oversight

Weapons Testing: DOD Needs to Plan and Conduct More Timely Operational Tests and Evaluation

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-05-17.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                   linited   States   General    Accounting   Office

                   Report to the Secretary of Defense
GAO

May 1990
                   WEAPONS TESTING
                   DOD Needs to Plan
                   and Conduct More
                   Timely Operational
                   Tests and Evaluation ’




                                       ___----
GAOi’NSIAJNO-107
    .


    ,




.
          united
            StateB
GAO       General &comting    Offke
          Washington, D.C. 20648

          National Security and
          Intemationai  Affairs Division

          B-222886

          May 17,1990

          The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
          The Secretary of Defense

          Dear Mr. Secretary:

          The Congress continues to express concern that weapon systems have
          begun production without operational test and evaluation (d&E). or&E
          conducted before a system’s “production start-up,“’ is a key internal
          control to ensure that decisionmakers have the best information availa-
          ble on a weapon system’s performance to minimiz risks of procuring
          costly and ineffective systems.

          We identified many perceived barriers to earlier or&~. Several had been
          previously reported by us and other agencies, and others were identified
          during discussions with officials in the Office of the Secretary of
          Defense (OSD)and the military services. This report provides the results
          of our analysis of the feasibility of overcoming three major barriers that
          we believe will allow or&E before production start-up. The three barriers
          were

      l   lack of prototypes for testing early,
      l   starting production before development is completed-(concurrency),                              and
      l   the need to start production to obtain or&~ test articles2

          We recognize that other factors, such as cost, urgency, and the state of
          advanced technology may sometimes preclude urr~ before production
          start-up. However, making ora results available before production
          start-up could help preclude cost growth, schedule slippages, and per-
          formance shortfalls that frequently arise during the later phases of a
          weapon system’s development.

          Several events make the present systems acquisition environment very
          receptive to earlier or&~. These include (1) recent DODreports that
          espouse the “aggressive use of prototyping and testing ro identify and
          remedy problems before production,” (2) DOD’Srevisior.5 to acquisition
          and test and evaluation regulations current!y underway, (3) the
          ‘In ths report, we use the term production start-upto referto thatpointinthe acqtusition process at
          which a weapon system or its subsystems begin production. “Low-rate initial production [LRIP],”
          “limited production,” and “pilot pmductlon” are terms that the Depatunent of Defense (DOD) uses to
          refer to production start-up.
          ‘Test articles are the units of a weapon system that are used to test a weapon’s performance.



          Page1                                                                     GAO/NSlAD90107        OT&E
                   5223886




                   appointment of a new Director of ora, (4) the need to make critical
                   tradeoff decisions in systems’ acquisition, and (5) DOD’S agreement, in
                   response to our May 1989 report discussed on page 4, to reemphasize
                   the need for or&~ as early as possible in the acquisition cycle.


                   Several DOD and congressional initiatives to reduce risks in system acqui-
Results in Brief   sition and many reports have highlighted weapon system performance
                   and testing shortfalls. Our review of six current systems plus other
                   recent work shows that DOD has made little progress in assuring that
                   earlier UN.E is planned and conducted. The military services generally
                   are not conducting or planning to conduct CT&E on weapon systems until
                   after production start-up.

                   In our view, the barriers we examined do not preclude earlier CT&E.With
                   proper planning, an operational test can and should be accomplished
                   before production start-up.3 We found that although some prototypes
                   have been used for development test and evaluation the military ser-
                   vices generally are not planning to use them for or&~ before production
                   start-up. We believe, however, that with adequate planning, prototypes
                   can be designated for or&~. We also found that concurrency does not
                   preclude earlier OTBE,if such testing is properly planned. Moreover,
                   because test articles are available during the full-scale development
                   phase of the acquisition process, it is generally not necessary to begin
                   production to provide them for CT&E.


Background         DOD  budgets over $100 billion annually for research, development, test,
                   and evaluation and for production of major weapon systems. In view of
                   such large sums, decisionmakers need the best information possible on
                   weapon systems’ operational performance and risks associated with
                   new technology before approving production start-up. CT&Eis intended
                   to provide an independent analysis of a weapon system’s performance
                   against operational requirements and the system’s reliability and ability
                   to be supported in the field.




                   %RkE before producuon start-up may be m addition to later CT&E conducted to support a full-rate
                   producuon decision (often referred to as the “final exam”). m&E before produmon start-up i 11may
                   be on a system or critical subsystem prototype, (2) might not meet alI requirements for effectweness
                   or suitability, and (3) should not be viewed as a “pans/fail” test but can serve as an input to the
                   design procw to ensure problems are addressed before a system begins production.



                   Page 2                                                                   GAO/‘NSLA.D9@107 URkE
                         The services are statutorily required to conduct CT&Ebefore making a
                         full-rate production decision. DOD’scurrent test and evaluation poliw
                         not only reflects this, but also states that “UNE shall be structured to
                         provide inputs at each decision point, including major milestones.“5 Yet,
                         DOD’S policy also permits production start-up before or&E is conducted.

                         Studies of the DOD acquisition pn>cess have recommended earlier opera-
                         tional testing, using prototypes, before production start-up. In 1986, the
                         President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Pack-
                         ard Commiss’ron) recommended that operational testing of prototype
                         systems begin early in advanced development and continue through full-
                         scale development. DOD’S recent Defense Management Review initiatives,
                         as reflected in the July 1989 DOD Report to the President on Defense
                         Management and the January 1990 DOD Annual Report to the President
                         and the Congress support implementation of the Packard Commission
                         recommendatiod, including aggressive use of prototyping and testing to
                         identify and remedy problems “well prior to commencement of high rate
                         production.”


                         Over the years, we have reported on weapon system performance short-
With Proper Planning,    comings and the lack of adequate or&~. (See app. III.) Our work on six
OT&E Before              current systems plus our other recent work (see apps. I and II) has
Production Start-Up Is   shown that CT&Eis not being conducted until production start-up has
                         been approved. We understand that the military services want to move
Feasible                 weapon systems into production as quickly as possible in order to
                         reduce the likelihood of them being canceled-a “build now and fix
                         problems later” attitude.

                         We believe that crr%~results have not been available to support decisions
                         to start production because of the failure of the military services to plan
                         for earlier CR&E and incorporate it into program acquisition strategies.
                         The barriers often cited for or&~ not being adequately planned for or
                         conducted before production start-up has been approved include
                         (1) prototypes not available for testing early, (2) concurrency, and
                         (3) the need to start production to obtain ULQE test articles. We believe
                         that these barriers do not preclude OT&E prior to production start-up.



                         4~ DOD Directive 5000.3, Test and Evaluation, dated March 12,1fB6.
                         “he milestones are: I (to dart the concept demonstration/ validation phase), II (to enter the fulLscale
                         development phase), and III (to enter the production phase).



                         Page 3                                                                     GAO/‘NSIAD~107       d&J3
                             In a recent report on test and evaluation,6 we discussed the manner in
                             which DOD used early operational assessments. Early operational assess-
                             ments provide input to decisionmakers on whether a weapon system is
                             ready for the “final exam or&~” and whether operational shortfalls are
                             being identified and corrected early in the development process. These
                             assessments, which usually rely on development test data, are being
                             used to support decisions for full-scale development and production
                             start-up. We reported in May 1989 that DOD’S reliance on early opera-
                             tional assessments when equipment is unavailable for or&~ is a step for-
                             ward in filling the information void, but should not be a substitute for
                             Ur&E. However, we support DOD’S current policy that calls for UME at
                             each decision point, including major milestones, and believe that more
                             emphasis should be given to conducting cm&~before production start-up.
                             This or&~ should not be viewed as a pass/fail test; it would function as
                             an input to decisionmakers to ensure that problems are identified before
                             a system begins production.


Prototypes Are Being Built   Cur review has shown that even though prototypes have been built or
but Not Being Used for       are under construction for some systems, the services generally do not
                             plan to use them to conduct or&~. For example, prototypes were built or
OF&E                         under construction for five of the six systems we reviewed (the Air
                             Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter and Short Range Attack Missile-II,
                             the Army’s Non-Line-Of-Sight Missile,and the Navy’s bng-Range Air
                             Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability Aircraft and Fixed Distributed Sys-
                             tem). However, only the Navy used or has plans to use its prototypes in
                             or&~ before production start-up. This is because only the Navy has regu-
                             lations calling for or&~ before production start-up. The other services’
                             regulations only require or&~,to support full-rate production decisions,
                             although some field testing or experimentation may be conducted.

                             The Navy used the Fixed Distributed System prototype to conduct or&E
                             before production start-up. Although the Fixed Distributed System was
                             not a mature system with a prototype available for only one of its two
                             major subsystems, the Navy considered the or&~ results to be useful.
                             This CJT&Ewas conducted before full-scale development.

                             We recognize that not all systems can or should have prototypes. How-
                             ever, o’r&~ conducted before the decision to begin production could be
                             performed on critical subsystems if it is not feasible to have a prototype

                             ‘Navy Weapons Testing: Defense Policy on Early OperationalTestmg (GAO/NSIAD-89-98, Maya.
                             lf=Q),



                             Page4                                                             GAO/NSIMMO-107 umE
                           of the full system. The controlling factors would be system/subsystem
                           maturity and the expected risk.

                           For earlier ONE to be conducted, acquisition strategy from the beginning
                           should require that prototypes be built and operationally tested before
                           the decision to begin production is made. This is the responsibility of
                           acquisition managers, not operational testers.


Concurrency Does Not       As we have previously reported,’ concurrency can be an effective tech-
Preclude OF&E Before       nique for expediting acquisitions if it is well planned and controlled;
                           however, the practice increases the risk that systems will be produced
Production                 with major flaws. ONE before production start-up is an especially impor-
                           tant safeguard against the increased risks of concurrent programs.

                           On April 17,1990, DOD reported to the Congress that its policy allows
                           varying degrees of concurrency, but mandates the completion of testing
                           and the assessments of results before the production phase.6 Proposed
                           concurrency guidelines call for the aggressive use of prototypes and
                           testing to identify problems well before production. Under normal cir-
                           cumstances, the low-rate initial production decision should be supported
                           by the completion of some early UWE.

                           Most DOD officials we talked with concerning earlier or&~ believe that it
                           is feasible to conduct oral before most production start-up decisions.
                           However, our discussions identified several factors that need to be con-
                           sidered when CT&Eis to be conducted before the production start-up
                           decision:
                       . d&E must be planned as part of the system’s acquisition strategy.
                       . Systems tested early may not meet ail requirements for suitability (i.e.,
                           reliability, availability, and maintainability).
                       .   Decisionmakers need to be told that or&~ earlier in the acquisition pro-
                           cess should not be viewed as pass/fail; it should be viewed as a way to
                           identify system performance shortfalls that need to be corrected before
                           production begins.



                                                                             With my L&n&d Operational Test and Evalua-


                           ‘As requested by section SO1of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and
                            1991,DODwastoreporrontherisk~withconcurrencyin~racquisitionp~ams.



                           P8ge 6                                                                 GAO,‘NSLMM@1o7 oT&E
                              B-222886




                              We believe that these factors are also important to systems that are not
                              categorized as concurrent programs.


Production Start-Up Is        Production start-up is traditionally considered as a means by which test
Generally Not Necessary       articles are acquired for or&~. The military services usually use the term
                              low-rate initial production to describe this. However, the Congress and
for OT&E Test Articles        DOD'S Inspector General have expressed concern that the services’ use of
                              low-rate initial production has sometimes resulted in de facto full-rate
                              production before any or&~ is conducted. To try to control the misuse of
                              low-rate initial production, in November 1989, the Congress passed leg-
                              islation requiring an appropriate DOD official to specify the quantities of
                              test articles needed for or&~ in major programs to decrease the number
                              of items produced before UIXE was conducted.

                              We found that production start-up is generally not necessary to produce
                              or&~ test articles. The DOD budget manual and the military services’ reg-
                              ulations require or at least allow or&E test articles to come out of full-
                              scale development. In addition, we identified many systems currently
                              under development or in production where the services plan to use or
                              have used or&~ test articles produced from full-scale development. (See
                              app. I.) In only one of the six systems we reviewed will the UWE test
                              articles come from a low-rate initial production decision. In that case,
                              according to the Deputy Program Manager, the Lineof Sight-Forward-
                              Heavy was already in production for an allied country before the U.S.
                              Army bought it.


Conclusions and               Weapon systems are starting production before ora is conducted
                              because DOD is not giving full effect to its policy for d&E at each decision
Recommendations               point, including major milestones. On numerous occasions we have
                              reported the negative effects of systems that have been produced with-
                              out adequate or&~. The barriers to earlier CWE can be overcome with
                              better planning.

                              To strengthen DOD'S recent reaffirmation of the proper role of CT&E as a
                              key internal control in the systems acquisition process made through the
                              Defense Management Review initiatives, we recommend you ensure that
                              DOD acquisition and testing directives currently under revision

                          l   clearly establish the need for or&~ before production start-up;




                              Page g
              . define when or&~ must occur and when it may be appropriate for deci-
                sionmakers to rely on operational assessments in lieu of 68tE for produc-
                tion start-up decisions, as previously recommended in our May 1989
                mpofi;
              . require the services to plan for and conduct earlier or&~; and
              . ensure thatacquisition strategies for major weapon systems require sys-
                tem or subsystem prototypes be built where practical and that these
                prototypes be operationally tested before production start-up.


                To determine whether perceived barriers precluded early or&~, we per-
Scopeand        formed work at test and program oversight offices within CISD, military
Methodology     service headquarters, and operational test agencies, and applicable pro-
                gram executive and management offices. On the basis of a judgment
                sample drawn with direct OSD and service input, we examined six cur-
                rent systems and reviewed our prior and recently reported work on
                additional systems. (See apps. I, II, and III.) We also performed an exten-
                sive literature search and review of available documents on defense
                acquisition, testing, prototyping, and concurrency.

                We did not obtain written agency comments on this report. However, we
                discussed the information in this report with DOD officials and incorpo
                rated their comments as appropriate. DOD officials were very receptive
                to our findings and conclusions and believed that systems acquisition
                changes would be helpful to the or&~ community. They pointed out that
                Defense Management Review initiatives and the Under Secretary of
                Defense for Acquisition are stressing the need for earlier m&E.

                We conducted our work from August 1989 through February 1990 in
                accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


                As you know, 31 USC. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
                submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to
                the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Com-
                mittee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of
                the report. A written statement must also be submitted to the House and
                Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for
                appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

                We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House Committees
                on Government Operations and on Armed Services and Senate Commit-
                tees on Governmental Affairs and on Armed Services; the Secretaries of


                Page 7                                                GAo,msL4D-90107 cm&E
                                                                          _   .
Iv223333




the Army, Air Force, and Navy; the Director, or&~; the Deputy Director
for Defense Research and Engineering/Test and Evaluation; the Direc-
tor, Office of Management and Budget; and the military service opera-
tional test agencies. We will also make copies available to other
interested parties upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Mr. Paul F. Math, Direc-
tor, Research, Development, Acquisition, and Procurement Issues, who
may be reached on (202) 27543400 if you or your staff have questions
concerning the report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.




Frank C. Conahan      -
Assistant Comptroller General




Page 8                                              GAO/?WAD90107   d&E
Page 9
Contents


Letter
Appendix I                                                                                  12
Cn’&ESchedulesfor
Six WeaponSystems
We Reviewed
Appendix II
Examples of Systems
Noted in Our Recent
Reports That Did Not
Have OT&E Planned
Before Production
Start-Up
Appendix III
Examples of Reports
Illustrating Where
Production Decisions
Were Made Before
OT&E Was Started or
Completed
Appendix IV                                                                                 18
Major Contributors to
This Report

                        Abbreviations

                        DOD         Department of Defense
                        OSD         Office of the Secretary of Defense
                        CT&E        operational test and evaluation
                        RWR         radar warning receivers


                        Page 10                                          GAO/‘?USIAD9@l(yI d%E
Page 11
Appendix I

UP&E Schedulesfor Six WeaponSystems
We Reviewed

                                                                                    Fircrl   yams
                                                                                                               lnithl
                                                                                             m&z         plod-               source of ol6E teat
Senfice/rystem                                              Program 8tut                                    decision         mlcle3
AmY
Lrne-of Srght-Forward-Heavy   (Air Defense   Antf-                       1987                   1990             1987b       Low-rate tntttal productron
  Tank System)
Non-Ltne-of-SrghtC (Fiber Opttc Gutded Missile)                          1987                   1994             1991b       Full-scale development
Air Force
Advanced Tacttcal FrghterC                                               1981                   1997             1994D       Full-scale development
Short-Range Attack Misstle-IP                                            1985                   1992             1991b       Full-scale development
Navy
Long-Range Anti-Submanne Warfare Advanced                                1986                   1992             1992b       Full-scale development
   Capabtkty AIrcraW (P-7A)
Fixed Dtstnbuted SystemC                                                 1984                   19W              19W         Demonstratton/valrdatton
                                                     ‘Without extensrvely revbewlng additlonal systems, we noted that several others used full-scale develop-
                                                     ment stems for producmg   OTIE test articles. These were MK-48 Advanced Capablrty Torpedo,
                                                     Extremely Low Frequency Ccmmunicatton System, ANSCBS3C Long-Range Sonar, and Arrbcrne Setf-
                                                     Protection Jammer

                                                     “For low-rate inftral production

                                                     ‘Prototypes have been built or planned for these systems. However, the servrces are not ptannrng to
                                                     use the Non-Lrne-cf-Srght Missile. Short-Range Attack Missile-Il. and Advanced Tactrcal Ftghter protc
                                                     types for OTLE.
                                                     “An OTLE, such as the one descrbed In footnote 3 on page 2. was successfully conducted




                                                     P8ge 12                                                                    GAO/‘NSlADB@1O7         OT’&E
Appendix II

Examplesof SystemsNoted in Our Recent
ReportsThat Did Not Have oT&E Planned
Before Production StarkUp
                  Abrams Tank: Block II Modifications Not Ready for Production
                  (NSIADOO-67, Feb. 28, 1990)

              . Army will commit %166.4 million to the MlA2 tank program before
                development prototype testing is begun.
              . OSD had not approved the Army’s test and evaluation master plan as of
                August 1989 because it was concerned that the Army had not suffi-
                ciently planned live-fire testing and or&~, which needs to be completed
                and evaluated before the production decision is made in August 1991.

                  Strategic Bombers: B-2 Program Status and Current Issues (NSWQO-
                  120, Feb. 22,199O)

              l   B-2 aircraft acquisition strategy includes ordering a large number of
                  planes before the necessary testing to demonstrate that the ES-2can per-
                  form its mission is completed.

                  ICBM Modernization: Rail Garrison Production Decision and Launch Car
                  Acquisition Should Be Delayed (NSLAD 90-19, Dec. 7, 1989)

              . No or&~ of the complete weapon system (missiles and rail cars) will have
                been conducted prior to the initial production decision.
              . We recommended that the Secretary of Defense delay the April 1990
                initial Rail Garrison production decision until the Air Force has con-
                ducted some or&~ of the complete system.

                  Navy Weapons Testing: Defense Policy on Early Operational Testing
                  (NSL~D-~~-98, May 8, 1989)

                  The following seven programs were authorized for low-rate initial pro
                  duction with no m&E:

              . ALQ-165 Airborne Self-Protection Jammer.
              l SQS-53C Sonar.
              l E6A Aircraft.
              l MK-45 Capsule Launching System.
              . Ocean Surveillance Information System Baseline Upgrade.
              l TB-23 Accelerated Thinline Towed Array.
              l AN/B%‘-2 Submarine Combat System.




                  P8ge 13                                             GAO,‘TUSIAD(IOlM CT&E
  Examplea of Syatema Noted In Chu Recent
  Reporta That Did Not Ibe OT&E Planned
  Before Reduction start-up




  Navy/Air Force Still Developing Separate, Costly Radar Warning Receiv-
  ers
  - (~~~~-87-167, July 1, 1987)
0 Five radar warning receivers (RWR) started production before CT&E was
  completed.
. Starting production before adequately testing the systems has resulted
  in the purchase of equipment that cannot be used for its intended pur-
  pose, production of RWR that were placed in storage rather than
  installed, and deployment of RWRjudged operationally unsuitable to U.S.
  combat forces by testing officials.




  Page 14                                             GAO/‘NSIAD96107 OTBE
Examplesof Reports Illustrating Where
Production DecisionsWere Made Before OT&E
Wa Started or Completed
              Operational Test and Evaluation Can Contribute More to Decisionmak-
              % (NSIAD-W-67, Dec. 23, 1986)

              Our analysis showed 41 cases where production was approved before
              or&~ was started or completed. Thirty-one of the 41 cases were identi-
              fied in our reports and summarized in this December 23,1986, report.
              The 31 reports are listed below.

              1. Adverse Effects of Large-Scale Production of Major Weapons Before
              Completion of Development and Testing (B-163068, Nov. 19, 1970)

              2. The Importance of Testing and Evaluation in the Acquisition Process
              for Major Weapon Systems (B-163068, Aug. 7,1972)

              3. Review of the Adequacy of Department of Defense Test Resources
              (~~~~76-84,Apr. 30,1975)

              4. Effectiveness of Testing of Selected Major Weapon Systems
              (FSALI-76-74,June 4,1975)

              6. Need for Additional Test and Evaluation on the Major Caliber Light-
              weight Gun (PSAD~~, Nov. 6,1976)

              6. Navy Operational Test and Evaluation - A Valuable Tool Not Fully
              Utilized (~~~~7877, Mar. 29,1978)

              7. Operational Testing of Air Force Systems Requires Several Improve-
              ments (FSAD7B102, June 2,1978)

              8. Department of Defense’s Conduct of Operational Test and Evaluation
              of Foreign Built Weapon Systems (~~~79-131, July 25, 1978)

              9. Practices and Procedures for FollowOn Operational Testing and EvaI-
              uation of Weapon Systems by the Military Services (~~~79-1, Oct. 19,
              1978)

              10. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Needs Improvements
              (PSAD-W~,Nov. 13, 1979)

              11, Ml Tank’s Reliability is Still Uncertain ( ~SAD-M-20, Jan. 29, 1980)

              12. F/A-18 Naval Strike Fighter: Its Effectiveness Is Uncertain
              (~~~~80-24, Feb. 14, 1980)



              P8ge 15                                                GAO/m3L4B~lo7       or&E
Ehmplea of Reporta Ill~tiag  when
RoductIon xkcblon8 were Made Before
ONE WM Started or Completed




13. Cruise Missiles: Status and Issues as They Near Production
(I~AD-M-19,Feb. 28, 1980)

14. Future Procurements of Army’s Copperhead Projectile Should Be
Contingent on Imnrovements in Performance and Reliabilitv (ps~~81-4.
Nov. 13,198O) *

15. Review of the High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile Program
(MASAD~~-7,Feb. 28, 1981)

16. Some Land Attack Cruise Missiles Acquisition Programs Need to Be
Slowed Down (MA&D-s 1-9, Feb. 28, 1981)

17. Most Critical Testing Still Lies Ahead for Missiles in Theater Nuclear
Modernization (MASADS1-16, Mar. 2,198l)

18. The Armv’s Advance Attack HehcoDter Is Not Readv for Production
(MASAD-S~~, Dec. 1,198l)

19. Air Launched Cruise Missile Shows Promise but Problems Could
Result in Operational Limitations (C- b1~sm-82-13, Feb. 26,1982)

20. Promzss of the Light Armored Vehicle Program Should Be Closelv
Monitored ( ~~~~-82-41, Aug. 10,1982)

2 1. Results of Production Testing Should Be Considered Before Increas-
ing Patriot’s Production ( MASADS~-7, Jan. 26,1983)

22. Acquisition of the Over-The-Horizon Backscatter Radar System
Should Be Reevaluated (MATADOR-  14, Mar. 15,1983)

23. The B-l Bomber Program - A New Start ( ~~~-93-21,       Apr. 13, 1983)

24. Better Planning and Management of Threat Simulators and Aerial
Targets Is Crucial to Effective Weapon Systems Performance
(M.kSADB-27, June 23,1983)

25. Air Force and Navy Trainer Aircraft Acquisition Programs
(MASADS~-22, July 5, 1983)

26. Results of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed to Confirm Army
Remotely Piloted Vehicle’s Readiness for Production (NSL4D-84-72, Apr. 4,
1984)


Page 16                                                 GAO/‘NSL4B90-107 OI’&E
Eumpla of ReportanlMlx8tlIlgwhere
Prodoetioll Deciai0M were Made Before
UME Wu Stand or Completed




27. Status of the Peacekeeper (MX) Weapon System    (NSLAD8e112,   May 9,
1984)

28. Army’s Decision to Begin Production of the High Mobility Multipur-
pose Wheeled Vehicle Was Premature (NSIAD-SM~~, June 12,1984)

29. Army Has the Opportunity to Recompete DAS3 Purchases and
Improve Automated Battlefield Support ( IIITEGW20, Sept. 28, 1984)

30. Production of Some Major Weapon Systems Began With Only Limited
Operational Test and Evaluation Results (NS-,    June 19, 1985)

31. Evaluation of Army’s Mobile Subscriber Equipment Program
(NSIAD-86-117,July 16,1985)




Page 17                                             GAO/NSLUM@lU7    UT%E
Appendix IV

Major Contributors to This &port


                        Michael E. Motley, Associate Director
National Security and   Lester C. Farrington, Assistant Director
International Affairs   Maureen Machisak-Hemdon, Evaluator
Division, Washington,
D.C.
                        Fred Harrison, Regional Management Representative
Norfolk Regional        Leslie Gregor, Evaluator-in-Charge
Office                  Clifton Spruill, Site Senior
                        Julie Chapman, Evaluator
                        Jim Marshall, Advisor


                        Ted Baird, Regional Management Representative
Denver Regional         Ernest Beran, Regional Assignment Manager
Office




                        P8ge 18                                             GAO/‘NS~~107   OTSE
There     is a 33”,, diwt)unt   OII ordt~rs   ft,r 100 or mow   copies   rnaibd   to a
\inglt*   address.
United States
General Accounting  Office
Washington,   DC 20548
                                    1   Permit   No. GlOO
Official   Business
Penalty    for Private   Use $300