_-_I ..--.-,- ---_- -_-- ARMY DEPOTS Alrl,[llst~ I!)!)0 Plans Abandoned for the New Distribution Center at the Red River Depot 142037 (;AO/NSIAJ)-!)()-I84 United States GAO General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-221107 August 20,199O The Honorable Earl Hutto Chairman, Subcommitteeon Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: In September 1989, you asked us to review the Army’s efforts to build new, highly mechanizeddistribution centers at three of its depots: the Sharpe Army Depot, in Lathrop, California; the New Cumberland Depot, in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania; and the Red River Depot, in Texar- kana, Texas, You were concernedthat the recently completed center at Sharpe might be underutilized and that the center at Red River, now in the early stagesof construction, might therefore be unnecessary.Among other things, you asked that we (1) compare the present work load at Sharpe to the Army’s early projections; (2) determine the actual cost of the Sharpe project; (3) report the status of work at the three depots; and (4) evaluate the rationale for completing the Red River project, given the potential excesscapacity at Sharpe and New Cumberland. In March 1990, we briefed your office on the preliminary results of our work. We also informed your office that, according to officials at the Army’s Depot System Command,the Army no longer planned to con- struct the distribution center at Red River. This report summarizes and updates that briefing. The work load at the three depots has not increased at the rate pre- Resultsin Brief dicted by the Army. In 1986, the Army projected that the total of mate- riel issuesand receipts handled annually by the three depots would increaseby 26 to 53 percent over a 4-year period. The Army used this projection as the primary basis for the construction of new distribution centers at the three depots. However, the total work load at the three depots has increased little since 1986. Depot System Command officials have not analyzed why the expected work load did not materialize. The estimated cost of the three distribution centers has increased36 percent since 1984, from $488 million to $668 million. Construction of two of the centers (New Cumberland and Sharpe) has been completed, and the center at Sharpe is partially operational. However, according to Army Depot System Commandofficials, neither center will be able to Page 1 GAO/NSIAD90-184 Army Depot Modernization , E-221107 operate as planned until the completion of delivery, integration, and testing of key software, now expected by March 1991. Theseofficials also informed us that the third center (Red River) is no longer needed. Canceling this project reducesthe $668 million estimate by at least $146.9 million. In 1976, the Army designatedthree depots to receive, store, and ship Background secondary items (primarily repair parts and other support items) to spe- cific geographic areas in the United States and overseas.The Sharpe Army Depot servesthe western United States, Alaska, and the Pacific; the New Cumberland Depot servesthe eastern United States, Europe, Central America, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Puerto Rico; and the Red River Depot servesthe central United States. In ‘1980,the Army stated that new distribution centers were neededat the three depots to meet increasesin the work load expected to result from force moderni- zation efforts. The objective of the depot modernization program is to streamline supply operations by constructing state-of-the-art automated distribu- tion centers. Automated centers are to integrate computers, materiel- handling systems, and bar coding to enable the centers to more effi- ciently receive, store, and ship supplies. In a report to the Secretary of Defense,Army Depots: Planned Distribu- tion Centers Are Not Adequately Justified (GAO/NSIAD-S6-84, June 6, 1986) we concluded that the Army’s work load projections at that time had been basedon questionable-assumptionsand-computation procedures and appeared to be overstated. We also concluded that there could be viable and less costly options to the construction program to satisfy any work load increases.We recom- mended that the Army (1) analyze options for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of existing facilities and (2) identify potential savings to be gained by further consolidation or realignment of the depot system. The projected work load increasesused by the Army as the primary jus- ProjectedWork Load tification for construction of the new distribution centers have not mate- Did Not M&erialize rialized. Although the total work load was estimated to increaseby 26 to 63 percent over a 4-year period, it has remained at about its 1986 level. Page 2 GAO/NSuDgO-lI34 Army Depot Modembtion . B221107 Work load for the three depots is measuredby the total number of issuesand receipts, that is, the number of shipments entering or leaving the depot each year. We analyzed Army projections that were prepared in responseto our 1986 report. For each depot, two projections were made through 1990, a high and a low projection. The Army expected that the actual work loads would fall somewherebetween the high and low projections. We compared the projected and actual work loads for each depot for fiscal years 1986 through 1989, the latest year for which actual data were available. Actual work load was below the Army’s projections for each depot; for example, the actual work load at Sharpe was 69 percent of the low and 47 percent of the high work loads projected for 1989. Figure 1 comparesthe total actual work loads at the three depots to the Army’s projections, and appendix 1 contains a detailed comparison for each center. Flgure 1: Projected and Actual Work Loada at the Three Depot8 12.0 lnwsandfiooolptslnYilllons 11.0 11.0 10.5 10.0 9.5 9.0 6.5 9.0 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.0 5.5 5.0 1995 1996 1997 1999 1999 FIscalYear - High Projection -1-1 Low Projection m Actual Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Depot System Command data. Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-!WlfJ4 Army Depot Modernization B221107 Depot System Commandofficials informed us that they had not for- mally analyzed the reasonsfor the discrepancy between projected and actual work loads. However, they offered the following observations: . Budget cuts might have reduced the number of orders from customer units. . Budget cuts might also have slowed the Army’s force modernization effort, delaying the introduction of new systems. Such a slowdown would reduce both depot receipts and issues. l New systems that have been introduced are better constructed and more trouble-free than expected. Fewer repairs would result in fewer orders of repair parts from the depots. Further, Army officials said work load for New Cumberland was below projections because(1) someof the work load was shifted from New Cumberland to Europe, after the establishment of three European redis- tribution facilities beginning in 1986, and (2) in anticipation of construc- tion, somework load was shifted to other depots. Most Stored Items Are Not Although the work load has not grown as projected, the number of items Eking Ordered in storage has. The number of line items stocked at the three depots steadily increased from 1985 to 1989, as shown in figure 2. Page 4 GAO/NE&W-90-184 Army Depot Modernization - lb221107 Flgure 2: Number of Line Item8 Stocked at the Three Depots 590 Llno item8 In Thousands 460 400 350 a00 250 200 159 100 1985 1996 1997 1998 1969 Flsosl Yrr - Sharpa - - - - New Cumbedand m Red River Note: Depot officials said that, for single line items stored at more than one location in a depot, each location is counted as a separate line item when the location contains different condition coded materiel. Source: GAO analysis of Depot System Command data. Most of the items stocked at the three depots are largely inactive. Data on line-item activity as of December23, 1989, show that more than half of the items stocked at the three depots had not been issued during the previous 12 months, as shown in table 1. For example, 61.7 percent of the items stocked at Sharpe experiencedno activity during the 12-month period ending December23, 1989. In fact, only 9.1 percent of the items stocked at Sharpe had an issue rate of 10 or more during this period. Page 5 GAO/NSIADBO-l&4 Army Depot Modernization > 5221107 Table 1: Line-Item Actlvlty at the Three Depot8 (For the 12.Month Period Ending New December 23,1989) Number of Isauea Cumberland Sharpe Red River High (20 or more) 25,848 7,674 21,734 Medium (10 to 19) 21,579 8,607 17,819 Low (1 to 9) 91,559 52,315 100,737 No issues 154,077 110,664 152,891 Total 293,063 179,260 293,161 Percentage with no activity 52.6 61.7 52.1 Depot Productivity Is The depots have continued to accomplish their supply mission despite a Increasing Without decline in work hours. In effect, productivity is increasing without the benefit of the new automated capabilities. From 1986 to 1989, work Modernization hours at Sharpe and New Cumberland declined, while work loads remained constant or increased slightly. Depot System Commandoffi- cials said that productivity improved in responseto budget constraints and at the expenseof other necessarydepot managementfunctions, such as managing inventory and packaging. The estimated cost of the three distribution centers has increased36 Cost of New percent since 1984, from about $488 million to about $658 million. Distribution Centers According to the DefenseDepartment (DOD), the costs exceededthe orig- Has Increased inal projections primarily due to the underestimation of the complexity of the software and its developmental costs. As of October 1984, the Army indicated that about $488 million would be required to modernize the three depots. This figure included about $404 million in construction and procurement costs and about $84 mil- lion in facility design and systems software development coststhat would be transferred from other Army accounts. Table 2 breaks down the $404 million capital costs neededto build the centers and to procure equipment, according to the Army’s 1984 esti- mate. These costs, of which about $386 million has been appropriated, are now estimated to total about $469 million. Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-90-164 Army Depot Modernhtlon B-221107 Table 2: Estimated Fundlng Requlrementr to Modernlte the Three Dollars in millions Depots (As of October 1984) Military Army construction procurement Total Sharpe $49.0 $41.4 $90.4 New’Cumberland 93.8 79.1 172.9 Red River 87.7 52.7 140.4 Total $230.5 $173.2 $403.7 The $84 million estimate for design and software costs has grown to $199 million. These costs have thus far been funded primarily with operation and maintenance and Army industrial funds transferred from other requirements. Budget submissionsto the Congresshave not associ- ated these costs with depot modernization. Table 3 shows funds expended or obligated and funds neededfor com- pleting each distribution center. This table includes the military con- struction and procurement funds appropriated by the Congressand the funds transferred by the Army from other accounts.Appendix II presents detailed cost information for each center. Table 3: Total Fundlng Requlremenk (As of October 31, 1989) Dollars in millions Expended or Estimated coat Distribution center obligated to complete Total Sharpe $158.2 $25.5 $163.7 New Cumberland 219.4 43.2 262.6 Red River 39.7 172.0 211.7 Total $417.3 $240.7 9666.0 The construction contract for the distribution center at Red River was OneProject Canceled; canceledin April 1990. Depot System Command officials informed us Two Continue that they do not plan to complete the proposed center. They determined that Sharpe and New Cumberland have the capacity to handle the Red River supply work load basedon proposed reductions in troop strengths as announcedby the Secretary of Defensein January 1990. Construction has been completed at the other two distribution centers, and one is partially operational. However, the software neededto achieve full automation at the two centers is in the testing stage. Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-90-184 Army Depot Modernization B-221107 Red River Distribution The site of the Red River center had been prepared, and utilities and Center Canceled roads had been relocated in anticipation of the construction. Two build- ings had also been relocated from the site. The construction contract was initially awarded in August 1989. However, a Depot System Com- mand official informed us in November 1989 that, becauseseveral bid protests were received, the order to start construction was delayed. In January 1990, the Depot System Commandofficial informed us the Army no longer plans to build the new center, and in April 1990, the Army terminated the contract. In addition, officials said that they were considering transferring Red River’s area-oriented depot supply mission to New Cumberland and Sharpe. An official said that, basedon a work load assessmentconducted during January 1990, Sharpe and New Cum- berland had sufficient capacity to handle the work load. Red River would continue to fulfill other missions. According to Army records, DOD allocated about $90 million in appropri- ated funds for the Red River center-$66.5 million in military construc- tion funds and $34.6 million in procurement funds. Of the $39.7 million expended or obligated for the center as of October 31, 1989, only about $8.7 million was from the military construction funds allocated for the center. The remaining $31 million was primarily operation and mainte- nance funds that were not specifically allocated for the Red River center. No procurement funds have yet been obligated for the center. In addition, the Depot System Commandofficial estimated that up to $18.6 million ($13.8 million in procurement funds and $4.8 million in military construction funds) would be neededto terminate existing com- mitments for the Red River center. Finally, $6.6 million, the prorated cost to the Red River center for completion of the managementand con- trol system, will have to be reallocated to the Sharpe and New Cumber- land centers. By canceling the Red River project, the $668 million total funding requirement shown in table 3 could be reduced by as much as $146.9 million. Sharpe Distribution Center The Sharpe distribution center, currently stocked with about 47,000 of a Built and Partially planned 169,000 line items, is in partial operation using a modified stan- dard depot system. The distribution center construction contract was Operational awarded in December1986. This contract included constructing the Y building and procuring the materiel-handling equipment, automatic data processingequipment, and the processcontrol system. The contract completion date was April 1988. While the Army acceptedthe building Page 8 GAO/NSIADBO-184 Army Depot Modernization B-221107 in January 1989, a Depot System Commandofficial said that it was not expected that the center would be in full operation until January 1993, when the necessarysoftware has been integrated and tested and the center has been fully stocked. New Cumberland Currently, the New Cumberland distribution center is not in operation. Distribution Center Bui.1t The construction contract was awarded in September 1986. Like Sharpe, this contract includes constructing the building and procuring the equip- but Not Operational ment and processcontrol system. The contract completion date was October 1989. While the Army acceptedthe building in January 1990, a Depot System Command official said it was not expected that the center would be in full operation until September 1991, when the.necessary software has been integrated and tested and the center has been fully stocked. Software Development Has Development of the managementand control system and the process Been Delayed control system software has been delayed. The managementand control system, originally scheduled for completion in June 1988, is now expected to be fully integrated and tested by March 1991. The processcontrol system for New Cumberland, originally scheduled for completion in October 1989, is now scheduled for completion by August 1990. The processcontrol system for Sharpe, originally part of the Sharpe construction contract, was scheduledfor completion in April 1988. The Army terminated the contract in May 1988, and the Sharpe processcontrol system is now to be adapted from the New Cumberland system. We visited the three Army depots, the Depot System Command, and the Scopeand Corps of Engineers.At each location, we interviewed appropriate offi- Methodology cials and examined pertinent contracts, cost records, and other documents. We discussedour findings with officials from the Army’s Depot System Command and the Corps of Engineers and incorporated their comments as appropriate. We performed our work from November 1989 through April 1990 in accordancewith generally acceptedgovernment auditing standards. Page9 GAO/NSIAD-90=184 Army Depot Modernization , B-221107 Matter for Becauseonly about $8.7 million of the $90 million in military construc- tion and procurement funds allocated for the now canceledRed River Congressional center have been expended and up to $18.6 million may be neededto Consideration terminate existing commitments, the Congressmay wish to rescind the remaining $62.7 million ($42 million in military construction funds and $20.7 million in procurement funds). DOD concurred with our findings but disagreedwith our suggestionthat Agency Commentsand the Congressshould consider rescinding $62.7 million of military con- Our Evaluation struction and procurement funds that were allocated for the Red River distribution center. DOD said that it had identified $39 million that can be rescinded and would agreewith a GAO recommendation to rescind that amount. DOD did not explain how it arrived at the $39 million figure. Our calculation of the amount we suggestedfor rescission($62.7 mil- lion) gave full consideration to the funds already expended, and to the maximum amount the Army estimates will be neededto terminate existing commitments for the Red River center. In the absenceof any explanation as to how DOD determined the amount that it believed should be rescinded, we continue to believe that the appropriate amount for rescissionis $62.7 million. Appendix I provides a comparison of projected and actual workloads at the three depots. The construction costs for these depots are presented in appendix II. A copy of DOD'S commentsis included as appendix III. We are sending copiesof this report to concernedcongressionalcommit- tees, the Secretariesof Defenseand Army, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copieswill also be made available to other interested parties. Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-90-184 Am~y Depot Modernization I B-221107 This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis, Director, Army Issues,who may be reached on (202) 276-4141if you or your staff have any questions. Other major contributors are listed in appendix IV. Sincerely yours, Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-90484 Army Depot Modehtion Contents Letter Appendix I Projectedand Actual Work Loads at the Three Depots Appendix II Costsof the Three Depots Appendix III 16 CommentsFrom the Department of Defense Appendix IV 22 Major Contributors to This Report Tables Table 1: Line-Item Activity at the Three Depots Table 2: Estimated Funding Requirementsto Modernize the Three Depots Table 3: Total Funding Requirements Figures Figure 1: Projected and Actual Work Loads at the Three 3 Depots Figure 2: Number of Line Items Stocked at the Three 6 Depots Abbreviations DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-SO-184 Army Depot Modernization Page 13 GAO/NSIADfJO-184 Army Depot Modernization Appendix I Projectedand Actual Work Loads at the Three Depots Issues and receipts in millions Year Depot 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Red River Projected Low 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 High 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.6 Actual 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 Sharpe Proiected Low 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 High 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.9 Actual 0.9 1.o 1.0 0.9 0.9 New Cumberland Projected Low 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.7 Hiah 2.7 3.3 3.0 4.4 4.9 Actual 2.7 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.7 Page 14 GAO/NSIAWO-184 Army Depot Modernization . Appendix II Costsof the Three Depots Dollars in millions Expended or Estimated obligated as of cost to Total Depot October 31.1989 comMte cost Sharpe Cost category Architect and enaineerina costs $11.6 $0.0 $11.6 Construction 50.0 0.4 50.4 Materiel-handling equipment 39.1 1 .o 40.1 Computer hardware 10.4 5.2 15.6 Software desian 23.6 12.4 36.0 Management and control system 20.6 6.5 27.1 Other 2.9 0.0 2.9 Total $158.2 $25.5 $183.7 New Cumberland Cost category Architect and enaineerina costs $12.4 $0.0 $2.4 Construction 93.0 9.0 102.0 Materiel-handling equipment 61.6 13.7 75.5 Cornouter hardware 16.8 1 .Q 18.7 Software design 8.4 8.7 17.1 Management and control system 20.6 6.5 27.1 Other 6.4 3.4 9.8 Total $219.4 $43.2 $262.6 Red River Cost cateaorv Architect and enaineerina costs $9.9 $0.0 $9.9 Construction 8.7 85.8 94.5 Materiel-handling equipment 0.0 53.0 53.0 Cornouter hardware 0.0 9.3 9.3 Software desian 0.0 15.6 15.6 Management and control system 20.6 6.5 27.1 Other 0.5 1.8 2.3 Total $39.7 $172.0 $211.7 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-90484 Army Depot Modernhtion Appendix III CommentsF’romthe Department of Defense ’ ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WA*HINGTON. D.C. 20301-8000 Mr. Frank C. Conahan Assistant Comptroller General National Security and International Affairs Division U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548 Dear Mr. Conahan: This Is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the General Accounting Office @AC) draft report, %RMy DEPOTS: Plans Abandoned for the New Distribution Center at the Red Rivei: Depot," dated May 14, 1990 (GAOCode 393367), OSDCase 8305. The Department conours with the draft report findings and is pleased that the CR0 supports the DODdecision to cancel the Central Distribution Center contract at the Red River Army Depot and its plan to transfer the area-oriented depot distribution functions end workload to the New Cumberland and Sharpe Area-Oriented Depots. The Department, however, does not agree with the GACsuggestion that the Congress should rescind $62.7 million of the $90 million appropriated for the Red River Central Distribution Center. The Department has identified that $39 million can be rescinded and would agree with a GACsuggestion to Congress for rescission of that amount. The detailed DODcomments on the report findings and the GAC suggestion to the Congress are provided in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Sinflrely, David J. “Berteau Enclosure Principal Deputy Page16 GAO/NSLAD-90-184ArmyDePotModemisstion Appendix ID CommentsFromtheDspsrtmentofDefense G&ODRAFTREPORT- DATEDMAY 14, 1990 GADCODE393367 - OSDCASE8305 "ARMYDEPOTS: PLANSABWDCNBDPORTBBNBWDISI‘RIBUTICN CBNTRRATTHE REDRIVBRDEPOT" DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSECCW4BNTS **** FINDINGS . -XNG 8: mound: mchanized Distribution Centers at Three mu. The GAOexplained that, in 1976, the Army designated three depots to receive, store, and ship secondary items (primarily repair parts and other support items) to specific geographic areas in the United States and overseas. According to the GAO, the Sharpe Army Depot was to serve the western United States, Alaska, and the Pacific states, Europe, Central America, the middle East, the Caribbean, and Puerto Rico; and the Red River Depot was to serve the central United States. The GAOobserved that, in 1980, the Army claimed that the new distribution centers were needed at the three depots to meet increases in the workload expected to result from force modernization efforts. The CA0 described the objectives of the depot modernization program as streamlining the supply operations by constructing state-of-the-art automated distribution centers. The CA0 observed that the automated centers were to integrate computers, materiel-handling systems, and bar coding--which would enable the centers to receive, store, and ship supplies more efficiently. Now on p. 2. (pp. 3-5/GAO Draft Report) &0D RBSP-: Concur. The Department agrees that the Army Area-oriented Depot concept, which evolved nearly fifteen years ago, and the subsequent plans for the physical plant/equipment and management system hardware/software modernizations were developed to meet forecasted workload increases and to gain efficiencies in distribution center operations. . H1;TmING@: &&acted workload Did Not Materialize. The GAO found that the projected workload increases used by the Army as Page17 GAO/NSLAD-90-184ArmyDepotModernizstion Appendix III CanmentsFromthe Departmentof Defexwe the primary justification for construction of new distribution centers did not materialize. The GAOobserved that, although the total workload was expected to increase by about 26 to 53 percent over a 4-year period, the depot workload at the three sites has actually remained at about its 1985 level. (The GAOexplained that the workload for the three depots was measured by the total number of issues and receipts-that is, the number of shipments entering or leaving the depot each year.) The GAOreferred to its June 1986 report, -DEPOTS: v Jusu (OSDCase 6876), which (at that time) concluded that the Army projections were based on questionable assumptions and computation procedures and appeared to be overstated. The GAOcompared the projected and actual workloads for each depot for the period FY 1986 through FY 1989--and found that the actual workload wab below the Army projections for all three depot. According to the GAO, the Army had not looked into the reasons as to why the projected increases did not occur. The GACI reported Army officials guessed that (1) budget cuts might have reduced the number of orders from customer units, (2) budget cuts might have slowed the Army force modernization effort, thus delaying the introduction of the new systems, and/or (3) the new aystems that have been introduced are better constructed and more trouble-free than expected. The GACalso pointed out that the workload for the New Cumberland depot was below projections because (1) some of the workload was shifted from New Cumberland to Europe beginning in 1986--after the establishment of three European redistribution facilities --and (2) in anticipation of construction, some workload was shifted to other depots. The CA0 also emphasized that, in the referenced 1986 report, it had concluded there were other viable and less costly options than the proposed construction program to satisfy any workload increases. The GAOnoted the prior report recommendedthat the Army (1) analyze options for improving (2) identify potential savings to be gained by further consolidation or realignment of Now on pp. 2-4. the depot system. (pp. 5-g/GAO Draft Report) -RESPONSE: Concur. The Department concurs that the receipt/issue workload increases were less than projected. The 2 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-SO-l&I Army Depot Modernization Comments From the Depnrtment of Defense DODfurther agrees that the recent and rapidly changing world events and pressurea for reduced Defense spending will reduce the receipt and issue workload during the 1990s. . OINDINa: GQ@toff v. The GAOobserved that, since 1984, the estimated cost of the three distribution centers has increased 35 percent--from about $488 million to about $658 million. The GAOagain referred to its 1986 audit report, which stated that about $404 million in construction and procurement funds and about $94 million in facility design and systems development software development that would be transferred from other Army accounts. The GAOfound that the construction costs have now grown to an estimated $459 million, of which about $385 million has been appropriated. The GAOalso noted that the estimated $84 million for design and software costs has grown to about $199 million. According to the GAO, those costs have thus far been funded primarily with operation and maintenance and Army industrial funds transferred from other requirements. The GAOreported, however, that the submisaiona to the Congress have not associated the costs from the Army operations and maintenance Army Now on pp. 6.7. industrial funds with Army depot modernization. (pp. IO-WGAO Draft Report) s: Concur. The Department agrees that the modernization coats have exceeded the original projections. The development, design, and implementation of the state-of-the-art Central Distribution Centers was a monumental undertaking with a number of inherent uncertainties. The coats exceeded the original projections primarily due to the underestimation of the complexity of the software and its developmental coats. . -0: -m . The GAO observed that the construction contract for the distribution center at Red River was canceled in April 1990. According to the GAO, the Army does not plan to ccnnplete that proposed center. The GAOobserved the Army determined that the Sharpe and New Cumberland Depots have the capacity to handle the Red River supply workload--and the Red River depot could fulfill other missions. The GAO reported that construction was complete at the other two distribution centers, with Sharpe partially operational. The GAOfound, however, that the software needed to achieve full automation at the two centers is still incomplete. 3 Y Page 19 GAO/NSIAD90-194 Army Depot Modembatlon Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense The GAOlearned that the development of the management and control system and process control system software has been delayed. According to the GAO, that system, originally scheduled for completion in June 1988, is now expected to be fully integrated and tested at New Cumberland by March 1991. The GAO also learned that the Sharpe managementand control system will be adapted from the New Cumberland system. The GAOfurther noted that the process and control system for New Cumberland, originally scheduled for completion in October 1989, is now scheduled for completion in March 1991. The GAOpointed out that the process control system for Sharpe, originally part of the Sharpe construction contract, was scheduled for completion in April 1988. The GAOlearned that the Army terminated the contract in May 1988 and the Sharpe process control system is now Now on pp. 7-8. to be adapted from the New Cumberland system. (pp. 11-14/GAO Draft Report) ~RESPONIE: Concur. The Department has canceled the construction contract for the distribution center at Red River. The DODhas determined that the Sharpe and New Cumberland Area-oriented Depots have the capacity to handle the Red River Army Area-oriented Depot supply workload. Current plans call for the attrition of stocks and the transfer of the Red River supply distribution workload to Sharpe and New Cumberland over the next five years. On April 12, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense made a Defense Management Review Decision to consolidate supply depot distribution functions within the Department, The first step in the consolidation process is to conduct a prototype of the consolidation concept in the San Francisco Bay Area. The supply depot functions at the supply depots in the San Francisco/Sacramento areas (including Sharpe Army Area-oriented Depot) will be managed and operated by the Defense Logistics Agency. The plans and actions to consolidate the distribution functions at the supply depots in the San Francisco/Sacramento area are underway and the prototype will be operational by 1991. 4 Page 20 GAO/NSIAIMO-lS4 Army Depot Modemhtion Cvmanente From the Department of Defense * * * * MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION . SUGGESTION TO THE: The GAOsuggested that the Congress may wish to rescind $62.7 million of the $90 million appropriated for the Red River center ($42 million in military construction Nowon p.9. funds and $20.7 million in procurement funds). (pp. 15-15/GAo Draft Report) . M)D: Partially concur. The Department disagrees with the GAOsuggestion that the Congress should rescind $62.7 million of the $90 million appropriated for the Red River Central Distribution Center. The Department has identified that $39 million can be rescinded and would agree with a GAOsuggestion to Congress for recision of that amount. Page 21 GAO/NSIAD#O-184 Army Depot Modemization Appendix IV Major Contributors to This Report Henry L. Hinton, Associate Director National Security and Edward M. Balderson, Assistant Director International Affairs Division, Washington,DC. John M. Schaefer, Regional ManagementRepresentative mm ti’rancisco c-t-- r Hector M. Castillo, Evaluator-in-Charge RegionalOffice Joseph M. Rosalez;Evaluator - Michael S. Sanabria, Evaluator (aaaaa7) Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-90-W Arn~y Depot Modernization --- “” ,-_* lll,lll.l,“,l,“,, ,“,,11”11,“1 I I. ._.. .- ..-......-..__._ -.-__-- ---._--.--“--- _ I_. ,,,I- 1*___1-1_. *_---.--.---____-. -I _l__l l,l”“., .,_ -----___~ Iltquwts for t*oj9iw 01 (30 rthl9ort,s sht911ltl t9tb sththt t,o: ‘I’twrt~ is ii 25”0 discounl on or&w for 100 or morth copies tnailecl lo a singltb ;dclrtwi. ! 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Army Depots: Plans Abandoned for the New Distribution Center at the Red River Depot
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-08-20.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)