it was developing computer-based training and that the agency plans to expand training modules to include more in-depth coverage of export laws and regulations, classification requirements, and procedures useful for conducting the annual audits of the export control program. • In addition to computer-based training, the headquarters’ and centers’ export control administrators will continue to conduct training seminars on export controls. • Auditing requirements and auditor qualifications are being included in a NASA program directive and a NASA procedures guide scheduled to be completed at the end of 1999. The directive and guide will also specify how center management will follow up on recommendations resulting from export control audits. Commerce’s Assessment of In June 1998, Commerce’s Office of Exporter Services reviewed NASA’s NASA’s Export Controls export control program, including the use of the special comprehensive license for the ISS Program. The purpose of this review was to ensure that NASA was complying with the Export Administration Regulations and the terms of the license. Commerce also reviewed pertinent records associated with NASA’s export control program, indicating in its report that NASA did not have a formal procedure in place to ensure that products were at the consignee sites and were being used for the intended purpose. Commerce concluded that, overall, NASA had adequate export controls and was complying with the act’s implementing regulations. However, to ensure full compliance with the implementing regulations, Commerce recommended that NASA • revise its procedures for screening the Denied Persons List, a list of specific persons whose export privileges have been denied by Commerce; Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 • update its export control audit module to reflect the latest Commerce terminology−using the Denied Persons List instead of the Table of Denial Orders;5 • develop a procedure for verifying that exports of certain items are at their intended destinations; and • develop procedures for screening against Commerce’s most current entities list, which provides notice of license requirements for certain end users when there is an unacceptable risk that the commodity or technology may be diverted. NASA has taken steps to implement these recommendations. While Commerce noted that NASA does not have a formal procedure in place to ensure that products are being used by the intended entity and for the intended purpose, it did not make recommendations regarding this point. NASA’s procedures developed in response to Commerce’s review focus on verifying that exports of certain items are at their intended destinations. Ascertaining that usage is as intended is not addressed. Johnson Space Center NASA’s export control program requires the agency’s centers to conduct Internal Audits annual audits of their export control practices and submit a report describing the review process, audit results, and any recommendations to NASA headquarters. However, such audits have not always been conducted in a comprehensive and rigorous manner. NASA’s OIG found during a 1999 review of NASA’s export control program that though a significant portion of Johnson Space Center exports related to the ISS, the Center’s auditor did not review ISS exports. Moreover, we found that the Center’s 1997 and 1998 annual audit reports were not sufficiently detailed to provide NASA headquarters with sufficient information to assess the effectiveness of the agency’s export control practices. Center auditors documented their reviews for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 by using a checklist−the NASA Export Control Program Audit Module−that included general questions requiring yes or no answers. Accompanying written reports, which were supposed to include a description of the review process, the audit results, and recommendations, were not prepared as required. Rather, the Center auditors forwarded only the completed checklists, with limited added detail, to the headquarters export administrator. For example, the checklists for 1997 and 1998 included a yes answer in response to a question regarding whether Commerce Export Administration Regulations’ 5 Former terminology for Denied Persons List. Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 record-keeping requirements were being followed. However, they did not explain how the auditors reached this determination, nor did they include any comments or recommendations on this issue. NASA guidance requires auditors to verify, through sampling, that required screening and licensing procedures are regularly followed and that required documents are maintained in compliance with Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations. In commenting on a draft of this report, Commerce pointed out that the special comprehensive license also requires that NASA conduct a complete system review and not simply compare its procedures to an audit checklist. Agencywide Self- In December 1998, NASA initiated an assessment of its export control Assessment of program to determine whether its technology transfer and export control procedures were thorough, rigorous, and provided for fully safeguarding Transfer/Export Control controlled goods and technologies, particularly in its international Practices partnerships and programs. NASA required managers and employees at various organizational levels to complete a questionnaire designed to assess technology controls in their areas of responsibility. Consolidation of all assessments is under way, and NASA’s centers will be briefed on results. NASA officials told us that NASA has no plans to conduct a similar agencywide self-assessment in the future on a regularly scheduled basis. NASA requested feedback on its three-part questionnaire from (1) NASA Enterprise directors, (2) center directors, and (3) center managers that direct projects involving international participation. We examined the assessments completed by the Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise, the Johnson Space Center, and the ISS program office since these entities are the most likely to be involved with ISS technology transfers. While the responses about the effectiveness of the implementation of NASA’s export control program were generally favorable, Johnson Space Center and ISS program office assessments cited a lack of adequate staff for export control matters. In particular, the assessments determined that additional personnel were needed for the time critical export classification process. The ISS program office assessment indicated that export control personnel were working with Johnson Space Center management to increase the number of personnel involved. Conclusions NASA’s internal audits at the Johnson Space Center have not been comprehensive or detailed enough to judge the effectiveness of NASA’s Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 export control program or compliance with export control laws and regulations. The reports of audit lack evidence of audit work focused specifically on ISS exports and do not include detailed information on audit methods, findings, and recommendations as required by the agency’s export control program. Since NASA has no plans to conduct the agencywide self-assessment on a regular basis, making the Johnson Space Center’s audit more useful takes on added urgency. Recommendation To enhance NASA’s ability to oversee and implement its export controls of ISS-related technologies, we recommend that the NASA Administrator ensure that center-based audits are completed with sufficient detail to enable the agency to identify weaknesses in NASA’s export control procedures. Agency Comments and NASA reviewed a draft of this report and stated that the report captured the many facets of export control related to the ISS Program. NASA did not Our Evaluation explicitly state whether it agreed or disagreed with our recommendation. NASA also provided technical comments to further clarify understanding of some issues and suggested revisions that we have incorporated where appropriate. NASA’s written comments are presented in appendix III. We also provided drafts of this report to the Departments of Commerce and State. We did not receive a written response from State. However, a State official indicated the agency concurred with the report. Commerce provided written comments, stating that the report is accurate (see app. IV). Both State and Commerce provided technical suggestions for clarification purposes that we incorporated where appropriate. Scope and To determine the number and types of ISS-related licenses issued in conjunction with the ISS Program and the destination of technology and Methodology commodities exported to date, we compared export license records maintained by NASA headquarters with Commerce’s Export Control Automated Support System database. Our comparison included ISS-related licenses that Commerce issued between fiscal year 1994 and the first quarter of fiscal year 1998. We also reviewed program office listings of ISS- related items it exported without licenses. To obtain information on the Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls B-283363 status of encryption exports, we reviewed NASA records and held discussions with NASA officials about requirements for such exports and countries of destination. To determine the results of past reviews of NASA’s export control program, we reviewed audit reports conducted by NASA’s OIG and Commerce and the results of a NASA investigation of radiation-hardened electronic parts. We also reviewed the methodology and results of recent internal audits of export control practices conducted by NASA’s Johnson Space Center. We assessed NASA’s responsiveness to audit recommendations by discussing follow-up actions with NASA officials and documenting changes in NASA’s policies and procedures. We conducted our review from September 1998 through September 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Honorable Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841. Key contributors to this assignment were Jerry Herley, Samuel Cox, and Shirley Johnson. Allen Li Associate Director Defense Acquisitions Issues Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix I Commodities Exported Using Individual Appendx ies Validated Licenses Appendx Ii Licenses Description Destination a 1 Circuit emulator, International Space Russia Station system bus upgrade, multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM) Amendment Circuit emulator, ISS system bus Russia upgrade, MDM Amendment Electronics equipment connectors Russia Amendment Prototype and flight MDM, field-testing Russia equipment, and cable kits Amendment Prototype MDMs Russia Amendment MDMs for payload blocks, command and Russia control, navigation and guidance, and testing; connectors; test processors; and memory cards Amendment Microswitches, MDM spare prototype, Russia functional equivalent, and flight circuit boards 2 Connectors, MDM prototypes and circuit Russia boards, spare circuit boards, flight enhanced MDMs, and flight stand 3 Random Access Memory (RAM) and Russia optical couplers for developmental and flight stages 4 Synchronous RAM Russia 5 Microcircuit optical coupler flight parts Russia (radiation-hardened) for service module and functional energy block matching unit requirements 6 Hewlett Packard optical coupler circuits Russia 7 Hatch assembly kits, including hatches, Italy tracks, trusses, and roller assemblies 8 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Germany Engineers (Firewire) Ethernet Hub/Gateway 9 Active and passive common berthing Italy mechanism (CBM) kits; CBM seal kits with bold assemblies a As shown, license 1 was amended six times. Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix II Examples of ISS-Related Commodities Exported in 1998 Under No License Required Authority Appendx iI Description Destination Articulating portable foot restraint for ISS Canada extravehicular activity (EVA) Seat track material to be used for evaluating Russia ISS designs and for interfacing with seat track anchors Labels fabricated for National Space Japan Development Agency of Japan flight in support of the ISS Protective caps to provide cover for ISS Canada EVA-installed communication cable connector Cable, Russian degassing pumps to Russia support the Russian spacesuit unbiblical for flight/testing applications Fans/hardware Canada Bar code reader, laser Russia Camera equipment (35-70 millimeter f2.8D Russia lens, Nikon) in support of Russian segment imagery Terminal switching unit Russia Smith press station for training of ISS crews Russia 22-inch hand rails (class III) for ISS EVA Russia training Russian simplified aid for EVA rescue Russia mockup Ammonium persulfate reservoir and acid Russia reservoirs Laptop computer Russia Microfixtures Canada On-board spacesuit control assembly Russia Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Appendx Ii Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Now on p. 4. Now on p. 4. Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Now on p. 4. See comment 1. Now on p. 5. Now on p. 7. See comment 2. Now on p. 7. See comment 3. Now on p. 7. Now on p. 8. Now on p. 9. Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration See comment 2. Now on p. 9. See comment 4. Now on p. 11. Now on p. 11. Now on p. 11. Now on p. 11. Now on p. 11. Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix III Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration The following are GAO’s comments on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) letter dated September 29, 1999. GAO Comments 1. We do not agree that the statement “NASA had no formalized export control policy when the International Space Station (ISS) Program began” is misleading. However, we have revised the text of the report to provide additional explanation. We believe that our report’s background section accurately describes the status of the NASA export control policy when the ISS Program began as well as the current status of its export control plan for the ISS Program. 2. In our opinion, the terminology “without license” is a more accurate characterization of the information that will be included in the database being developed. 3. We believe that our report accurately states that none of the items on the bilateral exchange list are under State’s export control jurisdiction. 4. We have revised the text of the report to clarify this fact. Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Commerce Appendx i IV Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix. Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Commerce See comment 1. Now on p. 14. Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Commerce GAO Comments The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce’s letter dated October 21, 1999. 1. We recognize that parties involved in the ISS Program have signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). Signing these agreements is recognition by the partners of their responsibility and obligation to comply with the terms of the agreement. However, we believe a mechanism that provides assurance that the partners are complying with the terms of exports is a necessary step in NASA’s implementation of its export control policy. In our opinion, NASA’s procedures for verifying that exports of certain items are at their intended destinations do not provide adequate assurance that the items are being used for the intended purpose. (707379) Leter Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary, VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 or visit: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, send an e-mail message with “info” in the body to: firstname.lastname@example.org or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at: http://www.gao.gov Appendix IV Comments From the Department of Commerce Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-00-14 Export Controls United States Bulk Rate General Accounting Office Postage & Fees Paid Washington, D.C. 20548-0001 GAO Permit No. GI00 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 Address Correction Requested
Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1999-11-03.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)