oversight

Major Acquisition Programs: Selected Aspects of the Army's Forward Area Air Defense System

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-06-25.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                          Committees on Appropriations

-----.--
.J 1111~’I !~!~O
                          MAJOR ACQUISITION
                          PROGRAMS
                          Selected Aspects of the
                          Army’s Forward Area
                          Air Defense System


                                                         141658




--                                 -----    ~..   I
(;A()   ~NSIAI)-!m-l!~l
                   United States
                   General Accounting Office
                   Washington, DC. 20548

                   National Security aud
                   International Affairs Division

                   B-239018

                   June 26,lQQO

                   The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
                   Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
                   Committee on Appropriations
                   United States Senate

                   The Honorable John P. Murtha
                   Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
                   Committee on Appropriations
                   House of Representatives

                   As you requested, we have reviewed selected aspects of the Army’s
                   Forward Area Air Defense System (FAADS)program. More specifically,
                   we have developed information on (1) the Army’s requirement for
                   FAADS,(2) the Army’s expected use of each component in performing its
                   ground-based air defense mission, (3) the cost and schedule of each com-
                   ponent, and (4) the Army’s reliance on its current air defense systems.
                   This letter and appendixes I, II, and III summarize the results of our
                   work. Our objective, scope, and methodology are discussed in appendix
                   IV.

                   Recent and continuing developments in Europe and the Soviet Union are
                   greatly altering the national security environment, and these events
                   could significantly affect the requirements for FAADS.According to an
                   Office of the Secretary of Defense official, each F&IDS component is
                   under review and in the process of being restructured to take these new
                   actions into consideration.


                   In 1986, the Secretary of Defense approved the concept of FAADSto
Results in Brief   improve the Army’s ground-based air defense capabilities. In December
                   1989, the Secretary of Defense eliminated the planned procurement for
                   one of the five FAADScomponents, the non-line-of-sight missile, and
                   uncertainty now exists as to whether this weapon will ever become a
                   part of FAADS.In May 1990, the Army advised us that it now plans to
                   revise its acquisition plan for the line-of-sight forward heavy missile
                   system because the system did not meet the Army’s goals during opera-
                   tional testing.




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                  B-239018




                  The Army estimates that the FAADScomponents will cost about $11 bil-
                  lion to develop and produce.’ The fielding of FAADSbegan in 1989 for one
                  component, and the others are expected to be fielded between 1993 and
                  1998. The Army plans to rely on some older forward area air defense
                  systems to differing degrees for the near future because of anticipated
                  delays in fielding several FAADS components.


                  Before the Army began fielding FAADS, its forward area air defense
Background        weapon systems included two heat-seeking missiles-the Chaparral and
                  the man-portable Stinger- and the 20-millimeter Vulcan gun. These sys-
                  tems are supported by an aging radar network-the    Forward Area
                  Alerting Radar (FM)-and     a manual command, control, and communi-
                  cation system.

                  The Army has been trying to improve its ground-based air defense capa-
                  bilities at or near the front lines for almost two decades. In late 1986, at
                  the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Army Chief of Staff con-
                  vened a group of experts to develop a new air defense strategy to over-
                  come long-standing and newly identified weaknesses in ground-based air
                  defense. This group concluded that no single weapon system could pro-
                  vide adequate forward area air defense and that complementary capa-
                  bilities were needed to overcome the existing and projected air threat. It
                  recommended a five-component concept referred to as “FAAJIS.” In July
                  1986, the Defense Acquisition Board approved the FAADS concept.

                  Due to the perceived urgency of the problem and the need to field FAADS
                  as soon as possible, system development was to be minimized, and
                  weapon selection was to rely on available systems and “off-the-shelf”
                  technology, or nondevelopmental items, to the extent possible.2 The
                  nondevelopmental approach was to be flexible enough to satisfy imme-
                  diate requirementswhile providing an opportunity for preplanned
                  product improvements.


                  The Army is acquiring FAADS because it does not have a weapon system
Requirement for   or set of systems with a command and control system that can defeat
FAADS             the type of aircraft that threaten the forward area. More specifically,
                  the Army does not have

                  I The Army’s estimate includes the cost to develop but not procure the non-line-of-sight missile.

                  2 The Army considered it imperative that it field a new air defense system by 1996.



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ic
                                E239918




                              . a frontline missile system that can reach threat aircraft before these air-
                                craft can fire their missiles;
                              . a radar system that can identify low-flying, terrain-hugging, fixed-wing
                                aircraft and helicopters, particularly when threat helicopters use “pop
                                up and fire” tactics; and
                              . an automated command, control, and communication system that can
                                quickly distribute target information to air defense weapons.

                                FAADS  is intended to be a self-sufficient, frontline, air defense system
                                encompassing all the functions necessary to detect, identify, and destroy
                                attacking threat aircraft. FAADS’ other mission is to assist theater air
                                defense by providing additional target detection and tracking informa-
                                tion and by engaging low-flying, high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft headed
                                for targets in the rear.


                                FXADS was to consist of three new missile systems; a new command, con-
Expected Use of the             trol, communication, and intelligence system (c31); and “Combined Arms
FAADS Components                Initiatives,” which were to enhance the air defense capabilities of cer-
                                tain ground weapon systems and helicopters. The three new missile sys-
                                tems-the line-of-sight forward heavy missile, the line-of-sight rear
                                missile, and the non-line-of-sight missile-were to have distinctly dif-
                                ferent missions.


Line-of-Sight Forward           The first weapon, the Air Defense Antitank System (ADATS), was selected
Heavy Missile System            to satisfy the Army’s requirement for an armored, line-of-sight missile
                                and gun system that could operate with and protect frontline troops and
                                armor from fixed-wing and helicopter attack aircraft. The system
                                entered low-rate production in July 1989, and the Army conducted oper-
                                ational testing of ADATs during the first half of 1990. During these recent
                                operational tests, the system did not meet the Army’s goals for con-
                                tinued production. As a result, a senior Army official told us in May
                                1990 that the Army plans to revise its acquisition plan.


Line-of-Sigh t Rear Missile     The second missile system, the Pedestal Mounted Stinger, called the
System                          “Avenger,” was selected to satisfy the Army’s requirement for a line-of-
                                sight rear missile system that could (1) protect static assets and convoys
                                several kilometers behind the front line from primarily fixed-wing
              ”                 attack aircraft and (2) be deployable by air in support of light divisions
                                and specialized forces. The Army began fielding the system in April
                                1989 and approved it for full-scale production in April 1990.


                                Page 3                          GAO/NSIALb90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense System
                             B-233018




Non-Line-.of-Sight Missile   The third weapon, the Fiber Optic Guided Missile (FOG-M),was selected
System                       to satisfy the need for a non-line-of-sight missile that could seek and
                             destroy attack helicopters hidden from other air defense missile systems
                             by terrain and other obstacles. For self-protection, it was to be located a
                             few kilometers behind the front line, but it was to have the range neces-
                             sary to attack threat helicopters long before they could reach their
                             attack positions.

                             The future of the FOG-Msystem is in doubt because in December 1989 the
                             Secretary of Defense deleted the fiscal year 1991 procurement funding
                             and removed system procurement from the 5-year defense plan. This
                             creates uncertainty as to whether the FOG-Mwill ever become a part of
                             FAADS.Without FOG-M,the Army does not have the ability to attack
                             enemy helicopters hidden from view by the terrain. According to Army
                             representatives, a requirement for the W-M capability still exists, and
                             an appeal for the reinstatement of procurement funds is planned. Cur-
                             rent plans are to complete FOG-Mdevelopment in December 1993.


C31Component                 The c31 component is to provide better detection and identification of
                             threat aircraft than are available with currently fielded systems and to
                             get this information more quickly to the weapon systems. It is to consist
                             of four elements: (1) an automated command and control system, (2) a
                             ground-based radar, (3) a masked target sensor, and (4) aircraft identifi-
                             cation devices.


Combined Arms Initiatives    The final component is referred to as the “Combined Arms Initiatives.”
                             It is intended to provide certain helicopters, the Ml/MlAl     tanks, and
                             the Bradley Fighting Vehicle with air defense capabilities. The Army
                             does not include the cost of the initiative in its estimates of FAADScosts
                             because they are recorded as part of the other programs.


                             In December 1989, the Army estimated the FAADSacquisition cost at
Cost and Schedule            about $11 billion. This estimate excludes the costs of the Combined
                             Arms Initiatives and the procurement costs for the FOG-Msystem. Table 1
                             shows the Army’s December 1989 cost estimates for FAADS.




                             Page 4                          GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense System
 .
                                     B-239018




Table 1: Army’s Coat Estimates for
FAADS                                Then-vear   dollars   in millions
                                                                                    Development             Production
                                     FAADS component                                cost estimate        cost estimate              Total
                                     ADATS                                                  $318.8              $6,516.4         $6,635.2
                                     Avenger                                                  12.8               1,276.l          1,266.g
                                     FOG-M                                                    630.8                         a       630.6
                                     c31                                                   1,120.8                1,103.l         2,223.g
                                     Total                                                $2,063.2              $6,695.6        $10,976.6
                                     aThe Army had estimated the FOG-M procurement costs at about $2.5 billion before the Secretary of
                                     Defense deleted the fiscal year 1991 procurement funding and removed system procurement from the
                                     5-year defense plan.


                                     FAADSfielding for the Pedestal Mounted Stinger began in April 1989 and
                                     is continuing. Fielding schedules for the other FAADSsystems have
                                     slipped by several years. The Army plans to field ADATSbeginning in
                                     June 1993, which is about 1 year later than originally planned. The
                                     various ~31 components’ schedules have slipped about 3 years overall,
                                     and these components are now expected to be fielded between December
                                     1993 and September 1998, depending on the component.


                                     The Army will rely on selected existing forward area air defense sys-
Continued Reliance on                terns (the Chaparral missile system, the man-portable Stinger missile
SomeCurrent Systems                  system, and the Vulcan air defense gun) to differing degrees until FAADS
                                     is fully fielded. The Army eventually plans to use these older weapons
                                     to provide air defense in areas that it believes have not had sufficient
                                     coverage in the past. These older weapons may be transferred to the
                                     reserve components as active forces receive the new systems.


                                     As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on this report;
                                     however, we did discuss it with responsible Army officials and have
                                     incorporated their comments where appropriate.

                                     We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the Senate and
                                     House Committees on Armed Services, the House Committee on Govern-
                                     ment Operations, and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.
                                     Copies are also being sent to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army,
                                     the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other inter-
                                     ested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request.




                                     Page 6                                    GAO/NSLAD-90-191       Forward   Area Air Defense System
B-239919




Please call me at (202) 276-4141 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix V.




Richard Davis
Director, Army Issues




Page 6                         GAO/NSIAD-99491   Forward   Area Air Defense System
Page 7   GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
Letter                                                                                                            1

Appendix I                                                                                                   10
The  Army’s Rationale
for Acquiring FEDS
                            The Air Threat to the Forward Area
                            Air Defense zones
                                                                                                             10
                                                                                                             12
                            Efforts to Improve Air Defense Capabilities                                      12
                            Inception of the Forward Area Air Defense System                                 12

Appendix II                                                                                                  14
The   Fomard   Area   Air   Line-of-Sight Forward Heavy Missile System                                       14
                            Non-Line-of-Sight Missile System                                                 16
Defense System              Line-of-Sight Rear Missile System                                                16
                            Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence                                17
                                 System
                            Combined Arms Initiatives                                                        20

Appendix III                                                                                                 21
Army’s Reliance on          Man-Portable Stinger
                            Chaparral
                                                                                                             21
                                                                                                             22
Current Systems             Vulcan Gun                                                                       23
                            Hawk and Patriot                                                                 24
                            C31 Network                                                                      26

Appendix IV                                                                                                  26
Objective, Scope,and
Methodology
Appendix V                                                                                                   27
Major Contributors to
This Report
Table                       Table 1: Army’s Cost Estimates for FAADS                                          5




                            Page 8                       GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
.


    Contents




    Abbreviations

    ADATS      Air Defense Antitank System
    AWACS      Airborne Warning and Control System
    C31        command, control, communication, and intelligence
    DIVAD      Division Air Defense
    FAADS      Forward Area Air Defense System
    FAAR       Forward Area Alerting Radar
    FOG-M      Fiber Optic Guided Missile
    JSTARS     Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
    POST       Passive Optical Seeker Technique
    RMP        reprogrammable microprocessor


    Page 9                         GAO/NSLAIMW191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
Appendix I

The Army’s Rationale for Acquiring FAADS                                                                     ’


                        Soviet fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and missiles have presented a
                        serious threat to U.S. and allied ground forces and other assets. An
                        effective air defense needs to protect ground assets, provide for freedom
                        of maneuver, and assist in the achievement of air superiority. Air
                        defense is particularly critical in the forward areas where the majority
                        of the Army’s combat troops and major combat weapon systems, such as
                        tanks and armored fighting vehicles, are located. Further from the front,
                        but still vulnerable to enemy air attack, are artillery sites, airfields, com-
                        mand and communication centers, fuel and ammunition dumps, supply
                        centers, and ballistic missile sites.

                        The Army and the Air Force share responsibilities for air defense mis-
                        sions in the forward area of the battlefield. The Army is to provide air
                        defense with its Apache and Cobra helicopters and several ground-based
                        air defense weapon systems, while the Air Force is to provide close air
                        support for the Army’s frontline combat forces with its fixed-wing air-
                        craft. The Air Force also is to intercept enemy aircraft that approach or
                        cross into corps areas and to attack ground targets that support enemy
                        air operations.

                        The following sections reflect the Army’s threat assessment at the time
                        of our review and do not take into consideration the recent and contin-
                        uing developments in Europe and the Soviet Union, which could signifi-
                        cantly affect the requirements for FAADS.


                        The Army’s older ground-based systems cannot identify and reach cer-
The Air Threat to the   tain existing and projected air threats to combat forces in the forward
Forward Area            area. Threat helicopters are now capable of identifying and destroying
                        U.S. and allied forces and assets at distances greater than 6 kilometers.
                        The Army projected that the helicopter threat would increase with the
                        full fielding of more advanced Soviet helicopters. These advanced heli-
                        copters are expected to be much more difficult to identify and to be able
                        to fire effectively from even greater distances. Therefore, the Army con-
                        siders it imperative that it field a new air defense system by 1995.

                        The most serious air threat faced by Army ground forces comes from
                        low-flying, terrain-hugging, fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Soviet
                        “Frogfoot” fighter bomber and stand-off, hovering, or hidden attack
                        helicopters, such as the Soviet “Hind” and “Havoc” helicopters. The
                        helicopter threat presents ground-based air defense systems with their
                        greatest challenge.



                        Page 10                          GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
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    The Am&s   RationaIe   for kquidng   WADS




    The Hind helicopter, which has been fielded in significant numbers, is
    capable of effectively firing its missiles from distances beyond the capa-
    bilities of the Army’s currently fielded forward area air defense sys-
    tems. The addition of the Havoc helicopter, with its ability to hover,
    “pop up,” and fire (a capability that the Hind helicopter does not pos-
    sess), presents a greater challenge. Existing radar systems will have
    more difficulty finding Havoc helicopters because they can hide among
    terrain features and pop up quickly to fire their weapons.

    Helicopters that use pop-up tactics will be extremely hard to locate and
    defeat with line-of-sight weapon systems because the helicopters may
    not be exposed long enough for the weapon systems to autonomously
    locate them and to fire weapons in time to hit them. Also, Soviet helicop-
    ters soon may not need to expose themselves at all because they will be
    able to fire laser-guided missiles from behind cover and then “hand off”
    control of the missile to another observer with a laser designation
    device.

    The Army expects the Soviets to simultaneously employ two basic strat-
    egies with their air forces. Their first strategy will be to employ very
    large numbers of bombers and fighter bombers to cross the front to
    attack high priority targets in the rear. To reduce losses, the bombers
    will penetrate allied air defenses along specific narrow corridors,
    thereby overwhelming ground air defenses. Air defense radars, com-
    mand centers, and weapon systems located along the attack corridor will
    be among the highest priority targets for the initial wave of aircraft.
    Intelligence and electronic warfare countermeasures will also be used to
    “blind” Army radar and other air surveillance assets, disrupt communi-
    cations in order to slow the Army’s air defense response, and degrade
    weapons’ effectiveness.

    The second strategy will involve Soviet offensive maneuver operations.
    Smaller groups of low-flying, close air support helicopters and fixed-
    wing aircraft are expected to attack Army armor and troop concentra-
    tions at the front. The aircraft will also try to destroy vital support
    assets and reserve forces immediately to the rear.

    Soviet close air support pilots are expected to place a high priority on
    destroying Army forward area air defense weapons, command and com-
    munication centers, and radars. Also, the Soviets are expected to use
    helicopters in a stand-off jammer role, to disrupt air defense radars and
    communication systems.



    Page 11                                 GAO/NSIAIM@191   Forward   Area Air Lkfemxe System
                         Appendix I
                         The Army’s Rationale   for Acquiring   FAAD!3




                         Ground-based air defense coverage is divided into categories based on
Air Defense Zones        the altitude (low, medium, or high) the weapon system can reach or,
                         conversely, where the expected threat will be found. Low altitude
                         threats, up to about 600 meters, are considered the most difficult to
                         engage because of radar acquisition limitations due to terrain. Short
                         range air defense weapons systems, such as the Stinger and Chaparral
                         missiles and the Vulcan gun, were developed to engage low-flying attack
                         aircraft and other aircraft passing through this area to targets in the
                         rear.

                         The medium altitude zone is from 600 meters to 7,500 meters, and the
                         high altitude zone is above 7,500 meters. Both of these zones are
                         defended by the Hawk and the Patriot missile systems, located in the
                         corps and theater areas. These longer range missile systems are
                         expected to engage fighters, fighter bombers, strategic bombers, and tac-
                         tical ballistic missiles flying through this airspace.


                         The Army has been trying to improve its ground-based air defense capa-
Efforts to Improve Air   bilities for a number of years. However, its previous efforts have fallen
Defense Capabilities     short of the Army’s requirements. For example, the Army attempted to
                         strengthen its frontline air defense capability by developing the Division
                         Air Defense (DIVAD) gun. The DIVAD gun was expected to replace the aging
                         Vulcan gun and to complement the Chaparral and Stinger missile sys-
                         tems by engaging low-flying aircraft at very close ranges, where the
                         missile systems are ineffective. The DIVAD program, however, was termi-
                         nated by the Secretary of Defense in August 1985 because it could not
                         handle the stand-off attack helicopter threat. Army analysis and
                         training had revealed that the projected air threat could strike ground
                         forces from distances beyond the range of current frontline missile sys-
                         tems and the DIVAD. According to the Army, the projected air threat to
                         forward area combat forces has increased since the termination of the
                         DIVAD.



                         In late 1986, after the Secretary of Defense terminated the DIVAD pro-
Inception of the         gram, the Army Chief of Staff convened a group of experts to develop a
Forward Area Air         new air defense strategy for overcoming identified weaknesses in
Defense System           ground-based air defense. This group concluded that no single weapon
                         system could provide adequate forward area air defense and that com-
            Y            plementary capabilities were needed to overcome the air threat. It rec-
                         ommended a five-component concept referred to as the “Forward Area
                         Air Defense System” (FAADS).


                         Page 12                                    GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
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    AwendIx I
    The Army’s   RatIonale   for Acquiring   FAADS




    The Army’s group of experts believed that the command, control, com-
    munications, and intelligence (C31) component was critical to the overall
    success of FAALB. It was to include a ground-based radar, an aerial or
    “masked” target sensor, several aircraft identification (“friend or foe”)
    devices, and a command and control network. The group considered it
    important that these capabilities be available when the weapon systems
    are fielded.

    In January 1986, the Secretary of Defense approved the FAADS concept
    and directed the Army to define, acquire, and deploy FAADS as quickly as
    possible. To field the FAADS system quickly, the Army decided to find or
    develop systems that, if not configured exactly as needed, were con-
    figured in such a way that desired features or improvements could be
    added without substantial modification. Weapon selection was to rely on
    available systems, or “off-the-shelf” technology, to the extent possible.

    The FAADS concept stresses the mobility and survivability of the air
    defense weapon system. Mobility is considered important because
    combat doctrine depends on a highly maneuverable force; an air defense
    weapon should move with the assets it is protecting. Survivability is
    crucial because air defense weapon systems are likely to become early
    and lucrative targets. Accordingly, FAADS weapons are to be mounted on
    different armored or unarmored, tracked or wheeled vehicles,
    depending on the degree of desired mobility and the location of the
    weapon on the battlefield. The same weapon system may be placed on
    different vehicles to satisfy the different requirements of heavy and
    light divisions.




    Page 13                                   GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
Appendix II

The Forward Area Air DefenseSystem


                        The FMS system consists of five components: (1) the Air Defense
                        Antitank System (ADATS)as the line-of-sight forward heavy missile and
                        gun system; (2) the Fiber Optic Guided Missile (FOG-M)system as the non-
                        line-of-sight missile system; (3) the Pedestal Mounted Stinger, or
                        Avenger, as the line-of-sight rear missile system; (4) a command, con-
                        trol, communication, and intelligence (~31) system; and (5) improvements
                        to certain existing systems, which the Army calls the “Combined Arms
                        Initiatives.” In December 1989, the Secretary of Defense eliminated
                        planned procurement for the FOG-Msystem. This creates uncertainty as
                        to whether the IO&M will ever become a part of FAADS.


                        The Army selected Martin Marietta’s ADATSfor its line-of-sight forward
Line-of-Sight Forward   heavy requirement. The ADATSsystem consists of a launcher with eight
Heavy Missile System    ready-to-fire missiles mounted on a modified Bradley Fighting Vehicle
                        chassis. The ADATSuses a hypervelocity, laser-guided missile, manufac-
                        tured by Oerlikon- Buhrle (Switzerland). The missile is considered to be
                        faster, more accurate, and have greater range than the Stinger and
                        Chaparral missiles that are currently deployed in the forward area. The
                        system has a radar and a forward-looking infrared device, which pro-
                        vide aircraft detection, acquisition, identification, and electronic coun-
                        termeasure capabilities, and it is expected to operate during the day, at
                        night, and in adverse weather. The ADATSis not currently configured
                        with the air defense gun the Army considers necessary for close ranges.

                        The ADATSis intended to detect and reach low-flying targets well beyond
                        the range of the Stinger and Chaparral heat-seeking missiles. The
                        weapon, mounted on a tracked, armored vehicle, is to be located in the
                        forward area of the battlefield to take advantage of its range and to be
                        close to the assets it is to protect. ADATScan fire only one missile at a
                        time because its targeting and guidance system must stay locked onto
                        the target until its missile hits or misses the target.

                        The Army’s current plan is to purchase 562 ADATSfire units and
                         10,078 missiles. According to the Army, each heavy division will receive
                        36 fire units. The Army has purchased 4 fire units and 14 missiles for
                        testing and training purposes. In December 1989, the Army estimated
                        the ADATSdevelopment and production cost at over $6.8 billion-$318.8
                        million for development and $6,516.4 million for production.

                        During recent operational tests, conducted during the first half of 1990,
                        the system did not meet the Army’s goals for continued low-rate produc-
                        tion. As a result, a senior Army official told us that the Army now plans


                        Page 14                         GAO/NSIAD-90H)-191 Forward   Area Air Defense   System
.

                    Arunxdx       II
                    The Forward        Are.a Air Defense   System




                    to revise its acquisition plan for the system. As required by the National
                    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989, we are evaluating the
                    performance of ~m'rs and plan to provide a report to the Senate and
                    House Committees on Armed Services on the results of our evaluation
                    after the Army completes its tests.


                    The Army has been developing a fiber optic guided missile technology
Non-Line-of-Sight   for an antitank role since the mid-1970s. Though it selected the FUG-Mas
Missile System      its non-line-of-sight missile system, the Secretary of Defense deleted all
                    procurement funds for the FOG-Mfrom the 5-year defense plan in
                    December 1989. According to Army representatives, a requirement for
                    the FOG-Mcapability still exists, and an appeal for the reinstatement of
                    procurement funds is planned for fiscal year 1994. Current plans are to
                    complete FOG-Mdevelopment in December 1993. The FYJG-M'S       development
                    cost is estimated at about $631 million.

                    The FOG-Mwas to be located within a few kilometers behind the front
                    lines to protect ground troops and vehicles against enemy helicopters in
                    the forward area of the battlefield, but unlike the ADATSit was to
                    operate from concealed positions, out of direct enemy view. The missile
                    is considered too slow to be effective against higher-speed, fixed-wing
                    aircraft, so its use will be limited to attacking helicopters.

                    The FOG-Msystem consists of a missile and a launcher/gunner station.
                    The missile, which contains a small television camera to help the gunner
                    direct the missile to hidden targets, has sufficient range to attack heli-
                    copters before they can effectively fire their weapons. Upon launch, the
                    gunner locates targets through the video display, which portrays the
                    missile seeker’s view as the missile cruises at low altitudes. These
                    images pass through a fiber optic link to the gunner’s console. The FOG-M
                    is also to have a passive sensor that can detect and identify threat
                    helicopters.

                    The system was to be deployed on a derivative of the Multiple Launch
                    Rocket System vehicle for heavy divisions and on the High Mobility
                    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle for light divisions. The version for heavy
                    divisions was to have 12 to 24 ready-to-fire missiles, and the version for
                    light divisions was to have 6 missiles.

                    The FOG-Mmissile is undergoing development for use in an air defense
                    role. The Boeing Military Airplane Company and the Hughes Aircraft



                    Page 16                                         GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
                     Appendix Jl
                     The Forward Area Air Defense   System




                     Company are currently doing development work to (1) increase the mis-
                     sile’s range, in anticipation of changes in the threat; (2) add an imaging
                     infrared target acquisition seeker to the missile; (3) add a variable speed
                     motor that will permit the missile to be launched faster but to slow
                     down when searching for targets; and (4) develop two versions of the
                     fire unit, one for light divisions and the other for heavy divisions.

                     The PUG-Mhas limited capabilities to autonomously detect targets and,
                     therefore, must rely to a large degree on external sources for target
                     information, such as radars or observers. The Army states that the mis-
                     sile system’s effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by the planned C31
                     network and its proposed masked target sensor and ground-based radar.
                     It can, however, send out a “scout” missile to locate targets with its tele-
                     vision camera or imaging infrared target acquisition seeker and flight
                     data recording devices.

                     Originally, the Army planned to purchase 403 FOG-Mfire units and
                     16,660 missiles. Each heavy division was to receive 18 FOG-Mfire units
                     plus spares, while light divisions were to receive varying numbers of
                     fire units. The Army had estimated the FOG-Mprocurement costs at about
                     $25 billion before the Secretary of Defense deleted the fiscal year 1991
                     procurement funding and removed system procurement from the 5-year
                     defense plan. The Army has purchased six FOG-Munits for initial devel-
                     opment and testing and was planning to buy eight of the fully developed
                     systems for future testing and training purposes, four for light divisions
                     and four for heavy divisions.


                     The Army selected the Avenger to satisfy its requirement for a line-of-
Line-of-Sight Rear   sight rear missile. This system, which is being developed by Boeing
Missile System       Aerospace as a replacement for the man-portable Stinger missile system,
                     consists of a launcher with eight heat-seeking Stinger missiles mounted
                     on a modified High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It has a 360-
                     degree rotatable turret and can “shoot on the move” or be operated
                     from a remote terminal. The same configuration will be used for both
                     light and heavy divisions.

                     The Avenger is a mobile, rapid-fire, line-of-sight missile system that is
                     intended to be located throughout the rear division and corps areas. It is
                     to provide air defense for convoys and stationary critical assets, such as
                     command posts and bridges, by detecting and engaging low-flying, fixed-
                     wing aircraft and helicopters that have evaded ADATSand are headed
                     toward rear targets. It has an autonomous target acquisition capability


                     Page 16                                 GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
 .

                      Appendix II
                      The Forward   Area Air Defense   System




                      consisting of a forward-looking infrared device, which enables the
                      gunner to detect and acquire targets during the day, at night, and in
                      adverse weather.

                      The Army plans to purchase 1,207 Avengers for use in heavy and light
                      divisions and other units. Each division will receive 36 Avengers plus
                      spares, and each corps will receive 54 Avengers plus spares. The
                      system, which is in low-rate production, was approved for full-scale pro-
                      duction in April 1990. The first active unit was equipped with Avengers
                      in April 1989. In December 1989, the Army estimated its development
                      and production cost at about $1.3 billion-$12.8    million for develop-
                      ment and $1,276.1 million for production.


                      Although the ADATS,the FOG-M,and the Avenger each has an autonomous
Command, Control,     target detection capability, the Army believes that expected changes in
Communication, and    the threat require that better and more timely target detection and iden-
Intelligence System   tification information be provided to the weapons. The c31 network is to
                      have overlapping radars and other sensors to expand detection capabili-
                      ties and increase system survivability. The Army also believes that
                      automated command and control are needed to facilitate the distribution
                      of information and to reduce the chances that different weapons will all
                      fire at the same targets. Therefore, F&ADS'overall effectiveness depends
                      on the successful development and timely fielding of the c31component.

                      The FAADSC31component consists of four elements: (1) computer hard-
                      ware and software to automate the processing and dissemination of
                      command and control tracking and target information; (2) a ground-
                      based radar; (3) a masked target sensor (aerial sensor), which is
                      intended to detect targets hidden from direct view; and (4) an aircraft
                      identification and recognition element. The system is to be integrated
                      with the Army Tactical Command and Control System, a larger system
                      intended to automate various battlefield functional areas, such as air
                      defense, maneuver control, fire support, and intelligence. In December
                      1989, the Army estimated the acquisition cost for the FAADSc31 compo-
                      nent at over $2.2 billion-$1,120.8  million for development and
                      $l,lO3.1 million for procurement. The various c31 elements are sched-
                      uled to be fielded between December 1993 and September 1998,
                      depending on the element.




                      Page 17                                   GAO/NSItiIMO-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
                        The Fonvard   Area Air Defense   System




Automated Command and   In order to destroy enemy aircraft after they have been identified, their
                        locations must be quickly communicated to air defense weapon systems.
Control                 Currently, the Army manually develops and communicates target infor-
                        mation to air defense weapon systems. Target data from numerous
                        sources is received, plotted, and analyzed by command center personnel
                        at the division and then transmitted to each successive level of com-
                        mand down to the platoon command post. Decisions about the target
                        data are communicated by radio to the appropriate weapon systems.
                        The Army considers this process too time-consuming because, in many
                        cases, the information arrives at the weapon system too late to be of use.

                        In the late 197Os, the Army began a project to automate its air defense
                        command and control network because the manual system was too slow
                        in distributing target information to the ground-based weapons. The
                        project became an important part of the FAADSprogram since it consisted
                        of the computer hardware and software needed to automate the
                        processing and dissemination of target-tracking and control information
                        to the weapon systems. The communications equipment is to use
                        existing and fielded voice and data radios and a battlefield telephone
                        system.

                        The FAADSCommand and Control system will automate most processing
                        and dissemination of target information to weapon systems. Command
                        center computers at each level of command will analyze target data and
                        filter, or reduce, it so that only the local picture is transmitted to the
                        weapon system. The weapon system operations screen will receive and
                        display the specific local target picture, taking into account priorities
                        and the immediacy of the threat. The assigned areas of coverage may
                        sometimes overlap from one weapon system to another, and the same
                        air targets may be displayed. However, their targeting priorities may
                        vary because one particular aircraft threat may present a greater threat
                        to one weapon than to another.


Ground-Based Radar      The FAADSground-based sensor, or radar, is to replace the currently
                        fielded Forward Area Alerting Radar (FUR). According to Army offi-
                        cials, because the FAARis ineffective, the Army plans to begin retiring
                        the FAARfrom its inventory in fiscal year 1990. The candidate radar
                        system most recently evaluated by the Army was not able to meet some
                        of the Army’s desired performance requirements. The Army, therefore,
                        plans to issue a new request for proposals with modified requirements.




                        Page 18                                   GAO/NSIAD99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
                          Appendix II
                          The Forward   Area Air Defense   System




Masked Target Sensor      The masked target sensor has not been fully defined by the Army. It is
                          to be positioned above the battlefield to detect the approach of low-
                          flying threat aircraft hidden by terrain from ground-based radars or
                          forward-looking infrared devices. The Army considers the masked
                          target sensor important to detecting hidden and stand-off “pop up” heli-
                          copters, which the FOG-Mis designed to defeat.


Aircraft Identification   Once aircraft have been detected in flight, ground-based weapon sys-
                          tems try to determine whether they are friends or foes. This may be
                          done either electronically or visually. The first method provides identifi-
                          cation at distances greater than the eye can see, but it endangers the
                          aircraft providing the information by giving away its position and iden-
                          tity. Since pilots are, therefore, obviously reluctant to use such devices,
                          the Army is generally limited to positive visual identification of aircraft
                          before its gunners can fire. This may result in the gunner’s identifying
                          the aircraft too late to prevent it from striking its target.

                          The FAADSaircraft identification element is to use two methods of distin-
                          guishing between friendly and threat aircraft. One is to identify
                          incoming aircraft by recognizing electronic signals transmitted by
                          friendly aircraft, and the other is to identify hostile aircraft by pas-
                          sively comparing the characteristics of incoming aircraft with a library
                          of known aircraft characteristics. The Army plans to use the existing
                          Mark XII system, which identifies aircraft by their electronic signals, for
                          the initial deployment of the FAADSc31system until the follow-on Mark
                          XV system is fielded in fiscal year 1997.


Other Sources of Target   The Army plans to get its air target picture from both strategic and tac-
                          tical detection sources. Strategic systems, which include military satel-
Information               lites, the Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS),and
                          the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),are
                          capable of providing the earliest possible alert and continuous surveil-
                          lance of very large areas of the battlefield. These systems provide intel-
                          ligence on troop concentrations and movements as well as the location of
                          and activity at enemy air bases. AWACS'airborne radars can track enemy
                          aircraft at great distances and provide the early warning needed by air
                          defense units. This early warning, or alert data, will be manually trans-
                          mitted to the theater, corps, and division command centers by radio on a
                          near-real-time basis. Once this information reaches the division, it will
                          be entered into the FAADSautomated network.



                          Page 19                                   GAO/NSIAIMO-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
                Appendix II
                The Forward   hea   Air Defense   System




                To get the best possible picture of the airspace it must defend, the Army
                plans to use a variety of tactical radars with different capabilities. The
                Army believes that using these radars will increase the weapons’
                chances of hitting targets at the weapons’ maximum ranges.

                Two of five tactical radars-associated    with the Patriot and the
                Hawk-are located in the theater and corps areas. The Patriot radar
                provides three-dimensional target data (measuring distance, direction,
                and altitude) for distances up to 100 kilometers away. The Hawk radars
                provide two-dimensional target information (measuring distance and
                direction) for up to 50 kilometers away. Target information received
                from these sensors is to be provided to the associated missile batteries
                and to division command centers, which will integrate the picture with
                information received from other sources, such as AWACS,and relay it to
                the appropriate FAADsweapon systems. Until the function can be auto-
                mated, communication from Hawk and Patriot units will be transmitted
                manually to the FAADScommand centers, where they will be entered into
                the automated FAADSCommand and Control system. The other three tac-
                tical radars are those organic to Funs-the    ADAlYradar, the ground-
                based radar, and the masked target sensor.

                The use of different radars, according to the Army, will also increase
                weapon systems’ survivability. FAADSweapons give away their positions
                when they use their on-board radars for detection. To overcome this
                problem, FAADSweapons will use remote radars such as the ground-
                based radar to provide their target information. If remote radar target
                information is unavailable for some reason, the weapon systems will be
                able to use their on-board radars or passive detection means such as
                forward-looking infrared devices. The on-board radars can be linked, or
                netted, between weapon systems so that no one system is operating for
                too long, thereby reducing the chances of being located. Remote systems
                are made more survivable by moving them around, overlapping their
                coverage, and randomly switching operation from one to another so that
                their positions cannot be pinpointed easily.


                The Combined Arms Initiatives are efforts to maximize the air defense
Combined Arms   potential inherent in frontline weapon systems, such as tanks and other
Initiatives     armored vehicles. The effort involves (1) placing air-to-air Stinger mis-
                siles on helicopters such as the OH-58 Kiowa to counter Soviet helicopter
          Y     forces, (2) providing tanks with ammunition that is more effective
                against helicopters, and (3) placing new devices on Bradley Fighting
                Vehicle sights that will help gunners lead aircraft.


                Page 20                                    GAO/NS~99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
       \

   I



Appendix III

Army’s Relianceon Current Systems


                       The Army will have to rely on some older forward area air defense sys-
                       tems to differing degrees for the near future because of delays in
                       fielding several FMDS components. The Army plans to use some of these
                       systems to provide air defense in areas that it believes have not had
                       sufficient coverage in the past. Older air defense weapons may be trans-
                       ferred to the reserve components as the active forces receive FAADS.


                       The Army employs the Stinger missile in what are referred to as “man-
Man-Portable Stinger   portable air defense Stinger teams.” The mission of the Stinger team is
                       to provide low altitude air defense against attacking fixed- and rotary-
                       wing aircraft in the forward areas of the battlefield. The team consists
                       of two personnel, one to act as driver and observer and the other to act
                       as principal launcher. Each is trained to perform either function and has
                       a shoulder-mounted launcher. The team uses a High Mobility
                       Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle to carry equipment, gear, and four addi-
                       tional missiles as reloads.

                       The Stinger missile, which is replacing the older Redeye man-portable
                       air defense missile in the field, weighs about 35 pounds and has
                       improved speed, range, and maneuverability. It is a supersonic missile
                       that can attack aircraft from any angle. The Army has three versions of
                       the Stinger missile: the basic Stinger, the Passive Optical Seeker
                       Technique (POST)Stinger, and the reprogrammable microprocessor (RMP)
                       Stinger. The basic Stinger and the Stinger POSTare no longer being pro-
                       cured by the Army. The Stinger POSTdiffers from the basic Stinger in
                       that it has increased infrared countermeasure capability and improved
                       acquisition due to its two-color seeker, which measures ultraviolet as
                       well as infrared images. The RMPStinger, the latest version being pro-
                       cured by the Army, has more improved seeker and infrared countermea-
                       sure capabilities. The RMPStinger also has external reprogrammable
                       software, which allows the Army to change the missile’s capabilities to
                       meet the growing threat without costly retrofit programs.

                       The Stinger team’s principal means of target detection and acquisition is
                       visual. The team is equipped with an identification friend or foe device,
                       which queries aircraft electronically to help the team determine
                       whether approaching aircraft are friendly or hostile. The launcher oper-
                       ator points the missile tube at the target and initiates the missile seeker.
                       When the seeker has locked on to the target, it notifies the gunner by
                       emitting an audible tone. The gunner then elevates the launcher and
                       fires the missile from the tube with a small launch motor. When the mis-
                       sile has traveled a safe distance from the gunner, its main engine ignites


                       Page 21                         GAO/N&ID-99-191   Forward   Area Ah Defense   System
            Appendix III
            Army’s Reliance   on Current   Systems




            and propels it to the target. The missile employs a proportional naviga-
            tion system, which keeps the missile on target. The missile must impact
            the target in order to explode.

            The 72 man-portable Stinger teams assigned to a division are placed in
            accordance with the commanding officer’s tactics. Generally, they are
            located completely around the divisional zone of control, with the heav-
            iest concentration located in the area that the enemy is most likely to
            attack. There are not enough teams to cover the division, so there may
            be gaps in coverage in some areas and overlapping coverage in others,
            depending on the defensive strategy.

            The Army states that since Stinger missile teams are essentially com-
            pletely exposed, they have practically no protection at the front. Their
            only protection is their ability to change locations and to take advantage
            of natural or man-made cover. Because they use a High Mobility
            Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle for transportation, they cannot keep up
            with armor units over rough terrain.

            The missile’s acquisition system requires a visible target, and although it
            is very effective against objects in the clear blue sky, it generally cannot
            acquire targets at night or in adverse weather. Neither can it easily
            determine targets against a backdrop of other objects that produce
            thermal signatures or clutter. Enemy close support aircraft and helicop-
            ters would be coming in at low altitudes in precisely that kind of thermal
            clutter. Also, current hostile aircraft identification systems are so lim-
            ited that unless certain area procedural orders are in effect, Stinger
            teams need to have positive hostile identification before they can fire.
            Finally, the Stinger’s range, which is limited because the missile must be
            small and light enough to be man-portable, is insufficient to defeat
            enemy helicopters at stand-off ranges.


            The Chaparral missile weapon system consists of a tracked vehicle with
Chaparral   a pedestal-type launcher mounted on the back. The launcher can hold
            four ready-to-fire Chaparral heat-seeking missiles. Eight additional mis-
            siles for reloading are stored on the carrier. Aircraft alert information
            can come from radio communication feeds from the Forward Area
            Alerting Radar or other sources. The Chaparral uses a forward-looking
            infrared device and visual sightings for target detection and acquisition.
            The system also contains the recognition equipment for identifying
            friend or foe aircraft that is available to Stinger teams.



            Page 22                                  GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
             Appendix III
             Army’s Reliance   on Current   Systems




             As FAADS is deployed, the Army plans to move the Chaparral units from
             the divisional area to the corps area. Teams of the man-portable Stinger
             now perform the forward area mission. Chaparral’s new mission is to
             provide low-altitude air defense for various static sites such as bridges,
             depots, and command centers. Eventually, the Avenger is expected to
             replace the Chaparral in the active forces, and the Chaparrals are to be
             redistributed to reserve component forces.

             Although the Chaparral missile system is on a tracked vehicle, it has
             neither the speed to keep up with heavy armor nor the armor to survive
             at the front. The Chaparral has a forward-looking infrared device,
             which gives it some capability to perform at night and in adverse
             weather, but it has difficulty locating targets in thermal clutter and does
             not have the range to defeat the current stand-off threat.

             Although the system can fire its four ready-to-launch missiles quickly, it
             takes a long time for its crew to reload the launcher. Army representa-
             tives said that the Chaparral crew could reload the launcher quickly
             once but would be worn out afterwards. They said that each reload
             would take the crew increasingly more time.


             The Army’s concept for low-altitude air defense calls for a combination
Vulcan Gun   of missile systems and air defense guns to provide for the “blanket” of
             needed coverage. The Army’s current air defense gun, the Vulcan, is
             needed because all missile systems have a zone surrounding them in
             which they cannot acquire and lock on targets. This zone, which is
             referred to as the “missile dead zone,” is where the gun systems are
             supposed to take over. Air defense guns can only fire effectively at
             short ranges within this zone. Although the gun may not account for
             very many actual kills, concentrated bursts of rounds from the gun may
             cause enemy pilots to change course and disrupt their attack runs. An
             Army official stated that keeping the enemy from completing its mission
             is still effective air defense, although not as desirable as a kill.

             The Vulcan gun system consists of a tracked carrier with a 20-millimeter
             six-barreled gun mounted on top. The gun has a range of approximately
             1,200 meters. Primarily, targets are detected and acquired using
             enhanced optical devices or visually. However, aircraft alerts can come
             from other sources through radio links. Like the other forward systems’
             crews, Vulcan gun crews must positively identify threat aircraft before
             firing.



             Page 23                                  GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
                   Appendix III
                   Army’s Reliance   on Current   Systems




                   Although the Vulcan gun is mounted on a tracked carrier, it does not
                   have the speed to keep up with the assets it is intended to protect and
                   does not have sufficient armor protection to survive at the front. The
                   gun turret is completely open, leaving the gunners exposed to small
                   arms fire as well as fragmentation. The Vulcan gun has been in use since
                   1968 and is effective at very short ranges. The Army plans to start
                   retiring the Vulcan gun as ADATSis fielded.


                   Although the Hawk and Patriot missile systems are not considered for-
Hawk and Patriot   ward area air defense weapons, they are critical elements of the Army’s
                   ground-based air defense capability. Forward area systems are to pro-
                   vide low-altitude air defense against aircraft attacking assets at or near
                   the front. Other threat aircraft may attack targets at the front at higher
                   altitudes, and still other threat aircraft may attempt to “hop” over the
                   front, flying above the low-altitude defenses and back down to attack
                   rear area targets from low altitudes. Currently, the Hawk and the
                   Patriot are intended to address threats not protected by forward area
                   air defense weapons.


Hawk               The Hawk is a surface-to-air missile system designed to defend against
                   enemy aircraft flying at low to medium altitudes. Located in the rear
                   combat areas, the system includes a command post, radar stations,
                   launchers, and missiles. It is used by the Army, the Marine Corps, and
                   allies to protect ground forces and high-value assets such as bases and
                   logistics complexes. The Army places special emphasis on countering
                   aircraft that attack at low altitudes to escape radar detection and take
                   advantage of the degradation of pulse-type radars caused by ground
                   clutter. The Hawk’s continuous wave radars and semi-active homing
                   guidance are not seriously degraded by ground clutter. However, a
                   Hawk fire unit can engage only one target at a time.


Patriot            The Patriot is a surface-to-air missile capable of engaging multiple high-
                   performance aircraft. The system consists of a radar, ground support
                   equipment, missile launchers, and missiles. It is intended for use prima-
                   rily against enemy aircraft flying at high to medium altitudes, and it is
                   designed to protect ground forces and other high-value targets such as
                   air bases in the rear combat zone.




                   Page 24                                  GAO/NSIAD-I)O-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
.
             Appendix III
             Army’s Reliance   on Current   Systems




             The Patriot missile system, which has replaced the Nike Hercules, is the
             first major air defense artillery system designed to defeat defense sup-
             pression tactics such as saturation, maneuver, and electronic counter-
             measures. The Patriot can simultaneously detect, identify, track, and
             destroy large numbers of attacking aircraft. The Patriot will provide
             essential air defense improvements, including substantially more fire-
             power, increased survivability, and greatly reduced susceptibility to
             electronic countermeasures. The Patriot system employs an integral,
             battalion-level command and control system.


             The existing C31 network consists of a number of strategic and tactical
C31Network   elements. Early warning and alert data can be received by frontline air
             defense weapons from AWAL=S or Patriot and Hawk batteries. This data
             must be manually processed and transmitted to the weapon systems and
             is not generally timely or adequate for weapons cueing. Primarily, cur-
             rent target detection is accomplished with the FM. The FAARS use the
             Mark XII aircraft identification device, which can only provide positive
             identification of friendly aircraft from which it receives a return signal.
             The FAARS transmit target detection and identification information, by
             voice, to the air defense command and control center, where it is manu-
             ally integrated with other information received. The command center
             transmits, over a radio network, target information to the weapon sys-
             tems. The Army believes that the current C31 network cannot provide
             adequate aircraft identification, detection, and acquisition information
             to units in time to alert them of the approach of threat aircraft.




             Page 26                                  GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense System
Appendix IV

Objective,Scope,and Methodology


              At the request of the Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Defense, Senate
              and House Committees on Appropriations, we reviewed selected aspects
              of the Army’s acquisition of FAADS.The objectives of our review were to
              develop information regarding (1) the Army’s requirement for FAADS,
              (2) the Army’s expected use of each component in performing its
              ground-based air defense mission, (3) the cost and schedule of each com-
              ponent, and (4) the Army’s plans for its current air defense systems.

              We performed our review at the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
              Washington, DC.; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington,
              D.C.; the U.S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and
              the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center and School, Fort Bliss,
              Texas. We interviewed program officials and obtained information on
              system requirements, cost estimates, development and acquisition pro-
              grams, fielding schedules, and testing results.

              We discussed a draft of this report with officials from the Office of the
              Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army, and we have
              incorporated their comments where appropriate. As requested, we did
              not obtain official agency comments on the report.

              We performed our review from March 1989 through March 1990 in
              accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




              Page 26                         GAO/NSIAD-90-191   Forward   Area Air Defense System
       *
qp“pendix V

Major Contributors to This Report


National Security and   Raymond Dunham, Assistant Director
International Affairs   William K. Newman, Senior Evaluator-in-Charge
                        George H. Shelton, Senior Evaluator
Divisick, Washington,   George W. Tabb, Senior Evaluator
D.C.




(393324)                Page 27                       GAO/NSIAD-99-191   Forward   Area Air Defense   System
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