oversight

Army Reserve Components: Opportunities to Improve Management of the Full-Time Support Program

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-02-08.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

                         ICepcwt to the Chairman, Subcommittee
    GkO                  on Military Personnel and
                         Cwnpons&ion, Committee on Armed
                         Swviws, House of’Representatives


                         ARMY RESERVE
                         COMPONENTS
                         Opportunities to
                         Improve Management
                         of the Full-Time
                         Support Program




    (;AO,‘NSIAI)-90-43

I
National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-236144

Fc~t,lTlal'v* 8. lO!~O

The Honorable Beverly B. Byron
Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
   and Compensation
Committee on Armed Services
IIouse of Representatives

Dear Madam Chairman:

This report responds to your request that we examine the Army’s full-time support program,
which provides personnel to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to assist in
various activities related to achieving unit readiness.

As you requested, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days after its issue
date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees
on Armed Services and on Appropriations; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and the Secretaries of Defense and the Army. Copies will also be made available to other
interested parties upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis, Director, Army Issues, who
may be reached on (202) 275-4141 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,




Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
                                                                                                  ,        6


                                                                                                       i
E$ecutive Summary


                   Within the Department of Defense (DOD), each military service has a full-
Purpose            time support program that provides personnel to reserve components to
                   assist with the administering, recruiting, maintaining, and training
                   essential to achieving unit readiness. Service-wide programs include
                   about 170,000 personnel. The Army’s program accounts for almost half,
                   with over 82,000 personnel, and costs about $3 billion annually. The
                   Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation,
                   House Committee on Armed Services, requested that GAO determine
                   whether the Army (1) exercises adequate management over its full-time
                   support program, (2) adequately justifies its estimated personnel
                   requirements, and (3) makes efficient and effective use of existing
                   personnel.


                   The Army’s total force policy in the mid-1970s placed greater emphasis
BaLkground         on the use of the reserve components and, in turn, on the expansion of
                   the full-time support force. Because the Army was experiencing some
                   civilian manpower reductions, the Congress directed the Army to con-
                   duct a test program using Active Guard/Reserve personnel in the full-
                   time support force. Currently, the Army’s support personnel consist
                   mostly of Active Guard/Reserve members, who belong to reserve units
                   and are on full-time duty for 180 days or more; and military technicians,
                   civilian employees who must maintain membership in a reserve unit as a
                   condition of their employment.

                   DOD provides general guidance on full-time support programs, leaving
                   specific guidance on implementation to the military services. Within the
                   Army, program responsibilities are spread among 10 organizations,
                   including the Offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the
                   Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The Director of the
                   Army National Guard and the Chief of the Army Reserve manage clay-
                   to-day program activities within their respective reserve components.


                   During the 1980s the Army’s full-time support program grew substan-
Rcjsultsin Brief   tially without adequate oversight and direction. The Army’s objective
                   during that time was to get as much support as possible. The Army is
                   currently looking closely at its program and initiating several changes to
                   help improve it. While these initiatives are a step in the right direction,
                   they do not address all the areas that need corrective action. GAO found
                   that




                   Page 2                       GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
     :,

--
                              Executive   Summary




                          . no one Army organization oversees and manages full-time support as a
                            totally integrated program;
                          l the Army has not applied adequate monitoring mechanisms to its pro-
                            gram, but it has taken steps to place the program under the Army’s
                            internal control system;
                          . full-time support personnel requirements are not adequately justified;
                            and
                          l the Army lacks guidance that defines the roles for full-time support per-
                            sonnel categories and procedures to ensure that these positions are filled
                            with the most cost-effective mix of personnel.



Pripcipal Findings

Program Needs Greater         The Army’s full-time support program lacks the centralized manage-
Mariagement Attention         ment that would provide general oversight and policy direction to
                              achieve an efficient and effective program. No one Army office oversees
                              and manages full-time support as a totally integrated program, and
                              inadequate management attention has contributed to several program
                              weaknesses. The Army has not established adequate internal controls to
                              monitor its full-time support program. Specifically, we found that
                              (1) the Army has not conducted any regular program effectiveness eval-
                              uations; (2) validation team reviews, although limited, have identified
                              misuse of personnel; and (3) until recently, the Army exempted the pro-
                              gram from the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act reporting
                              requirements. This fact may explain why no material weaknesses were
                              reported in the Secretary’s Annual Statement of Assurance for fiscal
                              years 1986,1987, and 1988.

                              Program monitoring mechanisms could be used to provide management
                              with the information it needs to make informed decisions and to imple-
                              ment changes to improve program efficiency and effectiveness. The
                              Army recognizes the need for greater management attention and is con-
                              sidering changes in several areas to improve it.


Requirements Lack Sound       The Army’s requirement for 120,000 full-time support personnel lacks
                              sound justification. The Army’s requirements for individual units are
Justification w               established in a staffing guide without any work load or similar analy-
                              ses Army officials generally acknowledge that these requirements are



                              Page 3                      GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
                                                                                                                     ,
  / ..-.. _ .._ _---.~-- .-._ ---
                                        Executive   Summary




                                        not established with any degree of accuracy and therefore are
                                        uncertain.

                                        In an attempt to establish more accurate requirements, the Army estab-
                                        lished a task force to revise its staffing guide for units and to develop an
                                        initial staffing guide for headquarters organizations. However, even
                                        with the proposed revisions, requirements for units will continue to be
                                        established without work load or similar analyses. Therefore, Army
                                        organizations question the way the guide is being revised and some of
                                        the full-time support positions proposed for inclusion. The use of work
                                        load analyses to determine full-time support position requirements for
                                        units seems appropriate because these positions are for peacetime oper-
                                        ations and, therefore, are susceptible to work load measurement.


The Army Does Not                       The Army has used primarily Active Guard/Reserve personnel to
                                        expand the full-time support force. Congressional committees and the
Adequately Determine the                Department of Defense have directed the military services, when filling
Most Cost-Effective Mix of              these positions, to establish the most cost-effective mix of personnel.
Fu:ll-Time Support                      The Army normally chooses between Active Guard/Reserve personnel
Personnel                               and military technicians because either personnel category, according to
                                        Department of Defense officials, can be used to fill most military-
                                        essential positions, The Army, however, has not developed guidance
                                        that clearly differentiates the roles of Active Guard/Reserve personnel
                                        and military technicians or procedures to ensure that these positions are
                                        filled with the most cost-effective mix of personnel. GAO found that most
                                        studies comparing the cost of these two personnel categories show that
                                        military technicians are, overall, less costly.

                                        The Army’s ability to employ military technicians is constrained by a
                                        limit on the amount of funds available for civilian pay, and in the past,
                                        the military services have experienced civilian manpower reductions.


                                        GAOrecommends that the Secretary of the Army take the following
R@ommendationsto                        actions:
the Secretary of the
Army                                . Assign authority and responsibility for overseeing and directing the
                                      Army’s full-time support program to one Army organization.
                                    l Develop measurable program objectives and implement adequate pro-
                                      gram monitoring mechanisms.
                                    9 If technically and economically feasible, use work load analyses to
                                      determine full-time support requirements for units.


                                        Page 4                       GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support Program
  .

                               ExecutiveSummary




---_--_--
                           l D e v e l o p clear g u i d a n c eth a t specifically differentiates a m o n g th e roles
                             for A c tive G u a r d /Reserve,m ilitary technician, active c o m p o n e n t,a n d
                             civilian e m p l o y e e sa n d stipulates w h e n full-tim e s u p p o r t p e r s o n n e l
                             should be used.
                           . D e v e l o p procedures,a s r e q u i r e d b y Directive 1 2 0 5 .1 8 ,th a t will h e l p th e
                             A rmy N a tio n a l G u a r d a n d A rmy R e s e r v eestablish th e m o s t cost-
                             e ffective m ix o f personnel.
                           l Id e n tify m a n a g e m e n td e ficienciesin th e full-tim e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m a s a
                             m a terial w e a k n e s sin th e S e c r e tary’sn e x t A n n u a l A s s u r a n c e S ta te m e n t.


                               In view o f th e g r o w i n g i m p o r t a n c e a n d i n c r e a s e dcost o f th e A rmy’s full-
M a tte rs fo r                tim e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m , th e C o n g r e s sm a y wish to consider d e ferring
C o flg ressional              r e q u e s ts for a d d i tio n a l p e r s o n n e la u thorizations a b o v e current levels
C o n sid e ratio n            u n til it is a s s u r e d th a t a d e q u a teaction h a s b e e n ta k e n to i m p r o v e th e
                               p r o g r a m . E x c e p tio n s to s u c h a d e ferral m ight b e c o n s i d e r e dw h e n th e
                               A rmy seeksto a d d n e w m issions to th e reserve c o m p o n e n ts.


                               T h e D e p a r tm e n t o f D e fe n s egenerally a g r e e dwith G A O 'S a u d i t fin d i n g s
A g e n cyC o m m e n ts       a n d r e c o m m e n d a tio n sa n d said th a t it p l a n n e d corrective actions, includ-
                               i n g a s s i g n i n gresponsibility for oversight a n d direction for th e full-tim e
                               s u p p o r t p r o g r a m to o n e A rmy organization. T h e D e p a r tm e n t o f D e fe n s e
                               d i d n o t a g r e e th a t th e full-tim e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m s h o u l d b e i d e n tifie d a s
                               a m a terial w e a k n e s sin th e S e c r e tary o f th e A rmy’s n e x t A n n u a l Assur-
                               a n c e S ta te m e n t, stating th a t th e p r o b l e m s G A O i d e n tifie d h a d n o t signifi-
                               c a n tly w e a k e n e ds a f e g u a r d sagainst th e m i s m a n a g e m e n ot f fu n d s . G A O
                               believesth a t th e full-tim e s u p p o r t p r o g r a m a n d th e p e r s o n n e lw h o m a k e
                               u p th e p r o g r a m a r e a significant resourceth a t s h o u l d b e m a n a g e de ffi-
                               ciently a n d e ffectively. Id e n tifying th e p r o b l e m a s a m a terial w e a k n e s s
                               w o u l d h e l p to fo c u s th e a tte n tio n o f to p m a n a g e m e n to n this issue.

                               A lso, th e D e p a r tm e n t d i d n o t a g r e e with G A O 'S s u g g e s tio nth a t th e C o n -
                               gress consider d e ferring r e q u e s ts for a d d i tio n a l p e r s o n n e la u thorizations
                               a b o v e current levels. It stated a c o n c e r n a b o u t its ability to properly
                               resource n e w force structure or reserve units th a t receive n e w m issions.
                               (;A O ’Ss u g g e s tio nrecognizesth a t it m a y b e desirableto m a k e e x c e p tio n s
                               to a d e ferral policy in th e instances cited b y th e D e p a r tm e n t.




                               Page 5                                   G A O / N S I A D - 9 0 - 4 3 T h e A r m y ’s Full-Time S u p p o r t P r o g r a m
contents


Eyecutive Summary                                                                                          2

Chapter 1                                                                                              8
Introduction           FTS in the Army Reserve Components
                       Cost and Growth of the Army’s Program
                                                                                                       8
                                                                                                       9
                       Program Responsibility in the Army                                             11
                       Objectives, Scope, and Methodology                                             12

Chapter2 ~
F!@ Program Needs      Program Lacks Overall Management Direction
                       Program Monitoring Mechanisms Have Not Been
GqieaterManagement         Adequately Implemented
Attention              Conclusions                                                                    22
                       Recommendations                                                                23
                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                             23

Chapter 3                                                                                             26
FTS Personnel          The Army’s Need for FTS Personnel Is Well Established
                       Determining Personnel Requirements
                                                                                                      26
                                                                                                      26
Rhquirements Lack      Current Personnel Requirements Are Uncertain                                   27
Sound Justification    A Work Load Analysis System Could Be Used to Establish                         30
                           FTS Requirements
                       Conclusions                                                                    31
                       Recommendation to the Secretary of the Army                                    32
                       Matters for Congressional Consideration                                        32
                       Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                             32

Chapter 4                                                                                             33
The Army Does Not      Military-Essentiality Should Be the Primary
                            Consideration in Making Personnel Decisions
                                                                                                      33
Adequately Determine   Cost Should Be a Consideration in Making Personnel                             34
the Most Cost-              Decisions
                       The Army Has Filled Positions Mostly With AGR                                  35
Effective Mix of FTS        Personnel
Personnel              Most Studies Show That Technicians Are Less Costly                             36
                            Than AGR Personnel
                       Some AGR Positions Might Effectively Be Filled by Less                         38
                            Costly Technicians
                       The Army Has Not Effectively Integrated Active                                 39
                            Component Personnel Into the FTS Program



                       Page 6                     GAO/NSIAD9043   The Army’s Pull-Time Support   Program
             Contents




             Conclusions                                                                          40
             Recommendations                                                                      40
             Agency Comments and Our Evaluation                                                   41
   I
Appendixes   Appendix I: List of Organizations Visited by GAO                                     44
             Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense                                 45
   I
   I         Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report                                      64

Fig$res      Figure 1.1: Total Growth in the Army’s Full-Time Support                             10
                 Program
   I         Figure 1.2: Growth of Full-Time Support, by Personnel                                11
   1             Category, in the Army’s Reserve Components




             Abbreviations

             AGR        Active Guard/Reserve
             DOD        Department of Defense
             KIRSCOM    U.S. Army Forces Command
             FTS        full-time support
             GAO        General Accounting Office
             JxsoPs     Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
             TDA        Table of Distribution and Allowances
             TOE        Table of Organization and Equipment
             TRADOC     U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command


             Page 7                       GAO/NSlAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                                                                                                   ,
Chapter 1

Inkroduction


                    Each military service has a full-time support (FTS) program that pro-
                    vides personnel to assist its reserve components. The Army currently
                    has the largest program, with over 82,000 FTS personnel at an annual
                    cost of about $3 billion, FTS personnel are currently assigned to manage-
                    ment and administrative positions throughout the Department of
                    Defense (DOD), the Department of the Army, and reserve component
                    headquarters. They are also assigned to administrative, training, supply,
                    and maintenance positions in individual units. The Army views these
                    personnel as “force multipliers” in that they accomplish the day-to-day
                    organizational and administrative tasks required to make the limited
                    training time of drilling reservists more productive. FTS in the Army has
                    taken on added importance during the 1980s because of the increased
                    reliance placed on its reserve components under the total force policy.


                    The concept of FTS personnel has existed in the Army since early in this
FT’Sin the Army     century. Civilian “caretakers” employed around 1916 to help maintain
ReserveComponents   horses and supplies were the first type. After World War II, when the
  ~                 Army added modern combat and support equipment to the reserve com-
                    ponents, caretakers became known as “technicians.” Along with the
                    modern equipment came an increased demand for supplies, training, and
                    administration, and more military technicians were hired for these func-
                    tions. These technicians were full-time civilian employees who were also
                    members of the reserve unit. The adoption of the Army’s total force pol-
                    icy in the early 1970s which placed greater reliance on the reserve com-
                    ponents, also resulted in the need to expand the FTS force. Under the
                    total force policy, reservists, rather than draftees, will be the initial and
                    primary source of personnel to augment the active forces in military
                    emergencies, According to the Reserve Forces Policy Board, the total
                    force policy means that the “reserve components are to be equal part-
                    ners, on and off the battlefield, and must be as ready as their active
                    counterparts,” The Army’s objective is to enhance reserve component
                    readiness and mobilization through the m ’s program.

                    In the late 197Os,the military was experiencing some civilian manpower
                    reductions, As a result, the House Committee on Appropriations pro-
                    posed that the Army conduct a test program to evaluate the use of
                    Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) personnel versus military technicians. The
                    Army’s initial implementation of the test program was accomplished by
                    allowing military technicians to voluntarily convert to the AGR position.
                    Beginning in 1981, these conversions were supplemented by the addition
                    of more AGR positions. The FTS force consists of the following categories:



                    Page 8                        GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
                         Chapter 1
                         Introduction




  I                  . Active Guard/Reserve personnel: Guard or Reserve members on full-
                       time duty for’180 days-or more. They receive the same pay and benefits
                       as active duty military personnel and are required to meet the same mil-
                       itary standards.
                     . Military technicians: Federal civilian employees who are generally
                       required, as a condition of employment, to maintain military member-
                       ship in a National Guard or Reserve unit.
                       Active component personnel: Military personnel on active duty who
                       directly support the reserve components.
                       Department of the Army civilians: Federal civilian employees who sup-
                       port the reserve components but have no military obligation.

                         The basic function of FTS personnel is to assist the reserve components
                         with the day-to-day administering, recruiting, maintaining, and training
                         required to support peacetime operations and to ensure a successful
                         mobilization, if needed. This allows drilling reservists to spend the maxi-
                         mum amount of time in training.


                         According to information provided by DOD budget officials, the Army’s
Cost and Growth of       ETSprogram cost about $3 billion in fiscal year 1988. AGR personnel
the Army’s Program       account for 54 percent of the program’s cost; military technicians and
                         other civilians account for 39 percent; and active component soldiers
                         account for the remaining 7 percent, In fiscal year 1988, the Army had
                         about 82,000 FTSpersonnel, up from 50,000 in fiscal year 1980, as
                         shown in figure 1.1.




                         Page 9                       GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                                         Chapter 1
                                         Introduction




Figure 1.1: Total Growth in the Army’s
FulllTime Support Program
                                         90 Number of FIB Panonnel in Thowanda

                                         89

                                         70

                                         80

                                         60

                                         40

                                         30

                                         20

                                         10

                                          0

                                               1990      1991
                                               Fiscal Year




                                         The Army National Guard has about two-thirds of the total number of
                                         FTSpersonnel. In fiscal year 1988, the Guard had about 55,000 full-time
                                         personnel, and the Army Reserve had about 27,000. These numbers rep-
                                         resent 12.1 percent of the Army National Guard’s selected reserve end
                                         strength and 8.8 percent of the Army Reserve’s. Even though the Army
                                         has the largest number of FTS personnel of all the military services
                                         (82,000 of the total 170,000 personnel), it has the smallest percentage in
                                         relation to its selected reserve end strength. For example, in fiscal year
                                         1988, FTS as a percentage of the selected reserve end strength for the
                                         Naval Reserve was about 22 percent, for the Air Force Reserve about 19
                                         percent, and for the Air National Guard about 29 percent.

                                         AGR personnel accounted for the vast majority of the growth in the
                                         Army’s FTS program during the 1980s as seen in figure 1.2. Specifically,
                                         AGRS accounted for about 28,800 of the 32,600 personnel increase-
                                         88 percent-in the Army’s FTS program between fiscal years 1980 and
                                         1988.




                                         Page 10                           GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support   Program
                                            Chapter 1
                                            Introduction




Figurei 1.2: Growth of Full-Time Support,
by Pe&onnel Category, in the Army’s
Reser$e Components                          45    Numkr of Ff3 Potwonnrl In Thousands

                                            40

                                            35

                                            30

                                            26

                                            20

                                            15

                                            10

                                             5

                                             0




                                                           Active Component
                                                           Civilians
                                                           MilitaryTechnicians
                                                           Active Guard/Reserve



                                            Beginning in fiscal year 1983, the Congress began to respond to concerns
                                            about the cost of AGR personnel in comparison to military technicians
                                            and complaints from the military technicians that their positions might
                                            eventually be phased out. The DOD Appropriation Act each year restricts
                                            conversions of technician positions to AGR positions in units to ensure
                                            that the number of technicians remains above established minimum
                                            strength levels.


                                            The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs has overall
Program                                     responsibility for reserve matters and provides general direction for the
Responsibility in the                       services’ full-time support programs through DOD Directive 1205.18. Spe-
                                            cific decisions about program implementation, however, are left to the
AmY         ”                               Secretaries of the military departments.




                                            Page 11                               GAO/NSIAD9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
                        Chapter 1
                        Introduction




                        The Army’s FTS program responsibilities, as defined in Army
                        Regulation 135-2, are spread among the following officials-the    Secre-
                        tary of the Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Deputy Chief of
                        Staff for Personnel; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
                        (DCSOPS); the Chief of the National Guard Bureau; the Chief of the Army
                        Reserve; the Commanding Generals of the major U.S. Army Reserve
                        commands; the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
                        Command (TKADOC);the Surgeon General; and the Chief of Engineers.
                        The Director of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the Army
                        Reserve manage day-to-day program activities within their respective
                        reserve components.


                        This assignment was done at the request of the Chairman of the
Objectives, Scope,and   Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, House
Methodology             Committee on Armed Services. Our objectives were to determine
                        whether the Army (1) exercises adequate management over the full-
                        time support program, (2) adequately justifies its estimated FTS person-
                        nel requirements, and (3) makes efficient and effective use of existing
                        l+“rspersonnel.

                        As requested, our review was limited to the Army’s FTS program because
                        it was the largest program. The review concentrated on AGH personnel
                        and military technicians because they make up the majority of the
                        Army’s FTS force.

                        To obtain overall program and policy information, we reviewed applica-
                        ble laws, regulations, congressional hearings, and previous GAO studies
                        on the subject.’ To gain further understanding of program management
                        and implementation, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
                        Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and numerous Army
                        officials. For the Department of the Army, these included the Assistant
                        Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Deputy
                        Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
                        Operations and Plans. For the National Guard Bureau, these included
                        officials from its Manpower Division such as the Director of the Man-
                        power Division, the Chief of the Requirements and Documentation
                        Branch, the Chief of the Evaluation and Utilization Branch, and the
                        Chief of the Validation Branch, For the Army Reserve, these included

                        lIicservc Components: Opportunities to Improve National Guard and Reserve Policies and I’rograms
                        (GAO/NSIAD-89-27 Nov. 17, 1988); Problems in Implementing the Army’s Reserve Components
                        Full-Time Manning I’iogram (GAO/NSIAD-85-95, June 4, 1985); and Information on Military Techni-
                        cian Conversions to Pull-Time Active Duty Guard and Reserve (GAO/mCD-82-57, Sept. 8, 1982).



                        Page 12                              GAO/NSIAD-9043     The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Chapter 1
Introduction




officials primarily from the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve. At
the major U.S. Army command level, we held discussions with officials
from US. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), including the Directorate of
Operations, Directorate of Resource Management, Directorate of Person-
nel, and the Office of the Chief of the Validation Branch. We also visited
the Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, to discuss full-time
support personnel’s involvement in recruiting activities.

We visited Army reserve component organizations in five states-
Alabama, California, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-to
gather program information and to obtain views on (1) the listing of full-
time positions in the FTS Staffing Guide (this guide is used to determine
E”I’srequirements for individual units), (2) the use of FTS personnel on a
daily basis, and (3) the mix of different personnel categories in the same
unit. Specifically, we visited the headquarters for three of the Army’s
five Continental U.S. Armies-the 1st 2nd, and Gth-and five major
IJ.S. Army Reserve Commands (the Army Reserve) and State Area
National Guard Commands. We also visited numerous Army National
Guard and Army Reserve units to gather data and hold discussions with
company commanders, senior noncommissioned officers, and drilling
reservists. Appendix I lists, by state, the Army National Guard and
Army Reserve units that we visited.

To determine whether FTS personnel requirements were based on sound
justification, we evaluated the approach and methodology used by the
DCSOPStask force in revising the FTS Staffing Guide. The guide provides
guidance on the number and kinds of FTS personnel needed to perform
certain functions in an organization, Since the revised guide was not
scheduled for completion until October 1989, we could not evaluate the
overall changes made by the task force. However, we reviewed sug-
gested changes to the guide made by officials from various Army organi-
zations-Tmuoc, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Chief of
the Army Reserve, and FoRscoM-and discussed with them the sound-
ness of the task force’s approach. We also held discussions with officials
from the U.S. Army’s Manpower Requirements and Documentation
Agency regarding the feasibility of basing FTS requirements on work
load analyses using the Manpower Staffing Standards System. The
Army uses this system to establish organizational staffing requirements.
It bases requirements for positions on the number of hours required to
accomplish specific work.

To determine whether the Army was making the most efficient and
effective use of FTS personnel, we evaluated two factors. First, we


Page 13                     GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                                                                            .


Chapter 1
Intrvductivn




sought to determine whether the Army had procedures to help the
reserve components determine the most cost-effective mix of JWS person-
nel. In considering the most cost-effective mix, we did not establish the
cost differences between AGRS and military technicians but, instead,
relied on previous DOD and GAO studies that specifically addressed this
issue. Second, we reviewed the monitoring mechanisms the Army used
to evaluate and control the FTSprogram’s effectiveness. A large part of
this work focused on the adequacy of the Army’s internal control sys-
tem for the FTS program and the adequacy of the evaluation efforts by
the reserve components’ validation teams. We also conducted our own
evaluation, using existing FVRSCOMrecords, to determine whether major
U.S. Army Reserve commands were adhering to established limits on FTS
personnel at those organizations.

We performed our review between August 1988 and June 1989 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.




Page 14                    GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
     I



Chapter 2

FTS Program Needs Greater
Mbagernent Attention

                                The Army’s FTS program lacks the centralized management that would
                                provide general oversight and policy direction to achieve an efficient
                                and effective program . No one Army office oversees and manages FTSas
                                a totally integrated program . Instead, FTS program responsibilities are
                                spread among many different Army organizations. Program weak-
                                nesses-such as insufficient program monitoring mechanisms-result
                                from inadequate management attention.


Prdgram Lacks Overall The Army’s FTS program lacks the overall management direction neces-
                      sary for it to function as an integrated whole. We reported on this prob-
Mahagement Direction 1em previously; however, there has been little progress in achieving a
                                coordinated program with clear management direction.


Previously Reported             The FTS program was the subject of three GAO reports and congressional
Concerns About Program          hearings during the 1980s. The Senate Committee on Armed Services
                                has pointed out and we have reported that the Army needs to provide
Management                      more adequate program management and guidance to help ensure an
                                efficient and effective program .

                                In our June 1985 report, we noted that program management and
                                administration in the Army’s FTS program had been marked by a lack of
                                clear direction and guidance. We pointed out that the lack of program
                                direction was a major factor in problems with the requirements determ i-
                                nation process and personnel policies. This lack of direction, we found,
                                had affected both program costs and effectiveness. For example, we
                                found that personnel policies had resulted in over-graded personnel
                                (individuals assigned to positions that were authorized lower grades/
                                ranks than those held by the occupants of the positions) and double-
                                slotting (the assignment of two persons to the same position in a unit).
                                Field unit commanders and program participants told us that they felt
                                overwhelmed by what they considered vague and often contradictory
                                instructions from the Department of the Army, the National Guard
                                Bureau, and FORSCOMregarding FTS personnel policies and procedures.

                                Second Continental Army officials told us the following:

                                “The major problem area which must be fixed before the FTS program can be fully
                                successful and before its success can be adequately measured is the elimination of
                                the fragmentation of program management at FORSCOMand HQDA [Headquarters,
                                Department of the Army].... The fragmentation at OCAR [Office of the Chief, Army
                                Reserve] and HQDA is even worse. The CONUSA [Continental U.S. Army] frequently




                                Page 15                         GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time Support   Program
                        Chapter 2
                        FTS Program Needs Greater
                        Management Attention




                        receives conflicting guidance from various higher headquarters staff, or receives
                        taskings which are not coordinated between staff sections.”

                        The Congress has also expressed concerns about DOD’S overall manage-
                        ment of FTS programs. It is concerned about the adequacy of the person-
                        nel requirements determination process, the use of personnel to
                        maximize readiness, and the lack of overall policy guidance for manag-
                        ing programs. For example, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in
                        its report on the 1988 and 1989 Defense Authorization Act, expressed
                        concern about the growth of FTS programs and indicated the need for
                        further oversight to ensure that these personnel are applied to readiness
                        needs. The report suggested that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
                        evaluate the mix of AGRS and technicians and establish a uniform policy
                        for their management and use among the various components. The
                        Office of the Secretary of Defense has contracted with the Rand
                        Corporation to study the mix issue. According to DOD, this study will
                        form the basis for developing a new DOD instruction that will address the
                        entire full-time support mix issue.

                        The U.S. Army Reserve, in response to our 1985 report as well as to
                        congressional concerns, developed a plan-the Command Support
                        Center Concept-whereby AGRS would be placed in units and techni-
                        cians in headquarters and support organizations. However, the House
                        Committee on Appropriations has stopped the U.S. Army Reserve from
                        implementing the plan because the Army could not assure the
                        Committee that military technicians would not be adversely affected.


Program Management Is   The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, through DOD
                        Directive 1205.18, provides general direction to the military services on
Spread Among Multiple   the management and use of FTS personnel. The Secretaries of the mili-
Organizations           tary services, however, are responsible for managing their own pro-
                        grams. In the Army, the management structure involves
                        10 organizations with varying degrees of responsibility.

                        The Assistant Secretary developed DOD Directive 1205.18, effective
                        September 20, 1988, primarily in response to the Senate Committee on
                        Armed Services’ direction that DOD provide greater oversight and direc-
                        tion for FTS in the reserve components. The Directive states that FTS per-
                        sonnel are authorized to assist in organizing, administering, recruiting,
                        retaining, instructing, and training the reserve components. The
                        Directive also states that it is DOD’S policy that FTS resources provide the



                        Page 16                         GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Chapter 2
Jf’lS Program Needs Greater
Management Attention




most cost-effective form of manpower consistent with readiness require-
ments. The Directive leaves it to the Secretaries of the military services
to develop procedures that implement the policies it describes for the
management and employment of FTSpersonnel. To date, the Army has
not developed such procedures.

Army Regulation 135-2 is the Army’s primary guidance for ms program
management. The Army made two major revisions to the regulation,
effective April 28, 1989: (1) the regulation now covers all four FTSper-
sonnel categories, whereas it previously covered only AGR and active
component personnel; and (2) the FTSprogram is now subject to the
Army’s internal control system, whereas it previously was exempt. The
revised regulation remains general in nature with regard to the specific
roles of the four FTS personnel categories.

Army Regulation 135-2 lists 10 organizations having various FTSpro-
gram responsibilities; however, no one Army organization has been
clearly designated as having oversight and management responsibility
for FTS as a totally integrated program. DCSOPS,which is the organization
responsible for Army Regulation 135-2, has more responsibility for the
ETSprogram than any of the other nine Army organizations. For exam-
ple, DCSOPS  is responsible for developing and publishing guidance for
identifying requirements, developing policy on the distribution of
resources, and regularly evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
Nonetheless, neither DCSOFJS   nor any other Army organization has been
specifically assigned responsibility for managing ITS on an integrated
basis. For example, both the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the
Chief of the Army Reserve directly advise the Chief of Staff of the
Army on IVS program matters regarding their respective reserve
components.

According to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the need to improve FTS pro-
gram management is recognized by the Army. While no decisions have
been made, the Army is considering two actions to improve program
management: establishing an FTS office within the Office of the
Secretary of the Army to provide general oversight and policy direction
for the FTS program and assigning responsibility through the FTS regula-
tion to one Army organization (possibly ECSOPS)for the day-to-day pro-
gram management of FTS.




Page 17                       GAO/NSIAD-W-43   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support Program
                      Chapter 2
                      FTS Program Needs Greater
                      Management Attention




                      The Army has not adequately used the array of program monitoring
Proigram Monitoring   mechanisms-program effectiveness evaluations, validation team
Meqhanisms Have Not   reviews, and internal control system reporting-to manage its FTSpro-
Bean Adequately       gram. Specifically, we found that (1) the Army had not conducted any
                      program effectiveness evaluations; (2) reviews by the reserve compo-
Implemented           nent validation teams were varied and limited; and (3) the FTSprogram,
   I                  until recently, was exempt from the Army’s internal control system.
   I

The’Army Is Not       Army Regulation 135-2 requires DCSOPS   to regularly evaluate FTS pro-
Performing Required   gram effectiveness, in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, the
                      Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, and major Army commands. In
Program Evaluations   1985, DCSOPSproposed the implementation of program evaluations that
                      would have required semiannual reports by the National Guard, the
                      Army Reserve, and FORSCOMcovering the progress and problems associ-
                      ated with the program. According to a DCSOPS  official, the program eval-
                      uations were never implemented due to inadequate management
                      attention.

                      In our view, it would have been difficult for the Army to conduct sound
                      program effectiveness evaluations because the Army has not developed
                      measurable objectives for the program. Army Regulation 136-2 states
                      that the Army’s objective for the FTS program is to improve reserve com-
                      ponent readiness and mobilization planning by providing full-time per-
                      sonnel to reserve component units and organizations. Army officials
                      have testified before the Congress on numerous occasions regarding the
                      need for FTS personnel to improve reserve component readiness. The
                      Army, however, has not developed any system to measure (1) the extent
                      to which reserve component readiness has been increased as a result of
                      the program or (2) the benefits associated with adding additional
                      resources to the program.

                      Army officials said that it is difficult to directly relate increases in read-
                      iness to increases in FTS personnel because many variables in addition to
                      personnel-such as equipment and training-can affect readiness.
                      Army officials, at one time, considered contracting for a study to show
                      how the program affects readiness but decided against such a study
                      because they believed that it would be costly and would not produce
                      useful results.

                      During our review, we discussed with the Assistant Secretary of the
                      Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and DCSOPSofficials the feasi-
                      bility of units’ tracking increases in available training time as a result of


                      Page 18                       GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s N-Time   Support   Program
                                 Chapter 2
                                 Fl’S Program Needs Greater
                                 Management Attention




                                 adding FTSpersonnel. Part of the program’s objective is to use these
                                 resources to do routine day-to-day tasks, thereby freeing up training
                                 time for reservists on the weekends. These officials agreed that it would
                                 be feasible to track increases in FTS personnel and training time and
                                 thought that such tracking would provide a good measure of program
                                 effectiveness.


Valkdation Reviews               The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve both have two FTSval-
Idehtify Misuse of FTS           idation teams-one for headquarters organizations and one for troop
                                 units. Although the methodologies applied by the teams have been
Perbonnel                        varied, the teams have identified inefficient and ineffective use of FTS
                                 personnel. The Army Reserve validation teams, in particular, found
                                 multiple instances in which FTS personnel were being misused. We also
                                 found that the number of Army Reserve personnel assigned to U.S.
                                 Army headquarters organizations exceeded the limits set by the
                                 Department of the Army for these organizations.

NationalGuard Bureau’s           National Guard Bureau officials from the Manpower Division told us
Validation Efforts               that they follow Army Regulations 570-4 and 570-5 in conducting vali-
                                 dation reviews. On the basis of these regulations, the National Guard
                                 Bureau validation teams ensure that FTS positions for troop program
                                 units meet minimum-essential needs. Any requests for additional per-
                                 sonnel must be individually justified and approved. In some cases, vali-
                                 dation team officials visit the unit to evaluate the information provided
                                 in the request, Furthermore, Manpower Division officials stated that FTS
                                 positions for headquarters organizations are established by the valida-
                                 tion team based on work load analyses using the Manpower Staffing
                                 Standards System.

                                 Manpower Division officials also told us that they conduct evaluations
                                 of the use of FTS personnel once they are assigned to positions. Accord-
                                 ing to these officials, the evaluations are made to determine whether FTS
                                 personnel are performing in accordance with applicable laws and regu-
                                 lations and whether they carry full-time work loads. Manpower Division
                                 officials, however, stated that they had not documented or reported on
                                 their evaluation results and agreed with our observations on the need to
                                 do so.

Army ReserveValidation Efforts   The Army Reserve validation teams primarily evaluate the use of F’TS
              Y                  personnel after the individuals have been assigned to positions. The val-
                                 idation team for headquarters organizations has developed a detailed
                                 approach to evaluating the use of FTS personnel against applicable laws


                                 Page 19                      GAO/NSLAD-9043   The Army’s Pull-Time   Support   Program
Chapter 2
ITS Program Needs Greater
Management Attention




and regulations and to determining whether FTSpersonnel are fully uti-
lized. The validation team for troop program units, on the other hand,
basically evaluates whether FTS personnel have full-time work loads.

The Army Reserve validation team responsible for headquarters organi-
zations reports to the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve. It evalu-
ated 576 FTS positions at 14 organizations between March 1987 (when
the team was organized) and September 1988. Among the headquarters
organizations evaluated were the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and
the Second and Sixth Continental U.S. Armies. We reviewed the valida-
tion team’s reports, which showed that for the 576 positions it evalu-
ated, 430 positions (about 75 percent) were valid, 99 positions
(17 percent) were valid contingent upon further review, 37 positions
(6 percent) were invalid, and 10 positions (2 percent) were excess to
needs.

According to the validation team’s chief, some positions identified as
“valid contingent upon further review” were expected to become invalid
after review. The team chief said that invalid positions included posi-
tions requiring active component work and positions in which ~1’smili-
tary personnel did work that could have been done by civilian
personnel. For example, the validation team found three situations in
which AGR personnel were performing active component work at the
U.S. Army Recruiting Command. According to the validation team’s
chief, Army Regulation 140-30 prohibits using reserve component FTS
personnel in support of the active component. The validation team’s
chief estimated that over $1.5 million could be saved by eliminating the
47 invalid and excess positions identified. The Army Reserve validation
team responsible for troop program units reports to EY)RSCOM.It per-
formed on-site reviews at 44 units, or about 1 percent of all units,
between March 1987 and April 1988. The chief of the validation team
told us that the methodology applied by the team to validate positions
had been developed by the team itself and that the Army had not pro-
vided any guidance on how to do validation reviews. The validation
team found situations in which FTS personnel had been assigned to posi-
tions with less-than-full work loads and to positions not authorized to be
filled by FTS personnel.

The validation team chief told us, however, that the team’s findings had
rarely been discussed with the units evaluated and that, as a result, lit-
tle corrective action had been taken. The chief also said that the valida-
tion efforts lacked adequate management attention and that no system



Page 20                      GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
                                 Chapter 2
                                 Fl’S Program Needs Greater
                                 Management Attention




                                 existed for reporting and taking action on validation findings. Further-
                                 more, the team chief told us that validation efforts at the troop program
                                 units had stopped for 10 months (from March 1988 to January 1989)
                                 primarily due to the lack of travel funds.

                                 We reviewed the validation team’s reports for most of the 44 units they
                                 visited (some reports could not be found). The following are some exam-
                                 ples of the team’s findings:

   I                         .   FTS maintenance personnel assigned to two units were not needed
                               because the units lacked the mission-essential equipment they were to
   I                           maintain.
                             . One unit clerk’s only assignment was to administer the unit’s payroll.
                               The validation team report stated that the majority of the time the clerk
                               was idle.
                             . Two maintenance personnel in a unit collocated with an area mainte-
                               nance support activity did not have full work loads, and as a result, both
                               personnel were assigned clerk functions and were frequently sent to
                               other units to provide assistance in preparing for key inspections.
                             . An automotive maintenance individual was detailed from a transporta-
                               tion company to the battalion’s headquarters; however, the individual
                               remains on the company records because the battalion staffing model
                               did not provide for an automotive maintenance technician position.


IJS. Army Headquarters           Department of the Army guidance limits the number of FTS personnel at
Perisonnel Exceeded Limits       major IJS. Army Reserve commands and division headquarters to
                                 10 percent of the organizations’ total FTS authorizations. The
for ~F?‘SPersonnel               lo-percent limit ties into the objective of the FTS program, which is to
                                 increase unit training time by assigning full-time personnel directly to
                                 individual units, rather than to headquarters positions.

                                 According to a EYIRSCOMDirectorate of Operations official, the lo-percent
                                 limit has not been adequately enforced in the past, but FORSCOM'Svalida-
                                 tion team now checks the lo-percent limit during its review. In our
                                 review of IWRSCOMdocuments, we found that the 47 major IJ.S. Army
                                 Reserve commands and division headquarters together had 2,906, or
                                 16.3 percent, of the 17,860 FTSauthorizations for those organizations
                                 and their subordinate units. Specifically, we found that

                             .   39 (83 percent) of the 47 major U.S. Army Reserve commands and divi-
                                 sions had not complied with the lo-percent limit, while 8 (17 percent)
                                 had complied;


                                 Page 2 1                     GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                               Chapter 2
                               FIS Program Needs Greater
                               Management Attention




                           . 7 of the 47 major U.S. Army Reserve commands and divisions had more
                             than 50 percent of the organizations’ total ms authorizations assigned to
                             them; and
                           l 1 engineering headquarters command had 100 percent of its FTS authori-
                             zations assigned to it.


The FTS Program Is Now         The Army’s internal control system requires all organizations to review
                               internal controls annually to verify that they are in place and working.
Sub/ject to the Army’s         Army Regulation 1 l-2, governing the internal control system, requires
Intfjrnal Control System       an annual statement of assurance that adequate internal controls exist
                               to help prevent fraud, waste, mismanagement, and misappropriation in
                               compliance with the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982.’
                               The annual statement of assurance must report material internal control
                               weaknesses discovered in the current period, with planned corrective
                               action and a status report on previously reported unresolved material
                               weaknesses. Army Regulation 1 l-2 also requires that if audit organiza-
                               tions have reported deficiencies associated with a program or the pro-
                               gram has been subjected to congressional hearings, the organization
                               responsible for the program should consider it as potentially having
                               material weaknesses in internal controls.

                               We found that the Army had exempted the FTS program from the inter-
                               nal control system until April 1989. This exemption may explain why no
                               material I+%program weaknesses were reported in the Secretary of the
                               Army’s Annual Statements of Assurance for fiscal years 1986, 1987,
                               and 1988, even though these problems had been the subject of previous
                               GAO reports and congressional hearings. Army officials could not explain
                               why the program had been exempt from internal controls. While the
                               regulation now contains internal control provisions, it does not yet con-
                               tain the necessary checklists for conducting internal control reviews.
                               The regulation states that checklists are being developed and will be
                               published at a later date.


                               No single Army organization is responsible for overall FTS management,
Coiwlusions                    and as a result, the program is not functioning as an integrated whole. In
                               our view, the lack of overall management direction and program evalua-
                               tion has contributed to many of the deficiencies we discuss in this chap-
                               ter, such as (1) the lack of measurable program objectives, (2) the
             u
                               ‘The act requires heads of agenciesto make annual examinations of their internal controls and issue
                               annual reports on their systems and plans to correct identified weaknesses.



                               Page 22                               GAO/NSIAD-90-43     The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
                       Chapter 2
                       FTS Program Needs Greater
                       Management Attention




                       inappropriate use of FTS personnel, and (3) inadequate attention to pre-
                       viously reported management weaknesses, By focusing management
                       responsibility for policy direction and general oversight, the Army could
                       better ensure consistent personnel policies and practices and program
                       evaluations. In addition, by appointing one Army organization to over-
                       see the entire FTS program, the Army might be able to overcome the
                       management fragmentation problem that has continued to hamper unit
                       commanders who receive contradictory instructions from the various
                       Army organizations having FTSprogram responsibilities. We believe that
                       the actions being considered by the Army to establish an FTS office, for
                       example, could improve program management.

                       Until the Army provides needed program direction and evaluation, how-
                       ever, it cannot assure DOD and the Congress that it has an efficient and
                       effective FTSprogram. Despite our identification of management prob-
                       lems in prior reports and congressional concerns about program manage-
                       ment, the Army did not report these deficiencies as a material weakness
                       in the Secretary of the Army’s Annual Assurance Statements. Because
                       significant management problems still exist, we believe that reporting
                       FTSprogram deficiencies as a material weakness would help to ensure
                       top management’s attention.


                       We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following
Retiommendations       actions:

                   . Assign authority and responsibility for overseeing and directing the
                     Army’s full-time support program to one Army organization.
                   l Develop measurable program objectives and implement adequate pro-
                     gram monitoring mechanisms.
                   l Identify FTS management deficiencies in the full-time support program
                     as a material weakness in the Secretary’s next Annual Assurance
                     Statement.


                       DOD agreed with our first two recommendations. It stated that the
Agency Comments and    Secretary of the Army had assigned responsibility for oversight and
Our Evaluation         direction for the FTSprogram to the Assistant Secretary for Manpower
                       and Reserve Affairs. Also, DOD stated that the Assistant Secretary had
                       directed the establishment of a Full-Time Support Program Integration
          Y            Office within DCSOPSto coordinate FTS program management. The
                       Secretary of the Army will develop measurable FTS objectives and moni-
                       toring mechanisms to ensure that the objectives are being pursued.


                       Page 23                     GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                                                                            .


Chapter 2
ETS Program Needs Greater
Management Attention




DOD did not agree with our recommendation that the Secretary of the
Army identify the FTSprogram as a material weakness in the next
Annual Assurance Statement. DOD stated that (1) in management’s judg-
ment the problems we identified had not significantly impaired fulfill-
ment of the full-time support mission or significantly weakened
safeguards against fraud, waste, or mismanagement of funds and (2) the
Army had already initiated actions to correct ~“rsmanagement deficien-
cies According to DOD Directive 5010.38, a military service’s system of
internal controls should provide reasonable assurance not only that
resources are safeguarded against waste and misappropriation but also
that programs are efficiently and effectively carried out in accordance
with applicable management policies. Moreover, the Directive’s defini-
tion of a material internal control weakness is not limited to mission
impairment and mismanagement of funds, as implied by DOD'S comment.
The definition also includes mismanagement of “other resources.”

Clearly, the FTSprogram and the personnel who make up the program
are significant resources to be managed efficiently and effectively. The
significance of FTS resources is acknowledged by DOD'S comment that the
FTSprogram is so critically important that DOD devotes a large percent-
age of the Reserve fiscal resources to FTS personnel. We found, however,
that the Army has consistently mismanaged these resources; existing
internal controls have not been effective in ensuring an efficient and
effective program. For example,( 1) personnel policies have adversely
affected program costs; (2) program evaluations have not been con-
ducted; (3) an effective monitoring system has not been established;
(4) PTSpersonnel have been misused; and (5) little corrective action has
been taken on the basis of validation team reviews. Further, problems
reported previously by GAO and the Congress still remain-for example,
the inadequacy of the personnel requirements determination process
and the lack of a uniform policy for the use of the various types of FTS
personnel. All of these problems stem from inadequate management
attention. Accordingly, we do not agree with DOD'S position that existing
management attention and corrective actions that have been initiated by
the Army negate identifying the FTS management problem as a material
weakness. We believe that it is important to focus the attention of top
management on the progress of corrective actions being pursued and
their ultimate resolution. Army Regulation 1 l-2 recognizes the impor-
tance of reporting problems that are judged to be material, even though
corrective action has been initiated. The regulation states that reporting
these problems allows higher levels of management to (1) evaluate the
adequacy of corrective actions taken or planned, (2) make any needed
changes, and (3) monitor the corrective actions until they are completed.


Page 24                     GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
Chapter 2
lFTs Program Needs Greater
Management Attention




Identifying FTSmanagement problems as a material weakness would
help to ensure top management’s attention.

DOD generally agreed with our findings but raised several concerns. It
said that our draft report had not recognized actions taken by the
Secretary of Defense in response to the suggestion by the Senate
Committee on Armed Services’ report on the 1988 and 1989 Defense
Authorization Act that the Department evaluate the mix of full-time
support within the services and establish a uniform policy for their
management. The report has been changed to recognize the action DOD
has initiated in this area subsequent to the completion of our fieldwork.

In commenting on the lack of a system for measuring the extent to
which reserve component readiness has been increased as a result of the
FTSprogram, DOD said that field surveys of key staff and unit com-
manders had indicated that increased full-time support had improved
unit readiness. Also, it said that, while a proposal to conduct empirical
research on direct correlations between full-time support and unit readi-
ness had proven to be cost prohibitive, statistics on general readiness
appeared to show a correlation.

DOD did not agree with a statement in our draft report that the National
Guard had not attempted to determine whether FTSpersonnel were per-
forming in accordance with regulations or were carrying full-time work
loads, On the basis of discussions with National Guard officials, we have
changed the report to recognize the Guard’s efforts to check the validity
of positions.

Finally, DOD stated that our finding that Army Reserve higher headquar-
ters had not complied with the Army’s lo-percent limit of full-time sup-
port personnel indicated a documentation problem rather than a
deliberate violation of policy. According to DOD, there is an occasional
commingling of headquarters support with unit support on higher head-
quarters’ manning documents, which masks the FTS numbers at each
level of organization. DOD said that the documentation problem was
being addressed by the full-time support task force. Also, it said that a
task force review of actual assignments at headquarters units we visited
had shown a 5%percent level of full-time support. We did not verify the
results of this review.




Page 26                      GAO/NSLAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Charjter 3

FTS PersonnelRequirementsLack
Shnd Justification

                        The Army’s need for FTS personnel is indisputable; however, the number
                        it needs is uncertain, The Army’s requirements for individual units are
                        set forth in the FTS Staffing Guide and are established without any work
                        load or similar analyses. A limited number of the Army’s FTS personnel
                        requirements for headquarters organizations are based on work load
                        analyses, using the Army’s Manpower Staffing Standards System. We
                        found indications that more accurate FTSpersonnel requirements for
                        individual units could be established if they were based on work load
                        analyses.


                        Full-time personnel were first added to National Guard units around the
The Army’s Need for     turn of the century. Recent studies by DOD, the Congress, and GAO have
FT$ Personnel Is Well   supported the continued need for FTS personnel in the Army’s reserve
Estjablished            components. For example, in our November 1988 report, we noted that a
                        critical factor in maintaining reserve capability was having an effective
                        group of full-time personnel to assist in training and administration.

                        The Army’s goal has been that FTS personnel should represent 14 per-
                        cent of its selected reserve end strength, Army officials stated, however,
                        that there is no specific justification for the 1Cpercent goal.


                        The Army uses two models to describe an organization’s personnel
Determining Personnel   structure-the    Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) and the
Requirements            Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). TDAS describe non-
                        deployable organizations staffed by both military and civilian personnel
                        and, generally, cover organizations above division level. TDA organiza-
                        tions are referred to as “headquarters and support organizations.” TOES
                        describe deployable organizations staffed by military personnel and
                        cover organizations at division level and below. TOE organizations are
                        referred to as “troop program units.”

                        The active Army establishes requirements for TDA organizations by
                        using its Manpower Staffing Standards System. Using this system, the
                        Army bases requirements on the number of work hours required to
                        accomplish specific work, generally measured at more than one site and
                        statistically analyzed. However, TDE positions are not work load-driven
                        because they relate to wartime fighting positions. TF~ADOCdetermines, in
                        a generic sense, the types and numbers of soldiers and equipment that a
                        unit needs to accomplish its wartime mission.




                        Page 26                      GAO/NSIAD9043   The Amy’s   Full-Time Support   Program
                               Chapter 3
                               FTS Personnel Requirements   Lack
                               Sound Justification




                               The Army’s reserve components have followed an approach similar to
                               that of the active Army in establishing FTS personnel requirements.
                               Determination of requirements for Reserve and Guard TDA units has
                               been based, to a limited extent, on work load analyses. For example, the
                               Army National Guard has established its FTSpersonnel requirements in
                               TDA organizations using work load analyses, while the Army Reserve has
                               just recently begun to use work load analyses to establish TDA personnel
                               requirements. FTS positions for Reserve and Guard TOE units are for
                               peacetime operations (whereas 'R3E positions in the active Army are war-
                               time fighting positions) and continue to be established in the FTS Staffing
                               Guide, which is based largely on professional judgment. The staffing
                               guide provides guidance on the numbers and kinds of personnel required
                               to perform a group of specific functions in common organizations.
                               Together, the individual TDA positions and ?DE unit positions identified in
                               the FT~Staffing Guide represent the Army reserve components’ FTSper-
                               sonnel requirements.


                               The Army’s current ~“rspersonnel requirements call for about
Current Personnel              38,000 additional personnel, which would add over $1 billion more
Requirements Are               annually to the program’s cost. According to Army officials, there is no
Uncertain                      specific time by which the additional personnel are to be obtained.
                               Department of the Army officials told us that these requirements had
                               not been established with any degree of accuracy. In an attempt to
                               establish more accurate requirements, the Army established an FTS task
                               force within DCSOPS.By August 1988, the task force was supposed to
                               (1) revise the FTS Staffing Guide for troop program units, (2) review all
                               Army National Guard and Army Reserve units and headquarters and
                               support organizations to determine the appropriate ETSstaffing levels,
                               and (3) establish criteria for AGR requirements at headquarters and sup-
                               port organizations. Changes to the mandate, however, have delayed
                               completion of the project.


PoSitions Are Not Based   on   The task force, in revising the staffing guide, set out to develop one
                               guide for WE unit positions for use by both the Army National Guard
W&k Load Analyses              and the Army Reserve. Staffing guides were initially developed by
                               KJRSCOMfor the Army Reserve and by the National Guard Bureau for the
                               National Guard. There were significant differences between the two
                               guides in their treatment of the same type of units, both in numbers and
                               types of full-time positions suggested. In order to resolve these differ-
                               ences, DCSOPSdeveloped a single staffing guide that was issued in
                               September 1984, applicable to both Army National Guard and Army


                               Page 27                             GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Tiie   Support   Program
I                                                                                                    -F-



    Chapter 3
    FTS Personnel Requirements   Lack
    Sound Justification




    Reserve units, Nevertheless, the Army National Guard and the Army
    Reserve continued to maintain and use their own staffing guides.

    The task force began its effort by reviewing the staffing guides from the
    Guard and the Reserve. Then, on the basis of historical data and profes-
    sional judgment, the task force identified FTS positions that it believed
    any unit should have, given a particular Standard Requirements Code.
    The Army uses this code to group like units with the same basic mis-
    sions. The revised FTS Staffing Guide consists of hundreds of standard
    requirements codes. For example, standard requirements code 55067H
    applies to light-medium truck companies, and there are a total of
    26 light-medium truck companies- 23 in the Army National Guard and
    3 in the Army Reserve. The revised staffing guide lists six FTS posi-
    tions-truckmaster,    supply sergeant, unit clerk, wheeled vehicle main-
    tenance technician, light wheeled vehicle mechanic, and equipment
    maintenance clerk-for units with standard requirements code 55067H.
    The task force sent the revised staffing guide to various Army organiza-
    tions for review and comment twice because, among other reasons, it did
    not believe that the reviewing organizations had performed adequate
    reviews the first time.

    TMDOC,FORSCOM,the National Guard Bureau, and the Office of the Chief
    of the Army Reserve were among the major organizations that reviewed
    the revised guide. According to officials in these organizations, while it
    was a step in the right direction, the greatest shortcoming of the guide
    was the lack of work load analyses in establishing FTS personnel
    requirements.

    For example, TRADOC officials told the task force that they disagreed
    with the process the task force had used to develop the staffing guide
    because it was driven “top-down” and based on “best guess”; it was not
    developed “bottom-up” using work load analyses. Even though officials
    from TRADOC headquarters would not officially comment on the staffing
    guide, they instructed the task force to contact TRADOC'S proponent
    schools directly for their comments.

    We discussed the review of the guide with one of TRADOC'S proponent
    schools-the U.S. Army Transportation School. Transportation School
    officials told us that the only rational way to establish E'TSpositions for
    the reserve components was to use work load data. They also told us
    that, in their opinion, FTS positions listed in the revised guide repre-
    sented the maximum number of full-time personnel that a unit required
    for wartime purposes and that actual personnel needs should be


    Page 28                             GAO/NSIAD-SO-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Chapter 3
FTS Personnel Requirements   Lack
Sound Justification




adjusted downward based on deployment date, the number of people in
a unit, amount of equipment, and proximity of units to other units (some
units are collocated and could share facilities and personnel).

Transportation School officials also pointed out that the revised guide
had not taken into account differences in unit size. In one situation,
11 heavy truck companies (4 Army National Guard and 7 Army
Reserve) had the same standard requirements code, and the guide for
that code called for 6 FTS personnel. Six of the units each had an autho-
rized end strength of about 60 reservists, while the other five units each
had an authorized end strength of about 140 reservists. While it is
unlikely that the units with 60 reservists would need the same number
of FTS personnel as the units with 140 reservists, Transportation School
officials said that there were no established criteria that could be
applied against the guide to determine final ITS personnel needs within
those units.

The fact that no established criteria exist to be applied to the guide was
also pointed out during our visit to the 121st U.S. Army Reserve
Command. Command officials told us that, since there were no estab-
lished criteria, they had to state FTS personnel requirements exactly as
identified in the guide.

E'OHSCOMwas the only reviewing organization that provided the task
force with detailed written comments on the revised guide. FORSCOMoffi-
cials said that, in their opinion, the guide contained an excessive number
of full-time positions and leaned toward turning the reserve components
into active component forces. These views are evident in some of the
following excerpts from FDRSCOM'Swritten comments concerning the
guide.

“HQDA [Headquarters, Department of the Army] staffing guides do not identify
which positions are minimum essential.... Minimum essential positions are base
operations type functions (administration, supply, operations and training, and
maintenance) which are required for all units, regardless of SRC [standard require-
ments code].... Recommend HQDA staffing guides be designated with minimum
essential positions. This would assist in answering HQDA staff and Congressional
questions on AGR ‘bare bone’ requirements versus ‘nice to have’ requirements.”

[Text omitted.]

“IIQDA staffing guides contain excessive number of key staff positions (S-l /S-2/
S-3/S-4), making these staffing guides officer heavy.... HQDA staffing guides contain




Page 29                             GAO/NSLAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
                       Chapter 3
                       FTS Personnel Requirements   Lack
                       Sound Justification




                       unit armorers (E-4). In peacetime environment, it is questionable if there is suffi-
                       cient work load to justify this duty position full-time.... HQDA staffing guides con-
                       tains [sic] some Chaplain positions. Full-time Chaplain does not meet AGR program
                       objectives in AR [Army Regulation] 136-2 or AR 140-30. These positions should be
                       deleted from staffing guides.. . . HQDA staffing guides contain excessive number of
                       maintenance and supply positions. In some cases, two or three of same type duty
                       position is [sic] authorized in one staffing guide.”

                       WRSCOM, in addition to providing comments about individual positions,
                       stated the following:

                       “Objective of AGR program is to improve RC [reserve component] readiness and
                       mobilization/deployment     planning and preparation-not     to take over complete
                       responsibility for certain unit functions. Task Force should relook staffing guides to
                       ensure they do not contain excessive full-time staffing for unit functions.... Total
                       full-time requirements for many HQDA staffing guides appears [sic] excessive com-
                       pared to FGRSCOMstaffing guides. AGR program was not instituted to provide level
                       of full-time staffing that allow [sic] RC units to operate as if they are AC [active
                       componentj unit (i.e. peacetime 40 hour work week). MTOE/TDA RC units are
                       expected to accomplish their mission responsibilities through 48 Unit Training
                       Assemblies and 14 days of Annual Training-not        through full-time staffing. Task
                       Force needs to relook staffing guides with objective to provide level of full-time
                       staffing that will accomplish program objectives in AR 135-2 and AR 140-30.”


                       The Commanding General of TRADOC stated in a December 1987 memo-
A Work Load Analysis   randum that the Army would not have a credible manpower justifica-
Syetem Could Be Used   tion program until it linked personnel requirements, including
to Establish F’TS      requirements for ITS personnel, to its Manpower Staffing Standards
                       System. The Commanding General, in reaffirming TRADOC’S commitment
Requirements           to the original goals of the system, stated that, although ignored, the
                       rationale behind the original creation of the Manpower Staffing Stan-
                       dards System had not changed. The Commanding General stated that, to
                       be competitive, the Army must demonstrate to the Office of the Secre-
                       tary of Defense and the Congress a credible, marketable manpower pro-
                       gram. The Commanding General also stated that the Army must show,
                       during the budgeting process for personnel requirements, its commit-
                       ment to and belief in the Manpower Staffing Standards System. In
                       responding to the memorandum, the Department of the Army agreed
                       that ultimately it must make a major commitment to change the methods
                       used by commanders to make resource decisions. It also stated that the
                       Manpower Staffing Standards System had proven its accuracy in deter-
                       mining correct resource levels.




                       Page 30                             GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
        .


J   (
              Chapter 3
              FT!3 Personnel Requirements   Lack
              Sound Justification




              As discussed previously, FTSpositions for Reserve and Guard WE units
              are for peacetime operations and, therefore, are much like TDA positions
              in terms of their susceptibility to work load measurement. Accordingly,
              we discussed the feasibility of using a system like the Manpower
              Staffing Standards System to establish TOE unit requirements for the
              reserve components with officials from the Army’s U.S. Manpower
              Requirements and Documentation Agency, which is responsible for the
              development of manpower requirements. According to these officials, a
              generic FTS staffing guide could be developed using work load analyses.
              Furthermore, the officials stated that a formula could then be developed
              using various criteria-unit     size, deployment date, percentage of equip-
              ment fill, unit location, and collocation-that   could be applied to the
              generic guide to come up with the final requirements for any given unit.
              The officials believed that FTS personnel requirements could be estab-
              lished very accurately in this way. While officials from the U.S. Army
              Manpower Requirements and Documentation Agency could not tell us
              how long it would take to complete such a project or its cost, they were
              sure that it could be done reasonably quickly and inexpensively.


              The Army has attempted to establish more accurate FTS personnel
Conclusions   requirements. However, many TOE unit positions are not based on work
              load or similar analyses, Reviewers of the revised FTS Staffing Guide
              have said that they are not able to evaluate the guide but believe that
              some requirements are overstated. To establish a more credible FTS man-
              power justification program, the Army should determine TOE unit posi-
              tion requirements for full-time support personnel based on work load
              analyses.

              Since the Army already has a system-the Manpower Staffing
              Standards System- to establish personnel requirements using work load
              analyses, we believe that a system of this type warrants consideration
              for use by the reserve components in establishing FTS positions for TDE
              units. A generic model might be developed for TOE units based on the
              standard requirements code, and individual unit differences could be
              factored into the model to establish final FTS requirements.




              Page 31                              GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support   Program
                        Chapter 3
                        FIS Personnel Requirements   Lack
                        Sound Justification




                        We recommend that, if technically and economically feasible, the
Recbmmendation to       Secretary of the Army use work load analyses to determine FTSperson-
the /Secretary of the   nel requirements for TOEunits.
AWY
   I

                        In view of the growing importance and increased cost of the Army’s ITS
    ters for            program, the Congress may wish to consider deferring requests for addi-
                        tional personnel authorizations above current levels until it is assured
                        that adequate action has been taken to improve the program. Exceptions
                        to such deferral might be considered when the Army seeks to add new
                        missions to the reserve components.



                        FIT personnel requirements and stated that such analyses will be
Our’Evaluation          adopted by the Army’s task force on full-time support. According to DOD,
                        the implementation of work load analyses will require additional man-
                        power resources that could be available by fiscal year 1992. DOD also
                        pointed out that established FTS requirements represent essential
                        requirements in an unconstrained world and that the Army must (1) pri-
                        oritize requirements in accordance with realistic budget constraints and
                        maintain minimum support levels for lower priority units and higher
                        levels for higher priority units and (2) develop a methodology to deter-
                        mine which category of full-time support best fits each requirement.

                        DOD did not agree with our suggestion that the Congress consider defer-
                        ring requests for additional personnel authorizations above current
                        levels. It commented that most of the growth in the FTS program was
                        related to the addition of new force structure or new missions and that
                        it did not want to lose ground in properly resourcing reserve units to
                        perform their missions. Our suggestion recognizes that it may be desir-
                        able to make exceptions to a deferral policy when the Army seeks to add
                        new missions to the reserve components.




                        Page 32                             GAO/NSLAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
 Tl$e Arky Does Not Adequately Determine the
 Mbst Cost-Effective Mix of FTS Personnel

A--



                        The Army has used primarily AGR personnel to expand its FTS force,
                        even though military technicians might have been more cost-effective.
                        Congressional committees and DOD have directed the military services,
                        when filling FTS positions, to establish the most cost-effective mix of per-
                        sonnel. The Army normally can choose between AGR personnel and mili-
                        tary technicians because either personnel category, according to DOD
                        officials, can be used to fill military-essential positions. The Army, how-
                        ever, has not developed guidance that clearly differentiates the roles of
                        AGIZS,technicians, active component personnel, or civilian employees or
                        procedures for comparing costs to ensure that these positions are filled
                        with the most cost-effective mix of personnel. The Army has filled these
                        positions primarily with AGR personnel, even though most studies show
                        that military technicians are less costly. According to DOD, significant
                        increases in the number of technicians were not feasible because of con-
                        straints on funds available for civilian pay.


                        Of primary importance in a decision to use military or civilian personnel
Military-Essentiality   in a position, according to DOD and Army officials, is determining
Should Be the Primary   whether the functions to be performed in that position are strictly mili-
Consideration in        tary. DOD policy states that a military person should be used if a func-
                        tion is determined to be military- essential;’ otherwise, a civilian should
Making Personnel        be used to fill the position. DOD cites two reasons underlying its policy to
Decisions               use civilian personnel whenever possible. First, DOD'S policy is to main-
                        tain the smallest standing military force possible and still satisfy mis-
                        sion objectives. Second, this personnel policy reflects DOD'S belief that
                        civilians generally cost less than military personnel. As a result, DOD pol-
                        icy and guidance to the military services stress military-essentiality as
                        the principal consideration in determining personnel mix.

                        According to DOD officials, the majority of FTS positions require military
                        personnel because they are wartime-deployable positions (the positions
                        require that the individuals go to war with the unit). Officials from the
                        Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs told us
                        that they believe that when an FTS position requires a military person, it
                        can be filled by either an AGR soldier or a military technician. Even
                        though technicians are federal civilian employees, they are also, in most
                        cases, required to belong to the reserves. As a result, military techni-
                        cians mobilize and deploy with the unit to which they belong and, as
                        such, arc consider-cd military assets.

                        ‘A military r)crson is required for reasons of law or for other reasons such as to maximize combat
                        rc~adincss,training, or security.



                        Page 33                                GAO/NSIAD9043        The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
                    Chapter 4
                    The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                    the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FTS Personnel




                    Both congressional committees and DOD have directed the military ser-
Co&tShould Be a     vices to ensure that FTS resources provide the most cost-effective form
Cobsideration in    of manpower consistent with readiness requirements. Since DOD believes
Mzjking Personnel   that a position requiring a military person can be filled by either an AGR
                    or a military technician, in most cases, cost should be the determining
Decisions           factor deciding which personnel category to use.

                    Congressional committees have provided direction to DOD regarding per-
                    sonnel costs. For example, in its input to the DOD fiscal year appropria-
                    tions, the House Committee on Appropriations stated that growth in the
                    FTSpersonnel required for National Guard and Reserve units should be
                    provided by the least costly form of manpower consistent with readi-
                    ness requirements. Furthermore, section 115(b)(5), title 10, of the U.S.
                    Code requires the Secretary of Defense to use the least costly form of
                    personnel consistent with military requirements when establishing over-
                    all defense personnel requirements.

                    DOD Directive 1205.18, dated September 20, 1988, requires the
                    Secretaries of the military services to determine the personnel mix-
                    AGRS, military technicians, active component personnel, and civilian
                    employees-that provides the most cost-effective FTSprogram consis-
                    tent with readiness requirements. The Directive also places responsibil-
                    ity with the Secretaries of the military services to develop the
                    procedures to determine the most cost-effective FTSpersonnel mix.

                    The Army has developed neither the guidance that clearly differentiates
                    the roles of AGR personnel and military technicians nor the procedures
                    for comparing costs to ensure the most cost-effective mix of personnel to
                    fill ws positions. The Army’s practice has been to indiscriminately place
                    AGR personnel in deployable units and technicians in headquarters and
                    support organizations. Officials from the Office of the Assistant
                    Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs said that they had not given
                    the FTS program adequate management attention, and therefore,
                    although they had placed the requirement on the services, they had not
                    provided the necessary direction and assistance to the Army and other
                    military services to develop the guidance for the use of FTS personnel.




                    Page 34                             GAO/NSIADIO-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
    I ,



                             Chapter 4
                             The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                             the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FI’S Personnel




                             AGR personnel have dominated the growth in the Army’s FTS program
Th$ Army Has Filled          during the 1980s. AGR personnel accounted for 88 percent of the total
Poditions Mostly With        growth in FTSpersonnel for the Army reserve components from fiscal
AGP Personnel                year 1980 through fiscal year 1988, During this period, AGR personnel
                             increased from 10,243 to 39,000, or 281 percent. Military technicians, on
                             the other hand, increased from 28,758 to 33,654, or by only 17 percent.

                             Long-range plans show that the Army Reserve will continue to empha-
                             size AGR personnel growth. The Army National Guard plans equal
                             growth in AGR personnel and military technicians. The Army National
                             Guard’s plans call for ITS personnel increases of 3,320 positions by the
                             end of fiscal year 1994-1,650 (49.7 percent) AGR personnel and 1,670
                             (50.3 percent) technicians. The Army Reserve’s plans call for FTS person-
                             nel increases of 4,436 by the end of fiscal year 1996-3,136 (70.7 per-
                             cent) AGR personnel and 1,300 (29.3 percent) technicians. According to
                             the Chief of the Army Reserve’s posture statement for fiscal year 1989,
                             additional growth in FTS is essential if the Army is to continue to assign
                             missions and force structure to the reserve components at required
                             levels of mobilization readiness. AGR personnel were cited in the posture
                             statement as the key to improvements in Army Reserve readiness due to
                             their availability for special assignments, schooling, and extended work
                             hours. The Chief of the Army Reserve also cited a shortage of over
                             8,000 AGR positions needed to adequately support existing units’
                             readiness.


The A .rmy’s Rationale for   The Army’s original decision on which type of personnel-&R      or mili-
                             tary technician- to use in the FTS program was made in the late 1970s.
Usijng AGR Personnel         At that time, the House Committee on Appropriations was concerned
                             about the readiness of the reserve components, and as a result, it
                             directed the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to increase FTS.
                             The military, however, was experiencing civilian manpower reductions.
                             The House Committee, therefore, proposed that the services test and
                             consider the use of AGR personnel.

                             The first AGRS were provided by allowing technicians to convert to AGR
                             status, and in the first 2 years, about 7,500 did so. As part of the test,
                             DOD contracted for a study (the results of which are summarized later)
                             to compare the cost of converting all technician positions to AGR posi-
                             tions. A 1976 report by the Defense Manpower Commission concluded
                             that replacing technicians with AGR personnel could save more than
                             $270 million annually. This determination led to the interest in using



                             Page 36                             GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support   Program
                                                                                                                  -
                       Chapter 4
                       The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                       the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FIS Personnel




                       AGR personnel in the FTSprogram; however, the cost methodology used
                       in the analysis was criticized because indirect costs were excluded.

                       DOD reported to the Congress in 1980 that an all-&R force would not be
                       cost-effective and that military technicians should be retained as part of
                       FF”I‘However,
                             S.       it stated that increasing the number of technicians would
                       not be feasible unless the policy of constraining the number of federal
                       civilian employees was changed. DOD reported, therefore, that the neces-
                       sary FTS increases could be achieved only by increasing the numbers of
                       AGHS or active component personnel. According to officials from the
                       Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the
                       consensus was that more FTS was needed, and at the time, AGRS were the
                       available source. Therefore, the Army’s manpower planning was domi-
                       nated by obtaining AGR personnel, with little or no consideration of cost-
                       effectiveness in filling FTS positions. As a result, technician strength has
                       grown slightly, and AGR strength has grown dramatically.

                       Army officials cite several reasons for using AGR personnel rather than
                       military technicians: (1) AGRS are not unionized; (2) AGRS have greater
                       work-hour flexibility; (3) AGRS offer easier and more reliable
                       deployability; and (4) AGRS offer improved readiness. A 1983 congres-
                       sional study showed, however, that these benefits may not always be
                       realized. For example, the study reported that unions were not a prob-
                       lem. Also, little concern was expressed regarding the normal workweek
                       of technicians -no specific instances were cited in which technicians’
                       workweeks had adversely affected the units’ missions. In addition,
                       although most unit officials believed that the additional manpower
                       gained through adding AGRS was very beneficial in terms of its impact on
                       readiness and unit capabilities, they felt that the same benefits could
                       have been achieved with additional military technicians. Many of the
                       same comments about AGRS, technicians, and union organizations were
                       heard during a 1988 congressional study.


                       DOD'S policy of filling positions that do not require military personnel
Mast Studies Show      with civilians reflects, among other things, its belief that civilians gener-
That Technicians Are   ally cost less than military personnel. When the cost of technicians is
Less Costly Than AGR   considered, however, the cost issue becomes somewhat clouded. This is
                       primarily due to the requirement for technicians to belong to the
Personnel              reserves: technicians receive both civilian and military pay and benefits.
          *            DOD officials told us that they believe that the relative cost of AGRS and
                       technicians changes from time to time. We found, however, that most
                       studies comparing the costs of AGR personnel and military technicians


                       Page 36                             GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
Chapter 4
The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FTS Personnel




have shown that technicians are, overall, less costly. In addition to the
lower cost of technicians, indications are that these personnel categories
are about equally as effective in performing the work.

A 1980 DODreport (DOD’S contracted study as part of the test for con-
verting technicians to AGRS)showed that the cost of converting all mili-
tary technician positions to AGRpositions was insignificant-about
$20 million annually DOD-wide.However, the cost among the services
varied widely, with the Army incurring the greatest cost for conversion
at about $62.5 million annually. On the other hand, the Air Force would
have saved $42.9 million annually by the conversion due to the high
proportion of wage grade technicians they employ. The report concluded
that an all-AGHforce would not be cost-effective; nor would it increase
unit readiness any more than a military technician force.

In our June 1985 report, we agreed with the Army’s cost-benefit analy-
sis, which had been submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations in March 1984. The Army had concluded that the direct
cost differences between AGRSand technicians were insignificant but
that life-cycle costs’ for AGRSwere approximately 16 percent more than
they were for technicians. We noted that this difference represented a
significant cost for an all-AGRforce and that in order for it to be consid-
ered a cost-effective approach, the Army had to ensure that AGRperson-
nel acquired military skills and experience comparable to those of their
active Army counterparts.

Most recently, a 1988 report by DOD’sSixth Quadrennial Commission on
Military Compensation showed, among other things, that AGRSgenerally
cost more than military technicians. This type of technician is normally
found in the units-where the Army wants an all-AGK force. The report
concludes, however, that the relative cost savings of using one form of
YI’Spersonnel rather than another will only occur at the margins, and as
a result, military requirements and effectiveness should be the primary
considerations in force mix decisions.




‘Lifccyclc costs for AWs include base pay, government contribution for social security coverage,
subsistcncc and housing allowances, support costs (medical and commissary privileges), and retirc-
mcnt accruals. Life-cycle costs for technicians include the pay and allowances they receive as military
mcmbcrs of rcscrvc component units and base pay and other pay and benefits (overtime pay, health
bcncfits, govcrnmcnt retirement contributions, life insurance, and workman’s compensation) they
rcceivc as frdcral civilian cmployttcs.



Page 37                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-43      The Army’s Full-Time    Support   Program
                                                                                                                  .


                              Chapter 4
                              The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                              the Most Co&Effective Mix of FlB Personnel




                              AGR personnel serve in unit positions and throughout reserve component
Soke AGR Positions            headquarters and DOD. However, there are situations at both unit and
Mig/ht Effectively Be         headquarters levels in which AGR personnel are in positions that might
Filled by Less Costly         be effectively filled by less costly military technicians, if funds are
                              available for civilian pay. Specifically, we found that military techni-
Te ‘hnicians                  cians could replace AGR personnel in unit clerk and other administrative
   (I                         positions. Also, technicians are currently used as substitutes in deploy-
   I                          able units when AGR and active component personnel are not available.


Military Technicians Could    FORSCOM,in December 1987, circulated a proposal among its five
      ace AGR Personnel in    Continental U.S. Armies suggesting the replacement of AGR unit clerks
                              with military technicians. The Second and Sixth Continental U.S. Armies
      inistrative Positions   agreed with the proposal because some of their units had independently
                              made the change and found that technicians were effective and, in some
                              cases, more suitable to performing certain functions, such as pay and
                              administrative duties. FORSCOMofficials told us, however, that the plan
                              had never been implemented due to a lack of management attention and
                              priority. FORSCOM,at our request, computed its requirements for AGR unit
                              clerk positions and told us that, as of January 1989, it had over
                              1,300 requirements for unit clerk or related positions. FORSCOMofficials
                              also said that it had authorization to fill about one-half, or 657, of these
                              requirements with AGR personnel.

                              During our visit to the 121st U.S. Army Reserve Command, a manpower
                              official identified 169 AGR positions (out of 583 total AGR positions) that
                              could be filled by technicians because the positions did not require mili-
                              tary expertise. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Resource Management at
                              both the Second and Sixth Continental U.S. Armies told us that,
                              although they believed that such conversions would be cost-effective,
                              decreased funding for civilian pay in the Operations and Maintenance
                              Reserve Appropriations (for technicians) would limit their ability to
                              convert AGR positions to military technician positions.


Technicians Currently         The Army believes that it is preferable to use AGR personnel in deploy-
Substitute for AGR            able units for a number of reasons. However, because of the annual DOD
                              Appropriation Act’s restriction on the conversion of technician slots to
Personnel in Some FTS         AGR slots or the unavailability of AGR personnel, technicians are often
Unit Positions                used instead of AGR personnel. Currently, many military technicians
              u
                              serve as authorized substitutes in positions designated for AGR
                              personnel.



                              Page 38                           GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program



                                                                                                              I
                         Chapter 4
                         The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                         the Most CortEfPective Mix of FM Personnel




                         We reviewed 41 AGR positions assigned to the 348th Engineering
                         Group-a unit that will deploy-and found that 6 positions had been
                         filled by military technicians. According to a Manpower and Force
                         Management official at the 121st U.S. Army Reserve Command (the
                         command that oversees the 348th Engineering Group), many positions
                         in the Engineering Group, including the six filled by technicians, were
                         administrative in nature and, in his opinion, did not require AGRS. The
                         manpower official said that some of the positions were for unit clerks
                         but that other administrative positions included positions for legal
                         clerks, personnel managers, and materiel officers. The U.S. Army
                         Reserve Command officials knew of no reason, other than possibly the
                         shortage of operations and maintenance funds, that these positions
                         could not be filled by military technicians.

                         Officials from the Sixth Continental U.S. Army headquarters shared a
                         similar viewpoint to that of officials from the 121st US. Army Reserve
                         Command. Officials from the Sixth Continental U.S. Army headquarters
                         identified 10 types of headquarters positions and 6 types of troop pro-
                         gram unit positions that, in their opinion, could be effectively converted
                         from AGR slots to military technician slots. For example, the 10 head-
                         quarters positions were occupied by 1 AGR and 9 active component
                         soldiers and included positions for protocol officer, administrative spe-
                         cialist, personnel specialist, and engineer.



                         support of the reserve components have not been effectively integrated
Effectively Integrated   into the FTSprogram. For example, a February 1987 National Guard
Active Component         Bureau information paper, based on input from 53 states and territories,
                         stated that active component soldiers’ support to Guard units was inef-
Personnel Into the FTS   fective. The program was considered a failure because active component
Program                  soldiers were assigned to units located in remote areas far from active
                         component support. As a result, soldiers were being (1) subjected to
                         financial hardship by their assignments, (2) sent to communities in
                         which they did not easily adapt, and (3) assigned to organizations of
                         which they had little knowledge. The Army reduced active component
                         support for its units from 750 to 138 personnel and was planning fur-
                         ther reductions.

                         The Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel issued a
                         March 1987 information report stating the Army’s objections to the
                         Senate Committee on Armed Services’ proposal to reduce the number of
                         AGH personnel and replace them with active component soldiers. The



                         Page 39                           GAO/NSIAD9043   The Army’s Pull-Time   Support   Program
                         Chapter 4
                         The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                         the Most Cost-Eff’ective Mix of FI’S Personnel




.._- _...{.-__.-----
                         Army opposed any proposal to replace AGR personnel with active com-
                         ponent soldiers because, among other reasons, of the difficulties that
                         active component soldiers experience when assigned out of the main-
                         stream of the active Army establishment and support facilities.

                         The Army Reserve validation team responsible for reviewing troop pro-
                         gram unit activities found that some positions occupied by active com-
                         ponent personnel did not require active component experience. For
                         example, the validation team reported that 45 percent of the active com-
                         ponent soldiers whom they interviewed from March 1987 through 1988
                         (the total number of soldiers interviewed was not identified) said that
                         the positions they occupied did not, in their opinion, require active com-
                         ponent expertise.


                         The Army has not clearly defined the functional roles for the four FTS
Cohclusions              personnel categories or developed adequate procedures to help ensure
                         the most cost-effective mix of FTSpersonnel consistent with military
                         needs. It appears that FTS positions, such as unit administration, person-
                         nel, supply, and payroll positions, may not require high levels of mili-
                         tary expertise or schooling and might be adequately filled by less costly
                         military technicians. It should be recognized, however, that the Army’s
                         ability to add or convert positions to military technician positions is con-
                         strained by a limit on funds available for civilian pay and, in the past,
                         by civilian manpower reductions. We recognize, on the other hand, that
                         some positions-for training and certain operational positions-may
                         require higher degrees of military expertise and that it may be prefera-
                         ble, even though possibly more costly, to use AGR personnel. In addition,
                         it appears that the Army may not be realizing the benefits it expects in
                         using active component personnel in the FTS program. In our opinion,
                         sound staffing decisions cannot be made until the Army clearly defines
                         the roles of the various FTS personnel categories and develops the proce-
                         dures necessary to help ensure a cost-effective FTSprogram.


                         We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following
Recommendations          actions:

                       9 Develop clear guidance that specifically differentiates among the roles
                         for AGR, military technician, active component, and civilian employees
                         and stipulates when these full-time support personnel should be used.




                         Page 40                               GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Tie   Support   Program
   .


                           Chapter 4
                           The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
                           the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FTS Personnel




                       l   Develop procedures, as required by DOD Directive 1205.18, that will help
                           the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve establish the most cost-
                           effective mix of FTspersonnel.


                           DOD agreed with our recommendations. It stated that the RAND study-
AdencY Coments   and       a z-yeareffort  -will provide the basis for DOD guidance on the roles and
Odr Evaluation             use of the various categories of FTSpersonnel. DOD expects to publish
                           this guidance in 1992. Concerning the most cost-effective mix of the var-
                           ious categories of full-time support personnel, DOD said that the Army
                           will establish procedures through its regulations to ensure that cost is
                           considered when establishing the full-time support mix.

                           DOD generally agreed with our findings but expressed several concerns.
                           It said that neither DOD policy nor, in its opinion, the Army leadership
                           preferred AGR positions over military technicians but that our draft
                           report language gave that impression. Although Army officials have
                           cited a number of advantages associated with the use of AGR personnel,
                           we agree that neither DOD nor Army policy states a preference, and we
                           have changed the report’s wording to clarify this matter. Also, DOD said
                           that its position that civilians generally cost less than military personnel
                           applies to actual civilian employees, not dual-status military technicians;
                           military technicians are military personnel. We agree and do not believe
                           that our report implies otherwise. Our discussion of the relative cost of
                           AGIZSand military technicians is within the context of DOD'S responsibil-
                           ity to ensure the most cost-effective mix of full-time support personnel.

                           DOD said that it supported the findings of the Sixth Quadrennial Review
                           of Military Compensation on cost comparisons between AGR and military
                           technician personnel and concluded that cost savings in the short term
                           were unlikely to result from full-time support force mix decisions.
                           Although cost differences in the short run may be marginal, as noted in
                           our 1985 report, the life-cycle costs for AGRS were considerably more
                           than they were for technicians. Further, DOD said that actual cost com-
                           parisons are best made on a position-by-position basis, and therefore, a
                           blanket policy to favor one category of full-time personnel over another
                           based on perceived cost savings at the macro level would not be pru-
                           dent. We agree that the potential for cost savings can best be determined
                           at the individual position level, We have changed the report’s wording to
                           clarify this point.

                           DOD commented that our finding that some AGR positions might effec-
                           tively be filled by less costly technicians was inconsistent with other


                           Page 41                             GAO/NSIAD-9043   The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
Chapter 4
The Army Does Not Adequately Determine
the Most Cost-Effective Mix of FTS Personnel




factors discussed in the report. DODstated that other factors such as
organizationally separating technicians from AGRSmust alsobe consid-
ered in deciding which category of full-time support personnel to use.
We agree that all factors must be considered, but we do not believe that
our draft report reflected an inconsistency. Our work was not intended
to infer that decisions necessarily could have been made to use techni-
cians instead of AGRS.Rather, its purpose was to demonstrate that
(1) some types of AGR-heldpositions could be performed effectively by
military technicians and (2) depending on the availability of funds for
civilian pay, cost savings might be possible.




Page 42                             GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Page 43   GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support Program
List of Organizations Visited by GAO


              Headquarters, 121st U.S. Army Reserve Command
Alabama
   ,          Headquarters, State Area Command, Alabama National Guard
              IIeadquarters, Troop Command, Army National Guard
              348th Engineer Group
              926th Engineer Battalion

              Headquarters, Sixth Continental US. Army
California    6th Recruiting Brigade
              820th Engineer Battalion
   ~          13th Engineer Battalion

              Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command
Gebrgia       Headquarters, Second Continental U.S. Army


              Headquarters, U.S. Army Recruiting Command
Illinois
              Headquarters, First Continental US. Army
Maryland      Headquarters, 115th Infantry Battalion
              629th Military Intelligence Battalion

              Headquarters, 78th Division (Training)
New Jersey    462nd Transportation Battalion
              1175th Transportation Unit
              920th Transportation Company
              86 1st Transportation Company
              459th Transportation Detachment
              Equipment Concentration Site #27

              Headquarters, State Area Command, Pennsylvania National Guard
Wnnsylvania   213th Area Support Group
              154th Transportation Battalion
              13 1st Transportation Company
              131st Transportation Company, Detachment 1
              12 1st Transportation Company
              121st Transportation Company, Detachment 1
              228th Transportation Detachment
              Combined Support Maintenance Shop
              Organizational Maintenance Shop # 15



              Page 44                     GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
App$ndix II

Gmments From the Department of Defense


supplbmenting those in the
repor( text appear at the
end 01 this appendix.
                                                     ASSISTANT      SECRETARY          OF DEFENSE




                                                                                            November   29,   1989




                             Mr. Frank C. Conahan
                             Assistant      Comptroller     General
                             National      Security     and International
                                Affairs     Division
                             United     States    General Accounting          Office
                             Washington       D.C.   20548
                             Dear Mr.     Conahan:
                                    This is the DOD response   to the draft  GAO Report titled,
                             “ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS: Management Problems and Inadequate
                             Requirements    Justification  Hamper Full-Time  Support  Programs,"
                             October    12, 1989 (GAO Code 393302/0SD Case 8147).
                                      The Department        generally     concurs    with the findings           and
                             recommendations          contained      in the report,       except with regard to
                             the report      comments on cost savings.               The GAO appears to misun-
                             derstand     the DOD policy          regarding    the filling       of positions         with
                             the least      costly      form of manpower.         The DOD position          that civil-
                             ian employees         are generally       less costly       than military        and that
                             civilian     manpower should be used whenever military                     requirements
                             do not dictate          otherwise,      is in reference        to actual     civilian
                             employees      and not to the dual ststus             military      technicians         who
                             serve in the Reserve components.                  The Department        policy       for the
                             fill     of Reserve full-time           support   positions      is to use the most
                             cost effective          form of manpower, consistent             with readiness          and
                             other military          requirements,       and that all positions           not having a
                             justified      military       function     shall  be filled      by non-dual        status
                             civilian     employees.
                                    It is important     to keep in mind that the Army National          Guard
                             and the U.S. Army Reserve have different           histories,    missions   and
                             management structures.        The GAO report    tends to address       the Army
                             reserve   components    In a generic     sense and it does not always make
                             it clear    that a particular     problem relates     more fully    to one of
                             the two Army Reserve Components.
                                   The full-time       support   program is key to the maintenance        and
                             improvement     of Reserve unit readiness.         This program is so criti-
                             cally  important      that DOD devotes     a large percentage     of the Re-
                             serve fiscal      resources    to these manpower assets.       It follows    that
                             management of the program is a primary            DOD concern.      The Depart-
                             ment strives     to ensure that the limited        full-time   resources   are
                             placed where they can do the most good.              DOD is particularly




                                 Page45                                     GAO/NSLAD8043TheArmy'sFull-TimeSupportProgram
         Appendix II
         Comments From the Department         of Defense




                                                                                             2
    concerned    about the management of              the program in        the Army compo-
    nents,   where the full-time       support          resources fall        so short of
    their   documented   requirements.
             Much of the report     corroborates       problems     Identified        earlier
    by the Department.         Several    corrective      actions      have already        been
    initiated.       Foremost of these ongoing actions              is a study,        now
    being conducted       by the RAND Corporation,           which will       assist     the
    DOD in publishing       more detailed       guidance     to the Service          Compo-
    nents on the utilization         of full-time       resources.         It will     provide
    detailed     guidance   as a follow-on        to the DOD Directive           on full-
    time support      and it is expected        to greatly      assist     the management
    of the program.
            In the meantime,           the Department      continues       to rely heavily        on
    the Reserve Components.                As the Reserve forces           assume more re-
    sponsibility,          the need for full-time          support      personnel      will
    become even greater.               At this   time,    most program growth is relat-
    ed to new force structure               or new missions.           The DOD does not have
    sufficient         resources     to close the requirements             gap, but it is
    important        that DOD not lose ground.             The Department         cannot,
    therefore,         subscribe     to the GAG recommendation             that all full-time
    support       growth be held hostage to the evolution                    of policy      guid-
    ance.      The DOD is working           expeditiously       to develop more detailed
    and stringent          guidance,      as are the Services.            The Department
    will    closely       monitor    the Army corrective          actions     which are taken
    as a result         of this    report     and will    continue      to seek better
    management procedures              for this program.
           The detailed    DOD comments on the report    findings     and recom-
    mendations    are provided    in the enclosure.   The Department      appre-
    ciates   the opportunity    to comment on this draft      report.
                                                  Sincerely,
                                                                 .


                                                 Stephen       M. Duncan
    Enclosure
    As stated




Y




        Page46                                   GAO/NSL4D-9043TheArmy'sFull-TimeSupportProgram
                            Appendix II
                            Comments From the Department             of Defense




                                      GAO   Draft   Report - Dated Ootober 12, 1989
                                              (GAO  Code 393302) OSD Case 8147
                         “Army  Reserve Components:        Management Problems  and Inadequate
                         Requirements   Justification      Hamper Full-Time  Support  Programs"
                                               Department       of     Defense        Comments
                                                                   ****
                                                                FINDINGS

                           INO &        -round:             Full-Time       Swport       In The Armv Reserve
                    -*                    The GAO observed          that the concept           of full-time
                    support      personnel        has existed       in the Army since early                in this
                    century.         The GAO noted that civilian                "caretakers"           employed
                    around 1916 to help maintain                  horses and supplies              were the first
                    support      types.        The GAO explained          that,    after      World War II,        when
                    the Army added modern combat and support                          equipment        to the Reserve
                    components,         caretakers      became known as technicians.                      The GAO
                    noted that,         along with modern equipment                came an increased             demand
                    for   supplies,        training,      and administration--and                 more military
                    technicians         were hired      for these functions.                 The GAO pointed         out
                    that these technicians              were full-time          civilian       employees,        who
                    were also members of the Reserve unit.                         According         to the GAO, the
                    adoption       of the Army total           force policy         in the early          19708, which
                    placed greater           reliance     on the Reserve components,                   also resulted
                    in the need to expand the full-time                      support       force.        The GAO
                    observed       that,     under the total          force policy,          Reservists,       rather
                    than draftees,           will    be the initial         and primary        source of person-
                    nel to augment the Active                 Forces in military             emergencies.         The
                    GAO referenced           the Reserve Forces Policy                Board statement          that the
                    total     force policy         means that the "Reserve components                      are to be
                    equal partners,            on and off the battlefield,                 and must be as ready
                    as their       active      counterparts."           The GAO reported           that the Army
                    objective        is to enhance Reserve component readiness                           and mobiliza-
Now qn pp. 2,8-Q.   tion through          the Full-Time        Support Program.              (pp.2-3,      pp, ll-13/
                    GAO Draft        Report)
                    DOD COMMENT: Concur
                    -TNG    8:   Cost And Growth Of The Armv Full-Time      Suvoort    Pro-
                    m@.=*  The GAO observed      that the Army Full-Time  Support   Program
                    cost about $3 billion     in FY 1988.   The GAO broke down the cost in
                    the components   as follows:
                    - the Army Guard/Reserve              personnel         account           for    54 percent
                      of the program's   cost:
                    - the    military    technicians          and other           civilians          account
                      for    39 percent:     and
                                                                                                                  Enclosure




                            Page 47                                     GAO/NSIAD-9043              The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
i
                                                                                                                            ---         ?’


                                 Appendix II
                                 Comments From the Department        of Defense




                                                                                                                  2
                           - the active           component   soldiers     account   for   the   remaining
                             7 percent.
                           The GAO found that in FY 1988, the Army had about 82,000 full-
                           time support          personnel--up      from 50,000 in FY 1980.           The GAO
                           explained       that the Army National            Guard has about two-thirds          of
                           the total       number of full-time          support    personnel,    while    the Army
                           Reserve has about 27,000.                The GAO noted that these numbers
                           represent       12.1 percent        of the Army National        Guard selected      Re-
                           serve end strength            and 8.8 percent        of the Army Reserve.         The GAO
                           emphasized        that,     even though the Army has the largest              number of
                           full-time       support      personnel     of all the Military       Services     (82,000
                           of the total          170,000 personnel),         it has the smallest       percentage
                           in relation         to its selected        Reserve end strength.         The GAO
                           learned      that for FY 1988, the full-time               support   personnel--      as a
                           percentage        of the selected        reserve     end strength    for the Naval
                           Reserve--was          about 22 percent;        for the Air Force about 19 per-
         jn pp. 2, 9-1 1   cent:     for the Air National          Guard about 29 percent.            (PP. 2-3,
                           pp.13-15/GAO          Draft   Report)
                           DOD COMMENT:            Concur.
                           FINDING  (;:    Proaram      ResDon&tbilitv        In The Army.      The GAO ex-
                           plained  that the Assistant            Secretary      of Defense for Reserve
                           Affairs  has overall         responsibility        for Reserve matters      and pro-
                           vides general      direction      for the Services         full-time   support   pro-
                           grams through      DOD Directive          1205.18.     The GAO noted,    however,
                           that specific      decisions      about program implementation           are left     to
                           the Secretaries       of the Military          Departments.
                           The GAO observed          that the Army Full-Time           Support   Program respon-
                           sibilities,       as defined     by Army Regulation           135-2, are spread among
                           the several      officials--(l)         the Secretary       of the Army: the Chief
                           of Staff,      U.S. Army, (2) the Deputy Chief of Staff                  for Personnel,
                           (3) the Deputy Chief of Staff                for Operations       and Plans    (4) the
                           Chief of National           Guard Bureau:       the Chief of the Army Reserve,
                           (5) the Commanding General,               U.S. Army Training        and Doctrine
                           Command, (6) the Army Surgeon General,                    and (7) the Army Chief of
                           Engineers.       The GAO pointed          out that the Director        of the Army
                           National     Guard and the Chief of the Army Reserve manage day-to-
                           day program activities           within      their   respective     Reserve compo-
    Nod on pp 3, 11-12.    nents.      (pp. 2-3, p. 15/GAO Draft              Report)
                           DBP--c_Qp$!I       :    Concur.

                           FINDIBA        Full-Time
                                          :             Support    Prosram   Lacks  Overall     Management
                           Direstign.     The GAO reported       that the Army Full-Time         Support
                           Program lacks the overall         management direction        necessary     to
                           function    as an integrated      whole.      It was noted that,      during   the
                           19808, this    issue has been the subject          of several      GAO reports    and
                           congressional     hearings.      The GAO found, however,         that there has




                                Page 4N                                  GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support     Program
                           Appendix II
                           CommentsFrom     theDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                            3

                     been little      progress      in achieving       a coordinated       program with
                     clearlmanagement        direction.          In a June 1985 GAO report            (OSD Case
                     6714) , the GAO pointed             out that lack of program direction                was a
                     major   factor    in problems         with the requirements         determination
                     process     and personnel        policies     and affected     both program costs
                     and effectiveness.           The Senate Committee          on Armed Services,           in
                     its report      on the 1988 and 1989 Defense Authorization                    Act    stated
                     that the Secretary         of Defense needed to evaluate               the mix of the
                     Active    Guard/Reserve        and technicians        and establish        a uniform
                     polioy    for their     management and use among the various                  compo-
                     nents.      The GAO found that,           to date the Secretary          of Defense has
                     not acted on the Congressional                suggestions     for the Full-Time
                     Support     Program and the Army Reserve has not implemented                       the Army
See cdmment   1      Guard/Reserve       placement       plan due to congressional            opposition.
                     The GAO further        noted that the Senate Committee                on Armed Servio-
                     es, in its report         on the 1988 and 1989 Defense Authorization
                     Act, expressed       conoern about the growth of Full-Time                   Support
                     programs and indicated            the need for further          oversight     to ensure
                     that full-time        support     personnel     are actually      applied     to read-
                     iness needs.
                     The   GAO   found that the Full-Time            Support management structure
                     involves      ten organizations        with varying     degrees of responsibill-
                     ty.     The GAO observed        that Army Regulation        135-2 lists    ten orga-
                     nizations       having various      Full-Time     Support   Program responslblll-
                     ties;     however,    no one Army organization          1s clearly    designated    as
                     having oversight         and management responsibility            for the Full-Time
                     Support     as a totally      integrated      program.    The GAO found that the
                     Army    is considering      two actions       to improve program management,         as
                     follows:
                     - establishing         a Full-Time  Support Office     within    the Office     of
                       the Secretary         of the Army to provide     general    oversight     and
                       policy     direction      for the program;   and
                     - assigning responsibility     through   the Full-Time                Support  regula-
                       tion to an Army organization       for daily  program               management.
Now on pp 3, 15-17     (pp. 3-4, pp. 19-21/GAO Draft       Report)

                     DoD:                   Partially      Concur.    It is not accurate      to state      that
                     the Secretary          of Defense has not acted on the Senate Armed Ser-
                     vices    Committee        suggestions      that the Department     evaluate      the mix
                     of full-time          support    within    the Services    and establish      a uniform
                     policy     for their       management.        The DOD has contracted       with RAND
                     Corporation         to study the mix issue.           This 1s a direct      precursor
                     for development          of a new DOD instruction          which will    address     the
                     entire     full-time        support     mix management issue.      Additionally,         the

                           ' GAO/NSIAD-85-95,  "Problems  in Implementing  the                  Army's
                             Reserve Components Full-Time   Manning Program,"                   Dated
                             June 4, 1985 (OSD Case 6714)




                           Page 49                               GAO/NSIAD-90-43     The Army’s Full-Time       Support   Program
                                                                                                     r
     Appendix II
     Comments From the Department          of Defense




                                                                                           4

Department has developed   a new reporting       format which                    will    assist
in management by allowing   a clearer    tracking     of where                   the    various
categories of full-time   support   are being utilized.
Within    the Army, responsibility           for oversight          and direction         for
the full-time      support    program has now been established                     in the
Offioe    of the Assistant       Secretary      of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs).         That office      convened a Task Force               to address
management issues and subsequently               directed        the establishment            of
a Full-Time     Support Program Integration               Office     within      the Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff            for Operations           and Plans to coordi-
nate Full-Time      Support    Program management.               As a result         of the
Full-Time     Support Task Force efforts,             a revised        Army regulation
135-2 was published        to define      responsibilities           for    program man-
agement.
FINDINO:         Proarrm
Iv.                     The GAO found that Army RegElation              135-2 is not
being implemented--as          it was proposed        in 1985 by the Deputy Chief
of Staff     of Operations.        The GAO indicated         that implementing       the
program effectiveness          evaluations      would have been difficult          for
the Army since measurable           objectives      for the program have not
been developed.         The GAO pointed        out that,    even though the Army
has testified       on the need for full-time            support  personnel     to
improve Reserve component readiness,                the Army has not developed
any system     to measure (1) the extent            to which reserve      component
readiness     has been increased         as a result      of the program or
 (2) the benefits       associated      with adding additional        resources      to
the program.
The GAO discussed       the tracking      of increases     in readiness      to
increases    in Full-Time     Support personnel        with officials      from the
Office    of the Assistant      Secretary     of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs      and Office     of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff           of
Operations.     The GAO concluded         that it is feasible        to track
increases    in Full-Time     Support personnel        and training     time and
that such tracking       would provide       a measure of program effective-
ness.
The GAO found that the Army National               Guard and the Army Reserve
Full-Time      Support evaluation        teams use different         methodologies       in
their    work.     The GAO noted,       however,   that the teams have identi-
fied inefficient         and ineffective      use of full-time         support    person-
nal.     According     to the GAO, the Army Reserve and the National
Guard validation         team have identified        multiple     instances     in which
Full-Time      Support personnel        were being misused.          The GAO also
noted that the number of full-time               support     personnel     assigned    to
U.S. Army headquarters          organizations      exceeded the limits          set by
the Department       of the Army for the organizations.
The GAO observed   that the National Guard Bureau follows     Army
Regulations  570-4 and 570-5 in conducting  validation    reviews                              to




     Page 60                                  GAO/NSIAD-9043        The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
                              Appendix    II
                              CommentsFromtheDepartmentof              Defense




                                                                                                                    5
                         ensure that full-time        support     positions      for troop program units
                         meet minimum essential        needs.       The GAO found that,       once full-time
                         support  personnel     are assigned,        no check is made to determine
       I                 whether   full-time    support      personnel      are performing    in accordance
                         with applicable     laws and regulations--or             whether the full-time
See cofnrnent 2          support  personnel     carry    a full-time       workload.      The GAO reported
                         Army  Manpower Division       officials       agreed that the use of full-time
                         support  personnel     should occur as part of the evaluation                pro-
                         cess.
                         The GAO found that the Army Reserve validation                  team findings     are
                         rarely     discussed       with the units     evaluated   and, as a result,
                         little     corrective       action has been taken.        The GAO also pointed
                         out that the Army validation             efforts     lack adequate management
                         attention       and no system exists        for reporting     and taking   action    on
                         validation       findings.
                         The GAO observed        that the Department          of Army guidance       limits    the
                         number of full-time          support     personnel     at major U.S. Army Reserve
                         commands and division          headquarters        to 10 percent.        The GAO found,
                         however,      that 39 of the 47 major U.S. Army Reserve commands and
                         divisions       had not complied       with the 10 percent        limit.      In addi-
                         tion,     the GAO determined        that seven of the 47 U.S. Army Reserve
                         commands and divisions           had more than 50 percent           of the total
                         Full-Time       Support   authorizations        assigned   to them and one engi-
                         neering      command had 100 percent          of its Full-Time       Support     authori-
                         zations      assigned.
                         The GAO also found that,         until      April    1989, Army Regulation        135-2,
                         which covers the Full-Time          Support       Program,    was exempt from the
                         internal    control    system.    The GAO concluded           that this   exemption
                         may explain      why no material       Full-Time      Support    Program weaknesses
                         were reported       in the Secretary        of the Army's annual Statements            of
                         Assurance    for FY 1986 through          FY 1988--even       though problems      were
                         identified     in previous     GAO reports        and congressional      hearings.
Now 04 pp,3, 18-21       (p. 4, pp. 28-30/GAO Draft          Report)

                         -:                    Partially        Concur.       Readiness    reporting      data is
                         only one of several             indicators      which must be employed to deter-
                         mine Reserve Component unit readiness.                        C-ratings      alone do not
                         indicate      a units      readiness.         Nevertheless,       since 1985, the Army
                         has seen a substantial               increase      in unit C-ratings.           Field     surveys
                         of key staff         and unit commanders overwhelmingly                   agree that in-
                         creased     full-time        support     has improved       unit readiness.           The 1985
                         GAO report        found that increased            Active    Guard/Reserve        support
                         improved      unit readiness.            Active      component Inspectors          General
                         reported      that unit operations             are more efficient          since the AC-
                         tive Guard/Reserve             program has been instituted.                While a propos-
                         al to conduct         independent        empirical      research      on direct      correla-
                         tions    has proven to be cost prohibitive,                    statistics       on general
                         readiness,        such as "C" ratings,             appears to show a correlation
                         between full-time            support     and improved       readiness.




                     Y




                              Page61                                    GAO/NSLAD-90-43      The Army’s Full-Time Support Program
        Appendix11
        CommentsFromtheDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                6
    The DOD does not agree that the National                Guard makes no attempt
    to determine      whether   full-time      support   personnel     are performing
    in accordance       with regulations       or are carrying      a full     time
    workload.       The Army National       Guard has trained       validation      teams
    and evaluation        teams that go to the field          and verify     compliance.
    The National      Guard Bureau continually          checks the validity         of
    positions.       Follow-up    action    is taken on all evaluations,            to
    include    reallocation     of positions      which are determined           to be
    invalid    or which full-time         support   personnel    are not performing
    at maximum workload.
    The GAO finding        that Army Reserve higher              headquarters         have not
    complied    with the Army established               10 percent        limit    on full-time
    support    assets in headquarters,               is actually       a documentation
    aberration      rather    than a deliberate          violation        of policy.        Full-
    time support       personnel     are sometimes carried,               as an administra-
    tive convenience,         on higher       headquarters       manning documents with
    only a notional        entry    stating       "duty with"      a specific       subunit.
    This occasional        co-mingling        of headquarters          support     with unit
    support    masks the numbers at each level                  of organization.            This
    documentation       problem is, however,            being addressed           by the Full-
    Time Support Task Force.               A review completed           by the Task Force,
    depicting     actual     assignments,         found 5.8 percent          of full-time
    support    actually      working     in the Army Reserve headquarters                   units
    referred    to.     The Army Reserve is aware that full-time                       support
    personnel     must be assigned          to, and mobilize           with,    the units      they
    support    and is taking        action      to properly       align     documentation.
    The May 1989 revision        of Army Regulation     135-2             has now brought
    the Full-Time      Support   Program under the Internal                  Control    System.
    Internel    Controls   checklists     will be published               in Department      of
    the Army Circular       11-89-1   for use by respective                 supervising
    headquarters.
    FINDING F:      The Anny'a     Need For Full-Time           SuDport Personnel          Is
    Well Established.        The GAO observed           that full-time      personnel        were
    first    added to the National         Guard units       around the turn of the
    century.      The GAO cited       recent    studies     by the DOD, the Congress,
    and the GAO--which have supported               the continued       need for full-
    time support     personnel      in the Army Reserve components.                 $0'
    example,    in the November 1988 GAO Report (OSD Case 7628)                        the GAO
    noted that a critical         factor     in maintaining        reserve   capability        Is
    having an effective        group of full-time           personnel     to assist      in
    training    and administration.

         2 GAO/NSIAD-89-27,           RESERVE COMPONENTS: Opportunities                    to
           Improve National           Guard and Reserve Policies  and
           Programs,"  Dated          November 17, 1988 (OSD Case 7628)




Y




        Page52                                   GAO/NSIAD-90-43TheArmy'sFull-TiieSupportProgram
                   Appendix II
                   Comments FromtheDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                             7
               The GAO explained      that the Army’s goal has been that full-time
               support   personnel     should represent    14 percent of its selected
               reserve   end strength.       According  to the GAO, Army officials
               Stated  that there is no specific        justification   for the 14-percent
Now or/ p.26   goal.   (pp. S-6, p. 32/GAO Draft        Report)
               DOD COMMENT: Concur.             There is no valid         justification         for the 14
               percent    figure     for full-time      support     levels.        This has not been a
               Department      goal,    but rather     an objective       mentioned         in congres-
               sional  reports.         The DOD goal is to establish               full-time      support
               levels  consistent        with identified       requirements.
               =ZNG         Q: Qetermining           PersonneJ      Requirements.            The GAO observed
               that the Army uses two models to describe                          an organization's
               personnel        structure--the         Table of Distribution               and Allowances        and
               the Table of Organization                and Equipment.            The GAO explained           that
               the Table of Distribution                and Allowances          describe       non-deployable
               organizations          staffed     by both military           and civilian         personnel
               and, generally,           cover organizations            above the division            level.
               The GAO noted that the Table of Distribution                            and Allowances
               organizations          also refers       to headquarters           and support        organiza-
               tions.       The GAO described           the Table of Organization                 and Equipment
               organizations          as deployable         organizations         staffed      by military
               personnel        and cover organizations             at division         level     and below.
               The GAO noted that Table of Organization                         and Equipment         organiza-
               tions     are also referred           to as troop program units.                   According      to
               the GAO, the active             Army establishes          requirements          for Table of
               Distributions          and Allowances         organizations          by using its Manpower
               Staffing       Standards       System.       The GAO learned          that,     using this
               system,      the Army bases requirements                on the number of work hours
               required       to accomplish        specific      work, generally            measured at more
               than one site          and statistically          analyzed.          The GAO found that
               Table of Organization              and Equipment        Positions        are not work load
               driven     because they relate             to wartime       fighting       positions.         The
               GAO noted that the Army Training                    and Doctrine         Command determines,
               in a generic         sense, the types and numbers of soldiers                         and equip-
               ment that a unit needs to accomplish                      its mission.
               According       to the GAO, the Army's Reserve components                  have followed
               an approach        similar     to the active       Army in establishing         full-time
               support      personnel      requirements.         The GAO reported     that a determi-
               nation      of requirements         for Reserve and Guard Table of Distribu-
               tion and Allowances            units     has been based, to a limited           extent,
               load analyses.            The GAO found that full-time          support     positions
               for Reserve and Guard Table of Organization                    and Equipment          units
               are for peacetime           operations       (whereas Table of Organization              and
               Equipment       positions      in the active       Army are wartime      fighting
               positions),       and continue         to be established     in the Full-time
               Sslooort Staffing          Guide, which is based largely           on professional
               judgement.        According       to the GAO, the staffing         guide provides
               guidance      on the numbers and kinds of personnel                required       to per-
               form a group of specific               functions    in common organizations.




                  Page 53                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-43 The Army'sFull-TimeSupportProgram
                                   Appendix II
                                   Comments From the Department         of Defense




                                                                                                                          8
                            The GAO concluded       that,     together,       the individual    Table of Distri-
                            bution   and Allowance       positions        and the Table of Organization           and
                            Equipment    unit positions         identified       in the m
                            StaffinP            represent       the Army reserve        components'   full-time
Now r/m pp, 34,26-27.       support   personnel     requirements.            (pp. 5-6, pp. 3344/GAO         Draft
                            Report)
                            DOD COMMENT:         Concur.
                            IQ.NDXNG     8:   mrrent       Peraonwl        Reuuiremeints     are   Uncw&@.&#l
                            The GAO found that the requirements         for an additional          3S:OOO
                            full-time   support   personnel   have not been established           with any
                            degree of accuracy.       The GAO explained     that,     to establish     more
                            accurate  requirements,     the Army organized        a task force charged
                            with the following:
                               -     revise  the Full-Time            Support   Staffing     Guide     for   troop
                                     program units:
                               -     review  all Army National   Guard and Army Reserve units
                                     and headquarters   and support    organizations   to determine
                                     the appropriate  full-time    support    staffing levels;   and
                               -     establish   criteria    for Army Guard/Reserve                  requirements
                                     at headquarters      and support organizations.
                            The GAO indicated          that    the completion  of          the task      force      project
                            has been deferred          from    August to October           1989.
                            In discussing          the revised     guide with Training          and Doctrine       Com-
                            mand officials,           the GAO learned       that the revised       staffing       guide
                            Is based on historical             data and professional          judgement      rather
                            than work analyses.              The GAO indicated       that further       discussions
                            with Army Training            and Doctrine      Command school officials            from the
                            Army     Transportation        School revealed       that full-time       support      posl-
                            tions     listed     in the revised       guide represent       the maximum number of
                            full-time        personnel     that a unit requires         for wartime       preparation
                            purposes.         The GAO pointed        out that several       other variables         must
                            also be considered            such as unit size in establishing               the full-
                            time support         staffing     guides    for peacetime      purposes.        (P. 5,
Now on pp. 34,27            pp. 34-38/GAO Draft            Report)
                            DoD:                 Partially       Concur.      Full-Time     Support     requirements
                            have been established             for the Army.          To question     the degree of
                            accuracy     is premature         at this     point.      The DOD is satisfied          with
                            the initial       effort      expended by the Army to establish                a method-
                            ology for Full-Time            Support    requirements       determination.          The
                            initial     undertaking        by the Army will,          however,   require      further
                            refinement      to include        incorporation        of a workload       analysis     pro-
                            csss.




                        w




                               Page 64                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-43TheArmy'sFulLTimeSupportProgram
                         Appendix    II
      ,                  CommentsFrom        theDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                                 9
                    The Army has totally         revised     unit   staffing       standards        for utiliz-
                    ation    of Full-Time     Support personnel.             These standards           have been
                    established       as a zero based requirement,             utilizing         surveys    to
                    determine     Table of Distribution           and Allowance          (TDA) unit require-
                    ments.      The Army Manpower Requirements              Criteria        system,     manpower
                                 staffing   guides,      technical     estimates,         statistical       stan-
                    i%z':"Snd      staffing   ratios     are used for Table of Organization                     and
                    Equipment      (TOE) type units.         All methods are approved engineered
                    or non-engineered       standards.
                    Established      manpower requirements          represent       the essential        re-
                    quirements      needed to fulfill       mission      responsibilities         in an
                    unconstrained      world.      What remains       to be done is to prioritize
                    these requirements         so as to fit     the whole into realistic               budget
                    constraints      and maintain       a minimum support         level    to lower prior-
                    ity units     and appropriately        higher     levels    for higher      priority
                    units     and to develop      a methodology       to determine        which category      of
                    full-time     support     best fits    each requirement.
                    PINQZNG .I.:        A Work Load Analysis            Svstem Could Se Used To Ratab-
                    ush    Pull-Tm           Suvnort      Reaui&menta.          The GAO noted that the
                    Commanding General of the Army's Training                         and Doctrine      Command
                    stated     in a December 1987 memorandum that the Army would not have
                    a credible        manpower justification              program until       it linked     person-
                    nel requirements,             including     requirements        for full-time       support
                    personnel,        to its Manpower Staffing               Standards    System.       The GAO
                    pointed      out that the Commanding General,                   in reaffirming       the
                    Command commitment              to the original        goals of the system,          stated
                    that,    although        ignored,       the rationale       behind the original         cre-
                    ation    of the Manpower Staffing                Standards      System has not changed.
                    According       to the GAO, the Commanding General stated                      that to be
                    competitive,          the Army must demonstrate               to the Office      of the
                    Secretary       of Defense and the Congress a credible,                      marketable
                    manpower program.               The GAO also cited          that Commanding General's
                    statement       that,      during     the budgeting       process    for personnel        re-
                    quirements,         the Army must show its commitment                  to and belief        in
                    the Manpower Staffing               Standards     System.
                    The GAO concluded           that,      since the Army already                has a system       to
                    establish     personnel         requirements          using work         load analyses--        the
                    Manpower Staffing           Standards          System    --that     a system of this         type
                    warrants     consideration           for use by the Reserve components                     in
                    establishing       full-time         support        positions       for Table of Organiza-
                    tion and Equipment            units,       baaed on the Standard              Requirements
                    Code, and individual              unit differences              could be factored        into the
                    model to establish            final      full-time         support     requirements.
Now +n pp, 30-31.    (pp. 30-39/GAO Draft             Report)
                    DOD COMMENTS: Concur.           DOD agrees that Full-Time         Support    re-
                    quirements     assessment    must    be based on the best      available     tech-
                    niques.     Approved manpower staffing            standards are appropriate        for
                    full-time     support   assessment      and the use of workload       analysis     is
                    clearly    required   as the    process    matures.




                         Page 66
                      Appendix11
                      CommentaFromtheDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                       10
               FJJJDING a:   vilitarv       Essentialitv      Should  Be The Primarv             Consider-
               Btion  In Makina      Personnel     Decisions.      The GAO observed           that,
               according    to DOD and Army officials,             of primary        importance     in a
               decision   to use military         or civilian      personnel       in a position        is
               the determination       of whether the functions             to be performed         in
               that position       are strictly     military.       According        to the GAO, the
               DOD policy     states   that a military         person should be used if a
               function   is determined         to be military       essential--otherwise,            a
               civilian   should be used to fill            the position.          The GAO stated
               that the DOD cites        two reasons underlying           the use of civilian
               personnel    whenever possible,         as follows:
                  -    the DOD policy       to maintain    the smallest          standing     military
                       force possible       and still   satisfy  mission          objectives:        and
                  -    the DOD assumption   that         civilians      generally      cost   less
                       than military  personnel.
               The GAO noted that the majority                   of the full-time       support    posi-
               tions     are currently     filled       with military       personnel      since they are
               wartime      deployable    positions.          The GAO pointed        out, however,       that
               officials      from the Office        of    the Assistant       Secretary      of Defense
               for Reserve Affairs         maintain        that full-time        support    positions      can
               be filled      with either      Army Guard/Reserve           soldiers     or military
               technicians      --who are Federal          civilian    employees,       and in most
Now on P 33.   cases, belong to the Reserves.                    (pp. 42-43/GAO Draft         Report)
               DOD COMMENT: Concur.       The DOD policy       is that civilian       personnel
               should be used when filling        a position     unless   the required       func-
               tion has a strict     need for fill    with a military        asset.    In the
               context  of this report,     it is important        to understand    that a
               military   technician   is considered      a military    asset due to his
               dual status    as both a full-time     employee and a reserve          military
               member.
               PXNDING K:   Cost        Should   Be The Secondary    Consideration              In   Making
               ErtreonnaL Ded.sio       n.8    The GAO observed   that both the         Congress and
               the DOD have directed         the Military      Services    to ensure that the
               full-time     support    program resources        provide   the most cost-effec-
               tive    form of manpower consistent          with readiness       requirements.
               The GAO pointed       out that,     since the DOD maintains          that a position
               requiring    a military      person can be filled         by either     an Army Guard
               /Reserve    or a military       technician,     in most cases, cost should be
               the determining       factor    deciding    which specific      personnel     catego-
               ry to use.
               According   to the GAO, the Congress has provided              direction    to the
               DOD regarding    personnel    costs.       The GAO cited    House of Represen-
               tatives   Report 97-943 (1982),         which stated    the growth in the
               full-time   support   personnel      required    for National      Guard and
               Reserve units    should be provided         by the least    costly     form of
               manpower consistent      with readiness       requirements.




                      Page56
                            Appendix IL
                            Cummenti From    theDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                               11
                    The GAO observed           that since the DOD believes           that a full-time
                    support     position       can be filled      by either    en Army Guard/Reserve         or
                    a military        technician,     cost should be the determining              factor
                    deciding      which personnel        category    to use.     According     to the GAO,
                    this    position      is supported      by congressional        guidance    and DOD
                    Directive       1205.18.       The GAO pointed      out that the Army has not
                    developed       the guidance      or procedures       to ensure that indiscrimi-
                    nate placement          of Army Guard/Reserve         personnel     and military     tech-
Now 01              nicians     does not occur.          (pp. 43-44/GAO Draft          Report)
                    poD m:               Concur.       The primary      factors     that determine           which
                    category     of Full-Time         Support    to use in filling            a given billet
                    should include        military      essentiality       and cost.          The type of
                    organization       in which the billet           resides     and the specific            funo-
                    tions    of the incumbent          also become an influencing               factor.        The
                    DOD is not opposed to the Army contention                     that military          tech-
                    nicians     and Army civilian          employees      are generally         best assigned
                    to support       administrative,        maintenance        and logistical         positions
                    in management headquarters              and maintenance         facilities,         while
                    Active    Guard/Reserve          members are best assigned              to unit positions
                    requiring      the uniqueness         of active     military      personnel.
                    In its 1985 report         on the problems         in implementing          the Army’s
                    Full-Time      Manning program,      the GAO reported             that a mixed force           of
                    Active    Guard/Reserve       and military       technicians         created     management
                    problems.        Thay recommended converting            to an all Active             Guard
                    /Reserve     force     in deployable     units     and reassigning          military
                    technicians        to non-deployable       support     activities.          Subsequent       to
                    the 1985 GAO report,          the DOD requested         that Congress authorize
                    the conversion        of technician      positions      so that the GAO recommen-
                    dations     could be implemented.           Congress has not yet provided                  the
                    necessary      authority.
                    The dynamics       of the various      Congressionally      established    floors
                    and ceilings       on military     technician    numbers and ceilings        and
                    grade limitations        on Active     Guard/Reserve      members frustrates      many
                    management initiatives         that have been proposed and makes it
                    difficult      to manage the program within            the consideration     guide-
                    lines     QrOQOsed    in thia report.
                    P..&WDllNGL:  The Army Prefers        To Fill     Positions       With Army
                    -d/Reserve       Personnel.       The GAO observed          that,    during   the
See comment 3       19808, the Army Guard/Reserve          growth have dominated             the growth in
                    the Army Full-Time      Support    Program.       The GAO found that Army
                    Guard/Reserve    personnel     accounted      for 88 percent         of the total
                    growth in the Army full-time          support     personnel       for the Army
                    Reserve components      from FY 1980 through           FY 1988.        The GAO pointed
                    out that the Army Guard/Reserve           personnel       increased       from 10,243
                    to 39,000 (or 281 percent)         during     that period.         As a point      of
                    comparison,   the GAO noted that,         during     the same period,         military
                    technicians   increased     from 28,758 to 33,654--or               only by 17 per-
                    cent.




                J




                            Page67                                GAO/NSIAD-90-43TheArmy'sFull-TimeSupportProgram
                              AppendixII
                              CommentsFromtheDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                                   12
                       The GAO indicated           that long range plans show that the Army Re-
                       serve will         continue    to emphasize       Army Guard/Reserve         personnel
                       growth,       while    the Army National        Guard plans equal growth in Army
                       Guard/Reserve          personnel    and military       technicians.          The GAO
                       further       found that,      while most unit officials            believe     that the
                       additional         manpower gained through          adding Army Guard/Reserve             was
                       very beneficial           in terms of its impact on readiness                and unit
                       capabilities,          they nonetheless       felt   the same benefits          could have
                       been achieved          at a lower cost with additional              military      techni-
Now fm pp. 4 and 33.   cians.        (p. 6, pp. 44-47/GAO Draft            Report)
                       poD COMMENT: Partially             Concur.     It is not DOD policy         to prefer
                       Active      Guard/Reserve     positions     over military       technician      posi-
                       tions.       However, a review of the facts           presented       by the GAO could
                       lead to that impression.              Resourcing    considerations,        earlier
                       limitations        on DOD civilian      employees,       and the management diffi-
                       culties      (discussed     in the DOD response        to finding      K) have set up
                       this     dichotomy,     which now must be overcome.
                       PINDING N: Studies              Show That Technicians              Are Less Costly        Than
                       Army Guard/Reserve            Personnel.          The GAO observed         that the DoD
                       policy     of filling       positions         that do not require          military     person-
                       nel with civilians            reflects        its position       that civilians        generally
                       cost less than military                personnel.         The GAO pointed         out, however,
                       that when the cost of technicians                     is considered,         the cost issues
                       becomes      somewhat clouded.              The GAO attributed          its questioning          of
                       technician       costs to the requirement                 for technicians         to belong to
                       the Reserves--thus            technicians         receive     both civilian         and military
                       pay benefits.           According        to the GAO, DoD officials              advised     that
                       the relative        cost of Army Guard/Reserve                 personnel       and technicians
                       changes from time to time.                    The GAO found that most studies                 com-
                       paring     the costs of Army Guard/Reserve                    personnel      and military
                       technicians        have shown technicians               are normally       less costly.          The
                       GAO concluded         indications          are that the technicians             are equally
                       effective      in performing           the work.
                       According      to a June 1985 GAO report         (OSD Case 6714),          the GAO
                       agreed with the Army March 1984 cost-benefit                   analysis--which        was
                       submitted      to the House Appropriations          Committee       in March 1984.
                       The GAO explained         that the Army analysis          concluded     that the
                       direct     cost differential      between Army Guard/Reserve              and techni-
                       cians was insignificant:          however,    the analysis        noted that life-
                       cycle costs      for the Army Guard/Reserve          was 16 percent          higher.
                       The GAO found that more recent           Army reports         show the oost differ-
                       ences to be minimal          and, as a result,     military       requirements       end
                       effectiveness        should be the primary       considerations         in force mix
Now on pp. 4,36-37.    decisions.        (p. 6, p. 49-5l/GAO      Draft   Report)
                       DOD COMMENTS: Nonconcur.             The DOD position         that civiliens        gener-
                       ally   cost less than military           is related     to actual      civilian     em-
                       ployees,    not     to dual   status   military     technicians.         The DOD policy
                       is   to use  civilians      in positions        not requiring     military      personnel




                              Page68                                    GAO/NSLAD-90-43       The Army’s Full-Time      Support   Program
                            Appendix II
                            Comments From the Department                   of Defense




                                                                                                                         13
                     - but,     in    this      context,        military        technicians     are   military       person-
                     nel.
                     The Department        supports     the findings     of the 6th Quadrennial
                     Review of Military         Compensation      on cost comparisons          between
                     Active     Guard/Reserve       and military     technician      personnel.       Relative
                     cost savings      from using one form of Full-Time               Support     rather    than
                     another,     will   occur only at the margins            as the result       of program
                     growth or realignment:           thus cost savings         in the short term are
                     very unlikely       to result      from any Full-Time        Support    force mix
                     decisions.
                     Further,     it is the DOD position            that actual    cost comparisons        are
                     best made at the billet            level.      Each position     has unique factors,
                     which make one type of manpower asset cheaper than the other.
                     For example,       in one type of unit,           a member has a greater         opportu-
                     nity   to advance in his military              grade at a faster      rate than would
                     a member in another           type of unit.        This impacts    on life-cycle
                     costs.     ~180, civilian         salaries     for military    technicians       vary by
                     geographical       srea,.     Factors     such as these must be correlated            with
                     the operational        military      requirements      before  a viable     decision
                     on position     fill      can be made.        Hence some degree of flexibility
                     is essential.         A blanket      policy    to favor one category        of full-
                     time asset over another,             based on perceived       cost savings       at the
                     macro level,      would not be prudent.
                                         Borne             v Guard/Reserve          Positions    Miuht     Effectivelv
                     -‘By                    I,ess*$stlv         Technicians.     The GAO observed         that Army
                     Guard/Reserve         personnel      serve in unit positions,                as well as
                     throughout       Reserve component headquarters                   and the DOD. The GAO
                     acknowledged,         however,     that there are situations                 at both unit and
                     headquarters        levels     where Army Guard/Reserve               personnel      are in
                     positions      that might be effectively               filled      by less costly        mili-
                     tary technicians,            depending      on the availability             of funds for
                     civilian     pay.      The GAO found that military                 technicians       can re-
                     place Army Guard/Reserve              personnel      in unit clerk           and other admin-
                     istrative      positions       and act as substitutes              in deployable        units
                     when Army Guard/Reserve              active     component personnel            are not avail-
                     able.      According       to the GAO, Army officials                prefer    to use the
                     Army Guard/Reserve            personnel      in deployable         units.      The GAO con-
                     cluded that due to the legislation                   prohibiting          the conversion       of
                     technician       slots     to Army Guard/Reserve             slats    or the unavailabili-
                     ty of Army Guard/Reserve              personnel,       technicians          are often    used
Now on pp. 4,38-39   instead     Of Army Guard/Reserve              personnel.       (p.6,     pp. 49-51/GAO
                     Draft     Report)
                     cMum!!!!m    : Partially        concur.   While the DOD supports      the use
                     of the least    costly   form of manpower consistent        with require-
                     ments, the findings      in this section      are somewhat inconsistent.
                     As pointed   out earlier      in the report,     cost is only one consider-
                     ation   in making fill     decisions.     Other factors   such as the earli-
                     er GAO recommendation       that military     technicians   be organization-




                            Page 59                                          GAO/NSIAD-90-43    The Army’s Full-Time      Support   Program
...-.ll,....”.,^^._...
                   ~.--..---.~.---.--
                                              Appendix11
                                              Comments FromtheDepartmentofDefense




                                                                                                                                      14
                                        ally   separated       from Active    Guard/Reserve       members, and the 6th
                                        Quadrennial      Review of Military          Compensation     findings       that cost
                                        savings     only occur at the margins,           must be taken into consider-
                                        ation    before   fill      decisions   are made purely       on the basis of cost.
                                        Additionally,        relief     from certain    Congressional       restrictions
                                        must be forthcoming           before  existing    technician       positions      are
                                        moved or replaced           by Active   Guard/Reserve      positions.
                                        ETNDING-0:        ermy...Bas~.~o~..Effe_t_tive.lv          Integrated        Active     Component
                                        Personnel      Into    The Full-Tjme         SupPort       Program.        The GAO observed
                                        that various        Army studies       have shown that active                 component per-
                                        sonnel in support          of the Reserve components                  have not been effec-
                                        tively    integrated       into the full-time              support      program.        The GAO
                                        cited    a February       1987 National         Guard Bureau information                 paper,
                                        which stated        that active       component soldiers              support       to Guard
                                        units    was ineffective.           According         to the GAO, the program was
                                        considered       a failure     because active             component soldiers            were as-
                                        signed to units         located     in remote areas,              far from active         compo-
                                        nent support.          The GAO pointed           out that the result              of these as-
                                        signments     was that soldiers            were being (1) placed in financial
                                        hardship     by their      assignment,         (2) sent to communities                in which
                                        they did not easily           adapt,     and (3) assigned             to organizations          of
                                        which they had little            knowledge.          The GAO found that the Army
                                        reduced active         component support            for its units          from 750 to 138
                                        personnel     and was planning           further        reductions.
                                        According       to the GAO, in a March 1987 Army paper,               the Office   of
                                        the Deputy Chief of Staff              for Personnel     opposed a Senate Armed
                                        Services       Committee proposal         to reduce the number of Army Guard/
                                        Reserve personnel          and replace       them with active     component sol-
                                        diers.       The GAO explained        that the opposition       was based on the
                                        difficulties          the active    component soldier      experiences     when as-
                                        signed out of the mainstream                of the active   Army establishment       and
Now on pp 39-40.                        support      facilities.         (p. 6, pp. 51-52/GAO Draft        Report)
                                        DOD COMMFNT:          Concur.
                                                                                    *****




                                             Page fi0                                   GAO/NSL4D-9043TheArmy'sFulbTimeSupport               Program
              Appendix II
              Comments From the Department        of Defense




    r

                                                                                                15
                                                 ****
                                            RECOMMENDATIONS
        RECOMMENDATI-:         The GAO recommended               that the Secretary    of the
        Army assign authority     and responsibility                to one Army organization
        to oversee  and direct    the Army Full-Time                Support Program.
        POD  COMMENT: Concur.         The recommendation       is moot, however.     On
        March 30, 1989, the Secretary         of the Army has already       assigned
        responsibility      for oversight    of the full-time      support  program to
        the Office     of the Deputy Chief of Staff         for Operations.
        RECO&@fENDATION2:     The GAO recommended that the Secretary       of the
        Army   develop measurable  Full-Time   Support program objectives     and
        ensure the implementation     of adequate program monitoring      mecha-
        nisms.
        POD COMMENT: Concur.      The Secretary      of the Army will   develop
        measurable full-time    support   objectives      and develop  monitoring
        mechanisms to ensure that the ObjQctivQs           are being pursued.
        Objectives will    be developed   by 3d quarter       1990 and monitoring
        mechanisms will    be in place at that time.
        PECQMMENDATION 3:        The GAO recommended that the Secretary   of the
        Army identify   full-time     support management deficiencies   as a ma-
        terial  weakness in the Secretary's       next Annual Assurance  State-
        ment.
        DOD COMMENT: Nonconcur.                  The Army has considered            inclusion       of
        this     program as a material            weakness in it's         Annual Assurance
        Statement.           However, management iudaement               in accordance        with DOD
        Directive         5010.38 (Internal         Management Control          Program),      is that
        the Full-Time          Support management deficiencies                do not constitute
        specific        instances     of noncompliance         with the Financial           Integrity
        Act.       The GAO concerns         revolve     around program direction,              measur-
        able objectives           and clarity       of requirements.          The specific        prob-
        lems     identified       in this     report    do not significantly           impair     ful-
        fillment       of mission,       constitute       a violation      of statutory        or
        regulatory         requirements,       or signific     an 1
        agsinsf;     fraud,      waste or mismanagement            of funds.      Reasonable
        assurance         has been established          that,    existing     management atten-
        tion and corrective            actions      which have already          been taken,       ne-
        gates any requirement             that the Full-Time            Support   Program man-
        agement processes            be identified        as a material       weakness.
        .RECOMt-JENDATION4:         The GAO recommended that the Secretary            of the
        Army use work load          analyses   to determine     full-time     support   per-
        sonnel requirements          for Tables of Organization           and Equipment
        units  if technically          and economically     feasible.
        DQD COMMENT.        Concur.      Workload analysis    processes    will   be adopted
        by the='Task             Force    on full-time   support.     Implementation    will




Y




              Page61                                  GAO/NSIAD-904TheArmy'sFull-TimeSupportProgram
     Appendix II
     Comments From the Department     of Defense




                                                                                  16
take time since additional      manpower resources     will  be required    to
implement  this    new process.    Additional    manpower requests    to per-
form this   function   will  be requested     in the next budget cycle    and
may be available     by FY 1992.
RECOMMENDATION 5:        The GAO recommended that the Secretary             of the
Army develop    clear    guidance    that specifically     (1) differentiates
the roles   for Army Guard/Reserve,         military   technician,     active
component,    and civilian      employees,   and (2) stipulates       when these
full-time   support     personnel    should be used.
DOD COWHINT: Concur.          The initial      guidance  in this area is being
prepared    by the DOD as a follow-on          to a RAND study now in
progress.      This study is a two year effort          and should be complet-
ed by 1991.       Once the DOD guidance        has been published   (in the
1992 time frame),      the Army will       be required   to publish   implement-
ing instructions.        This action      should be complete    by no later
than the end of 1992.
RECOMMENDATION 6:       The GAO recommended that the Secretary         of the
Army develop    procedures,   as required    by DOD Directive     1205.18,
that will   help the Army National      Guard and the Army Reserve
establish   the most cost-effective       mix of full-time    support   per-
sonnel.
DqD COMMENTS: Concur.             Army regulations        will   be revised  to put
procedures       in place that will      ensure that cost becomes a con-
sideration       in establishing      the full-time       support   mix, which
should be completed          by late 1990.       Additionally,      the DOD guidance
referred       to in the DOD response       to recommendation         5 will further
refine     this process.

                                       *****


                 MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION
SUGGESTION: The GAO suggested      that the Congress consider    defer-
ring requests   for additional  personnel  authorizations   above
current  levels   until it is assured that adequate action    has been
taken to Improve the Full-Time     Support program.
DgD COMMENTS: Nonconcur.            The DOD places     a heavy reliance      on its
Reserve Components.         With this   responsibility       comes a requirement
to properly     resource    the Reserve Units to perform          their  missions.
At this   time,    most program growth is related          to new force struc-
ture or new missions.          While the resources      are not available        to
close the gap with requirements           in the Army Reserve Components,
the DOD certainly       does not want to lose ground as missions             and
force structure      changes are implemented.          A moratorium     on full-
time support     program growth would be detrimental            to the program,
further   exacerbating      the management difficulties.




     Page 62                             GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Pull-Time    Support   Program
                 Appendix II
                 Commenta From the Department   of Defense




                 The following are GAO'S comments on the Department of Defense’s letter
                 dated November 29,1989.

   I
                 1. We changed the report to recognize DOD'S initiatives in this area subse-
GAc/ Cornments   quent to the completion of our fieldwork.

                 2. We changed the report to recognize the National Guard’s efforts to
                 check the validity of positions.

                 3. We changed the report to clarify that neither DOD nor Army policy
                 states a preference for AGRpersonnel.




                 Page 63                           GAO/NSIAD80-43   The Army’s Full-Time   Support   Program
Apfiendix
   I      III

Major Contributors to This Report


                        Charles J. Bonanno, Assistant Director
N;&tionalSecurity and   L. Michael Welsh, Evaluator-in-Charge
International Affairs   Hynek P. Kalkus, Evaluator
Division, Washington,

                        James E. Mowiser, Site Senior
Atlanta Regional        Kimberly A. Bowers, Evaluator
Office                  Christopher Keisling, Evaluator




Office




                        Page 64                      GAO/NSIAD-90-43   The Army’s Full-Time Support   Program
                                                                                                                                                    “llll----__.-   ..---__----
_c-   .-~   I_____...___I.   _._-_..-   __,-_-,   “.ll_““,,   l,~l..ll-“l-.   -”   _.-“-   _I   .--..   - -..---   ----.-   --..   --.----I.-.---