BURDEN SHARING Allied Protection of Ships in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988 142164 United States GAO General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20648 National Security and International Affairs Division B-240294 September 6,199O The Honorable Pat Schroeder Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives The Honorable Andy Ireland House of Representatives This report is the unclassified version of our classified report. It summa- rizes and updates the information provided to your staffs during our April 5, 1990, briefing on the major activities of the allies and Persian Gulf states to sustain open navigation in the Persian Gulf between March 1987 and August 1988. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) identify the countries involved in sustaining open navigation and the role each played, (2) analyze the value of the contributions provided by those countries, and (3) assess the potential economic impact of the dis- ruption of Gulf oil imports on Gulf states and industrialized countries. In late 1986, Iran began attacking ships in the Persian Gulf, In the spring of 1987, the President announced that the United States would reflag and escort Kuwaiti ships. In May 1987, he extended U.S. protec- tion to neutral ships on a case-by-case basis, under an operation called Earnest Will. The United States also called upon its allies to protect shipping in the Gulf. Section 1 of this report provides a historic perspec- tive of non-Gulf countries’ presence in the region. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Results in Brief United States escorted and monitored their flagged ships and helped keep the Persian Gulf shipping lanes clear of mines. Only three of these countries provided GAO estimates of the incremental costs they incurred in these naval operations. These cost estimates ranged from $100 million to $240 million, E3ecausesome of the participating countries did not report cost estimates for their naval operations in the Gulf, we assigned a daily cost-based on U.S. operating costs- to each type of ship supporting operation Ear- nest Will and derived a relative value of the contribution of each of the non-Gulf countries. Based on our analysis of the types and duration of naval assets provided, we believe the United States accounted for about Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf B-240294 40 percent of the assets, followed by France (34 percent), the United Kingdom (10 percent), Italy (7 percent), and the joint Belgium/Nether- lands operation (9 percent). Three other non-Gulf countries provided indirect assistance. West Germany interpreted its constitution as prohib- iting it from providing a naval presence in the Gulf. Alternatively, it fulfilled a U.S. commitment to NATO to provide naval forces in the Medi- terranean, thereby freeing U.S. ships for the Gulf operation. In calcu- lating its contribution, Japan claimed credit for $500 million in loans to Oman and Jordan, Japan also paid $9 million for a precision navigation system installed in the Gulf. Luxembourg, which has no Navy, provided $400,000 for the upkeep of other countries’ forces during the operation. The Gulf states provided vital access to their ports, bases, and facilities as well as other assistance, including fuel for U.S. ships and aircraft. Section 2 provides details on countries’ contributions to keeping the Per- sian Gulf open to navigation, and section 3 provides a burden sharing analysis of these contributions. One objective of operation Earnest Will was to maintain the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area. During the conflict, oil disruptions did not occur, and Persian Gulf oil production actually increased slightly. Section 4 provides an overview of oil prices and production during the conflict. The Department of Energy disruption impact simulator pro- jected that if a disruption had occurred, crude oil prices would have more than doubled. Moreover, the oil market would have distributed price changes to both imported and domestically produced oil, thereby affecting all industrialized countries dependent upon oil or its products. The allied countries involved in maintaining open navigation in the Gulf and 12 other countries belong to the International Energy Agency (IEA). During an oil disruption, these countries agree to share their oil reserves. This agreement is designed to spread the short-term impact of an oil disruption to all member oil-consuming countries. In addition, countries that are less dependent on Persian Gulf imports, like the United States, will lose some of their imports from other market sources, such as Mexico, as other oil-dependent countries compete for available resources, Section 5 provides a detailed analysis of the economic impli- cations of an oil disruption on oil prices and consuming countries. Page 2 GAO/NSJAD-QO-282BR The Persian Gulf B-240294 Our objectives, scope, and methodology are in appendix I. As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense and State and to other interested congressional committees. Major contributors to this briefing report are listed in appendix II. If you have any questions, you may reach me at (202) 276-4128. Joseph E. Kelley Director, Security and International Relations Issues Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-80-282BR The Persian Gulf Contents Letter 1 Section 1 6 Allied Commitment to Summary Several Countries Have Maintained a Lengthy Presence in 6 6 the Gulf Region the Region U.S. Objective Is to Ensure Regional Security and 6 Maintain Oil Flow U.S. Forces Vary as Threat Increases and Subsides 6 Operation Earnest Will Begins 7 Section 2 8 Overview of Country Summary Nine Non-Gulf Countries Provided Support 8 8 Involvement Six Gulf States Supported the Effort 9 Section 3 10 Assessmentof Burden Summary Cost of Contributions Is Difficult to Measure 10 10 Sharing Not All Countries Provided Cost Data 10 Non-Gulf Countries Assessed in Relation to Naval Assets 12 Provided Section 4 14 Overview of Oil Prices Summary 14 14 and Production During Non-Gulf Countries’ Presence Demonstrated the Importance of Gulf Oil the Conflict Operation Facilitated the Continued Free Flow of Oil 14 Little Increase in Worldwide Oil Prices Resulted 16 Section 5 17 Analysis of Potential Summary IEA Members Did Not Have to Share Reserves 17 17 Impact of a Persian Potential Impact of a Disruption on Oil-Dependent 18 Gulf Oil Disruption Economies Impact of a One-Quarter Oil Disruption on the United 21 States Potential Impact of a Disruption on Gulf Oil-Producing 22 Nations Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-BO-2S2BR The Persian Gulf Content8 Appendixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 24 Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 25 Tables Table 3.1: U.S. Incremental Costs of Persian Gulf 11 Operations Table 3.2: Relative Value of the Contributions of the Six 13 Countries With Ships Operating in the Persian Gulf (Between October 1987 and August 1988) Table 6.1: 1987 OECD Oil Statistics 18 Table 5.2: Estimated Losses From a Total Disruption in 20 Persian Gulf Oil Supplies Table 6.3: Estimated Losses Due to a Disruption in the 21 Strait of Hormuz Table 6.4: The Potential Effect of a Disruption of 22 Petroleum Shipments Through the Strait of Hormuz Table 5.5: Gulf States Oil Statistics (1987) 23 Figures Figure 4.1: Oil Production 1986-89 (First Quarter 1987 16 Through Third Quarter 1988 Covers Operation Earnest Will) Figure 4.2: Quarterly Oil Prices (March 1987 Through 16 September 1988) Abbreviations AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product IEA International Energy Agency IEP International Energy Program mbd millions of barrels a day OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-90.282BR The Persian Gulf * Section 1 Allied Commitment to the Gulf Region . Several Countries Have Maintained a Lengthy Presence in the Region Summary . U.S. Objective Is to Ensure Regional Security and Maintain Oil Flow l U.S. Forces Vary as Threat Increases and Subsides l Operation Earnest Will Begins The United States has maintained a naval presence in the Persian Gulf Several Countries region’ since 1949. France and the United Kingdom have also main- Have Maintained a tained a lengthy naval presence in the Gulf. The United Kingdom, for Lengthy Presencein example, has maintained ships in the region since 1980. The rationale for this presence is the importance of Gulf oil to industrialized nations. the Region The economies of the United States and its European and Pacific allies U.S. Objective Is to are dependent on the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf oil. In the short Ensure Regional term, a disruption in the flow of oil from the Gulf may not pose an Security and Maintain immediate problem because oil may be available from other producers. However, a mid- or long-term disruption would, no doubt, result in price Oil Flow increases, thereby threatening the economies of all net oil-importing nations. The greatest threat to allied interests in the area is the spillover of a regional conflict that could interrupt the flow of oil. Historically, rela- tions in the Gulf region have been volatile. U.S. strategy has been to demonstrate a commitment to the region that is firm, credible, and durable in the face of conflicts that could affect established U.S. com- mitments. The United States is therefore committed to ensuring stability and security with the friendly regional states. In the last 41 years of U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, forces have U.S. Forces Vary as varied depending on instability in the region. There was little threat to Threat Increases and U.S. interests between 1949 and 1978. Although the 1973 Arab oil Subsides embargo was not the result of a military conflict in the Gulf, it created an energy crisis that brought to the fore both the need for and risks of overdependence on imported Gulf oil. After 1978, the US. naval presence fluctuated as the threat increased and decreased. The fall of the Shah of Iran, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 emphasized the need for ‘The Persian Gulf region includes the Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean. Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-W-282BR The Persian Gulf Allled Cmnmltment to the Gulf bglon a U.S. strategy in an area now vital to U.S. interests. Between 1979 and 1986, the United States increased its naval presence in the region from three to six ships. In 1986, Iran boarded a U.S. tanker, the SS President Taylor, and Operation Earnest Will attacked Kuwaiti tankers. The Soviets responded by offering to trans- Begins port and escort Kuwait&flagged Soviet tankers. In March 1987, the Pres- ident announced the U.S. intention to reflag and escort Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf, adding three more Navy ships to the region. About this time, the United States called upon its allies to protect ship- ping in the Gulf. The US. ship protection program became known as operation Earnest Will. In May 1987, the United States extended its pro- tection to neutral ships on a case-by-case basis. U.S. naval forces were increased to 18 ships during the conflict, which ended when Iran and Iraq declared a cease-fire in August 1988. Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 2 Overview of Cbuntry Involvement Nine Non-Gulf Countries Provided Support Summary l l Six Gulf States Supported the Effort Six non-Gulf countries provided direct naval support during operation Nine Non-Gulf Earnest Will. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Countries Provided Kingdom, and the United States cleared mines from navigational routes. All these countries escorted and monitored their flagged ships in a SUPpofi defined channel and patrolled international waters. The United States formally extended its protection to neutral shipping on a case-by-case basis. The remaining three countries, Japan, Luxembourg, and West Germany, provided indirect support. In reporting its contribution, Japan included credit for a $300 million loan made to Oman and a $200 million loan to Jordan, which is not a Gulf state. These concessional loans provide favorable terms and low-interest rates.’ Japan also agreed to install a precision navigation system in the Gulf. Beacons are almost completely installed along the friendly states’ coast- lines and, by cross-fixing signals, will enable accurate ship location. This system will not only aid in navigation but will also enhance mine- clearing capabilities should other conflicts arise in the future. Japan has negotiated individually with each Gulf state for the installa- tion of the navigation system. Negotiations have been completed with all the Gulf states except the United Arab Emirates. Negotiated terms include maintenance and training agreements. The navigation system is operational in all the friendly Gulf states except for Oman and the IJnited Arab Emirates. The system’s cost, thus far, is $9 million. Luxembourg, which has no navy, provided $400,000 for the upkeep of forces. West Germany interpreted its constitution as prohibiting it from pro- viding a naval presence. It fulfilled a U.S.-NATO commitment to provide naval forces in the Mediterranean, thereby freeing other naval forces for relocation to the Gulf. ‘Oman’s loan is for 23 years, with an B-year grace period, at a 4.4 percent interest rate. Jordan’s loan includes a $132 million, 30-year loan at 2.9 percent interest for agricultural and road projects. At the time of our review, negotiations for the remainder of the -Jordanloan were ongoing. Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 2 Overview of Country Involvement The Gulf States, which profited from the continued oil flow, also sup- Six Gulf States ported the effort. They provided vital access to their ports, bases, and Supported the Effort facilities as well as other assistance-including fuel for both U.S. ships and aircraft. Page 9 GAO/NSLAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf 1 , Section 3 I Assessmentof Burden Sharing Cost of Contributions Is Difficult to Measure Summary l l Not All Countries Provided Cost Data . Non-Gulf Countries Assessed in Relation to Naval Assets Provided Establishing a common measure of the cost of naval operations was dif- Cost of Contributions ficult because some countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Is Difficult to Measure the United States, maintained a regional presence and had ships in the area. Other countries, such as Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, have smaller naval fleets and had to transit to the Persian Gulf region. Naval operating costs differ due to ship sizes, crew complements, and per- sonnel costs (which may or may not be included in naval operating costs). Additionally, incremental costs (costs additional to normal naval operation costs) are difficult to separate, largely because naval ships would be operating elsewhere. For the reasons noted, some countries did not provide cost estimates for Not All Countries their naval operations in the Persian Gulf during the conflict. The Provided Cost Data Department of Defense provided U.S. incremental cost data for opera- tion Earnest Will. These costs totaled about $240 million (see table 3.1). Page 10 GAO/NSIAlMO-282BR The Persian Gulf Se&Ion 8 Ansesement of Burden Sharing Table 3.1: U.S. Incremental Costs of Persian Cult Operations Dollars in thousands Fiscal year Through Jan. Service operating costs 1987’ 1988 1989 1990 Navy Aircraft operations $7,322 $24,914 $19,877 $211 ____ ShiD ooerations 26.681 68.418 23.517 392 Imminent danger pay 1,266 9,690 3,335 &herb -I_ 31,627 47,835 23,706 3,20; Total Navy 966,896 $150,857 $70,435 $3,809 Air Force Travel/TAD” 239 1.574 1.030 49 Other 5,540 1,940 245 0 Total Air Force $5,779 $3,514 $1,275 $49 Army Travel/TAD 325 3,520 2.093 1,078 SAAM lift 571 382 130 0 Supplies/ _-_--- contracts 45 2,496 1,573 157 Other 0 146 23 8 Total Army $941 $8,544 $3,919 $1,243 Total service operation costs $73,716 $160,915 $75,529 $5,101 Other coats and credits .-- ___- Host nation fuelsupport ..--____. 0 (57,138) (73,179) (24,392) USS Roberts Reoair 0 15,907 40.922 -- 0 kocurement (Army) --.--. 7,545 14,416 469 0 Total $81,281 $134,100 $(43,741) (19,291) ‘The fiscal year 1987time periodis July throughSeptember1987 “includes traveland NavalAir SystemsCommand,NavalSeaSystemsCommand,and NavalSupply SystemsCommandsupportcosts. “Temporaryadditionalduty. Source:Departmentof Defense It is difficult to establish a correlation between the number and type of naval assets provided by the countries (see table 3.2) and incremental costs identified. For example, Italy provided six combat vessels, about half of the naval force France had in the Gulf. While Italy’s cost esti- mate is nearly half of France’s estimated costs, the estimate appears dis- proportionate considering that the French force included a costly-to- Page 11 GAO/NSJAB90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 3 bsewment of Burden Sharing operate aircraft carrier. Furthermore, countries’ calculations of incre- mental costs may differ. The United States, for example, does not include personnel costs in its calculations except for hazardous duty pay. When considering the non-Gulf countries’ contributions in burden Non-Gulf Countries sharing, we focused on the naval assets provided by the countries. Assessedin Relation to Because not all countries provided cost estimates for naval operations, Naval Assets Provided ment we assigned a value to ships supporting operation Earnest Will. Involve- began in October 1987, when all the countries’ ships had arrived in the Gulf region, and ended with the cease-fire in August 1988. We used 1J.S.operating costs for various types of ships: the highest daily cost was $74,000 for aircraft carriers; the lowest daily cost was $1,500 for minesweepers. The values were then computed by days the ships were deployed in the Gulf. Table 3.2 identifies the naval assets, time frames, and values assigned. IJnder this methodology, the allied contribution is about 60 percent and the U.S. contribution about 40 percent. The United Kingdom, which had a large number of ships in the region, suffers under this methodology because it did not assign an aircraft carrier to the Gulf. Page 12 GAO/NSIALHO-282BR The Persian Gulf . Section 3 &semement of Burden Sharing Tablo 3.2: Relative Value 01 the Contrlbutlonr ot the SIX Countrier With Estimated Estimated Relative value of Shlpr Operating In the Pewian Qulf arrival/ months contribution (Between October 1987 and August 1988) Country and ships departure dates deployed (Percent)’ Belgium/Netherlandsb 9 1 Minesweeper 10/87-m/00 6 1 Minesweeper 1Q/87-07/88 IO- 2 Minesweepers 1Q/87-08/88 11 1 Succort shW I Franced -____-___ 34 1 Aircraft carrier 1O/87-08188 11 7 Combatants 1O/87-08/88 11 3 Minesweepers QSupport shipsC I o/87-08/88 11 --.---- I -’ -- Italy 7 3 Combatants 1 Combatant - 1O/87- 12187 ---________-- 3 --- -- 2 Combatants- I o/87-oat88 11 - 3 Minesweepers i oja7-oajaa 11 -_____~- 2 Support shipsC f United Kingdomd .--- --- IO 3 Combatants i o/87-08/88 11 3 Minesweepers 1o/87-08/88 11 I_---. 1 Command ship 1o/87-08/88-__ .____- 11 2 Support shipsC I __----____ -- United Statesd 40 _ 1 Aircraft carrier 1o/87-08/88 __-.-.__. 11 ----- 9 Combatants a Combatants I o/87-08/88 -____ 11 ..___-- 1 Combatant 05taa-oat88 __- 4 6 Minesweepers __-~~--~- i o/a7-oa+ ___.---__ 11 -_-.. 1 Command shio 1o/87-08/88 11 4 Amphibious ships? f ___l_--.-- 2 Other ships I -_____-~-- ---~- 10 Support shipsC I aValues are based on daily U.S. operating cost estimates, excluding manpower and maintenance costs as follows: Carrier, $74,000; Cruiser, $18,000; Destroyer, $16,000; Frigate, $9,000; Minesweeper $1,500, Command ship, $14,000. It should be recognized that ship size, complements, and maintenance costs doffer among countries. Transiting costs and adminrstrative costs are not Included. ‘Belgium and the Netherlands combined forces. COperating costs for support ships unavailable. dThese countries had a presence in the Gulf region prior to 1987. ‘Costs unavailable for amphibious ships. ‘Data not readily available. Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf . ’ Section 4 Overview of Oil Prices and Production During - the Conflict . Non-Gulf Countries’ Presence Demonstrated the Importance of Gulf Oil Summary l Operation Facilitated the Continued Free Flow of Oil l Little Increase in Worldwide Oil Prices Resulted According to Defense Department officials, Earnest Will has done much Non-Gulf Countries’ to further U.S. relations with the Gulf states. Through the operation, the Presence United States has demonstrated its resolve and willingness to respond to Demonstrated the the legitimate defense needs of friendly states in the region. Importance of Gulf Oil An informal allied presence in the region prior to the Iran-Iraq cease-fire indicated the importance of Gulf oil t% Western European and-Pacific nations. As long as oil remains a primary source of energy for the indus- trial world, the Persian Gulf region will remain vital to the security of the United States, its allies, and friends. One of the objectives of operation Earnest Will was to maintain the free Operation Facilitated flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area. As shown in figure 4.1, the opera- the Continued Free tion was successful. Oil disruptions did not occur, and Persian Gulf oil Flow of Oil production actually increased slightly. In the first quarter of 1987, when the President announced the reflagging and protection of Kuwaiti tankers, Gulf oil production was at about 10 million barrels a day. By the third quarter of 1987, Gulf oil production had increased to about 12 million barrels a day. This increased production was also reflected in a slight increase in global production as well. Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 4 Overview of Oil Pricee and Production During the Cmflict Ff9ure 4.1: Oil Production 1988-89 (First Quarter 1987 Through Third Quarter 1988 Covers Operation Earnest Will) 70 Mllllonoot Bamlmpof Day 65 60 mL8mmmmmmm~mmmmmmmmm * w •mmmmmmmmmm~mmmmmm .=--m8m..................=‘= mmmmmmmmmmmmm0mmg0 l 50 ; - _ _ -: -.-- a5 a0 25 -5-e. 20 ww”w~“www---*-- ---am. wwww~ww~wwwww.L-------------w...ww.-- -www-- ww--- I.www.wmnw------ 16 5 0 .- .,._ . -- -. I:1 88:2 00:) 811:4 81:l 872 ma 07:4 e&l 88:2 00s a&4 I)*1 89.2 89.8 - The Persian Gulf ---- OPEC v Market Emnornlea nnn n World Oil supply disruptions harm all net oil-importing nations regardless of Little Increase in their dependence on a particular regional supply. An oil loss from a par- Worldwide Oil Prices ticular region would, in the absence of an oil production surge in undis- Resulted rupted regions and accompanying oil austerity programs, create global competition for reduced supplies. The demand for reduced oil supplies would result in higher oil prices for all. International Energy Agency (IEA)’ countries have a common interest in keeping Gulf oil flowing because they have agreed to share their reserves and an oil disruption would result in price increases. For oil- consuming nations, dramatic price increases adversely affect their econ- omies. Fortunately, the Iran-Iraq war had little effect on oil prices. ‘The IEA was established to facilitate responsesto short-term energy disruptions and long-term supply problems. IEA members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer- land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Page 16 GAO/NSL4D!bO-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 4 Overview of’ Oil Prices and Production During the Cmflict Figure 4.2 presents three indicators of the cost to obtain a barrel of oil during the operation. The first indicator is the weighted average cost of a barrel of oil, including insurance and freight, for members of the IEA agreement. The line shows that oil prices declined steadily until the third quarter of 1986 and rose slightly until the announcement of U.S. operations. These prices ranged from around $14 to $18 a barrel for the duration of the operation. The second price indicator is the landed, or final, cost of a barrel of oil that is shipped from the Persian Gulf to US. ports. The third indicator is the cost of a barrel of oil at Persian Gulf ports. This is the price of oil on board vessels destined for the United States, excluding transportation and insurance costs. Figure 4.2 indicates that the difference between the second and third indicators did not significantly change. This suggests that the risk-real or imagined-from 1986 to the third quarter of 1989 also did not change. Flgure 4.2: Quarterly 011Price5 (March 1987 Through September 1988) 26 Dollara per Barrel 8 0 88:l 88:2 353 86:4 57A 87:2 m3 87.4 2&l 88.2 08:3 88:4 Yean:olJaltora - Mean Coe.t,lnsurance L Freight to IEA Member8 mm-1 LandedCoattotheUSfromArabOPEC m Freight On Board to the US from Arab OPEC Freight On Board (FOB) prices Exclude costs related to insurance and transportation to the United St&S Page 16 GAO/NSIAD90-282RR The Persian Gulf Sect& 5 Aklysis of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf Oil Disruption . IEA Members Did Not Have to Share Reserves Summary l Potential Impact of a Disruption on Oil-Dependent Economies l Impact of a One-Quarter Oil Disruption on the United States . Potential Impact of a Disruption on Gulf Oil-Producing Nations lJnder IEA'S International Energy Program (IEP), member countries vol- IEA Members Did Not untarily agree to share oil reserves. This emergency sharing system is Have to Share the Agency’s mechanism for reducing the adverse effects of a serious oil Reserves supply disruption.’ Under the system, member countries agree to l maintain emergency reserves equal to 90 days of net oil imports, l establish measures to reduce demand by 7 to 10 percent during a serious oil disruption, and . subject their oil supplies to an international allocation system, using a predetermined formula to share with or receive oil from each other if disruptions exceed 7 percent of their imports. Outside the system, mem- bers also have agreed to cooperate in disruptions that are smaller than 7 percent. The system guarantees members access to essential volumes of oil, but not necessarily at the same prices. Oil from the Persian Gulf accounts for 42 percent of the total net oil imports of all Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.” Table 5.1 shows, among other things, the Gulf oil imports of the countries that contributed to open navigation in the Per- sian Gulf. It also shows that Japan, the United States, and the smaller European nations that did not participate in operation Earnest Will were the main importers of Persian Gulf oil during this period. Measuring dependence on the Persian Gulf as the ratio of imports from the Gulf to daily consumption, the Netherlands and Japan were most dependent on oil from the Gulf. The Netherlands and Japan depended on the Persian Gulf for 74 percent and 58 percent of their daily oil consumption, respectively. In contrast, the U.S. dependence on the Persian Gulf oil was only 7 percent. In daily consumption, imports from the Gulf repre- sented 27 percent of the total for OECD countries. ’ For further information on the Emergency Sharing System, see GAO report Status of U.S. Participa- tion in the International Energy Agency’s Emergency Sharing System (GAO/NSIAD-8599, June 13, 19%). ‘OECD members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 5 Analyrb of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf OU Disruption Table 5.1: 1987 OECD Oil Statistics Average daily 1987 GDP” 1987 Daily net oil importsb consumption in U.S. Thousands/barrels (thousands/ (dollars in Country OPEC Gulf TotalC barrels) billions) Belgium 257 162 456 .-___ 452 $142 France .___684 459 --__ ____..--~- 1,742 1,789 a73 West Germany ___---- 679 187 2,281 2,424-----i-j% Italy ----..- .---~~---- ~- 1,307 782 1,718 -__ i ,855 749 .___ Japan 3,198 ~~~ 2,637 4,418 _---~~~-..--__.~- 4,454 2,376 United Kingdomd 164 277 -1015 7K 576 United States 3,053 1,072 5,914 16,665 4,497 Luxembourg _----____-.~--.-.-. e e 27 27 e Netherlands 773 516 -._-_____--- 562 -..~-____. 686 214 Others 3,120 ___- 2,036 2,725 _~..--. e e Total 13,235 8,128 18,828 29,955 e %ross domesticproduct. t’Basedon daily averagesreportedquarterly ImportsareextractedfromOPECtotals.DifferencesbetweenOPEC totals and total country ‘,Gulf ImportsIndicateadditionalsourcesof oil Importedor producedby countries. “Net exporter ‘Not applicable. If a disruption had occurred, the near-term impact on oil-consuming Potential Impact of a economies would have been serious. Dramatic increases in oil prices Disruption on Oil- have historically affected the economies that rely on oil or its products. Dependent Economies For example, following the 1973-74 embargo, crude oil prices nearly tripled. This increase contributed to a l . l-percen.t decrease in the real gross national product of the United States in 1975. Further, in the year following the 1979 Iranian shutdown, oil prices nearly doubled, contrib- uting to a 13.5-percent inflation rate and a 7.1-percent unemployment rate in 1980 in the United States. Generally, oil supply disruptions immediately increase the spot market price of oil. Lags in market response to the change in market conditions and increased inventory buildup may create a period of rising prices even after the disruption. The size of the disruption, market tightness, and the availability of emergency reserves would, however, ultimately determine the severity of the macroeconomic consequences of inflation, unemployment, and economic stagnation. Ultimately, oil supply disrup- tions harm all net oil-importing nations regardless of their dependence on supplies from a disrupted area. Page 18 GAO/NSIAD90-282BR The Persian Gulf . Se&on 5 AnalyeL of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf Oil Disruption The potential impact of disruption of oil imports from the Gulf on selected OECDoil-consuming countries is shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3. The generated estimates are derived using the assumptions in the Depart- ment of Energy’s Disruption Impact Simulator and petroleum statistics from the period. Table 5.2 presents the most severe impact that could have occurred at the outset of a disruption in the first quarter of 1987 through the launch of operation Earnest Will at the beginning of the second quarter of 1987. Table 5.2 shows the potential impact resulting from a disruption to oil transshipped through the Strait of Hormuz as well as oil shipped through existing regional pipelines, which were oper- ating at 24 percent of capacity. These tables show for the United States an initial oil import loss from a disruption, an increased oil import loss resulting from competition for available oil in the free market, and a slightly reduced loss resulting from IEP members’ sharing of reserves or member-produced oil. A total disruption of petroleum from the Persian Gulf in the first quarter of 1987 would have meant a loss of 6.63 million barrels a day (mbd) of worldwide supplies, of which 5.63 mbd would have been lost to IEA mem- bers. Among IEX members, Japan and the United States would have an immediate loss of 1.93 mbd, and 1.28 mbd, respectively. Moreover, had IEA members sought to replace the 5.63 mbd from other sources (without any global surge production), they would have obtained only .44 mbd, leaving them with a shortfall of 5.19 mbd. A disruption of the magnitude hypoth- esized in this report would have been large enough to trigger the IEP. This factor is evidence that the Persian Gulf is critically important as a prime source of petroleum to IEA members collectively. The implementa- tion of emergency burden sharing arrangements under the IEP would make it possible for member countries to collectively face a shortage of 4.81 mbd before consuming strategic petroleum reserves to meet their domestic needs. The IEP redistributions would partially alleviate U.S. shortfalls but worsen shortfalls in Japan, West Germany, and non-1E:A consuming nations. Page 19 GAO/NSlAD-90-282BRThe Persian Gulf Section 6 Analysis of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf Oil Disruption Table 5.2: Estimated LOWM From a Total Disruption in Perrian Gulf Oil Supplies Millions of barrels a dav Country Immediate 1058~ Free marketb Full lEPC U.S. and territories 1.28 2.30 2.17 Canada 0.10 0.26 0.11 Japan ___-__ i .93 -----..-~.-~0.76 ..~...0.80 Australia/ New Zealand 0.08 0.13 0.04 Norway/Sweden ~-. ~.-- - 0.03 0.10 -.----~__--__-._-~~-.~ 0.02 United Kingdom/ Ireland 0.09 o,03-.---.-~o~~-~-.-~~~. 0.29 0.04 o,,8 Benelux/Denmark ___-- __-~ -._-.. -.-.---.-. ~ ~ West--..---.--_._--I_--- Germany ___- 0.27 0.41 0.65 Austria/ Switzerland 0.04 --__--___.---...--..___--.-- 0.08 0.14 ..~. .~~_... ~-. Spain/Portugal 0.40 0.19_ __._~_ -.. ~--~ 0.23 Italy 0.80 0.31 0.26 Greece/Turkey ____-..--__--..._-..---.-_---~-.-~ 0.12 0.58 .~~~ -0.18 ~~ Total IEA 5.63 5.19 4.91 Non-IEA/ non-OPEC - 1 .oo 1.44 1.82 Total tree world 6.63 6.63 6.63 “Loss to each IEA member from a disruption in the Persian Gulf “Estimated shortfalls of petroleum supplies if each IEA member were to replace a loss by competing for suppltes in the global market. Assumption is that supplies to be obtained are normal demand wrthout reliance on reserves or surge in domestic production ‘,Estimated shortfall is based on IEP formula and represents IEP rather than marketplace distribution. Shortfalls could be met from member’s strategic petroleum reserves. Source: GAO estimate based on Department of Energy Disruption Impact Simulator. Another way to look at the effects of a potential disruption of the flow of petroleum in the Persian Gulf is to consider a disruption of oil shipped through the Strait of Hormuz. Table 5.3, which excludes over- land pipeline delivery systems, indicates the probable effects of ship- ping disruptions on the Strait of Hormuz-the main sea channel for transportation in the area. A total loss of petroleum shipped through the Strait of Hormuz in the first quarter of 1987 would have resulted in a 5.1 mbd loss to the free world. Japan would have incurred the largest loss. The disruption would have triggered the sharing of strategic petroleum reserves, thereby les- sening the impact of the disruption. Page 20 GAO/NSLAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Section 6 Andy& of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf OR Disruption Table 5.3: Estimated Loss08 Due to a Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz Millions of barrels a dav Country ---_I_- - Immediate loss Free market Full IEP U.S. and territories 1.08 1.77 1.65 Canada 0.07 0.20 0.06 Japan -.. 1.82 0.59 0.63 Australia/ New Zealand 0.06 0.10 0.02 Norway/Sweden ___ 0.02 0.08 0.00 United Kingdom/ Ireland 0.05 0.22 -0.01 Benelux/Denmark .____ 0.03 0.18 0.13 West Germany 0.17 0.32 0.57 Austria/ Switzerland 0.02 0.06 0.12 Spain/Portugal ---__-. 0.26 0.14 0.19 ltaly _--._---- --.. -~ 0.55 0.24 0.20 Greece/Turkey -- 0.32 ---- 0.09 0.15 Total IEA 4.44 4.00 3.71 Non-IEA/non-OPEC ___ 0.67 1.11 1.40 Total free world 5.11 5.11 5.11 Source:Departmentof EnergyDisruptionImpactSimulator If oil flowing through the pipelines had increased to full capacity and was not disrupted, the impacts shown in the tables may have been miti- gated. For example, the impact to free world oil-consuming countries would have been lessened from 5.1 mbd to 1.13 mbd. This loss would not have triggered the emergency sharing system of the IEP. However, there is no assurance that the conflict would have been confined to sea lanes and would not have affected the flow of oil through the pipeline. Dramatic oil price increases have a domino effect on oil-dependent econ- Impact of a One- omies, such as the United States, and affect inflation rates, unemploy- Quarter Oil Disruption ment, and the gross national product. Table 5.4 shows the potential on the United States effect on the United States from a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz. The first quarter of 1987 reflects the average costs of oil and its byprod- ucts as well as the consumption and oil imports. These baseline figures, coupled with the assumptions in the model, identify the potential effects of an oil disruption on the US. economy. The analysis is based on Department of Energy’s model using the fol- lowing baseline conditions. In 1987, the price of imported crude oil was at $18 per barrel, and gasoline prices and heating oil prices averaged $0.96 and $0.80 per gallon, respectively. Consumption of petroleum was Page 2 1 GAO/NSIAD-90.282BR The Persian Gulf Section 6 Analysis of Potential Impact of a Persian Gulf’ oil Disruption estimated at 16.6 mbd with a net import of 6.3 mbd. The analysis assumes that the disruption ends by the start of the second quarter of 1987. Assuming only a first quarter, 1987, oil disruption from the Strait of Hormuz, the simulation reveals that imported crude oil prices would have more than doubled during the quarter but would have returned to a price of $24 per barrel by the fourth quarter. If the disruption ended in the first quarter of 1987, the economy would recover quickly with the gross national product loss limited to .58 percent in the fourth quarter. Table 5.4: The Potential Effect of a Disruption of Petroleum Shipments 1987 Through the Strait of Hormuz 1 st qtr (Base line ____-.--- conditions) 1st qtr 2nd qtr 3rd qtr 4th qtr Crude ..-- oil pricea --- $18.13 $42.56 $33.23 $27.46 $23.90 Gasoline -- priceb $0.96 $154 $1.32 $1.18 $l.lo Heating oil pricer’ $0.80 _ $1.38 $1.16 $1.02 $0.94 U.S. consumptionC.- 16.53 14.76 15.45 15.92 16.42 U.S. net importsc 6.26 .._____- 4.49 4.97 4.90 5.78 GNP lossd -1.78 -1.26 -0.87 -0.58 Unemployment gaind 0.71 0.51 0.35 0.23 Inflation aain” 2.66 1.90 1.30 0.87 Terms of trade lo@ -$11.77 -$7.64 -$4.46 -$3.19 aPriceper barrelof importedoil bPriceper gallon Cmillionsof barrelsper day dpercentagepoints ebillionsof dollars Source:GAOestimatebasedon the Departmentof EnergyDisruptionImpactSimulator. If a long-term disruption had occurred, the impact on oil-producing Potential Impact of a countries would have been serious, considering the importance of oil to a Disruption on Gulf Oil- country’s gross national product and as a foreign currency earner. Oil Producing Nations represents a major part of the gross national product for all the Gulf states. For Gulf states that are friendly with the United States, 1987 oil exports to the OECDvaried from 95 percent of Bahrain’s 1987 gross national product to 19 percent of Kuwait’s gross national product. Oil ” exports to 0%~ were important to Iran and Iraq as well. Oil exports for Iran accounted for 6 percent of its gross national product, while Iraq’s exports comprised 20 percent of its gross national product. Moreover, Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Election 5 Analyst0 of Potential Impact of (L Persian Gulf oil Disruption for all the Gulf states, oil exports were a critical foreign currency earner. For example, in 1987 Iraq earned $8 billion from petroleum exports to OECDcountries. This represented 89 percent of its total exports to these countries. Similarly, Iran’s petroleum exports to OECD countries totaled $10 billion, or 87 percent, of its total exports to these countries. During the period, Saudi Arabia’s petroleum exports repre- sented 70 percent of its total exports to OECDcountries. Table 5.5 shows the amount of Gulf oil exported to OECDcountries in 1987 and its value in US. dollars. Table 5.5: Gulf States 011 Statistics (1987) Oil exports to 1997 gross OECD countries0 Value of 1987 oil national product (millions of exports (U.S. in (U.S. dollars (in Country barrels/day) dollars (in billions) billions) Bahrain 0.04 $4b $4.3 Kuwait - 0.9 - ._____ 5 25.8 Qatar 02 2 4.2 Saudi Arabiac 2.8 22 69.7d United Arab Emirates ----. 1.1 -_ 9 22.9 Iran 1.2 _____- IO 165.9 Iraq 1.1 a 40.0 “Average1987daily oil expects. hBahrainvalueof oil is only for 1988 ‘Oman exportsreportedwith SaudiArabia. dDoesnot IncludeOman’sgrossnationalproduct,which was $1.3billion Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Appendix I Objectives, Scope,and Methodology Our objectives were to (1) identify the countries involved in sustaining open navigation in the Persian Gulf and the role each played, (2) analyze the value of the contributions provided by those countries, and (3) assess the potential economic impact of the disruption of Gulf oil imports on the Gulf States and industrialized countries. The data obtained covers March 1987 and August 1988. We contacted embassy officials from Bahrain, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom and West Germany, to obtain information on their involvement and cost estimates. For information on U.S. involvement, we contacted officials at the Departments of Defense and State. Because of the time limits involved, we did not verify the information provided to us or obtain written agency comments from the Department of Defense. However, we met with appropriate DOD officials and obtained their official oral comments. For those countries that were unable to provide us cost data on naval assets, we developed a relative value based on US. naval ship operating costs. Using the Department of Energy’s Distribution Impact Simulator, we developed estimates of the probable economic effects of a Persian Gulf oil disruption. The Disruption Impact Simulator has been used by other U.S. government agencies, DOE included, for the assessments of poten- tial economic effects and policy implications of other oil flow disrup- tions. We did not independently validate the accuracy of the simulator’s predictions. We performed our work between January and March 1990 in accor- dance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-90-282BR The Persian Gulf Ppe &lGzi Contributors to This Report Louis H. Zanardi, Assistant Director National Security and Patricia L. Martin, Evaluator-in-Charge International Affairs Gezahegne Bekele, Economist Division, Washington, D.C. (467964) Page 25 GAO/NSLAD-SO-282BR The Persian Gulf ---.- -_-.--._- - .-.--I_......-I- ___ - ___. . _^._ .._”..I - l..l.-I”-.-.._..-.--- --.-----
Burden Sharing: Allied Protection of Ships in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-09-06.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)