oversight

Navy Acquisition: Cost, Schedule, and Performance of New Submarine Combat Systems

Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-01-31.

Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)

National Security and
International Affairs Division

B-220298

January 31,199O

The Honorable Edward Kennedy
Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces
  and Regional Defense
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your November 2, 1987, request, we assessed the ability of the Navy’s new
advanced combat system programs-AN/BSY-1 and AN/BSY-2-to meet cost, schedule, and
performance goals.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no
further distribution of this report until 7 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we
will send copies to the Chairmen, Senate Committee on Government Affairs, House
Committee on Government Operations, Senate and House Committees on Armed Services,
and Senate and House Committees on Appropriations; the Director, Office of Management
and Budget; and the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy. We also will send copies to
interested parties and make copies available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Martin M. Ferber, Director, Navy Issues,
who may be reached on 275-6504 if you or your staff have any questions. Other major
contributors are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,




Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General
Executive Summary


                   To meet new Soviet threats and ensure continued U.S. submarine
Purpose            superiority, the U.S. Navy has initiated development of two new
                   advanced combat systems. These systems-the AN/BSY-1 and the AN/
                   BSY-2-are to be installed in improved Los Angeles (~~~-688) and new
                   Seawolf (SSN-8 1) class nuclear attack submarines, respectively. The life-
                   cycle costs for the two systems have been estimated at over $26 billion.

                   The Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional
                   Defense, Senate Committee on Armed Services, requested that GAO
                   examine the status of the Navy’s submarine combat system develop-
                   ment programs. Specifically, GAO determined whether these two combat
                   systems will meet cost, schedule, and performance goals and whether
                   the combat system being developed for ~~~-21s can avoid developmental
                   problems experienced with the ~~~-688 combat system.


                   In 1980 the Navy began developing an advanced combat system for
Background         improved ~~~-688s authorized in fiscal year 1989 and beyond. Origi-
                   nally, it planned a single-phased program. However, in October 1983 the
                   Secretary of Defense accelerated the program and approved a three-
                   phased plan to apply to ~~~-688s authorized, starting in fiscal year
                   1983-a B-year acceleration.

                   Because of ambitious program objectives and schedules, cost, schedule,
                   and technical problems surfaced causing the Navy to restructure the
                   program into two separate development efforts-AN/BSY-1         for use on
                   improved ~~~-688s and AN/BSY-2 for SSN-21s. These combat systems are
                   designed to improve data processing and management capabilities. With
                   the use of new and more capable computers, new data displays, and
                   additional software, certain tasks, such as searching for, detecting, and
                   tracking targets, will be more automated. System operators can thus
                   perform multiple tasks, address multiple targets concurrently, and proc-
                   ess tactical data faster and more accurately than they can with prior
                   systems. Collectively, these capabilities are designed to reduce the
                   response time between initially detecting a target and launching a
                   weapon.


                   The Navy’s submarine combat system development programs are
Results in Brief   experiencing problems. AN/BSY-1 program problems raise questions as
                   to when the improved ~~~-688s will be fully mission capable. Because of
                   continued ambitious development objectives and schedules for the com-
                   bat system development program, the Navy allowed insufficient time in


                   Page2                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
    l .   1



                       Executive Summary




                       the development schedule to resolve technical problems. As a result, the
                       AN/BSY-1 systems will provide the ~~~-688s improved performance
                       capabilities in the acoustics and weapons launch areas, but the systems
                       will be less capable in other areas. Also, the capabilities will be delivered
                       later and cost more than originally planned under the earlier program.

                       The Navy has taken steps to reduce risks in the AN/BSY-2 program.
                       However, it appears that potential problems in the AN/BSY-2 are similar
                       to those experienced in developing prior submarine advanced combat
                       systems, including the AN/BX-1. In order to meet the SSN-2l’s construc-
                       tion schedule, the Navy also has established ambitious objectives and
                       schedules for the AN/BEY-2 development program. As a result, the first
                       combat system will not have full capabilities when delivered to the ship-
                       builder. In addition, combat system development problems could
                       adversely affect the planned cost, schedule, and performance of the first
                       SW-2 1.


                       The Navy continues to establish ambitious program objectives and
Principal Findings     schedules in its development of complex submarine combat systems. As
                       a result, the Navy must accept less than fully capable combat systems in
                       order to meet the shipbuilders’ schedule.


AN/BSY-1 Has           The estimated life-cycle costs for the AN/BSY-1 have increased from
                       $5.4 billion to $12.1 billion for 19 and 24 systems, respectively. The first
Experienced Problems   four systems will not have full AN/BSY-1 offensive capabilities and will
                       be upgraded during the submarines’ post shakedown availability period.
                       Therefore, these submarines will not be able to perform a full range of
                       missions. In addition, the AN/BSY-1 will provide less capabilities than
                       originally planned under the original submarine advanced combat sys-
                       tem program.

                       AN/BSY-1 design changes were the major cause of several improved
                       ~~~-688s under construction being modified. These changes also resulted
                       in one shipyard being awarded almost $82 million for changes to five
                       submarines and another requesting a $150 million contract adjustment
                       for modifications for nine submarines. The first nine AN/B%-l-
                       equipped submarines will be delivered an average 17 months late to the
                       Navy.




                       Page 3                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                           Executive Summary




AN/BSY-2 Will Not Have     Like the improved ~~~-688 program, the need to meet the SSN-21ship
                           construction schedule also is affecting the AN/BSY-2 development pro-
Full Capabilities When     gram. As a result, the prime contractor does not have sufficient time to
Delivered                  deliver the first combat system with full capabilities to the Navy.
                           Remaining capabilities are scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in
                           November 1994.


AN/BSY-2 Development       As of November 1989, AN/BSY-2 development was about 3 months
                           behind the program’s current schedule and further delays are expected.
Problems Could Adversely   Delays have resulted in deferring two Navy critical system design
Delay
- . . Further System       reviews and some critical item testing. Until the Navy completes these
lJ lelivery                reviews, the prime contractor is unable to begin developing most hard-
                           ware and writing most system software code.


                           GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
Recommendations

                           The Department of Defense (DOD) generally agreed with GAO'Sreport and
Agency Comments            with the facts as presented on the AN/BSY-1 but only partially con-
                           curred with GAO'Sfindings on the AN/BE%-2. In those cases where it par-
                           tially agreed with the report, DODprovided further elaboration. (See
                           app. II.)

                           DODagreed that AN/BSY-1 combat system design changes were a major
                           contributor to submarine delivery delays and cost increases but added
                           that other design changes also contributed to the submarines’ delays and
                           cost increases. Regarding the AN/BSY-2, DODstated that the slippage of
                           the preliminary design review and the critical design review had no
                           impact on the scheduled delivery of the system to the Navy. Although
                           DODagreed that some critical item tests have been delayed, it stated that
                           many have been satisfactorily completed. Also, DODagreed slowness in
                           subcontract definitization increased program risks but added that no
                           subcontractor design effort is being delayed.




                           Page 4                               GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                           ;.

                                                         -1
                                                         .i
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Page 5   GAO/NSIAIMO-72   Submarine   Combat Systems     .’
Contents


Executive Summary                                                                                2

Chapter 1                                                                                        8
Introduction            Background                                                               8
                        Objectives, Scope, and Methodology                                      10

Chapter 2                                                                                       12
SSNISSSCombat           Program Costs                                                           12
                        System Capabilities Not Provided on Schedule                            13
System Problems         Performance                                                             14
Affect the Readiness    Conflicting Combat System and Submarine Schedules                       17
                            Increase Risks
of Some Submarines      Conclusions                                                             19
                        Agency Comments                                                         19

Chapter 3                                                                                       20
Early AN/BSY-2          Program Cost
                        Program Schedule
                                                                                                20
                                                                                                21
Combat System           First AN/BSY-2 Will Not Be Delivered With Full                          26
Problems Could               Performance
                        Similarities Between Submarine Combat System Programs                   29
Increase Costs and      Conclusions                                                             30
Delay SSN-21 Delivery   Agency   Comments                                                       31

Appendixes              Appendix I: Comparison of Past and Present Combat                       32
                            System Program Features
                        Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense                    33
                        Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report                         46

Tables                  Table 2.1: Estimated AN/BSY-1 Life-Cycle Costs
                        Table 2.2: Delivery Schedules for First Five Combat
                            Systems
                        Table 2.3: Costs and Schedule Delays Due to SUBACS                       18
                            Basic Redesign
                        Table 3.1: Estimated Life-Cycle Costs for AN/BSY-2                       20
                            Systems




                        Page 6                               GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
Contents




Abbreviations

DOD     Department of Defense
OPTEVFOROperational Test and Evaluation Force
PSA     post shakedown availability
SSN    nuclear attack submarine
SUBACS Submarine Advanced Combat System


Page 7                            GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                       .’
                                                                                             L



Chapter 1                                                                                                    /

Introduction


               The nuclear attack submarine (SSN) is one of the nation’s most important
               antisubmarine warfare assets. To enhance the performance and ensure
               the continued superiority of U.S. nuclear attack submarines, the Navy
               will equip both the improved Los Angeles class (~~~-688) and the new
               Seawolf class (~~~421) nuclear attack submarines with new and
               improved combat systems-AN/BSY-1 and AN/BSY-2, respectively. The
               two computer-based combat systems are designed to detect, classify,
               track, and launch weapons at enemy subsurface, surface, and land
               targets; locate enemy targets faster than previous systems; allow opera-
               tors to perform multiple tasks and address multiple targets concur-
               rently; and reduce the time between detecting a target and launching
               weapons. Fully capable combat systems, which are successfully devel-
               oped, fully tested, and delivered on schedule, are critical to the
               improved ~~~-688 and the SSN-2 1 achieving full combat capability.


               Advanced submarine combat system development began in 1980 with
Background     the Submarine Advanced Combat System (SUBACS)~program. SUBACSwas
               started to meet the improved ~~~-688’s expanded mission and to counter
               the Soviet antisubmarine warfare threat through the 1990s. SUBACSwas
               to be a single-phase program and was to upgrade improved ~~~-688s
               authorized in fiscal years 1989 and beyond. In October 1983, however,
               the Secretary of Defense accelerated the program and approved a three-
               phased plan (SUBACS Basic, SUBACS A, and SUBACSB) for improved
               ~~~-688s authorized in fiscal years 1983 and beyond-6 years earlier
               than originally planned.

               SUBACSBasic was intended to be a new combat system to add new sonar
               subsystems and to process and integrate acoustic and combat control
               information by using a new fiber optic technology called a distributive
               system data bus. SUBACSA was to use new and upgraded software to
               integrate SUBACSBasic’s acoustic and combat control processing and was
               to be used in improved ~~~-688s authorized in fiscal years 1986 through
               1988. SUBACSB was to introduce sonar improvements into the integrated
               combat system on improved ~~~-688s authorized in fiscal years 1989 and
               beyond. Once completed, a modified SUBACSB system was to serve as the
               baseline design for the SSN-21's combat system. The three-phased plan,
               however, was not carried to full implementation.



               ‘For further information on the SUBACS program, see our report entitled SUBACS Problems May
               Adversely Affect Navy Attack Submarine Programs (GAO/NSIAD-86-12, Nov. 4, 1985).



               Page 8                                          GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                        Chapter 1
                        Introduction




                        In December 1983 the Navy awarded the International Business
                        Machines Corporation a $772 million contract for concurrent full-scale
                        development and production of five SUBACSBasic systems and for an
                        engineering development model. In 1985, because of program cost,
                        schedule, and technical problems, the Navy restructured SUBACSinto two
                        separate development efforts-AN/BSY-1     and AN/B%‘-2.


Emergence of AN/BSY-1   In redesigning the SUBACSBasic effort, the Navy named the program
                        AN/BSY-1, deleted the fiber optic distributive system data bus, and rein-
                        troduced the heavier and bulkier copper cable and some previously
                        developed hardware to accomplish data distribution. These actions
                        reduced the system’s planned performance capabilities. The SUBACTS
                        Basic contract was renegotiated in February 1986 to establish AN/BSY-1
                        requirements. The renegotiation also established maximum liability of
                        the government at $1.03 billion for development and production of the
                        first five systems. Because there was insufficient time to correct all
                        design and development problems and meet the improved ~~~-688 con-
                        struction schedule, two versions of the AN/BSY-1 combat system were
                        delivered.

                        The first version, preliminary product baseline system, was installed on
                        four submarines (SSN-751 through SSN-754). The preliminary systems
                        provide those submarines with limited self-defense capabilities (acous-
                        tic, safety, and weapon firing functions) necessary to operate until the
                        systems are upgraded to include all offensive capabilities. These four
                        systems will be upgraded’ to full performance capabilities during each
                        submarine’s post shakedown availability (PSA)’ and before the subma-
                        rine’s initial operational date. A second version, product baseline sys-
                        tem, is to have full performance capability and will be installed on the
                        20 remaining improved ~~~-688s starting with SSN-755.

                        The AN/BSY-1 replaces the AN/BQQ-5 sonar and the CCS MK-1 fire con-
                        trol systems and is designed to address shortfalls in these systems. The




                        ‘The upgrade will include improved software, replacement of the old AN/UYK-7 computer with the
                        new Navy standard AN/UYK-43 computer that was not available during the early design phase of
                        SUBACS,  and addition of hardware for signal processing and under ice operations.
                        ‘An availability is an asstgnment of a shop to a repair facility for repairs or maintenance. A PSA
                        occurs after a newly built. activated, or converted ship has completed its shakedown cruise. The
                        heavy estimates the PSA for the SSX-751 through SSN-754 will be 9 to 10 months each.



                        Page 9                                              GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                         Chapter 1
                         Introduction




                         Navy expects to buy 244 AN/BSY-1 combat systems and associated
                         equipment, at a total cost of about $4.7 billion. The AN/BSY-1 is nearing
                         completion of full-scale development.


Emergence of AN/BSY-2    The Navy combined SUBACS A and SUBACS B performance requirements
                         and renamed this effort the AN/BSY-2. This multibillion dollar combat
                         system is currently in full-scale development and is to be installed on 29
                         new SSN-21s. The AN/BSY-2 will be highly automated, will use existing
                         technology, and will include larger and more sophisticated sensors,
                         greater data processing capabilities, and more new computer software
                         than the AN/BSY-1.

                         To reduce AN/B%!-2 development risks, the Navy undertook a 2-year
                         development program to design a combat system and implemented a
                         leader/follower arrangement. In early 1986, the Navy awarded fixed-
                         price system design development contracts to the General Electric Com-
                         pany and the International Business Machines. In December 1987 the
                         Navy selected General Electric as the prime contractor and International
                         Business Machines as the “follower” contractor. On March 31, 1988, the
                         Navy awarded General Electric a $1.84 billion fixed-price-incentive fee
                         contract to develop and produce three AN/B%‘-:! combat systems and
                         related items. General Electric will develop and qualify International
                         Business Machines as a competitor for fiscal year 1992 production
                         systems.


                         The Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional
Objectives, Scope, and   Defense, Senate Committee on Armed Services, asked us to assess the
Methodology              status of the Navy’s AN/BSY-2 combat system development program.
                         Specifically, we were asked to determine whether the AN/BSY-2 pro-
                         gram would meet cost, schedule, and performance goals, including soft-
                         ware development and system test and integration requirements. We
                         also were asked to assess the Navy’s AN/BSY-1 combat system program
                         in terms of cost, schedule, and performance goals.

                         To evaluate AN/BSY-1 and AN/BSY-2 program progress, we discussed
                         cost, schedule, and performance issues with officials in Washington,
                         D.C., at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

                         ‘The total number of systems and associated costs reflects a 24 AN/BSY-1 combat system program.
                         However, the program’s size has been reduced to 23 as a result of fiscal year 1990 appropriation
                         decisions made for the SSN-688 construction program.



                         Page 10                                           GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
    Chapter 1
    Introduction




    Engineering, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Test and
    Evaluation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis
    and Evaluation (Cost Analysis Division), the Naval Sea Systems Com-
    mand program offices responsible for these two programs, and the
    Kavy’s Board of Inspection and Survey. We also discussed these issues
    with officials at the

l International Business Machines Corporation, Manassas, Virginia;
l General Electric Company, Syracuse, New York;
l Naval Underwater Systems Center, Newport, Rhode Island, and its on-
  site office at International Business Machines Corporation, Manassas,
  Virginia;
l Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, Groton, Connecti-
  cut, and Newport News, Virginia;
l Operational Test and Evaluation Force, Norfolk, Virginia;
l Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Newport News,
  Virginia;
. Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation, Groton, Con-
  necticut; and
. Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    We also reviewed and analyzed documents that describe and track sys-
    tem requirements, development, and acquisition.

    We discussed internal control system compliance with officials in Wash-
    ington, D.C., at the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Inspector
    General; the Naval Sea Systems Command’s, the Naval Space and War-
    fare Command’s, and the Naval Underwater System Center’s Offices of
    Internal Review; and the Naval Audit Service. We also discussed General
    Electric’s Underwater Systems Division’s internal control compliance
    with officials at the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense
    Contract Services Administration in Syracuse, New York. We reviewed
    the Defense Contract Audit Agency’s audit of General Electric’s
    AN/BSY-2 full-scale engineering development proposal.

    We conducted our review between April 1988 and November 1989 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. DOD
    provided written comments on this report. These comments are pre-
    sented and evaluated in chapters 2 and 3 and are included in appendix
    II.




    Page 11                              GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                                                         .’




Chapter 2                                                                                                                                          ,

SSN-688 Combat System Problems Affect the
Readiness of Some Submarines

                                          Ambitious development objectives and schedules have caused the AN/
                                          BSY-1 combat system program to experience cost increases and schedule
                                          delays. AN/BSY-1 life-cycle cost’ estimates more than doubled between
                                          February 1986 and November 1988. In addition, AN/BSY-1 design
                                          changes were the major contributor to several submarines being deliv-
                                          ered later and costing more than originally planned. As a result, AN/
                                          BSY-1 delivery dates were revised to coincide with shipyard require-
                                          ments. Revised AN/BSY-1 delivery dates have been met and, as of
                                          November 1989, two of the four system upgrades have been delivered.
                                          However, only one of the two upgrades has been installed on improved
                                          ~~~-688s. Thus, these four submarines are not fully mission capable or
                                          able to counter the evolving threat until the upgrades are completed.

                                          The fully compliant AN/BSY-1 combat system has not been operation-
                                          ally tested under realistic at sea conditions. However, land-based assess-
                                          ments show the system has the potential to be operationally effective
                                          and suitable, although it will provide less performance capabilities than
                                          originally planned under the SUBACSBasic program to alleviate program
                                          schedule and cost risks.


                                          Total estimated AN/BSY-1 program costs have increased 125 percent
Program Costs                             since February 1986 when the Navy estimated the life-cycle costs at
                                          about $5.4 billion for 19 systems, trainers, and spares. In November
                                          1988, the Navy estimated these costs at $12.1 billion for 24 systems and
                                          associated equipment. (See table 2.1.)

Table 2.1: Estimated   AN/BSY-1   Life-
Cycle Costs                               Escalated dollars In millIons
                                                                                                    Feb. 1986        Nov. 1988        Difference
                                          Development                                                 $1,227.7         $1,211 0            $-16.7
                                          Productton                                                   2.588 3          3.513 8              925 5
                                          ODeratIon and support                                        1,578.l          7,424 7            5.826 6
                                          Total                                                      $5,394.1        $12,149.5           $6,755.4




                                          ‘Life-cycle costs refer to total costs to the government to develop, produce, construct, operate, sup-
                                          port, and own a system over a specified life span.



                                          Page 12                                              GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                            Chapter 2
                                            SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
                                            Readinessof Some Submarines




                                            Production costs increased primarily from the addition of five systems,
                                            six new wide aperture arrays,? spares, and repair parts. Operation and
                                            support cost estimates increased about $6 billion, from $83 million per
                                            system in February 1986 to $309 million per system in November 1988.
                                            The substantial increase was attributed to a revised cost estimating
                                            model that corrected assumptions made in calculating the 1986 operat-
                                            ing and support cost estimate. For example, according to an AN/BSY-1
                                            program official, the February 1986 estimate did not include all operat-
                                            ing expenses and reflected a significant error in calculating the life
                                            expectancy of the systems.


                                            Timely delivery of the combat systems to the shipyards is essential to
System Capabilities                         ensure that improved ~~~-688 delivery schedules are met. However,
Not Provided on                             early combat system development, design problems with AN/BSY-1 ,
Schedule                                    design changes to the ~~~-688s to accommodate AN/BSY-1, and other
                                            ship design changes led to ship construction delays and shipbuilder
                                            claims against the Navy. Further, a labor dispute at one shipyard led to
                                            an additional 6-month construction delay. Original and revised AN/BSY-
                                            1 delivery dates based on shipyard need for the first five combat sys-
                                            tems with initial and full capabilities are shown in table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Delivery Schedules   for First
Five Combat Systems                                                                 Initial capabilities
                                                                                                       Required
                                                                                                      delivery to           Full capabilities
                                            SSN                                    Original        shipbuildera          Original         Currentb
                                            751                                         5187                 II/87           9/88             11189”
                                            752                                         8187                   4188         12188              4/90
                                            753                                       11187                    l/89          3189              6191
                                            754                                         l/88                   7188          4189             12190
                                            755                                                                              418%              5189”
                                            aThese dates are also the actual delwery dates

                                            bSchedule IS as of June 1989 but, accordmg to a Navy official, these dates are tentatwe and further
                                            delays may occur if shlpyard requirements change


                                            In accordance with the revised delivery schedule, the Navy accepted
                                            delivery of 5 of the 24 required AN/BSY-1 systems. However, because of
                                            ship construction delays, the shipbuilders were not prepared to install

                                            ‘A wide aperture array is a passive sonar that will be mounted on SSN-688 and SSN-21 hulls. It will
                                            provide enhanced capabilities over previous systems because it will locate targets faster and provide
                                            more accurate range and target motion analysis. It was originally planned for implementation in the
                                            SUBACS B tune frame.



                                            Page 13                                              GAO/NSLAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
              Chapter 2
              SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
              Readinessof SomeSubmarines




              the systems so the AN/BSY-1 contractor retained them. Later, the Navy
              delivered the systems to the shipbuilders as government-furnished
              equipment. The four systems with initial capabilities were installed on
              the SSN-751 through SSN-754. However, upgrades to make the four sys-
              tems fully capable will be installed an average 19 months later than
              originally scheduled. Upgrades for the SSN-751 and SSN-752 systems
              were delivered to the shipbuilder, but only the ~~~-751 upgrade was
              installed.

              In its comments on this report, DODstated that the two system upgrades
              delivered through November 1989 were delivered on time. However,
              DOD’S milestone assessment is based on revised delivery to the ship-
              builder, whereas our late delivery assessment is based on the program’s
              original installation schedule or the PSAending date. According to the
              Navy, the remaining upgrades will be delivered in time for installation
              during each submarine’s PSA.The fifth system, with full performance
              capabilities, was delivered to the shipbuilder in May 1989 and installed
              in September 1989. The Navy does not expect delivery of the remaining
              19 systems to be a problem.


              Although the Navy has taken delivery of five systems, the first four
Performance   were delivered without full performance capabilities. Until the systems
              are upgraded, the improved ~~~-688s will not be able to accomplish their
              expanded mission or to counter the evolving threat. According to Navy
              officials, these submarines would not normally be operated outside U.S.
              waters. i

              The AN/BSY-1 systems have not yet been subjected to operational test-
              ing under realistic, at sea conditions. Instead, the Navy has conducted
              developmental and preliminary tests on some AN/BSY-1 subsystems4
              and a land-based operational assessment. On the basis of these tests, the
              Navy is confident that a fully capable AN/BSY-1 will improve the SSN-
              688’s performance. Even though DODrequires that a production repre-
              sentative system undergo operational testing before proceeding beyond
              low rate production, the first full system testing under realistic, at sea


              ‘Although this is a normal sequence for newly constructed submarines between delivery and PSA,
              PSAs for the improved SSN-688s have been continuously delayed due to ship construction slippage.
               ‘Accordmg to the Navy, the SSN-751 fired 12 torpedoes with 9 hits during a weapon system accuracy
              test and tactlcal weapons training and certification firings. Three torpedo failures occurred. Accord-
              mg to the AN/B%-1 program manager, this performance is above the fleet average. The passive
              sonar also tracked MK-30 targets at ranges greater than any previous submarine.



              Page 14                                             GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                           Chapter 2
                           SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
                           Readinessof SomeSubmarines




                           conditions will not be performed until after commitment is made to pro-
                           cure all systems. Whether the AN/BSY-1 is more effective and is an
                           improvement over older systems, however, cannot be fully demon-
                           strated until a complete system is subjected to operational and technical
                           testing under these conditions. This testing is planned to occur in fiscal
                           year 1990 when the first improved ~~~-688 with a complete AN/B%?-1
                           system is subjected to technical and operational evaluation.


System Deficiencies        In June 1988 the Navy’s Board of Inspection and Surveys conducted an
                           underway acceptance sea trial of the first AN/BSY-l-equipped subma-
Preclude the Use of Some   rine, the SSN-751. The Board’s July 15, 1988, report identified 20 defi-
SSN-688s
II. .     for Intended     ciencies of such significance that the submarine’s ability to perform its
Missions                   missions was degraded and cited additional deficiencies relating to com-
                           bat system reliability and maintainability. Most of the 20 significant
                           deficiencies involved the AN/BSY-1 and existed because the upgrade to
                           full performance had not been installed. Therefore, the first four subma-
                           rines had limited acoustic and combat control capabilities.

                           The Board recommended that the submarine be accepted and that a
                           retrial be conducted after the system upgrades are installed. However,
                           according to a Chief of Naval Operations official, a retrial will not be
                           necessary because the Navy will rely on operational and technical evalu-
                           ation results to determine the SSN-75l’s suitability for deployment. In an
                           October 11, 1989, letter, the Board’s President agreed that a retrial of
                           the first AN/BSY-l-equipped submarine was not required. In its com-
                           ments on this report, DOD noted that all deficiencies the Board identified
                           and attributed to the AN/BSY-1 had been corrected.


Operational Testing        DODregulations require that a major defense acquisition program
                           undergo operational testing on a production representative system
                           before proceeding beyond low rate production to confirm that the items
                           or components actually tested are effective and suitable for combat.
                           However, operational testing has not been conducted on a fully compli-
                           ant AN/BSY-1 under realistic, at sea conditions, even though 20 of the
                           24 systems are under contract and the contractor has delivered five sys-
                           tems to the Navy. According to DOD,this is a consequence of having a
                           program enter low rate production concurrent with development.

                           The Naval Underwater Systems Center has conducted a comparative
                           analysis of the AN/BSi’-1 and its predecessor systems-the AN/BQQ-5
                           sonar and the CCS MK-1 fire control systems. The analysis shows the


                           Page 16                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                          ’




Chapter 2
SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
Readiness of Some Submarines




AN/BSY-1 has the potential to provide significantly improved effective-
ness over these systems in the acoustics and weapon launch areas, but
the AN/BSY-l’s performance capabilities are less than originally
planned under SUBACSBasic. In September 1987 the Navy’s Operational
Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR)provided an observation of the
AN/BSY-1 , and in September 1988 it recommended continuing the devel-
opment process. However, it emphasized that the findings must be
viewed in the context of extreme limitations. For example, OPTEVFORoffi-
cials cautioned that, because of the lack of suitable data for projecting
the system’s potential effectiveness and suitability, the observation was
based on OPTEVFOR'S   review of such items as development specifications,
personnel, training concepts, and resource documents.

The first AN/BSY-1 operational assessment, a land-based computer sim-
ulation, was conducted in July 1989. In August 1989 OPTEVFORreleased
an assessment of that simulation but again stated that the assessment
was preliminary and the testing scope limited. On the basis of an incom-
plete analysis of the test data and within the constraints of the testing
scope, OPTEVFORprojected that the AN/BSY-1 had the potential to be
operationally effective and suitable and again recommended continued
system development.

Although no major deficiencies were noted in most areas, additional
testing to resolve critical operational issues and to complete evaluation
of operational effectiveness and operational suitability is required due
to limitations in the land-based test facility and in the testing scope.
These limitations precluded the evaluation of certain effectiveness
thresholds. For example, the land-based test facility was not representa-
tive of the shipboard environment with respect to heat, noise, vibration,
ship motion, electrical power, accessibility, electromagnetic compatibil-
ity and interference, and interfacing systems. Additionally, mine laying,
mine field navigation and avoidance, under ice operations, and underwa-
ter communications could not be simulated. OPTEVFORstated that the
assessment may be modified as a result of additional analysis.

According to DOD,the final assessment of operational effectiveness and
suitability will occur with technical and operational evaluation. How-
ever, a fully compliant AN/BSY-1 system was not available for actual at
sea operational testing until November 1989-when the SSN-751 com-
pleted PSA.DODalso stated that the start of the evaluation is contingent
upon the ~~751’s schedule following PSA.The Navy plans to start tech-
nical and operational testing on the ~~~-751 in March and August 1990,
respectively. According to AN/BSY-1 officials, the testing delay is due to


Page 16                                    GAO/NSIALI-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                       Chapter 2
                       SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
                       Readinessof Some Submarines




                       the limited number of systems being procured, concurrent system pro-
                       duction, and program schedule. However, by the time testing is com-
                       pleted and results are reported, all 24 systems will be under contract
                       and several additional systems will have been delivered. Thus, problems
                       identified during testing will have to be corrected on all systems deliv-
                       ered as well as those in production. The Navy will have to pay to correct
                       any existing technical problems on systems.

                       The next Defense Acquisition Board review for the AK/BSY-1 is the fis-
                       cal year 1991 full production review. Because all systems will be under
                       contract before the review, DODwill consider eliminating the AN/BSY-1
                       review based on several factors, including the land-based test results.
                       However, such test data are normally used to support approved limited
                       production, while more comprehensive testing is used to support
                       approval for full production.


                       When SUBACSBasic was changed to AN/BSY-1, nine improved SSN-688s-
Conflicting Combat     five by Electric Boat and four by Newport News Shipbuilding-were
System and Submarine   under construction. With the approval of the AK/BSY-1 design, portions
Schedules Increase     of these submarines had to be redesigned to accommodate the AN/BSY-1
                       rather than the SI:BACSBasic design. Thus, the Kavy was required to pro-
Risks                  vide various design and configuration data to the ship design agent in
                       time to meet the ~~~-688 construction schedule if it was to avoid govern-
                       ment liability for delay. However, untimely and defective data caused
                       Electric Boat to incur significant delays and additional construction
                       costs, resulting in Electric Boat submitting a request for equitable
                       adjustment. Newport Kews Shipbuilding also has submitted a similar
                       request.

                       Between September 1986 and October 1986, Electric Boat alerted the
                       Navy on several occasions that late and/or faulty AN/BSY-1 design data
                       were affecting the ~3~688 construction schedule. During September
                       1986, Electric Boat notified the Navy that work on the SSN-751 was sig-
                       nificantly behind schedule, that major design problems, primarily with
                       Ah’/BSY-1, were causing the delay, and that the design must be finalized
                       immediately to meet the submarine delivery date. On October 7, 1986,
                       Electric Boat again cautioned the Navy that these major design problems
                       were causing rework, delays, and stoppages to the construction of the
                       ss1+751. Electric Boat again stated that the AN/BSY-1 must be delivered
                       on schedule to support the improved ~~~688 construction schedule.




                       Page 17                                    GAO/NSIALI-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                                                   _’




                                       Chapter 2
                                       SSN-688Combat System ProblemsAffect the
                                       Readinessof SomeSubmarines




                                       On July 17, 1987, Electric Boat submitted a request for equitable adjust-
                                       ment for about $97.1 m illion and schedule adjustments for five
                                       improved ~~~-688s.The request for equitable adjustment is based on the
                                       impact of formal and constructive changes (untimely and defective
                                       data) for the AN/BSY-1 design, retractable bow planes, and the place-
                                       ments of lead ballast, The Navy awarded Electric Boat a $824 m illion
                                       cost adjustment, including about $27 m illion for delivery delays. (See
                                       table 2.3 for cost and delivery information for specific submarines.)

Table 2.3: Costs and Schedule Delays
Due to SUBACS Basic Redesign           Dollars in millions
                                                                    Total   Adjustment         Contract         Revised             Delay
                                       SSN                   adjustment        for delay       date             date               months
                                       751                          $353             $6.1      Nov. 1987a       June    1988”             7
                                       752                           20.5             5.5      Mar. 1988”       Jan.    198gb           10
                                       754                           12.9             6.3      July 1988        Sept.   1 98gb          14
                                       755                            89              6.1      Dee 1988         Mav     1990            17
                                       757                            4.8             3.0      June 1989        Julv    1991            25
                                       Total                       $82.4           $27.0
                                       “Because the Navy accelerated the delrvery dates for the SSN-7.51and SSN-752,we used thusdate
                                       rather than the contract dellvery date to determine the schedule vanance
                                       ‘Submarrne was delrvered on thusdate

                                       According to a Navy official, the total $82.4 m illion adjustment, with the
                                       exception of $650,000,”was exclusively for AN/BSY-1 design changes
                                       and delivery delays. As a result of changing the AN/BSY-1 program and
                                       a labor strike,‘l Electric Boat will deliver five submarines to the Navy an
                                       average of about 14 months late. In addition, Newport News has submit-
                                       ted a similar request for its first nine submarines.

                                       As of June 1989, Newport News had submitted three of eight incre-
                                       ments to its request for equitable adjustment. These three increments
                                       represent an increase to the ceiling price; of about $198 m illion, includ-
                                       ing about $150 m illion for AN/BSY-1 design changes. It will deliver its
                                       first four submarines an average of 25 months late.


                                       ‘The $650,000 is for material for the retractable bow planes. The bow planes resulted in no delay.
                                       “In June 1988 Electric Boat shipyard workers went on strike over wage increases An agreement was
                                       reached in October 1988; a phased comeback of employees was initiated and continued through
                                       December 1988. As an aftermath of the strike, Electric Boat was unable to rehn-esufficrent quahfred
                                       workers.

                                       ‘The contract ceiling is the total dollar amount for which the government is hable.



                                       Page 18                                              GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombat Systems
                  Chapter 2
                  SSN-688Combat System Problems Affect the
                  Readinessof Some Submarines




                  In an attempt to resolve cost, schedule, and performance problems expe-
Conclusions       rienced with SUBACSBasic, the Navy established the AN/BSY-1 combat
                  system program. However, ambitious program objectives and schedules
                  also have caused problems within the AN/BSY-1 program. AN/BSY-1 has
                  experienced significant increases in total program costs and system
                  design problems. In addition, because the time to correct all AN/BSX-1
                  design and development problems was insufficient, the AN/B8Y-1
                  became the major contributor to delays in the improved ~~~-688 con-
                  struction program. This resulted in increased ~~-688 submarine costs
                  and delayed the introduction of new and fully mission capable subma-
                  rines into the fleet. These construction delays, in turn, caused a rippling
                  effect on AN/BSY-1 schedules.

                  To meet the improved ~~~-688 construction schedule, the Navy accepted
                  delivery of the first four systems without full performance capabilities.
                  These four systems are to be upgraded to full performance during each
                  ship’s PSA.However, since PSAcannot occur until after the improved SSN-
                  688 construction is completed, only the SSN-751'Ssystem has been
                  upgraded to full performance.

                  The Navy has accepted three AN/BSY-l-equipped improved ~~~-688s.
                  However, with the exception of the SSN-751, these submarines have only
                  limited performance capabilities and cannot accomplish their mission of
                  conducting prompt and sustained operations at sea until the systems are
                  upgraded during PSA.In addition, because PSAfor the first AN/BSX-l-
                  equipped submarine was only recently completed, a fully compliant AN/
                  BSY-1 has not been field tested under realistic, at sea conditions. Never-
                  theless, AN/BSY-1 assessments indicate the systems have the potential
                  to improve performance significantly and to be operationally effective
                  and suitable. However, it is not known how much improvement the AN/
                  BSY-1 will achieve over existing systems or if operational thresholds will
                  be obtained until the tests are conducted.


                  DODgenerally agreed with the facts on the AN/BSY-1 system as pre-
Agency Comments   sented. It partially agreed with our statement that AN/BSX-1 design
                  problems led to submarine construction delays and cost increases. It
                  stated that other ship design changes also contributed to schedule
                  delays and cost increases. However, during subsequent discussions, DOD
                  officials agreed that AN/BSY-1 design changes were the major contribu-
                  tor to ship construction delays and cost increases.




                  Page 19                                    GAO/N&W-90-72 Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                                                  .-

Chapter 3

Early AN/B%2 Combat System Problems
Could Inerease Costs and Delay SSN-21
Delivery
                                                The successful development of a fully capable AN/B?%-2 combat system
                                                is critical to the ~~21 achieving its mission requirements. Dedicated to
                                                the SSN-21, the Navy has no backup combat system planned should the
                                                AK/B%‘-2 be unavailable when needed. The AN/BSY-1 cannot be substi-
                                                tuted because its configuration does not permit its installation on the
                                                ~~-21 without modifying the ship design and the combat system hard-
                                                ware and software. The AK/BSY-2 is intended to take advantage of sig-
                                                nificant noise reductions expected of the ss1+21; however, if the SSN-21
                                                does not meet its noise quieting requirements, the AN/BSY-2 will be less
                                                effective.

                                                The AN/BSY-2 development program is in the first year of full-scale
                                                development and indications are that ambitious goals and development
                                                schedules may cause problems. Total program costs have decreased,
                                                from an estimated $16 billion to about $14 billion, but the program has
                                                experienced some schedule slippage and performance problems. Further
                                                schedule slippage and performance problems are possible and the poten-
                                                tial also exists for costs to increase. The greatest risk is the development
                                                of Ah’/BSY-2 software. An analysis of combat system program features
                                                shows many similarities between the AN/BSY-2 and its predecessors-
                                                SI'BACSand AT\;/BSY-1. Problems or delays in the development and pro-
                                                duction of the AN/BSY-2 could affect the SSN-21program.


                                                Estimated life-cycle costs for 29 AN/BSY-2 systems have decreased. As
Program Cost                                    shown in table 3.1, total life-cycle costs decreased from about $15.6 bil-
                                                lion to about $13.9 billion because the Navy eliminated one shore facility
                                                from which ~~~-21s were to be deployed. As a result, the resources (per-
                                                sonnel, equipment, training, spares, etc.) committed for the facility over
                                                the program’s life span are no longer required.

Table 3.1: Estimated   Life-Cycle   Costs for
AN/&Y-P    Systems                              Dollars In mllllons
                                                Phase                                          May 1986        June 1989”     Difference
                                                Development                                       $1,596            $1,737            $141
                                                Procurement        -                               5,698             5.711            13
                                                Operatton and Support                              8,291             6,542        -1,749
                                                Total                                           $15,585           $13,990       $-1,595
                                                These are prellmlnary cost estimates not yet approved by DOD




                                                Page 20                                          GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
     .
              1




                                         Chapter3
                                         Early A N /B S Y - 2C o m b a tSystemP r o b l e m s
                                         C o u l d IncreaseCostsa n d DelayS S N - 2 1
                                         Delivery




                                         T h e A N /B S Y -2 p r o g r a m ’s a m b i tio u s d e v e l o p m e n ts c h e d u l e is b e g i n n i n g
P r o g r a mS c h e d u le              to slip, a n d th e N a v y h a s n o b a c k u p system p l a n n e d for u s e in th e S S N - 2 1
                                         s h o u l d th e A N /B S Y -2 n o t b e available w h e n n e e d e d .T h e N a v y states
                                         th a t a b a c k u p c o m b a t system is n o t r e q u i r e d b e c a u s eth e A N /B S Y -2
                                         h a r d w a r e a n d software a r e b e i n g d e s i g n e dto b e built a n d written m o d u -
                                         larly. T h e N a v y e x p e c ts th e software to b e delivered incrementally, with
                                         fin a l delivery ta k i n g p l a c e b e fo r e technical a n d o p e r a tio n a l testing.
                                         S h o u l d software delays h a p p e n , th e N a v y believes th a t th e m o d u l a r
                                         d e v e l o p m e n t a n d th e incremental delivery a p p r o a c h e swill give th e sys-
                                         te m a n d th e s s 1 + 21 basic warfighting capabilities while p r o b l e m s a r e
                                         resolved.

                                         T o m e e t th e ~ ~ a - 2 1 construction s c h e d u l e a n d to r e d u c e th e software
                                         d e v e l o p m e n t risk, th e N a v y p l a n s to h a v e A N /B S Y -2 p e r f o r m a n c e c a p a -
                                         bilities for th e first S S N - 2 1delivered in two p h a s e s .D u r i n g th e first
                                         p h a s e , all h a r d w a r e a n d m o s t software a r e to b e p r o v i d e d to th e ship-
                                         builder in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 3 . D u r i n g th e s e c o n d p h a s e ,th e r e m a i n i n g soft-
                                         w a r e is to b e delivered to th e N a v y in N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 4 .T h e N a v y will
                                         c o n tin u e to evaluate installation p l a n s to incorporate this software a t
                                         th e earliest feasible d a te consistent with th e ship’s s c h e d u l eb u t b e fo r e
                                         c o m p l e tio n o f P S A te, n ta tively s c h e d u l e d d u r i n g fiscal year 1 9 9 6 . H o w -
                                         ever, th e A N /B S Y -2 p r o g r a m is b e h i n d its d e v e l o p m e n tm ilestones a n d
                                         schedules.A s a result, two critical N a v y system d e s i g n reviews h a v e
                                         b e e n d e l a y e d . In a d d i tio n , late s u b c o n tractor deliveries h a v e c a u s e d
                                         s o m e critical ite m testing to b e d e l a y e d . Unless th e s e p r o b l e m s a r e
                                         resolved, A N /B S Y -2 delivery s c h e d u l e c o u l d b e adversely a ffected.


Navy P r o g r a m                       N a v y p r o g r a m a s s e s s m e n tsexpress c o n c e r n r e g a r d i n g A N /B S Y -2 s c h e d -
A s s e s s m e n ts S h o w             u l e delays. B e t w e e n M a r c h 1 9 8 8 a n d N o v e m b e r 1 9 8 9 ,th e A N /B ? % -2
                                         d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m h a d fallen 3 m o n th s b e h i n d schedule. S e v e r a l fac-
C o n c e r n A b o u t S c h e d u le   tors c o n tributed to th e delay, including initial u n d e r s ta ffin g , late a n d
D e lays                                 incomplete c h a n g e sin system r e q u i r e m e n ts, c h a n g e sin a c o u s tic a n d
                                         w e a p o n s designs, a n d th e n e e d to perform a d d i tio n a l w i d e a p e r tu r e
                                         array testing. A J u n e 1 9 8 9 N a v y a s s e s s m e n talso s h o w s u n d e r s ta ffin g
                                         c o n tin u e s to b e a serious p r o b l e m . A c c o r d i n g to th e a s s e s s m e n t,G e n e r a l
                                         E lectric’s overall staffing level, e x c e p t a t o n e s u b c o n tractor location, is
                                         c o n s i d e r e dseriously short o f p l a n n e d levels in certain h a r d w a r e a n d
                                         software critical skill areas, w h i c h c o u l d seriously a ffect fu tu r e costs
                                         a n d schedule.

                                         A M a r c h 1 9 8 9 a s s e s s m e n tindicates th a t b e c a u s eo f th e a m o u n t o f work
                                         required, th e lack o f sufficient available resources, a n d th e current


                                         P a g e2 1                                             G A O / N S L A D - 9 0 -S7u2b m a r i n eC o m b a tSystems
                          Chapter 3
                          Early AN/BSY-2 Combat System Problems
                          Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                          Delivery




                          schedule, architecture’ development was considered a high risk area.
                          The assessment also indicates that history with other programs shows
                          that early schedule problems become future cost growth and the AN/
                          BSY-2 program is no different.


Critical Design Reviews   Two important Navy design reviews that will determine the extent to
                          which General Electric’s design meets system specification requirements
Delayed                   have been delayed. The first is a preliminary design review to assess the
                          Company’s hardware and software design approach. The second is a
                          critical design review to assess whether detailed design specifications
                          meet performance requirements before producing hardware and writing
                          software.

                          In March 1989 the Navy and General Electric agreed to delay the com-
                          pletion of the preliminary design review from April 1989 to October
                          1989 and the critical design review from August 1989 to January 1990.
                          Delaying these reviews will result in compressing the hardware and
                          software development for at least 5 months to meet the unchanged sys-
                          tem integration test schedule. In addition, the Navy’s February 1989
                          program assessment indicates that delays in completing the preliminary
                          design review could prevent the ship design agent from receiving
                          updated AN/BSY-2 data in a timely manner. Further delays will only
                          exacerbate the problem.

                          According to an AN/BSY-2 program official, two factors contributed to
                          the delays. One, General Electric’s contract was awarded later than
                          planned. Two, system specifications and designs were not detailed
                          enough for the Navy to conduct the reviews on schedule. This occurred
                          because General Electric needed more time to establish a firm system
                          design before preparing detailed specifications and writing software.
                          According to the official, the additional time should result in a better
                          system design baseline and less problems as the system progresses
                          through development and testing. The official also believes these sched-
                          ule delays will not adversely affect the planned delivery of the first sys-
                          tem. However, a June 1989 program review shows that General
                          Electric’s performance to meet the critical design review has not
                          improved, bringing into question the Navy’s ability to complete this
                          review by January 1990.


                          ‘According to the Navy, system architecture is the structural framework for all hardware and soft-
                          ware components that are combined and integrated to implement the total system’s functions.



                          Page 22                                            GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                             Chapter 3
                             Early AN/BSY-2 Combat System Problems
                             Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                             Delivery




                             According to DOD, the action taken concerning the design review delays
                             will result in both cost and schedule savings and has not affected the
                             scheduled delivery of the systems to the Navy. The preliminary design
                             review, rescheduled to October 1989, was completed on schedule, and all
                             required contractual documents were provided.

                             Whether the actions taken will provide the Navy with cost and schedule
                             savings, with no affect on delivery schedules, will not be known for
                             sometime. However, the 5-month delay in conducting the reviews is a
                             fact and results in 5 months less time to correct any system design defi-
                             ciencies Because of the tight time frame, little flexibility is provided to
                             deal with developmental problems. Therefore, we continue to believe
                             that compressing AN/BSY-2 hardware and software development for 5
                             months makes it difficult to achieve the overall schedule and that the
                             potential exist for delays in the scheduled delivery of the systems to the
                             Navy.


Some Critical Item Testing   During the system design definition phase of the development program,
Delayed                      according to the Navy, General Electric and the Navy identified several
                             critical system items that could present significant cost, schedule, or
                             performance risks during full-scale development. To mitigate these risks
                             early and allow contingency plans or approaches to be developed in time
                             to ensure that the overall development program would be successfully
                             implemented, General Electric developed a critical item demonstration
                             test schedule. However, Navy program assessments show that some crit-
                             ical item tests have been delayed. Should problems occur when these
                             tests are conducted, additional time will be needed to correct and retest
                             the items.

                             One subcontractor’s inability to deliver a cathode ray tube for AN/BSY-2
                             display consoles and another’s lag in designing the console hardware
                             have resulted in delaying a critical shock test of this tube from Decem-
                             ber 1988 to August 1989. In another instance, critical item tests to
                             demonstrate system response times for the database management sys-
                             tem, operator display consoles, and submarine switch network’ have
                             been delayed from October 1990 to March 1991. General Electric had
                             planned to perform demonstration tests on prototype hardware and
                             then on tactical hardware. Now such tests will be conducted only on
                             tactical hardware. The assessment indicates that, although the tests

                             ‘The submarine switch network transfers data between various computers and links all functional
                             processors for the workstations, supervisory displays and combat control.



                             Page 23                                           GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                           Chapter 3
                           Early AN/BSY-2 Combat System Problems
                           Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                           Delivery




                           have been delayed, contingency plans to mitigate risks have not been
                           submitted.


Subcontractors Not Under   As of September 1, 1989, General Electric had not awarded final con-
                           tracts for the development and limited production phase of the program
Contract                   to two subcontractors-International    Business Machines and Librascope
                           Corporation-that    have important roles in developing hardware and
                           software and assuring that the first system is delivered as planned. The
                           central issue between General Electric and the subcontractors is deter-
                           mination of a mutually agreeable contract price. It is important that
                           final contracts be awarded as soon as possible after the beginning of the
                           development phase to ensure that subcontractors “buy into” work they
                           are responsible for performing and that a viable, overall system test
                           schedule is developed.

                           The International Business Machines is to perform work amounting to
                           about 15 percent of the total value of General Electric’s contract. This
                           work will include developing and producing a wide aperture array, a
                           land-based engineering system, and other related AN/BSY-2 compo-
                           nents. Also, General Electric will qualify International Business
                           Machines as a competitor for fiscal year 1992 production systems.
                           Librascope is to develop and produce the weapons launch group and the
                           operator display consoles. These subcontractors were performing work
                           under sustaining engineering or letter contracts.

                           According to the Navy, delays in awarding these subcontracts have
                           raised questions as to the subcontractors’ commitment to the overall
                           development and testing program, introduced potential delays for test-
                           ing and delivering critical hardware and software, and decreased confi-
                           dence in the validity of the current test schedule. For example, a June
                           1989 Navy program review indicated that the absence of a contract with
                           Librascope was posing a great risk in the completion of a General Elec-
                           tric system integration test. In the long term, delays in awarding Inter-
                           national Business Machines a contract may affect not only the leader/
                           follower acquisition strategy but also its ability to be a qualified compet-
                           itor for the fiscal year 1992 production systems.

                           According to DOD,slowness in subcontract definitization added to pro-
                           gram risk. However, General Electric’s full-scale development contract
                           with Librascope was definitized on October 6, 1989. Although the sub-
                           contract with International Business Machines is not definitized, General
                           Electric and International Business Machines have agreed on both scope


                           Page 24                                 GAO/NSLAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                             Chapter 3
                             Early AN/M-2 Combat System Problems
                             Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                             Delivery




                             and price. As of December 3 1,1989, the contract had not been signed.
                             The Navy states that no subcontractor design efforts are being delayed
                             and all are being performed to the correct baseline.


Combat System and            Conflicts with the AN/BSY-2 and the SSN-21design schedule have
                             resulted in additional costs to the SSN-21 construction program. To
SSN-2 1 Schedules Conflict   ensure that the submarines’ design and subsequent construction will
                             accommodate the AN/BSY-2, the ship designer (Newport News) needs
                             system configuration data and information before construction begins.
                             The Navy has taken actions to assure that the ship designer is aware of
                             system changes and has provided General Electric data to reflect those
                             changes. However, General Electric did not provide the ship designer
                             with combat system data in a timely manner nor has it provided final
                             design data. As a result, portions of the submarines had to be redesigned
                             to accommodate late combat system data, increasing SSN-21design cost
                             an estimated $5 million. If final AN/BSY-2 design data result in further
                             changes to the SSN-21design, additional costs and delays could occur.

                             In June 1988 General Electric provided the ship designer with prelimi-
                             nary combat system design data that resulted in design changes to the
                             submarine’s interior. The ship designer estimated that this would
                             increase submarine design costs by $3.4 million. Subsequently, General
                             Electric, among other actions, changed the AN/BSY-2 design by replac-
                             ing a Navy standard computer with a commercially available processor.
                             The Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport
                             News, estimates that the redesign will cost an additional $1.6 million.

                             The changes and data provided do not fully represent the final AN/BSY-
                             2 design. A General Electric official stated that the ship designer was
                             urging General Electric to provide it with final AN/BSY-2 space and
                             weight requirements to ensure the submarine design is compatible with
                             the system. However, General Electric will not be able to provide all
                             final ship design data and information until the Navy completes its criti-
                             cal design review in January 1990.

                             DOD,in its comments on this report, stated that attributing the estimated
                             $5 million increase in ss~21 design cost to late delivery of combat sys-
                             tem design data reflects a misunderstanding of the sequence of events.
                             Before the AN/B,‘%-2 contract was awarded, the ship design agent was
                             provided with a “notional” system baseline, which was the Navy’s best
                             estimate of the system configuration prior to having a definitized con-
                             tract. After contract award, the winner’s system baseline was disclosed


                             Page 25                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                        Chapter 3
                        Early AN/B.‘%-2Combat System Problems
                        Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                        Delivery




                        to the agent. According to DOD, the fact that the cost of this change was
                        less than $5 million illustrates the accuracy of the Navy’s initial
                        estimates.

                        DOD also stated that although AN/BSY-2 design changes have affected
                        the ship’s design, many AN/BSY-2 changes have been made to accommo-
                        date the ship design agent’s requests. Potential changes in both ship and
                        combat system designs continue to be discussed and evaluated in open
                        forums as to impact, necessity, and desirability among all affected
                        parties.

                        An AiY/BSY-2 program official stated that because of the standard risks
                        of concurrent development efforts, changes to the AN/BSY-2 design
                        resulting from the Navy’s design review could increase the submarine’s
                        cost and delay submarine delivery. Thus, the Navy has taken precau-
                        tionary measures, even though significant changes are not expected. For
                        example, the Navy and the ship designer have biweekly meetings to
                        address combat system issues and concerns. Also, the ship designer has
                        been provided current AN/BSY-2 changes and has prioritized the data it
                        needs from General Electric, and General Electric has scheduled its work
                        to meet the ship designer’s needs.

                        According to DOD, concurrent development programs for the ship and
                        the combat system pose risks for both contractors and the Navy’s pro-
                        gram offices; these risks have been mitigated to the maximum possible
                        extent by the close coordination of the contractors and the Navy pro-
                        gram offices. These risks were well understood from the Seawolf pro-
                        gram inception. The Navy has provided a continuous stream of data to
                        the agent and has prioritized the generation of design data to accommo-
                        date the agent’s needs. According to DOD, as of November 21,1989, no
                        unresolved interface issues between the ship and combat system designs
                        existed.


                        The first AN/BSY-2 will not be fully capable or meet mission capabilities
First AN/BE&Z Will      when delivered to the shipbuilder in November 1993. According to a
Not Be Delivered With   G eneral Electric official, General Electric is unable to develop, test, pro-
Full Performance        duce, and deliver a fully capable system in time for the first delivery.
                        Therefore, in November 1987 General Electric proposed-and the Navy
                        agreed-that the first AN/B.‘%-2 would be delivered to the shipbuilder
                        in h’ovember 1993 complete with hardware but not all software. An AN/
                        BSY-2 program official stated that software would be delivered in two
                        phases to mitigate software development schedule risks. The official


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                        Chapter 3
                        Early AN/BSY-2Combat System Problems
                        Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                        Delivery




                        stated that delivering all software in November 1993 would have signifi-
                        cantly increased software development risks and General Electric’s con-
                        tract price.

                        During the first phase, General Electric plans to deliver about 2.7 million
                        lines of the required software (about 86 percent) in November 1993.
                        According to an OPTEVFORofficial, the planned capabilities to be deliv-
                        ered at that time will be sufficient to meet the expected threat. The sec-
                        ond phase, which includes the remaining 426,000 lines of software (14
                        percent), will primarily add acoustic functions. This software is to be
                        provided to the Navy in November 1994, before technical evaluation
                        begins in July 1995.

                        The extent to which system performance capabilities will be delivered
                        depends on the nature and the seriousness of problems General Electric
                        encounters as the program progresses through development and testing.
                        Although it is too early in AN/B=-2 development to determine how the
                        AN/BSY-2 will function under realistic operational conditions, software
                        development risks could jeopardize performance capabilities.

                        In its comments on this report, DOD stated the decision to install the final
                        portion of software on the system after ship delivery is a factor of ship
                        construction, integration and testing schedules, and system availability.
                        As both the ship and the combat system are being developed, the Navy
                        will continue to evaluate the installation schedule of the final portion of
                        software.


Technical Performance   The Navy is developing a new computer, the enhanced modular signal
Development Problems    processor, for the AN/BSY-2 combat system. The original model selected
                        (SIM B) had problems meeting its monitoring and fault localization and
                        AN/BSY-2 initial program loading requirements. In addition, the esti-
                        mated cost of providing the model increased $65 million because several
                        planned users switched to another model (SIM E). In June 1989 the Sec-
                        retary of the Navy approved the SIM E model for the AN/BSY-2 pro-
                        gram. Program officials expect the conversion to occur by fiscal year
                        1992. Because the SIM E model will be more widely used, the Navy
                        believes the cost will be reduced and savings will occur over the pro-
                        gram’s life. However, there will be nonrecurring and replacement costs.
                        In November 1989 the Navy estimated it would cost about $50 million to
                        modify the SIM E model to meet AN/B,!%-2 requirements and $52 million
                        to retrofit three ~~~-21s one maintenance trainer, and one land-based
                        engineering system with the SIM E model.


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                       Chapter 3
                       Early AN/BSY-2Combat System Problems
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                       General Electric also is experiencing other system architecture prob-
                       lems. The Navy requires all key AN/BSY-2 components to have redun-
                       dant capabilities. However, redundant capabilities do not exist for the
                       system receiver and beamformer cabinets. Also, General Electric is
                       resolving a technical problem that could result in a significant loss of
                       display data and make target detection nearly impossible over a large
                       area.


Software Development   Under the AN/BSY-2 program, the Navy will be significantly challenged
                       to meet performance requirements within tight time frames and bud-
Risks                  gets. For example, our March 1989 report’ on the combat system identi-
                       fied several areas where the Navy’s early and continued management
                       attention is desirable if it is to meet this challenge. Among them are the
                       Navy’s ability to maintain the software development schedule due to
                       massive software requirements and its use of Ada computer language.

                       The AN/BSY-2 requires designing, developing, and testing about 2.8 mil-
                       lion lines of new tactical software, the largest new computer software
                       development effort ever undertaken for a submarine combat system.
                       During system design definition, it appeared that this system would
                       retain a significant amount of software from previous systems that,
                       according to a technical direction agent official, would have greatly
                       reduced risks associated with this effort. However, recent software esti-
                       mates show that none will be retained from prior systems and that
                       about 83 percent, or 2.3 million lines, of the AN/BSY-2 new design soft-
                       ware will be accomplished using Ada language. Although DOD believes
                       Ada has matured and over 100 DOD programs either use or plan to use
                       Ada, our recent report’ shows that most experts agree that the Ada lan-
                       guage had not yet matured.

                       The Navy’s June 1989 AN/BSY-2 program review document shows the
                       shortage of Ada qualified (experienced) personnel in software was par-
                       ticularly a serious concern. Staffing, in certain functional areas, was 93
                       percent below the software plan for May 1989. Additionally, it shows
                       General Electric’s ability to recruit qualified Ada personnel could
                       severely affect both cost and schedule should General Electric have to
                       contract out portions of its tasks. The AN/BSY-2 contractor’s software

                       ‘Submarine Combat System: Technical Challenges Confronting Navy’s Seawolf AN/B%-2 Develop-
                       ment, (GAO/IMTEC-89-35, Mar. 13, 1989).
                        ‘Computer Language Standardization: Status, Costs, and Issues Associated With Defense’s Implemen-
                       tatlon of Ada (GAO/IMTEC-89-9, Mar. 24, 1989).



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                       Chapter 3
                       Early AN/BSf-2 Combat System Problems
                       Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                       Delivery




                       development plan estimates that up to 900 software personnel will be
                       required to develop and integrate all software. -

                       According to DOD,whether retaining software from prior systems
                       decreases or increases risk is a matter of opinion and depends on many
                       technical factors: architecture/partitioning, depth and quality of docu-
                       ments, interface definition, standards and conventions used, and lan-
                       guage and operating system compatibility.


                       The Navy, on the basis of problems with the SUBACSand AN/BSY-1 com-
Similarities Between   bat system programs, has adjusted its strategy for the AN/BSY-2. These
Submarine Combat       measures include establishing a 2-year system definition phase, develop-
System Programs        ing and testing software as separate modules called partitioning, and
                       procuring and providing General Electric with hardware early enough to
                       allow an additional year of development and testing within the overall
                       schedule. Many similarities, however, still exist between the AN/BSY-2
                       program and its predecessors, SUBACSand AN/BSY-1 programs, that indi-
                       cate the program could encounter future problems. An analysis of vari-
                       ous program features (see app. I) shows similarities exist between
                       schedules, software developments, concurrency, combat system capabil-
                       ities, and at sea testing. Of particular concern is the similarities in pro-
                       gram schedule and software development features.

                       To meet the SW:! 1 lead ship construction schedule, the Navy established
                       ambitious development objectives and schedules for the AN/BSY-2 pro-
                       gram. Initially, the first AN/BSY-2 system delivered was to be fully
                       capable; however, to maintain the required delivery schedule, the Navy
                       is having it delivered in phases. Other schedule delays-overall, the pro-
                       gram is 3 months behind and two important system design reviews have
                       been delayed 5 months-have surfaced that indicate the potential for
                       further slippages. Essentially, the same events (ambitious schedules and
                       phased delivery) were experienced within the SUBACSand AN/BSY-1
                       programs.

                       The AN/BSY-2 system requires twice as much new tactical software as
                       the AI\;/BSY-1 system required. To attempt to design, develop, test, and
                       integrate 2.8 million lines of new software, including 2.3 million lines
                       written in Ada language, without adequately trained, experienced pro-
                       grammers could affect the development schedule. Because of the soft-
                       ware volume and the ambitious schedules, AK/BSY-2 software
                       development will lag behind the hardware development and will be
                       delivered in phases. Final software installation is planned to take place


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              Chapter 3
              Early AN/B%-2 Combat System Problems
              Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
              Delivery




              in January 1995, more than 13 months after the hardware is scheduled
              to be delivered. AN/B%‘-1 program software development, although not
              written in the Ada language, also lagged behind the hardware develop-
              ment. As a result, the first four systems were delivered without a full
              software package.

              In its comments on this report, DODstated the lessons learned in develop-
              ing earlier combat control and acoustics systems, including AN/BSY-1,
              were incorporated into the planning for the AN/BSY-2 development
              effort. It is the first submarine system, for instance, to use the software
              development requirement of DOD-STD-2167.This, combined with (1) the
              longer development time for AN/BSY-2, (2) the benefits derived from
              the two-contractor, 2- year system design definition phase, and (3) the
              intensive early oversight, should allow AN/BSY-2 to profit from the sim-
              ilarities to earlier programs. In addition, the AN/BSY-2 phased software
              delivery is different from the AN/BSY-l’s in that the AN/BSY-2’s
              approach was taken before award of the development contract rather
              than as a mid-development mitigation plan.

              DODfurther stated that, although more new code development is
              required for AN/BSY-2, the integration job will be easier since all code is
              written to the same standards, conventions and style guides; code parti-
              tioning was done from scratch; computer software configuration item
              interfaces were defined before detailed design; and code is written in the
              same language, developed with a common tool set and written for the
              same operating system.

              Also, DODbelieves that on the basis of the training programs in use at
              General Electric and its subcontractors and the nature of the standards,
              tools, conventions and guides being used in the program, AN/BSY-2 soft-
              ware programmers will be adequately trained.


              The AN/BSY-2 combat system program, like its predecessor SUBACSand
Conclusions   AK/BSY-1 programs, must meet ambitious objectives and schedules in
              order to meet the needs of the SSK-21lead ship construction schedule.
              Critical to the SSN-21 meeting its performance goals and missions
              requirements, the AN/BSY-2 program has little flexibility for delays.

              In developing the AN/B.‘%-2 combat system, the Navy took measures to
              mitigate the problems encountered within the SUBACSand AN/BSY-1 pro-
              grams. Despite these measures, the AN/BSY-2 program is experiencing
              technical and performance problems and is behind schedule, and the


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                  Chapter 3
                  Early AN/BSY-2Combat System Problems
                  Could Increase Costs and Delay SSN-21
                  Delivery




                  potential exists for program cost increases and further schedule slip-
                  pages. In the software development and testing areas, the Navy needs to
                  take additional steps to maximize the possibility of delivering the first
                  system as planned and without jeopardizing the cost, schedule, and per-
                  formance of the SSN-21program. The h’avy’s attempt to design, develop,
                  test, and integrate the large amount of new tactical software in the Ada
                  language without adequately trained and experienced programmers
                  could severely affect program cost and schedule. Moreover, two impor-
                  tant system design reviews, which will establish the system’s final con-
                  figuration, have been delayed at least 5 months, and could affect
                  program cost and schedule. This delay could prevent General Electric
                  from providing the ship designer with final AN/BSY-2 design data.
                  Should further changes be required, the SSN-2I program’s cost could
                  increase and its schedule could incur delays.


                  DODpartially agreed with the facts presented on the AN/BSY-2 combat
Agency Comments   system program. In those instances where DODpartially agreed with our
                  presentation or provided further clarification, we modified the report
                  accordingly.

                  DODstated that although some critical item tests have been delayed,
                  many have been satisfactorily completed. The wide aperture array suc-
                  cessfully passed its flow noise test in July 1989, the beamformer chip
                  met requirements with significant margin on the first pass, the cathode
                  ray tube successfully completed both shock and magnetic susceptibility
                  tests in August 1989, and the database manager and executive were suc-
                  cessfully ported to switchnet, meeting all timing requirements.

                  We note, however, that the tests conducted were not as comprehensive
                  as the scheduled critical item tests and did not include all hardware. For
                  example, the tests did not include operator display consoles that were to
                  have been a part of the original August 1989 tests.




                  Page 31                                 GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                      ,

Appendix I

Comparison of Past and Present Combat System
Program Features

              Program          SUBACS Basic and
              features         AN/BSY-1                                AN/BSY-2
              Cost cap         Set under AN/BSY-I after cost,          Set before full-scale englneerlng
                               schedule, and performance               development and lImIted
                               problems surfaced                       lsroductlon
              Development      Ambitious development objectIves        Ambitious development objectIves
              objectIves and   and schedules established to meet       and schedules to meet SSN-21
              schedules        ship constructlon schedule.             construction schedule InsuffIcIent
                               lnsufftcient time to address            time to deliver fully tested and
                               problems and deliver fully tested       capable system
                               and fullv caDable svstems.
              Software         Originally required 1.4 milllon lines   Requires 2 8 mIllIon lines of new
              intensiveness    of new software                         tact’ical software In addition, most
                                                                       new software wntten In Ada
                                                                       programminq lanquaoe
              Concurrency      Program delivery schedule required      Program dellvery schedule requires
                               five systems to be developed and        three systems be developed and
                               produced concurrently                   Droduced concurrentlv
              Combat           Software and hardware not fully         Not all software to be developed
              capabIlItIes     developed when four systems were        and tested when first system
                               delivered to shipbuilder. First         delivered to shIpbuIlder First
                               system was to be fully capable          system to be fully capable wlthln 2
                               about 17 months after the               months after submarine delivered
                               submarine was delivered to Navy.        to Navy
              At sea testing   Limited testing before 14               Limited testing to be completed
                               production combat systems were          before two production systems are
                               to be delivered.                        to be delivered
              Management       Sufficient visiblllty and               Sufficient visibility to witness and
                               management authority. Navy              observe development and testing
                               report, however, identified several     No authority under fixed-priced
                               program management                      incentive contract to direct
                               weaknesses.                             changes to ensure goals are met
                                                                       unless the contract IS modlfled.
                                                                       This could potentially Increase cost
                                                                       and delay the schedule
              OversIght        Program manager was responsible         Program manager primarily
                               for informing the Navy, DOD, and        responsible for Informing the Navy
                               the Congress of program goals and       and the Congress of program goals
                               problems                                and problems DOD to review
                                                                       program status annually, with
                                                                       emphasis on software
                                                                       development.




              Page 32                                       GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense



                          DIRECTOR   OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

                                      WASHINGTON,   DC   20301-3010




              Mr. Frank Conahan
              Assistant   Comptroller  General, National       Security
                  and International   Affairs  Division
              U.S. General Accounting Office
              Washington, DC 20548

              Dear Mr. Conahan:

                    This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the General
              Accounting Office  (GAO) draft report,  "NAVY ACQUISITION:    Progress
              and Problems in Implementing Navy Submarine Combat System Programs,"
              dated October 2, 1989 (GAO Code 394236/OSD Case 8135).     The DOD
              generally  concurs with most of the report findings.

                    The detailed   DOD comments on the report findings  are provided        in
              the enclosure.     The opportunity to comment on the draft report is
              appreciated.

                                                           Sincerely,




                                                           Robert     C. Duncan


              Enclosure




                Page 33                                     GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                       l




      AppendivII
      Comments From theDepartment ofDefense




                GAO DRAFT REPORT- DATED OCTOBER2, 1989

                      (GAO CODE 394236) OSD CASE 8135

     "NAVY ACQUISITION:       PRXRESSANDPRO~INIMPLEMEZJTING

                 NAVYSUBMARINECOMBATSYSTEMPRWRAMS"

                  DOD RESPONSETO THE GAO DRAFT REPORT
                                    *****

                                    FINDINGS

.   FINDINGA:       Backaround:       Improved Combat Svstems.     The GAO
    reported that, to enhance the performance and ensure the contin-
    ued superiority     of U.S. nuclear submarines, the Navy will equip
    both the Los Angeles class (SSN-688) and the new Seawolf class
     (SSN-21) nuclear attack submarines with new and improved combat
    systems--the     AN/BSY-1 and AN/BSY-2, respectively.          The GAO
    explained that these systems are designed to reduce the time
    between detecting      a target and launching weapons. The GAO
    observed that advanced submarine combat development began in
    1980 with the Submarine Advanced Combat System (SDBACS) program.
    The GAO noted that,      initially,      this was to be a single-phase
    program to upgrade improved nuclear attack submarines authorized
    in FY 1989 and beyond.          The GAO reported    , however, that in
    October 1983 the Secretary of Defense approved a three-phased
    plan (SUBACSBasic, SUBACSA and SUBACSB) for the SSN-688s
    authorized    in FY 1983 and beyond--six        years earlier   than origi-
    nally planned.       The GAO also reported that a modified SUBACSB
    system was to serve as the baseline for the SSN-21 combat
    system.    The GAO found that, in 1985, because of program cost,
    schedule and technical        problems, the Navy restructured       SUBACS
    into two separate development efforts--the            AN/BSY-1 and
    AN/BSY-2.

    The GAO reported that the SUBACSBasic contract                was renegotiated
    to establish    AN/BSY-1 requirements.       The GAO found that, because
    there was insufficient      time to correct      all design and develop-
    ment problems and meet the improved SSN-688 construction                  sched-
    ule--two   versions of the AN/BSY-1 combat system have been
    delivered.     The GAO noted that the first         version    (the prelimi-
    nary product baseline      system) was installed        on SSN-751 through
    SSN-754--providing     those four submarines with limited            self-de-
    fense capabilities     necessary to operate until          the systems are
    upgraded to include offensive      capabilities.         The GAO found that




       Page34                                        GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
                            Appendix11
                            CommentsFrom theDepartment of Defense




                          the second version    will   be installed   on the remaining    20
                          SSN-688s--starting    with   SSN-755.

                          Finally,    the GAO reported that the Navy combined SUBACSA and
                          SUBACSB performance requirements       and renamed this effort  the
                          AN/BSY-2, which is currently     in full-scale   development and is to
Now on pp 8-11            be installed    on 29 new SSN-21s.    (pp. 7-13/GAO Draft Report)

                      .   DOD RESPONSE: Concur.
                      .   FINDING   8: AN/BSY-1 Cost Increases and Schedule Delavs.        The
                          GAO reported that, between February 1986 and November 1988, the
                          AN/BSY-1 life cycle cost estimate more than doubled--from        about
                          $5.4 billion    to $12.1 billion.    The GAO noted that the substan-
                          tial  increase (shown in table 2.1) is attributed      to a revised
                          cost estimating    model that corrected   assumptions on operating
                          and support costs.

                          The GAO also reported that the program has experienced schedule
                          delays.    The GAO compared original       and revised AN/BSY-1 delivery
                          dates for initial     and full capabilities.       The GAO noted that,
                          according to a Navy official,         the current dates for full capa-
                          bilities   are still   tentative    and further   delays may occur.      The
                          GAO found that, while four systems have been installed,            upgrades
                          will be delivered--on      average-- 19 months later than originally
                          scheduled.    The GAO observed, however, the Navy nevertheless
                          maintains that the upgrades will be delivered           in time for each
                          submarine's post shakedown availability.           The GAO further
                          observed the Navy also takes the position          that the delivery     of
                          the remaining systems (including         one already delivered)    will not
                          be a problem.      The GAO concluded that ambitious program objec-
                          tives and schedules have caused problems with the AN/BSY-1
                          program.    The GAO further      concluded that the SSN-688 combat
                          system problems affect the readiness of some submarines.               (PP.
Now on pp 12-14 and       14-17, P. 25-26/GAO Draft Report)
17-18
                      l   DOD RESPONSE: Concur.       It should be noted that each of the five
                          systems delivered    to date has met shipyard construction      sched-
                          ules.    The two system upgrades delivered      to date (for SSN 751
                          and SSN 752) were delivered     on time.    The research, development,
                          test and evaluation    costs have not changed.      Only the production
                          costs increased to reflect     an increase in the number of systems.
                          Overall,   cost growth was basically     a result of changes in
                          assumption of ship's operating years.

                      l   FINDINGC:      AN/BSY-1 Perfomance.     The GAO reported that, until
                          the first    four systems already delivered   are upgraded, the
                          improved    SSN-688s will not be able to accomplish their expanded




                            Page35                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
                      Appendix11
                      CommentsFromtheDepartmentofDefense




                    mission or to counter the evolving threat.             The GAO noted that,                 1
                    according to Navy officials,      these submarines normally would not
                    be operated outside U.S. waters.         The GAO found that, in June
                    1988, the Navy's Board of Inspection         and Surveys conducted an
                    underway acceptance sea trial       of the first     AN/BSY-l-equipped
                    submarine, and listed    20 significant      deficiencies     (most involv-
                    ing the AN/BSY-1) that degraded the submarine's ability             to
                    perform its missions.      The GAO noted that, although the Board
                    recommended a retrial    after the system upgrades are installed,            a
                    Chief of Naval Operations official        stated that a retrial       will
                    not be necessary because the Navy will rely on operational               and
                    technical   evaluation  results   to determine the submarine's
Now on pp   14-17   suitability   for deployment.      (pp. 17-19, pp. 25-26/GAO Draft
                    Report)

                    DOD RESPONSE: Concur.          The President,     Board of Inspection  and
                    Survey, in a letter       dated October 11, 1989, stated that a
                    retrial   of the first     AN/BSY-1 equipped submarine is not
                    required.    (m:       All deficiencies     attributable   to AN/BSY-1
                    program noted by the Navy's Board of Inspection            and Surveys have
                    been corrected.)

                    FINDING D: Operational             Testinu Not CoWded             on AN/BSY-1.      The
                    GAO reported that, despite the fact Federal and DOD regulations
                    require     that a major defense acquisition              program undergo opera-
                    tional    testing     on a production        representative       system before
                    going beyond low-rate production --a fully                  compliant AN/BSY-1 has
                    not been operationally           tested under realistic,            at-sea, condi-
                    tions.      The GAO did note that the Naval Underwater Systems
                    Center conducted a comparative analysis that showed the AN/BSY-1
                    has the potential         to provide significantly            improved effective-
                    ness over its predecessor systems.                  The GAO also noted that in,
                    September 1987, the Commander, Naval Operational                       Test and
                    Evaluation       Force, provided observations            on the system and
                    recommended continuing           development--but        at the same time cau-
                    tioned on the lack of suitable               data for projecting         the system's
                    potential      effectiveness       and suitability.         The GAO further       noted
                    that, in August 1989, the Naval Operational                    Test and Evaluation
                    Force assessed a land-based computer simulation                      of the
                    AN/BSY-l--but        again cautioned that the testing               scopewas limited.
                    The GAO reported that the Naval Operational                    Test and Evaluation
                    Force stated that, within the described constraints,                        the system
                    had the potential         to be operationally         effective      and suitable.
                    The GAO observed that, although no major deficiencies                         were noted
                    in most areas, additional            testing     is nonetheless        required to
                    resolve critical         operational      issues and to complete the evalua-
                    tion--due      to the land-based test facility              limitations       and to the
                    limitations       in the testing       scope.




                       Page36                                           GAO/NSIAD-90s72SubmarineCombatSystems
                               Appendix11
                               Comments Fromthe DepartmentofDefense




                             The GAO found that a fully             compliant AN/BSY-1 system will not be
                             available       for actual at-sea operational           testing   until    November
                             1989, when the SSN-751 completes post shakedown availability.
                             The GAO observed that the Navy plans to start technical                      and
                             operational        testing     in March and August 1990, respectively.              The
                             GAO reported that, according to Navy officials,                   the delay in
                             testing      is due to (1) the limited          number of systems being
                             procured,        (2) the concurrent      system production,       and (3) the
                             program schedule.            The GAO concluded that, by the time opera-
                             tional     testing      is completed and the results          are reported,     all 23
                             systems will be under contract              and several additional         systems
                             delivered.         The GAO observed that those problems identified
                             during testing          will have to be corrected         on systems already
                             delivered.         The GAO also observed that, once post shakedown
                             availability         is completed, the Navy will have to pay to correct
                             any existing         technical    problems on the systems--if           the warran-
                             ties have expired.             The GAO also noted that the next Defense
                             Acquisition        Board review of the AN/BSY-1 is the FY 1991 full
                             production        review, but because all systems will be under con-
                             tract the DOD is considering             eliminating      this review. The GAO
                             concluded that it will not be known how much improvement the
                             AN/BSY-1 will achieve over existing                systems or if operational
                             thresholds        will be obtained until        the tests are conducted.
Now on pp 15-17 and 19        (pp. 18-22, p. 26/GAO Draft Report)
                         .   DOD RESPONSE: Concur.    A land based assessment was accom-
                             plished. The preliminary   assessment had generally favorable
                             results.

                             The Acquisition      Strategy of concurrent         development and low level
                             production     included the provision        for the Commander, Operational
                             Test and Evaluation       Force, periodically        to assess the AN/BSY-1
                             capabilities.       These assessments occurred in 1988 and 1989, with
                             the conclusion that the system is potentially                operationally
                             effective     and operationally     suitable     for its mission.        The final
                             assessment of operational        effectiveness       and suitability       will
                             occur with Technical and Operational             Evaluation.      The start of
                             Technical and Operational        Evaluation      is contingent      on the
                             SSN 751 post-Post       Shakedown Availability         schedule.

                         .    FINDING E:   Conflicting  AN/BSY-1 and Submarine Schedules
                             Increase Risks.     The GAO reported that, when SUBACSBasic was
                             changed to AN/BSY-1, nine submarines were under construction.
                             The GAO found that, with the approval of the AN/BSY-1 design,
                             portions  of the improved SSN-688s had to be redesigned to
                             accommodate the AN/BSY-1 and the Navy was required to provide
                             various design and configuration     data to the ship design agent
                             in time to meet the ship construction     schedules.  The GAO noted




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                                                                                               SubmarineCombatSystems
                                                                                                        ,



                         Appendix II
                         Comments From the Department of Defense




                      that, on several occasions between September and October 1986,
                      due to non-receipt       of sufficient      ship design data from the ship
                      design agent (Newport News Shipbuilding),             the Electric   Boat
                      Company alerted the Navy that late or faulty AN/BSY-1 design
                      data were affecting       the construction       schedule.     The GAO also
                      noted that, on July 17, 1987, the Electric               Boat Company submit-
                      ted a request for equitable           adjustment in the amount of $97.1
                      million     and, subsequently,      the Navy awarded the company a $84.4
                      million     cost adjustment.       (The GAO listed     these costs and the
                      related schedule delays in table 2.3.)              The GAO also reported
                      that Newport News Shipbuilding            has submitted a similar     request
                      for its first      nine submarines.        The GAO noted that the first
                      three of eight increments of this request include about $150
                      million     for AN/BSY-1 design changes.          The GAO concluded that the
                      amount of time required to revise the SUBACSdesign, produce
                      AN/BSY-1 ship design data, and develop changes to ship construc-
                      tion/installation       drawings was insufficient         to support the
                      shipbuilder's      construction     schedule.     This resulted    in increased
                      SSN-688 submarine costs associated with incorporating                corrective
                      ship design efforts.          Further the GAO noted that even though the
                      phased approach minimized the length of time operational                 capa-
                      bility    was lost in the early improved SSN-688's (SSNs 751-754),
                      the delay in delivery         of fully    capable submarine resulted      from
                      restructuring      SUBACS. The GAO further         concluded that the
                      construction      delays have caused a rippling          effect with new
Now on pp 17-19       construction      SSN-6881 schedules.          (pp. 22-25/GAO Draft Report)
                  .   DOD RESPONSE: Partially        concur.      A number of submarine design
                      changes, including  those      attributable     to AN/BSY-1, resulted  in
                      the request for equitable       adjustment.

                  l   FINDING  F:  AN/BSY-2 Cost and Schedule.         The GAO reportedthat
                      the successful     development of a fully   capable AN/BSY-2 combat
                      system is critical      to the SSN-21 achieving its mission require-
                      ments, as the Navy has no backup combat system planned.            The GAO
                      noted that the Navy maintains that a backup combat system is not
                      required because the AN/BSY-2 hardware and software were being
                      designed to be built      and written modularly.

                      The GAO reported that the AN/BSY-2 system development program is
                      in the first   year of full-scale   development and indications     are
                      that the ambitious goals and development schedule may cause
                      problems.    The GAO noted that (as shown in table 3.1) total life
                      cycle cost decreased from about $15.6 billion      to a preliminary
                      cost estimate of about $13.9 billion,      because the Navy elimi-
                      nated one shore facility     from which the SSN-21s were to be
                      deployed.    The GAO also noted that, to meet the SSN-21 construc-
                      tion schedule and to reduce the software development risk, the




                          Page 38                                    GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
    ,

.

          Appendix II
          Comments From the Department of Defense




        Navy plans to have AN/BSY-2 performance capabilities     for the
        first   SSN-21 delivered in two phases--(l)  during the first
        phase, all hardware and most software are to be provided to the
        shipbuilder   in November 1993, and (2) during the second phase,
        the remaining software is to be installed    within  2 months after
        the submarine is delivered   to the Navy in May 1995.

               -Schedule SlipPacre.         The GAO also reported that,
               between March 1988 and March 1989, the AN/BSY-2
               development program has fallen three months
               behind schedule.         The GAO observed that, accord-
               ing to a Navy assessment one of the causative
               factors--understaffing--continues         to be a seri-
               ous problem except at one contractor          location.
               The GAO also noted other areas of concern iden-
               tified    by the Navy--such as architecture         devel-
               opment and early program schedule slippage             .

                --sign     F&views Delayed.        The GAO reported that,
                in addition,      two important Navy design reviews
                have been delayed-- reviews designed to determine
                the extent to which the contractor            meets system
                specifications.        The GAO found that, in March
                1989, the Navy and the contractor            agreed to
                delay the completion of the preliminary             design
                review from April to October 1989, and the crit-
                ical design review from August 1989 to January
                1990. The GAO noted that, according to an
                AN/BSY-2 program official,           two factors contrib-
                uted to the delays--(l)          the prime contract     was
                awarded later than planned and (2) the system
                specifications       and designs were not detailed
                enough for the Navy to conduct the reviews on
                schedule.       The GAO noted that the same Navy
                official     also maintained these schedule delays
                will not adversely impact the planned delivery
                of the first      system.      The GAO observed, however,
                that preliminary       design review completion could
                be delayed further,         since program assessments
                 show delivery      of key documentation has been
                 delayed and documentation quality           may not be
                 adequate    for Navy review purposes.          The GAO
                pointed out the assessment shows that the con-
                 tractor's    performance to meet critical         design
                 review has not improved--bringing           into question
                 the Navy's ability       to complete that review by
                 January 1990. The GAO also observed that delay-
                 ing the reviews will compress the hardware




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                                                                                                         c




                            Appendix11
                            CommentsFrom the DepartmentofDefense




                                  development and software writing    by at least
                                  five months in order to meet the system integra-
                                  tion schedule.   In addition,  that the GAO noted
                                  the Navy's February 1989 assessment indicates
                                  that delay in the preliminary    design review
                                  could delay the ship design   agent's receipt   of
                                  updated AN/BSY-2 design data.

                                  -Critical     Tests Delaved.    Finally,  the GAO
                                  reported that the Navy had identified         several
                                  items for critical      tests that could present
                                  significant     cost, schedule or performance risks.
                                  The GAO noted that Navy assessments indicated
                                  that some of these tests have been delayed.
                                   (The GAO cited some examples, such as shock
                                  testing     of a cathode ray tube for the display
                                  consoles, as well as tests of various system
                                  response times.)        The GAO concluded that these
                                  delays (of at least five months) could affect
Now on pp 20-23 and               program cost and schedule.         (PP. 27-34, pp.
30-31                             42-43/GAO Draft Report)
                      .   DOD RESPONSE: Partially        concur.   Although most of the facts in
                          this finding,    coming from internal       Navy documents, are correct,
                          the conclusions    inferred    from the facts are not always correct.
                          Slipping both Preliminary        Design Review and Critical    Design
                          Review to allow for more maturity         in the design specification
                          has been assessed to have no impact in the scheduled delivery            of
                          the system to the Navy. In fact, modeling, using the Pugh
                          Roberts Association      Program Management Model, indicates       that
                          taking these actions will result        in both cost and schedule
                          savings.    The Preliminary      Design Review Executive Session,
                          rescheduled to October 3, was conducted on schedule and was
                          fully   supported by all of the documentation required from the
                          contractor.

                          Although some critical        item tests have been delayed, many have
                          been satisfactorily        completed.      The Wide Aperture Array success-
                          fully passed its flow noise test in July; the beamformer chip
                          met requirements       with significant      margin on the first   pass; the
                          cathode ray tube successfully           completed  both shock and magnetic
                          susceptibility      tests in August; and the database manager and
                          executive were successfully          ported to switchnet,    meeting all
                          timing requirements.
                      .   FINDINGG:    Problems With Contractor   Interfaces.   TheGAO
                          reported that, as of September 1, 1989, the contractor       had not
                          awarded final contracts   to two important subcontractors--the




                            Page40                                      GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
                            Appendix II
                            CommentsFromtheDepartment ofDefense




                          central   issue being a mutually agreeable price.       The GAO noted
                          that, according to the Navy, problems in awarding these con-
                          tracts   raises questions as to the subcontractor's      commitment to
                          the overall    development and testing   program, introducing   poten-
                          tial delays.      The GAO concluded that, in the longer term, delays
                          in awarding one of these contracts      may also affect the leader-
                          follower    acquisition  strategy.

                          The GAO also reported that the submarine designer needs firm
                          system configuration      data on the AN/BSY-2 before construction
                          begins.     The GAO noted that the Navy has taken actions to assure
                          that the ship designer is aware of system changes and has
                          provided the AN/BSY-2 contractor       preliminary       data--but      the
                          AN/BSY-2 contractor     has provided the ship designer neither
                          timely data nor final design data.          The GAO found that, as a
                          result,    portions  of the submarines have had to be redesigned,
                          increasing     SSN-21 design cost an estimated $5 million.                The GAO
                          observed that, if final design data requires further                 changes to
                          the submarine design, additional       costs and delays could occur.
                          The GAO found, however, that the AN/BSY-2 contractor                 cannot
                          provide all final ship design data until          the Navy completes its
                          critical    design review in January 1990. The GAO noted that,
                          according to a AN/BSY-2 program office         official,      changes result-
                          ing from the Navy design review could increase cost and delay
                          delivery    of the submarine.    The GAO recognized that the Navy has
                          taken precautionary     measures, such as biweekly meetings with the
                          ship designer.      The GAO reported that, in addition,            the ship
                          designer has prioritized      the data it needs and the AN/BSY-2
                          contractor     has scheduled its work accordingly.           The GAO con-
                          cluded, however, that the AN/BSY-2 design schedule is not
                          compatible with the SSN-21 design schedule--resulting                 in addi-
                          tional   costs to the SSN-21 construction       program.        The GAO also
                          concluded that, should further       changes be required,          this could
Now on pp 24-26 and       affect SSN-21 program cost and schedule.             (pp. 27-37, pp.
30-31                     42-43/GAO Draft Report)

                      .   DOD RESPONSE: Partially         concur.    As noted, slowness in
                          definitization      of subcontracts     added to program risk.     However,
                          the General Electric       Full Scale Development contract      with
                          Librascope was definitized         on October 6. Although the subcon-
                          tract with International        Business Machines is not yet
                          definitized,      General Electric    and International   Business
                          Machines have agreed on both scope and price.            The contract   is
                          expected to be signed by the end of the year.            The Navy contin-
                          ues to press this issue, but it should be noted that no subcon-
                          tractor     design efforts   are being delayed and all are being
                          performed to the correct baseline.




                             Page 41                                      GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
                                                                                                       c




                        Appendix11
                        CommentsFrom the DepartmentofDefense




                      Concurrent development programs for the ship and the combat
                      system pose risks   for both the contractor   and Navy program
                      offices,  but these risks have been mitigated    to the maximum
                      possible extent by the close coordination     between the contrac-
                      tors, as well as with the Navy program offices.        These risks
                      were well understood from the SEAWOLFprogram inception.          It is
                      not true that "the ship designer . ..needs firm system configura-
                      tion data and information   before construction    begins."    The Navy
                      has provided a continuous stream of data to the ship design
                      agent and has prioritized   the generation of design data to
                      accommodate the ship design agent's needs. As of this date,
                      there are no unresolved interface    issues between the ship and
                      combat system designs.

                      The "late combat system data, increasing       SSN-21 design cost an
                      estimated $5.0 million"     statement reflects    a misunderstanding of
                      the sequence of events.      Prior to award of the AN/BSY-2 con-
                      tract,  the ship design agent was provided with a "notional"
                      system baseline,    which was the Navy's best estimate of the
                      system configuration    prior to having a definitized     contract.
                      After contract award, the winner's system baseline was disclosed
                      to the ship design agent.        The fact that the cost of this change
                      was less than $5 million     illustrates   the accuracy of the Navy's
                      initial  Navy estimates.

                      Although AN/BSY-2 design changes have impacted the ship design,
                      it is also true that many AN/BSY-2 changes have been made to
                      accommodate ship design agent requests.    Potential changes in
                      both ship and combat system designs continue to be discussed and
                      evaluated in open forums as to impact, necessity and desirabil-
                      ity in the presence of all affected parties.


                  .   FINDINGH:       First AN/BSY-2 W ill Not Be Deliver&           W ith Full
                      Performance.       The GAO reported that the first          AN/BSY-2 will not
                      be fully    capable when delivered      to the shipbuilder        in November
                      1993--because (according to a contractor            official)     the contrac-
                      tor is unable to deliver a fully          capable system in time.         The
                      GAO noted, therefore,      that with the agreement of the Navy, the
                      first   system delivery    will include all hardware but not all
                      software.     The GAO also noted that this first            phase of the
                      software, comprising 2.7 million          lines,  is planned for November
                      1993, and according to a Naval Operational             Test and Evaluation
                      Force official,      will be sufficient      to meet the threat.       The GAO
                      found that the remaining 426,000 lines, primarily               for acoustic
Now on pp 26-27       functions,    are scheduled for January 1995.             (pp. 37-38/GAO Draft
                      Report)




                         Page42                                      GAO/NSIAD-90-72SubmarIneCombatSystems
     ,



                                   Appendix11
                                   CommentsFromthe DepartmentofDefense




                           .       DOD RESPONSE: Concur.       The decision to install      the final
                                   portion of software after ship delivery         is a factor of ship
                                   construction    and the integration    and testing   schedules, as much
                                   as system availability.      As both the ship and combat system are
                                   being developed, the Navy will continue to evaluate the instal-
                                   lation   schedule of the final portion of software.
                           .       FINDING    I:    Software     Development Risks.      The GAO reported that,
                                   under the AN/BSY-2 program, the Navy will be challenged to meet
                                   performance requirements           within tight time frames and budgets.
                                   The GAO noted that its March 13, 1989, report "Technical                    Chal-
                                   lenges Confronting          Navy's Seawolf AN/BSY Development" (OSD
                                   Case 7944) identified          the software development schedule as one
                                   of these challenges.            The GAO observed that the AN/BSY-2 soft-
                                   ware represents the largest new software development effort                    ever
                                   undertaken for a submarine combat system.                The GAO further
                                   observed that, while it appeared initially               that the system could
                                   retain a significant          amount of software from existing          systems, a
                                   recent software estimate shows that it will all be new, includ-
                                   ing 2.3 million         lines in the Ada language.         The GAO also
                                   referred      to its March 24, 1989, report "Status,           Costs, and
                                   Issues Associated With Defense's Implementation                of Ada" (OSD
                                   Case 7832), which indicated            most experts agree that the Ada
                                   language has not yet matured.             The GAO alsonoted       (1) that the
                                   June 1989 Navy program review documentation                shows a shortage of
                                   Ada qualified       personnel as a serious concern and (2) that the
                                   contractor's       ability    to recruit   such personnel could seriously
                                   affect both cost and schedule.             The GAO concluded that, in the
                                   software development and testing            areas, additional       steps are
                                   needed to maximize the possibility             of delivering    the first
                                   system as planned and without jeopardizing               the cost, schedule,
                                   and performance of the SSN-21 program.              The GAO also concluded
                                   that the Navy's attempt to design, develop, test, and integrate
                                   the large amount of new tactical            software in the Ada language--
                                   without adequately trained and experienced programmers--could
Now on pp   28-29 and 31           severely affect program cost and schedule.                 (pp. 39-40, p.
                                   43/GAO Draft report)
                           .       DOD RESPONSE: Partially           concur.   Whether or not retaining      code
                                   from prior systems decreases or increases risk is a matter of
                                   opinion and depends on many technical            factors,   (1) architec-
                                   ture/partitioning,         (2) depth and quality     of documentation,    (3)
                                   interface      definition,     (4) standards and conventions used, and
                                    (5) language and operating         system compatibiltiy.
                               .   FINDINGJ: Similarities  Between Submarine Combat Svstem Pro-
                                   arams. The GAO reported that, based upon its experience with
                                   the SUBACSand AN/BSY-1 combat system programs, the Navy has




                                     Page43                                        GAO/NSLAD-90-72SubmarineCombatSystems
                               Appendix II
                               CommentsFromtheDepartment of Defense




                             adjusted its strategy         for the AN/BSY-2.        The GAO noted that
                             measures taken include--          (1) establishing     a 2-year system defini-
                             tion phase, (2) developing and testing               software as separate
                             modules, and (3) procuring           and providing     the contractor      with
                             software early enough to allow an additional                 year of development
                             and testing.          The GAO observed, however, that many similarities
                             still    exist between the AN/BSY-2 program and its predecessors--
                             which tend to indicate          the program could encounter future
                             problems.        The GAO pointed to an analysis of various program
                             features       (Appendix l), which showed similarities           between the
                             systems' schedules, software development, concurrency,                   combat
                             system capabilities,         and at-sea testing.         In the areas of
                             particular       concern, i.e.,     program schedule and software develop-
                             ment, the GAO noted the ambitious development objectives                    to meet
                             the ship construction         schedule and the attempt to write 2.8
                             million     lines of new software,        without adequately trained
                             programmers.          The GAO concluded that, despite the Navy measures
                             to mitigate       problems encountered in earlier          programs, the AN/BSY
                             program is nonetheless experiencing              problems and delays and the
                             potential       exists for cost increases and further           slippages.      (PP.
Now on pp 29 and 30-31       4+44/GAO Draft Report)
                         .   DOD RESPONSE: Partially         concur.     The lessons learned in devel-
                             oping earlier     combat control     and acoustics     systems, including
                             AN/BSY-1, were incorporated        into the planning for the AN/BSY-2
                             development effort.       It is, for instance,       the first     submarine
                             system to employ the software development requirements                 of
                             DOD-STD-2167. This, combined with (1) the longer development
                             time for AN/BSY-2, (2) the benefits           derived from the two-con-
                             tractor,   two year System Design Definition           phase, and (3) the
                             intensive    early oversight,     should allow AN/BSY-2 to profit           from
                             the similarities     to earlier    programs.      In addition,     the AN/BSY-2
                             phased software delivery        is different    from AN/BSY-1 in that this
                             approach was taken prior to award of the development contract
                             for AN/BSY-2, rather than as a mid-development              mitigation    plan.

                             Although more new code development is required for AN/BSY-2, the
                             integration   job will be easier since (1) all code is written     to
                             the same standards,      conventions and style guides,  (2) code
                             partitioning   was done from scratch,     (3) Computer Software
                             Configuration    Interfaces   have been defined prior to detailed
                             design, and (4) code is written      in the same language, developed
                             with a common tool set and written      for the same operating
                             system.




                               Page 44                                        GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
    *

.
           Appendix II
           Comments From the Department of Defense




           Based on the training    programs in use at General Electric     and
           its subcontractors    and on the nature of the standards,    tools,
           conventions and guides being used in the program, the AN/BSY-2
           software programmers will be adequately trained.


                                    RJZCO-TIONS

        NONE.




           Page 45                                   GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems
Appendix III                                                                                     .

Major Contributors to This Report


                         Brad H. Hathaway, Associate Director, Navy Issues
National Security and    Frederick A. Bigden, Assistant Director, Navy Issues
International Affairs    Frances W. Scott, Evaluator
Division,
Washington, D.C.
                         Richard E. Silveira, Regional Manager Representative
Boston Regional Office   Ralph L. Tavares, Evaluator-in-Charge
                         Edmund L. Kelley, Jr., Evaluator


                         Edward W. States, Regional Manager Representative
Norfolk Regional         Lester L. Ward, Evaluator
Office




(3Y423fq                 Page 46                             GAO/NSIAD-90-72Submarine Combat Systems