. United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on GAO Armed Services, U.S.Senate September 1990 SPECIALOPERATIONS COMMAND Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates GAO/NSIAD-90-166 National Security and International Affairs Division B-232924 September 28, 1990 The Honorable Sam Nunn Chairman, Committee on Armed Services United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: This report addressesthe Department of Defense’simplementation of congressionally mandated reforms involving the recently activated U.S. Special Operations Command.As requested, we focused on the status of implementation of the various legislative provisions affecting the revitalization of the U.S. special operations forces and the adequacy and appropriateness of the Defensebudget to meet the Command’srequirements until the Command assumesits own programming and budgeting responsibilities. We are recommending that the Secretary of Defenseestablish specific milestone dates for completing and administering the essential agreementsbetween the Command and the services and other Defenseorganizations and take appropriate steps to help ensure that such milestones are met. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defenseand to the Chairmen, House Committees on Armed Servicesand Appropriations and SenateCommittee on Appropriations. We will make copies available to others upon request. Pleasecontact me on (202) 275-4265 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Other major contributors are listed in appendix V. Sincerely yours, Nancy R. Kingsbury Director Air Force Issues Executive Summary The Department of Defense’sinability to effectively prepare for and Purpose conduct special operations missions has been a matter of concern to the SenateCommittee on Armed Servicesfor sometime. Becauseof these concerns,the Congresspassedreforming legislation in 1986, 1987, and 1988 to reorganize U.S. special operations policies, programs, and capa- bilities and to correct perceived deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations missions and engagein low- intensity conflicts. The Chairman, SenateCommittee on Armed Services,requested GAO to review the implementation of the mandated reforms and specifically assessthe following. Progressthe U.S. Special Operations Commandhas made in integrating special operations forces into the new unified command. The adequacy and appropriateness of the funding requested for special operations forces for fiscal years 1990 and 1991. Progressthe Command has made in assuming its budget preparation and execution responsibilities, which are to be exercised not later than the fiscal year 1992 budget cycle. One of the key legislatively mandated reforms was the establishment of Background the U.S. Special Operations Command.The legislation identified the forces to be assignedand defined the Command’sactivities and func- tions. The Congressmandated further reforms in 1987 and 1988 that strengthened the role and authority of the Commanderin Chief of the Command and increased the Commander’sresponsibilities for providing the necessaryresourcesto carry out the mandates. The Command is making progress in integrating special operations Results in Brief forces. Most special operations forces identified by the legislation for assignment were so assignedby March 1988. The Command is reaching agreementswith the Army, Navy, and Air Force and other Defense organizations to delineate responsibilities and relationships. However, someof the agreementsconsideredessential by the Command have not been completed, and milestone dates have not been set for completing them. The adequacy and appropriateness of funding requested for special operations forces for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 are uncertain. The requests do not represent the joint worldwide, special operations’ Page 2 GAO/-NSMMWl62 Special Operationa Forces Executive Summary requirements becausethey have not yet been validated by the Command. The Command is taking steps to assumeits congressionally mandated programming and budgeting responsibilities beginning with the fiscal year 1992 budget. Timely completion of this processrequires the coop- eration of Defenseand its organizations. Principal Findings Integration of Forces The legislation permits the Secretary of Defenseto (1) designate and assign forces not identified by the legislation and (2) exclude forces that were identified. The Secretary has exercised this authority several times since the Command was established. For example, those units desig- nated in the legislation but not assignedinclude (1) all Marine Corps units, (2) certain kinds of specially trained Air Force aircrews and their aircraft, and (3) two Naval Reservehelicopter units. Progress in Implementing As of March 1990,lO of the 29 agreementsconsideredessential by the Legislative Mandates Command for implementing the legislation were still unsigned, and typi- cally no milestone dates had been established to complete the agree- ments. The Command is implementing its joint baseline master plan and an action plan for integrating special operations forces. But, many of the milestone dates are not scheduledto be reached for several years becauseof the complexity of the new interorganization roles and respon- sibilities in areas such as intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemina- tion. Completion of sometasks, such as threat assessmentsfor certain geographical areas of the world, will continue to be modified due to con- stantly changing circumstances. Adequacy and The funding targeted for special operations forces for fiscal years 1990 Appropriateness of Fiscal and 1991, which totals about $5.5 billion, represents aggregationsof Year 1990 and 1991 each service’s unique requirements rather than the joint perspective of the Command. The Command is analyzing special operations missions to Budgets Are Uncertain validate its worldwide requirements but is not expected to complete its analysis and obtain concurrencefrom all of the other affected com- mands until June 1991. The validation results should provide the Com- mand a better and more impartial basis for choosing future weapons and Page 3 GAO/NSuD-W166 Special Operations Forces Executive Summary equipment rather than accepting candidates that reflect service advo cacy and parochialism. Command Is Preparing to The Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Opera- tions and Low Intensity Conflict are jointly responsible for managing Assume Its Programming Major Force Program 11 (Special Operations) as a new segmentof the and Budgeting Defensebudget. The Deputy Secretary of Defensedirected that the Com- Responsibilities mand begin budget presentation and execution in fiscal year 1991 to prepare for fully assuming its mandated responsibilities beginning in fiscal year 1992. The Command’s ability to complete the processin time dependson the cooperation of the other involved Defenseorganizations. Although the Deputy Secretary required that all agreementsneededto carry out this function be completed by December15, 1989, as of March 1990, this requirement had not been met. recommendsthat the Secretary of Defense(1) establish specific Recommendations GAO milestone dates for completing and executing the 10 essential agree- ments between the Command and the servicesand other Defenseorgani- zations and (2) take appropriate steps to help ensure that such milestones are met. The Department of Defensegenerally agreed with GAO'S findings and Agency Comments recommendations. It provided updated information on the status of the remaining 10 agreementsto the effect that all but 1 should be completed by September 30,1990, although admittedly this milestone date was neither mandated nor approved by higher authorities. This one agree- ment, between the Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, is dependent upon approval of the Assistant Secretary’s charter. Moreover, the agreements between the Command and its Air Force component command will have to be reevaluated and updated becauseof organizational and other changesmade internally by the Air Force to the component command in May 1990. Page 4 GAO/NSLADB@l6t3 Special Operation Forcea Page 5 GAOfl-l(lB Spechi Operation Forcea Contents Executive Summary 2 Chapter 1 8 Introduction Background 11 Objectives, Scope,and Methodology 14 Chapter 2 16 Progress Is Being Legislative Assignments Additions and Exclusions by the Secretary of Defense 16 17 Made in Integrating Command Progressin Implementing Other Legislative 19 Special Operations Mandates Forces Conclusions 23 Recommendation 24 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 Chapter 3 Adequacy and The RequestedFunding DoesNot Representthe 25 Command’sJoint Perspective Appropriateness of The Command Is Validating Special Operations Forces’ 27 Funding Requestedfor Requirements Fiscal Years 1990 and Conc1usions 28 1991 Are Uncertain Chapter 4 29 Command 1s preparing Legislative Mandates 29 Extent of DOD’sCompliance With the Mandates 29 to Assume Its Command Has Made Progressin Undertaking Its 31 Progr amming and Responsibilities Budgeting Conclusions 33 Agency Comments 34 Responsibilities Appendixes Appendix I: Description of Component Commands, 36 Schools,and Centers Included in the U.S. Special Operations Command Appendix II: Legislatively Mandated Missions, Functions, 37 and Activities Appendix III: Organizations Visited During the Review 39 Appendix IV: CommentsFrom the Department of Defense 40 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD9MBe Special Operations Forces Content.9 Appendix V: Major Contributors to This Report 49 Tables Table 1.1: Command Force Structure for Fiscal Year 1989 11 Table 2.1: March 1990 Status of 29 Agreements 22 Figures Figure 1.1: Organizational Structure of the Command 10 Figure 3.1: Funding From Fiscal Years 1981 Through 26 1992 Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office Page 7 GAO/NSIAD9@166 Special Operation Forces Chapter 1 Introduction The U.S. Special Operations Command was established as a unified com- batant command for special operations forces in November 1986 by Public Law 99-661. It becameoperational in April 1987 and is headquar- tered at MacDill Air Force Base,Florida. The Command is responsible for preparing its forces to conduct special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs operations in sup- port of national security interests acrossthe spectrum of conflict, from low to high intensity. The Department of Defense(DOD) defines special operations as actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic,or psychological objectives by nonconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.They are con- ducted in peace,conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces. Politico-military considerations fre- quently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low- visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special opera- tions differ from conventional operations in degreeof risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independencefrom friendly support, and dependenceon detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.Psychological operations are intended to convey selectedinfor- mation and indicators to foreign audiencesto influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign gov- ernment, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psycho- logical operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Civil affairs operations include those phasesof the activities of a commander that embracethe relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Unlike the five unified combatant theater commands(Atlantic, Pacific, Southern, Central, and European), the Command has no specific geo- graphic area of responsibility. It can employ its forces, as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense,anywhere in the world. The Command also supports the special operations requirements of other unified commands1and is responsible for developing special operations forces’ strategies, doctrine, tactics, and equipment requirements. ‘A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander and composed of signifi- cant assigned components of two or more services, and which is established and so designated by the Resident, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff commander of an existing unifkd command established by the President. Page 8 GAO/NSIAD9Cb166 Special Operations Forcea chapter1 Introduction The active and reserve special operations component forces of the Army, Navy, and Air Force located in the United States and assignedto the Command are shown in figure 1.1, The assignedunits operate through service component organizations that are under the operational control of the Command. Page 9 GAO/NSItiD~l66 Special Operations Forces chapter1 Introduction Figure 1.l : Organizational Structure of the Command Washington CMice United Statea WinI Cpemtbnr Command Pentagon Me&ill Air Force Base, Fb. I Nevy Component ArmyCompon~ni A& Force Component (Heedqwrters, Naval (Headqualters, U.S. (Headqusters, Air Special Warfare hY SW Command) Operatb~ Command) Qomtlonr Command) coloMdONaval Ft. Bmgg, N.C. Huliburl Flold, Fb. Amphibbu- -,_... Barr, Calif. Special Forcea Navd spsclal Groups watfam Groups i sEALa Unib i sEALa - Civil Affair Units Oolivwy Vehicle i UIlk !3pocld Boat ccmbat control unib unit --I i i Aviation Uniti --i Spscid warfan unlb -I Weathsr Unit Nlwal spscid -I.,Signal and Other Support Unit8 -I Warfore Canter Central Training Flight %ea-Air-Land units. Page10 Chapter 1 Introduction Each of the component commands,schools,and centers is described in appendix I. As shown in table 1.1, the Command was authorized by the Department of Defense(DOD) about 35,000 military and civilian personnel in fiscal year 1989. Becausethe information is classified, this figure excludes forces associatedwith the Joint Special Operations Command. Table 1.1: Command Force Structure tor Fiscal Year 1989 Guard and Active Reserve Component forces Forces Civilians Total Command Headquarters 445 149 128 722 Armv units and schools 10,731 13.362 269 24.382 Air Force units and schools 4,506 703 206 5,417 Navy units and schools 3,173 1,123 114 4,410 Total 18,855 15,337 719 34,911 The Congressfocused attention on the need to reorganize U.S. special Background operations capabilities following problems with several special missions carried out in the early 1980s.The Holloway Commissionreport on the failed attempt to rescueU.S. hostagesfrom Iran in April 1980 identified inadequaciesin organization, planning, training, and command and con- trol. The Commission recommendedthe creation of a permanent joint special operations capability to overcomethe shortfalls of an ad hoc crisis response. Additional incidents in the years after the aborted Iran hostagerescue mission, which focused congressionalattention on whether integration of special operations forces was sufficient, included the U.S. reactions to the 1983 events in Grenada, the 1985 terrorist hijacking of a Trans World Airline flight, and the 1985 Achille Lauro incident. In 1985, a SenateCommittee on Armed Servicesstaff report found that the United States lacked joint military institutions capable of effectively integrating the forces of the different servicesin combined (i.e., joint) operations. Organizational shortfalls that were cited related to (1) ser- vice parochialism in operational matters and (2) poorly developedjoint doctrine. The report emphasizedthat a basic “lesson learned” from the aborted Iran hostage rescuemission was that interservice interests dic- tated the character of the force that was used and did not enhancecohe- sion and integration. The report further identified the need for “. . . a Page 11 GAO/‘NSIAD-9&l&3 Special Operations Forces chapter I Intmdnction strong . . . multifunctional, organizational focus for low intensity war- fare and special operations.” Reforms Mandated in 1986 Citing serious deficiencies in the capabilities of the United States to con- duct special operations and engagein low-intensity conflicts2 the Con- gressenacted Public Law 99-661 on November 14, 1986, to revitalize special operations. The need for specific legislation was discussedin the October 1986 conferencereport accompanying the fiscal year 1987 DOD authorization bill and it stated: L‘ . . . legislation is necessary to overcome the unending resistance in the Department of Defense to necessary organizational and other reforms of special operations forces. 1‘ the seriousness of the problems and the inability or unwillingness of the . . . Department of Defense to solve them left no alternative . . . the failure to act force- fully in this area and at this time would be inconsistent with the responsibilities of the Congress to the American people.” The law directed the President, through the Secretary of Defense,to establish an Office of Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Opera- tions and Low Intensity Conflict and a unified combatant command for special operations forces. The law also defined special operations activi- ties; listed the new Command’s functions, to include responsibility of the Commander in Chief for ensuring the combat readinessof assigned forces and monitoring the preparednessof special operations forces units assignedto the other unified combatant commands;created a major force program3category for special operations forces in the Five- Year DefensePlam4and required the Command to budget for the devel- opment and acquisition of special operations-peculia@equipment. 2Political and military confrontation between contending states or gronpe below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states It frequently involvea protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflicta range from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized and generally in the Third World but present larger regional and global security implicationa. 3An aggregation of program elements in the Six-Year Defense Plan that reflecta a force mission or support function of DOD and contains the resources allocated to achieve an objective or plan. It reflects fiscal year timephasing of mission objectives to be accomplished and the means proposed for their accomplishment. 4As of July l!%S, thie is referred to as a six-year plan. 6Eqripment, materiala, supplies, and servicea required for special operations mission support for which there is no broad conventionaIrequirement. Page 12 GAO/?MAD-W166 Special Operations Forces Chapter 1 Introduction By reference to certain Joint Chiefs of Staff documents,the law also identified special operations forces and directed the Secretary of Defenseto assign those forces stationed in the United States to the Com- mand. The law further directed the Secretary of Defenseto submit a report describing the Command’simmediate strategic special operations airlift requirements and associatedfunding to the Congressby June 1987. Additional Reforms Citing institutional resistanceto the implementation of the legislation Mandated in 1987 and passedin 1986, the Congressmandated additional reforms in 1987 and 1f-lL3c-a lYbb 1988. In December 1987, the Congressenacted Public Law 100-180, which directed the Secretary of the Army to act as the Assistant Secre- tary of Defensefor Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict until the office was filled by presidential appointment. The law also directed the Secretary of Defenseto provide sufficient resourcesfor the Com- mand to carry out its duties and responsibilities and mandated that the Command’s headquarters have no fewer than 450 staff by September 30, 1988. In addition, the law provided the Commander of the Command with limited head of agency authority,6 established the Command’s Office of Inspector General, and directed the Secretary of Defenseto establish the new major force program category for special operations within 30 days of the enactment of the act. The conference report accompanying the law expressedconcern that DOD was delaying or blocking implementation of special operations forces reforms. It stated that insufficient progress had been made in reorganizing special operations forces, and as a result, additional legisla- tive action was necessaryto remove bureaucratic obstaclesto progress. The Congressmandated additional responsibilities and authority for the Commander in Chief of the Command by enacting Public Law loo-456 in September 1988. These included (1) preparing and submitting to the Sec- retary of Defenseprogram recommendationsand budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assignedto the Command and (2) exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assignedto the Command and, to a limited extent, for special operations forces assignedto the other unified combatant commands. %ocurement authority provided by chapter 137 of title 10 of the United Statea Code. The Com- mander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Ckmnand has head of agency authority with respect to his responsibilities for developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment and acquiring special operations-peculiar materiel, supplies, and services. Page 13 GAO/NSIADBMtM Special Operations Forces chapter 1 Introduction Congressionaldebate on this law indicates an understanding that the Command was to have sole responsibility for preparing and submitting the program objectives memorandum7for all special operations forces. Moreover, the Command was to assumeprogramming, budgeting, and execution responsibilities as soon as possible but no later than the resource allocation cycle for fiscal year 1992. DOD’S resistanceto imple- menting the prior legislation was again cited as a basis for this addi- tional legislation. Appendix II describesthe missions, functions, and activities authorized and specified to the Command by the legislation. The Chairman, SenateCommittee on Armed Services,asked us to review Objectives, Scope,and DOD’S implementation of mandated reforms involving the Command. Methodology Specifically, we were asked to assess(1) the progress made by the Com- mand in integrating the special operations forces of the services,(2) the adequacy and appropriateness of funding requested for special opera- tions forces in the President’s defense authorization request for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, and (3) the progress made in preparing the Com- mand to carry out its responsibilities for budget preparation and execution. To ascertain the Command’sprogress in integrating special operations forces, we reviewed legislation on the establishment of the Command, our prior works on unified and specified commands,congressionalhear- ings, and committee reports. We compared forces identified by law to be assignedto the Command with forces actually assignedto the Com- mand. We also verified decisionsby the Secretary of Defenseto include or exclude forces from the Command.We analyzed the information in the Command’sJuly 1988joint special operations forces baseline master plan and the 1989 Command organizational action plan that identifies the plan’s milestone dates, along with associatedCommand documents. We evaluated the status of the Command’svarious agreementswith the services and other DOD organizations neededto carry out legislatively mandated requirements and the progress in meeting those requirements. 7An annual memorandum in prescribed format submitted by the DOD component head to the Secre- tary of Defense that recommends the total resource requirements and programs of the component, commensurate with the parsmeters of the Secretary’s foal guidance. an&&ion: Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant Commands (GAO/ . 1.1989). Defense Manpower: Reductions in Joint Activities and Service Realloca- tions (GAO/N$W-148F$ May 17,19f39). Page 14 GAO/‘NSL4DBM66 Special Operations Forces Chapter 1 Introduction We interviewed Command and component command officials, as well as nine members of the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, to obtain their views on the progress being made to implement the requirements. To ascertain the adequacy and appropriateness of funding, we inter- viewed Command officials and officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. We reviewed the President’s biennial defensebudget requests for fiscal years 1988/89 and 1990/91 and compared them to the Command’ssup porting budgetary documentation. In addition, we reviewed the Secre- tary of Defense’sannual reports to the Congresson its biennial budgets and other relevant documentation to determine compliance with legisla- tive mandates. Furthermore, we reviewed documents,such as the Com- mand’s Operational Concept statement, to determine the status of the Command’sjoint mission analysis plan for validating special operations requirements. To ascertain the progress made in carrying out its programming, budgeting, and budget execution responsibilities, we interviewed Com- mand and component command officials and reviewed the Acting Secre- tary of Defenseand Deputy Secretary of Defensememorandums granting the Command program and budget responsibility. We reviewed the February 1988 DOD Deputy Inspector General’sreport on unified and specified command headquarters to determine the report’s effect on the Command’sneed for personnel to carry out the legislative mandate. We also reviewed the status of the Command’sjoint manpower programs and manpower requests associatedwith its programming and budgeting responsibilities and evaluated documents pertaining to Major Force Pro- gram 11, program objective memorandum development, and command acquisition authority. Appendix III lists the organizations visited during our review. We did our work between October 1988 and March 1990 in accordancewith generally acceptedgovernment auditing standards. Page 16 GAO/NSIAIMWl66 Special Operations Forcee Chapter 2 ProgressIs Being Made in Integrating Special OperationsForces The Command is making progress in integrating special operations forces. The Secretary of Defensehas assignedmost special operations forces identified by the legislation to the Command.In addition, the Sec- retary has included someforces not referenced by the legislation but has excluded other forces referenced by the legislation. These inclusions and exclusions are consistent with the authority granted the Secretary by the legislation. The Secretary has assignedmost active and reserve com- ponent special operations forces stationed in the United States referred to by the legislation to the Command. The Command has made progress in implementing plans that it pre- pared for carrying out its other legislative mandates. However, the Com- mand has not obtained all necessarysigned agreementswith DOD and other organizations delineating their respective roles, responsibilities, and relationships. According to the legislation creating the Special Operations Command, Legislative special operations forces stationed in the United States were to be Assignments assignedto the Command.Special operations forces basedoutside the United States were to be assignedto the appropriate unified combatant theater commanders. The legislation refers to specific Joint Chiefs of Staff documentsthat the Congressbelieved identified “special operations forces” and therefore should be assignedto the Command.Oneof the documents is Annex E to the December17, 1986, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which identi- fies military forces under the special operations category that are avail- able for assignment to the unified and specified commands. The legislation states that “core” or “augmenting” forces identified in Annex E should be assignedto the Command.The document doesnot specifically define those terms nor doesthe Joint Chiefs of Staff in its document of official definition of terms. The document, however, does generally categorize the listed forces by referring to them as . having a “primary” special operations mission, l being “units trained and equipped to conduct or support special opera- tions as a collateral mission,” l having “an inherent capability to support” special operations, or l possessing“a capability to conduct or support” special operations, Page 16 GAO/NSWW166 Special Operations Forces chapter 2 RogresslsBeingMadeinln~tingSpeclal Operations Forces The Secretary of Defense,in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assignsforces to unified and specified commandsby periodically issuing a document entitled “Forces for Unified and Speci- fied Commands.” This document has been updated three times since the Command was established in April 1987-in September 1987, in August 1988, and in January 1990. Our comparison of forces listed in Annex E to forces assignedto the Command showed that all those forces categorized as having a primary special operations mission had been assignedby March 1988. Con- cerning its component commands,the Command assumedoperational command of the Army’s Special Operations Command,the 23rd Air Force, and the Naval Special Warfare Command in April 1987. The Joint Special Operations Command was added in August 1987. The assign- ment of the component commandsalso included a variety of operating units belonging to those commands. The Secretary of Defenseexercised his discretionary authority per- Additions and mitted by the legislation to assign certain units to the Command and to Exclusions by the exclude other units referenced by the legislation. At the outset, the Secretary of Defense assignment of forces did not include Army and Air Force civil affairs and psychological operations units or any operating units under the Navy’s Special Warfare Command. But the Secretary assignedthe civil affairs and psychological operations units in October 1987, the Naval Special Warfare Groups 1 and 2 in January 1988, and the Warfare Groups’ Sea-Air-Land units in March 1988. The remaining forces listed in the documents referenced by the legisla- tion and categorized as having other than a primary special operations mission were not assignedto the Command.They included (1) all Marine Corps forces, (2) certain Rinds of specially trained Air Force aircrews and their aircraft, and (3) two Naval Reservehelicopter units. No Marine Corps forces have yet been assignedto the Command.While the Corps does not have any designated special operations forces, it does have special operations capable units that are intended to carry out maritime special operations. We were told that these Corps forces carry the special operations designation only while deployed outside the conti- nental United States. The outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendedin September 1989 that the DOD regulation governing the assignment of functions to the servicesbe amendedto state that special operations is a collateral function of the Corps. Also, the Corps has civil Page 17 GAO/Nf3lAtMW166 Speclal Opemtio~ Forces Chapter 2 R0gresslsBelnglUadeinlntegmtlngSpecial Operations Forces affairs units in its reserve component that appear to have the capabili- ties to perform the sameor similar functions as Army civil affairs units currently assignedto the Command. Somespecially trained Air Force air-crewsand their aircraft are dual tasked to both the Command and to the Air Force’s Military Airlift Com- mand. For the time being, the units are assignedto the U.S. Transporta- tion Command, the parent unified command of the Military Airlift Command. The dual tasking of these aircrews and their aircraft was handled by executing a Command Arrangements Agreement in December1988 between the Special Operations Command and the U.S. Transportation Command. When certain modifications to the aircraft, scheduled to be done from 1992 to 1993, are completed, assignmentof these particular forces is to be reevaluated. The Air Force clarified the command relationships within the Air Force component (23rd Air Force) of the U.S. Special Operations Command in May 1990 by replacing the 23rd Air Force with the Air Force Special Operations Command. Becauseregular and special operations forces had been assignedto the 23rd Air Force, it reported to both the Special Oper- ations Command and the Military Airlift Command. Neither the Army nor the Navy had this situation. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command recommendedin March 1990 to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force that the 23rd Air Force be upgraded to the status of an Air Force major command and that a.lInonspecial opera- tions units be removed from its operational control. The Assistant Secre- tary of Defensefor Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict concurred in this recommendation. In our opinion, adoption of the rec- ommendation should help clear up any potential command relationship problems within the Air Force component of the Command. Concerning Navy forces, the two Naval Reservehelicopter units listed in Annex E were assignedto the Atlantic and Pacific unified combatant commands,not to the Command. The mission of the units was changed by the Navy in fiscal year 1989 to essentially search and rescue,’ and the units were redesignated as helicopter composite squadrons. *!l’he use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for andrescuepersonnelindistresonlandoratsea. Page 18 GAO/NSIAD9I.W3g Special Operations Forces Chapter 2 Progress ls Being Made in Integrating Special Operations Forcea As of March 1990, about 65 percent of the 29 agreementsthe Command Command Progress in considers essential to fully implementing the legislative mandates had Implementing Other been completed. The Command’sposition is that the substantive issues Legislative Mandates associatedwith the remaining incomplete agreementshave been final- ized and agreed to by the affected parties. With the exception of the agreementsapplicable to development and implementation of the budget (seech. 4), milestone dates for completing the others have not been established. Also, the Command is continuing to implement a joint baseline master plan and an action plan for inte- grating special operations forces into the Command,but many of the milestone dates governing such functions as communications, readiness, training and operations, force structure, and personnel are not sched- uled to be reached for several years becauseof their complexity. Why Agreements Are The missions, functions, and responsibilities the Congressassignedto Needed the Command require continued analysis and assessmentof the Com- mand’s relationships with the services,DOD and non-nob agenciesand organizations, and the other unified and specified commands.The Com- mand has many responsibilities that are unique for a unified command, including preparing forces; ensuring the readinessand interoperability of those forces; monitoring promotions of assignedmilitary members; validating requirements for equipment and weapons; and, in coordina- tion with the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Inten- sity Conflict, preparing, executing, and managing a new major force program. Many of these responsibilities were previously the province of the services and other DOD organizations. Accordingly, to fully and suc- cessfully implement the changesrequired by the legislative mandates, the Command needsto have formal, signed agreementsthat will delin- eate each party’s role and responsibilities as well as the relationships with each other. In March 1988, the Command’sDeputy Commander in Chief told the SenateCommittee on Armed Servicesthat the Command could not uni- laterally respond to the legislative mandates. The Deputy Commander stated: The law must be interpreted by the various levels of authority and translated into directives, transfers of responsibility, memoranda of agreement, and so on... Although the process seems ponderous, ... much still remains to be done . .” Page 19 GAO,‘NSW90-166 Special Operations Forces Chapter 2 Pmgre8slsBehgMadeinlntegmtlngSpe!clal Operations Forces Many of the functions the Congressassignedto the Commandtradition- ally had been the sole responsibility of each service. For example, each service trained its special operations forces and developed strategy, doc- trine, and tactics for using the forces. The Command has been given the authority to prescribe the training standards and regimen for both spe- cial operations units and individuals, regardlessof service affiliation, as well as to develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics, joint or otherwise, in the use of those forces. The Commandneedsto complete agreements with the services to assigntraining and other tasks and to ensure that any changesmade in these functions are implemented uniformly among the affected units and organizations. As another example, before the Command was created, each of the ser- vices prepared its own plans for using its special operations forces to respond to possible contingenciesin the various theaters of operations. However, each service plan focused on its own forces and capabilities to support those forces. Each plan gave limited attention to the contribu- tion of other servicesor to inter-operability requirements, such as whether communications equipment was compatible. With the creation of the Command, however, the plans for deploying and using special operations forces in the various theaters of operation should represent the needsof joint special operations forces, not just an individual ser- vice. Agreements are neededto reflect this new, joint perspective. Other examples include the delineation of responsibilities in such areas as (1) developing intelligence architectures and sub-architectures, (2) establishing counter-narcotics activities, (3) developing special technolo- gies for special operations forces, (4) implementing low-intensity conflict policy, and (6) deploying and using special operations forces. The Command’s Progress The Command is making progress in developing the agreementsit needs in Obtaining Signed with the services and other DOD organizations. However, as of March 1990,lO of the 29 agreementsit considersto be essential to carrying out Agreements With Other its legislative mandates were still incomplete. The completion of these Organizations agreementsis important becausethey will define and clarify the new Command’s role and responsibilities. The Command’sposition regarding the incomplete agreementsis that the substantive issueshave been finalized and agreed to by the affected parties and that, due to the com- plexity of the agreements,accuracy has been placed ahead of speedin their completion. Page 20 GAO/IWAD4@166 Spechl Operationa Forces clmpter2 ProgmmIt3BeingMadeinIntegmdngSpedd Operations Forcea Among the completed agreementsare (1) an agreementwith the U.S. Transportation Command defining command and control and support relationships between these two Commands,(2) “umbrella” agreements with the Army and the Air Force that set the framework for developing more specific agreements,and (3) agreementswith the other unified combatant commandscovering command, control, and mutual support responsibilities. A Command official told us there were a total of 136 agreements,of which 29 are consideredessential in fully carrying out the legislative mandates. These agreementsare categorized as Memoranda of Agree- ment, Memoranda of Understanding, and CommandArrangement Agreements. The nonessential agreementsgenerally deal with house- keeping, host/tenant relations, and administrative matters. Table 2.1 shows that 10 of the 29 essential agreementswere not final- ized as of March 1990, according to Command officials. Page 21 GAO/NSMD-WMtl Spedal Operatione Forces Chapter 2 PmgHsehBelngMuleinlnt.egmdWSPedal Operations Forces Table 2.1: March 1990 Stetus of 29 Agreements Ofaaniration Comdete lncomdete Assistant Secretarv of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict X Army: “Umbrella” agreement X Deployment/redeployment X Trainina. doctrine. and professional development X Research, development, and acauisition X Intelligence activities X Major Force Program 11 responsibilities X Combatina terrorism X Transfer of classified proarams X Navv: ‘Umbrella” agreement X Training X Major Force Program 11 responsibilities X Research, development. and acauisition X Air Force: “Umbrella” agreement X Major Force Program 11 responsibilities X Research, development, and acquisition X Trainina. doctrine. and professional develobment X lntelliaence activities X Unified Combatant Commands: US. European Command X U.S. Pacific Command US. Southern Command U.S. Atlantic Command US. Central Command U.S. Transportation Command Specified Combatant Commands Forces Command Other DOD Organizations: Defense lntelliaence Aaencv U.S. Army Traininq and Doctrine Command X Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency X Naval Electronics System Activities X In evaluating the reasonsfor someof the agreementsbeing incomplete, several Command officials said that typically there were no milestone dates as to when the agreementswere to be completed. For example, a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of Defensein January 1989, P8ge 22 GAO/NSIAIMO-166 Special Operatione Forces chapter2 PmgreesI8BehgM8deinIntegr8thgS~ Operations Forces assigning progr amming and budgeting responsibility to the Command, stressedthe importance and necessity of developing executive agree- ments with the services and other DOD organizations. However, it did not prescribe milestone dates for completing the agreements.Not until December1989 was there an attempt to establish milestone dates for someof the budget related agreements(see ch. 4). The Command’s To fulfill its responsibilities mandated by the Congress,the Command Implementation of Its prepared implementation plans, including (1) a joint special operations forces baseline master plan that addressesthe Command’smissions, Master Plan activities, and functions and contains short-term, mid-term, and long- term milestone dates covering the next 20 years that have been imposed by the Commander in Chief to carry out the Command’sobjectives and (2) an action plan that tracks the incomplete tasks neededto carry out those objectives. The Command’sposition is that these plans are needed to ensurejoint, interoperable, and fiscally attainable special operations forces programs and to fulfill the intent of the mandates. Implementation of the plans has begun and is a continuous process.The action plan is updated quarterly, and as tasks are completed, they are routinely deleted from the plan and others are added as circumstances change.The baseline master plan, dated July 1988, is divided into 18 separate major functional areas such as command relationships, joint doctrine, joint mission analysis, force structure, Major Force Program 11, logistics, and readiness,training, and operations. The master plan contains milestone dates that are categorized by the Command as being in the short term (current year plus the following year), mid term (2 to 8 years), and long term (9 to 19 years). Becauseof the manner in which the Command implements its master plan, we were unable to quantify the Command’sprogress in this area. Someportions, such as the development of the operational concept document for special operations, have been completed; other portions, such as the threat to worldwide special operations forces analysis, are continually updated and, in a sense,may never be completed. The Command’sposition is that although the action plan always shows a number of incomplete tasks, this condition simply reflects the complexity of the issuesthe Command needsto resolve. The Command is making progress integrating special operations forces. Conclusions Most U.S.-stationed special operations forces have been assignedto the Page 23 GAO/NSIADlKbl63 Spedal Operatims Forcea Command. Consistent with the authority granted by the legislation, and in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secre- tary of Defensehas routinely included and excluded units for assign- ment to the Command through the “Forces for” document mechanism. In addition, the Command has developed a master plan with short-, mid-, and long-range goals and has begun signing agreementswith the services and other DOD organizations. The Command’s ability to complete the integration processwill be con- strained until it obtains all the major agreements.That processcould be made more timely if the Secretary of Defenseor his designeewere to set realistic milestone dates for obtaining these agreements. We recommend that the Secretary of Defenseset specific milestone Recommendation dates for completing and executing all of the essential agreements between the Command and the services and other DOD organizations and take appropriate steps to help ensure that such dates are met. DOD concurred with the recommendation but added that of the 10 agree- Agency Comments and ments cited as being incomplete as of March 1990,8 had been completed Our Evaluation or are scheduledto be completed by September30,1990, and 1 had been determined to be no longer required. (The one remaining incomplete agreement is between the Assistant Secretary and the Command and is dependent upon an approved charter for the Assistant Secretary.) The Septembermilestone was not mandated or approved by higher authori- ties but only reflected informal agreementsbetween the parties; there- fore, we have not dropped our recommendation. DOD told us that because of the new status of the Air Force Special Operations Command, an additional year will be allowed to update the agreements between this new organization and the Command. DOD did not agree with what it characterized as our legislative interpre- tation that all Marine Corps forces should be assignedto the Command. Although Corps forces were listed in Annex E of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Secretary of Defenseused legislative authority to exclude these forces from the Command. We have not questioned that decision. Page24 Adequacy and Appropriateness of Fhding Requestedfor F’iscailYears 1990 and 1991 Are Uncertain The adequacy and appropriateness of funding requested for special operations forces for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 are uncertain. The requested funding represents the viewpoints of each of the services, along with the unique requirements stated in their separate special oper- ations forces master plans, not the joint perspective of the Command. The Command is analyzing missions to validate worldwide special oper- ations forces’ requirements but doesnot expect to complete this analysis until June 1991. The validation results should provide the Command a better and more impartial basis for choosingits future weapons and equipment rather than accepting candidates that reflect service advo- cacy and parochialism. The fiscal years 1990 and 1991 funding requests were presented in January 1989 and January 1990, respectively. The Congressmandated the aggregation of all the separate special oper- The Requested ations programs and requirements of the servicesand DOD organizations Funding Does Not into one program. By creating a separate major force program category Represent the for special operations forces (Major Force Program 11) in the Six Year DefensePlan, the Congresswanted to highlight the resourcesneededto Command’s Joint ensure adequate consideration for funding special operations forces and Perspective to provide increased congressionaland DOD visibility over the forces’ revitalization. As in previous years, funding for special operations programs and spe- cial operations-related needsfor fiscal year 1990 is dispersed throughout many of the other 10 major force programs (e.g., training, intelligence, research and development, etc.) and is managedby the ser- vices and other DOD organizations. With the exception of the Military Personnel appropriation accounts,fiscal year 1991 funds budgeted for dedicated special operations forces’ financing were included in the new Major Force Program 11 category. In December1989, the Deputy Secre- tary of Defensedirected that these funds be transferred from the various appropriation accounts managedby the services and other DOD organizations to accountsto be managedby the Command for full pro- gram and budget execution. The Command’s Budget In his annuaI report to the Congressfor fiscal year 1990, the Secretary of Defensestated that DOD has invested about $11.8 billion in special operations forces’ revitalization since 1981 and that an additional $8.4 billion is programmed for fiscal years 1990 through 1992. The requested funding for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 was about $3.1 billion and $2.3 P8ge 26 GAO/‘NSIAIMW168 Special Operations Forcee chapter 3 Adequacy and Appropriateness of Funding Requested for Fiscal Years 1330 and 1331 Are Uncertain billion, respectively. Figure 3.1 shows this funding for fiscal years 1981 through 1992. Figure 3.1: Funding From Fiscal Years 1991 Through 1992 3.5 Billion8 of Dollrm A L L A... L _. L _.. 1981 1982 lsss 1964 1985 198(1 1981 1088 Fbcd Yaam Note: Fiscal years 1981-90 are actual funding; fiscal years 1991 and 1992 represent the level of funding requested. To prepare its fiscal years 1990 and 1991 budget submissionsfor special operations forces programs, the Command relied upon program budget and supporting data the services and other DOD organizations provided. The Command had difficulty aggregating the services’ budgetary infor- mation becauseeach service programmed special operations forces’ requirements differently. For example, the Air Force and the Navy dis- played the funding for conventional ammunition differently from the Army. In addition, the supporting data were generally basedupon requirements and priorities stated by each of the services’ master plans and other factors. Thus, the requirements did not necessarily represent the Command’s viewpoint or priorities. Service requirements were validated through service unique procedures, whereas the Command’s needsshould be driven by joint requirements of the unified combatant commands,according to the Command’smaster Page 26 GAO,WSIADWl66 Special Operations Forcea chapter 3 Adequacy and Appropriateness of Funding Requested for Fbcal Years 1990 and 1991 Are Uncertain plan. The validation results should enable the Commandto chooseits future weapons and equipment on a better and more impartial basis rather than to accept candidates that reflect service advocacy and paro- chialism. The Command has implemented the “crosswalk”1 approach to consolidate its programs into one force account as an expeditious, short- term responseto meet fiscal year 1990 and 1991 budget presentation needsand fulfill the congressionalmandate; however, the Command rec- ognizesthe need to identify, validate, and prioritize those requirements that meet joint special operations forces’ needs. The Command is analyzing special operations missions in coordination The Command Is with the services,the other unified commands,and other U.S. govern- Validating Special ment agenciesto identify joint theater and national mission area Operations Forces’ requirements for special operations. The joint mission analysis is expected to result in a complete and detailed definition and validation Requirements from the Command’spoint of view of special operations forces mission and resource requirements in all theaters in low-, mid-, and high- intensity conflict environments. This information is to be integrated into the planning, programming, and budgeting system and the development of Major Force Program 11. Becausethe joint requirements affect each theater and are essential to providing proper special operations support to the other unified com- manders, the Command must obtain concurrenceon the joint needsfrom each of the five unified combatant theater commands.It began pre- paring the joint mission analysis in November 1987 with the drafting of the Command’sOperational Conceptsstatement. As of March 1990, the Command had defined and reached agreementon the special operations mission and requirements for the U.S. Southern Command, and it was developing a separate analysis on counter-narcotics. An analysis of the Pacific Command’s requirements, which began in March 1989, has been completed. (A separate analysis covering Korea also has been com- pleted.) The European Command analysis began in December1989, and the analyses applicable to the Atlantic and Central Commandswere scheduled to begin in 1990. A member of the Command’sJoint Studies Analysis Group said the group expects to complete all of the analyses and reach an agreement with all the unified combatant theater com- mands by June 1991. ‘The process by which budgetary information applicable to special operating forces and programs appearing in the services’ respective budgets are reformatted as Mar Force Program 11 items and displayed in the Congressional Justification Book. Page 27 GAO/‘TWADBO-166 Special Opemtion~ Forms Chapter 3 Adequacy and Approprhtenew of Funding Reque8ted for F&al Years lgg0 and 1991 Are uncertain The basis for assessingthe adequacy of the funding DOD has requested Conclusions for its special operations forces for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 is the validity of the requirements contained in the services’ special operations master plans. However, becausethe Command has not completed its analyses of these requirements, a decision whether the funding requested is adequate cannot be made. Page 28 GAO/NSIADWl6B Special Operations Forcea CommandIs Preparing to AssumeIts progr amming and Budgeting Responsibilities The Command is taking steps to assumeits programming and budgeting responsibilities that are scheduledto begin in fiscal year 1992. However, the Command’s ability to complete the processon time dependsupon the cooperation of DOD and DOD organizations This cooperation includes (1) reaching agreementsand getting clarification as to how the program- ming and budgeting preparation and execution functions and responsi- bilities are to be carried out and (2) deciding how to program and budget for unassigned special operations forces units. To ensure that the pro- cesswas not delayed, the Deputy Secretary of Defenseissued a policy and procedures memorandum on December1,1989, mandating that all of the necessaryagreementsbe completed by December15,1989. As of March 1990, this had not been accomplished. The Congressdirected DOD to take three specific actions to ensure that Legislative Mandates the Command would assumeprogramming and budgeting responsibili- ties for special operations forces. First, as stated in the 1986 legislation, the Secretary of Defensewas to create a major force program category for special operations forces in the Five Year DefensePlan (now the Six Year DefensePlan). In December1987, the Congressset a 30-day dead- line for the creation of this category and required the Secretary of Defenseto certify that all program recommendationsand budget pro- posals for special operations forces were included. Second,as mandated by the 1987 legislation, the Secretary of Defense was to grant head of agency authority to the Command’sCommander in Chief to permit the Command to develop and acquire special operations- peculiar equipment identified in the Major Force Program 11 budget. Third, the 1988 legislation mandated that the Command be responsible for preparing and submitting budget proposals for special operations forces to the Secretary of Defense.The Command is also responsible for executing the budget after approval. The Command was expected to assumebudget and execution responsibilities as soon as possible but no later than the fiscal year 1992 budget cycle. Extent of DOD’s DOD has complied with two mandates and has acted to comply with the third. In January 1988, the Secretary of Defensecertified that DOD had Compliance With the established a Major Force Program 11 category in the Five-Year Defense Mandates Plan (the first mandate). In May 1988, DOD granted the Command’sCom- mander in Chief head of agency authority (the secondmandate). Actions Page 29 GAO/NSW99-196 Special Operationa Forces chapter 4 Command IE Preparing to Assume Ita Program&g and Budgeting Responsibilities to delegate the Command the authority to assumebudgetary responsi- bilities began in January 1989 with a memorandum from the Acting Sec- retary of Defense. The January 1989 memorandum authorized the Command to assume (1) budget execution responsibilities for selectedMajor Force Program 11 programs (as determined by the Command’sCommander in Chief), effective October 1, 1990, and (2) budget preparation and execution responsibilities for all of these programs, effective October 1, 1991. However, DOD has placed strict managerial controls over the execution of Major Force Program 11 funds. For example, these controls limit the Command’s authority for reprogr amming funds from or to these pro- grams to only the Secretary of Defenseor the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The authority granted in January 1989 was amendedby the Deputy Sec- retary of Defenseon December13,1989, by issuing a Program Budget Decision Memorandum. This document acceleratedthe processby authorizing the Command to assumeall budget and program responsibil- ities for Major Force Program 11 beginning with fiscal year 1991 (i.e., the fiscal period beginning October 1,199O). The memorandum also directed the transfer of $1.4 billion in Major Force Program 11 dedicated special operations forces’ financing for fiscal year 1991 from the various appropriation accounts managedby the servicesand other DOD organiza- tions to DOD agency accountsto be managedby the Commandso that the Command could begin preparing, presenting, and defending Major Force Program 11 budget requests. As directed by the Deputy Secretary in a December 1,1989, memorandum, the various Military Personnel appro- priation accounts,representing about $976 million of the fiscal year 1991 budget request, were not transferred but instead remained the fiscal responsibility of the military departments. The January 1989 memorandum also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and other DOD organizations to cooperate with and provide the Command the resources,support, information, and assistanceit needsto perform its Major Force Program 11 tasks but did not specify a timetable for doing so. As discussedin chapter 2, the absenceof mile- stone dates for obtaining agreementsand cooperation from other organi- zations in a timely fashion could hamper the Command’sability to meet the legislative mandates. Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-SO-166 Special Operations Forces chapter 4 Command Is Preparing to Assume Ita Programing and Budgeting Respomibilitiea On December 1,1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defenseissued a policy and procedures memorandum to the DOD community that specified gui- dance and mandated a milestone date of December15, 1989, for com- pleting all of the necessaryagreementsas to how the programming, budgeting, and budget execution for special operations forces was to be carried out. Among other tasks, the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity was directed to (1) provide overall super- vision of the preparation and justification of special operations forces programs and budget, (2) adjudicate disagreements,as necessary,and (3) with assistanceof the Command’sCommander in Chief, present and defend the special operations forces program to the Congress.The agreementshad not been completed as of March 1990. Command Has Made The Command has taken steps to undertake its program, budgetary, and acquisition responsibilities in that it (1) has developed an organizational Progress in structure, (2) has developed and tested information systems to assist it Undertaking Its in preparing and executing program budget estimates, and (3) was authorized most of the staffing requested to carry out these Responsibilities responsibilities. As to its head of agency responsibilities, the Commandplans to establish a special operations executive office for acquisition in the Washington, DC., area in 1991 and to have an acquisition liaison at the Command headquarters in Florida. The executive office will be responsible for car- rying out the research, development, and acquisition functions in accor- dance with the legislative mandate. The Command plans to continue to execute its major research, development, and acquisition functions through the services’ acquisition systems, and it has reached an agree- ment with the DefenseAdvanced ResearchProjects Agency about devel- oping special technologies for special operations forces. Command Needs While the Command has made progress in someareas, it still needsthe Cooperation From DOD cooperation of DOD and DOD organizations to meet its mandated fiscal year 1992 deadline for fully assumingits programming and budgeting and Its Agencies to Meet responsibilities. As discussedin chapter 2, the Command needsto obtain Its Fiscal Deadline agreementswith the services and other DOD organizations. In addition, the Command needsother cooperative actions from these parties to help it carry out its programming and budgeting preparation and execution functions. Page 31 GAO/NWWl66 Speciai Operations Forces Chapter 4 CmnmandIsPre~toAswuneIta pro(gammins and Budgeting Reaponsibilitiea The Command and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity still need to clarify their relationship to execute the legis- lative mandate properly. Even though the Command and the Assistant Secretary have joint budget preparation and execution responsibilities over Major Force Program 11 resources,they had not agreed,as of March 1990, as to who will do what in meeting these responsibilities. The responsibilities are to be defined in a memorandum of agreement that cannot be finalized until the Assistant Secretary’s revised charter is approved. The Command’sPolicy Officer, Directorate of Plans, Policy, and Doctrine, told us in August 1989 that the revised charter was on hold pending confirmation of a new Assistant Secretary. Confirmation occurred in October 1989, but the charter had not been approved as of March 1990. A staff officer in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also told us in July 1989 that the Joint Chiefs will not update its regulation, Memorandum of Policy No. 136, which defines the respective roles of the Joint Chiefs and its componentsin the programming, budgeting, and budget execution process,until the memorandum of agreement is finalized. Transfer of Appropriation itsprogramming and budgeting responsibilities properly, the Toexecute Accounts Command needsto know which appropriation accounts it will be man- aging. The absenceof such information makes it difficult for the Com- mand to (1) analyze the budgetary information provided by the services and (2) verify that all service-managedspecial operations forces pro- grams and items are included. This information is neededso that the Command can prepare and submit its first program objective memo- randum, which represents the first step of the fiscal year 1992-97Six- Year DefensePlan process,by April 1990. The December 1989 guidance for carrying out the Major Force Program 11 responsibilities should help the Command meet this legislative man- date. The Deputy Secretary directed that the Command will plan, pro- gram, and budget for all Major Force Program 11 programs. The Deputy Secretary also directed that with the exception of the Military Personnel appropriation accounts, all other appropriation accountsdirectly associ- ated with Major Force Program 11 will be transferred to the Command for budget execution, with the approval of and coordination with the Assistant Secretary. The Military Personnelaccountsare to remain within the authority of the services. For the Military Construction appropriation accounts,the serviceswere authorized to retain funding responsibility for completion of the design Page 32 GAO,‘NSIAD~~-~~~ Speda~ Operations Forcea Chapter 4 CommandIsPreparingt.oAmmeIta prorplrmmine and Budgeting Fkspo~ibilitie~ of prior year special operations forces projects. In addition, they were to prepare projects for contract solicitation and continue normal design efforts on fiscal year 1991 special operations forces projects approved during fiscal year 1990. The Deputy Secretary further directed that special operations forces support programs would continue to be programmed by the services with planning input from the Command and that, for the time being, the transfer of accounts would be made to the various DOD appropriations categories.The Command is to have the authority to either execute the programs itself through these categoriesor suballocate budget execution to the services. Potential Uncertainties in There are someuncertainties as to programming and budgeting for spe- Programming and cial operations forces not assignedto the Command.As discussedin chapter 2, all special operations forces stationed in the United States are Budgeting - for Unassigned required by the legislation to be assignedto the Command,unless Forces excluded by the Secretary of Defense.However, special operations forces based or deployed in a theater of operations outside the United States are assignedto the theater unified combatant commander in whose geographical area of responsibility the forces are stationed or based.As such, programming and budgeting of requirements for these forces are dependent upon the theater commander including the require- ments fully in the Command’s integrated priority list. However, there is a congressionalexpectation that the Commandwill perform program- ming, budgeting, and execution functions and monitor preparednessfor all special operations forces, regardlessof command assignment. According to Command officials, special operations forces’ needshave traditionally received varying levels of support among the theater com- manders. However, none of the command agreementssigned or being developed with the theater commandsclearly defines responsibilities or relationships to accomplish these particular tasks. The mandates that prescribe the Command’sprogramming and Conclusions budgeting responsibilities are being complied with by DOD and the Com- mand. Major Force Program 11, covering special operations forces and programs, has been established, and the Command has been granted head of agency authority and has plans for exercising it. However, the ability of the Command to begin its programming, budgeting, and execu- tion responsibilities by the fiscal year 1992 budgetary cycle depends upon the cooperation of DOD and DOD organizations. In particular, the Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-90-166 Spedal @MdiOM Forcea Chapter 4 CkmmandIaPreparingtnAssumeIta w and Budgeting Responeibilitiea unsigned agreements(seech. 2) need to be completed and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity needsto have his charter approved. As stated in chapter 2, the processcould be made more timely if the Secretary of Defenseor his designeewere to set real- istic milestone dates for getting these agreementssigned. stated that the Command had submitted its fiscal year 1992 budget Agency Comments DOD on time, and, as of June 1990, all service agreementswith respect to the planning, programming, and budgeting system had been finalized. Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-9O-166 Special ~IdOM Forces I Page 36 GAO/‘NSIADWItM Special @F%%ttiOM Forces Description of ComponentCommands,Schools, and CentersIncluded in the U.S. Special OperationsCommand The Army component command is the U.S. Army Special Operations Army Component Command, headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The command is composedof active and reserve component special forces groups, a ranger regiment, psychological operations, and civil affairs units, as well as signal, special operations, aviation, and support units. The naval component command is the Naval Special Warfare Command, Navy Component headquartered at the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base,California. The command is composedof Naval Special Warfare Groups, Sea-Air-Land units, special boat units, special warfare and other units, and the Naval Special Warfare Center. The Air Force component command is the 23rd Air Force, headquar- Air Force Component tered at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The command is composedof special operations wings, groups, and squadrons; special tactics, combat control, and weather units; a Central Training Flight; and the U.S. Air Force Spe- cial Operations School. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Schools and Centers based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, conducts training for Army special forces, civil affairs and psychological operations units, foreign area officers, and survival, evasion, resistance and escapetraining. The center and school is also responsible for developing doctrine and new equipment for someArmy special operations forces. The Naval Special Warfare Center at the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base,California, provides instruction and training for personnel of the U.S. Navy, other U.S. armed forces, and allied military personnel in naval special warfare operations. The center is also the principal authority for naval special warfare doctrine in support of maritime strategy. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field, Florida, trains selectedU.S. and allied personnel in geo-political, psychological, sociological, and military factors inherent in joint special operations. The school also trains selectedU.S. personnel for security assistance assignments.Furthermore, the school also helps prepare selectedindi- viduals for unconventional warfare and special operations missions. Page 30 GAO/N!XADSO-166 Special Operationa Forces Legislatively Mandated Missions,F’unctions,and Activities of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geo- graphic area the activity or mission is to be conducted, unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. . To exercise command of a selectedspecial operations mission, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics. Functions Training assignedforces. Conducting specialized coursesof instruction for commissionedand non- commissionedofficers. Validating requirements. Establishing priorities for requirements. Ensuring combat readinessof assignedforces. Developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment and acquiring special operations-peculiar materiel, supplies, and services. Ensuring the interoperability of equipment and forces. Formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support. Monitoring promotions, assignments,retention, training, and profes- sional military education of special operations forces officers. . Monitoring the preparednessof special operations forces assignedto other unified combatant commandsto carry out assignedmissions. . Preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defenseprogram recom- mendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assignedto the special operations command. . Exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds for forces assignedto the command and, to a limited extent, for special operations forces assignedto other unified combatant commands. Direct action involves short duration strikes and other small scaleoffen- Activities l sive actions (1) to seize,destroy, or inflict damageon a specified target or (2) to destroy, capture, or recover designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other muni- tions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. l Strategic reconnaissanceis conducted to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or Page 37 GAO/‘NSIADBO-166 Special @ETdiOM Forces to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrological, geographic, or demographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment,and post-strike reconnaissance. l Unconventional warfare is a broad spectrum of military and paramili- tary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degreesby an external sources.It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of sub- version, sabotage,intelligence collection, and evasion and escape. . Foreign internal defenseis the participation by civilian and military agenciesof a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, law- lessness,and insurgency. The primary role of special operations forces in this interagency activity is to train, advise, and otherwise assist host nation military and paramilitary forces. . Civil affairs. . Psychological operations. Counter-terrorism involves offensive measurestaken to prevent, deter, l and respond to terrorism. Humanitarian assistanceis provided by DOD forces, as directed by l appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-madedisas- ters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property. Assistance provided by US. forces is limited in scopeand duration and is designedto supplement the efforts of civilian authorities that have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. Theater search and rescue. l Other activities specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. l Page aS Appendx 111 OrganizationsVisited During the Review Office of Secretary of Defense,Pentagon,Washington, D.C. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon,Washington, D.C. Headquarters, US. Special Operations Command,MacDill Air Force Base,Florida Washington Office, U.S. Special Operations Command,Pentagon,Wash- ington, D.C. Headquarters, US. Army Special Operations Command,Fort Bragg, North Carolina Headquarters, Joint Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina Headquarters, 23rd Air Force, Military Airlift Command,U.S. Air Force, Hurlburt Field, Florida Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Command,Coronado, California Headquarters, Naval Special Warfare Group 2, Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base,Virginia Headquarters, Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base,Florida Special Operations Policy Advisory Group, Washington, D.C. Page 39 GAO/N3IAD9@166 Sm ~I-atiOM Forces Appendix IV CommentsFrom the Department of Defense - THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASNINOTON. D.C. 20301-2!BO Mr. Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General National Security and International Affairs Division U.S. Gennal Acaxmting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 Dear Mr. Conahan: This is the Department of Defense (DoD) tesponseto the U.S. General Accounting OfIke (GAO) Draft Repott, “SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: Rogtess in Implementing Legislative Mandates,” dated June 4.1990 (GAO Code 392460), OSD Case 8364. The Department generally agreeswith the GAO findings and recommendations. As discussedin the enclosure, the United StatesSpecial Operations Command is malting progresstoward full implementation of the legislation which directed its establishment. The Commanderin Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Commandrecently submitted his fast Rogram Objectives Memorandum, which te~outcesSpecial Operations Forcesin FY 1992- FY 1997. Fotces have been assigned to the Command consistent with the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense. Essential agreements,which establish ptocedumsand responsibili- ties between the Services and the Command, are either currently in place or will be completed by September 30.1990. Finally, significant work has beenaccomplishedon the U.S. Special Operations CommandJoint Mission Analysis, which is scheduledto be completed by mid-1991. That comprehensive document will become the baseline for future joint tequimments for Special Operations Forces. The detailed DOD commentson the report findings and recommendationsare provided in the enclosure. (Several additional technical commentswere provided separatelyto the GAO staff.) The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Sincerely, Enclosures: As stated Page40 GAO/NSIAD-W166 Special Operationa Forces Appendix N Commenta From the Department of Defense GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JUNE 4.1990 (GAO CODE 392460) OSD CASE 8364 “SPECIAL OPERATIONSCOMhUN’Dz PROGRESSIN IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVEMANDATES” DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSECOMMENTS ***** FINDINGS FINDING A: m: wlative Man- For Sue&al Ooerations, The GAO repotted that, in November 1986, as a result of serious deficiencies in the capabilities of the U.S. to conduct special operations and engagein low intensity conflict, the CongressenactedPublic Law 99-661 to revitalize special operations. The GAO explained that the law directed the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to (1) establish an Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and (2) establish a unified command for special operations forces--the U.S. Special Operations Command The GAO reported that the legislation identified the forces to be assignedand defined the activities and functions of the new Command. The GAO reported that additional reforms were mandated by the Congress in 1987 and 1988. The GAO explained that Public Law 100-l 80, enactedin December 1987,directed the Army to act as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, until the office was filled by appointment--and directed the Secretaryof Defense to provide sufficient resources for the Command to carry out its duties and responsibilities. ‘Ihe GAO noted that the conference report accompanying the legislation expressedconcern that the DOD was delaying or blocking implementation of the reforms and assertedinsufficient progresshad beenmade. The GAO reported that, as a result, in September 1988, the Congress mandated additional responsibilities and authority for the Commander in Chief of the Special Operations Command, by enacting Public Law 100-456. The GAO reported that those new responsibih- ties included the following: - preparing and submitting to the Secretaryof Defense program recommendationsand budget proposals for special operation forces assigned to the other unified combatantcommands. The GAO noted that the Armed Services Committee conference report directed the Command to assumeprogram and budget responsibilities as soon as possible, but no later than the Now on pp. 2 and 12-14 resource allocation cycle for Fy 1992. (p. 2, pp. 1l-13/GAO Draft Report) 1 Enclosure Page 41 GAO/NSL4Kb9O-1643Spedal Operations Forces Appendix N CommentsProm the Department of Deferme DoD RESPONS Concur. It should also be recognixed that the Commandhas already assumedexecution responsibility for FY 1991 resourcesand, in addition, has prepared and submitted its first Program Objectives Memorandum which resourcesSpecial Operations Forces programs for FY 1992- FY 1997. l FINDING B: &~Q&I of Suecial w Force. The GAO reported that, under the legislation creating the Special Operations Command special operations forces stationed in the U.S. were to be assignedto the Command, while those basedoutside the U.S. were assignedto the appropriate unified combatant theater commanders. The GAO found that, by April 1988, the Special Operations Commandhad assumedoperational commandof (1) the Army Special Operations Command, (2) the 23rd Air Force, and (3) the Naval Special War-fateCommand-- while the Joint Special Operations Commandwas addedin August 1988. The GAO also pointed out that the legislation permits the Secretary of Defense to designate and assign forces not identified by the legislation and to exclude forces that were identified. The GAO found that the Secretaryhas exercised his authority several times since the Commandwas established. The GAO explained that, at the outset, the assignment of forces did not include Army and Air Force civil affairs and psychological operations units, nor any units operating under the Navy Special Warfare Command The GAO observed that since then, the Secretary has assigned forces from each of these groups to the Special Operations Command The GAO also found that someforces categorized as having a other than primary special operations mission were not assignedto the Command The GAO reported, for example, that units referenced in the legislation, but not assignedinclude (1) all Marine Corps units, (2) certain kinds of specially trained Air Force crews and their aircraft, and (3) two Naval Reservehelicopter units. The GAO concluded that the additions and exclusions by the Secretary of Defense are consistent with the authority granted by the legislation. l&GAO also concluded that the Command is making progressin integrating special operations forces. Now on pp. 3 and 16-16 (p. 3, pp. 17-21/GAO Draft Report) PONSE: Partially Concur. The DOD agreeswith the GAO conclusion that additions and exclusions by the Secretary of Defense are consistent with the authority granted by the legislation. However, the DOD does not agreewith the GAO legislative interpretation that all United States,Marine Corps units should be assignedto the Command. Two points are submitted in clarification: Units specifically referencedby legislation as Special Operations Forces are, “...those forces of the armed forces that are identified as core or augmenting forces in Annex E of the JCS Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan dated December 17.1985 (or) are described in the Terms of Reference and Concept Operation Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in Page 42 GAO/‘NSlAD9O-166 Spedal Operations Forcea Appendix N Comment9From the Department of Defense effect 1 April 1986.” (Section 167, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987). United States Marine Corps forces am not listed in either set of documents. The United StatesMarine Corps does not have designated special operations forces. Instead, selected United StatesMarine Corps units train for and are designatedas “special operations capable” prior to deployment. The May 1990 creation of the Air Force Special Operations Command (formally 23rd Air Force), as recommendedby the Commander,U.S. Special Operations Commandand the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, clarified the commandrelationship for the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Special Operations Command The Ah Force Special Operations Commandis now the Air Component to U.S. Special Operations Command . The GAO found that, as of March 1990, about 65 percent of the agreementsthe Special Operations Command considersessential to implementing the legislative mandatesfully had beencompleted. The GAO explained that the Commandhasmany responsibilities that are unique for a unified command, responsibilities which were previously the province of the Services and other DoD organizations. The GAO reported therefore, that in order to fully and successfully carry out the changesrequired by the mandates,the Command needsto have formal, signed agreements that will delineate each party’s role and responsibilities, as well as their relationships with each other. The GAO found that, while the Commandis making progressin developing the agreements,as of March 1990.10 of 29 agreementsthe Command considers essential in carrying out its legislative mandateswem still incomplete. The GAO observed that the completion of those agmementsis important, becausethey will defme and clarify the Command’srole and responsibilities within the Defensecommunity. The GAO reported that it is the position of the Special Operations Commandthat the substantive issueshave been finalized and agreed to by the affected parties and that, due to the complexity of the agreements,accuracy has been placed aheadof speedin their completion. The GAO found, however, that with the exception of the agreementsdirectly applicable to the budget, there are no milestone datesestablished for completing the agreements. The GAO also found that the Special OperationsCommandis continuing to implement a joint baselinemasterplan and an action plan for integrating special operations forces into the Command, but many of the milestones governing functions such as communications, readiness, training and operations, force structure , and personnel are not scheduled to be reached for several years. The GAO noted that it was unable to quantify the Command’s progress,due to the mannerin which the Special Operations Commandimplements and tracks the master plan. The GAO concluded that the Command’s ability to complete the integration process will be constrained until it obtains all the major agreements. lbe GAO also concluded that the processcould be made more timely if the Secretaryof Defense or his Now on pp. 3 and 19-23 designee set xeal~sticmilestone datesfor achieving these agreements.(p. 4, pp. 21-27/GAO Draft Report) 3 Page 43 GAO,‘NSIABW166 Special Operations Forcea CommentsProm the Department of Defense 1 WSPONSE; Concur. Since the GAO completed its review, however, tht Serviceshave madeprogressin completing the remaining ten agreementsreferencedby the GAO. One of the agreementswas finalized and signed in June 1990,seven of the remaining nine agreementsare expected to be signed by the close of the fiscal year, and one agn?cmentis no longer needed. The requirement for an agreementbetweenthe U.S. Special Operations Commandand the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict will be reevaluated, with a decision by September30.1990. With the creation of the new Air Force Special Operations Command, rime is required to allow the Command to establish its responsibilities and relationships. The U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Air Force have agreedto allow one year for the new headquartersto becomeestablished while updating existing agreements. . JWDINGQ: ~&QIJJ Funding. The GAO reported that, by creating a separatemajor force program category for special operations forces, the Congress wanted to highlight the resourcesneededto ensure adequateconsideration for funding special operations forces and to provide.increased visibility over their revitalization. The GAO found, however, that as in previous years, funding for special operations programs and related needs for Fy 1990, is dispersed throughout many of the other ten major force programs and managedby the Services and other DOD organizations. The GAO reported that the requested funding of special operations forces needs for FY 1990 and FY 1991, was about $3.1 billion and $2.3 billion, respectively. The GAO found, however, that in order to prepare its budget submissions, the Special Operations Command relied on programdata provided separately by the Services and other DoD organizations. The GAO conch&d, however, that the support data provided by the Services was generally basedon the require- ments and priorities of their individual plans-rather than the viewpoint or priorities of the Special OperationsCommand. The GAO further concluded that. as a result. the adequacyor Now on pp. 3 and 25-27 appropriateness of the funding requested for FY 1990 and FY 1991 is uncertain. (p. 4, pp. 29-32/GAO Draft Report) pOD RESPONSE: Concur. Historically, programs for Special Operations Forces have not been separately identified within the Service budgets. As a result, the Commandinherited a program that was not balanced and did not meef evolving requirements. Beginning in FY 1991 all Special Operations Forces-specificbudget execution responsibilities will be assumedby the Special Operations Command. The Command’srecent development and submissionof the FY 1992-N 1997 Program Objectives Memorandum is the first step in authorizing the Command to program its own resources. l ENDING E: &e&l QperationsForcesRequinmems Bein- The GAO found that the Special Operations Commandis currently analyzing special operationsmissions,in coordination with the Services, the other unified commands,and other Federal agencies--in order to identify joint theater and national mission area requirements for special operations. According to the GAO, the joint mission analysis is expected to result in a complete and 4 Appendix IV Gmunents Prom the Department of Defense detailed definition and validation from the Command’sjoint point of view of special operations forces mission and resource requirements in all theaters. The GAO noted that preparation of the joint mission analysis began in November 1987, with drafting of the Command’sOperational Concepts. The GAO reported that a member of the Joint Studies Analysis Group said they expect to complete all of the analysis and get agreementwith all the unified combatant theater commandsby June 1991. The GAO observed that, until the Commandcompletes its analysis, it (the GAO) can not determine whether the funding Now on pp. 3 and 27. requestedis adequate. (p. 4, p. 29, pp. 32-33/GAO Draft Report) DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Command has now completed the theater-specific Joint Mission Analysis for U.S. Southern Command,U.S. Pacific Command,and Korea. While other theater Joint Mission Analyses are on-going, the foal U.S. Special Operations CommandJoint Mission Analysis is not scheduled to be completed until mid- 1991. PINDING F: Comuliance of the DoD With MandatedProarammine And Bu&g&g $suonsibilitie& The GAO reported that the Congressdirected the DoD to take three specific actions to ensure that the Command would assumeprogramming and budgeting responsibilities for all special operations forces as soon as possible, but no later than for the budget beginning with the FY 1992 budgetary cycle, as follows: - First, the GAO reported that the 1986 legislation requited the Secretary of Defense to create a major force program for special operations forces in the Five Year DefensePlan. - The GAO noted that, in December 1987, the Congress set a 30&y deadline for creation of this force program. The GAO found that the Secretary of Defense certified that the DoD established the Major Force Program 11 category in the Five Year Defense Plan in January 1988. but he did not delegate the authority to carry out its associatedprogram and budget development responsibilities until January 1989. The GAO concluded that the DOD compliance with this mandatewas completed on time, but the delegation of the necessaryauthority to the Command was not timely. The GAO reported that the 1987 legislation also directed the Secretary of Defense to grant Head of Agency authority to the Command’s commander-in-chief to permit the Commandto develop and acquire special opera- tions-peculiar equipment, supplies and servicesidentified in the Major Force Program 11 budget. - In addition, the GAO reported that the 1988 legislation required that the Command be responsible for preparing and submitting budget proposals for special operations forces. The GAO noted that the Conference Report accompanying this legislation directed the Command assume this responsibility as soon as possible, but no later than the 1992 budget cycle. The GAO found that the Secretary of Defense granted Head of Agency authority to the commander-in-chief of the Command in May 1988. 5 Page 4S GAO,‘NSIAD-9@166 Special Operations Forces Comments Prom the Department of Defense The GAO explained that, in order for the Special Operations command to be able to prepare and submit budget proposals for the PY 1992 budget cycle, specific authority had to be delegatedto the Command--and the rest of the DOD community directed to cooperatein the effort. The GAO found that the authority delegated to the Command in January 1989, was amendedby the Deputy Secretaryof Defensein a Program Budget Decision Memorandum issued December 13.1989. According to the GAO, that document speededup the processby authorixing the Commandto assumeall Program 11 responsibilities bCgiMiI@ with m 1991--and also directed the transfer of funds from various accounts managedby the Services and other DoD organizations to accountsmanagedby the Command The GAO reported that the January 1989, memorandum also directed the DOD organizations to cooperatewith, and provide the Command with, the resourcesand information needed to perform its Programs 11 tasks, but did not specify a timetable for doing so. The GAO concluded the absenceof an enforceable schedule or milestones could hamper the ability of the Command to fully meet the legislative mandates. The GAO further reported that, on December 1.1989, the Deputy Secretaryof Defenseissueda memcrandumspecifying guidance and mandating a milestonedate of December 15.1989, for completing all the necessaryagreements. The GAO found, however, that at least as of March 1990. the agreementshad not been completed. The GAO concluded that the DoD is complying with the mandatesthat prescribe the Command’s programming and budgeting responsibilities. The GAO further concluded, however, that the progress could be more timely, if realistic milestone dates were set for getting the agreements Now on pp.29-31 signed (pp. 3-5, pp. 34-37, p. 4l/GAO Draft Report) DOD ResnonE Concur. The U.S. SpecialOperations Commandpreparedand submittedits first Program Objective Memorandum for PY 1992-1997. As of June 1990, all Service agreements,with respect to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,have been finalized (See also the DOD response to Recommendation 1.) l FmdingQ Command ng&&ponsibilitieg. The GAO found that the Command has taken stepsto undertake its program, budget development, budget execution, and acquisition responsibilities. As examples, the GAO reported that the Commandhas (1) developed an organizational structure, (2) developed and tested information systemsto assist in the preparation and execution of program budget estimates, and (3) was authorized most of the staffing it requested to carry out those responsibilities. The GAO also observed, however, that while the Command has madeprogressin some areas,it still needsthe cooperation from other DOD organizations to meet the mandated IT 1992 deadline for assumingfully its programming and budgeting responsibilities. The GAO pointed out that the Command needsto obtain a variety of agreementswith the Services and other DoD organixa- dons, and needs their cooperation to help carry out the programming and budgeting preparation and execution functions. As one example, the GAO reported that the Command and the Assistant Secretaryfor Special Operations and Low Intensity still need to clarify their relationships. The GAO found, however, that as of March 1990. agreementon those responsibilities had not beenreached. The GAO also reported that, in order to properly execute its programming and budgeting 6 Page 48 GAO/NSIAMO-166 Special OpEMlOM Foreea Appendix N Cbmment8 From the Department of Defense responsibilities, the Command neededto know which appropriation accounts it will be managing so that it can prepare and submit its first program objective memorandum,due by the end of April 1990. The GAO observed that the December 1989 guidance for carrying out the Major Forces Program 11 responsibilities should help the Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity meet this legislative mandate. Finally, the GAO noted that there are someuncertainties as to programming and budgeting for special operations forces not assigned to the Command. In this regard, the GAO reported that special operations forces basedor deployed outside the U.S. are assignedto the theater commander in whose geographical areaof responsibility the forces are stationed or based The GAO explained that, as such, both the requirements and budgets of those forces are included in the priority list of the theater commander. According to the GAO, however, the legislative mandaterequires the Command to perform certain programming and budgeting functions and monitor preparednessfor all special operations forces, regardlessof command assignment. The GAO found that none of the command agreementsconsummatedor being developed with the theater commandsdefines responsibilities or relationships to accomplish this particular legislative mandate. Overall, the GAO concluded that the Commandhas madeprogressk Now on pp. 4 and 31-33 undertaking its programming and budgeting responsibilities. (pp. 3-5, p. 34, pp. 37-4WAO Draft Report) pOD RFSRONSE: Concur. The statement, “However, special operations forces basedor deployed in a theater of operations outside the United States are assigned to the theater unified combatant commanderin whose geographical areaof responsibility the forces ate stationed or based. As such, not only are their requirements included in the integrated priority list of the theater commander, but so are their budgets.” ...is misleading. Service centrally managedresources,such as depot maintenanceand baseoperating support, are fun&d through Service componentsof the unified commandsfor all forces, including Special Operations Forces. However, all Special OperationsForces-specificresourcesare planned, progmmmcd, budgeted,and executedby U.S. Special Operations Command The Departmentis continuing to evaluate Special Operations Forces-relatedrequirements to determine if they should fail under the auspicesof the Special Operations Command RECOMMENDATIONS pEcoMMEMDAnON 1: The GAO recommendedthat the Secretaryof Defense (1) set specific milestone dates for completing and executing all of the essential agreementsbetween the Special Operations Command and the Services and other DoD organizations and (2) take Now on pp. 4 and 24. appropriate steps to help ensure that such milestones are met. (p. 5, p. 28/GAO Draft Rep-0 7 Page 47 GAO/NSIADgO-166 Special Operations Forces Comments From the Depaatment of Defense poD RJWON~: Concur. However, the status of agreementscurrently under final coordination with Services must be taken into account. Primary agreementsconcerning readinessand training, researchand development, intelligence activities, combatting terrorism, and transfer of classikd programs, are in final review for signature by the individual Services. Of the ten incomplete agreementsnoted by the GAO in March 1590,eight have now been completed or are scheduled to be completed and signed by September3O,l!WO. and one has been determined to be no longer required (ie., the agreementrelated to Air Force Intelligence Activities). The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict will continue to monitor the establishment and execution of all existing and future essential agreements betweenU.S. Special Operations Command,the Services,and other DOD organizations. The Joint Staff remains the focal point for operational matters. 8 Page 48 GAOflSIAD-B@1tM Spedal Operationa Forces Appendix V Major Contibutors to This &port Norman J. Rabkin, Associate Director National Security Charles Thompson, Assistant Director Affairs Division, Cynthia A. Davis, Staff Member Washington, D.C. Roderic W. Worth, Evaluator-in-Charge Atlanta Regional Harry F. Jobes,Site Senior Office Edward M. Gentry, Evaluator Sara Bingham, Writer-Editor (88w3o) Pyle 49 GAO/NSUD4@166 Spedal Opentlona Forces United States First-Class Mail’ General Accounting Office Postage & Fees Paid Washington, D.C. 20548 GAO I Permit No. GlOO I Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300 . . Ordering Information The first five copies of each GAO report are free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accom- panied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20877 Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 275-6241.
Special Operations Command: Progress in Implementing Legislative Mandates
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-28.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)