oversight

Defense Acquisition: Fleet Ballistic Missile Program Offers Lessons for Successful Programs

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-06.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                             I’nited   States   General   Accounting   Office
la


GAO                          Report to the Chairman, Committee on -
                             Armed Services, House of
                             Representatives


September   1990
                             DEFENSE
                             ACQUISITION
                             Fleet Ballistic Missile
                             Program Offers w
                             Lessons for Successful
                             Programs




                    IUBTIUCTED--      Not to be released outside the
                    General Accounting OilIce unless specificaLly
                    approved by the Office of Congressional
                    Relations.


 GAO/NSIAD-90-160
National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-239137

September 6, 1990

The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report responds to your request concerning the management of the Navy’s Fleet
Ballistic Missile program. Specifically, it discusses program management features that have
been major contributors to the program’s success. We also found that successful programs in
the other services tend to share similar features.

As requested, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date,
unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Defense; the Service Secretaries; appropriate congressional committees; and
other interested parties.

This report was prepared under the direction of Martin M Ferber, Director, Navy Issues,
Appendix IV lists other major contributors to this report.

Sincerely yours,




Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
Executive Summq


             The Fleet Ballistic Missile system is the U.S. sea-based deterrent against
Purpose      the Soviet nuclear threat. Nuclear-powered submarines carrying
             nuclear-tipped Polaris A-l ballistic missiles began operational patrols in
             1960. In March 1990, fourth-generation submarines began operation
             with sixth-generation Trident II (D-6) missiles. The Navy’s Fleet Ballistic
             Missile program is one of the few major weapon system acquisitions
             that, over the years, has consistently met or bettered its cost, schedule,
             and performance goals.

             The Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, asked GAO to deter-
             mine (1) what features have contributed to the Fleet Ballistic Missile
             program’s success and (2) whether those features were present in other
             selected defense acquisition programs. GAO also determined to what
             extent the six features identified by the Packard Commission as typical
             of successful commercial programs could be found in the selected
             defense acquisition programs.


             The Department of Defense’s acquisition process has been the subject of
Background   a number of studies and management initiatives for more than 20 years.
             These studies suggested ways to address recurring problems in defense
             acquisition-cost   growth, schedule slippage, and performance
             shortfalls-but   these problems continue to exist.

             GAO  used a comparative case study methodology to determine whether
             features that were identified as contributing to the Fleet Ballistic Missile
             program’s success were common in other major acquisition programs.
             The GAO study included one “successful” and one “less than successful”
             program each from the Navy, Army, and Air Force. GAO considered pro-
             grams that generally met their cost, schedule, and performance goals as
             successful. The other successful programs studied were the Army’s Mul-
             tiple Launch Rocket System and the Air Force’s F-16. For comparison
             purposes, GAO studied the Navy’s Submarine Advanced Combat System
             (a portion of which became AN/BSY-l), the Army’s Aquila Remotely
             Piloted Vehicle, and the Air Force’s Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
             Missile.

             The Packard Commission’s 1986 report on defense management
             included an “Acquisition Model To Emulate,” which identified six fea-
             tures that could be used as a model for defense acquisition programs.
             These features are (1) clear command channels, (2) stability, (3) limited
             reporting requirements, (4) small, high quality staffs, (5) communica-
             tions with users, and (6) prototyping and testing.


             Page 2                             GAO/NSIA.D@O-16OFketBallisticMissileRogram
                            Executive   Summary




                                  identified five interrelated major features that contributed to the
Results in Brief            GAO
                            Fleet Ballistic Missile program’s success. These features are (1) funding
                            and program stability, (2) program responsibility over the system’s
                            entire life cycle from development through operations support, (3) con-
                            tinuity of key personnel, (4) program office technical expertise, and
                            (5) good management practices, such as open communications, indepen-
                            dent internal evaluation, and on-site management representation at con-
                            tractor plants.

                            GAO  found no guaranteed “cookbook” approach to a successful weapon
                            system acquisition. Each of the acquisition programs studied developed
                            in a unique environment with its own particular opportunities and
                            problems. In each case, GAO found that the program’s success or lack of
                            success was the result of multiple causes. However, more of the Fleet
                            Ballistic Missile program’s features were generally present in the suc-
                            cessful programs than in the less than successful programs. For
                            example, the successful programs generally had funding and program
                            stability, continuity of key personnel, and program office technical
                            expertise.

                             Likewise, the successful programs shared more of the Packard Commis-
                             sion model’s features than the less than successful programs. For
                             example, the successful programs generally had stability, high quality
                             staff, and good communications with users.



Principal Findings

Program Stability and        Since the mid-1950s, the Fleet Ballistic Missile program office has had a
Life-Cycle Responsibility    well-defined mission of high national priority. The program also has had
                             strong and continuous congressional and executive branch funding sup-
                             port. Therefore, program managers have been able to concentrate on
                             resolving technical problems rather than funding problems.

                             The Fleet Ballistic Missile program office has been responsible for the
                             design, development, procurement, and maintenance support of several
                             generations of submarines and missiles. With this life-cycle responsi-
                             bility for the system, the program’s management emphasized the long-
                             term view, knowing that it would be responsible for supporting the
                             system. For example, decisions made during the Trident I missile’s



                              Page 3                           GAO/NSIAD-90460   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                       Executive   Summary




                       acquisition phase are today’s logistics and maintenance realities for the
                       same program office.

                       Most of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program’s principal contractors have
                       been with the program from the beginning and share this long-term
                       responsibility. Many of the program’s developmental contracts provided
                       for incentive payments based on long-term performance, including relia-
                       bility and accuracy. For example, the Trident II navigation subsystem’s
                       performance on the first 32 operational patrols will determine the final
                       amount of the contractor’s incentive payment.

                       The successful acquisition programs GAO studied had funding and pro-
                       gram stability while the less than successful programs did not.


Staff Continuity and   Military personnel had an acquisition career path in the Fleet Ballistic
                       Missile program office, which provided continuity. The average tenure
Technical Expertise    of the six program managers is 6 years, compared to 27 months for
                       other defense program managers. Also, four of these program managers
                       each served as the program’s Technical Director before becoming pro-
                       gram manager.

                       Civilian personnel in the Fleet Ballistic Missile program office also have
                       long tenures and promotion opportunities within the program. For
                       example, about 40 percent of the headquarters civilian personnel have
                       more than 10 years of program experience. These senior personnel use
                       their experience not only to resolve problems but also to avoid them.

                       Fleet Ballistic Missile program personnel have the necessary technical
                       expertise to direct and evaluate contractor performance. This is in con-
                       trast to some program offices that use either contractors as weapon
                       system managers or technical staff from functional organizations
                       outside the program offices.

                       The successful acquisition programs GAO studied had more continuity in
                       senior staff than did the less than successful programs.


Good Management         Five good management practices have helped to ensure that the Fleet
Practices               Ballistic Missile system meets performance and design requirements.
                        These practices are (1) open communications, (2) independent internal
                        evaluation, (3) on-site management representation at contractor plants,
                        (4) strict management of proven designs and manufacturing processes,


                        Page 4                            GAO/NSIAIMO-160   Fleet Ehllistic   Missile   Program
                     Executive   Summary




                     and (5) contracting with multiple incentives for prime contractors and
                     extensive competition at the subcontractor level.

                     These practices are not unique to the Fleet Ballistic Missile program, but
                     they were generally absent from the less than successful programs
                     studied. For example, the communications practices used are not neces-
                     sarily different in the type and number of meetings or reviews. How-
                     ever, only the successful programs benefitted from open
                     communications, which resulted in program and contractor personnel
                     recognizing problems as they developed, openly discussing them, and
                     working to resolve them.


Packard Commission   GAO’S review showed that the three successful programs shared more of
                     the Packard Commission model’s features than the less than successful
Model Comparisons    programs, particularly stability, high quality staff, and communications
                     with users. This corroborates the Packard Commission’s view that inclu-
                     sion of these features can contribute to program success.


                     GAO     is not making recommendations in this report.
Recommendations

                          did not obtain official agency comments. However, GAO discussed
Agency Comments      GAO
                     the report’s findings with Department of Defense officials and officials
                     of the various acquisition program offices reviewed and included their
                     comments where appropriate.




                      Page 6                              GAO/NSLU.bW16O     Fleet BUntic   Missile   Program
Contents


Executive Summary                                                                                             2

Chapter 1                                                                                                     8
Introduction                Program History
                            Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
                                                                                                              9
                                                                                                             10

Chapter 2                                                                                                    15
Features Contributing       ~;~;l;~e~;~;l~ilit~                                                              15
                                                                                                             17
IJo the   FBM   Program’s   Coniinuity of Key Personnel                                                      19
Successand                  Program Office Technical Expertise                                               22
Comparisons With            Good Management Practices                                                        23
                            Applicability to Other Defense Acquisitions                                      27
Other Acquisition
Programs
Chapter 3                                                                                                    29
Comparison of the Six
Acquisition Programs
and the Packard
Commission’s
Acquisition Model
Appendixes                  Appendix I: Definitions of the Packard Commission                                32
                                Model’s Features
                            Appendix II: The Six Defense Acquisition Programs                                34
                                Studied
                            Appendix III: GAO Reports Used in Our Review                                     43
                            Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report                                   47

Tables                      Table 1.1: Acquisition Programs Selected for Our Review                          13
                            Table 3.1: Comparison of the Features of the Acquisition                         30
                                Programs Studied With the Commission’s Acquisition
                                Model Features
                            Table II. 1: FBM Submarine Comparison                                            35
                            Table 11.2:FBM Comparison                                                        36




                            Page 6                            GAO/NSIAD90-160   F’leet Balhtlc   MSsdle Program
          Contents




Figures   Figure II. 1: FBM Submarine Class Comparison                                       34
          Figure 11.2:Six Generations of FBMs                                                36
          Figure 11.3:The MLRS                                                               37
          Figure 11.4:The F-16                                                               38
          Figure 11.5:AN/BSY-1 Combat Control and Acoustics                                  40
               System
          Figure 11.6:Major Components of the Aquila System                                  41
          Figure 11.7:The AMR.AAM                                                            42




          Abbreviations

           AMRAAM    Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
           DOD       Department of Defense
           FBM       Fleet Ballistic Missile
           GAO       General Accounting Office
           MLRS      Multiple Launch Rocket System
           PM        program manager
           SSP       Strategic Systems Programs
           SUBACS    Submarine Advanced Combat System


           Page7                           GAO/NSIADW)-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Chapter 1

Introduction


               The weapon system acquisition process has been the subject of studies
               and Department of Defense (DOD) management initiatives for more than
               20 years. For example, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report in 1970,
               the Report of the Commission on Government Procurement in 1972, the
               DOD’S Assessment of Its Weapons Acquisition System (the Carlucci Ini-
               tiatives) in 1981, the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control
               (the Grace Commission report) in 1983, and the President’s Blue Ribbon
               Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) in 1986
               were five major studies made by various organizations that examined
               ways to improve the weapon system acquisition process. As a rule, these
               studies suggested ways to address recurring problems in defense acqui-
               sition-cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls-
               but the existence of continuing studies and initiatives indicates that the
               problems still exist.

               We also have examined and reported on acquisition problems of indi-
               vidual major weapon system programs since the 1960s. In 1988 we
               reported’ that the continuing problems associated with defense weapon
               system acquisition is indicative of the high level of difficulty in devel-
               oping lasting solutions to the seemingly intractable problems of
               affordability and stability.

               One exception to these acquisition problems has been the Navy’s Fleet
               Ballistic Missile (FBM) program. This program is one of the few major
               weapon system acquisitions that, over the years, has consistently met or
               bettered its cost, schedule, and performance goals. Both the Congress
               and the defense community generally recognize this program as one that
               has avoided many of the problems associated with defense weapon
               system acquisition, such as cost growth, schedule slippage, and perform-
               ance shortfalls.

               The FBM weapon system, operational since November 15,1960, consists
               of nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic mis-
               siles. (See app. II.) In addition to missiles and submarines, the FBM pro-
               gram includes research and development, production, training, facility
               construction, and maintenance and operational support. However, FBM
               submarine reactors are provided by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Pro-
               gram, and the nuclear warheads are provided by the Department of
               Energy.


               ‘Major Acquisitions: Summary of Recurring Problems and Systemic Issues: 1960-1987 (GAO/
               mm1m,               Sept. 13, 1988).



               Page 8                                      GAO/NSLUHJO-160      Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                  Chapter 1
                  Introduction




                  The FRM Program Manager (PM) is the Navy’s Director of Strategic Sys-
                  tems Programs (SSP), which is the FBM program office. As a direct-
                  reporting PM, the PM reports to the Assistant Secretary of the IKavy for
                  Research, Development and Acquisition-the        Navy’s Service Acquisi-
                  tion Executive-on      acquisition matters. The PM also reports to the Chief
                  of Naval Operations for all operational requirements. In addition, the PM
                  acts as the liaison for the FBM program with all other government agen-
                  cies and leads an organization of about 500 military and civilian head-
                  quarters personnel and 2,600 field personnel at government and
                  contractor facilities.


                  In the mid-1950s the defense establishment realized the need to respond
Program History   to a growing Soviet nuclear threat that largely nullified the elaborate
                  network of facilities that provided early warning of possible air attacks
                  against the United States. The Soviets had already demonstrated a bal-
                  listic missile capability, and the country was impressed with a serious
                  urgent need to acquire a defense arsenal of ballistic missiles to counter
                  the Soviet threat. One former PM described the political and psycholog-
                  ical atmosphere at the time as a state of national emergency dramatized
                  by the launch of the first earth-circling satellite (Sputnik) in October
                   1957. As part of the U.S. response, the services began to study and
                  develop intercontinental ballistic missiles.

                  The Navy was responsible for designing the sea-based ballistic missile
                  system. Because of the urgent need, the Navy believed that unusual
                  methods were needed to cut through the normal acquisition review and
                  approval processes if a weapon system was to be developed quickly.

                   In November 1955, the Secretary of the Navy created the Special
                   Projects Office, now called SSP. This new organization was given full
                   responsibility for the FBM program and was provided the funding and
                   the authority to use any Navy resources needed to develop a military
                   capability in the shortest time possible. The Secretary of the Navy and
                   the Chief of Naval Operations gave the PM complete authority to design,
                   develop, produce, and support the FBM system.

                   In December 1956, the Navy began development of a submarine-
                   launched ballistic missile that came to be known as the Polaris missile.
                   This weapon system incorporated new technologies and charted
                   unknown technical paths. In particular, three major components-a
                   solid propellant fuel, a small high yield nuclear warhead, and an accu-
                   rate guidance/fire control/navigation system-needed major technical


                   Page 9                             GAO/NSIAIMO-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                        Chapter 1
                        Introduction




                        breakthroughs at the time that the Polaris project was authorized. A
                        nuclear attack submarine also had to be modified to carry and launch
                        the missiles while submerged. SSP’S first Plans and Programs Director
                        made the analogy that building and fielding Polaris was similar to
                        building the entire automobile industry. That is, not only did the first
                        automobile have to be developed but also the internal combustion
                        engine, tires, the oil industry, gas stations, and driver training before the
                        automobile’s feasibility was known. However, technical problems were
                        solved, and the Polaris program went from concept development to
                        deployment in 3-l/2 years -3 years ahead of the original schedule.

                        Because of the sense of urgency of the program, funds were made avail-
                        able. Thus, the challenge to SSP during the Polaris development was one
                        of how to use money wisely rather than how to obtain it. Between fiscal
                        years 1956 and 1990, about $74 billion (in then-year dollars) was appro-
                        priated for FBM program acquisition.’ This total does not include the cost
                        of nuclear submarine reactors or nuclear warheads, The total includes
                        about 46 percent of the Trident II missile funding and about 70 percent
                        of Trident II-capable submarine funding; the remaining Trident II acqui-
                        sition costs have not been appropriated.

                         The sixth-generation Trident II (D-5) missile began full-scale develop-
                         ment in October 1983. At that time, dates were set for the first sea-
                         launched missile flight test and the missile’s initial deployment. The
                         land-based missile flight test series was completed in January 1989, and
                         the sea-launched test series began in March 1989, as planned. The mis-
                         sile’s initial deployment, however, was delayed 3 months, to March
                          1990, to allow design corrections to be incorporated after the first and
                         third sea-launched missiles failed and recovery of one contractor’s mis-
                         sile motor casting capability, which was destroyed in a fire. Flight tests
                         resumed in December 1989; the six remaining sea-launched development
                          flight tests and demonstration and shakedown operation tests for the
                          USS Tennessee and the USS Pennsylvania-the          first two Trident II
                         capable submarines-were       successful.


                         The Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to deter-
Objectives, Scope,and    mine (1) what features have contributed to the FBM program’s success
Methodology              and (2) whether those features were present in other selected defense

                         ‘This represents the then-year dollar amounts for the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Weapons
                         Procurement, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Other Procurement, and Military Con-
                         struction accounts for foal years 1966 through 1990. It excludes all operations and maintenance and
                         crew costs.



                         Page 10                                       GAO/NSJAD9O-160      Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Chapter 1
Introduction




acquisition programs. We also determined to what extent the six fea-
tures identified by the Packard Commission as typical of successful
commercial programs could be found in the selected defense acquisition
programs.

This report responds to the Chairman’s request for a management study
of SSP, which was the second part of a two-part request. The first part
addressed the acquisition status of the Trident II program and resulted
in our November 1988 report.” As we reported, the Trident II program
was proceeding on schedule and was slightly under the initial estimated
acquisition cost. However, we cautioned that many key milestones
remained, including the entire sea-based test program, before the
system’s initial deployment.

To address the second part of the Chairman’s request, we selected the
following approach. We first delineated the features that led to the FBM
program’s success and compared these features to those in other defense
acquisition programs. We then compared the features of these acquisi-
tion programs to those described in the Packard Commission’s “Acquisi-
tion Model to Emulate.” This second analysis corroborated our first
analysis.

To determine the features that have contributed to the FBM program’s
success, we developed a list of areas considered important. Because our
earlier report had provided information on some successful aspects of
the Trident II program, we reviewed reports and documents on the FBM
program, such as guidance, and information that had been collected. For
example, SSP’S Orientation Manual cited nine principles that were estab-
lished in the FBM program’s first year and have been adhered to
throughout the program’s existence. We also reviewed studies of the
defense acquisition process, such as the Packard Commission’s 1986
report.’ We reviewed the Commission’s report because it was the most
recent study of the defense acquisition system. Also, some of the Com-
mission’s recommendations had been implemented by DOD or required by
the Congress enacting legislation such as the Goldwater-Nichols Depart-
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433). We also inter-
viewed experts in the field of management and defense acquisition. The
experts and literature recognized that there is no consensus of definitive
criteria that leads to program management success. However, using our

 “Navy Strategic Forces: Trident II proceeding Toward Deployment (GAO/NSIAD-89-40, Nov. 21,
 19SS).

 .‘A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President (June 19%).



 Page 11                                        GAO/NSIAD9O-160        Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Chapter 1
Introduction




list, we were able to structure a framework of descriptive questions to
obtain additional information on the features contributing to the FBM
program’s success. These questions were used in interviewing (1) offi-
cials at SSP'S offices in Arlington, Virginia, major FBM contractors, and
selected FEiM subcontractors, (2) former SSP and contractor officials, and
(3) current and former high-level DOD and Navy officials.

We then analyzed our list of features, looking for those that were men-
tioned most often. Through this process, we identified five major fea-
tures of the FBM acquisition program that experts considered to have
contributed to its success. These features are (1) funding and program
stability, (2) life-cycle responsibility, (3) continuity of key personnel,
(4) program office technical expertise, and (5) good management prac-
tices. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to represent
those features that appeared to be significant contributors to program
success (see ch. 2).

To determine if these five features were present in other defense acqui-
sition programs, we used a comparative case study methodology in
which the FBM program was compared with other acquisition programs.
To select the acquisition programs, we developed case-selection criteria,
including (1) representation from the Navy, Army, and Air Force,
(2) DOD designated major acquisitions (generally those requiring more
than $200 million in research and development or $1 billion in produc-
tion), and (3) “successful” and “less than successful” acquisition pro-
grams, based on a judgmental assessment of how well they met their
cost, schedule, and performance goals, using our prior reports as a pri-
mary source of information.

 Because a program must have been assessed as being successful in all
 three categories of cost, schedule, and performance or less than suc-
 cessful in all three categories, various candidate programs were elimi-
 nated. Also, these assessments were made based on a program’s initial
 deployment goals, and a later assessment may have resulted in different
 programs being selected. We recognize that most weapon system acquisi-
 tions tended to fall somewhere between successful and less than suc-
 cessful as defined, with a mixed performance in the three categories.
 Therefore, we believe that the acquisition programs selected represent
 the extremes in defense acquisition at the time they were selected. (See
 table 1.1 for the acquisition programs reviewed.)




 Page 12                            GAO/NSIAD9O-160   Pleet Ballbtic   Missile   Program
                                           Chapter 1
                                           Introduction




Table 1.1: Acquisition Programs Selected
for Our Review                                                                                                         Outcome
                                                                                 Lead service                                 Less than
                                           Program                          Navy    Army Air Force              Successful   successful
                                           Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)         X                                              X
                                           Multlple Launch Rocket
                                           System (MLRS)                                   X                                    X
                                           F-16 tactical fighter                                        X                       X
                                           Submanne Advanced
                                           Combat System
                                           (SUBACS)a                             X                                                                  X
                                           Aquila Remotely Plloted
                                           Vehicle                                         X                                                        X
                                           Advanced Medium Range
                                           Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM)                                  X                                           X
                                           aAs noted in app. II, the SUBACS program was restructured and a portlon was renamed AN/&Y-l


                                           We designed the case studies to illustrate the types of features, both
                                           internal and external to a program, that may influence a program’s out-
                                           come. We realized that we could not make judgments as to cause-and-
                                           effect relationships with respect to a specific feature’s effect on the out-
                                           come of a program. Thus, we highlighted those features of the other five
                                           programs where we found comparisons to those in the FBM program.

                                           We obtained information for the case study comparisons from our prior
                                           reports (see app. III) and ongoing efforts and from defense literature.
                                           We also interviewed past and present program officials at the service
                                           commands where the program offices were located. These included the
                                           Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia; the Army Missile
                                           Command, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama; the Army Aviation
                                           Systems Command, St. Louis, Missouri; and the Air Force System Com-
                                           mand’s Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force
                                           Base, Ohio, and Munitions Systems Division, Eglin Air Force Base,
                                           Florida. We discussed our observations from the case study programs
                                           with Navy, Army, and Air Force officials to verify the accuracy and
                                           completeness of the information obtained and incorporated their views
                                           where appropriate.

                                           We then compared the features of these case study programs to those in
                                           the Packard Commission’s model. The Commission report included “An
                                           Acquisition Model to Emulate,” which contained six features that typi-
                                           fied successful commercial acquisition programs and could be used as a
                                           model for defense acquisitions (see app. I). Some of these features, such
                                           as those dealing with stability and quality staff, overlapped with the



                                           Page 13                                       GAO/NSIA.D~ltlO      Fleet 3M.llstic       Missfle   Program
    Chapter 1
    introduction




    features we had identified through the review of the FBM program. The
    model’s features were organized differently and included additional
    dimensions, such as prototyping and testing, but they provided an addi-
    tional framework for comparing acquisition programs.

    Our methodology for identifying features of success and comparing the
    features among major defense acquisition programs was limited in the
    following areas.

. Definitive criteria for determining a successful acquisition program did
  not exist. Thus, we used experts to identify areas they considered
  important, from which we developed a framework for asking questions,
  descriptive in nature, to identify the contributors to success.
. We were not able to define definitive measures; definitions of these fea-
  tures, including those in the Commission’s model, were subject to dif-
  ferent interpretations. For example, officials of the defense acquisition
  programs studied could not agree on a definition of “small, high quality
  staff,” especially given that the Commission chose not to put a numer-
  ical value on “small.”
l The features, such as prototyping and testing or open communication,
  were implemented to different degrees in the various acquisition
  programs.
. The acquisition programs were different, if not unique, in many aspects,
   making it difficult to collect identical information for each. For example,
  the FBM program began as an urgently needed response to a national
   emergency, and the F-16 and MLRS programs operate under multinational
   memorandums of understanding.

     This review was conducted in accordance with generally accepted gov-
     ernment auditing standards. We did not obtain official agency com-
     ments. However, we discussed our findings with DOD officials, and
     officials of the acquisition programs reviewed and included their com-
     ments where appropriate.




     P8ge 14                          GAO/NSIAD@O-160   Fleet Ballistic   Mimile   Program
FeaturesContributing to the FBM Program’s
Successand ComparisonsWith Other
Acquisition Programs
                      Five interrelated features were consistently mentioned as major reasons
                      for the FBM program’s success. These features are (1) funding and pro-
                      gram stability, (2) life-cycle responsibility, (3) continuity of key per-
                      sonnel, (4) program office technical expertise, and (5) good management
                      practices. We found no guaranteed “cookbook” approach to a successful
                      defense acquisition. Each of the acquisition programs studied developed
                      in its own unique atmosphere with its own particular opportunities and
                      problems. However, the successful programs studied shared more of the
                      features associated with the FBM program than the less than successful
                      programs.


                      The Defense Systems Management College defines program instability as
Funding and Program   “the condition imposed on a program due to problems in requirements,
Stability             technology, and funding.” Our 1988 report on recurring problems and
                      systemic major weapon system acquisition issues concluded that insta-
                      bility within the acquisition process has been a continuing problem since
                      the 1960s. As a rule, weapon system acquisition studies for the last 20
                      years have stressed that a major weapon program encounters problems
                      of cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance shortfalls when the
                      program becomes unstable. Conversely, we have reported that stable
                      programs generally proceed through the acquisition process on schedule
                      and within cost targets and meet performance requirements. For
                      example, our 1985 report1 on the production problems of six weapon
                      systems stated that weapon systems that avoided major problems in
                      production had a development phase in which design, planned procure-
                      ment quantities, and funding were relatively stable. However, systems
                      that had problems in early production went through development
                      phases that were characterized by design, funding, and quantity
                      instability.


FBM Program           One of the most important features in this program’s success has been
                      funding and program stability. For this program, we defined program
                      stability in two dimensions. First, SSP has had a single, well-defined mis-
                      sion, allowing it to focus attention on one job over almost 35 years.
                      Second, technological advances in the program have been evolutionary
                      rather than revolutionary.



                      ‘Why Some Weapon Systems Encounter Production Problems While Others Do Not: Six Case Studies
                      (GAO/NSIA~85-34, May 24, 1985).



                      Page 15                                    GAO/NSIABQO-160 Fleet Ballistic Missile program
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                 Acquisition Programs




                 Since its inception, the program has had strong and continuous congres-
                 sional and executive branch funding support. The Congress has regu-
                 larly appropriated the funds requested for the FBM program. This
                 commitment enabled those responsible for managing the program to con-
                 centrate on resolving technical problems instead of funding problems.

                 From its inception, SSP has had a single mission and unchanging require-
                 ments. Although each variant of the missile, from the Polaris A-l to the
                 Trident II D-5, has been an improvement, the system and the job it per-
                 forms have essentially stayed the same. The FBM mission involves a bal-
                 listic missile launched from a submerged submarine to travel great
                 distances to deliver one or more nuclear warheads on targets. This is in
                 contrast to, for example, the Navy’s attack submarine acquisition pro-
                 grams, where the changing threat environment requires corresponding
                 mission and requirement changes with which the PM must contend.

                 Each improvement to the FBM system has been evolutionary as opposed
                 to revolutionary. A stable design provides confidence that development
                 problems have been overcome and that a system will meet technical and
                 operational performance requirements. Once the technology and design
                 were proven in the first Polaris missile, each new generation of the FBM
                 system was based upon a proven prior version: an evolution of the prior
                 version, not a radical, technological jump. SSP'S third PM said that pro-
                 gram office personnel disciplined themselves to make only the required
                 technological jump to meet the need and did not undertake a develop-
                 ment until they understood the technology. This approach enabled SSP to
                 build upon past successes, analyze past failures, and apply the lessons
                 learned to each succeeding variant. In addition, SSP made maximum use
                 of existing facilities and relied heavily on prior variants’ materials,
                 processes, and databases in its evolutionary approach.


Other Programs    In the other acquisition programs, we found that the two successful pro-
                  grams were stable, and the less than successful programs generally were
                  not.

MLRS              The successful MLRS program has had a stable and well-defined mission
                  since early development, and the system’s requirements and the defined
                  threat have not changed during the program. In addition, the program’s
                  technical risk was low because the design did not require major tech-
                  nology advances. According to program officials, the program also has
                  had strong congressional support and adequate funding. Funding and



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                 Acquisition Programs




                 program stability was enhanced by multiyear contracting and gave the
                 contractors and the program office clear and unchanging goals to meet.

F-16             The successful F-16 fighter program’s production began in 1977.
                 According to program officials, early and adequate funding was a signif-
                 icant feature in the program’s success, They noted that early program
                 funding provided stability and that the program’s multinational produc-
                 tion and multiyear contracts reinforced the stability. Also, the prede-
                 cessor Lightweight Fighter Prototype Program reduced the technical
                 risk during the F-16’s full-scale development phase.

SUBACS           The less than successful SUBACS program experienced schedule delays,
                 increased costs, and a reduction in performance capabilities. According
                 to program officials, the SUBACS Basic program (the first phase of the
                 SUBACS program) underwent drastic mission and requirements changes.
                 As a result, the program design was changed three times through 1985.
                 However, since SUBAcS Basic was renamed the AN/B=-1 and a new pro-
                 gram office was formed in October 1985, the program has stabilized.

Aquila           The less than successful Aquila remotely piloted vehicle program was
                 canceled in late 1987 after 13 years of development. Army officials
                 stated that a major problem with the program was that funding levels
                 were never stable from year to year, which led to program restructuring
                 when funding changes occurred. The Army’s decision to delete fiscal
                 year 1982 funding and thus begin program termination, followed by a
                 congressional decision to restore full funding, is an example of the pro-
                 gram’s funding instability.

                  The less than successful AMRUM program has had an unstable design
                  throughout its development, and although the missile is now in limited
                  production, it still does not have a stable design. This instability was a
                  contributing factor to congressional funding cuts and a delayed full-pro-
                  duction decision.


                  A major acquisition program normally proceeds through five basic
Life-Cycle        phases during a system’s life cycle. These phases are (1) concept explo-
Responsibility    ration/definition, (2) concept demonstration/validation,  (3) full-scale
                  development and low-rate initial production, (4) full-rate production and
                  initial deployment, and (5) operations support. In addition to being
                  responsible for developing and producing the system, the PM is normally
                  responsible for maintenance and logistics planning, which is performed
                  by assigned program office personnel. For most Navy weapon systems


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              Success and Comparisons With Other
              Acquisition P~~~grams




              (the main exceptions being those for the FBM and Naval Nuclear Propul-
              sion programs), the performance of maintenance and logistics is trans-
              ferred from the program office to a service or logistics command after
              production. For Army systems, logistics planning occurs within the pro-
              gram office, but operations support comes from other support organiza-
              tions within the program office’s host command. The Air Force divides
              responsibilities between the Air Force Systems Command for system
              development and production and the Air Force Logistics Command for
              support.


FBM Program   Unlike most Navy weapon system program offices, SSP, its subsystem
              contractors, and selected subcontractors have life-cycle responsibility
              for the FBM program. This means that SSP has management control over
              all program phases (initial research, design, development, test, evalua-
              tion, production, maintenance, training, and fleet support) and all pro-
              gram aspects, including technical data, quality control, and reliability.
              Having total life-cycle responsibility bonds research and development
              decisions with implementation of those decisions later in the program
              and helps to focus attention on the long-term effects of each decision
              before implementation. It also provides a continuation of program poli-
              cies, concepts, techniques, and control.

              At SSP, the people responsible for the design of each piece of equipment
              are ultimately responsible for the consequences of that design, whether
              in terms of producibility, maintainability, or reliability. For example,
              SSP’S decisions on the Trident I program in the early acquisition phases
              are today’s logistics and maintenance realities. Thus, SSP has, in effect, a
              “cradle-to-grave” responsibility for program maintenance and material
              reliability because its maintenance and logistics responsibilities are not
              transferred to a service or logistics command after production, as is the
              case with most Navy weapon systems or with Air Force systems.

               Contractors also are included in SSP’S life-cycle responsibility. Their
               responsibility begins when they receive the requirements; continues
               through development, into production, and onto operational support;
               and ends when the system is retired or is replaced by an advanced
               system. Also, incentives expressing long-term life-cycle values are
               included in many of the developmental contracts as a means of rein-
               forcing long-term performance considerations during the system design
               phases. For example, the Trident II missile subsystem contracts include
               reliability, accuracy, and other performance incentives. Incentive pay-
               ments are based on results of test missiles flown over a 3-year period,


               Page 18                                      GAO/NSIAlMO-160   Fleet Balktic   Missile   Program
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                    Acquisition Programs




                    including both development test missiles and production missiles flown
                    by Navy crews during demonstration and shakedown operations and in
                    evaluation tests after the missile’s deployment. Similarly, the Trident II
                    navigation subsystem’s performance on the first 32 operational patrols,
                    extending up to 4 years past the missile’s deployment, will determine
                    the final amount of the contractor’s incentive payment.


Other Programs      None of the other acquisition programs studied had total life-cycle
                    responsibility.


Continuity of Key   PM  level indirectly hindered program stability and that defense PMS’ ten-
Personnel           ures averaged about 27 months while deputies averaged 30 months.
                    These periods of experience are relatively short, considering that the
                    typical weapon system acquisition cycle spans 10 to 15 years. However,
                    responding to PM turnover, the Congress provided, in Public Law 98-525,
                    dated October 19, 1984, that a military PM’S tour of duty “shall be (1)
                    not less than four years, or (2) until completion of a major program
                    milestone...”


FBM Program          In contrast to our 1986 report findings, we found that many officials
                     said that the continuity of the FBM program’s key personnel helped SSP
                     keep the philosophy of the program and the infrastructure of the gov-
                     ernment/contractor relationship intact. This program’s continuity has
                     two major components. The first of these deals with SSP’S PMS. In almost
                     35 years, the program has had six PMS with an average tenure of almost
                     6 years. (Only the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program exceeds this
                     average, with only three PMS over about 38 years.) The second is the key
                     civilian personnel that have been with the program for many years.

                     From the outset, tours of duty at SSP were extended; SSP personnel have
                     had long tenures and promotion opportunities within the program.
                     Thus, newcomers to SSP are able to learn about the program and its oper-
                     ation from veteran personnel. Lessons learned from previous system
                     variants by these personnel help to decrease the chances of repeating
                     the same mistakes in current projects and enhance problem resolution
                     when problems occur.

                     “Acquisition: DOD’s Defense Acquisition Improvement program: A Status Report (GAO/
                                  48, July 23, 1986).



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                                  Success and cOmparisons With Other
                                  Acquisition Programs




Military   Personnel Continuity   SSPhas developed a military acquisition career path within its own
                                  headquarters and field organization. Four of SSP’Ssix PMS“grew up”
                                  through a military career path in SSP,each serving as the Technical
                                  Director before being promoted to the PMwith the rank of rear admiral.
                                  In addition, 30 percent of all military officers assigned to SSPhave more
                                  than 10 years of FBM experience. This experience means that SSPman-
                                  agement can explain the technical aspects of the program to all levels:
                                  the Congress, DOD,Navy, and contractors.

Civilian Personnel Continuity     A large number of key civilian personnel at SSPhave been with and pro-
                                  moted within the program office for many years. For example, about 40
                                  percent of SSP’Sheadquarters civilian personnel have more than 10
                                  years of experience in the FBMprogram. The average tenure of Senior
                                  Executive Service civilians at SSP headquarters is about 21 years. At SSP
                                  field organizations, many personnel have 20 or more years of FE!Mexpe-
                                  rience. By having worked on the earlier FBMvariants, SSP’Spersonnel are
                                  able to use this experience to resolve problems in the newer variants.

                                  This same kind of experience occurs with FBMcontractor personnel. For
                                  the most part, the same team of contractors that started with the pro-
                                  gram in the 1950s is still with the program. During one of our visits,
                                  contractor officials noted that they were the “new kids” in the FBMpro-
                                  gram, having only been in the program for about 21 years. Other con-
                                  tractors have many personnel that have worked with the FBMprogram
                                  20 to 30 years. The effect of having experienced Navy and contractor
                                  personnel interacting with each other on a system that each has helped
                                  to develop facilitates the exchange of information and the resolution of
                                  problems.


Other Programs                    Frequent turnover of personnel, especially at the PM level, may have
                                  affected two of the less than successful programs. The high PMturnover
                                  resulted in a loss of program expertise and corporate memory for both
                                  the Aquila and AMRAAMprograms. However, the MLRSprogram’s con-
                                  tinuity of civilian personnel helped alleviate the negative effects of PM
                                  turnover. Also, the F-16 program benefitted from having PMSwith
                                  longer tenure and prior experience in the program and from having
                                  civilian personnel continuity.

MIX3                               The MLRSprogram benefitted from having several key officials that
                                   remained with the program for a decade or more. In particular, the
                                   civilian deputy PMstayed with the program for 11 years, from system



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         Acquisition Programs




         development through deployment, and provided strong continuity in
         leadership.

F-16     The first five PMS served an average of over 3 years in that position.
         Also, five of the six PMS had background dealing with the program either
         internally as Deputy PM or externally, having served on the Air Staff or
         the Air Force Inspector General’s staff.

         Civilian personnel continuity also benefitted the F-16 program. The
         assistant PM, who has served in that position for 9 years, and two senior
         program control and financial management officials have each worked
         on the F-16 program for 13 or more years.

Aquila   From August 1978 through its termination in 1987, the Aquila program
         had six PMS with an average tenure of 19 months. This PM turnover may
         not have been conducive to the most effective Aquila development and
         acquisition effort. Army officials said that, except for PMS, continuity of
         key personnel was fairly good within the Aviation Systems Command in
         St. Louis, Missouri, and the Missile Command in Huntsville, Alabama.
         However, the transfer of program management to Missile Command
         almost completely disrupted staffing continuity, as only two individuals
         moved to Huntsville and a new PM was assigned.

          A similar lack of personnel continuity occurred in the prime contractor’s
          staff, where project manager turnover was also high. According to an
          Army program official, the contractor had four project managers over
          7 years, three in the program’s first 4 years. In addition, when the con-
          tractor moved its Aquila operations to Austin, Texas, many personnel,
          including some key officials, did not move with the program. Thus, the
          contractor lost much of its expertise and corporate memory on the
          program.

AMRAAM    Our 1987 AMRAAM report3 stated that frequent turnover at the PM level
          may have adversely affected the AMRAAMprogram. From 1980 to 1984,
          five PMS were in charge of the program for various lengths of time. This
          resulted in the loss of corporate knowledge and historical perspective. It
          may also have caused cost and schedule problems to go unresolved
          longer than necessary.



          “Missile Procurement: AMRAAM Cost Growth and Schedule Delays (GAO/NSIAD-87-78, Mar. 10,
          1987).



          Page 21                                      GAO/NSL4D90-160 Fleet Ballistic Missile program
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                      In programs located within the services’ major system commands, many
Program Office        of the technical staff are assigned from functional organizations outside
Technical Expertise   the program office. For example, one fighter aircraft program office
                      may have a staff of only 15 to 20 people, while another 90 or more
                      people supporting the program office are part of the functional organi-
                      zations within the Naval Air Systems Command. Unlike those in self-
                      contained program offices, such as SSP,these support people may work
                      on different programs concurrently.

                      One recent study of defense acquisition management4 noted the
                      following:

                      “Most defense officials and contractors agree that the most appropriate type of
                      management for a development or production program depends on several program
                      characteristics. The greater the technical complexity, budget, concurrency, and
                      importance of a program, the greater the need for a self-contained [program man-
                      agement office] with its more direct control of functional activities.”

                      We believe the      FBM   program is one that fits this assessment.


FBM Program           To assist SSP in setting up its organization, the Navy allowed SSP’S top
                      management to hand pick those people with the appropriate technical
                      expertise that would best help SSPachieve its goals. Thus, SSP is gener-
                      ally not dependent upon other Navy organizations for technical support
                      because its personnel have the necessary in-house technical expertise to
                      direct and evaluate contractor performance. For example, its Technical
                      Division has primary responsibility for the development, test, produc-
                      tion, installation, repair, maintenance, and fleet support of the FBMS;
                      that is, the division is responsible for the entire weapon system’s coordi-
                      nation, integration, and management. This is in contrast to many other
                      program offices that use contractors as weapon system managers or
                      technical staff from functional organizations outside the offices. This
                      technical capability within the program office sets the FESMprogram
                      apart from most other weapon system programs, with the major excep-
                      tion being the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.

                       SSP places a strong emphasis on evaluating the technical program man-
                       agement of its contractors. For example, SSPconducts contractor tech-
                       nical program management evaluations, which began early in the FBM
                       program, to help it assess the effectiveness with which management

                       ‘Fox, J. Ronald, and James.L Field. The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition.
                       Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School press, 1988, pp. 158-159.



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                      Success and Comparisons With Other
                      Acquisition Programs




                      actions and technical disciplines are being implemented. Carrying out
                      these evaluations effectively requires a high level of technical expertise
                      within SSP.


Other Programs         The MLRS program was the only one studied in which in-house expertise
                       played a significant role in its outcome. For most of its existence, this
                       program had strong in-house technical expertise because the deputy PM
                       hand selected a project office staff based on technical expertise in mis-
                       sile system acquisitions. However, beginning in 1988, Missile Command
                       directed a transition to a new arrangement in which most of the staff
                       working for this program belong to the Command’s functional direc-
                       torate rather than the project office.


                       Since the Polaris program, SSPhas used various management practices.
Good Management        While not inclusive of all the practices used, five that have significantly
Practices              contributed to the FBM program’s success are

                       open communication,
                       independent internal evaluation,
                       on-site management representation at contractor plants,
                       strict configuration management for approved designs and manufac-
                       turing processes, and
                     . incentive contracting at the prime level and extensive competition at the
                       subcontract level.


FBM Program            The openness for communication in the FBM program has led to recog-
                       nizing problems as they develop, openly discussing them, and working to
                       resolve them. This practice, as well as others, has enabled SSPto ensure
                       that the weapon system meets performance and design requirements
                       and has contributed to the program’s success. According to the third PM,
                       much of the credit of the FBM program’s success belongs to the first PM,
                       who established various management practices that were critical to the
                       program’s success. He added that these practices encouraged an open-
                       ness for communication between SSPand the contractors, which he
                       believes is one of the program’s hallmarks.

Open Communication     SSPofficials characterized their communications as “open” with all FBM
                       program participants. They define this open communication in the fol-
                       lowing way: If there is a problem, bring it forward and start to solve it,



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                                   because hiding problems only makes them get worse-in                              other words,
                                   “don’t kill the messenger.”

                                   In addition to emphasizing solutions versus punishment, SSP encourages
                                   early problem recognition by having a team approach that fosters open-
                                   ness between contractor and government personnel and that, according
                                   to SSP and contractor officials, promotes an open discussion of problems
                                   in seeking resolution. Problems and possible solutions may be discussed
                                   during weekly staff meetings5 quarterly Steering Task Group meetings,”
                                   and Technical Director’s reviews. Also, FBM submarine crews provide
                                   feedback on problems encountered during patrols, either by reports or
                                   post-patrol reviews.

                                   Since the program’s inception, SP’S philosophy has been to inform the
                                   Congress and DOD of the program’s progress. This type of communica-
                                   tion has built a sense of credibility outside the program office that has
                                   benefitted SSP.

Independent Internal Evaluation    SSP’S internal evaluation branch, known as SP-12, monitors program pro-
                                   gress on a continuous basis at all levels of management by reviewing
                                   contractor progress reports, internal SSP progress reports, and evalua-
                                   tions of contractor efforts independent of SSP’S Technical Division.
                                   SP-12’s forum for communicating to the PM is the weekly staff meeting.

On-Site Representation              SSPhas an extensive network of on-site management representatives in
                                    field offices at its contractors that report monthly to the PM. Some field
                                    offices have over 100 SSPpersonnel on site at contractor and govern-
                                    ment facilities that act as SSP'Stechnical representatives and administra-
                                    tive contracting officers. In addition, SP-12 personnel visit field offices
                                    and contractor plants to collect information for their independent
                                    evaluations.

Strict Cort@uration   Management    SSPhas a strict configuration management policy regarding changes to
                                    successfully tested and approved designs and manufacturing processes.
                                    This so-called “no-change policy” recognizes that the various compo-
                                    nents that constitute the weapon system have many subtle interactions.
                                    Experience has shown SSP that seemingly trivial changes in a design or

                                    “SSP branch management and selected contractors report to SSP’stop management on significant
                                    changes, short- and long-range milestones, contract milestones, and funding. SSP field offices also
                                    report in a similar manner each month.

                                    “This group is comprised of senior representatives from subsystem prime contractors, officials from
                                    government agencies directly involved in the program (including the Department of Energy’s nuclear
                                    weapons laboratories), military customers ,who use the system, and SSPTechnical.Division staff.



                                    Page 24                                         GAO/NSIAD90-160       Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
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                         Success and Comparisons With Other
                         Acquisition Programs




                         in the manner in which it is produced can cause unpredictable and,
                         sometimes, serious consequences to the program. Therefore, once a
                         design and a method of production have been evaluated and proven
                         through testing (in the case of the missile, flight testing), the design and
                         the manufacturing processes and procedures are fully documented, and
                         SSPenforces a strict control system thereafter. This system ensures that
                         components are manufactured using the same design and manufacturing
                         processes and procedures, thereby assuring that production units will be
                          as acceptable as those proven successful through testing.

Contracting Philosophy   SP has used most of the same contractors for more than 30 years
                         without significant competition at the prime level for most subsystems,
                         but extensive competition is pursued at the subcontract level. SSP
                         believes that the absence of competition at the prime level has helped it
                         to foster a good working relationship with its contractors.

                         The guidance subsystem- the only subsystem with ongoing competition
                         at the prime level-has been cited as a model for competition, due to its
                         being the best example of a cost and technical competition working
                         together to support the program’s goals. Prime contractors compete for
                         each year’s production of the Trident II guidance subsystem’s compo-
                         nents. The fiscal year 1988-the 15th-Trident     submarine contract was
                         competed and won by the builder of the previous 14 Trident subma-
                         rines. However, the other five subsystem prime contracts were not
                         competed.

                         With respect to subcontractor competition, as of January 1990, the Tri-
                         dent II (D-5) program had met or exceeded goals set for five of six sub-
                         systems. In most cases, the subsystem goals were set equal to or higher
                         than the Trident I (C-4) program’s achievements.

                          Starting with the Poseidon program, SSPhas used incrementally funded,
                          multiple year contracts covering full-scale development and initial pro-
                          duction. SSPhas refined this technique in the Trident missile programs.
                          Because most fixed-price incentive contracts can only put an incentive
                          on price, SSPuses cost-plus-incentive fee contracts through which it can
                          include reliability, accuracy, and other performance incentives. SSP
                          found that the considerable time and effort spent in negotiating the
                          incentive structure for these contracts have served the program well.
                          The negotiating process forces SSPto sort out and quantify program
                          objectives and priorities. Consequently, contractors can make the
                          needed trade-offs during their development and design work to achieve
                          performance or production incentives during later stages of work.


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                 Former senior Navy acquisition officials said that performance incen-
                 tives had been successful in some Navy aircraft contracts but not in
                 some torpedo and antiair missile contracts. One official noted that these
                 incentives (1) do not cost a lot of money, (2) involve a lot of pride on the
                 part of a contractor to make the product work, and (3) require a pro-
                 gram office that understands the product.


Other Programs   In the other programs studied, various methods of communication, such
                 as regular meetings and reviews, were used that appeared to be similar
                 to those used in the FBM program. However, only the successful program
                 offices focused on early problem recognition and resolution. For
                 example, the MLRS PM said that weekly and daily meetings between lower
                 level engineers in the program office and the prime contractor were used
                 to bring issues to management’s attention. Formal quarterly reviews
                 between upper level management also were oriented to resolving
                 problems. Similarly, F-16 program officials said that communication
                 within the program office and outside with other Air Force officials, the
                 contractors, and the participating foreign governments was a key to the
                 program’s success.

                 None of the other programs studied had an independent internal evalua-
                 tion group. In addition, on-site defense contract administrative services
                 personnel or their program office personnel were usually used in the
                 other successful programs to collect information on contractor progress.
                 On-site representatives were used in a manner similar to that used by
                 SSPin the successful MLRS program and the less than successful AMRAAM
                 and SUBACSprograms. However, the number of program representatives
                 ranged from one to eight, significantly less than the number used by SSP.

                 Only the F-16 program office emphasized configuration management to
                 the extent that it was similar to SSP'Sno-change policy. Cost control con-
                 siderations and the need to maintain commonality between the various
                 aircraft configurations were the basis for the F-16 program’s policy
                 restricting the amount of changes by setting a $100,000 per unit limit on
                 configuration changes. The other program offices generally made design
                 changes and modified production articles that were built to earlier
                 designs. For example, the AMRAAM design still has not stabilized,
                 although the missile is in limited production.




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                         Acquisition Programs




                         In the acquisition programs studied, we found that each program’s suc-
Applicability to Other   cess or lack of success was the result of multiple causes. The successful
Defense Acquisitions     programs shared more of the FBM program’s significant features than
                         the less than successful programs. However, the features contributing to
                         the FBM program’s success are not necessarily the only features that are
                         required for a program to be successful. The other successful programs
                         had features that were either not present or not significant in the FBM
                         program. Also, in contrast, the less than successful programs had some
                         of the FBM program’s features. In other words, similar features in dif-
                         ferent acquisition programs can have different outcomes. For example,
                         although PM turnover had little or no effect on the successful MLRS pro-
                         gram, it proved to be a significant problem in the less than successful
                         Aquila program.

                         We found no guaranteed cookbook approach to a successful defense
                         acquisition. Each of the acquisition programs studied developed in a
                         unique environment with its own particular opportunities and problems.
                         Many conditions and situations contributing to the FBM program’s suc-
                         cess are unique to that program and may not be repeated for other
                         defense acquisitions. For example, the United States was operating
                         under a great sense of urgency to develop the FBM system as soon as
                         possible. Thus, since its beginning, the program has held the highest
                         defense acquisition priority, and the Congress has regularly appropri-
                         ated the funds requested for the program. However, while stable and
                         sufficient early funding lend stability to a program, officials told us that
                         availability of funds is not necessarily sufficient for success.

                          The FBM program is the only program studied that had life-cycle respon-
                          sibility. As such, ssp is involved not only in the development and produc-
                          tion of a new missile but also in the effects of earlier year decisions on
                          logistics and maintenance for the earlier missiles in operation. ssp also
                          emphasizes the long-term view in its decision-making and in contracting
                          by structuring contracts to include long-term performance incentives
                          and cost incentives, which is unlike most programs. Also, most program
                          offices developing systems incorporate logistics support, but they do not
                          have to live with the effects of their decisions because the support
                          responsibility is transferred to another organization.

                          As noted in earlier reports, high PM turnover is common in weapon
                          system acquisitions and is not conducive to effective program manage-
                          ment and program stability. The FESMprogram shows the benefits of PM
                          continuity, and the MLRS program shows that continuity at the civilian
                          deputy PM level can alleviate the negative effects of PM turnover.


                          Page 27                                      GAO/NSIAB9&160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Chapter 2
Features Contributing  to the FBM Program’s
Success and Comparisons    With Other
Acquisition Programs




Civilian personnel continuity and program office technical expertise
give ssp experience and program knowledge for negotiations with con-
tractors and for effective oversight of contractors. However, most pro-
gram offices do not have continuity and expertise similar to those in SSP.
The others have not built and fielded six generations of their weapon
system like ssp. Only the MLRS program shared the benefit of having the
project office staff hand selected based on their prior expertise.

The good management practices used in the FBM program are not neces-
sarily unique to that program. For example, ssp's communication prac-
tices are not necessarily different in the type and number of meetings or
reviews, but ssp uses a team approach and encourages openness in order
to surface, address, and resolve problems. This approach, which is made
possible by the continuity and technical expertise of ssp's staff and its
contractors’ managers and staff, has contributed to the program’s
success.




 Page 28                                      GAO/NSIAB!IO-16OFleetBallisticMissileProgram
                                           Chapter 3
                                           Comparison of the Six Acquisition      Programs
                                           and the Packard Commission’s
                                           Acquisition Model




                                           tended not to share as many of the model’s features. This corroborates
                                           the Commission’s view that these features are more likely to contribute
                                           to a program’s being successful than if they are not in place. (Table 3.1
                                           shows which acquisition programs studied had features similar to those
                                           in the model.)

Table 3.1: Comparison of the Features of
the Acquisition Programs Studied With                                                                Acquisition program
the Commission’s Acquisition Model                                                   Successful                    Less than successful
Features                                   Management feature                     FBM MLRS            F-16      SUMACS’ Aquila AMRAAM
                                           Clear command channels                     X          X       X              X            X            X
                                           Stability                                  X          X       X
                                           Limited reporting
                                           requirements                               X
                                           High quality staff                         X          X       b              b             b           b
                                           Communications with
                                           users                                      X          X       X                            X
                                           Prototyping and testing                    X          X       X              X             X           X
                                           aAs noted in app. II, the SUBACS program was restructured and a portlon was renamed AN/BSY-1
                                           bSlgnlfies “insufficient information to compare.”

                                           Although many of the programs contained elements of the model’s fea-
                                           tures, program office definitions of specific features did not match the
                                           model’s definitions. For example, command channels were uniformly
                                           described as being “clear” within the service’s traditional service struc-
                                           ture. However, each service implemented the Commission’s recommen-
                                           dations concerning clear command channels differently, which, except
                                           for the direct-reporting ssP PM, negated having limited reporting
                                           requirements.2

                                           While all of these management features may not be incorporated in a
                                           particular defense acquisition program, these features may improve an
                                           acquisition program’s chances for success. However, the presence of
                                           these features does not guarantee success. For example, two of the pro-
                                           grams we studied, the F-16 and the MLRS, did not possess all of the
                                           model’s management features but were still considered successes. Also,
                                           as all six programs had prototyping and testing, the type and extent of
                                           prototyping and testing-the       quality, quantity, adequacy, and use of
                                           test results, not just their existence -apparently    made a difference in
                                           the programs’ successes; for example, the F-16 program benefitted from
                                           the successful Lightweight Fighter Prototype Program.

                                            ‘Acquisition Reform: DOD’s Efforts to Streamline Its Acquisition System and Reduce Personnel
                                            (GAO/-90-21,         Nov. 1,1989).



                                            Page 30                                            GAO/NSLUWO-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Page 31   GAO/NSIAJMO-160   Fleet BaUistic   Missile   Program
Appendix I

Definitions of the Packard Commission
Model’sFeatures

               The following are the six underlying features that typified the most suc-
               cessful commercial programs, as defined in the Packard Commission’s
               “Acquisition Model to Emulate.“’

               “1. Clear Command Channels. A commercial program manager has clear responsi-
               bility for his program, and a short, unambiguous chain of command to his CEO [chief
               executive officer], group general manager, or some comparable decision-maker. Cor-
               porate interest groups, wishing to influence program actions, must persuade the
               responsible program manager, who may accept or reject their proposals. Major
               unresolved issues are referred to the CEO, who has the clear authority to resolve
               any conflicts.

               “2. Stability. At the outset of a commercial program, a program manager enters into
               a fundamental agreement or ‘contract’ with his CEO on specifics of performance,
               schedule, and cost. So long as a program manager lives by this contract, his CEO
               provides strong management support throughout the life of the program. This gives
               a program manager maximum incentive to make realistic estimates, and maximum
               support in achieving them. In turn, a CEO does not authorize full-scale development
               for a program until his board of directors is solidly behind it, prepared to fund the
               program fully and let the CEO run it within the agreed-to funding.

               “3. Limited Reporting Requirements. A commercial program manager reports only
               to his CEO. Typically, he does so on a ‘management-by-exception’ basis, focusing on
               deviations from plan.

               “4. Small, High-Quality Staffs. Generally, commercial program management staffs
               are much smaller than in typical defense programs, but personnel are hand-selected
               by the program manager and are of very high quality. Program staff spend their
               time managing the program, not selling it or defending it.

               “6. Communications with Users. A commercial program manager establishes a dia-
               logue with the customer, or user, at the conception of the program when the initial
               trade-offs are made, and maintains that communication throughout the program.
               Generally, when developmental problems arise, performance trade-offs are made-
               with the user’s concurrence-in   order to protect cost and schedule. As a result, a
               program manager is motivated to seek out and address problems, rather than hide
               them.

               “6. Prototyping and Testing. In commercial programs, a system (or critical sub-
               system) involving unproven technology is realized in prototype hardware and tested
               under simulated operational conditions before final design approval or authoriza-
               tion for production. In many cases, a program manager establishes a ‘red team,’ or
               devil’s advocate, within the program office to seek out pitfalls-particularly those
               that might arise from operational problems, or from an unexpected response by a


               ‘A Quest for Excellence: Final Report to the President by the President’s Blue Ribbon Cmunission on
               Defense Management,June 1986,pp. 49-61.



               Page 22                                       GAO/NSIAD@O-160      Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Appendix I
Definitions of the Packard Commission
Model’s Features




competitor. Prototyping, early operational testing, and red teaming are used in con-
cert for the timely identification and correction of problems unforeseen at a pro-
gram’s start.”




Page 33                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                                                                                                                                       I

Appendix II

The Six DefenseAcquisition ProgramsStudied


                                         The FBM weapon system, operational since November 15, 1960, consists
Fleet Ballistic Missile                  of nuclear-powered submarines carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic mis-
Program                                  siles. (Figure II. 1 shows the relative size of each generation of FBM sub-
                                         marine, and table II. 1 provides information on FBM submarines.)

Figure 11.1:FBM Submarine Class Comparison


                 Polaris




                  Poseidon




                  Trident




                                         Page 34                             GAO/NSIAD-!80-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                                      Appendix II
                                      The Six Defense Acquisition
                                      Programa studied




Table 11.1:FBM Submarine Comparison
                                                                    Polaris 598 Polaris 808 Poseidon 818/827/840                    Trident 728
                                                                          class       class                class                           class
                                      Length (feet)                         382             410                           425                   560
                                      Beam (feet)                            33              33                            33                    42
                                      Submerged
                                      displacement (tons)                 6,700           7,900                         8,250                 18,700
                                      Number in class                         5               5                            31                     21a
                                      Misslles
                                         Number                              16              16                             16                 24
                                        We                               Polans          Polans                     Poseidon           Tndent I or
                                                                                                                  or Trident I           Tndent II
                                      aThe Selected Acquisltlon Report contains a total of 13 Tndent submarines, additionally,    the eight
                                      Trident I submarines will be modified to Trident II capabillty


                                      The latest missile-the Trident II (D-5)-began full-scale development
                                      in October 1983 and was initially deployed in March 1990. This missile
                                      will be deployed on the ninth and subsequent Trident submarines. The
                                      first eight Trident submarines are currently deployed with the Trident I
                                      (C-4) missile, but the Navy plans to modify these submarines for Trident
                                      II missile capability. (Figure II.2 shows the relative size of each genera-
                                      tion of FBM, and table II.2 provides information on FBM characteristics.)




                                      Page 36                                           GAO/NSIADBO-160       Fleet Balbtic      Missile   Program
                                              4wn~ n
                                              The Six Defense Acquisition
                                              Programs Studied




Figure 11.2:Six Generations of FBMs




      A-l                      A-2                   A-3                         c-3                      c-4                                  D-5
     Polaris                  Polarlr               Polafis                    Posetdon                 Trident                              Tridant




Table 11.2:FBM Comparison
                                                        Polaris         Polaris           Polaris      Poseidon               Trident I            Trident IIa
                                                           A-l                A-2            A-3              c-3                    c-4                  D-5
Length (feet)                                                 28.5             31              32               34                     34                   44
Diameter (inches)                                           54                  54            54               74                     74                    83
Weight (pounds)                                         28,800              32,500        35,700           64,000                 73,000               130,000
Range (nautical miles)                                   1,200               1,500         2,500            2,500                  4,000                 4,000
Year deployed                                             1960                1962          1964             1971                   1979                  1990
Year retired                                              1965                1974          1982
Number of missiles (includes test missiles)                205                 374           699                  640                 !i!x                 RW
                                              %ipecrficatioos are approxrmate; quantities are based on Selected Acqursrtion Report estimates.

                                              The Army’s MLRS is an unguided, surface-to-surface artillery rocket
Multiple Launch                               system (see fig. 11.3) that can provide a high volume of fire in a short
Rocket System                                 period of time. It began development in 1976 and achieved initial opera-
Program                                       tional capability in 1983, and the Army entered its second multiyear
                                              production contract in fiscal year 1989.


                                              Page 36                                         GAO/NSIADftO-MO           Fleet Ballistic      Missile   Program
                                Appendix II
                                The Six Defense Acquisition
                                Programs Studied




Figure 11.3:The MLRS




                                                                                           . :-
                                                              , .‘Tc-
                                                                           .
                                                                                -&.                             -
                        . i-_      _-       .   .                                                                                   I
                                                                           \’         *-
                                                                                      a.’                                          _-
                                                                           ;
_    -_..          _”                                                                 ,’          -’       _,        -      -       -
                                 Source. DOD


                                 The MLRS program is considered a success in terms of meeting its cost,
                                 schedule, and performance goals. Because of a successful accelerated
                                 development program, the system was fielded in less than 7 years. Some
                                 program features that stand out as important contributors to the pro-
                                 gram’s success include (1) low-risk technology, (2) stable requirements,
                                 (3) adequate funding and strong support from the Army, the Office of
                                 the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, (4) strong leadership and


                                  Page 37                               GAO/NSIAD!M-100                Fleet Ballistic   Missile        Program
                       Appendix II
                       The Six Defense Acquisition
                       Programs Studied




                       good continuity in key personnel, and (5) an innovative acquisition
                       strategy.


                       The F-16 is a single engine, lightweight, highly maneuverable fighter
F-16 Program           (see fig. 11.4) that is currently coproduced by the Air Force and four
                       North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations. The F-16 performs in both
                       air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

Figure 11.4:The F-16




                        Source: DOD


                        The F-16 began full-scale development in 1975 and reached initial opera-
                        tional capability in October 1980. As of April 1990, 1,637 F-16 aircraft
                        had been delivered to the Air Force. F-lGC/D aircraft, currently being
                        built, are operational at 13 U.S. Air Force bases, and F-16 aircraft are
                        deployed by 12 nations. The F-16 program office continues to manage
                        sales of several F-16 configurations to foreign countries.




                        Page 38                           GAO/NSIAD-90-160   Fleet Ballistic   Miaaile   Program
                     Appendix II
                     The Six Defense Acquisition
                     Program!3 shldied




                     F-16 officials cited program stability as a key to the success of the pro-
                     gram. Several characteristics combined to create program stability.
                     These characteristics are (1) adequate funding throughout the program,
                     (2) reduced technical risk resulting from the Lightweight Fighter Proto-
                     type Program, (3) lack of initial performance requirements, (4) emphasis
                     on cost containment since the program’s inception, and (5) multinational
                     coproduction, which provided strong incentives to minimize design
                     changes and cost increases.


                     In 1980, the Navy began to develop an advanced combat system for
Submarine Advanced   improved SSN-688 class submarines authorized in fiscal years 1989 and
Combat System        beyond. The SUBACS began as a single-phased program to meet the Soviet
Program              antisubmarine warfare threat through the 1990s. However, in October
                      1983, the Secretary of Defense approved a Navy plan to accelerate, by
                     6 years, SUBACS development and to introduce it in three phases-SuBAcs
                     Basic, SUBACS A, and SUBACS B-for improved SSN-688s authorized in
                     fiscal years 1983 and beyond. The three-phased approach was under-
                     taken so that additional capabilities could be introduced earlier than
                     planned and to spread program risks and costs over time.

                     The SUBACS program, considered less than successful, encountered tech-
                     nical, schedule, and cost problems during full-scale development, which
                     led to several program restructures. The last restructure redesigned the
                     SUBACS Basic effort and resulted in renaming the program the AN/BSY-1 .
                     The AN/M-l      will provide improved capabilities in acoustics and
                     weapon launch areas but will not provide the SUBACS    Basic’s planned
                     growth potential and reliability improvements. Deliveries of the 24
                     required AN/BSY-1 systems began in 1987. The AN/BSY-1 Combat Con-
                     trol and Acoustics System is shown in figure 11.5.In addition, the Navy
                     combined the SUBXS A and SUBACS B performance requirements and
                     renamed the effort AN/BSY-2, which is to be installed on SSN-2 1 attack
                     submarines.




                      Page 39                           GAO/NSIABW169   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                                           Appendix II
                                           The Six Defense Acquisition
                                           Programs Studied




Figure 11.5:AN/BSY-1 Combat Control and Acoustics System
r                Spherical Array
                       ...
                    .....
                      ...
                   o\,
                Tower'   I” r.rQu,s
                            Arrznn                  Array                       Post
                                                                             Processor
            a                          -         Processors
                                                                 -       I




                                                                                                       Key Characteristics



                                                                                                                 100 general purpose
                                                                                                                 50 special purpose


                                                                                                Cooling Water    150 gallons/minute




                                           The Army’s Aquila remotely piloted vehicle was a small, unmanned air-
Aquila Program                             craft that was designed to conduct battlefield surveillance and target
                                           acquisition over enemy territory. The Army began developing the
                                           Aquila in 1974 and canceled the program in December 1987. The Aquila
                                           system’s major components are shown in figure 11.6.




                                           Page 40                                       GAO/NSIAKHO-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                                          Appendix II
                                          The Six Defense Acquisition
                                          ProgrIune studied




Fiaure 11.6:Maior Components of the Aquila System

                                                                              Remote Ground Terminal
                                              Ground Control Statlon




                                                              Recovery



                                                                                               Sensors
                  Launcher




                                           The Aquila program is considered less than successful because it did not
                                           meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals. After more than 13
                                           years of development and costs of about $800 million, the system never
                                           entered production.

                                           Several factors stand out as significant features of the Aquila’s develop-
                                           ment history, which in combination may have contributed to the pro-
                                           gram’s demise. These factors are (1) unstable funding, (2) unstable
                                           program management, (3) changing requirements, (4) limited support
                                           from the Army, and (5) the system’s poor performance during field
                                           operational testing.




                                           Page 41                            GAO/NSIABW-160      Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
                         Appendix II
                         The Six Defense Acquisition
                         Fvogmme studied




                         The primary objective of the AMRAAM program is to produce an all-
Advanced Medium          weather, medium-range missile that will enable a pilot to simultaneously
Range Air-To-Air         engage multiple aircraft in combat. The missile (see fig. 11.7) is to
Missile Program          destroy targets both within and beyond the pilot’s visual range and is to
                         be compatible with the Air Force and Navy’s latest fighter aircraft.
                         Since 1976, the Air Force and the Navy have been jointly developing
                         AMRAAMto meet their future air-to-air missile requirements.

Figure 11.7:The AMRAAM

                         Inertial      Target
    Antenna




                                                                 Rocket Motor     Data L




                         Since its inception, the AMRAAMprogram has experienced significant cost
                         growth and schedule delays, and the missile’s present operational capa-
                         bility is uncertain. A number of factors may have contributed to these
                         problems, including (1) unrealistic cost and schedule estimates during
                         the program’s early phases, (2) an unstable design throughout develop
                         ment, and (3) a high degree of turnover at the PM level.




                          Page 42                           GAO/NSIADgQMO   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
Appendix III

GAOFteportsUsedinOurReview


                           Defense Acquisition: Perspectives on Key Elements for Effective Man-
Defense Acquisition        agement (GAO/NSLAD9c-90, May 14, 1996)

                           Defense Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems (GAO/
                           ~~1~~90-30, Dec. 14, 1989)

                           Acquisition Reform: DOD'S Efforts to Streamline Its Acquisition System
                           and Reduce Personnel (GAO/N&~-90-21, Nov. 1, 1989)

                           Defense Management: Status of Recommendations by Blue Ribbon Com-
                           mission on Defense Management (GAO/NSIAD-89-19FS, Nov. 4, 1988)

                           Major Acquisitions: Summary of Recurring Problems and Systemic
                           Issues: 1960-1987 (GAO/NSIAD-88-136BR, Sept. 13, 1988)

                           Procurement: Assessment of DOD'S Multiyear Contract Candidates (GAO/
                           NSIAD-88-233BR,Sept. 1, 1988)

                           DOD AcquisitionPrOgrams:     &&US   Of SelectedSystemS (GAO/NSIAD-88-160,
                           June 30,1988)

                           DOD Acquisition Programs: Status of Selected Systems (GAO/NSLAD87-128,
                           Apr. 2,1987)

                           Acquisition: DOD'S Defense Acquisition Improvement Program: A Status
                           Report (GAO/NSLW%-148, July 23,1986)

                           DOD Acquisition: Strengthening Capabilities of Key Personnel in Systems
                           Acquisition (GAO/NSLAD~~-~S, May 12,1986)

                           Why Some Weapon Systems Encounter Production Problems While
                           Others Do Not: Six Case Studies (GAO/NSLMM&~~, May 24, 1985)

                           Impediments To Reducing The Costs Of Weapon Systems (PSAD-80-6,
                           Nov. 8, 1979)


                           Navy Strategic Forces: Trident II Proceeding Toward Deployment (GAO/
 Fleet Ballistic Missile   NSIAD-8t3-40,Nov. 21,1988)

                           Observations on the Defense Enterprise Program (GAO/T-NSw8%26,
                           Apr. 2,1987)



                           Page43                              GAO/NSI.AIMO-1tlOFleetBall&ticMisaileFrogram
       Appendix Ill
       GAO Reports Used in Our Review




       Trident II System: Status and Reporting   (GAO/NSIAD-84-86,   May 15, 1984)

       Information Regarding Trident II (D-5) Missile Configured Trident Sub-
       marine Costs and Schedule (GAO/MASAD82-47, Sept. 3, 1982)


       Defense Budget: Potential Reductions to the Army and the Navy Missile
MLRS   Budgets (GAO/NSIm90-29, Nov. 13, 1989)

       Defense Budget: Potential Reductions to Missile Procurement Budgets
       (GAO/NSIAD89-17,Nov. 18, 1988)

       Defense Budget: Potential Reductions to Missile Procurement Budgets
       (GAO/NSIAD-87-206BR, Sept. 10, 1987)

       Defense Budget: Potential Reductions to Army and Marine Corps Missile
       Budgets (GAO/NSIAD-86-158BR, Aug. 6, 1986)

       An Assessment Of The Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System Multi-
       year Contract (GAO/NSIAD-86-6, Oct. 28, 1985)

       GAO  Analysis of Projects Proposed by the Department of Defense for
       Multiyear Contracting in its Fiscal Year 1983 Budget Request (~~~~-82-72,
       Apr. 29,1982)

       The Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System Is Progressing Well And
       Merits Continued Support ( MASAD-~~-13,Feb. 5, 1982)

       Budgetary Pressures Created By The Army’s Plans To Procure New
       Major Weapon Systems Are Just Beginning (MASAD-82-5, Oct. 20, 1981)


       Procurement: An Assessment of the Air Force’s F-16 Aircraft Multiyear
F-16   Contract (G~o/~sI~~86-38, Feb. 20, 1986)

       F-16 Integrated Logistics Support: Still Time To Consider Economical
       Alternatives (LCD-80-89, Aug. 20, 1980)

       Status Of The Air Force’s F-16 Aircraft Program     (PSAD-78-36,   Apr. 24,
       1978)

       Contract for the Development and Production of F-16 Aircraft         (PSAD-78-3,
       Oct. 21, 1977)


       Page 44                           GAO/NSIADNO-160Fleet Ballistic Missile Program
            Appendix LII
            GAO Reports Used in Our Review




            Operating And Support Costs Of New Weapon Systems Compared With
            Their Predecessors (LCD-77-429,
                                         Oct. 17, 1977)

            Sharing The Defense Burden: The Multinational      F- 16 Aircraft Program
            (PSAD-77-40, Aug. 15, 1977)

            Status Of The F-16 Aircraft Program (~~~~-77-41, Apr. 1, 1977)


            Navy Acquisition: Cost, Schedule, and Performance of New Submarine
SUBACSand   Combat Systems (GAO/NSIAD-90-72, Jan. 3 1, 1990)
AN/BSY-1
            Kavy Contracting: Fiscal Year 1986 Contract Award for Construction of
            SSN 688 Submarines (GAO/NSMW-120, May 4, 1987)

            Navy Acquisition: SUBACSProblems May Adversely Affect Navy Attack
            Submarine Programs (GAO/N&D-86-12, Nov. 4,1985)


            Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution
Aquila      Still in Doubt (GAopmw-88-19, Oct. 26, 1987)

            Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle: Recent Developments and Alternatives
            (GAO/NSLAD-~~~~BR, Jan. 4, 1986)

            Results Of Forthcoming Critical Tests Are Needed To Confirm Army
            Remotely Piloted Vehicle’s Readiness for Production (GAO/NSIAD-84-72,
            Apr. 4,1984)

            DOD'S Use Of Remotely Piloted Vehicle Technology Offers Opportunities
            For Saving Lives and Dollars (MASAD-81-20, Apr. 3, 1981)

            Status Of The Remotely Piloted Aircraft Programs (~~~~77-30, Feb. 18,
            1977)


            Missile Procurement: Further Production of AMRAAMShould Not Be
AMRAAM      Approved Until Questions Are Resolved (GAO/NSIAD-90-146, May 4, 1990)

            Weapon Acquisition: Improving DOD'S Weapon Systems Acquisition
            Reporting (GAO/NSLo90-20, Nov. 14, 1989)




            Page 45                            GAO/NSIAIMO-150 Fleet RdIistic Missile Program
AppendixIII
GAOReporteUsedinOurReview




Missile Procurement: AMFWIMNot Ready for Full-Rate Production (GAO/
NSIAD-89-201, Sept. 7, 1989)

DOD Acquisition Programs: Status of Joint Major Programs (GAO/
NSIAD-89-158, July 17, 1989)

Missile Development: AMFWAM’S  Combat Effectiveness at Production Not
Fully Tested (GAO/N&m-88-186, July 7, 1988)

Missile Development: Development Status of the Advanced Medium
Range Air-To-Air Missile (GAO/NSIAD87-168, Aug. 14, 1987)

Missile Procurement: Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
Preproduction Test Results (GAO/NSIAD-87-165~3, June 2, 1987)

Missile Procurement: AMRAAMCost Growth and Schedule Delays (GAO/
~~~~-87-78, Mar. 10, 1987)

Missile Development: Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile
(AMRAAM)Certification Issues (GAO/NSIADX-124BR, July 9, 1986)

Missile Development: Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile Legal
Views and Program Status (GAO/NSLWX-88~~, Mar. 28, 1986)

Missile Development: Status of Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Mis-
sile (AMRAAM)Certification (GAO/NSIAD-86-66BR, Feb. 18, 1986)

The Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missile: Resolve Uncertainties
Before Production (GAO/NSIAD-~~-~~, May 7, 1984)




Page46
Appe.tdix IV

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Brad Hathaway, Associate Director
National Security and   Bernard Easton, Assistant Director
International Affairs   Fred Fenstermaker, Project Manager
Division, Washington,   Timothy Morrison, Deputy Project Manager
                        Sarah Brady, Evaluator
D.C.                    Toni Townes, Evaluator
                        Ann Baker, Evaluator
                        Karen Creller, Evaluator
                        Beth Hoffman, Evaluator




 (894285)               Page 47                         GAO/NSIADBO-160   Fleet Ballistic   Missile   Program
.




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