oversight

Information Security: Disposition and Use of Classified Documents by Presidential Appointees

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-28.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         lIdted   States   General   Accounting   Office
                         Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee              ’
GAO                      on Federal Services, Post Office and
                         Civil Service, Committee on
                         Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

September   1990
                          INFORMATION
                          SECURITY
                          Disposition and Use of
                          Classified Documents
                          by Presidential
                          Appointees




                    REsTBIcrED    ---Not  to be releacled outside the
                    General Accounting OffIce unless specifkally
                    approved by the Office of Congressional
                    Relationa


 GAO/NSIAD-90-195
             United States

GAO          General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20648

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-234031

             September 28, 1990

             The Honorable David Pryor
             Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal
               Services, Post Office and Civil
               Service
             Committee on Governmental Affairs
             United States Senate

             Dear Mr. Chairman:

             As you requested, we determined the number of agency arrangements
             for former presidential appointees to have access to classified docu-
             ments related to their government service, and examined access
             arrangements for former Secretary of State George Shultz and former
             Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

             Agencies apply Executive Order 12356, titled “National Security Infor-
             mation,” to presidential appointees who are leaving the government and
             who are making arrangements for disposition of their files and other
             documentary materials accumulated during their federal service. The
             materials affected include copies of federal records and personal papers.


             The disposition of files and documentary materials accumulated within
Background   an agency is governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended,
             and the Records Disposal Act of 1943, as amended. The laws and regula-
             tions governing the management and disposal of federal records gener-
             ally do not apply to personal papers. See appendix I for definitions of
             records and personal papers.

             Executive Order 12356, effective August 1, 1982, prescribes a uniform
             system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security
             information. It recognizes that it is essential that the public be informed
             of the activities of its government, but that the interest of the United
             States and its citizens require that certain national defense and foreign
             relations information be protected against unauthorized disclosure.

              Classified information generally cannot be disseminated to anyone
              whose official duties do not require access to it. This is often called the
              “need-to-know” policy. However, Executive Order 12356 and previous




              Page 1                                      GAO/NSIAD-99-196   Information   Security
                   B-234031




                   orders allowed exceptions to the “need-to-know” policy for former pres-
                   idential appointees. The order provides that former presidential appoin-
                   tees who served in policy-making positions may be granted access only
                   if the agency originating the classified information (1) determines in
                   writing that access is consistent with national security interests, (2)
                   ensures that the information is protected from unauthorized disclosure,
                   and (3) limits access to the items the person originated, reviewed,
                   signed, or received while serving as a presidential appointee. The Execu-
                   tive Order assigns the Director, Information Security Oversight Office,
                   responsibility for developing governmentwide directives for imple-
                   menting the order. The Oversight Office’s directive does not provide
                   additional guidance relative to access arrangements for former presiden-
                   tial appointees.

                   The State and Defense Departments transferred copies of many classi-
                   fied papers related to the government service of former Secretary of
                   State George Shultz and former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
                   to locations where the two men might have access to them after leaving
                   office. The State Department arranged with the National Archives and
                   Records Administration to transfer an estimated 60,000 classified docu-
                   ments associated with Mr. Shultz’s government service to the Federal
                   Records Center at San Bruno, California. It also transferred Mr. Shultz’s
                   unclassified personal and nonrecord papers to the Hoover Institution at
                   Palo Alto, California. The Defense Department arranged for over 13,000
                   classified documents as well as unclassified documents related to Mr.
                   Weinberger’s government service to be transferred to the Library of
                   Congress.


                   We found that the State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Informa-
Results in Brief   tion Agency exercised the exception allowed by Executive Order 12356
                   for a total of 11 currently living former presidential appointees by
                   arranging access to classified documents related to their government
                   service.

                   The arrangements for former Secretary of State Shultz were not initially
                   but are now in general compliance with Executive Order 12356 and
                   State Department regulations. However, we question whether the
                   arrangements for former Secretary of Defense Weinberger fully comply
                   with the Executive Order and the Defense Department’s regulations.
                   Defense Department officials did not provide the required written state-
                   ment declaring that it had determined that giving Mr. Weinberger access
                   to classified information is consistent with the interest of national


                    Page 2                                   GAO/NSIAD9@195   Information   !Jecurity
                      B334O31




                      security. Furthermore, we are concerned about provisions in Mr. Wein-
                      berger’s Agreement of Deposit with the Library of Congress, the terms
                      of which allow Mr. Weinberger to control access to classified informa-
                      tion and allow him to remove documents at his discretion. Subsequent
                      documents have indicated that the Library of Congress is expected to
                      protect the classified information under Defense Department oversight.
                      However, we believe the terms of the Agreement do not provide for ade-
                      quate government control, and that the inconsistencies between the
                      Agreement and other documents could cause confusion in controlling the
                      classified information.


                      Three agencies reported arrangements for access to classified informa-
Agency Arrangements   tion by former presidential appointees. In addition to the arrangement
for Access            for Mr. Shultz, the State Department had made similar arrangements for
                      former Secretaries Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig. The U.S. Infor-
                      mation Agency transferred classified documents to the Reagan Presiden-
                      tial Library Project for its former director, Charles Wick. In addition to
                      Mr. Weinberger, the Defense Department made access arrangements for
                      former Secretaries Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford, Elliot Richardson,
                      and Donald Rumsfeld, former Under Secretary Fred Ikle; and former
                      Director of the National Security Agency William Odom.


                      When we initiated our review of access arrangements for former Secre-
Extent of State       tary of State George Shultz we found that the State Department had not
Department            inventoried the top secret documents or assigned them control numbers
Compliance            as required by State Department regulations. We also found highly clas-
                      sified documents at a federal records center that was not authorized to
                      store them. These problems were subsequently corrected.

                      Our tests of other Shultz papers identified secret and confidential docu-
                      ments transferred separately by the State Department to the Hoover
                      Institution as unclassified personal and nonrecord papers. Hoover Insti-
                      tution officials told us that they removed the classified documents we
                      found from the other personal and nonrecord papers and stored them in
                      a safe located in the Institution’s vault. A State Department security
                      official said that the Hoover Institution has since been instructed to send
                      such classified documents to the San Bruno Federal Records Center.




                       Page 3                                   GAO/h?+IAlMM-195   information   Security
                    B-234991




                    Our examination of access arrangements for former Secretary of
Extent of Defense   Defense Caspar Weinberger raised questions about the Defense Depart-
Department          ment’s compliance with the Executive Order and its regulations. First,
Compliance          we did not find the required written determination that providing access
                    to the papers was consistent with the interest of national security.
                    Second, we question a provision in the former Secretary’s Agreement
                    with the Library of Congress that gives him the right to control access to
                    the papers and remove documents.

                    According to Defense Department officials, the Agreement of Deposit
                    between Mr. Weinberger and the Library satisfies the requirement for a
                    written determination, but we found no reference to a determination in
                    the Agreement.

                    Executive Order 12366 requires each agency to establish controls to
                    ensure that classified information is adequately protected and that
                    access by unauthorized persons is prevented; however, it does not say
                    what constitutes adequate control over classified information. Although
                    the Library of Congress’ procedures provide for adequate control over
                    the papers, former Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s Agreement of
                    Deposit with the Library gives Mr. Weinberger the right to control
                    access to the papers and to remove any document from the collection at
                    any time. The Agreement conflicts with a classified information nondis-
                    closure form that Mr. Weinberger signed waiving any future claim to the
                    documents.

                     On February 22, 1990, the Information Security Oversight Office
                     reported the results of its inspection of safeguarding, accountability,
                     and access control measures over classified information in the Wein-
                     berger collection at the Library of Congress. One of its recommendations
                     was that the Agreement of Deposit be amended to ensure control of clas-
                     sified documents. In its April 6, 1990, response, the Defense Department
                     stated that its interpretation is that the existing Agreement is sufficient
                     because it in no way contravenes any statutory authority, departmental
                     directives, regulations, or instructions. The Defense Department stated
                     that those involved with the Agreement had no intent other than to
                     comply with all pertinent laws, Executive Order 12356, and its imple-
                     menting directives.




                     Page 4                                     GAO/NSIAD9@196   Information   security
                 B-994991




                 We found no evidence that national security information was actually
Conclusion and   compromised. However, we believe that the control weaknesses we
Recommendation   noted indicate potential problems. In particular, we question one of the
                 two arrangements, because the terms of the Agreement allow a former
                 presidential appointee to control access to classified documents and
                 remove such documents from government control. Regarding the
                 arrangement for the Weinberger papers, the Director of the Oversight
                 Office accepted a recent Defense Department letter as assurance that
                 the government has adequate control. However, to avoid such questions
                 in the future, we believe language appearing to give control of classified
                 information to a private individual should not be allowed in such
                 agreements.

                 We therefore recommend that the Director, Information Security Over-
                 sight Office, issue guidance that more clearly specifies the controls
                 needed over classified materials made available to former presidential
                 appointees. In particular, the guidance should ensure that agreements
                 for access by former presidential appointees do not contain provisions
                 that could compromise government control.


                 General arrangements for former presidential appointees to have access
                 to classified documents are discussed in appendix I. The State Depart-
                 ment’s arrangement with the National Archives and Records Adminis-
                 tration is discussed in detail in appendix II, and the Defense
                 Department’s arrangement with the Library of Congress is discussed in
                 appendix III. The objectives, scope, and methodology are discussed in
                 appendix IV.

                 As agreed with your office, we did not obtain official agency comments.
                 However, we discussed our findings with agency officials and incorpo-
                 rated their views where appropriate.

                  As you requested, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30
                  days from its issue date unless you publicly announce its contents ear-
                  lier. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of State and
                  Defense; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Librarian of Con-
                  gress, Library of Congress; the Archivist of the United States, National
                  Archives and Records Administration; the Director, Information
                  Security Oversight Office; the Chairman, National Security Council; and
                  other interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon
                  request.



                  Page 5                                    GAO/NSLW-WlW    Information   Security
If you have any questions please call me on (202) 275-8412. Major con-
tributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,




Donna M. Heivilin
Director, Logistics Issues




Page 6                                   GAO/NSIADBMW   Information   Security
Page 7   GAO/NSLiBWMM   hfonnation   Security
Contents


Letter
Appendix I
General Arrangements
for Former
Presidential
Appointees to Have
Accessto Classified
Documents
Appendix II                                             13
The State
Department’s
Arrangement With the
National Archives and
Records
Administration
Appendix III                                             16
The Defense
Department’s
Arrangement With the
Library of Congress
Appendix IV                                              19
Objectives, Scope,and
Methodology
Appendix V                                               20
Major Contributors to
This Report


                        GAO/WlMDNbllM   Infomdon   Secnrlty
Page 9   GAO/NSIAD-99495   Information   Security
Appendix I

GeneralArrangements for Former Presidential
Appointeesto Have Accessto Classified
Documents
               The disposition of files and documentary materials accumulated within
               an agency is governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended,
               and the Records Disposal Act of 1943, as amended. With certain excep-
               tions, such as convenience copies, the later act defines the term
               “records” as including

               “...a11 books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other docu-
               mentary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received
               by an agency of the United States Government under Federal law in connection with
               the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by
               that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions,
               policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or
               because of the informational value of data in them” (see 44 U.S.C. 3301, as
               amended).

               The laws and regulations governing the management and disposition of’
               federal records generally do not apply to personal papers, which are
               defined as:

               “documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, of a private
               or nonpublic character that do not relate to or have an effect upon the conduct of
               agency business. Personal papers are excluded from the definition of Federal
               records and are not owned by the Government” (see 36 CFR Section 1222.36).

               Oversight responsibility for federal records management is divided
               between the National Archives and Records Administration, the General
               Services Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget. The
               National Archives and Records Administration provides guidance and
               assistance to federal agencies on how to adequately and properly docu-
               ment government policy and transactions and how to dispose of federal
               records. The General Services Administration provides guidance and
               assistance on economical and effective federal records management.
               However, the General Services Administration has delegated its respon-
               sibility for the federal information security program to the Information
               Security Oversight Office. The Office of Management and Budget is
               responsible for directing and overseeing federal records management.

               Classified information generally cannot be disseminated to anyone
               whose official duties do not require access to it. This is often called the
               “need-to-know” policy. Executive Order 12366 and previous orders
               have provided an exception to this policy for former presidential
               appointees. Section 4.3 of the Executive Order allows agencies
               originating classified information to authorize access to persons who
               previously occupied policy-making positions to which they were



               Page10                                           GAO/NSIAD90-196InfonnationSecurity
    General Arrmgementa       for Former
    Presidential   Appointees to Have Access to
    Cladfled     Documents




    appointed by the President. Such access may be granted only if the
    agency originating the classified information

l   determines in writing that access is consistent with the interest of
    national security;
l   takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unautho-
    rized disclosure or compromise; and
l   limits access to items that the person originated, reviewed, signed, or
    received as a presidential appointee.

    Executive Order 12356 assigns the Director, Information Security Over-
    sight Office, responsibility for developing governmentwide imple-
    menting directives and overseeing agency actions to ensure compliance.
    The Executive Order allows government agencies to promulgate their
    own implementing regulations. The Director issued Directive No. 1,
    effective August 1,1982. Although the directive provides guidance on
    various information security matters, it does not provide additional gui-
    dance relative to former presidential appointees.

    We addressed government agency procedures and practices for granting
    former presidential appointees access to classified information in our
    June 1989 report1

    In January and August 1988, the Director, Information Security Over-
    sight Office, wrote to executive branch agencies saying that many offi-
    cials who had access to classified information would be leaving the
    government in the final year of President Reagan’s administration. The
    Director emphasized that classified information, including extra copies,
    is not personal property and may not be removed from the government’s
    control by any departing official.

     When former Secretary of State George Shultz and former Secretary of
     Defense Caspar Weinberger left office, their departments transferred
     copies of many classified papers related to their government service to
     locations where they could access them for their personal use. The State
     Department’s arrangement with the National Archives and Records
     Administration is discussed in detail in appendix II, and the Defense
     Department’s arrangement with the Library of Congress is discussed in
     appendix III.


     ‘Information Security: Controls Over Unofficial   Access to Classified Information    (GAO/
                Q-146, June 8,1989).




     Page 11                                                     GAO/MIABWl96             Inform&on   Security
Appendix I
General Arrangements    for Former
Presidential Appointees to Have Access to
Classified Documents




We found that government agencies make limited use of the exception to
the Executive Order. Of the 51 agencies we surveyed, only the State and
Defense Departments and the U.S. Information Agency have arrange-
ments for living former presidential appointees to access classified docu-
ments related to the appointees’ government service. These agencies had
such arrangements for a total of 11 individuals.

The State Department indicated that in addition to the arrangement for
Mr. Shultz, it had similar arrangements for former Secretaries Henry
Kissinger and Alexander Haig. The U.S. Information Agency transferred
classified documents to the Reagan Presidential Library Project at the
request of its former director, Charles Wick.

The Defense Department indicated that it had made arrangements sim-
ilar to those for Mr. Weinberger for former Secretaries Robert McNa-
mara, Clark Clifford, Elliot Richardson, and Donald Rumsfeld; former
Under Secretary Fred Ikle; and former Director of the National Security
Agency William Odom.




 Page 12                                    GAO/NSIAD-90496   Information   Securit)
Appendix II

The State Department’sArrangement With the
National Archives and RecordsAdministration

               When former Secretary George Shultz left office, the State Department
Background     transferred copies of many documents related to his government service
               to the National Archives and Records Administration’s Federal Records
               Center in San Bruno, California. The State Department allows Mr. Shultz
               to temporarily transfer, for his personal use, part of the classified mate-
               rial from San Bruno to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
               Peace. The Hoover Institution is located on the Stanford University
               campus at Palo Alto, California, which is about 26 miles south of San
               Bruno.

               The State Department transferred copies of about 76,000 documents to
               San Bruno. The copies were made by the State Department at Mr.
               Shultz’s expense. An estimated 76 to 80 percent of the documents are
               classified. The State Department’s arrangement with the National
               Archives allows Mr. Shultz to transfer up to 8 cubic feet of classified
               material to Hoover for up to 60 days. The transfers may be extended for
               additional 60day periods, provided that the total quantity of classified
               documents does not exceed 8 cubic feet.

               Mr. Shultz, a Diplomat in Residence,’ a research assistant, and an Asso-
               ciate Director of the Hoover Institution had access to the classified
               papers. All four had top secret clearances. Clearance has also been
               requested for an additional research assistant. The Diplomat in Resi-
               dence, previously custodian of the classified papers at Hoover, is cur-
               rently a personal services consultant to the State Department.

               The State Department’s regulations both restate and expand on Execu-
               tive Order 12366 requirements for providing access to former presiden-
               tial appointees. In addition to the Executive Order’s requirements, the
               State Department’s regulations require the former presidential
               appointee to agree in writing (1) to safeguard classified information
               from unauthorized disclosure, (2) to authorize review of notes and man-
               uscripts to ensure that they contain no classified information, and (3) to
               not further disseminate classified information without the State Depart-
               ment’s permission. In addition to former presidential appointees, the
               State Department’s regulations also allow individuals to have access to
               classified information on behalf of a former appointee, provided they
               are deemed trustworthy and agree to safeguard classified information.
               They must also work for the former appointee and may not gather infor-
               mation for their own publication. The Information Security Oversight

               ‘The State Department’s Diplomat in Residenceprogram
                                                                  temporarily place3 foreign service officers at
               universities to teach in foreign affairs programs.



               Page 13                                                GAO/N8IAD-9M#       Infomution   Security
                  Appendix II
                  The State Department’s  Arrangement     With
                  the National Archlvea and
                  Records Administration




                  Office reviewed the State Department’s proposed procedures for con-
                  trolling the classified documents in the Shultz collection at San Bruno
                  and Hoover. According to the Oversight Office, it is generally satisfied
                  with the procedures.


                  We found that the State Department’s procedures provide reasonable
Extent of State   control over classified material with the exceptions noted below. San
Department        Bruno and Hoover are both approved storage facilities for classified
Compliance        information up to and including top secret. Also, as required by Execu-
                  tive Order 12356, the State Department had stated in writing that
                  granting Mr. Shultz access to classified information was consistent with
                  the interest of national security.

                  Certain controls were not in place when we first visited San Bruno and
                  Hoover in mid-March 1989. However, the State Department corrected
                  them before our next visit in October 1989. We initially found that top
                  secret documents had not been inventoried or assigned control numbers
                  as required by the State Department’s regulations. Also, we found sev-
                  eral documents were marked as having sensitive compartmented infor-
                  mation or special access program3 information. Neither San Bruno nor
                  Hoover is approved to store documents with such markings. Only San
                  Bruno had held the documents up to that time.

                  The State Department’s Office of Diplomatic Security restricted access
                  to the classified documents until the problems we found were resolved.
                  In late March 1989, that Office inventoried the documents and assigned
                  control numbers to the documents that were classified top secret. They
                  also identified documents with possible sensitive compartmented infor-
                  mation or special access program designations. About 120 such docu-
                  ments were returned to the State Department’s headquarters, and 60
                  which were found to have such designations were retained at the
                  headquarters.

                   During our follow-up visit to San Bruno and Hoover in October 1989, we
                   found that the control weaknesses had been corrected and temporary


                   ‘Sensitive compartmented information includes aU information and materials requiring special con-
                   trols indicating restricted handling within present and future intelligence collection programs and
                   their end products.

                   3A special accessprogram requires need-to-know or accesscontrols beyond those normally required
                   for accessto confidential, secret, or top secret information.



                   Page 14                                                  GAO/NSLADMUS5         Information   Security
Appendix II
The State Department’s  Arrangement   With
the National Archives and
Records Administration




transfers of classified documents to Hoover had begun. The transfers
were properly documented and did not exceed quantity or time limits.

However, tests of other papers that were separately transferred to the
Hoover Institution as Mr. Shultz’s unclassified personal and nonrecord
papers identified secret and confidential documents. Our tests of about
10 percent of the papers in a related review identified 7 secret and 16
confidential documents. Hoover Institution officials told us that the clas-
sified documents that we found were removed from the personal papers
and are stored in a safe located in the Institution’s vault. A State Depart-
ment security official stated that the Hoover Institution was instructed
to transfer any classified documents found to the Shultz collection
stored at the San Bruno Federal Records Center.

The State Department has been considering a request to permanently
locate all of Mr. Shultz’s classified papers at Hoover. Hoover officials
indicate that Hoover is willing to provide the necessary storage for all
classified documents. A final decision had not yet been made as of
August 1990.




 Page 16                                     GAO/NSLAD@O-196   Information   !3ecnrity
Appendix III

The DefenseDepartment’sArrangement With
the Library of Congress

                    The Defense Department transferred copies of many papers related to
Background          the government service of former Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
                    berger to the Library of Congress in order that he might have access to
                    them for his personal use. According to the Library, the papers contain
                    copies of 13,697 classified items, including 948 top secret documents, 25
                    top secret restricted data’ documents, 206 secret restricted data docu-
                    ments, and 12,518 documents classified at the secret and confidential
                    levels.

                    General Services Administration Bulletin F’PMR B-106 and its successor,
                    National Archives’ Bulletin 89-2, which provide guidance for all federal
                    agencies, allow removal of nonrecord material by an employee. How-
                    ever, copies of classified documents may be removed only if they are
                    transferred to a facility meeting federal security requirements.


                    The Library’s procedures provide reasonable control over the classified
Extent of Defense   papers. The papers are kept in a vault area that is approved for storing
Department          classified information up to and including top secret restricted data. The
Compliance          Library stores the top secret restricted data, top secret, and secret
                    restricted data documents separately. All classified documents had been
                    inventoried but some top secret documents did not have control num-
                    bers and copy numbers as required by Defense Department regulations.
                    However, each document was assigned an inventory number when the
                    Library staff processed the papers. The Defense Department considers
                    the inventory numbers to be adequate for document accountability pur-
                    poses. The Library staff also showed us a receipt documenting one
                    package of top secret restricted data documents that was returned to
                    the Defense Department for declassification review. Library staff had
                    been given access to all papers for processing purposes at the time we
                    reviewed the papers. Processing included segregating the papers by sub-
                    ject matter, arranging them in chronological order, and preparing a
                    master index. The Library devoted one staff archivist to this effort for
                     about l-1/2 years.

                    Mr. Weinberger, a research assistant, and an administrative assistant
                    had access to the papers. All had been cleared for top secret and
                    restricted data. Mr. Weinberger’s staff had been given access to the
                    unclassified information.


                    ‘The top secret restricted data and secret restricted data documents concern the design, manufacture,
                    or use of atomic weapons; the production of special nuclear material; and the use of special nuclear
                    material to produce energy.
                                                 .


                    Page 16                                                  GAO/NSIADW496         Iniormation   !Security
Appendix      ElII
The Defense Deputment’s Armngement    With
the Library     of Cmgreas




Before a former presidential appointee may have access to classified
information, Executive Order 12356 requires a statement in writing that
access to classified information is consistent with the interest of
national security. Defense Department officials did not provide such
documentation. Defense Department officials stated that Mr. Wein-
berger’s Agreement with the Library is sufficient and constitutes a
written determination that releasing the papers was consistent with the
interest of national security. However, the Agreement does not discuss
the release’s effect on the national security interest or otherwise refer to
such a determination. We therefore question whether the Agreement
satisfies the requirement for a written determination.

Apart from document receipts and the Agreement of Deposit between
Mr. Weinberger and the Library, we found no description of the arrange-
ments for the papers. The Agreement requires his written consent and
the requisite security clearance before anyone can be granted access to
classified documents in the papers. The Agreement also states that at
his discretion, he may remove any document from the collection. In this
regard, the Agreement with the Library of Congress is inconsistent with
subsequent Information Security Oversight Office guidance that classi-
fied information may not be removed from the government’s control by
a departing official. The Agreement is also inconsistent with a classified
information nondisclosure form (Standard Form 189) signed by Mr.
Weinberger on March 15,1985. The Form 189 states, in part

“I understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this
Agreement is now and will forever remain the property of the United States Govern-
ment. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatso-
ever to such information.”

Executive Order 12356 states that the originating agency must take
appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized
disclosure or compromise and ensure that the information is safe-
guarded in a manner consistent with the order. Because the terms of the
Agreement with the Library allow Mr. Weinberger to control access to
the papers and to remove any document at his discretion, we do not
believe that the terms provide for adequate government control.
According to Library representatives, they have requested the Defense
Department’s permission before granting anyone access to the classified
information in the Weinberger papers. Even though the Agreement
would allow removal, they stated that they do not believe Mr. Wein-
berger has the authority to remove classified items. Also, they said no
classified documents have been removed.


 Page 17                                           GAO/NSIAD9@196     Information   Security
Appendix III
The Defense Department’s   Arrangement   With
the Library of Congress




A Defense Department official said they did not consult the National
Archives and Records Administration or the Information Security Over-
sight Office before they transferred the papers to the Library.

On February 22, 1990, the Information Security Oversight Office
reported the results of its inspection of safeguarding, accountability,
and access control measures over classified information in the Wein-
berger collection. It found that the Library’s policies and procedures for
handling and safeguarding classified information in the collection prop-
erly protect it from unauthorized disclosure. It recommended, however,
that the Defense Department improve oversight of its classified informa-
tion at the Library and that the Agreement of Deposit be amended to
ensure executive branch control over the classified information in the
Weinberger collection.

In its April 6, 1990, response to the Oversight Office’s recommendations,
the Defense Department agreed to make annual oversight inspections of
the classified information deposited in the Library by Mr. Weinberger
and other former Defense Department officials. The Defense Depart-
ment also stated that it does not believe the Agreement contravenes any
statutory authority, departmental directives, or instructions. The
Defense Department stated that those involved with the Agreement had
no intent other than to comply with all pertinent laws, Executive Order
 12356, and its implementing directives. The Defense Department pro-
vided a copy of this letter to the Library of Congress.

The Director of the Oversight Office accepted the April 6 letter as assur-
ance that it would conduct periodic oversight inspections of classified
documents at the Library and that the government does have adequate
control over the classified documents.




Page 19                                         GAO/NSIAD44@196   Information   Security
Appendix IV

Objectives,Scope,and Methodology


              The Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office and Civil
              Service, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, requested that we
              review agency arrangements for former presidential appointees to have
              access to classified documents related to their government service. We
              (1) determined the number of arrangements made for living former
              presidential appointees and (2) examined access arrangements for
              former Secretary of State George Shultz and former Secretary of
              Defense Caspar Weinberger. We were also asked to determine the
              National Archives and Records Administration’s involvement with such
              arrangements, and the Information Security Office’s position on them.

              With respect to the arrangements made for former Secretaries Shultz
              and Weinberger to have access to classified documents related to their
              government service, our objectives were to determine (1) compliance
              with directives, (2) the volume of classified documents involved, and (3)
              the names and positions of nongovernment employees, other than the
              two former Secretaries, who were granted access to the classified
              documents.

              To satisfy our objective, we asked 51 government agencies to identify all
              living former presidential appointees for whom they had arranged
              access to classified papers related to their government service. We inter-
              viewed National Archives and Records Administration and Information
              Security Oversight Office officials to determine their involvement in
              such arrangements. We obtained and reviewed laws, regulations, bulle-
              tins, correspondence, and other documentation related to arrangements
              for access to classified documents by former presidential appointees.

              Our review of the arrangements made for former Secretaries Shultz and
              Weinberger included an analysis of applicable directives and tests of
              administrative and security controls over classified documents at the
              San Bruno Federal Records Center, the Hoover Institution on War,
              Peace, and Revolution, and the Library of Congress. These tests included
              examination of vault access logs, top secret document inventories, and
              classified document charge-out records. We also interviewed officials at
              the State and Defense Departments, the Library of Congress, and the
              National Archives and Records Administration about the two
              arrangements.

              We conducted our review between February 1989 and July 1990 in
              accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


                                      .

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Appendix V

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Uldis Adamsons, Assistant Director
National Security and   Donald H. Lentz, Evaluator-in-Charge
International Affairs   Irving T. Boker, Advisor
                        Carolyn S. Blocker, Writer-Editor
Division,
Washington, DC.
c
Office of the General
Counsel




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