oversight

Defense Inventory: Controls Over C-4 Explosive and Other Sensitive Munitions

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-07.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

GAO


                             DEFENSE
                             INVENTURY
                             Controls Over C-4
                             Explosive and Other
                             Sensitive Munitions



                                                                                  142396




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                              General Accounting ORice unless specif’ically
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             United States
             General Accounting Office
             Washington, D.C. 20548

             National Security and
             International Affairs Division

             B-238708

             September 7,199O

             The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
             Chairman, Legislation and National
               Security Subcommittee
             Committee on Government Operations
             House of Representatives

             Dear Mr. Chairman:

             In response to your request, we have reviewed the inventory controls
             now in place for sensitive munitions under the control of the military
             departments, and the extent of reforms undertaken to safeguard those
             inventories in response to our earlier reports. You had expressed partic-
             ular concern about C-4 explosive due to its high demand by paramilitary
             groups and other illicit organizations. To address your concerns, we
             reviewed the inventory controls over such sensitive munitions at Fort
             Lewis, Washington, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the extent of reforms
             undertaken to safeguard those inventories. We focused our work prima-
             rily on the Army because it has the largest requirement for C-4 explo-
             sive of the military services. We provided you with information on the
             production, distribution, and storage of C-4 explosive in our earlier
             report. I


             Composition C-4 is a semiplastic, putty-like material containing
Background   Research Development Explosive (RDX)2 (9 1 percent) and a nonexplo-
             sive plasticizer (9 percent). It is dirty white to light brown in color, can
             be molded over a wide range of temperatures (-7)F to 17lF), and pro-
             duces a cutting action when detonated. The U.S. Army Armament, Muni-
             tions and Chemical Command is the national inventory control point for
             C-4 explosive at the wholesale level.3 According to Munitions and Chem-
             ical Command officials, if C-4 is properly stored and kept from extremes

             ‘Defense Inventory: Production, Distribution, and Storage of C-4 Explosive (GAO/NSIAD-90-139FS,
             May 7,lOW.
             zRDX (the chemical name is cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine) is a white solid compound manufactured
             by the nitration of hexamethylenetetramine. RDX was first prepared in 1899, but its explosive
             properties were not discovered until 1920. It was used extensively in World War II as an explosive
             filler in ammunition.

             “The wholesale system is comprised of the inventory control points that determine inventory require-
             ments and procure the items; the distribution depots which receive, store, and issue stock to retail
             activities; and the manufacturing plants that produce C-4. The retail system is comprised of
             numerous supply support activities at bases and installations throughout the world.



             Page 1                                                  GAO/NSIAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
                   of heat, its shelf life is considered to be indefinite. C-4 is only produced
                   for the military, and the current producers are Holston Army Ammuni-
                   tion Plant in Kingsport, Tennessee, and Expro Chemical Products, Inc.,
                   of Canada. C-4 is not available for purchase from the military by non-
                   military users. However, the Defense Logistics Agency sells C-4 deter-
                   mined to be unusable by the military to non-military users who have
                   valid end-use permits and are licensed by the Bureau of Alcohol,
                   Tobacco and Firearms. Civilians use C-4 for such items as initiators for
                   other explosives or in underwater seismic charges. The U.S. government
                   also sells C-4 to foreign governments as discussed in our earlier report.

                   According to Munitions and Chemical Command officials, C-4 explosive
                   and other sensitive materials are most vulnerable to pilferage or loss at
                   the retail level where it is used for training. Also, our previous reports
                   showed that maintaining controls over C-4 issued for training is difficult
                   because it is considered to have been consumed during training if not
                   returned to the supply system.4


                   We did not find major losses or thefts of C-4 and other explosives from
Results in Brief   the supply systems at Forts Lewis and Stewart, other than those recov-
                   ered on the bases. Our work at Forts Lewis and Stewart shows that they
                   have implemented a number of measures designed to strengthen con-
                   trols over ammunition and explosives. We found evidence that signifi-
                   cant command emphasis and initiatives have been instituted to correct
                   many ammunition and explosives control, accountability, and manage-
                   ment deficiencies identified in our previous reports and in reports by the
                   Department of the Army Inspector General” and Army Audit Agency.
                   These reports had identified weak internal controls that had resulted in
                   large thefts of ammunition and explosives and recommended further
                   improvements, particularly at the unit level, where they are most vul-
                   nerable to theft after leaving the ammunition supply point for training
                   exercises.

                   Army criminal investigative activity reports showed that from 1986 to
                   1989 the number of incidents and amounts of lost, stolen, or recovered


                   4Ammunition and Explosives: Improved Controls and Accountability at Fort Bragg (GAO/
                         - _44BR, Nov. 13, 1986) and Ammunition and Explosives: Improved Controls Are Needed to
                   Reduce Thefts at Fort Bragg and Camp Pendleton (GAO/NS IAD-89-3,
                   sFollowup Inspection of Ammunition, Arms and Explosives (A2E) Accountability-Action    Memo-
                   randum, Department of the Army, Office of the Inspector General (Washington, DC.: July 1987).



                   Page 2                                                GAO/NSIAD-90.221BR Defense Inventory
              B-238708




              C-4 explosive and other sensitive” munitions have generally declined.
              However, these reports do not provide a complete picture of the Army’s
              lost, stolen, and recovered C-4 and other sensitive munitions because
              installation officials may not always forward the required reports of
              such incidents to the headquarters law enforcement activities. Our past
              work showed that military activities sometimes did not know C-4 had
              been stolen until it was recovered and reported to them by law enforce-
              ment officials. Sometimes the reports do not reach them.

              Data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on stolen and
              recovered explosives for 1979 through May 1990 showed that military
              explosives continue to be recovered in substantial amounts. For
              example, from 1979 through May 1990, the Bureau reported 3,710
              pounds of stolen C-4 explosive and recoveries of 4,913 pounds. Identi-
              fying where recovered explosives came from is often difficult and
              recently recovered C-4 could have been stolen in years prior to the
              recent Department of Defense and military service initiatives to
              strengthen controls over ammunition and explosives. The Bureau
              recently recovered a large amount of C-4 explosive in an ongoing under-
              cover investigation. Also, a continuing investigation in Georgia has led
              to the recovery of 15 pounds of C-4 by the Bureau.


              Although we focused our work primarily on the Army, we did obtain
Scopeand      information on the amounts of C-4 reported lost, stolen, and recovered
Methodology   for the Navy and Air Force for fiscal years 1985 through 1989.7 To
              assess internal controls over sensitive munitions at field locations, we
              selected Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart based on our prior work as two
              locations with potential problems in managing ammunition and
              explosives.

              6The Army classifies munitions into four categories. Category I items include non-nuclear missiles and
              rockets in a ready-to-fire configuration (e.g., Redeye, Stinger, Dragon, and Law) and explosive rounds
              for such items. Category II items include hand or rifle grenades, high explosive, and white phos-
              phorus; mines-antitank or antipersonnel (unpacked weight of 50 pounds or less each); and explo-
              sives used in demolition operations (e.g., C-4 explosive, military dynamite, and TNT). Category III
              items include ammunition, 50 caliber and larger, with an explosive-filled projectile (unpacked weight
              of 100 pounds or less each); grenades, incendiary, and fuses for high explosive grenades; blasting
              caps; supplementary charges; bulk explosives; and detonating cord. Category IV items include anunu-
              nition with non-explosive projectile; fuses, except for category II ; grenades, illumination, and smoke;
              incendiary destroyers; and riot control agents, 100 pounds or less. We defined sensitive munitions
              items as categories II and III.
              7The Air Force reported that 3.76 pounds of C-4 explosive were lost, and 2.6 pounds of C-4 explosive
              were recovered from 1986 through 1989. The Navy reported that between 1986 and 1989,80 pounds
              of C-4 were lost, 440 pounds of C-4 were missing following inventories, and 460 pounds of C-4 were
              recovered.



              Page 3                                                    GAO/NSIAD-BO-221BR Defense Inventory
                                                                                d
    R-238708




    We performed the majority of our work at the U.S. Army Armament,
    Munitions and Chemical Command; the U.S. Army Military Police Opera-
    tions Agency; the US. Army Criminal Investigation Command head-
    quarters; Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and the Bureau
    of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

    At the Munitions and Chemical Command we reviewed the policies, pro-
    cedures, and practices for accountability and control of C-4 explosive
    and other sensitive ammunition and explosives at the wholesale level.
    At the U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency, we reviewed
    reports of lost, stolen, and recovered ammunition and explosives for
    fiscal years 1986 through 1989.

    Our work at Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart consisted of (1) interviewing
    installation and local law enforcement officials and gathering data on
    incidents of lost, stolen, and recovered ammunition and explosives, (2)
    reviewing the policies and procedures in place for controlling them, (3)
    interviewing personnel responsible for the control, accountability, and
    recovery of ammunition and explosives, (4) determining the extent that
    other organizations have audited the management of ammunition and
    explosives, and (5) determining the extent of local initiatives to improve
    accountability and control over ammunition and explosives. However,
    we did not do an in-depth analysis of the day-to-day implementation,
    because our review of all relevant data did not indicate significant thefts
    of ammunition and explosives. We did not do an accounting of all prose-
    cutions in recent years for thefts of C-4 explosives because we found
    that the necessary data were not readily available and the time and
    effort necessary to review the individual investigative case files were
    prohibitive.

    As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments on this
    briefing report. However, we discussed our findings with Army and
    Department of Defense officials and incorporated their views where
    appropriate. We conducted our review from November 1989 to July
    1990 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards,


    As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
    of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
Y   its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen, House
    and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services; the
    Secretaries of Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Director,


    Page 4                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
B228708




Defense Logistics Agency; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and the Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. If you have any
questions, please call me on (202) 275-8412. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,




Donna M. Heivilin
Director, Logistics Issues




Page 6                                  GAO/NSIAD-90.221BR Defense Inventory
                                                                                           ,

                                                                                                   I




contents


Letter
Appendix I                                                                                             8
Thefts and Recoveries
of C-4 Explosive
Appendix II
Accountability and
Control Over
Ammunition and
Explosives at Fort
Lewis and Fort
Stewart Have Been
Strengthened
Appendix III                                                                                      16
Amount of C-4
Explosive Required by
the Military Services
Appendix IV                                                                                       16
Major Contributors to
This Report
Tables                  Table 1.1: C-4 Explosive Reported Lost, Stolen, and                            8
                            Recovered for Fiscal Years 1986 Through 1989
                        Table 1.2: C-4 Explosive Reported as Stolen and                                9
                            Recovered in Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
                            Firearms Reports




                        Page 0                                  GAO/NSIAD-90.221BR Defense Inventory
Abbreviations

A&E       Ammunition and Explosives
DOD       Department of Defense


Page 7                                GAO/NSIAD-BO-221BR Defense Inventory
                                                                                                                               I
Appendix I                                                                                                                             i

Thefts and Recoveriesof C-4 Explosive


                                           Our review of Army-reported incidents of lost, stolen, and recovered C-4
                                           and other sensitive munitions showed that these incidents have gener-
                                           ally declined from previous years. Table I. 1 shows the pounds of C-4
                                           explosive reported as lost, stolen, or recovered by the Army.


Table 1.1:C-4 Explosive Reported Lost, Stolen, and Recovered for Fiscal Years 1986 Through 1989
                                                                                             Number of reported incidents
                                             Pounds of    Pounds of       Pounds of C-4                           All sensitive
Fiscal year                                     c-4 lost  C-4 stolen          recovered      C-4 explosive           munitions
1986                                                 1.25         202.00                  252.50                   26                  35
1987                                                 9.00         100.00                  117.50                   14                  25
1988                                                39.00            1.00                  23.53                   10                  18
1989                            .~                      0               0                    1.00                   2                  10
Total                                             49.25           303.00                  394.53                   52                 88

                                           Source: U.S. Army Military Police Operations Agency


                                           These figures do not reflect all of the C-4 lost, stolen, or recovered in the
                                           Army during this time period. A U.S. Army Military Police Operations
                                           Agency official said that, although installations are required to complete
                                           reports of missing and recovered ammunition and explosives, these
                                           reports are not always forwarded to his agency. During our review we
                                           found evidence that confirmed this. For example, at Fort Lewis during
                                           1988 and 1989,24 pounds of C-4 were recovered through the amnesty
                                           program. However, the Agency’s files did not contain a report of the
                                           recovery. Also, at Fort Stewart 7 pounds of C-4 were recovered in 1988
                                           and 1989. Again, the Agency’s files contained no such report.

                                           Data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms on stolen and
                                           recovered explosives for 1979 through May 1990 show continued
                                           recovery of C-4 explosive, including a recent recovery of a large amount
                                           as a result of an ongoing undercover operation. In addition, in an
                                           ongoing investigation in Georgia that began in March 1990, 16 pounds of
                                           C-4 were recovered by the Bureau. Although the Bureau recovers more
                                           C-4 explosive annually than the services report as lost or stolen, our
                                           past work showed that the services sometimes did not know C-4 had
                                           been lost or stolen until it was recovered and reported to them by law
                                           enforcement officials.

                                           Table I.2 shows the C-4 explosive reported as stolen or recovered during
                                           fiscal years 1979 through May 1990.




                                           Page 9                                                   GAO/NSIAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
                                           Appendix I
                                           Thefts and Recoveries of C-4 Explosive




Table 1.2:C-4 Explosive Reported as
Stolen and Recovered in Bureau of                                                                                    Pounds of C-48
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Reports     Fiscal year                                                      Stolen                          Recovered
(FiscalYears   1979 Through   May 1990)
                                          1979
                                          -~
                                                                                                             1.415           --                  385
                                                                                                                                                __-
                                               1980                                                             93                                162
                                               1981                                                             20                               409
                                               1982                                                          1,744                              2,072
                                          1983
                                          -~-                                                                   64                                108
                                          1984                                                                  34                                159
                                               1985                                                            174                                231
                                          1986
                                          ---                                                                    1                    --__        358
                                          1987                                                                   1                _____-          263
                                               1988                                                            161                                213
                                               1989                                                              3                               308
                                               1990"                                                             0                                226
                                          Totals                                                            3.710                               4.913
                                          “Figures are approximations     because quantities less than 1 pound were unavailable and therefore
                                          counted as 1 pound.

                                          hFigure is for part of the fiscal year (October to May 1990)


                                          A Bureau official said that there is no statutory requirement for the
                                          Bureau to contact the services when military explosives are recovered.
                                          In some instances, the Bureau may contact the services if a military
                                          explosive ordnance detachment team is needed to destroy the explosive
                                          or if an active member of the military is involved in an incident the
                                          Bureau is investigating. Because explosives are sent from the production
                                          plant to the various installations, it is often difficult to identify the
                                          installation from which the explosive was lost or stolen.

                                          The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Bureau are working on an
                                          agreement that will require the DODcriminal investigative organizations
                                          to report significant incidents of loss and theft of arms, ammunition,
                                          and explosives to the Bureau. Also, the agreement will require the
                                          Bureau to provide DOD, when requested, a list of military munitions
                                          recovered during investigations and information on trends relating to
                                          the loss or theft of military munitions that may require corrective action
                                          to prevent further losses or thefts. DODexpects the agreement to be
                                          signed in August 1990.




                                               ‘The agreement defines the arms, ammunition, and explosives considered significant or serious.



                                          Page 9                                                         GAO/NSIAD-90.221BR Defense Inventory
Appendix II

Accountability and Control Over Ammunition
and Explosives at Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart
Have Been Strengthened
                     Based on our review, we believe that accountability and control over
                     ammunition and explosives (A&E) at Fort Stewart and Fort Lewis have
                     been strengthened in recent years. Generally, the appropriate A&E poli-
                     cies and procedures are in place and, when followed, should provide a
                     substantial amount of control at the installations.


                     Current A&E policies and procedures in place at Fort Lewis and Fort
A&E Policies and     Stewart appear to be adequate. We found that both installations have
Procedures at Fort   policies and procedures which provide checks and balances for the issu-
Lewis and Fort       ante of A&E for training. For example, at Fort Lewis, an office indepen-
                     dent of the ammunition supply point and units is responsible for
Stewart              requisitioning installation A&E and independently accounting for unit
                     allocations and usage. The ammunition supply points at both installa-
                     tions receive, store, issue, and maintain stock record accountability for
                     all installation A&E. At both installations, the user units are responsible
                     for maintaining control over the A&E while it is in their possession.


Independent Office   Fort Lewis created an office independent of the ammunition supply
ManagesA&E at Fort   point and the units to eliminate the fragmentation of A&E management
                     identified in a 1986 Army Audit Agency review.1 Based on our inter-
Lewis                views with officials and our review of its records, the office appears to
                     be adequately performing its required functions and responsibilities.
                     The office is responsible for refining procedures for forecasting, safety,
                     security, accountability, receipt, and turn-in of A&E. Also, the office pro-
                     vides using units with technical assistance on A&E management; con-
                     ducts ammunition users’ conferences to keep major subordinate
                     commands apprised of changes in policy and procedures affecting A&E
                     management; monitors A&E reconciliation, policy, and procedures; and
                     monitors the extent that user units are late in documenting their A&E
                     turn-ins.

                     In 1988, the office noted 177 incidents where units had been overdue in
                     completing their reconciliation and turn-in documentation. Such delays
                     distort information on the amounts of potential A&E losses. The office
                     responded by stressing the importance of adhering to reconciliation
                     requirements by bringing it to the attention of the units and the deputy
                     commanding general, These actions were apparently successful because


                     ‘Training Ammunition Management, I Corps and Fort Lewis, U.S. Army Audit Agency
                     (Washington, DC.: Nov. 1986).



                     Page 10                                             GAO/NSlAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
                           Appendix II
                           Accountability and Control Over Ammunition
                           and Explonlves et Fort Lewis snd Fort
                           Stewart   Have Been Strengthened




                           in 1989, as compared to 1988, overdue incidents decreased to 31 inci-
                           dents, or over 82 percent.


Ammunition Supply Points   We did not note any significant problems at the ammunition supply
                           points of both installations. Based on our review of supply point
                           records, interviews with officials, and our observations of their opera-
                           tions, the ammunition supply points at both installations are secure and
                           personnel appear to be adequately performing their required functions
                           and responsibilities.

                           The ammunition supply points receive, store, issue, and maintain stock
                           record accountability for all installation A&E. They also perform periodic
                           inventories of stock and conduct physical inspections to verify the gen-
                           eral condition and location of their A&E.

Inventories                At Fort Lewis our analysis of the ammunition supply point quarterly
                           inventories for 1988 and 1989 indicated that it has maintained account-
                           ability and control over its A&E stocks. For the 2 years the lines of A&E
                           stocks inventoried (about 9,000) were on the average 99.5 percent accu-
                           rate. The quarterly inventory adjustments for the years were generally
                           small. For example, for the first quarter of 1989, the inventory loss was
                           about $48 out of a total inventory valued at about $15 million. For the
                           third quarter of 1989, the inventory loss was about $4 out of a total
                           inventory valued at about $13 million. Further, of the 46 lines of A&E
                           stocks that did contain discrepancies for the years, almost all were cate-
                           gory IV items, except for seven lines which were category III items. Cat-
                           egory II items had no discrepancies. For each item with an inventory
                           discrepancy, the ammunition supply point records indicated research
                           was performed to determine the cause for the loss or gain (see footnote
                           6 for category definitions).

                           Based on Fort Stewart ammunition supply point inventory records for
                           fiscal year 1989, accountability and proper controls were being main-
                           tained over the A&E stored at the supply point. The quarterly inventory
                           adjustments for the year were small. For example, for the first quarter
                           of fiscal year 1989, the inventory loss was about $13 out of a total
                           inventory valued at $21 million. For the fourth quarter of fiscal year
                           1989, the inventory loss was about $8 out of a total inventory valued at
                           about $18 million. For the entire fiscal year 1989, there were no dis-
                           crepant category I or category II items. For each item with an inventory
                           discrepancy, ammunition supply point records indicated that research
                           was performed to determine the cause for the loss or gain.


                           Page 11                                      GAO/NSIAD90-221BR Defense Inventory
                           Appendix II
                           Accountability and Control Over Ammunition
                           and Explosives et Fort Lewla and Fort
                           Stewart Have Been Strengthened




Physical Security          During our inspection of ammunition supply point facilities at both
                           installations, we found what appeared to be adequate physical security
                           systems. For example, at the Fort Lewis ammunition supply point, 38
                           bunkers or magazines store basic load and training ammunition. The
                           magazines, contained in a controlled, fenced, and continuously guarded
                           area, are electronically monitored by a security system connected to mil-
                           itary police facilities. The Fort Stewart ammunition supply point con-
                           sists of a main office building where the records are maintained and an
                           ammunition holding area. The holding area is surrounded by a chain link
                           fence topped with rolled barbed wire. The area is patrolled by two
                           armed guards during off-duty hours and contains a building where the
                           ammunition is issued and received, as well as four ammunition storage
                           bunkers.


A&E User Units             Based on interviews and our review of records, the units at Fort Lewis
                           and Fort Stewart appear to understand and comply with the bases’ poli-
                           cies and procedures for controlling and accounting for A&E.

                           At each base we contacted two active Army units that were heavy users
                           of training A&E to determine their compliance with required procedures
                           for the issue, management, and turn-in of A&E. Unit requests for A&E are
                           required to be within authorized and allocated amounts, and each issue
                           request must be independently matched against an allocation before it
                           goes to the ammunition supply point. Units that request and receive A&E
                           from the ammunition supply point are required to maintain training
                           ammunition management and control documentation. Also, units
                           receiving A&E assume responsibility for controlling the A&E issued to
                           them. After completing each training exercise, units must ensure that
                           the amount of A&E they consumed or did not use matches the amount
                           issued to them. Forms documenting unexpended A&E must be completed.


Control of A&E on Ranges   The Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart training ranges have procedures for
                           controlling A&E. For example, units designate a unit range safety officer
                           to (1) observe the placement of charges and their detonation and (2)
                           certify the quantity of all items expended. In addition, after all
                           unexpended A&E has been returned to the supply point, a safety inspec-
                           tion is required to be conducted to ensure that soldiers have not retained
                           any on their person, in their equipment, or on their vehicles. A range
                           control officer conducts frequent patrols to ensure that used A&E is not
                           left on the ranges and that ranges are left in proper condition for the
                           next training event.


                           Page 12                                      GAO/NSLAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
                         Appendix II
                         Accountability and Control Over Ammunition
                         and Explosives at Fort Lewis and Fort
                         Stewart Have Been Strengthened




Amnesty Program          Both Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart operate an amnesty program designed
                         to let individuals turn in lost or stolen A&E to the ammunition supply
                         point or other designated areas without fear of prosecution. Our review
                         of amnesty recoveries at Fort Lewis for 1988 and 1989 indicated that
                         most of the sensitive A&E turned in were category III items. Out of 640
                         total items recovered, 33 were category II items, including 24 pounds of
                         C-4 explosive. At Fort Stewart, most of the items turned in during fiscal
                         years 1988 and 1989 were small arms ammunition or other nonsensitive
                         items. The only sensitive items recovered were 43 expended launch
                         tubes for a 66mm M72 HE rocket.


                         Fort Lewis and Fort Stewart both reported lost, stolen, and recovered
Sensitive Munitions      sensitive munitions in 1988 and 1989. The incidents at both installations
Continue to Be           appeared to be isolated and not indicative of widespread problems.
Reported Lost, Stolen,   Where deficiencies or control weaknesses were identified, we found that
                         the installation commands were taking steps to address these problems.
and Recovered            Also, officials from the local sheriff’s and police departments in the area
                         surrounding Fort Lewis and the Provost Marshall’s office at Fort
                         Stewart advised us that there has been a significant decline in their
                         recoveries of A&E in 1988 and 1989 compared to previous years.


Fort Lewis               Nearly 700 items (categories II and III) were recovered during 1988 and
                         1989. Of these items, approximately 640 were turned in through the
                         amnesty program, 6 were recovered by the Army Criminal Investigation
                         Command, 32 were recovered by the explosive ordnance detachment,
                         and 20 were recovered by the county sheriff’s office. Included in the
                         recoveries were 41 category II items, including 24 pounds of C-4 explo-
                         sive turned in through the program.

                         Of the Criminal Investigation Command’s six cases involving A&E recov-
                         eries between July 1987 and November 1989, only one involved a sensi-
                         tive explosive lost or stolen during 1988-1989. It involved the theft of
                         six 40-pound demolition charges from inside the fenced, guarded ammu-
                         nition supply point area at Fort Lewis. While on guard duty at the
                         ammunition supply point, three Fort, Lewis soldiers cut the lock off a
                         tractor trailer, which was parked inside the ammunition supply point
                         grounds during a weekend, to gain access to the demolition charges.
                         Other ammunition supply point guards reported the theft. Within 3 days
                         the demolition charges were recovered, and the soldiers involved were
                         placed in custody. Fort Lewis officials have taken measures to punish
                         the soldiers and improve the internal control weaknesses identified as a


                         Page 13                                      GAO/NSIALMW221BR Defense Inventory
               Appendix II
               Accountability and Control Over Ammunition
               and Explosives at Fort Lewis aud Fort
               Stewart Have Been Strengthened




               result of this incident. The five other cases involved recovered A&E that
               had been either lost or stolen prior to 1986 or were category IV items.


Fort Stewart   At Fort Stewart, we identified three incidents involving the recovery of
               sensitive munitions during 1988 and 1989. These items included 7
               pounds of C-4. In March 1989, three claymore mines, 1,000 feet of deto-
               nating cord, and two blasting caps were recovered on one of the Fort’s
               training ranges. In May 1988, two soldiers from Fort Stewart stole two
               1.26-pound blocks of C-4 explosive during a training exercise while they
               were detailed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. In October 1988, a pound of
               TNT explosive was found in a trailer park in the town where Fort
               Stewart is located and turned over to the military police,




               Page 14                                      GAO/NSIAD!W221BR   Defense Inventory
Amount of C-4 Explosive Required by the
Militaxy Services

               Pounds      in thousands
                                                                        Requirements by service
                                                                               Fiscal year
               Service                                    1985          1986        1987      1968          1989
               Army                                      2,000         3,500       5,000      3,900         7,900
               Navy                                        800             0         300          0           700
               Marine Corps                              2,800           600           0        100            0
               Air Force                                   200           300           0          0             0
               Total                                     5,800         4,400       5,300     4,000          8,600
               aFigures are the total amounts required by the services to produce the items that use C-4.
               Source: AMCCOM, Rock island, Illinois




               Page 15                                                   GAO/NSIAD-90.221BR Defense Inventory
Appendix IV

Major Contributors to This Report


                          Richard A. Helmer, Assistant Director
National Security and     Jacqueline L. James, Evaluator-in-Charge
International Affairs
Division,
Washington, D.C.

                          Jimmy R. Rose, Regional Audit Manager
Atlanta Regional          Carl W. Christian, Site Senior
Office
                          William R. Swick, Regional Audit Manager
Seattle Regional Office   Daniel C. Jacobsen, Site Senior




(swoln)                   Page 16                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-221BR Defense Inventory
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