-___,,,.,,_, _____.__... .___ ._ “.lir~it,wl .._ I_..._. .l”l.l.l“,.“,” St;rt.c~s (knr~ral “I“.“l-*.-.-.---------.--- Awottttt.irtg---- Ol‘f’iw __-_--l -- _--_ ~-- -- -_,,___-. _._._I,.,“_ “..“.,l I “. “.-- ---.. --.--- ..--... ----I Ikw~rttl,c~r 1!W) ARMY WEAPONS Status of the Sense and Destroy Armor System _.._ -_-..----.-_~---.--- _~_-_---- United States GAO General Accounting Office Washington, DC. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-241 179 December 17,lOOO The Honorable John P. Murtha Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives Dear Mr. Chairman: The Army’s Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM), a new system of target- sensing munitions, is being developed to enhance the capabilities of the 155-millimeter (mm) howitzer and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to attack targets such as self-propelled enemy artillery, when sta- tionary. Through fiscal year 1991, the Congress has provided about $600 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funding for the system. In 1988, we reported on the status of the SADARM system.’ As you requested, we have updated that analysis to determine (1) actions taken by the Army to comply with congressional directives, (2) the current program schedule, (3) the Army’s estimate of the program’s total cost, (4) the status of technical development, (5) test results to date, and (6) the Army’s assessment of the counterfire mission and of SADARM’S ability to meet that requirement.* In March 1990, we briefed your staff on the preliminary results of our review for use during hearings on the fiscal year 1991 defense budget. In October 1990, we briefed your staff on the final results of our review. This report summarizes the information provided at the October briefing. Our review disclosed the following: Results in Brief . The Army has restructured the SADARM development program to address congressional concerns about development deadlines and technical risks. . The program is over 3 years behind its original schedule and the full- rate production decision is now scheduled for July 1994. . The Army now estimates the total cost of the program to be about $4.7 billion. Increased development costs are expected to be more than ‘DODAcquisition Programs:Statusof SelectedSystems(GAO/NSIAD-88-160,June 30, 1988). 2”Counterfire” is fire intendedto respondto enemyindirect fire systems. Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System B241178 offset by the decision to substantially reduce the number of SADARM munitions to be bought. l SAINRM'S technical development is in its final stages of component design testing. l SADARM'S application to the 155-m howitzer and the MLRS have not yet been tested, but its application to the &inch howitzer was successfully tested, according to Army officials. l The Army’s February 1990 threat assessment reaffirmed the impor- tance of SADARM and its counterfire capability. Appendix I provides more detailed information on the results of our review. The Army’s March 1990 revised SADARM development program calls for SADARM Development the concurrent development of SADARM for the 155-mmhowitzer and the Program Restructured MLRS, the completion of developmental testing before a design is selected, and competition among potential contractors into production. Congressional directives, budgetary pressures, and other problems have Program Schedule Has extended the SADARM development schedule. Between September 1986 Slipped and Costs and March 1990, the original schedule was extended by over 3 years. Increased The revised schedule calls for making full-rate production decisions in July 1994 instead of September 1990 for the MLRS SADARM and June 1991 for the 155-mmSADARM as originally scheduled. In addition, the revised schedule calls for fielding the 155 -ITIITISADARM in July 1994 and the MLRS SADARM in December 1995 instead of the original targets of December 1991 for the 155-m SADARM and February 1991 for the MLRS SADARM. Since 1986, the estimated cost of the program has decreased by about $634 million to about $4.7 billion. While development costs increased by $542 million, procurement costs decreased by about $1.2 billion because the Army substantially reduced the number of SADARM munitions it planned to buy. This quantity reduction has resulted in an increase in unit costs. Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-91-44BR Sense and Destroy Armor System B-241179 The technical development of SADARM is in the final stages of component Technical design testing for the munitions, the 155-mmprojectile, and the MLRS Development and rocket dispenser. Testing Because SADARM is still being designed and tested, its capabilities with the 155-mmhowitzer and the MLRS have not been fully determined. How- ever, as required by a congressional directive, the Army conducted tests of SADARM using the &inch howitzer and concluded that they were successful. The Army updated its threat assessment as of February 1990 and reaf- Ability to Meet firmed the importance of SADARM and its counterfire capability. Army Counterfire Mission representatives said that the Army had reduced the planned procure- ment quantity for SADARM because of the reduced European threat. How- ever, recent and continuing developments in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East are greatly altering the national security environ- ment, and these events could significantly affect the requirements for SADARM. We updated our analysis of the SADARM program by assessing relevant Scopeand program documents such as the operational requirements document, Methodology selected acquisition reports, program cost estimates, acquisition and test plans, monthly program status reports, briefing documents, and quar- terly program reviews from contractors. We obtained information from and interviewed officials at the Office of the Project Manager for Sense and Destroy Armor and the Fire Support Armaments Center, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, and Army Headquarters, Washington, DC. We conducted our review from September 1989 to August 1990 in accor- dance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments on this report. However, we discussed its contents with Department of Defense and Army officials and have incorporated their comments where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, the House Committee on Govern- ment Operations, and the Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Governmental Affairs. Copies are also being sent to the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of the Office of Management and Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-91-44BR Sense and Destroy Armor System E241179 Budget, and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to others on request. Please contact me on (202) 275-4141 if you or your staff have any ques- tions concerning the report. The major contributors were Henry Hinton, Associate Director, Army Issues; Raymond Dunham, Assistant Director, Army Issues; and Manfred J. Schweiger, Senior Evaluator-in-Charge, New York Regional Office. Sincerely yours, Richard Davis Director, Army Issues Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-91-44BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Page 5 GAO/NSIAD91-44BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM System The SADARM is a “fire-and-forget” system designed to defeat targets such Background as self-propelled artillery, infantry fighting vehicles, and other lightly armored combat vehicles, when stationary. The munition is being devel- oped for two existing weapon systems-the 155-millimeter (mm) how- itzer and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Operating the SADARM SADARM is designed in two sizes, both cylindrically shaped submunitions: System (1) the 5.8-inch submunition, together with a thin-walled base ejection carrier (projectile), is used with 155 -mmhowitzers, and (2) the 6.9-inch submunition, together with a warhead dispenser mated to an existing rocket motor, is used with the MLRS. The 155-mmprojectile carries two submunitions, and the MLRS rocket dis- penser carries six. Each submunition has the capability to sense and defeat a target. The SADARM munitions are shown in figure I. 1. Figure 1.1: SADARM Munitions 155-mm Projectlk Y Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-91-44BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM Syetem The submunitions are ejected from the l&5-mm projectile or the MLRS rocket over the target area. Upon ejection, each submunition first deploys a “deceleration and despin device” that slows its speed and its spinning, followed by an “orientation and stabilization device” that acti- vates the power supply, drops its velocity, and sets a fixed rotation speed to enable the sensors to scan the target area. A “range-sensing device” on the descending SADARM detects the preset ground slant range and arms the lethal mechanism, and the sensor begins its ground search pattern. The spiral search pattern decreases in area and travels toward the center as the descent continues. If the millimeter wave and/or infrared sensors detect a target in the search area, they send an impulse to the lethal mechanism, which fires an explosively formed penetrator down into the target. If no target is detected, the submunition self- destructs just before hitting the ground, The operational concept for SADARM is shown in figure 1.2. Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM System Figure 1.2:SAOARM Operational Concept 155-mmHowitzer 155mm ProJectlIe --.,--c- ----- -----/ --w----c . Program History Originally, the Army intended to develop SADARM as an anti-armor mum- tion to provide 8-inch artillery with the ability to detect and defeat tanks and other mobile, hardened, armored targets. In 1980, the Army awarded competitive advanced development contracts to Alliant Tech- systems, Inc.,* and Aerojet Electra Systems Corporation for the S-inch Y ‘Until recently, Alliant Techsystems,Inc., was calledHoneywell,Inc. Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM System projectile and the 6.9-inch submunition, However, in 1984, the Army ter- minated that effort because of SADARM'S limited capability against moving targets. Subsequently, in 1985, the Army reinstated the SADARM development as a counter-battery weapon for primary use against sta- tionary self-propelled howitzers and secondary use against lightly armored vehicles. The Army approved its requirements document for developing SADARM for the 155-mmhowitzer and the MLRS in March 1986. In September 1986, the Army approved full-scale development of the SADARM submunitions and awarded 48-month cost-plus-incentive-fee con- tracts to Alliant Techsystems, Inc., and Aerojet Electra Systems Corpo- ration to develop the two sizes of submunitions and the 165-mm projectile. The Army also awarded an initial integration contract for the MLRS rocket dispenser to LTV Aerospace Defense Company in December 1986. Shortly after the Army awarded these contracts, the Department of Defense (DOD) designated SADARM as a major program because of its cost and congressional interest. With this designation, the SADARM program was required to undergo more stringent reviews by the Army and DOD at various stages in its development. DOD reinstated SADARM'S application to the 8-inch howitzer in November 1986. However, in August 1987, the Army again terminated those efforts because it intended to eliminate the 8-inch howitzer from its inventory. Additionally, it decided to develop only the 5.8-inch sub- munition for both the 155-mmhowitzer and the MLRS. In May 1988, after a WD review, the Secretary of Defense approved SADARM'S full-scale development for the 1,65-mm howitzer and the MLFS and directed the Army to develop two sizes of submunitions to maximize lethality against the full spectrum of armored targets. He also directed the Army to study alternatives for the 8-inch howitzer. In June 1988, the Army told DOD that it planned to phase out the 8-inch howitzer, starting in fiscal year 1990, and to replace it with the MLRS. The Army completed the SADARM program structure by awarding the full-scale MLRS rocket dispenser development and integration contract to LTV in September 1988-l year later than originally planned. Page 9 GAO/N&W-91-44BR Sense aud Destroy Armor System Appendix I Statns of the SADARM System In response to congressional directives, the Army revised its original The Arrny Has program structure and schedule in July 1987. The original schedule, set Complied With in September 1986 with the award of the 48-month full-scale develop- Congressional ment contracts, had called for deferring the bulk of work on the 155-mm projectile until June 1987. After conducting a technical and design com- Directives petition between the two contractors, the Army had planned to select one submunition design 30 months into the development effort. Congressional Directives The Conference Committee reports on DOD appropriations for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 directed the Army to restructure the SADARM pro- gram. The conferees were concerned that technical and financial deci- sions were being driven by artificially short deadlines rather than by specific technical accomplishments and efforts to reduce program risks. The directives required (1) at least a 60-month full-scale development program; (2) concurrent development of the MLRS and 155-mm submuni- tions; (3) an early firing demonstration of an 8-inch howitzer using mod- ified hardware from the advanced development phase; (4) approval by the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations before release of funds for the final phase of engineering development, system qualifica- tion, and developmental and operational testing; and (5) support of at least two competing prime contractors throughout development and into production. The Restructured Program The Army’s restructured SADARM acquisition program, approved in July 1987, provided for a 67-month development effort. Specifically, (1) the two development contracts were amended from 48 months to 60 months, and (2) development of the two submunitions was to start simultaneously and run concurrently. The Army also revised the SADARM test and evaluation program to address congressional concerns about the need for more testing and ade- quate proof of principle, that is, the need to demonstrate SADARM'S capa- bilities and thereby reduce program risks. The revised program provided for demonstration tests using modified 8-inch howitzer hard- ware that had been used during advanced development. Before com- pleting those tests in July 1989, the Army told the Committees on Appropriations that the tests had delayed the development schedule for the 156-mm and MLRS applications. To avoid further slippage of the schedule, the Army requested relief from the congressional restriction on obligating funds for development and operational test hardware. The restriction was removed in July 1989. Page 10 GAO/NSIAD9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Statns of the SADARM System The revised SADARM test program also expanded live-fire testing, increased test quantities and the target requirement, and added test instrumentation and funding for risk assessment. In addition, the test schedule provided for completing submunitions and projectile opera- tional testing before design selection, projectile type classification,2 and the decision to go ahead with full-scale production. Operational testing of the MLRS rocket dispenser was scheduled after the MLRS SADARM rocket was to have been approved for limited production; however, the testing was to precede the MLRS type classification and the award of the con- tract for full-scale production. The Army’s implementation of the congressional directives commits it to maintaining competition by carrying the two current development con- tractors into competitive production. An alternative acquisition strategy under consideration would carry two designs into production provided both contractors have acceptable designs. The SADAHMprogram is over 3 years behind its original schedule. The Program Is Behind Army’s March 1990 revised schedule calls for making full-rate produc- Original Schedule tion decisions in July 1994 instead of the original targets of September 1990 for the MLRS SADARM and June 1991 for the 155~KWSADARM. In addi- tion, the March 1990 schedule calls for fielding the 165-mmSADARM in July 1994 and the MLRS SADARM in December 1995 instead of the original targets of December 1991 and February 1991. The schedule was revised in July 1987 when the Army implemented the congressional directive and reinstated the 8-inch howitzer SADARM appli- cation It was revised again in September 1988 when the Army awarded a 60-month full-scale development contract for the MLRS dispenser. In March 1990, the schedule was updated a third time to reflect the impacts of technical difficulties, budgetary shortfalls, and an extensive government testing schedule. Table I. 1 shows the changes in the SADARM program schedule. “Type classificationidentifies itemsthat are acceptablefor their intendedmissionsand for introduc- tion into the inventory. Army policy requiresitemsto be type classifiedbeforethey are procured. Page 11 GAO/NSIAD9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System . _ ,,,._ _” ...I _-- _,... 1.“” ._.......I I -_-- _.-“_. ._“. “-I_. ._--,-.-_ ^ .__“_.,. -_ AppendSx I Statue of the SADARM System Table 1.1:Changes in the SADARM Program Schedule Sept. 1986 July 1987 revised Sept. 1988 Mar. 1990 revised Milestone ._ -. original schedule schedule revised schedule schedule --_-__-.--- Submunitions and projectile Contract award __ _ . . -. ._---____ .-___ Sept. 1986 Sept. 1986 Sept. 1986 Sept. 1986 Operational testing completed Mar. 1991___- May 1991 Dec. 1991 Sept. 1993 Low-rate initial production decision May 1989 Sept. 1989 a Apr. 1993 ._._ Full-rate.t&oduction . decision June 1991 June 1991 Apr. 1992 July 1994 ii& unit equipped with 156mm SADARM Dec. 1991 Mar. 1993 July 1993 July 1994 MLRS dispenser Contract award -.. May 1987 Sept. 1987 Sept. 1988 Sept. 1988 Operational testing completed Sept. 1990 Mar. 1992 July 1993 Mar. 1994 Low-n-& initial production decision May 1989 a . - .^ ~....--..._ -~-.- -.- ._- _- .___--._________I_ 1988 ~ Oct. Jan. 1992 Full-rate i,rrst unit.production decision equipped“..~with .~LRssAoAR~--.-----‘eb.1991 Sept. 1990 Mar. 1992 Sept. 1993 July 1994 Mar. 1993 Mav 1994 Dec. 1995 aThe Army’s schedule did not include low-rate initial production decisions. The Army’s estimated total program cost for SADARM has decreased by Program Cost $634 million from the original September 1986 estimate of about Estimate Has $6.3 billion. This is a net figure consisting of a $542 million increase in Decreased,but Unit development costs and about a $1.2 billion decrease in procurement costs. Development costs have increased because of congressional and Costs Have Increased DOD program requirements and higher-than-anticipated contractor development costs. Procurement costs have decreased because the Army substantially reduced the number of SADARM munitions it planned to buy. According to Army officials, the procurement quantity was reduced because of the changing threat in Europe. This reduction in the planned procurement quantity has resulted in an increase in SADARM'S unit cost. The Army’s estimated cost of the program has changed several times since 1986. In September 1986, the Army estimated the program cost at approximately $5.3 billion for the planned acquisition of 600,000 sub- munitions. This cost increased to about $5.7 billion for 484,296 submuni- tions in July 1987, and then increased to about $6.2 billion for the same number of submunitions in December 1988. However, in May 1990, the estimated cost decreased to approximately $4.6 billion because the Army decided to acquire 222,756 submunitions rather than the previ- ously planned 484,296. (See table 1.2.) Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM System Table 1.2: Changes in the SADARM Program’s Cost Estimate Dollars in millions -- Sept. 1966 July 1967 Dec. 1966 Ma 1990 item estimate estimate estimatea est Tmat@ Research and development .-- $365.1 $589.7 $702.9 $906.9 Procurement 4,933.0 5104.6 5,495,3 3,757.0 Total $5,296.1 $5.694.3 $6.196.2 $4.663.9 % December 1988, the Army prepared cost estimates for the September 1988 revised program schedule. ‘In May 1990, the Army prepared cost estimates for the March 1990 revised program schedule. As shown in table 1.3, the Army has reduced the number of SADARM munitions it plans to acquire, which has resulted in an increase in the estimated unit costs. Table 1.3:Changes In SADARM Acqulaition Quantltles and Unit Costs Sept. 1966 July 1987 Dec. 1968 May 1990 Item estimate estlinate estimate estimate Acquisition quantities’ MLRS warheads 50,000 59,174 59,l IO 23,712 ii-mm projectiles 150,000 63,530 63,385 39,018 .-- Unit cost MLRS warheads $40.608b $44.380 $59.981 $82.384 15%mm oroiectiles 11,307c 11,420 13,609 19,453 BThi$ is the total number of MLRS warheads and 155.mm projectiles being procured with SADARM munitions. bThe unit cost is based on the low-rate initial production quantity of 82,392 submunitions, which equates to 13,732 MLRS SADARM rockets. The unit cost estimate does not include the cost for the warhead/ dispenser. CThe unit cost is based on the low-rate initial production quantity of 15,125 projectiles. SADAKM'S technical development is in the final stages of design/testing Technical for the submunition components, the 155-mm projectile, and the MLRS dis- Development Is in , penser. Through May 1990, the two submunitions and projectile contrac- Final Design Testing tors conducted an extensive series of development tests, including tests of the subsystems. Under the March 1990 program schedule, the con- Stages tractors for the submunitions and projectile are scheduled to complete design and qualification tests by October 1991, and government tests are scheduled to be conducted between July 1991 and September 1993. * The contractor’s development testing of the MLRS dispenser has been less extensive because only the SADARM dispenser section is new to the MLRS Page 13 GAO/NSLAD914BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Statue of the SARARM System rocket. Under the March 1990 schedule, development, design, and quali- fication of the dispenser will end in March 1991, and government tests are scheduled to be conducted between October 1991 and March 1994. Submunition Component Development testing of the submunitions and projectiles involves three Testing major submunition components: the deceleration system, the sensor, and the lethal mechanism. Deceleration System The two-stage deceleration system slows the submunition down and sta- bilizes it after it has been expelled from the carrier. This system has undergone several types of tests: wind tunnel, whirl tower, cable drop, rocket sled, ballistics ejection, gun-firing, and rocket flight. Both con- tractors have essentially completed their designs; however, more gun- firing and ballistics ejection tests must be completed to verify the func- tional operation of the final designs. Sensor Upon activation, the dual-mode (millimeter wave and infrared) sensor begins a ground search to detect targets for destruction. The sensor has been extensively tested in five major captive flight test programs; in drop, laboratory, radiation, and rail gun tests; and in live-fire data col- lections.3 The flight tests were conducted to accumulate sufficient back- ground and target signature data to design and develop the final tactical sensor signal processing procedures. More than 64,000 target engage- ments in various climatic and geographical environments, and against the complete spectrum of countermeasures, have been conducted to evaluate the performance of the sensor. The two contractors’ sensor designs are nearing completion; however, the contractors must conduct additional captive flight and helicopter drop tests to complete and verify their final tactical sensor processing procedures before the gov- ernment evaluation. Lethal Mechanism Upon detection of the target, the lethal mechanism fires an explosively formed penetrator into the top of the target. The mechanism has been subjected to a series of short- and maximum-range horizontal test firings and live-fire tests. The two contractors have fired more than 180 lethal mechanisms, and both contractors’ MLRS and 155-IIUIIdesigns have met the specified target perforation requirement. 31nthe “captive flight tests” the sensorswere mountedin helicopters,which flew over targetsto determinewhether the sensorscould detecttargets. Page 14 GAO/NSIADS144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System i Appendix I Status of the SADARM Systek One contractor’s designs are virtually completed; designs for the two lethal mechanisms have been selected, and verification tests have been completed. Additional tests were to be completed and a final design qualification test was to be conducted to complete the design effort. The other contractor must complete testing to baseline its two designs and must conduct verification and qualification tests of its final designs before the government evaluation. 155-mm Thin-Wall The If%-mm thin-wall projectile, when fired from a howitzer, delivers the SADARM submunition to, and ejects it over, the target area. The projectile Projectile Testing has been evaluated in low-elevation and vertical gun firings, as well as in static and dynamic ejection, drop, and other tests, Both contractors have developed acceptable projectile designs, according to the Army. One has completed its projectile development testing, and the other has to select one of two designs as its final design. The two contractors are required to demonstrate projectile capability in live firings. MLRS Warhead/Dispenser The MLRS warhead/dispenser, which serves the same purpose as the Testing 156-~11t1thin-wall projectile, has essentially completed its design and development test phase. Development testing involves three compo- nents: the fuze, the initiation transfer system, and the dispense mecha- nism. All these components have been, or are being, fabricated and delivered for the MLRS flight tests Fuze The MLRS fuze, an existing fuze modified to meet SADARM'S requirement, has completed development and qualification testing. The fuze’s Critical Design Review was conducted in December 1989, and its Government Safety Board Review was completed in February 1990. Initiation Transfer System The initiation transfer system, which starts and times the SADARM sup- munition ejection sequence for the MLRS, has completed its development testing. The system’s Critical Design Review was held in October 1990. Qualification testing was completed by one contractor in August 1990 and is in process for the other contractor. Dispense Mechanism The dispense mechanism, which ejects the six SADARM submunitions from the MLRS warhead, has completed development testing. The dispenser’s Critical Design Review was held in September 1988, and the design was Y updated in March 1990. Qualification testing, which is in process, is expected to be completed in March 199 1. Page 15 GAO/NSIAD9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Statue of the SADARM System Government Tests Government submunition and projectile testing is scheduled to start in July 1991 with the live firing of seventy-eight 165-1t~11 projectiles, This development demonstration test will proceed through a series of tech- nical tests ending in October 1992, which involve 858 projectile firings to verify that the 155 -INKIprojectile meets performance, reliability, and safety requirements. These tests will form the basis for a planned April 1993 low-rate initial production decision for the projectile. Gov- ernment tests, consisting of a 72-projectile live-fire initial operational test and evaluation, are scheduled to be completed in September 1993. Government testing of the MLRS-SADARMwarhead is to begin in October 1991 with a performance test involving seven rocket flights per contractor. This is to be followed by technical tests, involving 18 rocket flights per contractor, to verify system performance and ground testing, involving 16 warheads per contractor, to evaluate safety and other issues. Government testing is scheduled to end in March 1994 with a combined preproduction qualification test and initial operational test and evaluation. This testing will involve 28 MLRS rocket flights and 126 submunition firings to evaluate the dispenser’s operational effec- tiveness and the submunition’s performance. Because SADARM'S application to the 155-1~1howitzer and the MLRS is still Contractor Tests to in the design/testing stage, its capabilities in those applications have not Date Have Been been demonstrated. However, in accordance with the 1986 congressional Successful,According directive, SADARM'S application to the 8-inch howitzer was tested and, according to Army officials, proved successful. to the Army The 8-inch howitzer demonstration testing started in January 1989 and was completed in July 1989. At the final test, Aerojet fired four projec- tiles with one submunition each. The major components of three sub- munitions (deceleration system, sensor, and lethal mechanism) functioned correctly, and two targets were penetrated. The fourth sub- munition lost its deceleration device. Alliant Techsystems, at the final test, fired two projectiles, each with one live submunition. The major components of one submunition functioned correctly but failed to locate a target. The second submunition tangled in its parachute and self- destructed on the ground. The Army believes that this testing was successful and that both con- tractors demonstrated improved reliability of the subsystem. According Page 16 GAO/NSIAD9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System Appendix I Status of the SADARM System to project officials, the goal of the test was achieved; the test recon- firmed the system’s proof of principle and reduced risk to the full-scale development program. The Army continues to highly rate the importance of the counterfire SADARM’sCounterfire mission and has given SADARM a high priority, as indicated by its budget Mission Continues to request in fiscal year 1991 and the Five-Year Defense Plan. Receive High Priority During its 1985 assessments of artillery fire support systems, the Army found that the primary deficiency in artillery fire support was insuffi- cient lethality. The Fire Support Mission Area Analysis Update for Bat- tlefield Development Plan, 1985, and other studies concluded that current field artillery systems were limited in accuracy, lethality, and volume of fire and that the required volume of fire to destroy enemy targets was inordinately high and, in most cases, impractical. The assessment also considered the important role that massed threat artil- lery, deployed at a large numerical superiority, would play in a Soviet main ground attack. With the fielding of fully armored, self-propelled artillery, this threat has become less vulnerable to conventional counterfire. The Army concluded that SADARM munitions, with their target-sensing capability, were needed as a force multiplier to reduce the field artillery’s dependence on firing a high volume of conventional munitions-such as 155-mm M483 projectiles and MLRS dual-purpose (anti-personnel and anti-materiel) munitions-to destroy targets.4 It also concluded that SADARM’Starget-sensing capability would help to reduce the fire support needed to defeat armored, self-propelled artillery sup- porting the main ground attack. The Army updated its SADARM system threat assessment as of February 1990, and the update reaffirmed the need for SADARM, According to Army representatives, the Army reduced the planned pro- curement quantity because of the reduced European threat. However, recent and continuing developments in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East are greatly altering the national security environment, and these events could significantly affect the requirements for SADARM. 4SADARMis considereda “force multiplier” becausefewer munitions would be neededto defeatthe samenumberof targets. (393362) Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-9144BR Sense and Destroy Armor System ---_______ ..-_.-. l_ll _ .I. ...”l.._-l.l....... -l.l- _._.. ._.._,._._ -.- .. ..^-_-- ______.. -.-- -_-__
Army Weapons: Status of the Sense and Destroy Armor System
Published by the Government Accountability Office on 1990-12-17.
Below is a raw (and likely hideous) rendition of the original report. (PDF)